Construction on the building began in July last year, although its purpose was not clear at that time. In recent weeks, however, a helipad has been constucted in front of the building, painted with a large “+” symbol. 

An identical helipad with a large painted “+” symbol sits atop the Pyongyang General Hospital which opened in 2025, although North Korea is not known to have a medical helicopter service. 

At Wonsan, the new probable hospital sits about 300 meters inside the resort, opposite a large parking lot used by coaches and the motor service center. 

It appears to be the latest in a string of new hospitals being built in North Korea. In his speech at the first session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Jong Un said a “public health revolution” was underway in the country and called for new hospitals to be built across the country. 

No other major construction appears to have taken place inside the resort over the winter months, but just south of the airport, work on a large railway station continues. 

Workers are in the process of roofing the main station building and adding a canopy over the railway platforms. A footbridge connects the railway station’s five platforms. 

As noted previously, the purpose of the station or rationale for its location is unclear. It would appear the station is intended to serve the resort, but the airport sits as an obstacle between the two areas. 

Access to the resort from the station is imperfect, at least currently. One route runs through Kalma town and past the existing Kalma Station, which raises questions as to why that existing station was not just expanded; another route runs into the resort’s rear entrance, which appears to be the service entrance. The most direct route will take traffic across a lightly-used—but technically active—airport taxiway. This puzzle will likely become clear when the station opens.  

The post A Probable New Hospital at Wonsan-Kalma Beach Resort   appeared first on 38 North.

Kim Yo Jong’s April 6 communiqué replying to South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s apology for 2025 drone incursions showed an evolution to the text of her public statements. It was the first observed occasion in which she explicitly attributed a new opinion or perspective to her brother, supreme leader Kim Jong Un.  

Until now, Kim Yo Jong has avoided mentioning or alluding to Kim Jong Un’s reactions or viewpoints to the topics or events her statements seek to address. In past communiqués, she has alluded to statements and verbiage Kim Jong Un has made himself or which had surfaced in a separate fora. In her April 6 statement, his paraphrased comment is presented as something new and previously unreported.

If we follow the mechanics of her statement, in the second paragraph, she recapitulates President Lee’s apology for the drone incursion. In the third paragraph, she says that President Lee “personally expressed regret.” In the next sentence, she said the North Korean “government appreciated it as very fortunate and wise behavior for its own sake.”  

In the one-sentence, fourth paragraph, Kim Yo Jong refers to Kim Jong Un as “our head of state” and says he “commented it as a manifestation of frank and broad-minded man’s attitude.” Here, Kim Yo Jong is paraphrasing Kim Jong Un’s response. It is not a direct quote or statement, but a characterization of what he said. This is quite notable because a paraphrase like this is common for presidential and prime ministerial spokespeople.  

In the final two paragraphs, Kim Yo Jong returns to her regularly-scheduled programming. She issues a warning against further drone incursions and warns of a North Korean reaction. The basic mechanics of Kim Yo Jong’s April 6 communique are: President Lee said/our government said/Kim Jong Un said/I am saying. There is no explicit or implicit connection between Kim Jong Un’s paraphrased reaction and the two paragraphs following it.  

A day later, following Kim Yo Jong’s statement came a more poetic communiqué from Jang Kum Chol, first vice Foreign Minister and head of the Foreign Ministry’s Tenth Department. Jang’s statement recapitulated Kim Yo Jong’s warning to the South Korean government and underscored that North Korea acknowledging Lee Jae Myung’s apology should not be construed as an amicable gesture. Jang refers to Kim Yo Jong’s statement as having “very short and gentle sentences and expressions,” sort playing the bad cop in restating the North’s position. Jang does not even touch the Kim Jong Un paraphrase mentioned in Kim Yo Jong’s statement, which probably indicates that the supreme leader’s one-sentence was his only perspective in the whole item, separate from both Kim Yo Jong and Jang Kum Chol’s rhetoric.

In a recent analysis by Donghyuk Shin for 38 North’s Emerging Scholars Program creatively categorized Kim Yo Jong’s media statements based on context and tenor. Leveraging that, one median conclusion we might reach is that no matter the event or topic, Kim Yo Jong is expressing her perspective as a top North Korean elite. In Jang Kum Chol’s statement he referred to discussing Kim Yo Jong’s statement with her and adding his thoughts. Taking all this into account, we might see these communiques as insight into the advice Kim Jong Un hears from some (probably not all) elites. This provides what might be a small insight into what gets discussed when he is briefed and when he is deciding on policy.  

Given this is the third Kim Yo Jong statement since her appointment to the position of Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Affairs Department Director, this might be the pretext for elevating the scope and content of her public statements. Paraphrasing Kim Jong Un could be a one-off event. On the other hand, it could indicate going forward that Kim Yo Jong’s public statements will combine core elite perspectives and her brother’s views making her the supreme leader’s spokesperson.  

The post Quick Take: Kim Yo Jong’s Evolving Messaging   appeared first on 38 North.

In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), state media have constantly shown women in meaningful, if not powerful, positions since Kim Jong Un came to power in December 2011. These figures include Choe Son Hui, the country’s first female foreign minister, and Ri Sol Ju, Kim Jong Un’s wife, whom he disclosed to the public in July 2012, soon after his ascendance to power. Most striking, however, is the emergence of two women belonging to the Mount Paektu Bloodline, the direct descendants of the DPRK’s founding father Kim Il Sung: Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s younger sister, and Kim Ju Ae, his daughter.

Kim Yo Jong is believed to be only around four years younger than her brother and currently holds multiple formal positions within North Korea’s political system, serving as a member of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee (CC) and a deputy to the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly. On February 28, Pyongyang’s official Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that she was appointed to the director of the General Affairs Department of the WPK CC.

Kim Ju Ae is believed to be around 13 years old and is the first child of the Kim family to be revealed to the public at such a young age. Despite her increasing visibility in state media and at major political and military events since 2022, she does not have any formal titles and is below the minimum age of 18 required for WPK membership. Nevertheless, in the lead-up to North Korea’s Ninth Party Congress, BBC reported that the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) claimed Kim Jong Un had selected his daughter as his heir. The basis for this assertion is unclear.

This brings us to a central question: Is Kim Ju Ae a viable successor candidate? Given Kim Ju Ae’s increasing visibility and Kim Yo Jong’s expanding institutional authority, it may be suggested that women of the Mount Paektu bloodline are assuming more prominent political and public roles. However, it remains difficult to conclude that this constitutes a clear indication of female succession. While these appearances suggest the potential for women to assume more prominent roles, the opaque nature of decision-making and deeply entrenched patriarchal norms in North Korea make it uncertain whether they could exercise substantive political authority. Careful attention to state media portrayals and formal appointments may provide insight into whether such symbolic visibility could translate into institutionalized power.

Evolving Role of Women in Kim Jong Un’s Era

Kim Ju Ae’s and Kim Yo Jong’s prominent visibility exemplifies a broader pattern under Kim Jong Un, in which women have increasingly appeared around him in public events. This represents a notable departure from the Kim Jong Il era and is particularly striking in North Korea, where male-centric thinking remains deeply entrenched.

Kim Jong Il never appeared with his wives in public and did not bring his partners to his public activities and events, instead presenting himself alone in most settings. Although his younger sister, Kim Kyong Hui, held multiple official positions throughout her career, she remained largely out of the public eye until June 2009, when her public profile increased noticeably, as the Kim regime was preparing to debut Kim Jong Un as the successor.

By contrast, Kim Jong Un has actively showcased his wife, Ri Sol Ju, in public. In 2012, the couple attended the opening ceremony of an amusement park arm in arm, signaling a visible departure from past practice. Ri’s fashion choices, often described as bold and modern, have stood out in a society still deeply influenced by patriarchal norms.[1]

In the diplomatic sphere, Ri has also appeared to take on the role of a first lady, at times softening Kim Jong Un’s otherwise austere public image. She accompanied him during meetings with Moon Jae-in and his wife in September 2018, and co-hosted Xi Jinping and his wife during their first visit to Pyongyang in June 2019. One possible explanation is offered by Gomi, who argues that Ri’s public presence helps project a fresh and individualized image to the population.[2]

In Kim Jong Un’s early years in leadership, Kim Yo Jong was close by his side in roles that supported and complemented him. She has accumulated multiple and notable formal positions within the party and state apparatus and has emerged as a key figure in the regime’s external messaging, indicating that she exercises a significant degree of influence and practical authority beyond a merely symbolic role. Their close relationship and her rising political profile led many analysts to previously believe she was being groomed as a potential successor, despite their narrow age gap. However, this assertion has largely faded away.

Since being revealed, Kim Ju Ae has made numerous public appearances with Kim Jong Un at major state events, including her prominent seating during symbolic occasions such as New Year’s celebrations. In North Korea, such choreographed visibility and spatial positioning often indicate political favor. While she currently holds no formal party, military, or administrative position, and deeply entrenched patriarchal norms may constrain the feasibility of a female successor, her repeated exposure has nevertheless led to wide speculation she could be considered a potential successor.

Debate Over Kim Ju Ae

While Kim Ju Ae currently holds no formal political authority, she is often suggested to be a potential future successor to her father as leader of the DPRK. Since her first appearance in North Korean state media in 2022, she has been publicly observed on Korean Central Television (KCTV) more than 600 days over the past three years, beginning with her debut on Pyongyang’s Korea Central Television (KCTV). By October 2025, she had appeared on KCTV on 41 occasions, 25 of which were related to military events, the largest proportion among all categories.

Professor Atsuhito Isozaki of Keio University has observed that her presence across a wide range of events suggests that the Kim Jong Un regime maintains firm control over the military to the extent that it can afford to display a potential successor in such settings. He further notes that this visibility may even indicate the possibility of successor education, reflecting the regime’s confidence and institutional stability.[3] However, the same could be said about simply the exposure and education of a young Kim child regardless of succession status. In general, Kim Jong Un must have high confidence in the stability and safety of his surroundings to bring his child around.

Kim Ju Ae, when she does make public appearances, is usually featured prominently on the front pages of Rodong Sinmun, the party daily newspaper. Since 2022, the terms “beloved child” and “respected child” have been used to describe her. In the March 16, 2024, issue of Rodong Sinmun, reporting included the phrase “great guiders,” which is understood to refer jointly to Kim Jong Un and Kim Ju Ae. According to Isozaki, this term has historically been reserved for a select few, particularly the supreme leader, as it signifies clarifying the path forward in revolutionary struggle and suggests a significant symbolic elevation of her status. However, given the lack of precedent, the implications of such language should be interpreted with caution.

This symbolic prominence has led Isozaki to suggest that Kim Ju Ae may be accorded a status superior to that of Kim Yo Jong and Ri Sol Ju. For example, in August 2024, Yo Jong is observed escorting Ju Ae to her seat, which implies a hierarchical distinction. He notes that Ju Ae is treated as an exceptional figure, emphasizing that while KCNA does not explicitly define her political role, her continuous exposure helps normalize her presence in public life and reinforce her symbolic importance.[4]

On the other hand, Ri Il Gyu, a former high-level diplomat at North Korea’s Cuban embassy who defected to South Korea in 2023, does not believe that Kim Ju Ae is likely to succeed her father, given the importance the regime places on its patriarchal lineage. He contends that Ju Ae’s inherited power would signify the end of the Mount Paektu bloodline, thereby undermining the hereditary foundation of the Kim dynasty.

At the same time, he notes that Ju Ae’s recent public appearances appear to convey a message to the North Korean populace that a fourth-generation succession is forthcoming. Even if Ju Ae herself is not designated as the successor, these appearances lay the ideological groundwork for legitimizing the succession of a child of Kim Jong Un.

Ju Ae’s frequent and highly visible public appearances as well as her apparent proximity to her father constitute observable features of recent state media representation. While these developments have led some analysts to view her as a potential candidate for succession, the absence of clear precedent and institutional confirmation makes such interpretations necessarily tentative.

Repeated exposure also appears to shape public perception. Through images and footage alone, audiences may increasingly come to associate Ju Ae as an important figure in North Korean leadership, much like her mother and her aunt have been portrayed. State media have consistently portrayed her in close physical proximity to Kim Jong Un, including scenes in which they hold hands or interact affectionately. At the New Year’s celebration performance in 2026, for example, such images were again prominently featured. These portrayals message, at the least, the seemingly close relationship between Kim Jong Un and his daughter and the importance he places on his family.

At that same time, Ju Ae remains in her early teens, and questions have been raised regarding age norms and potential gender constraints in North Korea’s leadership structure. The extent to which such factors would apply in practice remains uncertain given the opacity of the system.

Conclusion

The public elevation of female members of Kim Jong Un’s family, including his daughter, sister, and wife, may suggest a shift in representational practices under his leadership. The broader significance of this trend is still unclear—particularly, how much is about the women themselves versus shaping Kim Jong Un’s public image as a leader, a husband, a brother, a father, or unlike his father, a man of the people.

In the coming years, particular attention should be paid to future political appointments, or potential changes in terminology describing Kim Ju Ae,even the visual framing and frequency of her appearances in North Korean media, and especially the framing of female leadership in public discourse. Will there be more than just the Kim family women to gain visibility in public and especially political life? Will more women be elevated into elite positions to support the idea of female leadership writ large? These changes could serve as indicators of whether her role is transitioning from symbolic representation to a more institutionalized political position. Moreover, when succession happens will matter to what the choices are at that time. Kim Yo Jong, while around her brother’s age, is unlikely a planned successor, but should something happen to Kim Jong Un in the short-term, she could be part of a contingency plan given her family status and gained political power.

However, it should be kept in mind that everything around how young Ju Ae is being portrayed is unprecedented, so tweaks in language and title could be as much finding the right tone as intentional signaling. Moreover, the complete lack of information about Kim Jong Un’s other children should also be reason for caution in reading too much into the current situation.

The post Assessing the Limits of Female Leadership in North Korea appeared first on 38 North.

South Korea’s approach toward North Korea has long been marked by a lack of policy coherence and durability. This weakness stems primarily from the absence of a sustained bipartisan foundation on North Korea—the most pressing and long-standing security challenge for Seoul. Political divisions between the left and right in Seoul reflect fundamentally different, and often ideologically driven, perceptions of the North Korea. Unlike conservatives, who regard North Korea as a security threat requiring strong deterrence and firm alliance posture, progressives tend to see the North not as antagonists but as compatriots for eventual reunification, viewing the division of the peninsula as an externally imposed injustice.   

South Korea requires a candid yet constructive, non-ideological and non-partisan deliberation on how to manage relations with the North in pursuit of long-term national interests. In the absence of such a framework, North Korea policy is likely to remain reactive and fragmented, characterized by repeated reversals and stalled initiatives. Against this backdrop, this article proposes the establishment of a Korean-style Blue Ribbon Commission on North Korea policy, which would lay the groundwork for a durable, bipartisan consensus and spur new policy ideas.  

Inconsistency in North Korea Policy  

Progressive administrations in South Korea have generally pursued an engagement-centered approach toward North Korea, emphasizing high-level summitry, inter-Korean agreements, and confidence-building measures as pathways toward denuclearization and peace. Beginning with the Sunshine Policy under Kim Dae-jung and continuing through initiatives such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex under Roh Moo-hyun, progressives sought to sequence denuclearization alongside economic cooperation and expanded inter-Korean exchanges. This approach culminated during the Moon Jae-in administration, which advanced three inter-Korean summits, attempting to shape the peace process through bilateral engagement and military confidence-building mechanisms such as the Comprehensive Military Agreement in parallel with US-DPRK talks. While these efforts contributed to a reduction in immediate tensions and opened diplomatic space, their longer-term outcomes were constrained by a combination of factors on both sides. While North Korea engaged in high-profile diplomacy, many inter-Korean initiatives pursued by Seoul—including the resumption of economic cooperation projects—remained stalled due to international sanctions and the absence of corresponding support or exemptions from the United States and the broader international community. 

By contrast, conservative administrations have consistently framed engagement with North Korea as conditional upon demonstrable progress toward denuclearization, while placing greater emphasis on deterrence and pressure. Under Lee Myung-bak, “the Denuclearization, Openness, and 3000” policy explicitly linked large-scale economic assistance to North Korea’s prior abandonment of its nuclear program, reflecting a shift toward conditional engagement rather than unconditional cooperation. Similarly, Park Geun-hye’s “Trustpolitik” maintained openness to dialogue but emphasized that sustainable inter-Korean cooperation required verifiable steps toward denuclearization, while also strengthening deterrence in response to North Korean provocations. More recently, Yoon Suk Yeol advanced a similarly conditional approach through its “Audacious Initiative,” offering economic and political incentives contingent on denuclearization while simultaneously reinforcing extended deterrence, expanding joint military exercises, and deepening trilateral security cooperation with the United States and Japan. Taken together, these administrations did not reject engagement per se but subordinated it to denuclearization preconditions and embedded it within a broader strategy centered on deterrence and pressure. 

The key distinction among the administrations lies in perception and strategy. Progressive governments have emphasized flexible reciprocity, prioritizing inter-Korean engagement, exchanges, and economic cooperation as tools for building trust and encouraging change in the North. Conservative administrations have insisted on strict reciprocity, linking engagement to prior steps toward denuclearization, and focusing on deterrence and pressure. These perceptual differences have shaped divergent policy approaches and triggered domestic political debates, highlighting that sustainable North Korea policy requires both careful analysis of measures and an understanding of underlying perceptions of the North. 

This pattern has not only undermined policy continuity at home but has also eroded South Korea’s credibility in the eyes of North Korea and other regional stakeholders, reinforcing perceptions that commitments made by one administration are unlikely to survive the next. In this sense, the central weakness of South Korea’s North Korea policy lies less in the choice between engagement and pressure than in the lack of an institutionalized, bipartisan consensus capable of anchoring strategy beyond a single presidential term.  

The Case for a Blue Ribbon Commission  

In the United States, Blue Ribbon Commission refers to a special panel or committee composed of highly respected individuals, often recognized experts, or former leaders in their respective fields, who are tasked with examining complex policy challenges and offering high-level recommendations. They are special platforms in the US political process for promoting innovation in policy ideas, allowing space for open debate on difficult issues. The president or Congress appoints each commission with the intention for it to operate independently and provide objective, bipartisan recommendations. The intent is to ensure that their findings and recommendations are grounded in rigorous analysis rather than immediate political considerations. The outcome of a commission’s work is a comprehensive report detailing its conclusions and policy proposals, which often carries significant influence over subsequent policy decisions, legislative initiatives, or administrative actions. 

The track record of US commissions is mixed but includes some notable successes such as the 9/11 Commission in 2002, which led to the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center. The Iraq Study Group, for example, was established in March 2006 by US Representative Frank Wolf, a moderate Republican, to review America’s involvement in the Iraq War amid escalating violence. Wolf initiated the commission because “no real solutions were being offered at the time” and sought to prompt the Bush administration to reconsider its Iraq policy. Co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and Congressman Lee Hamilton, the group comprised five former Republicans and five former Democrats. After months of study, it issued a 142-page unanimous report in December 2006, containing 79 recommendations addressing diplomatic, security, economic, and other issues. 

The report’s significance lay not only in its recommendations but also in how it was presented to the public, which shaped its reception and amplified its impact on public discourse, increasing American disapproval of Bush’s handling of the Iraq conflict. The unanimous nature of its recommendations lent substantial weight, and its delivery to President Bush at a highly publicized press conference ensured broad visibility and public engagement. Although Bush initially resisted the proposals, the report exerted considerable influence on the subsequent administration, informing Barack Obama’s approach as he prepared to launch his presidential campaign. Its bipartisan credibility and enduring authority made the recommendations particularly appealing to policymakers and candidates seeking to demonstrate that their policies were both pragmatic and well-founded. 

The Commission’s effectiveness is largely derived from its unique political credibility. Its authority stems from independence from both the president and Congress, the stature of its members, and, critically, its bipartisan composition. This structure enables consensus-building, as members face little pressure to appeal to electoral constituencies. Equally important is the environment the Commission provides for sustained private deliberation, with members often dedicating dozens of hours to hearings, discussions, and debates. Commissions have historically served as one of the United States’ most effective mechanisms for achieving bipartisan agreement on complex foreign policy issues. They fulfill a vital democratic function by fostering ideas that may not find a home within either partisan camp. 

End North Korea Policy Divide  

One could envision the creation of a “K-Blue Ribbon Commission” on North Korea policy, designed to generate strategic guidance that transcends the priorities of any single South Korean administration. Mirroring the US model, the commission’s membership would be comprised of nationally recognized figures from both major political camps, including former senior officials, retired lawmakers, military leaders, and policy experts from think tanks. Inclusion of think tank experts would help inject fresh policy ideas and innovative approaches. Sitting elected officials, however, should be excluded, as their participation would inevitably be influenced by short-term political pressures and electoral considerations, potentially undermining the commission’s goal of fostering long-term policy thinking. 

The commission could establish subcommittees focusing on specific areas such as politics, security, the economy, and human rights, providing a forum for open discussion of sensitive issues on which the two sides have historically clashed. Upon its formation, the commission should be tasked with developing a set of shared policy principles and actionable recommendations capable of transcending partisan cycles. It should also critically reassess the assumptions that have guided past approaches, evaluate current conditions in North Korea, and determine how best to address the evolving security challenges on the Korean Peninsula in the years ahead. 

Through closed-door deliberations, hearings, and expert briefings, the commission would aim to reach consensus on key issues such as denuclearization, engagement, conditions for dialogue, alliance coordination, and responses to North Korean provocative actions. As in the US model, it would seek unanimous recommendations through intensive deliberation among all members. Such consensus would enhance the authority and credibility of the report, amplifying its political influence on both the Blue House and the National Assembly. 

Unlike his predecessors, President Lee Jae Myung has explicitly emphasized a commitment to pragmatism. In his inauguration speech, he spoke about consigning “outdated ideologies to the museum of history,” signaling a departure from partisan, ideology-driven policies. Moreover, a transformed North Korea demands a new approach. North Korea today is fundamentally different from 30 years ago; its nuclear and missile programs have advanced rapidly and evolving geopolitical conditions have created opportunities for Pyongyang to create new levels of military and security cooperation with Russia, in particular. This is compounded by both a lack of interest in further dialogue with South Korea in particular, and only under very specific conditions with the US. Such recognition is critical, as it requires moving beyond outdated assumptions that North Korea still favors inter-Korean dialogue and that complete denuclearization is feasible. 

Foreign policy begins at home. The Blue Ribbon Commission will provide an opportunity to address longstanding, unanswered questions, such as how the relationship with North Korea should be defined—whether as a compatriot, or a separate state—and what a consensus goal for reunification should be. It is the time to carefully consider what South Korea truly seeks, before pursuing bilateral engagement with North Korea, or even mediating discussions between Washington and Pyongyang. Without thoughtful, clearly-defined principles, actions risk repeating past cycles of inconsistency and policy reversal. By fostering deliberation and clarity, the commission can strengthen the credibility and reliability of South Korea’s position in inter-Korean affairs. 

Well Begun Is Half Done 

Of course, a Blue Ribbon Commission has its limitations. It lacks formal policymaking authority, and there is no guarantee that the current or future administrations will adopt its recommendations. As noted earlier, President Bush rejected the Iraq Study Group’s proposals, since the invasion of Iraq was the defining foreign policy decision of his presidency and central to his legacy. Nevertheless, the commission’s impact was significant: its findings were widely publicized, endorsed by many members of Congress, and helped to catalyze new initiatives on Iraq policy. The commission’s independence and the public availability of its report ensured that future presidents or administrations had access to valuable bipartisan views to help guide its thinking when needed. 

Second, despite the commission’s bipartisan composition, one might question whether its membership could unconsciously represent the biases of the appointing authority. However, because both the report’s findings and the identities of its members are publicly accessible, there is a strong incentive for participants to maintain objectivity and uphold their reputations and legacy. Former Secretary Baker, co-chair of the Iraq Study Group and closely aligned with President Bush, acknowledged this dynamic when he supported recommendations that ran counter to the administration’s position. 

Despite these limitations, the true value of a Blue Ribbon Commission lies in its role as a platform for intensive deliberation on complex issues. Such a commission should not be seen as a substitute for active governmental action. Rather, precisely because of its bipartisan composition, it can serve as an instrument of change within a political and bureaucratic environment that is often resistant to new ideas. Indeed, calls for bipartisanship on North Korea policy are nothing new in South Korea. Many former senior officials and opinion leaders from across the political spectrum have consistently urged a cooperative, cross-party approach to address the North Korean issue. Yet no sustained effort has been made to-date and now may be the opportune moment to act.  

The creation of a commission alone is not a silver bullet, but the initiative could serve as a signal to both allies and North Korea of a renewed commitment to consistency and long-term strategy. By giving bipartisanship a chance, South Korea can explore how best to calibrate its future North Korea in an environment that is fundamentally different from the past. 

The post Over Three Decades of North Korea Policy Divide: South Korea Should Give Bipartisanship a Chance appeared first on 38 North.

Imagery from March 25, 2026 revealed the maneuvering of a recently stripped-down coastal freighter toward the launch rails of the yard’s second largest construction hall (north construction hall) from which the Sinpo-C class ballistic missile submarine (SSB), also known as the Hero Kim Kun Ok, had been launched in September 2023. Imagery taken later the same day showed the bow of the freighter on the launch rails preparing to move the vessel into the hall. Imagery from March 29 revealed that while the ship had been moved onto the incline building rails, the vessel had not been moved inside, although its bow had been removed.

What is planned for this vessel is unclear. What is clear is that modernization and expansion of the Sinpho complex continues, portending a larger production and basing capability. At the same time, progress has been slow not only on those construction efforts, but also in the building, launching, and sending to sea of new classes of SSBs. Whether this is a matter of changing government priorities or the lack of materials, funds, and/or technology remains in question.

Tracing the Ship’s Movements

The cargo ship, a bulk carrier, was first seen at Sinpho when it arrived in the harbor on February 14, 2026. By February 17, the vessel was berthed stern-to-port at the launch quay that supports the larger of the two construction halls.

The vessel measured approximately 96 meters long with a beam of approximately 16 meters. The ship was configured with two cargo hatches, a bridge house located aft, and a king post mounted near the bow ahead of the forward hatch.

Disassembly of the vessel began approximately a month later, when imagery from March 15 revealed the bridge house had been removed and the cargo hatch covers opened. A mobile crane and a flat-bed semi-truck were parked on the quay astern of the vessel.

On March 19, the mobile crane was active alongside the stern of the vessel. The upper deck plates covering the engine compartment had been removed, as had both cargo hatch covers, revealing an empty lower deck. By the following day, the ship had been turned 180 degrees with the bow now facing portside. Disassembly of the upper deck, including the removal of the king post, continued through March 24. On March 25, the vessel was seen being maneuvered towards the launch rails of the north construction hall—the same hall and rails used in the construction and launch of North Korea’s Sinpo-C SSB in 2023.

Imagery from March 29 confirmed what was thought to be the case—that the vessel, as presently configured, could not be moved inside the hall. The north construction hall is fitted with two pairs of launch rails, equally spaced, with total door opening of 30 meters. With the ship’s beam at 16 meters and being positioned on the south pair of rails, it was clear it would not fit. However, by March 29, the ship’s bow had been removed suggesting that, at minimum, it would be refitted with a narrower one.

Imagery from April 1 revealed another unexpected development: the sides of the vessel’s hull were being removed, allowing the remaining keel, approximately 6.5 meters in width, to pass into the hall. By April 3, only 36 meters of the vessel remained outside the hall. It appears that the intent is to keep the ship’s keel and power plant intact as they work to repurpose the vessel. As the disassembly continues, it is unclear where the removed hull plates have been stored, although it is likely they will be reused in support of this project or another in the future.

While it is clear the main components of the vessel will be repurposed, the end product remains unknown. This shipyard has been dedicated to naval vessel construction and repair, and in the past decade, also to forward North Korea’s ballistic missile program. It has seen the launch of the Sinpo-B Class SSB (GORAE-class), a testbed for North Korea’s submarines, and most recently, the Sinpo-C SSB, a converted and reconfigured Romeo-class diesel submarine fitted with an array of missiles. A second submarine of the latter class is anticipated, and North Korean media has shown photos of an alleged nuclear-powered submarine being built in the larger hall.

The fitting jigs used to shape submarine and surface ship hulls may hold a partial clue for what might reemerge from the north hall. Adjacent to the larger, main construction hall, there is a component staging area. There, what appear to be U-shaped jigs are present. This differs from the round jigs seen in the past which have been associated with the round hull designs of submarines.

For large ships, refurbishment or reconfiguring activity would typically be performed in a graving dock or on open building ways supported by overhead cranes. At Sinpho, there is a dual-purposed graving dock located on the northeast side of the complex. That dry dock has been used to repair and fit-out both the Sinpo-B and Sinpo-C SSBs, as well as other attack-class submarines. But it also used to service the local fishing fleet. The graving dock is 175 meters long, but following the fitting out of the Sinpo-C SSB in 2024, a floating platform approximately 45 meters long, was moved into the dock and positioned at its north end. The platform’s presence and other modification taking place to the graving dock itself, may have precluded its use for the ongoing conversions to this cargo vessel.

At this time, we can only speculate as to how the vessel might be modified and repurposed. Among the possibilities are: a tender or replenishment ship for a growing SSB fleet, an arsenal ship fitted with missiles or possibly drones, the latter which are proving their worth in recent years as intelligence collectors and weapons systems, and then less likely, a space debris recovery ship or an assault/landing craft mother ship. And of course, there are other possibilities.

The Drydock

Following the fitting out of the Hero Kim Kun Ok SSB, which departed the dry dock in December 2024, new construction activity began at the dock. The dock is a two-level design; the levels equally divided along its north/south axis. The dock is approximately 175-by-60 meters, with half approximately 28 meters wide, with low spacing wall separating them. The lower basin occupies the east half of the dock and serves as the primary area for the repair of vessels. The fill gate is fitted to the deeper basin.

By January 1, 2025, 30 posts had been erected along the center line wall, and as previously mentioned, a floating platform had been moved into the graving dock where it has remained positioned at the north end of the east section. A gridded structure had been placed on the floor of the dock just prior to the platform’s arrival and is located beneath the platform. The purpose of the posts remains unclear, but they are reminiscent of the style used in building of the new construction hall at the Nampho Shipyard, and are likely intended to support a future covering over the entire east side of the dock. The purpose and presence of the floating platform remain unclear.

On March 9, 2026, ten 7-meter-long crates appeared on the floor of the dock, and tens of elongated items had been neatly arranged on top of the platform. By March 19, the 7-meter crates had been removed and by March 20, five small fishing boats had been moved into the basin. However, the objects on the floating platform remain. The appearance of the fishing boats suggests dual-use of the dock remains important, and while the purpose of the objects on the floating platform is unclear, they may represent building materials to be used in the construction of a future covering for the graving dock.

Due to the lengthy period the Sinpo-C SSB had spent fitting out in the dock, and noting that after the initial first few weeks of fitting out, the submarine was covered with tarps to either preclude viewing of the work being done or to serve as weather protection, the construction of a more permanent structure seems logical when one of the SSBs is moved in for repair.

Construction Progress in the South Portion of Sinpho

Construction continues along the shipyard’s south shoreline. Modifications have been underway since August 2013 when construction of a coastline seawall began. By July 2014, construction had begun on what is likely to become a submarine storage/repair hall protected by the adjacent mountain side, and a concrete pier to serve as a breakwater for the new harbor.

The hall construction coincided with the launch of the experimental Sinpo-B SSB. The pace of construction has been slow, particularly when compared to many of Kim Jong Un’s other strategic projects. While few changes are observed since 38 North’s last shipyard update on September 6, 2024, there are a few notable advances. First and foremost, the L-shaped pier, which will serve as both berthing space and a breakwater to protect the newly formed harbor, is now complete. It extends 140 meters out from the shoreline and pivots to the east another 280 meters. Tetrapods have been installed along its seaward sides to protect the structure. In addition, hundreds of tetrapods have been installed along the coastal road leading to the shipyard.

There has been little change to the storage and maintenance hall, which will eventually be earth covered although some backfilling is evident. But while some earth has been pushed up to its walls, no roof structure has been added. In addition, there are two new administration/support facilities located 450 and 720 meters east, respectively, along the coastal road. The first is presently a four-building complex and the second, six. Two buildings at the first location have been under construction for over two years. The others at this and further location began in the past six months. Construction at the latter facility continues with walls raised, but the roof has yet to be added.

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North Korea claims to have ground-tested a “newly upgraded” solid-propellant rocket motor about 20% more powerful than the new motor it revealed in September 2025. The source of the motor’s thrust increase is unclear, as is whether any Russian assistance was involved. Pyongyang associated the new motor with “strategic forces” but not a specific missile system; use as the first stage of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is most likely. The advent of the new motor further muddles the outlook for the North’s future solid ICBM force, raising questions as to whether there will be yet another new system in addition to the as-yet-untested Hwasong-20 (HS-20) revealed last fall, and whether that new system would supplant the HS-20 or even the prior HS-19, which has only been flown once. For both the new motor and its predecessor, the most likely purpose of their increased thrust would be in boosting heavier payloads; the most strategically impactful such payload would be multiple warheads if the North can successfully develop them.

Information to Date

North Korean media on March 29 reported that Kim Jong Un had overseen an undated ground (static) test of a “newly upgraded,” “high-thrust,” solid-propellant rocket motor “using the composite carbon fiber material.” The motor was claimed to have 2,500 kilonewtons (kN) of thrust (about 562,000 lbs). Accompanying photographs show a composite-case motor (consistent with the use of carbon fiber) that appears roughly the same diameter as the first stage motors of the North’s previously revealed solid ICBMs, the Hwasong (HS) -18, -19, and -20. It is unclear how the new motor’s length compares to the first stage of the HS-20, which is assessed to be longer than that of the HS-19, which in turn, is probably longer than that of the HS-18.

Pyongyang did not ascribe the new motor to a particular missile system beyond saying it was related to “strategic strike” and “strategic forces.” The article said the test is part of the new five-year plan that “set[s] the steady upgrading of strategic strike means as a major goal… both in quality and quantity,” and was characterized by the introduction of “better components with superior economic and technical effectiveness” like the new motor.

Analysis and Implications

Motor capability. If North Korea’s claims are correct, the new motor has about 20% more thrust that the 1,960 kN claimed for the HS-20 first stage motor revealed in September 2025, which the North also said would be used in a new variant of the HS-19. (By way of comparison, the 1980s US Peacekeeper solid ICBM’s first stage had 2,200 kN of thrust.) The source of the claimed thrust increase is unclear; possibilities include a longer motor and/or a small diameter increase, more energetic solid propellants, and improved motor design. Whether any of these changes are due to any Russian technical assistance is unknown.

Missile system association. The “strategic” missile most likely to be associated with the new motor is an ICBM, although use in a new intermediate- or medium-range ballistic missile cannot be ruled out. Use in an ICBM-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is unlikely, since the height constraints of missile subs generally dictate shorter missiles with larger-diameter stages.

The advent of the new motor so soon after the unveiling of the HS-20-associated motor last fall further muddles the question of the evolution of the North’s solid ICBM force. Will the new motor go into yet another new ICBM beyond the not-yet-tested HS-20 and the recently announced (and also unflown) HS-19 variant? If the new motor is longer than that of the HS-20, will it be combined with longer upper stages into a missile able to fit on the longer, 12-axle road-mobile launcher chassis revealed in September 2024? Will the new motor replace the one unveiled in September 2024 in the HS-20, or will a new ICBM using the new motor supplant the HS-20, the HS-19 variant, or even the original HS-19 (which has only been flown once in October 2024)? More data in the future will be needed to answer these questions.

Military utility. The use of strong, lightweight carbon-carbon in the motor case (the heaviest part of the stage beyond the solid propellant itself) means that more of the new motor’s thrust would be available to loft larger payloads or increase the overall missile’s range. Because even the HS-18 is assessed to be able to reach targets throughout the continental US, increased range would not seem to be a necessary use of the new stage’s increased boost capacity. Instead, lofting a heavier payload to the same range appears to be the best use of that increased capacity.

A heavier (and thus larger-yield) single nuclear warhead or the addition of warhead decoys or other missile defense penetration aids are possible uses for increased payload capacity. But the most strategically impactful use would be in lofting the multiple warheads and post-boot vehicle (payload “bus”) associated with a multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload. The North revealed multiple-warhead missiles as a development goal in 2021, and conducted what it said was a MIRV payload flight-test in June 2024 (albeit unsuccessfully). If MIRVs can successfully be developed, likely requiring at least several successful flight tests over a minimum of a few years, the North could further complicate the task of allied missile defenses and increase the number of targets that its missile force can strike with a given number of missiles and launchers.

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The demolition means the villages of Jangang-dong and Jangya-dong, both part of Cholsan County in North Phyongan province, have disappeared from the map. All but a handful of buildings by the port remain after the work, which points to either security concerns or the further expansion of the space port. 

Given how satellites and anti-satellite weaponry are in the country’s new five-year plan, expansion of North Korea’s main space center may be underway.

Figure 1a. Jangya-dong and Jagang-dong villages on imagery from February 25, 2026. Image © 2026 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com; Figure 1b. Jangya-dong and Jagang-dong villages razed on imagery from April 1, 2026. Image © 2026 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Activity Overview 

Sohae Satellite Launching Station , also known as Tongchang-ri after its nearest town, has been the site of all seven of North Korea’s satellite launch attempts since 2012. 

 Following Kim Jong Un’s visit to the site in March 2022, construction and expansion work has been almost constant at the facility since mid-2022.

First, a new launch pad was built, additional test facilities were added or upgraded, and more recently, construction has focused on a new assembly building, a tunnel through the site’s mountainous terrain, and a sea port. The pace of work has been relatively slow by North Korean standards, and it seems much remains to be done. 

In his policy speech at the opening session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly on March 23, 2026, Kim stressed the need to develop the country’s science and technology and emphasized “AI and space technologies” as primary areas of interest. In the new five-year plan set forth at the recent 9th Party Congress, Kim also set goals for “more evolved reconnaissance satellites” and “special assets” for attacking enemy satellites.  

Kim was at Sohae in late March to oversee a ground jet test of solid-fuel rocket engine. State media did not disclose the exact day or location of the test, but photos carried with the story appear to show the Horizontal Engine Test Stand at Sohae. 

No satellite launches have been attempted since the country’s fourth attempt to launch a military reconnaissance satellite in May 2024. However, after Kim Jong Un’s summit in 2023 with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russia’s Far East, space is believed to be one area of cooperation between the two countries. 

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The landscape of modern warfare contains only one constant variable: change. This modernity has brought forth a necessity to evolve at an increased speed than previous generations of warfighting have required. The rapid emergence of dual-use technological applications and the increased lethality of existing tactical concepts and defense industry advancements have emphasized the need for modern militaries to effectively handle change management.

Often, the best way to gauge the functionality of a military and its ability to adapt occurs in wartime as opposed to times of peace. North Korea’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has provided a profound opportunity to observe the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or North Korea) adaptability to emerging, critical-use technologies on the battlefield.

Since April 2025, an estimated 11,000-15,000 DPRK troops have been deployed to Russia with varying reports showing higher estimated numbers. With this large-scale engagement, it could be assumed that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has been exposed to a variety of modern warfare techniques and technologies, especially drone warfare.

North Korea’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict demonstrates a sophisticated capacity for tactical and institutional flexibility. Within its traditional military doctrinal framework, the KPA has gleaned innovative operational and tactical lessons, particularly with unmanned systems, from this conflict. Ultimately, Pyongyang’s ability to bridge the gap between these technological advancements and legacy doctrine displays a serious commitment to modernization and the integration of emerging technologies on the battlefield.

North Korea’s Military Framework

While North Korea’s recent warfighting experience has likely informed how it thinks about preparation for future wars, the ability to innovate in the pursuit of asymmetric advantages on the battlefield is not a recent occurrence. This ability stems back to the “Four Military Guidelines” set forth by Kim Il Sung in 1962. These guidelines consisted of: arming the population for defense, fortifying for structural defense, training the army as a “cadre” army, and modernizing for self-reliance in defense. Kim Jong Il continued to adhere to these guiding principles, passing them down to the current leader Kim Jong Un as well. While these principles may appear dated, they still have operational relevance, as displayed by the eagerness to recalibrate to the rapidly changing defense landscape in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

It could be assumed that North Korea’s approach to implementing dual-use technologies has been shaped by the guiding principle of juche—broadly defined as self-reliance—which prioritizes regime survival, political control, and asymmetric deterrence. The DPRK’s experience with unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in this conflict potentially represents a way to cultivate asymmetric advantages through deliberate technical adaptation. The seemingly unlimited potential uses of drones, ranging from intelligence gathering to offensive and defensive operations—all at a low financial cost—provide the North Korean military with an opportunity to enhance operational capabilities within its existing military doctrine. This emerging technology enhances its ability to fight, without overturning or overhauling the existing warfighting concepts.

Drones as a Force Multiplier

The proliferation and operationalization of UAS have changed the tactical landscape of modern warfare. The use of drones, which was once reserved for simply niche reconnaissance purposes, has evolved into a versatile multiplier that can be utilized to enhance virtually every aspect of military operations. The conflict between the Russia and Ukraine has proven to be prime ground for evaluating Western and Eastern weapon systems within the context of conventional warfare. The battlefield experience of having to evade enemy attacks while observing friendly forces’ usage of these technologies has alerted the North Korean forces to the utility of these systems.[1] Exposure to drone warfare capabilities in Ukraine has highlighted opportunities to multiply forces across the battlefield in a low-cost, highly effective manner that creates asymmetric warfare capabilities, an integral part of North Korean military doctrine.

Drones can be employed for a variety of methods that are now commonplace on the contemporary battlefield. For reconnaissance purposes, UAS are used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) that supports decision-making for collecting and processing information. This function has fundamentally changed real-time artillery spotting, allowing for both offensive and defensive applications with accuracies that would previously have required guided munitions. Drones can also be used for swarm attacks to overwhelm enemies in a low-cost method that can be used to overburden defensive systems with sheer numbers. These attacks can contain lethal munitions that make kamikaze-style operations highly effective.

The North Korean military has taken an interest in this capability as a potential means to diversify the ways in which their forces can operate and achieve effects on the battlefield. In the face of international sanctions and constrained reserves, the low-cost and asymmetric nature of drone warfare could provide the DPRK with a battlefield equalizing force that can be mass produced. These dual-use systems can support both offensive and defensive operations, allowing them to create effects similar to those of a larger conventional force. Additionally, the ISR application of UAS provides North Korea with an enhanced ability to observe enemy activity. This could aid them with early notification to potential incursions or revealing critical adversarial vulnerabilities, which is considered key to the DPRK for success in the event of a conflict. Investment in this technology, and the experience necessary to master such systems, could increase self-reliance and self-sufficiency to withstand defense against larger adversaries and conduct offensive attacks to create asymmetric advantages.[2]

Adaptation Under Constraint: Battlefield Learning

North Korea’s experience in support of Russian forces in Ukraine has provided a dynamic environment ripe with educational value for operational enrichment. North Koreans have had the unique experience of exposure to both Russian and Western combat tactics and warfighting capability applications. The North Korean infantry and special operations units that have been deployed in the conflict have fought alongside Russian allies, gaining a deeper, first-hand knowledge of how to apply modern warfare techniques. On the other hand, they have been able to face Ukrainian adversaries employing Western warfighting techniques and equipment. This simultaneous educational experience has created a prime environment for battlefield learning.

Working alongside Russian forces, North Korean troops almost certainly have gained direct exposure to a wide range of UAS and drone applications in active combat. The DPRK likely views the current conflict as an opportunity to gain proficiency in the coordination of drone-artillery tactical integration. North Korean forces may have had the opportunity to observe and participate in this proven tactic when used in a complementary manner with infantry units. This application of drone warfighting in conjunction with artillery demonstrates the highly effective results attainable from low-cost UAS used in mass deployments. The nature of this warfighting tactic likely made a favorable impression on the DPRK, as it could potentially be modeled for future conflicts along its own borders. The low-cost nature of these tactics is particularly attractive to the resource-constrained DPRK that seeks to dedicate its resources toward battlefield solutions that feed its desire to create asymmetry and quick-strike forces.

The Ukrainian side of the battlefield has potentially offered additional value for operational and tactical education, potentially compelling DPRK forces to adjust to Western tactics. Exposure to combat appears useful in understanding how to counter UAS. In the initial phases of this deployment, North Korean troops were frequently labeled as inexperienced fighters—with many referring to them as “cannon fodder” resulting in high-casualty operations. However, recent assessments suggest a different picture and may indicate adaptation in real time, where North Korean troops appear to have identified gaps in their own counter-UAS capabilities. Particularly, a possible example of this learning comes from its own organic drone defense systems. The observed poor effectiveness of drone jamming tools may have given the North Koreans the ability to adapt, in real-time on the battlefield, to the usage of shotguns as a useful and easily accessible weapon for counter-UAS purposes. They also appear to have adopted advanced camouflaging methods and rapid redeployment strategies consistent with Ukrainian drone operations.

Another significant observable adjustment appears to be the North Korean units’ shift toward small, more agile formations, as opposed to larger, traditional formations. This evolution suggests the ability of DPRK forces to adapt to modern ISR capabilities that come as a result of advanced drone warfighting applications. Additionally, Ukrainian reports show a perceived trend toward advancing technical capabilities from the DPRK forces, which may represent an increase in effectiveness from the earlier stages of the conflict. While this operational experience appears valuable, it may be confined to infantry tactics and small-unit operations. It is important to note the reported absence of combat experience in this war from North Korean aviation, logistical, and artillery units, which do not appear to have been deployed to the region to gain combat experience; this potentially creates a gap in the learning of combined arms integration of this new technology that defines modern warfare. Despite this potential experience shortfall, this increase in operational exposure to advanced drone warfighting tactics provides another compelling example of how real-world feedback on the battlefield can lead to tactical changes.

Strategic Adaptation: Military Doctrine and Drone Integration

It appears that this conflict has displayed adaptability and resilience in the warfighting abilities of North Korean troops. Ultimately, the learning that is gained from this experience in combat alongside the Russians is a demonstration of the DPRK’s capacity for operational evolution from tactical experience while adhering to existing DPRK military doctrine. Within traditional North Korean military doctrine, as set forth by Kim Il Sung, military adaptation needs to primarily serve the interest of the political apparatus and its strategic objectives.

Modernization presents unique challenges within this historically-rooted doctrinal framework of North Korea. A key principle is the ability of North Korea to organically develop its forces. Drone technology and hardware can be adopted due to the low-cost, domestically available quadcopters, and the potential for easily importable hardware from allies producing the same capability. The use of shotguns and traditional weapon systems for counter-drone capabilities shows the ingenuity of DPRK warfighters and their ability to integrate existing technologies for functions in modern warfare. The integration of drones in doctrinal practice could be interpreted as a reflection of a deep understanding from the North Korean military of the need to seek out alternative ways to create asymmetric warfare in the 21st century. Drone warfare also offers a strategic opportunity to leverage accessible technologies. It appears to be no coincidence that Kim Jong Un has emphasized drone development since 2024, a period that aligns with the deepening of the DPRK-Russia relations.

Operationally, the implementation of unmanned aerial systems provides a key link between increasing tactical capabilities and national security objectives of North Korea. Logistically, the ease of acquisition of drone related materials, mass development of this technology, and battlefield experience positions the North Koreans to integrate these systems with formidable lethality. The potential for overwhelming offensive operations, using swarm attacks and ISR capabilities create conditions for maximally effective rocket force deployment to deliver crippling losses for adversaries. Further, ISR employment could provide real-time targeting that could lay the groundwork for opportune artillery strikes or special operations infiltration. The ability of UAS to compound the effects of North Korean operational strengths make it a prime example of how the DPRK can increase asymmetrical warfare advantages whilst remaining in the framework of their supremely valued military doctrines.

Conclusion

Fundamentally, the ability to evolve with UAS technologies and drone warfare demonstrates that military innovation does not occur despite doctrinal restraints, but rather it happens because of them. The operational ability and willingness displayed by DPRK troops actively fighting alongside its Russian allies and the military-political structure of North Korea serve as significant examples of its commitment to modernization. By implementing these emerging technologies through the lens of creating an even more self-reliant national defense, Pyongyang has displayed an openness to learning and adaptation in ways that will create asymmetric advantages on the battlefield.

The exposure to combat in Ukraine and initiative to deploy troops to the region show the seriousness that the DPRK places on this modernization and adaptation. This selective engagement with dual-use technology serves as an example of a likely similar trajectory and implementation approach from the DPRK that will be applied to future emerging technologies to continue to create asymmetric warfighting advantages that serve the strategic political objectives of North Korea.

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