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Freddie Ponton
21st Century Wire

Saudi Arabia has never signed the Abraham Accords, which means its relationship with Israel can still be discussed as a deal waiting to happen. But long before anyone agrees on what a public deal should contain, Israeli-made spyware has reached a Saudi dissident, Saudi sovereign wealth has backed investments in Israeli companies, and the two countries have been drawn into discussions about intelligence cooperation against Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement.

In a new Double Down News investigation, Lowkey traces a shadow network linking senior Israeli intelligence figures, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Israeli cyber-warfare technology exported to Saudi Arabia with state approval. Jeffrey Epstein appears in that story seeking a place close to the Saudi leadership. In correspondence examined by The New Arab, he offered advice on the planned sale of Saudi oil company Aramco and helped draft a letter addressed to the crown prince. The question becomes more urgent in Yemen, where reports describe talks mediated by US Central Command, or CENTCOM, over Israeli intelligence assistance to Riyadh against Ansar Allah.

Freddie Ponton

Israel’s campaign for observer status in Central America’s regional parliament is advancing in a Guatemala that already has a trade agreement with Israel, diplomatic contact with its municipalities and a record of purchasing from Israeli suppliers.

In Buenos Aires, the president of Central America’s regional parliament said she could win the two-thirds vote needed to grant Israel observer status. Six weeks later, Israel’s advocates had a caucus inside the chamber, giving the campaign a way in even though Guatemala had not signed the Isaac Accords.

Karla Gutiérrez told legislators in Buenos Aires on 29 June 2026 that she was working to make Israel an observer in the Central American Parliament, known as PARLACEN, and said she could secure the two-thirds majority required for approval by October. “I can do it,” she said at a conference convened by the Israel Allies Foundation and American Friends of Isaac Accords (AFOIA). The Genesis Prize Foundation helped establish AFOIA to promote the initiative across Latin America.

Karla Gutiérrez has emerged as the institutional face of Israel’s PARLACEN strategy. As the parliament’s president, she publicly championed Israel’s observer-status bid at a conference linked to the Isaac Accords network, then an Israel Allies caucus opened inside the very body she leads. Gutiérrez called Israel’s observer-status bid an “unprecedented achievement” that could open “a new chapter for Israel in the region.” According to JNS, she made the remarks in Buenos Aires at the Israel Allies Foundation’s Latin America Chairman’s Conference, telling lawmakers she was guided by faith and shared “Judeo-Christian values.”

“Now I know why God allowed me to be president,” she said. “It’s through a commitment to Israel.”

On 11 August, the Israel Allies Foundation launched an Israel Allies Caucus in PARLACEN’s plenary hall in Guatemala City, giving the observer-status campaign a permanent platform inside the chamber. Gutiérrez said she would lobby for a vote as early as the following month, while IAF president Josh Reinstein said the caucus was actively advancing recognition. The conference organiser now had a working group inside the parliament where Gutiérrez needed a two-thirds majority.

IMAGE: Karla Gutiérrez, president of the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN), at the Israel Allies Caucus launch on 11 August 2026. (Source: JNS)

Israel and Argentina launched the Isaac Accords in April, but Guatemala has not joined. PARLACEN, based in Guatemala City, brings together legislators from Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic, and can confer observer status without the Guatemalan government signing the Accords. That gave Israel’s advocates a route to a regional foothold while Guatemala remained outside their formal membership.

The caucus and the vote

Gutiérrez was the only Guatemalan participant identified by name in available accounts of the Buenos Aires conference. She attended as PARLACEN president rather than as a representative of Guatemala’s national legislature, framing her support for Israel in terms of shared Judeo-Christian values. Reinstein gave that appeal a political purpose, saying observer status would show what happens when politicians turn biblical support for Israel into “concrete political action.” With a vote anticipated in October, the campaign would need to continue after the delegations left Buenos Aires.

American Friends of Isaac Accords brought the initiative into the meeting and had made the Israel Allies Foundation one of its first grant recipients. IAF brought its network of parliamentary caucuses and its model of “faith-based diplomacy,” while conference organisers said delegates committed to coordinated political action. Its Latin America director, Leopoldo Martínez, called the August group a permanent platform for cooperation with Israel between plenary sessions. The foundation says it works in 65 legislatures and described the new PARLACEN group as its 66th caucus, extending that model into the chamber where Gutiérrez was seeking votes for Israel.

IMAGE: Launch of the Parliamentary Group Allies of Israel at PARLACEN – Guatemala City, 11 August 2026. (Source: PARLACEN)

PARLACEN’s observer rules make observer status more than a symbolic gesture. It is governed by a specific incorporation agreement that sets the terms of participation, including representation, contributions and rights inside the parliament. PARLACEN showed the geopolitical value of that access in 2023, when it removed Taiwan and accepted China as a permanent observer. The caucus was therefore not simply an expression of support for Israel, as it gave the campaign a base inside a regional institution alongside Guatemala’s existing trade, technical and procurement ties with the country.

The relationships already in place

Guatemala’s free-trade agreement with Israel took effect in March 2024, creating a bilateral framework for cooperation in sectors including water management, irrigation and renewable energy, according to its official treaty profile. The agreement predates the Isaac Accords and does not determine how PARLACEN will vote. But it shows that the sectors now proposed for regional investment, water, agriculture and energy, already have a bilateral framework in Guatemala.

Israel’s development agency, MASHAV, also has an established presence in Guatemala. The Israeli embassy says its agricultural modernisation centre opened at the ENCA agricultural school in 2022, where Israeli experts have trained more than 1,500 farmers, extension workers and technicians in irrigation, water management and related fields. That work predates the Isaac Accords, but it has already put Israeli expertise and local institutions together in the agricultural and water sectors where future projects would be developed.

IMAGE: Israeli ambassador Mattanya Cohen joined Guatemalan officials to open the MASHAV-backed agricultural modernisation centre at ENCA on 22 June 2022. (Source: MAGA photograph via Agencia Guatemalteca de Noticias)

Sebastián Siero, president of Guatemala’s National Association of Municipalities, met Israeli ambassador Alon Lavi in July 2025 to discuss cooperation and strategic projects across the country’s 340 municipalities. The association reported no resulting contract, but the meeting placed Israeli officials in contact with the municipal leaders who decide which water systems and public works move forward.

Guatemala’s army has used another bilateral channel to buy from Israeli suppliers. Under a 2023 defence memorandum with Israel, it completed four direct purchases worth Q79.3 million in May 2024 from Elbit entities and Marom-Dolphin, according to eP Investiga’s reporting from Guatecompras records and implementation agreements. The purchases show how an existing bilateral framework can deliver contracts to Israeli suppliers. Guatemala had already bought Israeli surveillance tools, with consequences for privacy and public oversight.

Guatemala’s earlier purchases of Israeli surveillance tools put a harder edge on the proposed digital-technology agenda. A 2018 investigation reported more than Q90 million in public spending on surveillance systems that included Pegasus and Circles, while Citizen Lab later identified a Circles system apparently operated by Guatemala’s civilian intelligence agency, DIGICI. Guatemala’s record on Israeli surveillance tools is part of a broader pattern that also includes a corruption case involving an Israeli water technology.

In 2014, the state contracted M. Tarcic Engineering to supply a product for Lake Amatitlán, a deal CICIG described as a Q22.83 million purchase of 23,000 litres alongside a proposed Q115 million contract to apply it. The arrangement later became a corruption case, leaving a local precedent for the proposed investment facilities and raising questions about who sets the terms, tests the technology and scrutinises contracts before public money is committed.

The finance still out of view

Israel and the Inter-American Development Bank announced a letter of intent on 1 June 2026, before Gutiérrez took her observer-status campaign to Buenos Aires. The proposed facilities would combine Israeli expertise and capital with lower-cost financing for agriculture, water, energy and digital technologies, extending the Isaac Accords agenda from political organising into investment. No document obtained for this investigation shows that the PARLACEN caucus has directed an IDB-backed project to Guatemala.

Luz Itzá Cocom Apaza places those existing relationships alongside the new caucus and calls the political cover potentially supplied by bank-backed finance the “Triple-A Shield of Plunder”. Her warning is that a development bank’s standing can lend credibility to commercial expansion while states and communities carry the debt, environmental costs and loss of control over essential services. Those unanswered terms take on particular weight in Guatemala, where access to water remains deeply unequal.

Today, more than seven million Guatemalans lack an indoor water connection. Half of Indigenous Guatemalans live without running water at home, compared with one-third of non-Indigenous people. The IDB’s accountability mechanism has already investigated complaints linked to two hydroelectric projects in Guatemala and issued its review in Mayan Chuj and Q’anjob’al. The investigation left a record of what can happen when Indigenous communities enter the process only after a project has taken shape.

VIDEO: Guatemalans describe the struggle to access water. This Human Rights Watch film documents conditions that predate the proposed Isaac Accords investment facilities – 2 July 2025. (Source: Human Rights Watch)

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If Isaac Accords-linked finance reaches water, energy or agriculture, the question is who decides before money is committed and contracts are set. Indigenous authorities and community water systems have too often entered after those terms are fixed. Israel’s advocates had already gained a caucus inside PARLACEN ahead of the observer-status vote Gutiérrez expected. The project pipeline remains undisclosed, but the political campaign has already gained a place inside PARLACEN without a public account of the very projects it may help advance.

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Deep Dive host Lt Col Daniel Davis speaks with Patrick Henningsen about the conflicts in West Asia. Watch:

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Host of Syriana Analysis, Kevork Almassian, talks with 21st Century Wire editor Patrick Henningsen about the West’s incessant march towards World War III, and why this signals a failure of Western civilization. Watch:

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NOTE OF CLARIFICATION: At 27.00 minute mark, Patrick mentions legendary political activist and author Michael Parenti, some viewers may have  misunderstood Patrick’s mention of Parenti – he meant to say ‘without sounding exactly like classic anti imperialist left discourse’, ie. too cliche. Perhaps too much of a nuanced or casual quip for some, but in reality those who follow Patrick for years know he has been referencing and reposting Parenti for years—and is a fan of Parenti. Apologies for any misunderstanding – but at end of the day, sometimes casual throwaway comments amid a long interview does not always land well for everyone.

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CrossTalking with host Peter Lavelle are guests, 21WIRE editor Patrick Henningsen, and American academic Joshua Landis.

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Ansar Allah, the armed northern movement known as the Houthis that holds Sana’a, entered the Red Sea port of Mokha on 10 September after the Saudi-backed National Resistance, which had held the western shore, withdrew before dawn. The offensive continued along the coast, reached islands in Bab al-Mandab, the strait at the entrance to the Red Sea, and climbed into the Kahboub mountains of Taiz and Lahj, the high ground separating the captured shoreline from Aden, southern Yemen’s main city. Saudi-backed units and local tribes have since driven the assault from the ridgeline, but they have not retaken the port. Aden is no longer a distant name in a frozen war but a destination on a road now visible from the hills.

What some call the revolution of the two souths has already reached that ridge. The first south is southern Yemen, where Saudi power is being tested and Aden must decide whether it still possesses a politics of its own as Houthi fighters on the Kahboub heights look towards the road into the city. The second lies across the border in Jizan, Najran and Asir, the three Saudi provinces adjoining Yemen whose incorporation into the kingdom was consolidated through the conflicts and settlements culminating in 1934. There, Riyadh’s failure to hold the coast may give old grievances a political life of their own, turning resentment over displacement, discrimination and rule from Riyadh into a public challenge to the Saudi state.

This is the southern storm gathering beneath the House of Saud. The fall of Mokha has forced both souths to confront the political project carried by Ansar Allah’s advance. Saudi and Emirati-backed forces kept the movement out of Aden for nine years, but it may now return with the aim of unifying Yemen under Sana’a. Yet military victory would not settle what governing the South would require from Sana’a, since grievances over land, power and political standing will survive the foreign systems of patronage that have shaped its politics.

The coast moved, and the coalition did not

Mokha had stood as proof that the west remained under control. In 2017, a Saudi and Emirati-backed campaign pushed Houthi forces off that shore, and for nine years the port kept Bab al-Mandab beyond Sana’a’s reach. That position collapsed overnight as units withdrew towards Dhubab, the next district south, followed by families fleeing the retreat while Houthi fighters entered the abandoned line. Fighting was also intensifying around Marib, the government’s last major oil city, leaving Riyadh’s Yemeni allies to defend two fronts without the Saudi and Emirati partnership that had built and held the coastal order.

After the port fell, Saudi Arabia asked the United States for strikes and received intelligence instead. Only a month earlier, it had signed the Mecca agreement with Türkiye and Pakistan, a defence pact that treats an attack on one as an attack on all, yet neither ally joined the battle when Riyadh appealed for military help. The United Arab Emirates, which built much of the South’s separatist order, no longer fights this war as Riyadh’s second command. Saudi aircraft can still operate from their bases, but Saudi power could neither hold nor retake the port that was supposed to prove the coalition still existed as a military force. Southern commanders in Lahj can now see what that failure has brought to their doorstep.

Southern Yemen has to say what it is defending

In Aden, the collapse of the coastal line has brought the prospect of Ansar Allah’s return closer to the centre of southern political life. The city is the South’s main port, the seat of its remaining ministries and the place where memories of the 2015 fighting survive street by street. When Ansar Allah entered Aden that year, many southerners saw its fighters as another northern army. Fadi Baoum of the Hirak, the older southern movement that opposes both Gulf patronage and rule from Sana’a, later called the decision to fight for Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, Yemen’s president at the time, a grave mistake. His judgement drew on an older history, since the 1990 merger promised one country while the 1994 war ended with northern forces taking control of southern land and state institutions. The fighting at Kahboub has put that history back on the road to Aden as the military and political order built to keep Ansar Allah out begins to break apart.

The Southern Transitional Council built its political and military power with Emirati support, although it also operated for years inside the wider Saudi-led coalition. Alongside its Security Belt forces, the Council once controlled large parts of the South and could pursue independence with an armed force and a powerful foreign patron behind it. Hani bin Brik, a senior Council leader and former commander of the Security Belt forces, can still rally fighters against an Ansar Allah advance, and some will answer because their memories of the 2015 battle for Aden carry more weight than any statement from Abu Dhabi. Yet the Council can draw fewer fighters from areas it once governed after its confrontation with Saudi-backed forces weakened its administration and exposed the limits of Emirati support just as the fighting returned to the mountains.

The Presidential Leadership Council, the internationally recognised authority based in the South, still presents a unified Yemen under Riyadh’s protection as the alternative to Ansar Allah, even though the Saudi funded forces aligned with it belong to the camp that lost Mokha. The Hirak rejects both Saudi and Emirati patronage but lacks the military strength to hold the ridge. The demand for southern independence rested on Emirati military support, while the defence of a unified Yemen depended on Saudi-backed forces. Both projects have lost the power needed to sustain their claims as Ansar Allah has advanced within sight of the road to Aden.

Factions moving towards Lahj must now do so without Emirati military support, either under a Saudi command they have less reason to trust or in defence of a statehood claim that Abu Dhabi is no longer willing to support. Ansar Allah offers none of them a separate southern country, since its project begins with a unified Yemen governed from Sana’a. Yet that project would still need terms capable of governing a South whose grievances predate Abu Dhabi and will survive its departure. The political pressure created by Ansar Allah’s advance does not end at Yemen’s southern front, since it is also testing Riyadh’s authority across the border.

Jizan, Najran and Asir have to say how far their grievance goes

The same week that put Houthi fighters on the hills above Aden brought missile strikes and damage to southern Saudi Arabia, where families had already been displaced from the frontier during earlier fighting. This is the other south, not a hidden Yemeni army but the three Saudi provinces bordering Yemen, Jizan, Najran and Asir, whose incorporation into the Saudi state was consolidated through the conflicts and settlements culminating in 1934. Ansar Allah invokes that history and presents Jizan, Najran and Asir as occupied Yemeni territories placed under Saudi rule through the war of 1934 and the treaties that followed.

Jizan is the easiest to see. It is the coastal plain where the Red Sea lowlands of Saudi Arabia meet those of Yemen. For a long time, the border there existed more clearly on paper than in daily life. Families married across the border, farmed land on both sides and maintained ties that the boundary never fully severed. When the war came, the state cleared parts of that belt, leaving households without fields, access and, in many cases, a settlement they still dispute. Ansar Allah’s advance does not make those communities supporters of Sana’a, but it weakens the bargain imposed on them by Riyadh. They lost homes, fields and cross-border access in the name of securing a frontier that the kingdom has again failed to protect from war.

Najran lies inland, across the border from Yemen’s far north, where Saudi Civil Defence issued emergency alerts on 21 September and instructed residents to remain indoors because of a potential danger. Press TV reported that air-raid sirens and explosions followed the purported launch of ballistic missiles by the Yemeni armed forces, although the cause of the explosions remained unclear. The city and province have a large Sulaymani Ismaili population, a Shia community distinct from the Zaydi tradition from which Ansar Allah emerged, while the Yam is the province’s dominant tribe.

Grievances in Najran have centred less on territory than on the treatment of Ismailis, who report discrimination in employment, education, worship and the courts. Families still remember the 2000 confrontation with Saudi security forces, and Houthi media has drawn on that history by presenting visits from Yam members as evidence of wider support in Najran. Prominent Yam leaders have rejected that claim, showing that the cross-border ties that remain give Sana’a a route into Najran but not the authority to speak for it. Ansar Allah’s advance may give that appeal greater weight, but Najran’s grievances remain rooted in the province’s own relationship with the Saudi state.

Asir, the highland province between Jizan and Najran, has a strong regional identity and longstanding disputes over development policies set in Riyadh, but there is less evidence of political engagement with Sana’a. No public leadership linked to Ansar Allah has emerged from the province.

Yemen’s defeat in 1934 led to the Treaty of Taif, while the Treaty of Jeddah formally established the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia in 2000. What remains unsettled is the relationship between Riyadh and the communities living along that border. Ansar Allah did not create the loss of land and cross-border access in Jizan or the memory of discrimination and confrontation in Najran, but its advance makes both harder for the Saudi state to contain as local grievances. Sana’a has already created a place where those grievances can be recast as opposition to the kingdom.

Sana’a has built a shelter

Saudi opponents have been given a public platform and a place to organise in Houthi-held territory. In 2024, Ali Hashim Salman al-Hajji, a Saudi dissident, reached Sana’a, pledged himself to Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and began speaking publicly against the monarchy. Later reports of meetings in Haddah, a district of the capital, described exiles discussing a military council and assigning tasks across different regions. No charter has appeared, no membership has been verified and no attack inside the kingdom has been linked to those meetings. The reporting establishes Sana’a as an external base for Saudi dissent, not the existence of an organised army.

Whatever the status of the reported council, Sana’a’s broader method is visible. Houthi media keeps the territorial settlement of 1934 in public debate, tribal contacts maintain a route into Najran and sanctuary in the capital gives Saudi defectors a platform outside the kingdom. The fall of Mokha and the failure of Riyadh’s allies to intervene have given that platform greater political weight, allowing Ansar Allah to present the grievances of both souths as consequences of the regional order it seeks to replace.

Both souths are being asked to answer the same advance

Ansar Allah did not advance towards Aden to grant the South a separate country or adopt every grievance from Najran as its own. Its objective is a unified Yemen governed from Sana’a and an end to the foreign-backed order that divided the country. Defeating Gulf-backed forces, raising the cost for Riyadh and speaking across the border established in 1934 all serve that objective, but military victory would not by itself produce stable rule.

A southern movement seeking independence would confront a movement committed to one sovereign Yemen, leaving Sana’a to show whether unity could accommodate southern claims over land, resources, political standing and local authority without reproducing the centralisation and political exclusion that strengthened the demand for secession. Communities in Jizan and Najran may seek redress from Riyadh without looking to Sana’a, but Ansar Allah can use their grievances to revive the wider Yemeni argument that the treaties settled the border without resolving the dispossession, discrimination and divided ties left along it.

Ansar Allah’s advance is more than a movement of men and weapons towards Lahj. It is forcing both souths to revisit histories that Saudi power had kept politically separate. Southern Yemen must decide whether its future lies with the foreign-backed order now retreating before Sana’a, with separation, or with a new settlement inside a reunited Yemen. Jizan and Najran must decide whether their grievances remain contained within the kingdom or acquire a political life across the border, while Asir has so far shown less evidence of such a turn. The 2000 settlement remains the legal basis of the border, but Mokha has changed the balance of power around it. The two souths are not one movement, yet both must now answer questions that Riyadh’s military order had allowed them to postpone.

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This week on the SUNDAY WIRE, host Patrick Henningsen returns this week with a shorter than usual show program, but with a very important message to deliver this week to our viewers and listeners at 21st Century Wire. The ‘elite’ and bureaucratic classes and their media minions to telling us the a world war is now inevitable and the prepare accordingly. This includes the threat of a nuclear war. Hence, we reject this premise, and are now calling on people to engage with this issue more seriously than ever. All this and more…

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Neturei Karta’s ultra-Orthodox Jews march under the Palestinian flag, rejecting Zionism and the State of Israel while supporting Palestinians resisting occupation. This new documentary follows the movement from early Jewish opposition to Zionism to protests in Jerusalem and New York. Through its members and critical historians, the film explores the Balfour Declaration, the assassination of Jacob Israel de Haan, the movement’s Holocaust-era origins and its defiant stance after Israel’s creation in 1948. Despite police crackdowns, death threats and isolation from mainstream Jewry, Neturei Karta has forged ties with Palestinians, from Yasser Arafat’s inner circle to solidarity with Gaza, challenging assumptions about Judaism, Zionism and resistance. Watch:

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Run time: 46 minutes
Produced by: Media Town
Production: Media Town for Al Jazeera World Documentary

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