Introduction

Project Anthracite is the RUSI project to assess the nature and scale of North Korea’s chemical warfare (CW) capability using open-source capabilities. While a major part of the effort is to study the North Korean chemical industry to determine the potential capability and capacity to support a CW programme, this is unlikely to provide definitive evidence of an active CW capability. An end-to-end approach would be needed to determine this, which is beyond the scope of the current study and unlikely to be fully achieved using publicly available sources only.

One element of this approach is to ascertain the existence and location of dedicated military Battalions (Bns) subordinate to the Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB)[1]. Eight Bns are referenced, two of which are reportedly active (the 17^th & 18^th), with six in reserve (13^th, 14^th, 15^th 16^th, 27^th and 36^th). Multiple reports about the locations and even existence of these Bns are contradictory, historical, and the subject of probable circular reporting. Additionally, the existence of NCDB Bns would not necessarily confirm the existence of an offensive, militarized nuclear or chemical warfare capability, as it could be argued that such formations would have a defensive function to counter an external chemical or biological warfare (CBW) threat.

Some or all of the reported Bns may no longer exist, may never have existed, may have been relocated, or may be hidden from sight (tunnel complexes are prolific in North Korea). Additionally, the North Koreans are extremely surveillance-aware and therefore tend to avoid sensitive activity during known time windows of satellite passes. However, the lack of an external, credible nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) threat to the DPRK indicates that the existence of NCDB Bns could be an indicator of an offensive North Korean CBW capability.

Through a broad search and analysis of commercially and publicly available imagery and other available open-source references, this study sought to identify possible likely locations for the NCDB Bns, prioritizing the 17^th & 18^th Bns for which there was the most collateral reporting, including defector testimony. Specific attention was applied to identifying anything on imagery that could support a link to CW (e.g. specialist vehicles, reinforced storage areas, additional security, collocated/integrated production or storage facilities).

Several identified sites of interest were analyzed, some of which had some of these features, however only one NCDB Bn (18^th) was located, which heavily relied on collateral reporting. The scarcity of reliable open-source collateral and large geographical extent of the search areas, limited access to very high-resolution imagery. The ambitious nature of this study makes this overall a low-confidence assessment of the existence and/or location of NCDB Bns. However, it provides a useful baseline and an example of the challenges and opportunities of open-source intelligence (OSINT) when applied to such a complex and difficult target set.

Background & Context

According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the North Korean Nuclear and Chemical Defence Bureau (NDCB) is actively involved in the research and development of weapons, and nuclear and chemical defence. It operates at the national level and reportedly is broken down into seven different units: operations, training, materials, technology, reconnaissance, section No. 32 (possibly relating to CW research & development), and mining/underground facility operations. Two additional research institutes (No. 55 and, No. 398) are responsible for: 1) simulating nuclear and chemical contamination and 2) training and operations, and decontamination respectively.

According to NTI, the NDCB has its own department of operations, made up of eight battalions.[2] Two of these were reported as active, the 17^th and 18^th, with the remaining, 13^th,14^th, 15^th, 16^th, 27^th, and 36^th in reserve. Some of these national assets may be assigned to support a corps, division, or regiment, and provide the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) with both detection and decontamination capabilities.

According to the US Army, North Korean chemical battalions comprise three chemical companies, each with two chemical reconnaissance platoons and two chemical decontamination platoons. This potential subordination, historical nature of the reporting on unit designations, and the likely routine reorganization and redesignation of military units in general, further challenges the ability to identify and locate CBW related units since they are likely to be dispersed and integrated into other military formations.

In the absence of additional information, this analysis focused exclusively on attempting to identify the eight NCDB Bns listed above. Each of these Bns were considered in turn to try to identify and locate them on imagery.

NCDB Bn ORBATs and Functions

If there is little in the way of open-source reference material regarding the existence and location of NCDB Bns, there is even less on the potential orders of battle (ORBATs), structures, or task organization for an NCDB Bn.

The NCDB is reported to be responsible for oversight and technical assistance for chemical precursor and agent production, distribution and storage of chemical weapons, and production of defensive equipment in coordination with other military organisations. It also is responsible for NBC defense training within the KPA and response to NBC incidents. At the tactical level, it would therefore be logical for NCDB Bns to have both offensive and defensive responsibilities. This could include the handling and transport of chemical weapons and radiological material, training and doctrinal development for NBC resilience, specialist support to CBW delivery capabilities (e.g., chemical artillery and chemical warheads), and providing an emergency response to accidents and leaks, in addition to protection and decontamination of North Korean forces in the event of conflict.

As in all national militaries, the size of a battalion depends on the type of troops involved, the role of the battalion and the doctrine employed by the nation involved. North Korean military doctrine evolved from the Former Soviet Union in the 1950s-60s, when the Korean People’s Army (KPA) was trained, organized and equipped along Soviet lines. During the Korean War, Chinese influence led to a greater emphasis on irregular warfare, the use of light infantry and human wave tactics. Following the end of the war, juche (self-reliance) and songun (military-first) ideologies reshaped doctrine to prioritize internal resilience, asymmetry, and independence from foreign dependencies.

Deep tunnelling and underground facilities, massed artillery near the demilitarized zone, forward-deployed light mobile infantry forces, and training for guerilla operations behind enemy lines have since been prioritized. KPA ground force battalions are therefore not standardized against other well documented doctrinal models, and likely have, in any case, evolved as the KPA has modernized. Additionally, the highly specialist nature of an NCBD Bn makes it unlikely that it would follow standard organizational norms.

However, this specialization is likely to be reflected in the type of equipment observed within such a unit. Expected signature vehicle types would include CBRN reconnaissance vehicles such as the M1989 (variant of the BTR-60PB), modified UAZ-469 or Kia KM420 and decontamination trucks based on the Zil-130 or Gaz-66, or indigenously produced variants. Signature decontamination vehicles may include Russian TMS-65U and ARK-14KM, although decontamination equipment could also be mounted on a variety of Russian or North Korean chasses. Other vehicles may include command and control vehicles (e.g. Gaz-69 variants), general transport (e.g. Zil-130, Gaz-66 trucks), indigenously-produced variants such as the Sungri-58 (built on a Gaz-51 chassis) and Sungri-4.15 (built on a Gaz-69 chassis), and light engineering support vehicles such as bulldozers and diggers. Although some of these generic vehicle types are potentially identifiable on very high resolution imagery, specific features of individual variants identifying them as NBC-related are too small to be visible. Many of these vehicles are applicable to both nuclear and chemical functions and as such, even if positively identified, would not, on their own, confirm a chemical warfare-related unit. Together, these factors make the task of identifying NCDB Bns on imagery particularly challenging.

A common feature of the battalion is that it is the main tactical formation capable of acting independently. The multiplicity of potential tasks and the sensitive nature of the NCDB Bn role make it feasible that they would be based in discrete, self-contained bases, not necessarily collocated with other KPA units, although this cannot be ruled out. Other potential features are a proximity to CBW-related facilities, including those linked to research and development, chemical weapon production sites, missile units, decontamination training facilities, and CW storage facilities. NCDB units may also be deployed alongside other tactical units for training and exercises, however, they are likely to return to their home bases upon completion of these activities. Finally, the existence of extensive tunnels and underground facilities throughout North Korea means it can’t be ruled out that NCDB Bns are hidden from view.

Potential Locations of NCDB Bns

13^th NCDB Bn – Hamhung Vinalon Complex

The 13^th NCDB (reserve) Bn has been reported as located at the Hamhung Vinalon Complex. This is assumed to be what is more frequently referred to as the February 8^th Vinalon Complex. An approximate 15 kilometer diameter area imagery search centred on the Vinalon complex (39°51′21″N 127°35′07″E) was conducted to identify a potential location for the 13^th NCDB Bn (Figure 1).

The following three areas of interest were located as the only probable military facilities identified in the search area, other than air defense sites:

Area of Interest (AOI) #1 (39°48′57″N 127°35′28″E). This probable military facility is located 3 kilometers southwest of the 8^th February Vinalon complex, adjacent to the Number 17 Explosives Factory. The site comprises a HQ/Admin compound with probable barracks, a vehicle depot that may double up as a depot for civilian vehicles servicing the adjacent explosives factory, a separately secured, walled compound that may be a small arms shooting range, and a small probable training area. The training area includes a trench and three possible mock up military vehicles that appear to have been static on all available imagery since early 2015. Imagery quality is unable to identify these vehicles and they may be generic mock ups, but they appear to have a configuration indicating armoured personnel carriers (APCs). However, they are relatively small vehicles (approximately 4 meters in length), which makes them shorter than most APCs, so they could be modified light command vehicles.

This is a small military establishment, and the only identified probable military site within the immediate vicinity of the Vinalon complex, but it could also be associated with the nearby explosives factory. The configuration of the base indicates its primary role is for training. That would be consistent for a reserve Bn, however there is no evidence of military vehicles other than those on the training area, and no other evidence from imagery that this could be the location of a NCDB Bn.

Area of Interest #2 (39°55’56”N, 127°31’56”E). This military facility is located behind the Institute of Chemistry (Hamhung Branch) that was the subject of a previous report. It comprises a large vehicle storage compound with U-shaped and rectangular sheds, and a second vehicle storage area that may be for vehicle maintenance. Military vehicles are regularly seen in both areas. Although imagery resolution precludes a positive identification of these vehicles, a rough mensuration on all available imagery since 2017 indicates most of them are box bodied vehicles, approximately 4 meters in length and 1.8 meters in width (Figure 4).

Imagery from June 2, 2017, shows nine vehicles of these dimensions, which is consistent with a Bn level formation. There are few military vehicles of these dimensions, apart from the UAZ-469. The UAZ-469 is a common Soviet Union era light utility vehicle, widely exported globally.[3] Numerous variants and local adaptations of this vehicle have been produced, including a CBRN reconnaissance variant (designated the UAZ-469RKh). Modifications for this variant are visibly minor and are comprised of predominantly antennae and tubes, so are undistinguishable on commercial satellite imagery. There are several features about this location that would make it a logical location for an NCDB Bn: its colocation with the Institute of Chemistry (Hamhung Branch) that has been potentially linked to research and development for chemical weapons, and the possible existence of buried and bermed buildings associated with this facility would support this assumption. However, there is nothing on imagery to confirm the nature of the military base, and the presence of air defence sites, communications towers and other potentially sensitive facilities in the area makes it equally likely that the base could be used to support any or all of those.

Area of Interest #3 (39°56’15”N, 127°30’54”E). On the other side of the mountain, and linked by a switchback road to AOI #2, is another military base, comprising three separate areas. Nested in the foothills is an HQ/administrative support compound, with a sports field/parade square and probable barracks.

Directly opposite the main entrance to this compound, on the other side of the main road that leads directly to the 8^th February Vinalon Complex, approximately 10 kilometers away, is a vehicle depot. This comprises a large walled compound surrounded by vehicle sheds, with a single entryway. There is an unidentified structure in the compound that appears to be bunded and with two vents, but the quality of available imagery precludes a positive identification. Military vehicles are regularly observed in the compound, (Figure 5) as is a white coach.

The third area is located further east, 0.5 kilometers down an access road from the vehicle depot. It comprises two areas, one an active air defence site and the other a probable air defence support area. The location and layout of this AOI does not rule it out as a candidate for the 13^th NCDB Bn, however its proximity to the air defense site suggests that the facility is air defense-related.

14^th NCDB Bn – Sunchon Vinalon Complex

The 14^th NCDB Bn has been associated with the Sunchon Vinalon Complex (also known as 118 Factory and the Sunchon Nitrolime Fertilizer Factory). This is located in the sprawling industrial city of Sunchon, and is the subject of a separate report. It was established in 1985, but by 2009, the original site had reportedly been shut down and was derelict. This could potentially impact the existence or location of the 14^th NCDB Bn, and available historical imagery prior to 2009 was limited. However, subsequent analysis indicates that significant reconstruction has occurred in this area, and other potentially chemical warfare-associated sites are present. These include the Sunchon Pharmaceutical Factory, Sunchon Chemical Complex, and a new facility constructed to the southeast between November 2019 and June 2022 (Figure 7). The continuing existence of an NCDB Bn in the Sunchon area is therefore feasible.

With no other collateral information than the name of the Bn, a 10 kilometer diameter imagery search was conducted to identify potential candidate facilities. While there were numerous sites that had characteristics of military facilities, many of these were in urban areas and had the appearance of training, academy or administration sites with little security. These have therefore been discounted. The proximity of Sunchon Military Airfield to the Sunchon Phosphatic Fertilizer Plant (within 4 kilometers) is of particular note. The airfield has an embedded underground complex and would be a natural location for an NCDB Bn. The following were identified as potential sites of interest, based on their layout, location and in some cases the historical presence of military vehicles (Figure 8).

Area of Interest #1 – 39°25′10.54″N 125°53′39.29″E. AOI #1 is a military facility located approximately 500 meters northeast of Sunchon Military Airfield, to which it is connected by well-maintained metalled roads. It comprises a large probable sports field, around which are located several support buildings, including a possible gymnasium and probable accommodation blocks. To the west of this primary area are two other compounds, one of which has the appearance of a vehicle maintenance depot and behind this a separately secured compound with a vehicle parking area and a U-shaped support building.

This compound was reconstructed between late 2017 and early 2018. Prior to that, military vehicles of various sizes were regularly observed in this compound (e.g see Figure 10), although the quality of available imagery precluded a positive identification of vehicle types.

The layout of the main area of the facility indicates this is either a military training establishment or barracks, potentially for military personnel serving the airfield. Two significant new buildings were constructed between September and December 2024 (Figure 11), likely to be sports centers/gymnasiums.

While there is nothing on imagery to positively identify this as the location for an NCDB Bn, the discrete, separately secured compound highlighted on Figure 10 would be the most likely location for one if it were there. However, the relatively high profile of the site, further evidenced by the formal avenue of trees on the approach road, indicates this as an unlikely location for an NCDB Bn.

Area of Interest #2 – 39°25′56.89″N 125°54′09.85″E. AOI 2 is a smaller compound off the same access road as AOI #1. It comprises of a central open area that has historically been used as a football pitch, and several support buildings, including probable barracks and vehicle maintenance sheds. On imagery from September 19, 2022, eight military vehicles are parked on the central open area. Image quality precludes a positive identification of these vehicles, and there may be more than one type, however all are approximately 5 meters-long. There is a probable open body truck parked separately in the compound. Notably, this is the only available image in which vehicles have been identified at this location.

This site is in close proximity to an underground hangar that is almost certainly used to store military aircraft. It has two separate entrances that allow the aircraft to transit in and out of the tunnel without having to turn round. While the expanse of the facility is unknown, the number of aircraft that have been seen parked outside, on, for example, imagery from April 16, 2018 (Figure 13), indicates a substantial underground area.

There is no evidence on imagery or other collateral to indicate a link to a NCDB Bn, and it would be unlikely that chemical or nuclear weapons would be stored in the same buried location as operational aircraft, although this cannot be entirely ruled out. The lack of regular military vehicle activity or additional security makes it far more likely that this site is a general support area for the underground facility.

Area of Interest #3 – 39°24′59.54″N 125°54′19.52″E. Immediately behind AOI  #2 is a third military compound. This compound comprises a vehicle parking lot and probable maintenance areas, possible workshops and an HQ/Admin building. Several features distinguish this site from AOIs #1 and #2. While it is the same general vicinity, it is accessed by a single-track road and contains two artificial water reservoirs. Vehicle activity is also more consistent over a longer period, with a greater range of vehicles frequently observed (Figure 15), although quality of available imagery in unable to confirm vehicle types.

Of note are a series of semi-bermed probable storage buildings on the access road and along a connected track to the east (Figure16).

Historical imagery from December 2002 (Figure 17) also indicates potential tunnel entrances and other possible hidden entrances that have since been covered by vegetation and trees.

While there is no indication of a link between these buildings and either AOIs #2 or #3, the proximity and access make a link possible. The proximity to Sunchon Military Airfield makes it just as likely that these structures are associated with operations there. There is also an adjacent substantial probable logistics/storage compound that could be linked to these buildings. This compound has gradually expanded since 2017 and is likely to be linked to the observed airfield refurbishment.

Area of Interest #4 – 39°24′49.43″N 125°54′39.68″E. This site is connected to a much larger probable military barracks via a single-track road. It is located approximately 1.2 kilometers from the airfield and 2.5 kilometers from the Sunchon Phosphatic Fertilizer Plant. Of note, it has no direct access to the airfield so is likely not linked.

Although an innocuous looking facility, it is characterized by very high physical security, including a high wall surrounding the entire compound, two guard towers and a probable guard room. Various military vehicles and trucks have been observed in the central compound since at least 2006. While the compound has been in existence since the first available imagery of 2002, it was only wall secured in 2006. Two unidentified circular buildings were present immediately outside the facility until their removal in 2011 (Figure 19) but it is unclear as to both their role and whether they are linked to the facility.

15^th NCDB Bn

Given the lack of a location for the 15^th NCDB Bn, and the complete lack of any collateral information, it has been impossible to determine whether this Bn exists.

16^th NCDB Bn – Namhung Youth Chemical Complex

The 16^th NCDB (Reserve) Bn is reportedly located at the Namhung (Anju Namheung) Chemical Factory, which is located just north of the Chongchon River, in North Pyongan Province (39°39′05.72″N 125°41′17.55″E – see figure 20). This is a large chemical complex, built in the 1970s, that has been a central part of North Korea’s chemical industry and is a major producer of a range of chemicals for agriculture and other civil industries.

Located near the city of Anju, the complex is sometimes also referred to as the Anju Youth Chemical Complex or the Namhung Chemical Factory. Since the 1970s, the complex has been an active site with regular expansion and modernisation that still takes place today and it has been linked with elements of a CW programme. This makes it a logical location for an NCDB Bn. However, being a reserve Bn, there may be little to see on imagery and there may just be a headquarters element that could be accommodated in one of the several administrative buildings on the complex. For consistency, a 10 kilometer diameter area search, centred on the middle of the complex, was conducted to look for potential sites. The following sites of interest were noted.

Area of Interest One – 39°37′18.20″N 125°41′23.52″E. AOI #1 is a walled discrete military compound, located in a residential area approximately 2.5 kilometers to the south of the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex, to which it is connected by road. The facility comprises an HQ/Admin building, vehicle storage and maintenance sheds. A variety of military vehicles have been observed on imagery within the compound on a regular basis since the first available image from 2006.

Area of Interest Two – 39°40′39.20″N 125°41′39.67″E. AOI #2 is another walled military compound, located approx. 2.5 kilometers north of the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex. It includes a central courtyard, with likely vehicle storage/maintenance and workshops around the perimeter. Numerous military vehicles have been observed on imagery since the first available image in 2006, although the quality of imagery precludes their identification.

Area of Interest #3 – 39°34′28.84″N 125°39′45.89″E. AOI #3 is a walled compound within a much broader sensitive complex spread out over a valley within a mountainous area approximately 8 kilometers south of the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex. The facility is accessed via a single road with a controlled access point and is fence secured over a large area.

Within the complex, there are numerous remotely-located bermed buildings, indicating the storage of volatile or explosive material. There are also substantial areas of disturbed earth and individual buildings nested into the mountainside, indicating the potential presence of underground structures.

This facility is fairly non-descript, comprising a small, separately secured compound, with a central courtyard, admin/support buildings, vehicle storage sheds and a probable inspection ramp. Of note, there is a bermed building in a compound immediately adjacent to the AOI, with a probable guard tower at the entrance. This is connected by a track to two further, unidentified buildings. Another small bermed building was removed sometime between 2014 and 2016 (Figure 26).

Area of Interest #4 – 39°42′13.38″N 125°39′04.06″E. AOI #4 is located in a heavily militarized mountainous region, approximately 5.5 kilometers north of the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex. It comprises a discrete compound on the periphery of a larger military facility, at the end of a 2 kilometers tree-lined avenue. This compound consists of a central courtyard surrounded by buildings probably associated with vehicle storage, maintenance and administrative support. Military vehicles are regularly seen within the compound, although not in significant numbers.

Adjacent to the compound is another separately-secured site that has a single building surrounded by a berm. The site has the look of a training base or academy and is in the vicinity of at least two helicopter operating and dispersal facilities. It could therefore be related to flying training and the bermed compound a possible armory, although that is purely conjecture.

There are numerous other military establishments within the search area, most of which are barracks, headquarters and support buildings and with central courtyards, some of which have sports pitches marked out on them. There is nothing compelling from imagery that can positively identify the presence or identity of an NCDB Bn. However, based on location, layout, associated facilities and activity, the four AOIs described above are the most likely candidates for a 16^th NCDB Bn, should one exist in this area.

17^th NCDB Bn – Onjong-Ri

Reporting on the possible location of 17th NCDB Bn is historical and contradictory, and, despite claims that this is one of two active Bns, there has been no confirmation to date that this battalion exists. A key challenge in identifying a location for this NCDB Bn has been to refine the appropriate image search areas, given the plethora of reported place names with different translated spellings, similar place names in different regions and probable circular reporting. Examples are as follows: ‘The 17th battalion was located at a hot-spring spa in the mountains of Ojong-Ri.’ The only location for Onjong-Ri on Google Earth and other reference material is in South Hamgyong Province (39°31′49.58″N 127°21′56.63″E) which is in the east of the country. The same reference places Onjong-Ri in Songchon County, South Pyongan Province (in the central west of the country). Other references are variations on the theme that may be due to translation or nomenclature variations, for example, ‘17th NCDB is location at Pyeongan Namdo Songchon gun Onjori.’

The existence of the 17^th  Bn has been questioned, but an NCDB General Training Center at Onjong-Ri has also been reported[4]. Ri Chung Guk, lists the 17th NCDB as Onjong-ri, in Songchun County, South Pyongan Province (reference not available). According to Daily NK, the 17th NCDB is in the same ‘gun’ as the headquarters of the KPA Strategic Forces Command, at Pyungannam-do, Songchon-gun in Paekwon-ri, North Hamgyong Province.

Given the conflicting reporting but taking into consideration the weight of existing evidence, the search was centred around Onjong-ri (village), Songchon-gun (county), South Pyongan Province (39°31′29.60″N 127°21′45.96″E). The sites of interest described below were noted (Figure 28). There are several other possible military facilities within the search area, but none of them fit the likely profile expected of an NCDB Bn.

Area of Interest #1 – 39°31′37.99″N 127°21′52.08″E. AOI #1 is a small military compound on the northern outskirts of Onjong-ri. The facility comprises a central square, surrounded by vehicle sheds and support buildings, apart from a single access gate. Immediately outside of the gate is a possible vehicle inspection shed/garage, and there is a small water reservoir immediately to the southeast. Vehicles are routinely seen within the compound on available imagery. For example, imagery from November 14, 2019, shows three vehicles, each approximately 3.2 meters long. Although the quality of imagery was too poor to identify these vehicles, at least one of them appears to be military.

This is the only military related site in the immediate vicinity of Onjong-ri, and probable military vehicles are present on all available imagery since the first available image in 2007. There are several other compounds of similar format in the vicinity, however these do not have the same degree of security and are clearly associated with agriculture.

Areaite of Interest #2 – 39°33′16.75″N 127°24′30.94″E. AOI #2 is a military complex just under 4.5 kilometers northeast of Onjong-ri, nested in the conjunction of two valleys just 2 kilometers southwest of Kumsa-ri. The complex comprises a central parade square/sports field, a headquarters/barracks building on the north side, a possible gymnasium and an unidentified support building. East of the parade square is another sports field and support building, behind which is an enclosed courtyard and a vehicle compound, which routinely contains a variety of military vehicles. Image resolution prevents identification of these vehicles, but they include flatbed trucks, box bodied vehicles and other unidentified vehicle types. Next to this compound is a probable prison.There is also a water storage facility associated with the site. It is uncertain as to whether this vehicle compound relates to the prison or to the military facility, or indeed whether the colocation of the military facility and prison signifies a link between the two.

Area of Interest #3 – 39°32′11.94″N 127°23′50.36″E. AOI #3 is at the head of a dammed reservoir, approximately 3 kilometers east-northeast of Onjong-ri. It comprises two sites, approximately 500 meters apart. The western site, constructed between 2003 and 2007, comprises a large parade square/sports pitch, headquarters/barracks, workshop, and large warehouse.

The workshop and warehouse were constructed over a long period from early 2013 to completion by mid-2016.

The eastern site comprises a series of unidentified support buildings and possible accommodation blocks, and two vehicle storage courtyards in which are located the occasional unidentified vehicle. This element of the facility was in existence at least since the first available image of 2003.

There are several other possible accommodation and storage buildings located in the immediate vicinity of this SOI.

The timings of construction, and lack of military vehicles make it unlikely to be a location for an NCDB Bn, although the western site cannot be discounted as a potential candidate.

Area of Interest #4 – 39°33′40.24″N 127°21′37.85″E. AOI 4 is a remote military facility spread along a valley 3.5 kilometers north of Onjong-ri. The site comprises six discrete areas, laid out in a similar configuration, and a seventh that probably includes an administrative support area. By mid-2025, buildings in four of the discrete areas had been removed. This site has all the hallmarks of a military training base, possibly for special forces, with assault courses, probable water training courses, and small arms ranges, and is therefore unlikely to be an NCDB Bn location.

18^th NCDB Bn – Sogam-Ri

The 18^th NCDB Bn is the second of the reportedly ‘active’ Bns, allegedly located at Sogam-Ri, Pyongwon-Gun, Pyongannam-Do. Although no corresponding name could be identified on collateral, there is a Sogam Station located in Pyongwon County. Unusually, limited collateral exists that has been invaluable in locating this Bn.[5]^,[6] Ri Chung Guk offered the following regarding the 18^th Bn, supported by a sketch illustration (FIGURE 35). He recalled reaching the unit by going some distance from Sogam Station, on the rail line from Sinuiju Station, bound for Kaesong. He and his guide left the road and went into the mountains. Ri spotted the unit by looking down from halfway up a slope. Leaving his vehicle at that point, Ri and his guide walked 20 minutes to reach the unit. It should be noted that there is no independent verification of this report, however the diagram and description have been used to help identify the likely location for the 18^th NCDB Bn.

A 10 kilometer radius area search centred on Sogam Station was conducted to identify all potentially military related facilities within the selected area to identify likely looking sites. These were then cross-referenced against the Ri defector report. The area is characterized by a mixture of farmland and mountainous outcrops and is highly militarized. There are a substantive number of air Defense missile sites, military training and academic areas, barracks, underground and buried facilities and tunnel entrances, as well as the Sunan joint military/civilian airfield. This made positive identification of an individual unit such as the 18^th Bn a particularly challenging task. An initial list of approximately 25 sites was refined to 13 of particular interest (Table 2).

Of these, the facility that most closely matched the layout and directions given in the defectors report was No. 11. A detailed comparative analysis of the site on historical and current imagery with the defector map, description and labelling makes this a high confidence assessment that the site described by the defector is that identified on imagery. However, without further collateral, this does not confirm that this facility is or was the location of the 18^th NCDB Bn.

An overview of the facility is given on Figure 36, indicating its relative location and associated facilities according to the defector report.

Figure 37 compares a historical image from 2003 (the earliest available) with the defector report, demonstrating a strong correlation between the two. There have been several changes since this time, most notably the reconstruction of 1^st, 4^th and 5^th Companies and the replacement of the three buildings corresponding to 3^rd, 6^th and 2^nd Companies with two longer buildings.

Additionally, there has been a significant expansion of Factory 274, which occurred sometime between March 2020 and August 2022. Military vehicles have been a regular feature of this area on all available imagery since 2003 and imagery from July 10, 2025 shows four towed artillery units (possibly D-30) and three other unidentified military vehicles (Figure 39).

The only discrepancy between the defector reporting and the imagery analysis is the lack of an observed chemical complex or recruit training center on imagery at the location he indicated. It is possible that these facilities had been demolished between the time of his visit and the earliest available image, however there is a possible chemical complex approximately 2 kilometers south down the main road towards Sogam Station, and three possible locations of a potential training facility in the vicinity of the 18^th NCDB Bn have been identified (Figure 40).

27th NCDB Bn – Wonsan, Kangwon-do (Kangwon)

Also known as the 37^th NCDB Bn, this bn is assumed to be collocated or associated with the Wonsan Chemical Complex. Wonsan is North Korea’s fifth largest city, located on the east coast. As a natural harbour, it has a substantial port facility and naval base. Since 2015, the city has seen significant redevelopment with the aim of transforming it into a tourist destination. A review of available imagery from 2002 has been unable to definitively identify a functional chemical complex, however there are two likely areas that may have been linked to the chemical industry at one point. Several facilities have nonetheless been identified with a profile that could potentially comprise an NCDB Bn, although there is nothing on imagery to confirm this and the existence of the 27^th NCDB Bn in the Wonsan area is assessed as low confidence. There are numerous other military facilities within a 10 kilometers radius of the city centre, however most of these have the appearance of standard military training/academic or barrack facilities.

Areas of interest have been identified as follows:

Area of Interest One – 39°09′03.08″N 127°27’23.72″E. This site is within a kilometer of one of the potential legacy locations of the Wonsan Chemical Complex. It comprises two primary secured areas, the eastern one of which includes several vehicle storage and maintenance sheds and a large courtyard area. Military and civilian vehicles are frequently seen in this area, primarily box bodied vehicles and white coaches, which are frequently used for moving troops throughout North Korea. The western area, to which there is separate access, has the appearance of a support area, with probable barracks, administrative and other support buildings. There is nothing in imagery to indicate this site as a NCDB Bn and the site is just as likely to be a military vehicle depot. Other than the air defence sites located on hill tops in the surrounding area, it is, however, the only identified non-naval military site in the immediate vicinity of the potential chemical complex locations.

Area of Interest #2 – 39°09′06.09″N 127°25’53.45″E. AOI #2 is a substantial military facility approximately 2 kilometers from the potential legacy locations of the Wonsan Chemical Complex. The site is dominated by a large parade square and likely substantial barracks accommodation. Unusually, there are two air defense sites in the immediate vicinity of the site, which could indicate a sensitive facility, however this could be coincidental due to the elevated terrain surrounding the facility, or the base could be a training facility, which could potentially include air defence training. There is nothing on imagery to indicate the presence of an NCDB Bn.

Area of Interest #3 – 39°08′34.68″N °26’06.86″E. AOI #3 is a discrete, secure site of significant interest. Although not configured as a standard military facility, it is unusually well-secured, with an external perimeter wall, internal walls, and a single gated entrance with an associated guardroom. The main feature within the complex is a tiered, multi-story building that has the appearance of a possible research and development building, although this cannot be confirmed on imagery. Occasional military vehicles are observed in the compound. Of note are two tunnel entrances nearby, linked to the site by a road. Therefore, while there is no indication of a NCDB Bn from imagery and it does not have military barracks or a parade square, it is clearly a sensitive site.

36th NCDB Bn – Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex

The 36^th NCDB Bn has been linked with the Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex. Although unconfirmed, there are two probable potential locations for this facility, both approximately 6 kilometers east of the city of Sariwon, which is the capital of North Hwanghae Province

A wide area (10 kilometers in diameter) search of the area revealed a significant number of probable military facilities, although many of these were generic.

Those with some or all the features that may be expected of a possible NCDB Bn were analysed in more detail (labelled AOIs #1 – 6) and described below. However, with no collateral information, it was not possible to confirm a location for 36^th NCDB Bn.

Area of Interest #1 – 38°32′01.76″N 125°48’03.41″E. AOI  #1 is a military barracks in the foothills of the mountains approximately 3 kilometers northeast of Sariwon City. There are several other military facilities in the vicinity, however this one stands out for several reasons. It is the only one that appears to have a dedicated vehicle parking area and military vehicles are routinely present. There is also a buried building, and a semi-buried remote building, and two possible tunnel entrances along a track leading directly from the facility.

There are also two further tunnel entrances in the hillside approx. 300 meters away (Figure 47). Therefore, while there is nothing on imagery to confirm this as an NCDB Bn location, it is a site of significant interest.

Area of Interest Two – 38°28′37.79″N 125°51’00.84″E. AOI #2 comprises two military facilities only 500 meters from one of the potential locations for the Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex. However, they are both of broadly standard layout and their direct connectivity to two operational air defense sites indicates that they are probably support facilities for this capability.

Area of Interest Three – 38°26′51.32″N 125°43’32.69″E. AOI #3 is a walled military compound approximately 9 kilometers east-southeast of one of the potential locations for the Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex. It comprises a vehicle parking and maintenance area and single multi-story probable barracks. A variety of military vehicles are routinely observed in the compound and many of these are approximately 3.6 meters in length. They could therefore be UAZ-469, although imagery quality precludes positive identification. Flatbed trailers and cabs are also regularly observed. There is nothing to indicate an NCDB Bn link and the distance from Sariwon makes this an outlier, however it is an active, self-contained facility, so this cannot be ruled out.

Area of Interest Four – 38°28′58.49″N 125°50’57.67″E. AOI #4 is a small possibly joint civil/military walled compound less than one kilometer from one of the potential locations of the Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex. It includes vehicle sheds, administrative and other support buildings, as well as a two two-tiered multi-story building that could be related to academics or research. There are also four probable concrete cylinders in the facility, three of which are covered and one uncovered. It is likely that they were used for storage at some point, however all now appear to be derelict. Civilian and military flatbed trucks are routinely seen in the compound.

The function of this facility is unidentified, however its location to the fertilizer complex, likely joint civilian and military function and additional infrastructure (multi-story buildings) not normally expected of a military facility, make it a site of interest.

Area of Interest Five – 38°29′17.49″N 125°49’52.55″E. This military base is located approximately 1.5 kilometers northwest of potential locations for the chemical complex and comprises three connected compounds. The main compound includes a large central open area, surrounded by probable barracks buildings. Military trucks are regularly seen in this area, although normally in small numbers. There is a separate substantial vehicle parking and maintenance area to the north of this compound. A second, separately secured, smaller compound may have been a technical support area for the main facility at one point, however, now appears to have largely been turned into an agricultural area.

The third compound is probably a headquarters, administrative and logistical support hub. The layout and size of the facility, coupled with observable probable training and small arms ranges, indicate that this is likely to be a military training base and there is no evidence of an NCDB Bn presence. However, this cannot be ruled out.

Area of Interest Six – 38°29′28.27″N 125°49’02.56″E. AOI #6 has a similar layout to AOI #5 and is located only approximately one kilometer away. It also has an open central courtyard surrounded by probable barracks buildings although is configured slightly differently in that it has a probable HQ/admin building facing this main compound. There are also a sizeable military vehicle parking and storage area and a separate vehicle compound attached, with its own entrance and support area. There is a probable large vehicle inspection ramp in the compound, which may indicate this as a deeper vehicle maintenance yard.

Conclusion

The aim of this study was to determine the extent to which military sites of interest (in this case NCDB Bns) could be identified as being potentially linked to a North Korean CW program through the analysis of publicly available imagery. Given the paucity of recent open-source reporting, search areas were wide and the analysis necessarily superficial and illustrative.  However, the sites detailed above indicate the most likely identified candidates for the location of NCDB Bns. Respective locations in the vicinity of industrial chemical facilities known or suspected to be linked to a CW programme, the presence of military equipment, tunnels and bermed buildings and associated facilities were used to narrow down options, however, in the absence of more detailed collateral, only one of these potential sites (18^th NCDB Bn) has been positively identified, if defector reporting is accurate. There is nothing on imagery to confirm that this base, or any of the other potential sites still accommodate an NCDB Bn, if they once existed. Sites are all individual and there is no apparent single template or layout that marks them as having the same function, including when compared to the 18^th Bn.

A more detailed, longer-term analysis of each of these bases, supported by up-to-date collateral information would be needed to provide a higher confidence assessment about the existence, role and locations of NCDB Bns. Although outside the scope of this project, an analysis of equipment and personnel present during official parades, may confirm the existence of dedicated NBC vehicles, equipment and formations, and the identification and monitoring of discrete artillery and rocket launch training ranges may provide further indications of their existence.

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For decades, deterrence on the Korean Peninsula has rested on a single fundamental assumption: that in the event of an all-out war, US reinforcement would be swiftly introduced both from Japan and the continental United States, while Japan would provide crucial rear-area support in accordance with the existing operational plan—OPLAN 5055. This assumption has shaped not only operational planning, but also the broader strategic trust that has buttressed South Korea’s defense posture. 

However, such an assumption is increasingly being questioned. A simultaneous contingency—China initiating a military invasion against Taiwan, and Russia enlarging the conflict in Europe—would place unprecedented strain upon US available forces. Under such conditions, USFK could be partially redeployed to Taiwan, US reinforcement could be delayed or curtailed, and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces—except for those that are sent to the Taiwan Strait to support US war efforts—would be fully absorbed in the defense of their territory and surrounding waters. Operational frameworks like OPLAN 5055 would become difficult, or even impossible, to execute as originally outlined. 

In such a case, Pyongyang may see these conditions as presenting a rare strategic opportunity. The convergence of reduced US presence in the region, Japan’s resource constraints, and heightened global distraction could lead North Korea to think that military provocation—and even a large-scale attack—might be feasible. But could South Korea defend itself—largely alone—against a full-scale North Korean invasion? 

In such a contingency, the early stages of the war would be defined by the absence of immediate US reinforcement, with an estimated 20 to 40 percent of USFK potentially redeployed to the Taiwan Strait. Naturally, South Korea would have to rely on its standing forces and prepositioned assets—including prepositioned equipment and wartime reserve stocks, similar in function to US Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS)—to absorb the initial shock. North Korea would likely exploit this window of opportunity through a combination of massive artillery and rocket attacks targeting the Seoul metropolitan area, cyber and electronic warfare, and special operations infiltration through airborne and subterranean methods. Rapid armored thrusts toward major operational targets south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) would follow, aiming to achieve an early breakthrough before South Korea fully mobilizes its defense capabilities. 

Recent observations from the Russia-Ukraine War suggest the possibility of North Korea’s adaptation of its operational approach. The increased use of low-cost drones and loitering munitions for reconnaissance and strike missions, paired with enhanced artillery coordination enabled by UAV-based targeting, indicates a more adaptive and networked battlefield methodology. At the same time, the emphasis on distributed operations—in order to reduce vulnerability to precision strikes—showcases North Korea’s awareness of the technological advantages held by more advanced militaries. 

In this early phase of the war, South Korea’s priority would be survival and stabilization, rather than immediate counteroffensive action. The South Korean military maintains a qualitative edge that includes advanced ISR capabilities and superior air platforms like the F-35A, F-15K, and KF-21—it will enter service this year. Meanwhile, a multi-layered missile defense architecture comprised of M-SAM II, Patriot, and THAAD batteries—assuming they are replenished and if the US does not relocate them again to other theaters during the crisis—would ensure some degree of defense against inbounding threats. Nonetheless, without US reinforcement, these capabilities would be under sustained stress. The critical challenge would be to preserve command-and-control integrity and defensive cohesion during the first several days of high-intensity conflict. 

If South Korea were able to absorb the initial blow, the war would very likely be transformed into a protracted high-intensity defense phase. In this stage, South Korea’s superiority in firepower would become increasingly important. Precision strike capability, particularly in the field of counter-battery operations, would enable the rapid suppression of North Korean artillery systems. The K9 self-propelled howitzer, coupled with guided munitions, would play a crucial role in degrading North Korea’s sustained offensive momentum. 

Airpower would also become a decisive element, yet its overall effectiveness would depend on how quickly South Korea secures air superiority over the skies of the Korean Peninsula. Although the North Korean air force remains limited in its capacity, its integrated air defense network—an amalgam of SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5—could still impose operational constraints. Therefore, achieving and maintaining control of the air domain would be critical not only during defensive operations, but also during subsequent counteroffensive operations. 

At the same time, South Korea’s network-centric warfare capability could offer a significant advantage—provided that its command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems remain resilient under. Faster decision-making cycles and effective targeting could contribute to compensating for numerical inferiority and stabilizing the battlefield. In addition, the robust foundation of South Korea’s defense industrial base functions as an invaluable source of resilience. In wartime, South Korea’s export-oriented industrial base could be reshuffled through government-led mobilization measures, enabling the incorporation of civilian industry into the defense supply chain. Unlike Ukraine in the early stages of the war in 2022, South Korea possesses the industrial capacity to produce major ammunition and equipment without interruption—ultimately reducing reliance on external resupply. 

Nevertheless, significant vulnerabilities would remain. Sustained combat would place a heavy burden on munition stockpiles—munitions stored in the United Nations Command-Rear (UNC-R) bases could be prioritized to resupply US forces for Taiwan operation—including missile defense interceptors. The dense urban environment of the Seoul metropolitan area would be highly exposed to artillery and missile salvo attacks, imposing prohibitive political pressure—particularly given that South Korea’s overall civil defense readiness remains less than fully robust. Meanwhile, the loss of high-end assets, including aircraft and command nodes, would incrementally weaken operational efficiency. If US assistance cannot be expected, sustaining high-intensity operations beyond several weeks would become increasingly uncertain. 

One of the most dangerous variables in this scenario is the potential use of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. Recent simulations conducted by the Atlantic Council illustrate that Pyongyang may view limited nuclear use as a means to collapse defensive cohesion, trigger political shock, and deter outside intervention. In a situation where US extended nuclear deterrence is not immediately visible or credible, South Korea could face a serious strategic dilemma. A purely proportional conventional response would risk failing to restore deterrence, while escalation carries the danger of further nuclear use by North Korea. 

South Korea’s existing doctrinal tools—the Three-Axis System comprised by the Kill Chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR)—offer a conceptual basis for responding to such threats. However, if nuclear weapons were to be actually deployed, their practical effectiveness would remain uncertain. The challenge would be psychological as well as political—not only operational—as the government would need to maintain public trust and manage the risk of escalation. 

Under such constraints, the overall outcome of the war without US reinforcement would be conditional. In the short term, South Korea has a high chance of preventing North Korea’s rapid breakthrough, stabilizing major defense perimeters, and inflicting notable attrition on advancing forces. Nonetheless, the situation would likely become murky in the medium term. Protracted combat would strain the logistics system, reduce the availability of ammunition, while civilian disruption would impose additional constraints on military operations. In the long term, the absence of external support would make it extremely difficult to maintain deterrence credibility and operational tempo. To be sure, South Korea would be able to avoid a complete defeat. But achieving a decisive victory alone would be far more challenging. 

These realities suggest policy implications that go beyond South Korea. For Seoul, the most urgent task is to prepare for a scenario in which it is required to operate autonomously for an extended period of time. To make this possible, it would necessitate expanding stockpiles of precision-guided munitions and interceptors—especially the M-SAM II and L-SAM II—that could withstand months of high-intensity warfare, and hardening command-and-control systems against cyber and kinetic disruptions. Investments in counter-artillery capabilities, including AI-based targeting and long-range precision strike, would be a sine qua non. At the same time, South Korea should strengthen the credibility of its non-nuclear deterrence capability that could impose severe costs on the North Korean leadership even when immediate US support is unavailable. 

For the United States, the central challenge hinges on maintaining the credibility of its deterrence across multiple theaters. This would require selective, surge-based forward deployment of critical assets to the Korean Peninsula, adoption of a layered nuclear deterrence approach across both theaters, and avoiding a unilateral, abrupt redeployment of USFK without reasonable or sufficient consultation with the South Korean counterparts so as not to undermine the existing deterrence posture. 

For Japan, it is necessary to ensure that some level of rear-area support and coordination with South Korea can be sustained even in the context of a Taiwan contingency, while strengthening a functional trilateral cooperation mechanism—using the 2023 Camp David trilateral summit as a reference point—that can operate effectively even under degraded conditions. 

Ultimately, the long-held assumption that sizeable US reinforcement would arrive in time may not necessarily apply in an era of overlapping strategic crises. South Korea is not defenseless; it possesses one of the most capable militaries in the region, underpinned by advanced technology and a robust industrial base. Yet self-reliance does not necessarily equal a self-sufficient victory. To maintain deterrence, Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul should prepare for the possibility—no matter how low it may be—that the next conflict on the Korean Peninsula may begin with South Korea standing largely on its own. 

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The “20×10” regional development policy, introduced in January 2024, represents Kim Jong Un’s attempt to restore a state-led development model in North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK). The policy involves building or renovating development projects in 20 cities and counties each year over a 10-year period, first focusing on light-industry factories, but later expanding to include hospitals, grain-management facilities, and science- and technology-related infrastructure. Kim’s regional development model sets out to reduce the gap between Pyongyang and the provinces, improve the quality of living conditions, and create 200 economic prosperity clusters throughout the country under state guidance.

While 20×10 is an ambitious undertaking that speaks to real needs, the risk of undermining long-term economic development in exchange for short-term success should not be taken lightly.

Kim’s New Economic Line

The 20×10 regional development model signals Kim Jong Un’s effort to define an independent economic line. Under Kim Il Sung, the economy operated within a centralized socialist system, while under Kim Jong Il, particularly following the Arduous March, it evolved into a dual structure characterized by diminished state control and the rise of jangmadang (informal) markets.

At the Ninth Party Congress, Kim Jong Un demonstrated a departure from these earlier trajectories, abandoning his grandfather and father’s lines, and positioning himself as the architect of a distinct phase of socialist construction. His 20×10 program reflects an attempt to consolidate political authority through economic development emanating from ideological renewal. Instead of allowing “benign neglect,” Kim seeks to reassert state control by gradually phasing out jangmadang, and establishing a redefined “hybrid” socialist framework. The question is whether this approach can produce lasting improvements in productivity and welfare.

The “hybrid” model was initially launched in 2021, as a pilot project in Kimhwa County. The Party provided initial funding and materials to establish local industry. After this initial push, however, local authorities were expected to secure their own labor, raw materials, and fuel, effectively sustaining production themselves. This approach channels money from the center with bottom-up responsibility, aiming to generate self-sustaining regional production within a controlled socialist framework.

This initial investment was probably made possible, at least in part, by the windfall from North Korean participation in the Russia-Ukraine war, making it vulnerable to changes in the relationship over the long term. Estimates suggest that Pyongyang may have earned between $7.67 billion and $14.4 billion from troop deployments and arms exports between August 2023 and December 2025. Funding aside, the 20×10 regional development program may face a number of structural constraints embedded within the socialist economy.

Structural Constraints of Socialist Regional Development

First, socialist economies have historically struggled to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Structural features such as state ownership, weak property rights, and the absence of market-based incentives create high levels of uncertainty for foreign investors, limiting capital inflows, technology transfer, and managerial spillovers. In the DPRK, these constraints are compounded by the country’s foreign policy, relative political isolation, economic sanctions, and institutional opacity. As a result, the country is still largely excluded from global investment networks and deprived of the benefits associated with FDI, including job creation, technology transfer, managerial know-how, and export growth—conditions that are still true even with deepening relations with countries like Russia and Belarus. The contrast with China under Deng Xiaoping is instructive: in a 1984 speech to the Central Advisory Commission, Deng explicitly rejected economic isolation, arguing that “no country can now develop by closing its door.” This statement, made in defense of China’s “reform and opening-up” policies, underscored the necessity of attracting foreign investment to achieve economic modernization.

Second, the 20×10 policy relies primarily on extensive growth, increasing inputs such as land, capital, and labor. However, these conditions simply do not exist in its regional communities. North Korea also faces a mounting demographic crisis—its population is decreasing while a large portion of the population still suffers from malnutrition. The socialist system prevents the transition to intensive growth, which depends on innovation, transfer of technologies, and the enhancement of efficiency, including through the adoption of modern technologies.

Third, the DPRK’s socialist ownership structure undermines the incentive system required to enhance economic productivity. The means of production remain concentrated in the hands of the state, which relies on ideological indoctrination and mass mobilization rather than market incentives. In such a system, the state can extract surplus value while compensating workers only partially for their labor, or not at all, limiting motivation and efficiency.

Fourth, the DPRK’s infrastructure bottlenecks further limit what the 20×10 program can achieve. Chronic shortages of electricity and industrial inputs restrict production, even where factories and buildings are present. In such conditions, construction alone does not generate sustained output, but instead increases demand for already scarce resources.

Fifth, Kim continues to prioritize the military component of his byungjin (dual track) line over economic development. North Korea currently spends approximately 24% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on its nuclear and military programs, compared to around 3.5% in South Korea, which is ranked as the fifth strongest military in the world and spends $44.8 billion on its military sector. For North Korea, a country with a GDP of less than $30 billion, this rivalry constitutes a major burden and drains financial resources that could otherwise support economic development and household welfare.

These constraints are already visible in practice. In Songchon county, authorities reportedly ordered a halt to factory goods entering informal markets and threatened punishment to enforce a “state-centered distribution management system.” If official channels cannot compete with market channels in stock, quality, or price, redirecting goods into state circulation does not resolve the underlying weakness. Instead, it restricts distribution while supply constraints remain unchanged, extending shortages rather than improving productivity or welfare. At the same time, industrial expansion under 20×10 has, in some cases, come at the expense of agricultural land, such as the early projects in Tongsin, Jangphung, and Songchon having reportedly demolished greenhouses to make room for factory construction, even as local authorities are tasked with sourcing local inputs for those same factories.

Taken together, these dynamics suggest that the 20×10 policy may encounter challenges in achieving its intended outcomes. The project’s constraints are structural rather than incidental, rooted in distorted incentives, resource misallocation, and declining productive capacity. More critically, if the project is, indeed, funded in part from weapons sales to Russia, sustaining this effort beyond the war in Ukraine is not a foregone conclusion. Once the war ends, Russia may not have the means or desire to support North Korea to the same extent.

Implementing 20×10 

This change in circumstance is likely to have a significant impact on the project’s implementation. The capital invested in regional development enterprises could be rapidly exhausted once Russian wartime revenues decline. In their absence, the regime may resort to intensified extraction of the labor force to sustain the program.

Second, managers in state enterprises will have difficulty competing with the jangmadang economy due to a fundamentally misaligned incentive structure: performance is driven more by ideological pressure than incentives based on private ownership. As a result, there is little motivation to ensure efficiency, introduce innovation, and generate profit. State enterprises are also likely to attract poorly trained labor cadres, while more entrepreneurial individuals gravitate toward market activity. This structural divergence reinforces a persistent productivity gap between the state sector and the informal economy, which the state is unable to close over time.

Third, by expanding the state sector, the policy reallocates labor and resources away from productive market-based activity. Given that market and informal activity account for a substantial share of household income, drawing workers into underpaid or unpaid state employment reduces overall household earnings and weakens economic resilience. This is not simply a redistribution of labor but a displacement from higher efficiency to lower-efficiency production systems. As a result, even where state enterprises expand in scale, they do so at the cost of aggregate productivity and income generation. The anticipated outcome is not only declining welfare at the household level but also widening regional disparities, as areas with stronger market integration experience sharper losses when informal activity is constrained.

The issue is not simply funding, but that even a successful rollout could potentially work against the conditions needed for sustainable economic development. While the plan could evolve if conditions change, the more important point is that even effective implementation could struggle to deliver tangible improvements due to the nature of its system. As market activity is curtailed and state enterprises underperform, household income declines, supply shortages intensify, and local economies lose their primary mechanisms of adaptation. The failure of the program therefore risks producing outcomes that are materially worse than those observed prior to its implementation, with implications that extend beyond economic performance to the well-being and resilience of the population. At the political level, such outcomes could erode confidence in the regime’s development agenda and, by extension, in Kim Jong Un’s authority as the policy’s principal architect.

Shortcomings of the program’s implementation have been observed at at the highest level of political reporting. In his Party Congress address, Kim Jong Un declared that the 2021-2025 five-year economic plan had been fulfilled “in the main,” while simultaneously acknowledging “deep-rooted defeatism, irresponsibility, conservatism, formalism and immaturity in leadership ability” —a recurring criticism of officials failing to implement the top leader’s intentions, dating back to the Kim Il Sung era. More significantly, in his concluding speech, Kim warned that newly built facilities under the 20×10 regional development policy were “not managed and operated as properly as they should be,” citing “serious dereliction of duty, irresponsibility and other ingrained maladies of seeking only immediate gains.” These remarks point to implementation challenges arising within the flagship policy itself, though responsibility continues to be framed mainly in terms of cadre performance rather than policy design.

Conclusion

In sum, North Korea’s 20×10 policy appears constrained less by a lack of ambition than by the conditions under which it is being pursued. While the program responds to real regional needs and may bring visible improvements in some localities, its 10-year horizon remains vulnerable to shifts in state income, and its reliance on weak infrastructure, limited external investment, and tension with market-based livelihoods creates risks that should not be overlooked. Instead of narrowing regional disparities, it could exacerbate existing strains on local economies while leaving deeper constraints unresolved. More importantly, the problem is not whether the policy can be funded, but the fact that, under current economic circumstances, full implementation could undermine the very foundations of regional development it is intended to advance. Its long-term impact will depend on its ability to adapt to changing realities, rather than on adherence to a fixed blueprint. 

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North Korea claimed that launches of KN-23/Hwasong-11A and Hwasong-11D short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) on April 8 and 19, respectively, tested “cluster bomb warhead” (submunition) payloads. Although these were the North’s most specific public references to such missile payloads, it alluded to them in Fall 2022 and has long been assessed by outside analysts to possess them. The new reports underscore the important conventional warfighting roles of North Korea’s SRBM force, which performs many of the key missions traditionally taken on by air forces. The launches also follow through on the mandate of the February 2026 Ninth Party Congress to reinforce SRBM deployments against South Korea. Finally, the North probably wanted to capitalize on the substantial press attention given to Iran’s recent use of submunition warheads to trumpet its similar capabilities.

Information to Date

Early April tests. An unidentified North Korean missile was launched April 7, according to the South Korean Ministry of Defense, reportedly showing abnormal early-stage flight. South Korean and Japanese defense sources then reported the launch of multiple unidentified ballistic missiles from North Korea on the morning of April 8 to a range of 240 km, and the launch of a single missile that afternoon to at least 700 km, possibly on an irregular trajectory. The reported flight characteristics of the latter missile resemble those of the KN-23/Hwasong-11A SRBM.

On April 9, North Korean media reported the April 6-8 testing of an “electromagnetic weapon system, carbon fiber sham bombs scattering…and estimating combat application and power of cluster bomb warhead of tactical ballistic missile,” as well as a “firing for testing the maximum workload of engine using low-cost materials.” The “cluster bomb warhead” was said to have been flown on a KN-23, and the test reportedly “confirmed” that the payload “can reduce to ashes any target covering an area of 6.5~7 hectares [16-17 acres, or 0.065-0.07 sq km] with the highest-density power.”

Mid-April tests. The North launched about five SRBMs on April 19 to a range of about 140 km, according to the South Korean military.  The next day, North Korean press reported the April 19 launch of five “improved” Hwasong-11D (HS-11D) small, solid-propellant SRBMs with “cluster bomb warhead and fragmentation mine warhead” to a range of 136 km.  The warheads reportedly covered their targets over “12.5-13 hectares [31-32 acres, or 0.125-0.13 sq km] with the very high density.”

Kim Jong Un reportedly supervised the test and said that “the development and introduction of different cluster bomb warheads can meet the operational demand of the KPA [Korean People’s Army] in a more satisfactory and effective way…to boost the high-density striking capability to quell a specific target area as well as the high-precision striking capability.” The warheads reportedly were developed over a five-year period by “a group specializing in research into missile warheads.”

Analysis

“Cluster bomb warheads.” These reports are the North’s most specific public references to submunition (cluster) warheads for its SRBMs, although SRBM drills in October and November of 2022 were reported to have used “dispersion strike” and “dispersion warheads,” which probably also meant submunition warheads. Submunitions provide a longstanding means for missiles to distribute warhead effects across a larger area than possible for a single (unitary) warhead of the same total mass. This can better cover area targets such as airbases or dispersed troops, help compensate for missile accuracy limitations, more effectively disperse chemical or biological agents, and complicate targeting of warheads by missile defenses. Soviet-made Scud and SS-21 SRBMs obtained by the North in the 1980s and 1990s had submunition variants, and North Korea long has been credited with submunition-armed SRBMs.

The new reports are significant in that they specifically associate the KN-23 and HS-11D with submunition and “fragmentation mine” warheads, provide sizes of areas purportedly covered by the warheads’ effects, and in the case of the HS-11D test, provide a photo claiming to show one of those areas. As a rough benchmark, the 1990s US ATACMS Block I SRBM carried a 500 kg submunition warhead that affected an area of about 3.3 hectares [8 acres, or 0.033 sq km] compared to the 6.5-13 hectares claimed for the North Korean SRBMs. Because there is no information on the number, size/weight, composition, and release altitude of the tests, it is difficult to evaluate the veracity or effectiveness of the claimed affected areas, or compare the sizes of the claimed areas for the KN-23 and HS-11D. The photo provided by the North with the HS-11D test shows many very small impacts spread over a circular area, suggesting a “fragmentation mine” warhead distributing many small bomblets fuzed to detonate above ground and shower its target with shrapnel.

Other possible warhead types. It is not clear from the North Korean media reports whether the “electromagnetic weapon system” and “carbon fiber sham bombs” are associated with SRBM launches.

• The “electromagnetic weapon” might be a jammer payload to help an SRBM attack penetrate missile defenses, but might also refer to a ground-based jammer or radiofrequency weapon to defend against drones such as the drone-jamming “rifle” the North Koreans have depicted using in the Ukraine war.
• The US first used warheads dispersing carbon/graphite fibers on Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles to short out electric power grids in the 1991 First Gulf War, and aircraft-delivered gravity bombs with such payloads in Serbia in 1999. Thus, the North might have tested such a warhead on an SRBM but may have used a different type of delivery system.

Engine with low-cost materials. The context of the April 9 report suggests that the new engine North Korea fired “for testing the maximum workload of engine using low-cost materials” was associated with the unidentified SRBMs tested on April 7-8, or possibly the KN-23. (It would seem unusual to describe the warhead flown on the KN-23 but not a modified motor.) The large expenditures of SRBMs to be expected in modern conventional conflict, as underscored by the situations in Ukraine and Iran, would certainly put a premium on being able to lower the cost of rocket motor production. But it is unclear what measures are being taken to lower cost, or the degree of cost reduction achieved.

Implications

The North’s conducting and publicizing these tests underscores the important conventional warfighting roles of its SRBM force, which it relies on to perform many of the key conventional missions traditionally taken on by air forces due to longstanding alliance air superiority on the Peninsula. Conventional SRBMs would play a central role in the North’ ability to suppress alliance command/control, staging areas, logistics, airbases, ports, and other targets critical to military operations. This importance was directly recognized in the February 2026 Ninth Party Congress report, in which North Korea endorsed reinforcing SRBM deployments to “greatly increase the density and durability of concentrated attack” against the South. Publicizing the latest SRBM tests shows the North making good on this pledge. Finally, the substantial global press attention given to Iran’s use of submunition warheads in the recent conflict—particularly as a way of penetrating Israeli and US missile defenses—is likely to have motivated Pyongyang to trumpet its similar capabilities at this time.

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On commercial satellite imagery of North Korea’s Sinpho South Shipyard, it appears that the Sinpo-B class (GORAE) ballistic missile submarine (SSB) (8.24 Yongung) is probably in the drydock, likely undergoing repairs or modifications.

The submarine is usually berthed in the secure boat basin, sometimes alongside the larger Sinpo-C class SSB (Hero Kim Kun Ok) under the covered area along the quay. On imagery from March 29, it had been moved to the north wall. By April 6, it was no longer against the north wall, but the imagery angle precluded the ability to determine if it was back alongside the Sinpo-C SSB under the protective awning or elsewhere. Due to imagery angles and low resolution, its location in subsequent imagery could not be determined.

On imagery from April 15, however, it appears that the Sinpo-B SSB is in the drydock, although covered with netting that obscures it from view. Measurement of the few key points that can be seen through the covering indicate the vessel in question is approximately 68-meters-long, which is within the range of the Sinpo-B and significantly shorter than the Sinpo-C and Romeo-class SSBs.

The last time the Sinpo-B SSB had been drydocked was after an at-sea ballistic missile launch on October 19, 2021. Following that launch, which apparently damaged the submarine, repair work was done on its sail, which contains the submarine’s sole missile launch tube, in the secure boat basin. However, by early December 2021, the submarine was moved to the drydock likely for further repairs or maintenance. Why it is currently in the drydock is unclear, as no at-sea ballistic missile launches have been detected or reported. It is possible that after four years of being berthed in the secure boat basin, hull cleaning was needed or further modifications or repairs are underway.

At the construction hall, the cargo vessel previously reported as being stripped down appears to be now fully inside the building. The purpose of this activity is still unclear.

Imagery from April 22, 2026 reveals the netting has been removed, confirming that the Sinpo-B Class SSB is in the drydock. It is likely that the vessel is being worked on in some capacity, though the nature of this activity still remains unclear.

By April 24, the Sinpo-B SSB was positioned back in the secure boat basin alongside a support vessel. The nature of the work conducted on the vessel is unknown, however  took place over a short period of time.

The post Quick Take: North Korea’s Sinpo-B Class Submarine Drydocked appeared first on 38 North.

This article is from the fourth edition (January – March 2026) of 38 North’s quarterly product, North Korea Briefing, that monitors key internal developments in North Korea. For the full series, click here.

At the Ninth Party Congress, Kim Jong Un signaled a more assertive and secretive foreign policy posture, claiming that North Korea (also the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) now stands at the center of a multipolar world and vowing to expand its international influence while keeping adversaries in the dark.[1] In the wake of the Middle East crisis, Kim appeared intent on demonstrating that North Korea, unlike Iran, possesses credible military deterrence, overseeing cruise missile tests and calling for “peace with strength” while deepening anti-Western alignment with Russia and Belarus. North Korea also is likely to gradually expand economic cooperation with China, though political calculations on both sides will likely keep the pace measured. Meanwhile, Kim Yo Jong’s rebuff of Japan’s interest in a bilateral summit seems to underscore Pyongyang’s confidence in its enhanced international standing.

North Korea Claims “Important Changes to the Position and Influence of the DPRK”

According to North Korean media’s summary of Kim Jong Un’s report to the Ninth Party Congress—a review of the Workers’ Party’s work over the past five years—Kim claimed that “the building of a fair and just multi-polar world will be further promoted” and that North Korea stood “right at the centre of” that movement. He also stressed the need to “expand and strengthen the external prestige and influence of our state more broadly,” adding that the “Party Central Committee’s direct involvement in the external activities of the state is an essential requirement.” Notably, he emphasized the clandestine nature of external activities, saying: “Now our enemies don’t know what we’re planning and calculating. They can’t and shouldn’t know.”

Context and Implications

At the Eighth Party Congress in 2021, too, Kim Jong Un mentioned the need to “extensively develop the foreign relations on a par with the strategic position of our state.” However, Kim went further in his opening address to the Ninth Party Congress, playing up Pyongyang’s increased global influence by declaring that “the position of our state was firmly consolidated as an irreversible one, bringing about a great change in the global political landscape and in the influence on our state.” It is also rare for North Korea to call for the Party’s “direct guidance and involvement” and for strengthened security in the foreign policy domain considering North Korea’s “remarkably enhanced” international standing. In this context, North Korea’s diplomatic flexibility and pragmatism likely will be diminished further, as Kim Jong Un will play a more dominant role in North Korea’s external activities going forward. The covert and irregular nature of those activities will likely continue to increase, and Pyongyang will further assert its status as a self-declared “nuclear weapons state.”[2]

Kim Likely to Continue Flaunting Military Capabilities and Deepen Russia Ties Amid Middle East Tensions

On March 1, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s press statement condemned the US-Israeli airstrikes on Iran as a “shameless rogue act.” The Foreign Ministry followed up with a spokesperson’s answer to a journalist on March 10 to once again “strongly denounce the acts of aggression by the U.S. and Israel” and support Iran’s election of a new Supreme Leader.

North Korean state media have refrained from criticizing US President Donald Trump by name so far, but that does not mean talks are close. After the Party Congress, Kim Jong Un appeared to reinforce the notion that North Korea is different from Iran because it has nuclear weapons, and demonstrated those capabilities. For example, he oversaw or observed strategic cruise missile test launches conducted from the 5,000-tonne destroyer Choe Hyon on March 4 and 10 ahead of its commissioning, emphasizing the need to “maintain and expand the powerful and reliable nuclear war deterrent.” In his policy speech to the opening session of the 15th SPA, Kim called for “peace with strength” while referring to US “acts of state-sponsored terrorism and aggression in various parts of the world.”

Meanwhile, on March 26, Kim held a summit with visiting Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, signing a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation and agreements on cooperation in the fields of diplomacy, information, agriculture, education, and public health.

Context and Implications

Some analysts have argued that North Korea’s restraint in reporting on the Iran situation and in criticizing Trump by name signal Kim Jong Un will adopt a positive attitude toward dialogue with the United States. In this author’s view, however, North Korea’s incentive to come to the negotiating table will only diminish further. This is because engaging in dialogue while still refusing to denuclearize would expose North Korea to greater pressure—whether through US follow-up actions or a further worsening of US-North Korea relations—than refusing both dialogue and denuclearization altogether.

Instead, North Korea will likely continue to demonstrate that it is different from Iran in three key respects: its status as a “nuclear weapons state,” its backing by Russia, and the geopolitical difference between the Far East and the Middle East in that both South Korea and China oppose a war. In particular, North Korea will further step up its diversification of nuclear and missile capabilities while strengthening its own defensive posture. To that end, it will likely press forward with military cooperation with Russia and reinforce the anti-Western trilateral alignment with Russia and Belarus.

North Korea to Expand China Ties While Keeping Its Pace

Unlike at the Eighth Party Congress, Kim Jong Un’s “report” to the Ninth Party Congress made no explicit mention of Pyongyang’s relations with Russia or China, simply remarking that it “should steadily develop the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with neighboring countries onto a higher stage.”[3] However, the Ninth Party Congress’s claim that North Korea had made “remarkable achievements” in the foreign policy domain appeared intended to signal that a) the country has risen to the status of a “nuclear weapons state” on par with China and Russia, and b) its solidarity with these two nations has deepened. Though not publicized, the Party Congress is presumed to have shown off Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic accomplishments, for example in Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui’s speech.

Context and Implications

North Korea will likely maintain its close relationship with Russia for the military reasons cited above, while expanding exchanges and cooperation with China out of economic necessity, including importing goods in short supply for the implementation of the new five-year economic plan. North Korea-China trade reached approximately $2.73 billion in 2025, up 25 percent from the previous year, and passenger train service between Pyongyang and Beijing resumed on March 12 for the first time in six years. With its major political events now behind it, North Korea will likely gradually expand economic cooperation with China, though Pyongyang will also likely pace itself, guided by the political calculations of both leaderships. Kim Jong Un’s visit to China in September 2025 and the Chinese premier’s visit to Pyongyang the following month set the stage for restoring bilateral relations, but the two sides still remain at the level of the top leaders exchanging diplomatic correspondence and resident embassies trading platitudes about strengthening friendship and cooperation. Notably, Kim Jong Un’s recent speech to the SPA hints at a possible recalibration of Pyongyang’s relations with friendly countries, which could include China:

We should continue to improve and strengthen, from a developmental point of view, the relations with the countries with which we have traditional friendly ties in line with the requirements of the new era, and at the same time readjust and redefine diplomatic preference and adroitly translate it into practice by prioritizing our national interests on the principle of ensuring medium- and long-term and strategic national interests.

Kim Yo Jong Rebuffs Japanese Prime Minister’s Desire for a Summit

In a March 23 press statement, Workers’ Party Department Director Kim Yo Jong responded to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s interest in holding a North Korea-Japan summit, saying that it was “not the one that comes true, as wanted or decided by Japan.” She added: “If the prime minister of Japan seeks to resolve its unilateral matter not recognized by us, our state leadership will have no intention to meet or sit face to face with her.”

Context and Implications

The “unilateral matter” refers to the issue of Japanese abductees, which was discussed at the March 19 US-Japan summit. The statement’s main point—that dialogue may be possible only if Japan does not raise the abductees issue—appears to reflect Pyongyang’s confidence that its international standing has improved.

This chapter was originally drafted in Korean. The initial translation was produced using AI tools and subsequently reviewed word-for-word and refined by a bilingual subject-matter expert to ensure accuracy and readability.

The post With Little Incentive to Engage the US, North Korea Deepens Russia and China Ties appeared first on 38 North.

This article is from the fourth edition (January – March 2026) of 38 North’s quarterly product, North Korea Briefing, that monitors key internal developments in North Korea. For the full series, click here.

North Korea held completion ceremonies in January for the Wonsan General Fishing Implements Factory and District 1 of Aedo Tideland, both aimed at boosting food production under the five-year plan and overseen by the cabinet. At a completion ceremony for the first-stage modernization project at the Ryongsong Machine Complex in January, Kim Jong Un publicly dismissed Cabinet Vice Premier Yang Sung Ho on the spot for working in a “slipshod way,” a striking display of the leader’s intolerance for underperformance and false reporting among senior cadres. Between January 29 and February 9, groundbreaking ceremonies were held across 20 regions for construction projects under the 20×10 regional development plan, now in its third year. Once this year’s projects are complete, new facilities will have been built in 30 percent of North Korea’s local administrative districts, though whether local officials can effectively leverage this infrastructure to revitalize their regional economies remains an open question.[1]

Cabinet-Led Push to Boost Food Production

In January, North Korea reported on the completion of two notable economic construction projects aimed at boosting food production. First, it held an inaugural ceremony for the Wonsan General Fishing Implements Factory, attended by Vice Cabinet Premier Ri Chol Man and Pak Song Guk, chief secretary of the Kangwon Provincial Party Committee. Minister of Fisheries Song Chun Sop delivered a completion address, emphasizing the importance of adopting scientific fishing systems and rational methods to drive innovation in the sector.

Next, District 1 of Aedo Tideland was inaugurated, with Vice Cabinet Premier Ri Chol Man and Kim Chol Sam, chief secretary of the North Phyongan Provincial Party Committee, attending. A ring road has been formed along seawalls connecting Sinbong-ri with Aedo-dong and Ilhae-ri, all in Jongju City, North Phyongan Province. Google Earth satellite imagery shows the embankments did not exist as of February 2025 but were nearly complete by May of that year. While actual farming remains some way off, the completion ceremony likely marks a milestone in the drainage and desalination work.

Context and Implications

The seniority of attendees suggests both projects are under direct cabinet oversight. The Kim Jong Un government has favored short-term, intensive construction cycles completed within a single fiscal year. Expanding cultivated land through reclamation and boosting protein supply through fisheries serves a dual purpose: increasing food production while reinforcing the legitimacy of the Workers’ Party and the state. The emphasis on scientific methods and rational fishing also reflects Kim’s broader push to break with outdated practices in production and build a new economic system.

Kim’s Public Dismissal of a Vice Premier at Ryongsong Machine Complex

A completion ceremony for the first-stage modernization project at the Ryongsong Machine Complex was held on January 19. Kim Jong Un attended alongside senior Party and government officials, provincial officials from South Hamgyong, Complex staff, and others.

Cabinet Premier Pak Thae Song spoke at the ceremony, declaring that despite the scale and difficulty of the tasks ahead, success was inevitable if participants pressed forward with the same spirit and determination that had driven the first-stage project to completion under the Party’s leadership.

Kim Jong Un also addressed the ceremony, using the occasion to publicly criticize the cabinet’s performance. He charged that “the then premier of the Cabinet and the current vice-premier in charge of the machine-building industry worked in a slipshod way” and dismissed Vice Premier Yang Sung Ho on the spot. Kim clarified that he did not consider Yang disloyal to the Party, but judged him temperamentally unfit for a position of responsibility. It is also worth noting the fate of Kim Tok Hun, the former cabinet premier implicitly criticized alongside Yang in Kim Jong Un’s speech. Rather than being sidelined, Kim Tok Hun was re-elected to the Politburo at a Party plenary meeting during the Ninth Party Congress and subsequently appointed both cabinet first vice premier and a member of the State Affairs Commission.

Context and Implications

The available reports do not allow a firm conclusion about what went wrong at the Ryongsong Machine Complex. Sanctions-induced shortages of intermediate and capital goods may have made renovation work impossible. Alternatively, the mandated direction of the modernization projects may have clashed with actual conditions on the ground, such as power supply constraints, leading officials to quietly disregard their instructions. It is also possible that the vice premier viewed Kim Jong Un’s emphasis on integrated production systems and automation—which became a dominant policy trend under his rule—as dogmatic requirements detached from factory realities. What is clear is that Kim has a deep aversion to false reporting and views it as a bad habit among his officials.

A recent signed article in the Party daily Rodong Sinmun quoted Kim Jong Un as saying that mobilizing the masses would unlock unlimited reserves and yield practical solutions to adverse conditions. Though the article concerned production at small- and medium-sized coal mines, its underlying diagnosis was a deficit of Party consciousness and political awareness among Party members. The prescribed remedy was intensified criticism sessions and closer study of the Party daily. Whether such measures would translate meaningfully to a large, complex factory like the Ryongsong Machine Complex is doubtful, but if they were applied, the implication would be that motivation among cabinet officials and state enterprise managers is seriously lacking.

Groundbreaking Ceremonies Held Across 20 Regions as Part of Regional Development Policy

From January 29 through February 9, North Korea held groundbreaking ceremonies for construction projects across 20 regions under its regional development plan.[2] Kim Jong Un delivered a speech at the ceremony in Unryul County, South Hwanghae on January 29 and Premier Pak Tae Song spoke at the ceremony in Pyongwon County, South Phongan on January 31. A full list of ceremonies is as follows:

Context and Implications

Construction projects under the 20×10 policy for regional development are now entering their third year. In his January 29 speech in Unnyul County, Kim Jong Un noted that once this year’s work is complete, regional economy and people’s livelihood projects will have reached 30 percent of North Korea’s local administrative districts. The challenge is whether local governments can put these facilities to productive use. Kim’s own concluding remarks at the Ninth Party Congress acknowledged that some facilities, built at considerable expense, were already being neglected and failing to operate as intended. Yet, local administrators can only be held accountable once the necessary infrastructure is actually in place. The 20×10 policy, in this sense, appears designed to eliminate excuses: by supplying the physical foundation, the state removes any justification for inaction and compels local officials to deliver on regional economic revitalization.

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The first quarter of 2026 saw follow-on events to the Ninth Party Congress.[1] North Korea held national elections for the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) on March 15, its first parliamentary elections in seven years and two years behind schedule. Following his replacement as director of Bureau 10, formerly the United Front Department (UFD), during the Party Congress, Ri Son Gwon took on leadership positions at one of the DPRK’s (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or North Korea) satellite parties.[2] Finally, one of Kim Jong Un’s closest advisers, Jo Yong Won, was elevated to head the SPA itself.

Supreme People’s Assembly Elections Held

For the first time in seven years, the DPRK held national elections for its unicameral parliament, the SPA. Kim Jong Un voted at a coal mine in the Sunchon Youth Coal Mining Complex in South Phyongan Province. The elections were two years overdue, as the SPA lasts five years. This may have been to align SPA elections to the years of a Party Congress, but could also be due to self-declared crises and national emergencies in 2021 and 2022. One theory is just as good as the other.

The 15th SPA might formalize any legal changes and, via budget control, implement any government policies resulting from the Party Congress and the Central Committee apparatus elected therein.

Context and Implications

Kim Jong Un’s choice to cast his SPA ballot at one of the country’s major coal mines reiterates the Ninth Party Congress’ emphasis on domestic economic development. His appearance and speech may have also been meant to be a subtle message to North Korean citizens that the country’s “self-sufficient” economy can be immune from the high energy prices caused by geopolitical problems such as the recent attack on Iran.

Coal is one of North Korea’s viable exports. Opting to appear at the Sunchon Area Coal Mining Complex may foreshadow Sino-North Korean interactions during 2026 with an eye toward boosting coal exports to China, the largest purchaser of North Korean coal.

Former UFD Boss Crosses Over to Satellite Party

Ri Son Gwon, former head of the #3 Office Complex (the bureaucratic units tasked on inter- and diaspora Korean issues) and former UFD director, was elected to the 15th SPA as a member of the Korea Social Democratic Party (KSDP) and during the SPA’s opening session on March 22, Ri was elevated to vice chairman of the SPA Standing Committee. Along with Chondoist Chongu Party, the KSDP is one of two satellite parties which elect SPA deputies. Both satellite parties are technically subordinate to the former UFD. According to some South Korean reporting, the former UFD might now be called “Bureau 10,” but no further reporting has neither substantiated nor corroborated if that is the institutional name.

Context and Implications

During the Ninth Party Congress, Ri Son Gwon was replaced by another former UFD Director Jang Kum Chol as head of the former UFD. Jang was observed at a Party Congress sideline policy meeting with the other two top officials for external affairs—Party Secretary for International Affairs Kim Song Nam and Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui.

Ri Son Gwon’s migration to the KSDP placed him in the 15th SPA’s leadership as Vice Chairman of the SPA Standing Committee, despite the KSDP’s subordination to the former UFD.

Ri’s appointment to the KSDP continues a trend in which the WPK exerts a heavy-handed approach to the DPRK’s satellite parties. For example, during the second session of the 14th SPA, former KSDP Chairman Kim Yong Dae was replaced on a motion initiated by the WPK. As Ri Son Gwon is a former negotiator, his SPA and KSDP appointment indicate some degree of external engagement by the regime during 2026 may be possible. This could very well take the form of Ri issuing a communique on external relations or participating in delegation visits.

Jo Yong Won Migrates to SPA Leadership

During the opening session of the 15th SPA, Jo Yong Won was elected chairman of the SPA Standing Committee. Jo is a former top aide in the personal secretariat to Kim Jong Un and his last position was Secretary and Director of the WPK Organization Guidance Department (OGD).

Context and Implications

Jo’s SPA election fits into two broader personnel trends of the last 10 or so years of Kim Jong Un’s leadership. At the SPA, Jo Yong Won replaces Choe Ryong Hae, a princeling of the partisan core elite cohort (North Korea’s naval destroyer the Choe Hyon is named after Choe’s father). Jo Yong Won is a self-made core elite, attaining trusted positions through accomplishment, accountability, and hard work. Jo served in administrative affairs via the OGD’s local and provincial party apparatus before becoming a close aide to Kim Jong Un during his succession. He emerged in 2014 as a close aide and adviser to the leader and was mainstay in Kim Jong Un’s entourage until 2025. This is almost certainly due to Jo being an effective gatekeeper and proxy who can brief the leader in candid and constructive fashion.

Jo Yong Won’s migration to the SPA leadership also fits into a broader trend of core elites who hold different positions across the regime. Like his peers No Kwang Chol and Kim Jae Ryong, he has held different posts; compared to No and Kim, Jo’s experience is not as diverse. However, Jo’s lengthy public absence at the start of 2025 possibly involved him inspecting or working at local development projects. This type of experience familiarizes North Korean elites with the implementation and implications of strategic policy on a micro-level. It seasons core elites with holistic managerial experience. Once that experience is acquired, the individual elite can be appointed to any number of leadership positions as an effective regime manager. For Kim Jong Un this provides two benefits. First, it ensures his policies are being implemented. Secondly, it builds the institution itself.

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