At a July 1 meeting of the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council in Incheon, President Lee Jae Myung pledged that South and North Korea would find a path on which they “respect each other’s systems and sovereignty” and coexist in peace.

Sovereignty is an attribute of statehood. A South Korean head of state was undertaking, on the record, to treat the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea or DPRK) as a state.

Behind the pledge is a changed Peninsula. Pyongyang has declared the two Koreas hostile states and abandoned unification as a goal—and with that, the division both sides had shared for eighty years, each claiming the whole, has come apart. One side has left it. The other still lives under a constitution that mandates peaceful unification and has to decide what that mandate means now that the counterpart has withdrawn.

The administration’s answer is the Policy for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. Its implementing strategy is a peaceful two-state framework: peace first, and the counterpart acknowledged as a state. It keeps faith with the constitution’s mandate, keeps the peace, and does not wait on the other side’s goodwill.

The Policy: What Changed, and What Seoul Answers

In December 2023, Kim Jong Un declared that inter-Korean relations were no longer a relationship of kinship but a relationship of two hostile states—two belligerents at war. Within months the declaration was made concrete: the monuments to unification demolished, the rail and road links across the border severed and walled. The country’s recently revised constitution has also deleted the unification clauses.

North Korea’s practices changed as well. Pyongyang disbanded the institutions that used to manage inter-Korean relations and refuses dialogue and exchange with South Korea across the board. The military hotlines lie dormant. While Seoul still hopes to restore the suspended 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement—a once-promising set of confidence-building measures—Pyongyang has declared it void and reversed the concessions it once made. Two armies face off along the world’s most fortified border with no functioning mechanism between them for managing a crisis—and on such a line, a minor collision can escalate, step by step, into war.

This is the situation the Policy for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula seeks to address. It was not written for a quiet pPeninsula. It is designed to help manage a fraught relationship where one side has walked away and shut every door behind it.

In his Liberation Day address of August 15, 2025, President Lee set out three principles underlying the new approach: respect for the North’s current system, no unification by absorption in any form, and no hostile acts. The Unification Ministry’s white paper released in May gave the relationship its official name—a peaceful two-state relationship oriented toward unification—and framed it explicitly against North Korea’s “hostile two-state relations.”

The Ministry’s August 5 report to the President states the aims: face the reality of inter-Korean relations as it is, ease the North’s distrust, establish peace as the top priority, and strengthen the future orientation of unification.

Facing the reality of inter-Korean relations as it is means starting from the fact that North Korea is a state—separate, but not foreign. Easing the North’s distrust means removing the ground Pyongyang has named for it—the South’s ambition of unification by absorption—from the Republic’s declared policy. Establishing peace as the top priority means placing it before unification and before denuclearization. And strengthening the future orientation of unification means leaving unification to the future, for a time when its conditions are met. Together, these four are what the government calls a peaceful two-state relationship oriented toward unification.

Changing course rarely comes without controversy. Domestic debate has centered on three criticisms: that deferring unification abandons the constitution’s mandate for peaceful unification; that the framework weakens security by accommodating a nuclear-armed adversary at the expense of deterrence and the alliance; and, above all, that acknowledging North Korea’s statehood violates the constitution’s territorial clause. Each misreads the policy. The sections that follow take them in turn.

Why Peace Must Come First

Neither element of a peaceful two-state framework is new. Seoul introduced the two-state framing more than half a century ago: the June 23 Declaration of 1973 opened the door to coexistence within international institutions, and the simultaneous UN admission of 1991 made both Koreas full members of the state system. And “peaceful” is older still. In the détente of the early 1970s, both Koreas committed to peaceful unification in the July 4 Joint Statement and then wrote it into their constitutions. Even the ordering is not new: “peace first, unification later” was Park Chung-hee’s stated line from 1974.

What has changed is the setting. Both sides then claimed unification, and each meant unification under its own system—the survival of one and the end of the other; “peaceful” meant only that neither would go to war for it. Within that limit everything else was tried. Engagement—contact and exchange—was meant not only to draw the two Koreas closer but to open the North, in the belief that an opened North would change and that change would lead, in time, to unification; Kim Dae-jung’s Policy of Reconciliation and Cooperation, better known as the Sunshine Policy, said as much. Pressure served the same end by the opposite route—sanctions, arms competition, diplomatic isolation, human-rights campaigns, leaflets and loudspeakers across the line—and North Korean “collapsism”—the expectation that the regime would fall—never quite died out. And the North wanted the same, in reverse: what it called completing the territory, and so called liberating the South. Between two states each claiming the whole nation, that was a contest, and while it lasted it justified everything short of war.

However, North Korea’s revised stance now changes what the mandate requires. A counterpart that has renounced unification will receive every unification-oriented approach—even reconciliation, exchange, common growth, peaceful coexistence itself—as an assault on its existence. Pursuing the disappearance of a state that has refused unification is no longer competition between two claimants; it is coercion directed at the other state. The old latitude is gone.

Maintaining the old definition of “peaceful,” then, means the constitution’s mandate is contradictory. On the old definition, everything short of war counted as peaceful. But peaceful unification is unification by agreement, and unification pursued without the other side’s consent, whatever a unified Korea would finally look like, is a hostile merger by peaceful means.

The way out is to set the pursuit aside and keep the goal. The goal itself does not change, and it is not abandoned. What changes is its character. Unification ceases to be a matter of time—something that arrives, however gradually—and becomes a matter of conditions: something only both sides can bring about, not a goal one side carries toward the other. Because it depends on consent, its timing and its form, and whether it happens at all, are left open. This is where the government’s language points—leave unification to the future, strengthen its future orientation—and it is the only reading under which the constitutional goal and the constitutional means no longer collide.

The design is not without precedent. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 preserved the aspiration to Irish unity while placing it under consent: unity may come only “by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions.” Unity remains available; coercion is excluded; the door is open and no one is pushed through it. A generation has lived under that arrangement without the aspiration being treated as a hostile posture. An aspiration disciplined by consent can survive—and can keep the peace while it waits.

Peace first, then, sets aside the one thing that cannot be pursued against the North without denying its existence: unification. This is where the framework differs most from the coexistence policies before it, from Kim Dae-jung’s onward. Those policies also renounced absorption, put coexistence first, and treated the North as a state in practice; but coexistence was, for them, the road to unification—the means, and unification the end it served. Now the framework takes coexistence as the end. The door to unification is left open, but only by agreement if or when the time comes. That is the arrangement the Good Friday Agreement made for Irish unity, and it is the only form in which the constitution’s mandate can still be honored, because every other form has become coercion.

Institutionalizing Peace Begins with Statehood

What does a peaceful coexistence policy actually change, given that the two Koreas have existed as separate states in fact since 1991? The answer is what it makes possible. Declaratory peace dies with the government that declared it, as the July 4 Joint Statement of 1972 did, and as the 1991 Basic Agreement did. Peace lasts only when it is institutionalized. On the Korean Peninsula, that process requires acknowledging the counterpart as a state.

Coexistence begins with how each side classifies the other. If the counterpart is unrecovered territory and an anti-state organization to be suppressed, then every offer it receives–reconciliation, cooperation, aid—reads as a sophisticated disguise for absorption. The distrust is justified.

In December 2023, Kim Jong Un confirmed it, and said it made no difference which side of Seoul’s politics was in power: the ambition to destroy the North’s system and regime had “remained unchanged even a bit whether they advocated ‘democracy’ or disguised themselves as ‘conservatism.’” He named what the party had concluded from the long history of inter-Korean relations—that unification could never be achieved with a South that had made unification by absorption its state policy—and read Article 3 of the South Korean constitution back at Seoul, word for word, as the proof. Decades of contact never dislodged that reading, because the classification underneath it never changed.

Acknowledging statehood does two things: it accepts the reality of the counterpart, and it creates a new possibility for the two Koreas to establish agreements that bind.

The record shows what that possibility is worth. The Basic Agreement read like a treaty; the South Korean Supreme Court and Constitutional Court both framed it as a gentlemen’s agreement, without legal force—a holding that followed from a legal order that withheld statehood. West Germany, by contrast, took the opposite path: it accepted East German statehood—two states in Germany, not foreign to each other—concluded the 1972 Basic Treaty as a treaty, and saw that treaty survive constitutional review and bind successive governments. The same design met opposite fates, and the difference was statehood.

With statehood acknowledged, new agreements between the two Koreas can be registered under Article 102 of the UN Charter and take their place on the plane of international obligation. Universal norms—the prohibition on the use of force, non-interference—become rules the two Koreas can invoke against each other, not abstractions floating above the Peninsula. Violations acquire a cost the violator does not control.

None of this makes the relationship foreign. The government’s own formula already draws the line: two states, not two foreign states. Statehood is acknowledged; the special relationship, and the orientation toward unification, remain. That is what separates a legal foundation for coexistence, which Seoul proposes, from a declaration of permanent estrangement, which Pyongyang has made.

Under Seoul’s new policy, deterrence remains untouched. The framework alters no military posture and no alliance commitment; the army that watches the border on the day the policy succeeds is the army that watches it now. Nor could the framework do otherwise: the same constitution that mandates peaceful unification mandates national defense, and the peace it commands is not a peace that forgoes the means of defending it.

Nor does the framework ask for trust. Both sides have now officially disavowed what the other most feared. Pyongyang has renounced not only unification but the means: Kim Jong Un has said that the North once spoke often of liberating the South and of unification by force, and that it now has no interest in either. Seoul has renounced unification by absorption in the principles set out above. Coexistence stands on those declared positions, not on goodwill. That is a floor: thin and cold, but load-bearing. The security objection mistakes this floor for a concession. It is the opposite—the first structure on this Peninsula that does not rest on trusting the adversary.

Is This Unconstitutional?

The constitutional objection rests on Article 3, the territorial clause. On the traditional reading, the Republic is the sole legitimate government on the peninsula; the area north of the line is unrecovered territory under unlawful occupation; the DPRK is therefore not a state but an anti-state organization; and a government that calls it a state acts against the text. A second prong follows from Article 4: to call the North a state is to call it a foreign country, and one does not unify with a foreign country—so acknowledging statehood ends the special relationship, and the command of unification with it. The question is not only domestic: because Pyongyang cites Article 3 as proof of the South’s intent, what the clause means is part of the dispute between the two Koreas, not merely a debate within one of them.

Status asks what an entity is; relationship asks how two entities treat each other. Whether the North is a state is not Seoul’s to choose—the DPRK has territory, population, government, and a seat at the United Nations, and it is a state whether or not any government concedes it. What relationship to have with that state is Seoul’s to choose.

The framework makes three distinct moves. It accepts the status. It withholds recognition — the discretionary act that would establish ordinary relations between foreign countries. And it chooses the relationship: special, not foreign. Two states can stand in a special relationship if they are not foreign to each other — and whatever Pyongyang now declares, these two are not: one people, divided in 1945 by the occupying powers, against its own will and without its consent. Seoul holds that position on its own account, as West Germany held it against East Germany’s insistence that the two Germanys were foreign states; it asks nothing of the other side.

Nor does statehood put unification out of reach. In 1973 the state of Bavaria asked the Federal Constitutional Court to strike down the Basic Treaty with East Germany (GDR) on grounds that read like the Korean objection today—that acknowledging the GDR as a state betrayed the Basic Law’s command of reunification and made the two Germanys foreign to each other. The court upheld the treaty. The GDR was a state; acknowledging it was not recognition of it as a foreign country; the two Germanys stood in a special relationship, not a foreign one; the treaty barred reunification neither in law nor in fact; and which road to take toward reunification was for the political branches to decide. Every element of the Korean objection was put to that court, and every element was rejected.

What of Article 3 itself? The objection reads it as a standing command to recover the North and remove its government. Two things follow from that reading. First, it makes Article 4 impossible to obey. A norm that denies the counterpart’s existence can be squared with the facts in only one way—by ending the counterpart—so every policy under it, however it begins, has to aim at that end; and a policy so aimed is not a peaceful unification policy. A peaceful unification is a unification by agreement, and an agreement requires a counterpart able to give it. Second, it condemns the record. The UN admission of 1991, the Basic Agreement, and every summit declaration since acknowledged the North in practice, and none of them has ever been held unconstitutional.

The command is in Article 4, not Article 3. Article 3 declares the extent of the territory and directs no one to do anything; Article 4 speaks in the imperative and mandates a peaceful unification policy. Read literally, the two collide—Article 3 admits no division, Article 4 presupposes it, and colliding provisions are read to accommodate each other: Article 3 states the goal, the territorial extent of a unified Korea, and Article 4 governs the means, which must be peaceful—and peaceful means require a counterpart. What Article 3 forbids is not acknowledging that the North is a state; it is renouncing unification for good and recognizing the North as an ordinary foreign country. The framework does neither.

On unification, then: the constitution mandates the goal, and Article 4 sets two limits on the means: peaceful, and within the free and democratic basic order. Within those limits, which road to take is for the political branches to decide. The framework stays within both limits: it confines itself to peaceful means, and acknowledges the North as a state, respects its system, and holds unification open to consent change nothing in the South’s own constitutional order. Respecting the North’s present system is not the same as accepting what a final unified state would look like; what exists across the border today and what unification must finally adopt are different questions, and the framework answers only the first.

Unification is not abandoned. It is kept, but is no longer considered a matter of time. Instead, it is of of conditions: whether it comes, and when, is for both sides to decide. After the counterpart’s withdrawal,as argued above, peace first is the only way to pursue unification that is not coercion; it carries the constitution’s command of peaceful means through to the end. A policy cannot violate Article 4 by being the last available way of obeying it.

Pyongyang’s Own Texts

The policy is, by the government’s own framing, an answer to a position Pyongyang has put in writing. Read as doctrine, it reduces to four sentences. We are two states. The project of liberation is closed. Leave us alone, and we will leave you alone. Touch us, and we will strike.

Everything about separation is unconditional and final: the declaration of two states, the removal of unification from the party charter and the constitution, the demolished monuments and the severed roads. These sentences close; they do not bargain. Everything about hostility and force, by contrast, is conditional, and Kim has said so himself. In October 2024 he told the world to read him properly: whenever he had stated the North’s position on the use of force, he had “clearly and consistently put a precondition of the word ‘if.’” If sovereignty is infringed, if territory is violated—then force. The threats are drafted as a conditional rule, and a conditional rule turns on what the other side does. The supreme norms show the same asymmetry. The party charter revised at February’s Ninth Party Congress carries the erasure forward—no unification task, no kinship with the South—while the first wartime clauses in the party’s history name no adversary. The constitution deleted the unification clauses and added a territorial article, but it did not name the South a hostile state. Separation is codified; hostility is not.

Separation is therefore grounded in a closed past, eighty years of confrontation that no one can reopen or amend. That verdict will not change, because the years it judges will not change. Hostility is grounded in present conduct, above all in what Pyongyang calls the South’s ambition of unification by absorption.

Of the grievances Pyongyang names, Seoul controls exactly one. Kim Yo Jong itemized them in August 2025: the ambition to absorb the DPRK, written into the South’s own constitution; the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group; the war drills “of aggressive nature”; and the repeated talk of “denuclearization,” which she cast as “totally denying” the North’s constitution. Only the first is Seoul’s to withdraw, and the framework withdraws it—officially, at the level of declared policy, which is the only level at which a doctrinal ground can be answered. The rest remain disputes: the nuclear program, military posture, the alliance. Nothing in this essay pretends otherwise.

Conclusion

North Korea’s abandonment of a shared goal of unification is a fact and will not be undone. What Pyongyang cannot end is the commitment on the southern side of the line: the constitution still mandates a peaceful unification policy, and no other state’s declaration can amend it.

A workable policy must therefore do three things at once: preserve the goal, exclude force and absorption, and acknowledge the state that stands on the other side. The peaceful two-state framework does all three. Nothing else on offer does.

Whether Pyongyang responds is an empirical question, and the argument does not depend on the answer. What it buys is not warmth. It is a cold peace—the floor described above, on which nothing further may ever be built, or which, if the other side chooses, becomes a staircase. This is what a peace-first policy looks like.

The post Peace First: Seoul’s Two-State Answer to a Changed Peninsula appeared first on 38 North.

China is North Korea’s largest trading partner, and Sinuiju is its largest import and export point. Several other crossings exist along the border, but none are as busy as Sinuiju. Opening the new bridge will facilitate a greater volume of traffic between the two countries as they appear set to expand trade. Earlier this week, North Korea opened a new crossing with Russia at Tumangang, which is expected to boost trade between the two countries. However, China is likely to remain North Korea’s dominant trading partner.

Recent Activity

Construction of the New Yalu River Bridge began in 2011 and although the crossing was completed in 2014, it never opened. China completed a customs building in 2016 but the bridge essentially ended in a field on the North Korean side. Work on the North Korean side began in 2020 then stalled for several years before resuming again. Activity picked over the summer months in 2026, and it appears that North Korea has finally completed its customs and immigration infrastructure.

The bridge is expected to become the main crossing point for cargo trucks traveling between China and North Korea. Currently, trucks cross the aging Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge traveling between the center of Dandong and Sinuiju. The new crossing has larger cargo processing capacity on both sides of the river and means trucks won’t clog up the city centers of Dandong and Sinuiju.

The old bridge is likely to remain in operation for rail traffic as the new bridge does not include a rail link.

On September 7, all construction activity appeared to be finished on the North Korean side with road surfacing, observed a week earlier, completed.

A small number of cargo containers are present in the North Korean yard on imagery from September 7. They have been there for several days.

On the Chinese side, there are no trucks inside the customs area. A few can be seen on an adjacent roadway, although it is unclear if they are associated with border trade or simply using it as a quiet road stop.

The customs yards on both sides of the river contain large warehouses for the storage of goods. In general, cross-border trade between the two countries involves trucks depositing goods for import or export in the warehouses to be taken across the border. Chinese trucks do not drive into North Korea beyond the customs point, and, in turn, North Korean trucks do not enter China.

The post New North Korea-China Link Appears Close to Opening appeared first on 38 North.

Recent indicators suggest that the North Korean economy has begun to emerge from the COVID‑19-era downturn and is now on a sustained recovery path. According to the latest estimates by the Bank of Korea, North Korea has recorded three consecutive years of growth in the 3 percent range since 2023, with particularly strong momentum in the heavy and chemical industries as well as the construction sector. The rebound in trade with China, the expansion of economic cooperation with Russia, and increased grain production also contribute to this economic recovery.

Against this economic backdrop, the North Korean authorities are advancing the 20×10 policy for regional development—Kim Jong Un’s signature economic initiative launched in 2024 that mandates the construction of industrial factories in 20 cities and counties per year over a 10-year period—and housing construction in rural and mining areas as key policy initiatives. These projects are significant not only for their economic significance—given their aim to narrow regional disparities and deliver tangible results for residents—but also for what they reveal about the regime’s capacity to implement policy and maintain regime stability.

However, it is difficult to view the economic recovery and the expansion of regional development policies in an entirely positive way. Recently, instability regarding exchange rates and prices has been growing in North Korean markets, and the policy implementation process faces multiple constraints, such as securing foreign currency, allocating electricity and resources, and ensuring the efficient operation of regional factories once completed. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between the continued pursuit of these policies and their translation into tangible economic outcomes.

The analysis suggests that North Korea’s recent economic recovery and mobilization capacity will likely enable the regime to sustain its regional development initiatives and largely meet its physical construction targets. Whether these projects produce durable economic gains, however, will depend on the regime’s ability to overcome resource constraints and keep the newly built facilities operating productively over time.

Recent Economic Conditions and the Lives of Residents in North Korea: The Coexistence of Recovery and Instability

In 2025, North Korea appears to have achieved economic growth comparable to the previous year, driven by increased trade with China, expanded economic cooperation with Russia, and the state‑led revitalization of local factory construction, all of which contributed to a rise in overall industrial output. The Bank of Korea estimates North Korea’s economic growth rate for 2025 at 3.5 percent.

Growth has been notable in the heavy and chemical industries and the construction sector. Recovering from the downturn experienced during the COVID‑19 pandemic, the heavy and chemical industries recorded three consecutive years of strong growth: 8.1 percent in 2023, 10.7 percent in 2024, and 7.8 percent in 2025. This trend appears to be driven largely by the post‑pandemic recovery of trade with China and the increase in North Korea’s arms exports to Russia following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS) estimates that North Korea’s revenue from weapons sales to Russia over the past three years exceeded USD 10 billion.

Following significant growth of 8.2 percent in 2023, the construction sector has maintained strong growth for three consecutive years through 2025. This trend appears to be driven primarily by housing construction in Pyongyang and rural areas, as well as the 20×10 policy for regional development. Notably, the construction sector recorded a growth rate of 12.3 percent in 2024, the first year of the policy’s implementation. This demonstrates that the regional development and housing construction initiatives recently promoted by the North Korean authorities are contributing, at least to some extent, to actual economic growth rather than functioning merely as political undertakings.

North Korea’s foreign trade began to recover in 2022 as the North Korea-China border, previously closed to prevent the spread of COVID‑19, partially reopened. Except for a slight decline in 2024, trade continued to grow steadily, reaching USD 3.1 billion in 2025—a 16.0-percent increase from the previous year.

Since 2023, grain production has remained in the range of 4.7 to 4.8 million tons. In 2025, total output reached 4.9 million tons—a 2.5 percent increase from the previous year—due to relatively favorable weather conditions during the sowing season and an expansion of cultivated area, driven mainly by gains in rice, wheat, and barley.

As the economy shifted toward recovery after the COVID‑19 pandemic, both North Korea’s state budget revenues and expenditures began to rise. The growth rates of revenue and expenditure, which had hovered around 1 percent through 2023, increased to the 2-3 percent range from 2024 onward. Improvements in economic performance, the recovery of foreign trade, and strengthened fiscal conditions serve as a firmer economic foundation for North Korean authorities to sustain policies such as regional development and housing construction, while also bolstering the stability of the regime.

However, developments in the markets present a somewhat different picture. Market activity among North Korean residents appears to have contracted significantly, largely due to the authorities’ tightening controls over the inflow of food and state‑produced daily necessities into markets as part of efforts to “rebuild the state‑run commercial network,” as well as sharp increases in prices and exchange rates. Market prices and exchange rates have exhibited high volatility. According to the Bank of Korea, market prices in North Korea rose by 63.1 percent and market exchange rates by 119.9 percent in 2025. The rise in market prices appears to be driven primarily by the authorities’ decision to raise workers’ wages by an average of twentyfold beginning in late 2023.[1]

Nevertheless, it appears that there has been no significant impact on the real incomes of North Korean residents. In general, rising prices lead to a decline in residents’ purchasing power, and the same pattern has historically been observed in the North Korean economy. Following the July 1 economic management improvement measures in 2002, the currency reform in November 2009, the tightening of international sanctions in 2017, and the COVID‑19 outbreak in 2020, periods of economic instability led to higher prices, invariably accompanied by an increase in the corn‑to‑rice price ratio. However, despite the sharp rise in prices since 2024, the corn‑to‑rice price ratio has instead declined. This suggests that, despite recent inflation, the real incomes of residents may not have deteriorated as severely as during past economic crises.[2]

Overall, the North Korean economy is showing a clear recovery trend in areas such as growth rates, foreign trade, grain production, and state finances, and the living conditions of residents appear to have improved compared with the COVID‑19 period. At the same time, the sharp rise in market prices and exchange rates, along with the contraction of market activity, indicates that sources of instability coexist alongside this economic recovery.

The 20×10 Policy for Regional Development and Housing Construction in Rural and Mining Areas: Policy Factors Strengthening Regime Stability

North Korea’s recently pursued 20×10 policy for regional development and housing construction projects in rural and mining areas aim to reduce regional disparities and improve the lives of local residents through regional development. The policy priority and implementation momentum behind these initiatives are expected to be sustained for a considerable period.

The 20×10 policy for regional development has the advantage of imposing relatively limited fiscal burdens, as it utilizes domestically produced materials such as cement and steel, as well as military construction units, while delivering visible results and helping secure public support within a short timeframe. With its designation as a key task in the new five‑year plan (2026-2030) announced at the 9th Party Congress, the policy’s priority has further increased.

Housing construction in rural and mining areas is also a sector with high policy priority for the North Korean authorities. State‑led investment in housing projects in these regions is aimed primarily at strengthening the loyalty of workers in the agriculture and mining sectors, where productivity improvements are urgently needed. North Korea has yet to resolve its food shortage issues. Demand for coal also appears to have surged recently, likely due to excess demand created by the Russia-Ukraine war—particularly within the heavy and chemical industries—that exceeds the country’s current production capacity.

Therefore, the regional development policy and housing construction in rural and mining areas can be understood as serving not only economic objectives—such as improving residents’ living standards and boosting productivity—but also as instruments for fostering greater public acceptance of and support for state policies. If the recent economic recovery provides the material foundation needed to sustain these projects, the regional development policy is likely to function as a key policy instrument underpinning the stability of the North Korean regime for a considerable period.

Sources of Instability and Constraints in the Policy Implementation Process

However, it is difficult to view the regional development policy as contributing solely to regime stability. The economic costs and distortions in resource allocation that arise in the course of policy implementation may instead function as new sources of instability.

The first incident to note is the recent sharp surge in the market exchange rate. Following sharp wage increases in late 2023, both prices and exchange rates began to climb, with the exchange rate rising far more steeply than prices. In 2024, market prices fell by 0.5 percent year‑on‑year, whereas market exchange rates rose by an average of 68 percent. In 2025, market exchange rates surged by nearly 120 percent, showing an increase roughly twice as large as the 63.1 percent rise in prices.

The sharp rise in market exchange rates may have been substantially influenced by the increased demand for foreign currency associated with the implementation of the 20×10 policy for regional development. Although the North Korean authorities may have provided supplies of cement, steel, and military construction units, it is possible that local authorities had to procure equipment and certain materials on their own. Alternatively, even without explicit pressure from the central authorities, the voluntary “loyalty competition” among local officials could also have played a role.

For local regions lacking their own sources of foreign currency, purchasing foreign currency in the market becomes necessary to obtain imported equipment or materials. If such demand for foreign currency emerges simultaneously across the country, expectations of further exchange‑rate increases can trigger speculative activity. The recent sharp rise in market exchange rates may have been driven not only by increased demand for foreign currency following the recovery of North Korea-China trade, but also by excess demand generated during the implementation of the regional development policy and the resulting speculative activities of market currency traders.[3] A shortage of foreign currency constrains the sustainability of investment while driving up market exchange rates, thereby functioning as a source of regime instability.

In addition, the expansion of construction projects during the policy implementation process appears to have been influenced by improved fiscal conditions resulting from the recovery of trade with China and the expansion of economic cooperation with Russia. Consequently, should foreign‑currency inflows decline—for instance, due to the end of the Russia-Ukraine war—market instability may intensify and the capacity for continued investment may become constrained.

Next is the issue of North Korea’s chronic power shortages and the resulting deepening of a dual structure in resource allocation. Under conditions where power supply falls short of demand, electricity is distributed according to policy priorities. As initiatives such as the 20×10 policy for regional development and housing construction in rural and mining areas emerge as key tasks and are assigned higher priority in power supply, electricity provision to lower‑priority sectors correspondingly declines. This can be viewed as a form of opportunity cost, in which limited resources are allocated preferentially to the regional development policy, thereby constraining production activities in other regions or industries. In other words, a policy introduced to reduce regional disparities ends up generating new disparities between sectors.

In this regard, recent research utilizing North Korea’s nighttime light intensity data shows that nighttime brightness in areas implementing the 20×10 policy for regional development increased in a statistically significant manner compared with levels prior to implementation, whereas nighttime luminosity in surrounding areas declined.[4]

Finally, greater uncertainty lies in whether factories and facilities can be operated stably over the long term once construction is completed. Kim Jong Un pointed out at the Ninth Party Congress that recently built production and service facilities are failing to be properly operated within less than a year, indicating that problems are emerging in the operation of completed factories and facilities. Construction targets can be achieved within a set timeframe by concentrating cement, steel, and labor, but stable operations require the continuous input of electricity, raw materials, equipment, and parts. Power shortages in particular serve as a major factor hindering stable operation.

The structural inefficiencies inherent in the 20×10 policy for regional development itself also act as a constraint on the sustainability of operations. North Korea’s local‑industry development policy is based on the principle of equal distribution, designed with national defense considerations.[5] The policy centers on constructing small‑scale factories in every city and county to produce nearly identical types of food and daily necessities—a strategy intended to minimize vulnerability to air strikes in the event of war. Because these factories rely primarily on locally sourced raw materials, they are not suited for mass production, and they are required to produce goods even when they lack a comparative advantage over other regions. As a result, they incur additional costs arising from the inability to fully leverage economies of scale or regional comparative advantages. While it is difficult to argue that these inefficiencies directly undermine the policy’s sustainability, the costs incurred by prioritizing resource allocation to specific sectors aligned with policy objectives can be passed on to other sectors, thereby hindering economic growth.

The preceding discussion demonstrates the need to evaluate the outcomes of the regional development policy by distinguishing between the construction phase and the operational phase.

Outlook and Implications

Given the recent strong recovery of the North Korean economy and the regime’s policy priorities, the 20×10 policy for regional development and housing construction in rural and mining areas are likely to continue being pursued consistently in the future. In particular, the regional development policy is expected to serve as a key policy instrument for North Korean authorities, as it can yield visible results with relatively limited fiscal input. The ongoing economic recovery and improved external economic conditions will also provide a foundation for sustaining these initiatives.

However, it is necessary to distinguish between the sustainability of the policy and the likelihood of its success. Given North Korea’s mobilization system and current economic conditions, it is likely that physical construction targets, such as factories and housing, can be largely achieved. Yet, considering the adverse effects and constraints that arise during implementation, it remains uncertain whether these achievements will translate into sustained increases in production and improvements in residents’ living standards. Therefore, when evaluating the regional development policy going forward, greater attention should be paid to the actual operation and productivity of completed facilities and their impact on residents’ livelihoods, rather than construction outcomes.

The same perspective is also required for regime stability. In the short term, economic recovery and the expansion of regional development projects are likely to bolster regime stability by delivering visible improvements to residents. However, whether these effects will translate into medium‑ to long‑term stability depends on the success of the regional development policy in generating sustainable increases in production and improvements in residents’ living standards. Ultimately, in assessing the economic stability of the North Korean regime going forward, what matters is not “how much has been built,” but “the extent to which completed facilities continue to operate and actually improve residents’ lives.”

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North Korea held the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in February of this year, where it reviewed the Party’s and state’s activities over the past five years and set out priorities for the next five. Although the proceedings of the Party Congress were released through outlets such as Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the achievements and goals of the five-year plan for economic development were presented only in broad terms, without specific figures. Since June 2025, North Korean readouts of key meetings, including Party plenums, have grown even shorter, making it increasingly difficult to assess developments in the country’s economy.

Fortunately, the press releases from the First Plenary Session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), held in late March, disclosed key points of Kim Jong Un’s policy address and Premier Pak Thae Song’s report on the Cabinet’s work. These releases offered a clearer picture of the achievements of the 2021-2025 five-year plan and the goals set for 2026 to 2030, as well as the broader direction of future economic policy. However, official reports issued by North Korea’s state media tend to highlight positive outcomes that support regime propaganda. To gain an accurate understanding of the North Korean economy, it is therefore essential to look beyond the information presented—examining what is emphasized or omitted—and to read between the lines of these reports.

This paper evaluates the achievements of the five-year plan for economic development (2021-2025) based on North Korean press releases and forecasts the direction of the new five-year plan (2026-2030). In particular, by examining the background behind the emergence of the “12 key targets” and the “20×10 policy for regional development”—which North Korea has highlighted as signature accomplishments of the current plan—it appears that the last plan period underwent changes or adjustments, which shaped future resource-allocation priorities and prospects.[1] Furthermore, regarding the 20×10 policy for regional development, assessments may differ depending on the criteria used to measure its performance, underscoring the need to evaluate the policy based on its intended objectives and the actual improvement of residents’ livelihoods, rather than market performance-based expectations.

The Achievements of the Five-Year Plan for Economic Development (2021-2025): The 12 Key Targets and the 20×10 Policy for Regional Development

The achievements of the five-year plan for economic development (2021-2025) were disclosed through press releases from the Ninth Party Congress, held in February 2026, and the first plenary session of the 15th SPA, held in March 2026. The press release from the Ninth Party Congress highlighted the 20×10 policy for regional development, the 12 key targets, the construction of 50,000 housing units in Pyongyang, and the construction of 110,000 housing units in rural areas nationwide as the major accomplishments of the five-year period. Kim Jong Un declared that the five-year plan had been fundamentally fulfilled, describing it as “the most significant achievement in the economic sector in more than 30 years.” Specific performance figures for the five-year plan can be found in North Korean Cabinet Premier Pak Thae Song’s report during the March SPA session, which focuses primarily on the 12 key targets. Where this reframing of plan goals came from is worth further examination.

Sanctions against North Korea and the COVID‑19 pandemic served as the most significant hindrance to the North Korean economy during the recent five-year plan period (2021-2025). Exports continued to decline due to harsher UN sanctions since 2017, while imports fell sharply as a result of North Korea’s self‑imposed border closures aimed at keeping COVID‑19 out of the country. Consequently, North Korea’s foreign trade plummeted to near‑zero levels starting in 2020.

Facing a shortage of fiscal resources due to the economic downturn, North Korean authorities issued Tonpyo—temporary money vouchers issued by the Central Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—in the second half of 2021. In particular, the state-reported outbreak and spread of COVID‑19 within the country from April 2022 prompted nationwide quarantine measures, causing the economy to face shortages of both raw materials and labor. The Bank of Korea estimated North Korea’s economic growth rate for 2022 at ‑0.2 percent. An analysis of the annual total number of industrial sectors that met their monthly economic plan targets—as reported in official North Korean press releases—shows a 43 percent decline, falling from 40 sectors in 2021 to 23 in 2022.

The 12 key targets and the 20×10 policy for regional development emerged at this juncture. An analysis of the context surrounding official reports from North Korean state media suggests that, as the country faced a crisis triggered by COVID‑19, it scaled back the sectoral targets of its five-year plan to the 12 key targets. This mirrored what was previously known as the “10 major prospective goals for socialist economic construction,” which had disappeared from North Korean media in the 1980s. Furthermore, the country’s limited capacity was underscored by renewed references to the chollima movement of the 1950s, as well as other “patriotic and mass movements.”[2] From this point onward, North Korean state media replaced sectoral reporting on the five-year plan with the 12 key targets.

The 20×10 policy for regional development, introduced in 2024, appears to have been one of the few areas in which the state could achieve visible results with the limited resources it could mobilize. This also aligned with the policy need to ease public discontent, as people’s livelihoods had deteriorated under COVID-19 containment measures. Due to fiscal constraints, only 20 regions were selected each year. However, construction targets—initially restricted to food-processing plants, clothing factories, and daily-necessities plants—expanded in 2025 to include general service centers, grain-processing facilities, and local hospitals, suggesting that the economic recovery has provided greater fiscal latitude. This shift is likely attributable to the increased trade with China following the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the wartime windfall resulting from the Russia-Ukraine war.

These observations suggest that the sectoral economic development plans announced at the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea were scaled back and refocused during the COVID-19 pandemic toward targets capable of yielding visible results through concentrated inputs of funds and effort, such as the 12 key targets and the 20×10 policy for regional development.

Instances of adjusted or delayed plans can also be found in the recent past. Policy tasks adopted at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in December 2019 were modified due to COVID‑19.[3] Construction of the Pyongyang General Hospital, which began construction in March 2020 with a target completion date of October that same year, was not finished until October 2025—five and a half years after groundbreaking. Similarly, the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone, which began construction in May 2015 with a target completion date of April 2020, was not completed until June 2025.

From this perspective, it is likely that the achievements of the five-year plan were evaluated against adjusted targets. Detailed plans for other sectors presented at the Eighth Party Congress—except for core industries such as electricity and metals, as well as housing construction and railway transport—may have been abandoned midway or fallen short. For instance, although the authorities claimed that nitrogen fertilizer production had increased 1.5 times compared to 2020, they made no mention of achievements during the Ninth Party Congress and the March SPA session regarding “C1 chemical industry,” a core task of the chemical sector. Despite the completion of the Sunchon Phosphatic Fertilizer Plant in May 2020, no results were reported for the phosphatic fertilizer production task set under the five-year plan. Likewise, while cement production was said to have risen 1.4 times compared to 2020, the annual production target of 8 million tons announced at the Eighth Party Congress went unmentioned. This raises the question of whether North Korea truly “fundamentally accomplished” the goals of its five-year plan.

Goals and Resource Allocation Priorities for the New Five-Year Plan (2026-2030)

The core objective of the new five-year plan is to maintain the existing growth strategy centered on key industrial sectors while fostering advanced industries such as space technology and artificial intelligence. At both the Party Congress and the SPA session, Kim Jong Un emphasized the need for technological upgrades across the entire economy, including basic industrial sectors, and specifically highlighted the importance of enhancing production capacity in the metals, chemicals, electric power, and coal industries.

Tasks were announced for economic sectors—including basic industries, construction, building materials, information and communications, energy, tourism, foreign economic relations, and agriculture—broadly consistent with the objectives set forth at the Eighth Party Congress.

The importance of electricity and coal production was further emphasized, and a concrete target was set to build 80,000 housing units over four years—20,000 units annually—in mining regions nationwide through state investment. The advancement of the 20×10 policy for regional development was also included as a major task of the five-year plan.

Although detailed sectoral tasks were not fully disclosed, press releases from the Party Congress, the SPA meeting, and the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Party Central Committee held in late June provide sufficient indications of the resource-allocation priorities in North Korea’s economic policy over the next five years.

First, during the new five-year plan period, the North Korean authorities are expected to devote significant effort to completing Juche steel and C1 chemistry technologies. These technologies are critical because the domestic production of raw materials and inputs is central to building a self-reliant economy, which is a major part of North Korea’s economic development goals.

It appears that the development of Juche steel production technology and C1 chemistry technology—key components of the metal and chemical industries prioritized during the previous five-year plan period—has not been completed. For example, there have been no follow-up reports since the December 2024 announcement regarding the completion of an “energy-saving oxygen-heat blast furnace” at the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex; furthermore, increasing steel output through repairs and upgrades in the metal industry remains a key task, as highlighted during SPA session discussions.[4] Although the authorities claim that Juche steel production increased 3.2 times compared to 2020, there is still no evidence that the Juche steel production technology has been successfully established, given that coke imports—a catalyst used in steelmaking—rose to 74,000 tons in 2025, up nearly 115 percent from 34,000 tons in 2023.[5]

Although the development of C1 chemistry technology was designated as a core task for the chemical industry at both the Seventh Party Congress in 2016 and the Eighth Party Congress in 2021, it remains a priority at the Ninth Party Congress, indicating that the technology is still incomplete. However, the report delivered by Premier Pak Thae Song at the March SPA session identified the “completion of construction projects to establish the C1 chemical industry” as a key task for the chemical sector, suggesting that some progress has been made.

The sluggish progress in developing Juche steel and C1 chemistry technologies stems from shortages of technical capacity and financial resources. However, the recent strengthening of North Korea-Russia economic cooperation has increased the likelihood of securing the necessary technology and funding.

Second, coal production remains a critical issue. At the SPA session, Kim Jong Un acknowledged that securing sufficient electricity and coal supplies is one of the most difficult challenges. During the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth WPK Central Committee held in late June, a “decision” was adopted emphasizing the development of the coal industry and the construction of housing in mining areas. Coal serves as both a raw material and an energy source for the North Korean economy; the steel, power generation, and chemical industries all rely on coal. The surge in coal demand appears to be primarily driven by the growth of the heavy and chemical industries, which has benefited from a recent wartime-driven expansion linked to the Russia-Ukraine war. According to the Bank of Korea, North Korea’s heavy and chemical industries are estimated to have grown for three consecutive years—8.1 percent in 2023, 10.7 percent in 2024, and 7.8 percent in 2025.

Third, the 20×10 policy for regional development continues to be implemented. As discussed earlier, this policy was not part of the goals outlined in the five-year plan (2021-2025) presented at the Eighth Party Congress; it appears to have been introduced later as an alternative measure to help overcome the COVID‑19 crisis. Initially, the policy was intended to generate visible results by mobilizing available resources and to appease residents whose lives had been disrupted by pandemic control measures. However, as it began to show tangible outcomes and gained momentum, the policy subsequently became a core initiative for improving residents’ livelihoods. The financial burden is minimal because the policy utilizes domestically produced steel and cement and mobilizes military construction units whose labor comes at virtually no cost. Furthermore, its results are immediately visible, making it advantageous for showcasing achievements.

Outlook and Implications

The conditions for implementing the new five-year plan are assessed to have improved compared to the previous planning period. The COVID-19 pandemic, which had been the most significant constraint on the North Korean economy over the past five years, has been resolved, and the strengthened relations with China and Russia have increased the prospects for expanded economic cooperation. In particular, the foreign currency, technology, and equipment secured through cooperation with Russia are expected to contribute substantially to North Korea’s industrial reconstruction and the expansion of its production capacity.

The 20×10 policy for regional development also appears likely to proceed without major difficulties. The products manufactured at local factories—such as basic food items like soybean paste and soy sauce—are produced using locally sourced raw materials. Judging from the packaging and contents of the products featured in the Rodong Sinmun, their quality does not appear to be particularly high. However, if the goal of the 20×10 policy for regional development is simply to meet residents’ basic needs with products of this level, the policy seems fully achievable given North Korea’s current circumstances.

While some may anticipate the failure of this policy, its success or failure depends on the criteria used to evaluate it. If judged against the standards of high-quality, mass-produced goods produced through the advanced production technologies we commonly encounter, the outcomes of the 20×10 policy for regional development would indeed appear far from successful. However, if the benchmark is whether residents can be provided with sustainably improved living conditions relative to the past, there is no reason to be overly pessimistic about the prospects for meeting the construction targets and continuing to implement the policy.

On the other hand, uncertainties also remain. If sanctions against North Korea persist, constraints on the procurement of equipment and parts could limit coal production and the development of key industries. Moreover, a shift in the currently favorable external environment, such as the end of the Russia-Ukraine war, could also affect North Korea’s fiscal conditions and industrial growth momentum.

Under its new five-year plan, North Korea continues to prioritize key industries while concentrating national resources on selected areas according to strategic priorities. Therefore, when assessing the future performance of the North Korean economy, it is necessary to closely monitor not only growth rates and production indicators but also progress in these core tasks.

In addition, the success of the new five-year plan is likely to depend heavily on the continuity and scope of economic cooperation with China and Russia. In particular, if cooperation with Russia leads to expanded access to equipment, technology, and financing, North Korea could make substantial progress in industrial reconstruction and production capacity expansion. Conversely, if sanctions against North Korea remain in place and external conditions shift, such as the end of the Russia-Ukraine war, significant constraints may emerge in executing the plan. Ultimately, the relationship with Russia appears to be a key variable in North Korea’s economic trajectory over the next five years, and the extent to which it can help restore the country’s industrial production capacity.

The post Successes and Challenges of North Korea’s Five-Year Plan for Economic Development: Assessment and Outlook appeared first on 38 North.

On August 29, Kim Jong Un presided over both an awards ceremony for three defense industry personnel and a meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Military Commission (CMC) that ended with a major shake-up of top Korean People’s Army (KPA) high command personnel. Together, these events reinforced Kim Jong Un’s role as head of state and formalized decision-making processes of North Korean power institutions. The CMC meeting was also the latest high visibility leadership action tied to corruption in the KPA General Political Bureau (GPB), seemingly aimed at changing the structural environment to prevent and repeat attempts to subvert the system.

The Award Ceremony

The August 29 ceremony bestowed state awards onto individuals in the defense industry who “made a major contribution to resolving scientific and technological problems of epochal significance in developing new combat weapons systems” and having “recently developed exclusive technologies to be regarded as an event in strengthening the capability of fighting a war and the deterrence.” State media did not disclose the specific type of weapons systems or the innovation, but the use of “deterrence” and “strengthening… deterrence” strongly suggests links to the nuclear program.

However, the significance of this ceremony was how Kim Jong Un participated, reading out the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) decree granting the awards. This was an unusual act, although it aligns with new head of state duties specified in the revised constitution (clause 5, chapter 90), which notes the head of the State Affairs Commission (SAC) “confers state decorations on persons who have rendered distinguished services.” This does not mean Kim Jong Un reading decrees will become common at future events but demonstrates him taking on more of the head of state role and underscores the SAC’s precedence over the SPA.

CMC Personnel Shakeup

The CMC gathered for its second meeting since the Ninth Party Congress in February. Attendance was restricted to CMC members, in contrast to most CMC sessions that usually expand participation and attendance to a wider population of senior defense managers and military commanders. Compared to other CMC meetings, which mainly deliberate, debate and decide on policy, the August 29 session addressed personnel changes with some discussion on the KPA’s “structural reorganization.” It is probable that the restricted attendance was due to the discussion of sensitive information (i.e., “need to know”) about personnel affairs and organizational adjustments.

In particular, the CMC addressed five personnel changes for the top leadership of the KPA and the CMC itself.

• No Kwang Chol was dismissed as Minister of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and removed from the Political Bureau. He was reassigned as the WPK Munitions Industry Department (MID) senior deputy director. No is part of a cohort of core elites Kim Jong Un rotates between high visibility frontline and second-tier posts for institutional continuity and to mitigate factional entrenchment.
• No was replaced by Kim Song Gi, KPA GPB Director. This appears to be a concurrent position, with Kim now serving as both MND Minister and GPB Director.
• Pak Jong Chon was appointed CMC Vice Chairman and retained his position as an MND Adviser.
• Yu Kwang U shifted from Military Security Command (MSC) Director to GPB Senior Deputy Director.
• Om Ju Ho replaced Yu as MSC Director. These GPB/MSC appointments follow a precedent of senior GPB and MSC personnel rotating between organizations.

Fallout from Pak Hui Chol Scandal

The changes described above are all tied to entrenched corruption and abuse of power centered around Pak Hui Chol, former director of the GPB Organization Department (OD). Publicized at a Central Committee Plenum in June and detailed at a rare joint leadership meeting in July, Pak’s case is the most prominent abuse of power and corruption scandal in North Korea in over a decade.

Pak served in the GPB OD role from 2022 to 2026, in charge of party life, political management and personnel affairs in the GPB and MND. He used this position and its authority for enterprise corruption, building a network of associates who sold administrative MND and GPB positions and swindled the regime out of money and materials. Although Pak’s activities were not a direct power challenge to Kim Jong Un, it did create a shadow hierarchy that triggered a months-long high-level intervention. As a result, Jo Yong Won was reappointed to lead the OGD, to which the GPB is traditionally subordinate, after only three months leading the SPA. This highlights the severity of the problems at the GPB.

The Pak case exposed a major failure in the political management structure of the KPA. Changes announced at the August 29 CMC meeting sought to reshape the interface among MND, GPB and MSC and the WPK Political Guidance of the Military Department (PGM). In addition to personnel changes, broader administrative changes were also likely, such as diversifying reporting and authority lines across different departments, weakening the grip of the OGD over the GPB. Jo’s return is intended to stabilize authority amid fallout from the Pak Hui Chol scandal and ease GPB’s transition away from OGD-centered control.

Insights and Implications

Certainly, the North Korean state media reporting of these events does not offer sufficient detail to know the full extent of what took place or the intended final outcome. However, there are a few insights to be gleaned from current available information.

• Kim Song Gi’s concurrent MND/GPB position is not unprecedented, although it has not happened in over 30 years. Kim’s concurrent appointments may be temporary, intended to fill the gaps left by the Pak Hui Chol scandal.
• Pak Jong Chon was appointed CMC Vice Chairman alongside Jong Kyong Thaek, meaning there are now two CMC Vice Chairmen. Having dual CMC vice chairmen splits policy responsibility between political management and policy compliance (Jong) and military modernization and operational implementation (Pak).
• Pak Jong Chon retains his post as MND Adviser. Under Kim Jong Un, this position has been used for retired or semi-retired officials who can provide advice based on their experience and institutional memory. Pak’s appointment to the CMC elevates this adviser’s position to a more active decision-making role, most likely based in the SAC Secretariat.
• Pak Jong Chon and Yu Kwang U’s full Political Bureau membership were both new and discretionary appointments, elevating their bureaucratic influence (MND and GPB senior deputy director respectively) by integrating them into the regime’s formal hierarchy.[1]

The August 29 events provide further insight into the decision-making landscape after the Ninth Party Congress. From these changes, Kim Jong Un appears to be reasserting the primacy of the WPK and SAC and restoring coherence and control to the KPA’s political management following the Pak Hui Chol corruption scandal.

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The New Yalu Bridge is a 3-kilometer-long link between China and North Korea that was completed in 2014 but has never been officially opened. China appears to have finished immigration and cargo facilities on its side, but significant work on the North Korean side did not begin until last year. 

On satellite imagery from August 30, significant progress has been made over the summer months. Several large warehouses now have roofs, and exterior construction on the complex’s main building and several support buildings appear complete.  

Throughout the facility, roadways have been paved and several vehicles are stationed in the parking lot. In one part of the complex, landscaping appears to have been completed outside of support buildings. 

A new gateway structure has also been constructed over the roadway where the bridge touches North Korean soil. 

On the bridge itself, vehicles are visible on carriageways on both the Chinese and North Korean sides of the bridge, further suggesting preparations are in place for regular traffic to begin. 

While the project has made significant progress over the past few months, work to complete the facility remains. 

On the North Korean side, several trucks are present at the foot of the bridge, and further construction efforts are underway. Within the complex, there are currently no road markings indicating the flow of traffic; it is unclear if asphalt will be laid over the concrete.  

The new bridge is expected to partially replace the aging Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge to the north, which carries both road and rail traffic between Dandong and Sinuiju. Opening the New Yalu River Bridge should relieve truck traffic on either side of the existing crossing.  

Work on the New Yalu River Bridge infrastructure coincides with efforts to complete and open a new road bridge with Russia at Tumangang. There, it is the Russians who are yet to complete work, while the North Korean facility has been finished. 

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The first article looked at North Korea’s new five-year economic plan unveiled by Kim Jong Un at the Ninth Party Congress in February 2026. And in a second, we explored the country’s rural housing and rural industrial development initiatives of the last few years.  

When Kim Jong Un kicked off the 20×10 regional development policy in 2024, he framed the initiative as bringing up the standard of living in “backward” rural areas. Using commercial satellite imagery, state media analysis, accounts of escapees and other data, these articles attempt to characterize how rural areas might be “backward” in comparison with other less remote areas. 

This installment will examine variances in the country’s access to education facilities and the resources challenges that exist in different areas.  

Educational System Overview 

The national education system in North Korea is structured throughout the country into nursery, kindergarten (ages 5-6), primary school (ages 6-10), junior secondary school and senior secondary school, college, and university. All education levels are tuition free for citizens and follow a standard curriculum. Teachers’ pedagogical methods are also mandated by the state for all schools, though anecdotal evidence hints that teachers’ instruction methods can vary widely, from lecture-style classes to more student-let discussion. It is unclear what the current prevailing methodology is in classrooms country-wide. 

While the education system and curriculum may be uniform across the country, schools themselves, their resources and capabilities can differ widely by city and region. Technology access is particularly challenging. As the state pushes technological literacy, not all schools are able to support this kind of learning. Some reports note that students in rural areas take written exams about using the computer or huddle around one screen for lessons, while others in Pyongyang have access to resources that enable hands-on education for students. 

Schools in North Korea are required to fund their own intranet access. Even if technology and the intranet are a part of state-level curriculum requirements, remote schools in poor counties, such as Kim Hyong Jik, may be unable to provide this for their students.  

At the more local level, there is a “support organization system” to help address some of these challenges. This is a mechanism in which enterprises are assigned to local schools and provide labor by way of renovations or other improvements in exchange for lunch and cigarettes, usually supplied by families. Unless there is a well-resourced, state-favored enterprise attached, school families bear the brunt of this burden. However, this means the schools that have the greatest need, are unlikely to be able to provide the incentives for the support system, especially those in more remote places like Kim Hyong Jik county. 

State Education Priorities 

North Korea is also finding ways to leverage align education with regime priorities. In recent years, greater emphasis has been placed on regional and workforce development within curriculum. This includes a new focus on technical and practical skills—both for the construction of these facilities and the knowledge to operate what is built. However, questions remain as to how widespread this more technical type of education is and, practically speaking, whether or not schools outside of Pyongyang are equipped with relevant resources to support these types of new initiatives.  

One way that the state is attempting to broaden the reach of these programs and cultivate a workforce pipeline is through distance education. While not a new phenomenon in North Korea, distance learning has been a priority of Kim Jong Un’s since he came to power. At the Seventh Party Congress in 2016, digital distance education was declared integral to North Korea’s education modernization strategy; in 2020, the Distance Education Act was put in place, codifying digital distance education in North Korea’s legislature. Recently, it has been leveraged as a way to train those outside of the capital on how to operate facilities—like the sci-tech dissemination centers or factory machinery—constructed as part of the 20×10 plan.   

During the second year of 20×10 implementation, science and technology hubs were constructed in each of the selected counties—and appears to be continuing under the plan. While the specifics of these sci-tech centers are unclear from North Korean reporting, it appears they are intended to serve as media rooms or computer lab-type facilities that provide e-library access to area residents. Sci-tech dissemination centers are not new to the country. Between 2014 and 2016, North Korea rapidly expanded their construction.  

The information sharing systems available in each regional facility connect to the centralized Science and Tech Great Hall in Pyongyang, or the Sci-Tech Complex, which serves as the country’s largest digital knowledge and e-learning hub, particularly for technical learnings and science and technology knowledge dissemination. This system allows researchers and other workers throughout the country to access relevant technical information that’s available only through the Sci-Tech Complex—another form of distance learning. Including these technical facilities within the 20×10 industrial hubs is one way to provide access to technical information in areas where technical education may be more scarce. 

According to a June 2026 Daily NK report, North Korea is also trying to institute hands-on teaching models at vocational colleges. That month, the Ministry of Education held a remote demonstration in Pyongyang for instructors from vocational and technical colleges across the country that worked to identify a production problem at a factory and troubleshoot it. However, teachers from outside of Pyongyang have expressed concern over whether or not this type of model or curriculum can be replicated outside of the capital, with such a large disparity in resources and technologies.   

Despite these concerns, anecdotal reports suggest another educational trend emerging is an elective system, promoted since the Eighth Party Congress and particularly concerning STEM-related subjects. This was rolled out nationwide at senior secondary schools in 2026. The electives offered vary by region or county and are tied to local industries in efforts to create a pipeline of workers who are well-suited to meet the industry and enterprise demands in their area. If a student wants to take an elective that is not offered in their area, they can either hire private tutoring or try to gain permission to stay with a family member living in a different area, possibly under the guise of caretaking. This supports the North Korean regime’s primary goal of education: to cultivate a workforce.  

Education in Pyongyang   

The capital city has the highest concentration of all levels of education—and, in turn, the most resources to provide for the benefit of students and teachers.  

Throughout the country, higher education is generally not prioritized. Reports estimate that less than 30% of the population has tertiary education, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that figure is not increasing. Spots at universities are only reserved for elites, many of whom live in the capital, making the largest concentration of the country’s college graduates in Pyongyang. 

Multiple schools across each level of education are available across Pyongyang, likely due to the level of resources designated to the city as well as the population size of the metropolitan area. Schools and universities in Pyongyang are often well-manicured and more modern than in other areas of the country. Universities like Kim Il Sung University have full campuses and ample facilities for students.  

Aside from the facilities, Pyongyang sets the direction of curriculum and pedagogy throughout the country. Teachers are often brought into Pyongyang for technical trainings. However, this also exposes among teachers and instructors the resource gaps between their schools and the capital.   

Some Resources, But Not Pyongyang: Haeju  

As a provincial capital, Haeju is home to a variety of educational institutes across all levels—from primary and secondary schools through more technical schools such as the Haeju University of Medicine, Haeju University of Technology, and the South Hwanghae Agriculture Science Research Institute. Nonetheless, the area has fewer offerings than Pyongyang. 

Haeju’s education system is reportedly better-resourced than schools in other areas outside of Pyongyang. For example, according to a 2022 DailyNK report, computer ownership rates at elementary schools in Pyongyang and Haeju were highest nationwide at 63%, compared to closer to 6% elsewhere. While only a fraction of the complete picture, this is one metric by which the resource disparity throughout North Korea is evident.  

Access to higher education is more readily available in Haeju than many other areas of North Korea and its institutions are also frequently cited by state media, namely around bolstering the quality of teachers and resources. A report from June 2026 noted that “…Haeju universities of medicine have intensified practical education to help students acquire knowledge in the field of medical science and clinical abilities, while raising the teachers and students’ level of mastering foreign languages,” and a November 2025 report highlighted efforts to “spruce up teachers’ retraining institutes capable of making a substantial contribution to improving the qualifications of teachers.”  

Other articles reference efforts at Kim Jong Thae Haeju University of Education, which was remodeled in 2025, to teach educators new methodologies—suited to different students’ age groups—and new areas of interest, like robotics. This discussion of different education types and teaching methodologies highlights that Haeju, while likely having fewer resources than schools in Pyongyang, holds educational importance in the country.  

The universities are not as expansive as they are in the capital city, but feature the identifiable school yard and long, narrow building. In Haeju, schools are often clustered around each other, though no pattern has been discerned.   

Challenges of Rural Education: Kim Hyong Jik 

The state of the education system in Kim Hyong Jik county is relatively unknown, largely due to its remote location. State media seldom mentions schooling in the area, but it has highlighted the Sampho Senior Secondary School and, in spring 2025, mentioned Kim Jong Un sending instruments to newly-built schools in flood-stricken areas of Kim Hyong Jik.  

Anecdotal reports highlight the disparities between remote counties like Kim Hyong Jik and other more urban areas. For instance, a journalist once noted that a school in Kim Hynog Jik held a cooking elective, but the school was unable to provide ingredients for the class. Instead, instructors led a course on cleaning and maintaining the machinery found in a foodstuffs factory—a more practical use case than what is typically thought of as an “elective.”  

Given that Kim Hyong Jik County was the recipient of three factories as part of the 20×10 regional development plan and the state’s efforts to align education with local industry, it is likely that schools in this county are strongly geared toward operating factories and farming. However, a lack of access to resources—including technology, electricity, and at times, the intranet—call into question if the county’s education system possesses the capabilities to actually train citizens to work in and operate these types of factories or tap into Pyongyang-led distance education programs.   

While we do not have any confirmed school locations in Kim Hyong Jik, we have identified likely schools in the area that share signatures of centers of education throughout the country, such as a large school yard in front of the building. In rural areas like Kim Hyong Jik, it is likely that multiple levels of education are aggregated under one roof.  

This research was sponsored by The UniKorea Foundation. 

The post Beyond Pyongyang: Educational Resource Divide appeared first on 38 North.

The first article looked at North Korea’s new five-year economic plan unveiled by Kim Jong Un at the Ninth Party Congress in February 2026. And in a second, we explored the country’s rural housing and rural industrial development initiatives of the last few years.  

When Kim Jong Un kicked off the 20×10 regional development policy in 2024, he framed the initiative as bringing up the standard of living in “backward” rural areas. Using commercial satellite imagery, state media analysis, accounts of escapees and other data, these articles attempt to characterize how rural areas might be “backward” in comparison with other less remote areas. 

This installment discusses North Korea’s telecommunications network, including access to the Internet (and intranet), mobile phone service, and broadcasting across the country. 

Telecommunications 

North Korea’s telecommunications networks are less developed than many countries, although some relatively modern services have begun to emerge in recent years. Due to the country’s tight controls on its population and the spread of unapproved information, most telecommunications services are restricted to domestic use only.

That means phones cannot call overseas or receive calls from other countries and data network access is restricted to an internal network with no Internet access.

The country has a nationwide fiber optic backbone that was installed in the early 1990s with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and expanded to cities across the country.[1]

Today, the network appears to connect to most government offices, official organizations and educational institutions in towns and cities across the country. The state of rural connectivity to the network is less clear.

The International Telecommunications Union estimates 1.18 million homes have a fixed-line telephone—a number that has not fluctuated since the mid 2000s.

Cellular Service

Prior to the launch of 3G mobile service in late 2008, few North Korean homes had access to a telephone. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) estimates a million homes had a fixed line phone in the early 2000s, jumping to 1.18 million in 2006 and remaining there ever since.

When mobile phone service arrived, it surpassed the number of fixed line phones within a couple of years and has since grown to around 6-7 million lines. Actual figures are not available, but visitors to Pyongyang indicate that most North Koreans they meet in the capital have mobile phones.

Network coverage was initially centered on Pyongyang and gradually expanded to other major cities and major highways, before reachingto the rest of the country. Today, commercial satellite imagery shows that the country’s cellular network covers a large portion of the country with many smaller towns and villages in range of a signal. The ITU estimates that 94 percent of the North Korean population have access to cellular coverage.

The mobile network allows for telephone calls, video calls, text messaging and access to the nationwide intranet. A growing number of services are being offered via apps that work in at least the capital region.

These include electronic payment systems, which are spreading across the country. A study on the evolution of the Samhung E-Wallet network shows it was centered around Pyongyang in the early years, starting around 2022, and began expanding to areas outside the city around 2024.

Smartphone-based shopping apps also began with delivery networks that only covered the capital, but have recently expanded to other major cities.

Broadcasting

North Korea’s strict censorship and information control environment means only a handful of broadcast networks are available. These include two state radio stations and several TV stations. Until 2016, most of the country had access to a single channel, Korean Central Television, while viewers in Pyongyang had two additional channels, Mansudae TV and Ryongnamsan TV.

In 2016, the country began to roll out a digital broadcasting network across the country that delivered KCTV, the two Pyongyang channels, and an additional sports channel to all homes. The network appears to cover most of the country.

Wired Broadcasting

North Korea maintains a national wired broadcasting network that carries a single audio program into houses across the country. The service, called the “Third Radio Network,” carries both national and local programming and it used to relay information to citizens that is deemed too sensitive to broadcast over the air, where it might be received overseas.

Exact penetration is unknown, but it is supposed to be in every house. When the interior of new rural housing has been shown in state media reporting, receivers for the radio network are often visible.

Internet and Intranet

Access to the Internet is strictly controlled in North Korea; most citizens have never used it. Internet connectivity is available at some universities and organizations in Pyongyang under heavily monitored conditions.

Conversely, the nationwide intranet is much more widely available. It appears that domestic websites can be accessed through the mobile data network via smartphones and the national data network via PCs. As part of the regional development “20×10” project, new libraries are being constructed that appear to have online access to books and study materials. Study centers at companies and schools also have intranet access although often the organizations must finance their own connection and equipment.

The intranet is also used to support the national distance learning network, which offers online courses to citizens across the country. The programming originates from major universities and organizations across Pyongyang and provincial capitals. and is a way for knowledge to be spread across the country without citizens traveling to different regions.

Regional Access

Compared to other sectors, access to telecommunications is more evenly spread throughout the country. This is, in part, because each cellular, radio, or TV tower can cover a large area.  However, the wide coverage serves multiple purposes. Not only does it provide connection, entertainment, and educational options for the population in even the most remote areas, but it also plays a vital role in the state’s control and indoctrination programs.

North Korea requires citizens to apply for mobile phone connections and to use a national data network ID to sign on to most services.

Smartphones are beginning to provide access to electronic government services, with medicine delivery as an early application. The service works across the nation, according to the app, although it is dependent on availability of medicines in local areas. If services continue to be rolled out on the mobile platform, it could start to rebalance access to services, information and entertainment between city areas and the countryside.

The post Beyond Pyongyang: Mobile Networks, the Internet, and Broadcasting appeared first on 38 North.