Across the Bay

The Hezbollah Model Revisited

2009-10-23T14:45:00.004-04:00

Following up on my previous post, here's a piece I co-authored with Mara Karlin that appeared in the Washington Times today.

I guess it was a fitting coincidence that it was published on the anniversary of Hezbollah's 1983 attack on the US Marine Barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 American servicemen.

The Hezbollah Model in Afghanistan?

2009-10-14T09:06:00.003-04:00

Over at the MESH blog, Matt Levitt has an excellent post on a recent report in the Washington Post that "[s]ome inside the White House have cited Hezbollah, the armed Lebanese political movement, as an example of what the Taliban could become."

Make sure you read Levitt's post, and then check out my own comment there.

Is the Obama Administration Fed Up with Syria?

2009-09-15T10:32:00.011-04:00

Hussain Abdul-Hussain has a very interesting report in the Kuwaiti Al-Rai today (Arabic): As a result of its frustration with Assad's negative behavior, Abdul-Hussain writes, the Obama administration has decided against sending its ambassador back to Syria at this time, in a reversal of the announcement made 100 days ago.

This report comes a few days after Jackson Diehl wrote in the Washington Post that "George J. Mitchell, the Middle East envoy, appears to have given up on including Syria in the Middle East negotiations he is preparing to launch." Mitchell did not include Syria on the itinerary of his current trip to the region.

Abdul-Hussain spoke to unnamed sources and US officials who expressed to him that the Obama administration has had it with the Syrians, who, according to one source, "don't know the difference between normalizing relations and [them] behaving like they've defeated the US in a world war."

Anyone who's read my commentary, whether here or elsewhere, knows full well that that's precisely how the Syrians were interpreting engagement. Remember Imad Shoueibi, the incomparable apparatchik who declared that Syria had "broken" the US, and that it was therefore "up to the defeated to present his menu and up to the victor to present his demands," even threatening then Acting Asst. Sec. Feltman?! And of course, who can forget the comedy classic, the list of conditions to "Abu Hussein" from the regime's most amusing clown, Sami Moubayed?

The sources go on to tell Abdul-Hussain, in an unamused tone, that "Assad had started to count the American eggs in his basket before offering anything in return," adding, "Assad fires a rocket here or there [in south Lebanon] and expects us to run to him... This kind of security blackmail no longer works on the United States."

However, the straw that broke the camel's back, according to Abdul-Hussain's sources, was the regime's behavior after special envoy George Mitchell's latest trip to Syria in July. Abdul-Hussain's sources provide us with a recounting of what happened at the meeting between Assad and Mitchell, and what ensued afterwards:

"During the meeting between Mitchell and Assad in Damascus, the Syrian president asked the American envoy to explain to him the articles in the Syria sanctions. Mitchell pulled out the sanctions draft and read it article by article, and explained it in detail to Assad, which took over an hour and a half... Mitchell concluded by explaining the mechanism of placing and lifting sanctions, and informed Assad that they were reviewed yearly, and that they could be lifted if and when the necessary conditions were met."

However, the Syrians, who are always eager to portray relations with Washington as being on an inevitable path of entente, leaked, either intentionally or by mistake, that the US had promised to lift the sanctions imposed on Syria. Before Mitchell's plane landed in Dulles airport... a wave of anger was sweeping through official hallways in Washington. The State Department had not given Mitchell any instructions that would give the impression that it had any intention of lifting the sanctions. Likewise, several members of Congress were angry, and quickly requested meetings with diplomats from State in order to be briefed on the US envoy's meeting with Assad.

Mitchell showed the official minutes of the meeting with Assad to his colleagues at State and to his former colleagues in Congress. "When we read what really happened between the two men, we reached a singular decision: Assad was always trying to play us, and we had to prove to him that Washington's plans in the region are not dependent on him," said one high-level US source.
...
But what really angered the US administration, according to the sources, was that "after months of dialogue with him (Assad), he hadn't changed an inch in his behavior, and offered us nothing of what we were asking. Instead, he always asks us about what we can offer him, under the mercy of blackmail and instigating [security] incidents in the region... America will not succumb to Syrian blackmail."

The bit about the Syrians eagerly and prematurely leaking the disinformation about sanctions is certainly true, and I've written about it recently. Essentially, it's Imad Moustapha's doing (via the WSJ), which didn't win him any chums here (not that the had many). And apparently, according to rumors, his standing in Syria is not that hot either, given the way engagement with the US has gone, after Moustapha and pals had portrayed it as a walk in the park, setting up what Andrew Tabler dubbed a huge "expectations gap."

Abdul-Hussain also asked unnamed US officials regarding any Arab role to bring Washington's and Damascus' viewpoints closer, and they replied that "Egypt is angry at Assad and shares our point of view that there is no use talking to the Syrian regime. As for Saudi Arabia, we watched it offer concession after concession to Assad -- in Lebanon and elsewhere -- and we have not seen any results so far." The officials added, "Israel is further today than ever from the idea of prying Assad away from Iran." The Syrian president, said the officials, had tried to use the card of indirect talks with Israel -- via Turkey -- in order to get to Washington, "but Israel categorically rejected what Syria and its Turkish sponsor had to offer."

Finally, Abdul-Hussain concludes that this tension might be escalating, according to his estimation of the mood in Washington. His sources conclude by saying: "we went to Assad because we believe he's the weakest link in the alliance hostile to us in the Middle East. But he behaves as though he were the strongest link and places conditions on us instead of seizing the opportunity of engagement. In the midst of these discrepancies, a return to sharp disagreement, and perhaps even a lasting break, became inevitable."

All in all some very interesting stuff. Let's see how it plays out. But overall, the mood reflected in Abdul-Hussain's report was mirrored in this recent piece by Andrew Tabler. It was also reflected in Diehl's column: "The problem is that none of this has brought any results. ... The results of the outreach to Syria were manifest a couple of weeks ago when the Iraqi government withdrew its ambassador from Damascus after blaming Assad's regime for continuing to foment terrorism in Iraq."

Following up on Tabler's analysis in the aftermath of the crisis with Iraq (see my commentary on that here), David Schenker put forward a rather sensible policy advice, proposing the US "reevaluate" and "review" its approach to Syria.

Perhaps the administration is on a similar wavelength in its overall approach to Syria? In the end, as Ziad Majed recently put it, Syria pretends to be a player but has "no real capacity" to deliver. It's a structural reality that the administration would do well to acknowledge.

Addendum: A very well plugged-in source in Washington writes in response to this post: "I too think the kerfuffle on the Hill over Mitchell's meeting revealed to State that any nominee to Damascus is going to get a great deal of Congressional scrutiny, and until State and their nominee have very good answers to the question: 'What has Syria done to deserve this?' there is little or no reason to go to the mattresses for Assad. So I do think [the Ambassador idea] is pretty dead right now."

Meanwhile, a propos Imad Moustapha, guess who's not on the guest list for Secretary Clinton's Iftar dinner tonight. For whatever that's worth.

Gen. Odierno on Syria and Iraq

2009-09-11T08:51:00.003-04:00

Important statements from Gen. Ray Odierno to al-Hayat (my translation from the Arabic):

General Odierno renewed accusations against Damascus of lending support to armed groups. He clarified in statements to al-Hayat that "during the past years Syria was lending indirect support to some of the fighters, on top of financial support." He added that Damascus "has not changed this type of interference and the American forces are watching that closely, and cannot interfere unless the Iraqi government requests it, that is for us to offer support and backup inside Iraqi territory and not outside it."

Regarding the evidence and documents displayed by Iraq in accusing Syria of supporting the perpetrators of the recent double bombings in Baghdad, and how convinced he was of that evidence, Odierno said: "there are armed groups that receive financial and logistical support from Syria," refusing to go into the evidence and confessions aired by the Iraqi government.

Regarding internationalizing the Syrian-Iraqi dispute, he said: "we support the Iraqi government's request that the UN moves to end the interference of all neighboring countries whose involvement in acts of violence or whose interference in Iraq's affairs have been proven." (Emphasis mine)

Update: Another major statement by Gen. Odierno:

"Syria continues to allow the facilitation of foreign fighters through Syria that both come into Iraq as well as, I believe, into Afghanistan," Gen. Ray Odierno, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, told reporters after meeting with Biden late Tuesday.

"We do know that there are some ex-Baathist elements that are in Syria that are funding operations in Iraq, and we also know that they are operating Web sites that encourage attacks inside of Iraq," Odierno said.

Inglorious Baathists

2009-08-31T07:28:00.015-04:00

Here's my commentary on the crisis between Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi government has accused Syria of harboring and refusing to hand over figures who have played a direct role in the latest bombings in Baghdad.

The Syrians, I argue, are playing an old game of theirs, trying to create for themselves a political asset (where none exists in Iraq) using Muhammad Younis al-Ahmad, whom they cultivated in order to attempt and create a splinter faction of the Iraqi Baath party that they would control (think Abu Musa and Fateh Intifada, e.g.). I had blogged about him back in 2007.

The Iraqis are also shining the spotlight on Syria's sponsorship of Al-Qaeda in Iraq as well:

Shemari said when he arrived in Syria from Saudi Arabia, he was met by a militant who took him to an al Qaeda training camp in Syria. The head of the camp was a Syrian intelligence agent called Abu al-Qaqaa, he said.

"They taught us lessons in Islamic law and trained us to fight. The camp was well known to Syrian intelligence," he said.

For more on the infamous Abu Qa'qa', see my old post here.

You'll recall that in the case of al-Qaeda's Abu Ghadiyah, the Iraqis had told the Syrians numerous times to hand him over, to no avail, until the US raided his hideout in the Syrian border town of Al Bu Kamal and ostensibly took him out. Similarly today, the Syrians are playing the same game.

This type of transparent evasive trickery will have repercussions on the already cautious US engagement effort.

Finally, Arabic readers should also check out Hazem Amin's follow-up in al-Hayat:

لكلا التوجهين السوري والإيراني نتائجه الدموية، والمالكي يتلقى صفعاتهما بصفته واقفاً في نقطة وسط. فالبعث الذي يتحدث عنه المسؤولون في سورية هو غير البعث الذي يرغب المالكي في استدراجه الى العملية السياسية. فالبعث، عند الأخير، بعث الداخل، او بالأصح البيئة البعثية بعد سحب الجهاز الحزبي منها، في حين تتحدث دمشق عن الجهاز الحزبي المقيم عندها، والمتورط بأعمال عنف وقتل، قبل سقوط النظام وبعده. أما البعث الذي تسعى طهران عبر حلفائها العراقيين الى «استئصاله»، فلا يقتصر على الجهاز الحزبي الذي كان حاكماً، إنما أيضاً يشمل البيئة البعثية في العراق، وهو ما يعني حرباً أهلية جرب العراقيون بعض نُذرها.

وإذا أجرينا عملية حسابية لما تريده كل من سورية وإيران في ملف البعث في العراق، حصلنا على نقطة مشتركة. فسورية غير مكترثة بالبيئة البعثية، وتطالب باستيعاب الجهاز الحزبي، وإيران غير مكترثة بالجهاز الحزبي المقيم في دمشق، وتطالب بإقصاء «مجتمع البعث». إذاً، الحرب الأهلية في العراق هي ما يلتقي عنده كل من النظامين الجارين للعراق.
...
الأوراق الإيرانية في العراق واضحة، وطهران تجيد لعبها، بدءاً من ضغطها لإعادة إحياء الائتلاف الشيعي وصولاً الى إيوائها قيادات تنظيم «القاعدة» العاملين على خط كابول – بغداد. أما الأوراق السورية فهي، وإن كانت اقل تأثيراً، أكثر طموحاً. فزيارة المالكي الأخيرة الى دمشق لم تُخلف ارتياحاً سورياً بسبب شعور المسؤولين في دمشق انهم حيال ممثل لدولة بدأت تتحسس الطريق الى مصالحها.

Amin is wrong about one thing, however, and that is the notion that the US discussed with the Syrians the issue of drawing in Baathist clients they harbor into the political process and forcing them on Maliki. That's simply not true. It is however the false impression the Syrians want to give, as I noted in my piece about how the Syrians are putting out such nonsense as the US "inviting" them to play a "bigger role" in Iraqi affairs! That's King of Comedy material.

What this Syrian propaganda campaign shows is a perfect example of how Syria uses engagement to screw its enemies (US allies and friends). I.e., it uses US engagement to screw US interests. It targets it in media (or other) campaigns in order to demoralize and confuse US allies and friends, and in order to create impressions about the engagement with the US. This is done to extract concessions from US allies under the illusion of an American cover.

In reality, however, no such "discussion" exists with the US. It's a complete distortion of not just US intentions, but also the actual pace and substance of the engagement process. It's vintage Syrian trickery. It's also a good example of some of the public pitfalls of engagement.

Amin's main insight, however, is that he shows how terrorist extortion is in fact the Syrians' (only) foreign policy tool, which is what I have argued repeatedly. That is what I've dubbed structural and systemic reasons why Syria won't change its behavior, and why its relations with its neighbors and the US will continue to be tense and problematic. Syria cannot have the kind of influence it regards as its entitlement, commensurate with its grossly over-inflated self-image, without sponsorship of terror and extortion of its neighbors. As Amin put it in the conclusion of his piece, "the bombings... are part of the relations with the Iraqi government." I.e., terrorism as state policy.

Doran on the US and the Middle East

2009-08-13T15:51:00.005-04:00

I've added a new feature to the blog: the feed of Michael Doran's Facebook blog on the US and the Middle East. It is in the right sidebar on the home page, under my Twitter widget.

Doran is one of the sharpest and most original commentators on the Middle East and US policy in the region. I'm sure you'll learn much from his insights, as I do.

Across the Bay on Twitter

2009-08-10T12:34:00.005-04:00

So I've succumbed and decided to give Twitter a try following the advice of my friend Mustapha of Beirut Spring.

You'll see a Twitter widget in the sidebar to your right on the home page. It's for short notices (which I hope will be more frequent), whereas the longer posts will still be here and in my regular op-eds. For the time being I'm removing the Quick Links feature until I figure out if the Twitter thing works as an alternative.

Syria's Premature Triumphalism on Sanctions

2009-08-06T09:52:00.003-04:00

Here's my commentary on the US sanctions on Syria, which were recently in the news. I'll be back shortly with a post on Imad Moustapha and his hilarious statements on this issue.

The Syrian Mirage: All Bills and No Merchandise

2009-07-22T09:24:00.007-04:00

Here's my latest for NOW Lebanon, which in a way follows up on Michael Young's recent piece in The National.

Syria has long tried to convince the world that nothing could be done in the region without its help. But Syria’s regional relevance is on the decline, and while the US is re-engaging Damascus, the reality is that the Assad regime comes to the table with a weak hand.

I explore two recent headlines that draw attention to Syrian marginality and limitations: Farouq Qaddoumi's storm in a tea cup, and Moqtada Sadr's meeting with Assad.

Assad is looking anywhere and everywhere for the semblance of strong cards. Ultimately, this reflects the fundamental flaw in the Syrian mirage: For structural reasons the Syrians cannot deliver what the US expects of them. Therefore, they trade in snake oil to create the illusion of importance.

When it comes to describing what dealing with Syria is all about, we can borrow from the title of a song by the American soul singer Clarence Carter. It’s like “getting the bills; but no merchandise.”

The Syrians Have Nothing, and Demand Everything

2009-07-09T09:07:00.003-04:00

Michael Young absolutely nails it in his piece in The National, explaining how despite having nothing, the Syrians, as always, demand everything.

A must read.

'Death to the Rahbar': Iran, Hezbollah, Velayat-e Faqih, and Lebanon

2009-06-24T09:35:00.007-04:00

Here's my commentary on Hezbollah's recent statements about the Velayat-e Faqih concept, in light of what's going on in Iran.

Hassan Mneimneh's essay, "The Arab Reception of Vilayat-e-Faqih: The Counter-Model of Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din," that I reference in the article, appeared in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 8, along with a related essay by Hussain Abdul-Hussain, as well as my own essay on Hezbollah's Agenda in Lebanon.

As for the Ibrahim Mussawi episode with David Samuels, you can revisit that here.

Finally, for the record, and for those who read French, I'm also copying the L'Orient-Le Jour interview with Saoud al-Mawla referenced in the article.

Saoud el-Mawla : La wilayet el-faqih n’est pas une notion théologique

20/06/2009

INTERVIEW
M. Saoud el-Mawla a contesté les récents propos tenus par le leader du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, au sujet de la wilayet el-faqih, soulignant notamment que la wilayet el-faqih est une théorie de jurisprudence et n'est nullement une notion théologique liée au dogme de la foi chiite, comme l'a affirmé Hassan Nasrallah dans son discours de mercredi dernier. Saoud el-Mawla, note-t-on, est un écrivain et professeur d'université chiite qui était conseiller de l'ancien vice-président du Conseil supérieur chiite, feu l'imam Mohammad Mehdi Chamseddine. En sa qualité d'intellectuel chiite, il a été l'un des fondateurs du congrès permanent du dialogue libanais et du groupe arabe pour le dialogue islamo-chrétien.

Dans une interview express accordée à L'Orient-Le Jour, Saoud el-Mawla a commenté la déclaration du leader du Hezbollah qui avait invité les journalistes, les responsables politiques et les forces du 14 Mars à s'abstenir désormais de soulever le problème de la wilayet el-faqih, sous prétexte que cette question relève du dogme chiite « que vous devez respecter », avait-il affirmé. M. Mawla a commencé par dénoncer sur ce plan « le mutisme des ulémas chiites et des hauts dignitaires religieux, et à leur tête Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, cheikh Abdel Amir Kabalan et tous les juges chériés et les muftis ». « Dans son dernier discours, sayyed Hassan Nasrallah a déclaré que la wilayet el-faqih fait partie du dogme chiite, affirmant que toute atteinte à cette notion ou toute discussion à ce sujet est une atteinte au dogme et à la religion. Hassan Nasrallah sait plus que tout autre personne que la notion de wilayet el-faqih générale est une théorie de jurisprudence et non pas une notion théologique ou dogmatique. Cela signifie que la wilayet el-faqih représente des dispositions et des mesures de détail en rapport avec l'organisation (de la vie de la communauté). Les musulmans chiites divergent au sujet de ces dispositions depuis l'occultation de l'imam Mehdi. D'où le fait que l'on a ouvert la voie au ijtihad (l'interprétation personnelle). »

Et Saoud el-Mawla d'ajouter : « Faire de la question de la wilayet el-faqih une affaire de dogme, c'est-à-dire prétendre qu'elle est au cœur de la croyance du musulman chiite et des fondements de la religion, constitue une atteinte à la Constitution libanaise ainsi qu'aux fondements de la coexistence, de la citoyenneté, de la démocratie et de la liberté au Liban, car adopter une telle attitude revient à brandir le spectre du terrorisme et de l'apostasie face à tous ceux qui rejettent la wilayet el-faqih (général, c'est-à-dire ayant une dimension politique globale). Or ceux qui rejettent la wilayet el-faqih (générale) représentent la grande majorité des ulémas et des dignitaires chiites en Iran, au Liban, en Irak et dans d'autres pays. Et cette position se retrouve à travers le siècles. »

L'attaque contre le patriarche maronite
« Les ulémas chiites, a ajouté Saoud el-Mawla, ont rejeté le principe de la wilayet el-faqih générale (englobant un pouvoir politique absolu) en lieu et place de l'imam Mehdi. Ils ont choisi d'accorder au wali (autorité religieuse) un pouvoir limité, c'est-à-dire celui d'un médiateur social, d'un conseiller, d'un juge, d'un cheikh. Les ulémas chiites n'étaient même pas d'accord sur les limites de tels pouvoirs. Certains d'entre eux ont englobé dans le pouvoir du wali le khoms (le cinquième des bénéfices du croyant payé aux imams), la zakate (taxe religieuse obligatoire), la prière du vendredi, ainsi que le fait de commander le bien et d'interdire le mal. D'autres ont donné à la wilayet el-faqih un pouvoir très restrictif n'incluant pas une autorité sur les individus, ce qui implique le rejet du recours à la force et de l'effusion de sang. »

Après avoir souligné que « la mise en place du gouvernement de la justice divine est du seul ressort de l'imam infaillible » (l'imam Mehdi), Saoud el-Mawla a relevé qu'« à travers l'histoire, aucun faqih chiite (savant de la foi) n'a prôné la wilayet el-faqih générale, à l'exception de cheikh Ahmad ben Mohammad Mehdi el-Nouraki (1245 de l'Hégire) dont l'imam Khomeyni s'est inspiré ».

Qualifiant d'« attitude répressive étrange » le fait de considérer la wilayet el-faqih comme un dogme, Saoud el-Mawla a relevé que « le peuple d'Iran ainsi que les hautes personnalités de la révolution de l'imam Khomeyni, ceux qui croyaient dans la wilayat el-faqih révolutionnaire font face aujourd'hui aux décisions du wali el-faqih » (l'imam Khamenei). « Sont-ils donc des mécréants ? » s'est-il interrogé. M. Mawla a appelé sur ce plan à la conciliation et au dialogue, à l'acceptation de l'autre et du droit à la différence, ainsi qu'au respect de la liberté d'opinion et d'expression. « Ce qui se passe aujourd'hui en Iran est la preuve la plus éclatante du fait que la wilayet el-faqih n'est pas agréée, même dans le pays d'origine, et donc à plus forte raison au Liban, en Irak et dans d'autres pays. »

Sur un tout autre plan, Saoud el-Mawla a souligné que les attaques de Hassan Nasrallah contre le patriarche maronite constituent « une calomnie et une injustice injustifiée ». « Ces attaques ne peuvent s'expliquer que par la volonté de justifier la défaite aux élections du fait que leur base populaire s'attendait à la victoire », a-t-il déclaré. Et de conclure que les accusations de traîtrise et les attaques personnelles lancées par les responsables du Hezbollah sont aujourd'hui déplacées car même l'Iran de Khamenei et d'Ahmadinejad pratique une politique d'ouverture en direction des pays arabes et de l'Occident.

Lebanon May Have Missed Going Iran's Way

2009-06-19T10:47:00.003-04:00

Michael Young in the Daily Star:

...

With the regime of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad acting with great brutality to impose a doubtful election victory, we can legitimately ask, caveats notwithstanding, whether Hizbullah would not have used a win of its own to place a similar headlock on the Lebanese political system in the future. In that way, the party could have used its authority to predetermine the outcomes in next year's municipal elections and the 2013 parliamentary elections to guarantee a lasting majority for itself and its allies.

...

Ultimately, Hizbullah did not put so much money and effort into the elections merely to recreate the situation that existed before June 7. For Nasrallah, like for Ahmadinejad, if we recall the Iranian president's recent statements on Lebanon, the elections were supposed to bring about precisely what Hizbullah's secretary general spent weeks saying they would: a state structured around a paramount concept of "resistance," which would sanction Hizbullah's weapons in the context of an official national "defense strategy." There was in the party's actions a definite will to power - no less decisive than is Khamenei's and Ahmadinejad's defense of their power in the security-dominated, post-revolutionary Iranian order.

Once in office, Hizbullah would have regarded its victory as a mandate to turn state institutions around to implement its aims. Given its behavior in May of last year, and now that we know that Nasrallah, even in defeat, believes he represents a Lebanese majority, Hizbullah would likely have accelerated its takeover of the state. Aoun, given his limited means to counter such actions, would have ended up being a fig leaf.

In many respects Hizbullah is a Leninist organization, a vanguard party focused on implementing a revolutionary ideology. The revolutionary impulse has always been an essential part of Hizbullah's mindset, with the idea of "resistance" at its center. That's not to say the party is today seeking to introduce an Islamic Republic in Lebanon, as that would only undermine its broader objectives; for a revolutionary party to survive, it sometimes needs to make momentary compromises. But for the past decade and more, Hizbullah has pursued, with great clarity and steadfastness, the objective of making the principle of armed resistance against Israel, but also against the United States, the cornerstone of national policy both in Lebanon and the Middle East, whether through its own actions or those of likeminded groups. While this has served Iranian interests above all, it has also reflected an ideological worldview that can only truly see its finality in the context of a state - the institution best able to protect and develop the revolutionary impulse. Therefore, to assume that the party would not have taken advantage of an election victory to help fulfill that ideological commitment in Lebanon seems almost counter-intuitive.

Two things reinforce this conclusion. The first is that Nasrallah has never hidden his contempt for the Lebanese political system, nor his hubristic belief that he and his party can define a "better" Lebanon than the one we have today. That is one reason why he has been able so readily to exploit Michel Aoun, who, no less hubristically, if far less persuasively, also feels that he can change Lebanon to satisfy his preferences.

The second is that Nasrallah needs to alter the foundations of the Lebanese state in order for Hizbullah to survive. The secretary general knows very well that since the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, his party's future has rested on shaky foundations. A majority of Lebanese, and that includes Shiites, remains uneasy about the prospect of perpetual war against Israel. Yet without conflict Hizbullah could not survive, nor could it justify retaining its weapons; so the party needs to maintain the threat of conflict alive, just as it needs to more strongly anchor itself in the Lebanese state to ensure that such conflict, when it does come, will not unseat it from power. In this respect, Hizbullah sees things much in the same way as do its sponsors in Iran, particularly the Pasdaran, who have established a parallel authority in the Iranian state to guard against any possible counter-revolutionary urges from within the society.

Then again Lebanon is not Iran. What Hizbullah would have liked to achieve is not necessarily what it could have achieved. Had it tried to take over the state, the party would have met resistance, provoking civil unrest, if not outright civil war, because that is how Lebanese society reacts when its sectarian rules are broken. But as the events of May 2008 showed, Hizbullah can be recklessly indifferent to these rules. So, when the Lebanese voted against the opposition on June 7, they voted not only against the possibility of being ruled by Hizbullah; they also voted against an equally unpleasant alternative: sectarian conflict.

Why the Western Press Corps Botched Lebanon's Elections

2009-06-17T11:20:00.004-04:00

Here's my piece for NOW Lebanon critiquing the Western press corps' coverage of the Lebanese elections.

There are several reasons that explain the overall mediocrity. I highlight laziness and tendentiousness -- enthrallment with a romanticized idea of Hezbollah and Aoun. This sentiment was best expressed in a post-election blog post by the Charlottesville siren, who, after trashing the March 14 majority as "anti-democratic," expressed her disappointment at the election result -– something very palpably shared by those writers who were enthusiastically heralding a Hezbollah victory –- and managed to verbalize what was undoubtedly a common premise among many Western reporters in Beirut.

“Aoun,” she wrote, “offered a clear alternative to [Lebanon’s] system.” Similarly, she added, “Hizbullah … also supports a ‘de-confessionalized,’ one-person-one-vote system in Lebanon.” And, for those reasons, she concluded, “I wanted their alliance to win.”

One could find numerous incidents to support this, some of which are noted in the article. Or, just read any random posting by the crown jewel of the foreign press corps in Beirut, the incomparable Andrew Lee Butters.

Another factor in the overall mediocrity is ignorance. For example, and I'm not sure whether to classify the reliance and uncritical reproduction of partisan polls as an instance of ignorance or a conscious participation in disinformation, there were numerous other polls, none of which were cited. One poll, by Ijma' on May 25, came very close to accurately calling what ended up being the official result. It gave March 14 a 68-60 win. Of course, March 8 performed even poorer, winning only 57 seats.

Not only were such polls not cited, but to add insult to injury, the other, blatantly partisan polls by pro-Hezbollah types like Abdo Saad, were accompanied by reinforcing commentary from pro-Hezbollah "academics," like Saad's daughter, Hezbollah groupie Amal Saad-Ghorayeb! It was really a freak show.

A perfect example of pure ignorance, however, can only come from said Butters. Having decided to embark on the adventure of trying to understand the electoral billboard campaigns, Butters fell upon a challenge: a billboard that read, "Achrafiyeh is Not for Pussies."

After scratching his head real hard, Time's Wunderkind squeezes out the essence of his penetrating insight and understanding of all things Lebanese: "I thought this was amusing because chi-chi Frenchified Achrafiyeh, which happens to be home to Time Magazine's Beirut bureau and many a lady who lunches, is definitely for p#%%$*s."

That's the best this guy could come up with: Taking an oh-so-original swipe at the residents of Ashrafiyeh, without having the slightest clue what the reference in the billboard was all about (and he's been living in Beirut, presumably covering the country's political life). What this anecdote reveals is that Butters had no idea that an Aoun-supported candidate running for a Maronite seat in Ashrafiyeh is named Massoud "Poussy" Ashqar. And so, Ashrafiyeh is not for "Poussies," just as reporting is not for clueless buffoons -- at least in principle.

This is but one example. One could go on and on. And, I should note, this kind of subpar quality of reporting was not restricted to Western journalists, but extended to clownish hired pens of the Syrian regime, like the King of Comedy, Sami Moubayed. Witness this genius comment, e.g.:

The Hezbollah-led opposition, which had been expected to take the majority, emerged with only 50 seats, although eight seats are still to be announced in the Metn region. Early results show that of these eight seats, only two were taken by March 14 coalition candidates - Michel al-Murr and Sami Gemayel - while the remaining six went to Hezbollah.

Mmmm, yeeess. Apparently Hezbollah was fielding candidates in the Metn and none of us heard about it! The lazy, idiotic ignorance doesn't stop there. The King of Comedy proceeds: "There were no surprises in this regard on Sunday. Hezbollah and Amal candidates captured all 27 seats allocated to the Shi'ites." Right. I guess Okab Sakr, Ghazy Yousef and Amin Wehbe really are not Shiites. And so on and so forth.

Now that March 14 won, many Western analysts, "experts" and reporters are putting out a truly sinister line in relation to the upcoming cabinet formation, preemptively placing the onus of any Hezbollah or Syrian terrorist violence on the shoulders of March 14. Taking the lead from Muhammad Raad's threat, the tone was set by none other than Hezbollah's "academic," Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, in a piece by Massoud Derhally about how March 14 "must" give Hezbollah veto power... or else:

“If the pro-Western coalition is intransigent about not giving veto power to Hezbollah and its allies then we will witness a renewed political crisis, and a return to the period before the Qatar agreement,” Saad-Ghorayeb said.

This repulsive, not even veiled threat of violence (by an "academic," mind you; not to be confused with "Hezbollah flack") was shamefully repeated by Mona Yacoubian:

Should the March 14th coalition remain steadfast in its refusal to allow a blocking veto, Lebanon will once again find itself in the throes of a dangerous political stalemate that could easily spiral into violence.

Marvel at the modality in both quotes. The only active subject and verb are March 14 remaining "steadfast" and "intransigent" in refusing to hand over an unconstitutional device to those who have lost the elections. The rest of the sentence is completely in the passive voice, with the perpetrators of the potential violence not even named! And yet, Hezbollah is still dubbed a "political" (nay, reformist!) party that has "evolved" over the years -- but which of course reserves the right to use terrorist violence whenever it sees fit! Needless to say, the responsibility is laid at the feet of the recipients of the violence.

In other words, these people have totally internalized the Assad regime's and Hezbollah's thuggish style of issuing threats and blaming it on those who will be subjected to it (who were "stubborn" and thus, got their comeuppance). The Syrians are the masters of this type of thuggery. Recall Walid Moallem and Farouq Sharaa. The perfect wording for it came from that quintessential embodiment of all the ugliness of the Syrian system, Imad Shoueibi (emphasis mine):

If some attempt to hold on to their opinion in the framework of forming a government with a majority and minority, in the democratic representative sense, then they would be heading towards a major crisis in Lebanon.

فإن حاول البعض التمسك برأيه في إطار تشكيل حكومة بالأكثرية والأقلية بالمعنى الديمقراطي التمثيلي فإنه يذهب باتجاه أزمة كبيرة في لبنان

The Orwellian nature of this comment needs no elaboration.

In the end, it speaks volumes about the moral center of the people propagating this insidious line, or those who present a violent Islamist militia, who only last year stormed civilian neighborhoods by force of arms, as a democratic force of reform. As if that weren’t enough, some went on to explain the “unexpected” March 14 victory as being in part a result of campaign “scare tactics” – as though the violence wrought on the Lebanese by Hezbollah and Syria is a product of sinister March 14 propaganda.

I cannot think of a better example of depravity than what was and continues to be on display in the journalistic and policy analysis literature on Lebanon. And all this with Hezbollah having lost. Just imagine the nauseous nonsense that would have been written had they won.

More Lebanon Election Analysis

2009-06-10T15:47:00.006-04:00

Here's my latest piece on the election and post-election situation. See also Michael Young's column yesterday, as well as Emile Hokayem's editorial.

Arabic readers might want to check out the following op-ed by Elie Fawaz. Ziad Majed also draws some conclusions from the election result. Also, see this very sharp piece by Hazem Saghieh on the Aoun-Hezbollah alliance.

Finally, I'll be coming back to address the latest brazen nonsense being peddled by the March 8 crowd and their Syrian chums, about them winning the "popular majority." Stay tuned.

Update: A quick follow-up to something I wrote in my piece. I noted that "Already, the Syrians are voicing their opposition to majority leader Saad Hariri becoming prime minister, unless he sanctions the 'resistance,' and thereby hands Syria and Hezbollah unilateral domination of the country's security and foreign policy."

On cue, here's Syria's Faysal Miqdad: "Syria’s relations with the next Lebanese government will be based on two key issues, he said, 'The first is the way this government deals with Syria and its view of Lebanese- Syrian relations. The second is the way it deals with Hezbollah’s arms, which Syria sees as a necessity to Lebanon in the face of the Israeli occupation.'"

Mapping Out the Election Results

2009-06-07T19:54:00.018-04:00

Let's run through what seems to be the final result of the election. It seems, with the preliminary results, that the March 14 coalition and its independent allies have won 71 seats, adding one seat to their current total, despite what March 8 thought would be an electoral law advantageous to them (the 1960 law adopted in the now-defunct Doha Accord). This puts to rest the myth that in 2005, M14 won because of its alliance with Hezbollah and the gerrymandering of the electoral law of 2000. M14's victory is clear. It ran unified lists and wherever M14 won, the lists won in total without any breaches.

Who are the winners and losers?

Obviously, M14 as a coalition emerges victorious. The independents add a couple to the total number but M14 still maintains a majority on its own. It's a decisive majority trashing once and for all Bashar Assad's "imaginary majority" and "transient few" snide remarks.

Hariri reemerges with the biggest bloc and thus keeps his position as head of the parliamentary majority. The Future Movement sailed through in the north, Beirut, the Western Bekaa and Zahle, and swept two seats in Sidon. The Lebanese Forces performed very strongly in Koura and Batroun, with M14 sweeping both, and eliminating Aoun's son-in-law Gebran Bassil in what is a major symbolic victory.

Walid Jumblat sacrificed from his share for the sake of the M14 alliance, and he emerges with a slightly diminished bloc as a result.

On the other side, Michel Aoun took a hit with the loss of his son-in-law, and saw his huge margin in Keserwen dwindle down drastically to about 2,000 votes, with Mansour al-Bone and his list performing ably.

Furthermore, this was done with Aoun's preferred electoral law, which he had been bragging about since the Doha Accord saying that he "forced" it on the other parties, and that it would "liberate" the Christian vote, especially in places like Ashrafiyeh, and that he would expand his bloc to over 30 MPs. Well, his list was demolished in Beirut 1 (Ashrafiyeh), where M14 swept all five seats.

Also, his allies in Zahle (Elie Skaff and the "Popular Bloc") got smashed, with M14 performing very strongly there.

Nevertheless, Aoun scored big in districts with large Hezbollah votes, namely Baabda and Jbeil. While a victory in Jbeil was expected, the sweep in Baabda is a net win. Aoun also maintained his sweep in Keserwen, despite a dramatically narrower edge. He also did well in the Metn, winning 6 (in alliance with the Armenian Tashnag party) out of 8, with Michel Murr and Sami Gemayel getting the other two. As such, Aoun will still claim he is the strongest in the Maronite heartland. Nevertheless, the win is very obviously a lot shakier than the "tsunami" of 2005, and nothing made it clearer than his son-in-law's big loss in Batroun. Batroun, whose citizens lost an Army pilot, shot down in his helicopter by Aoun's Hezbollah's allies, threw out the Aounists completely.

In effect, the Christian vote, as always, is still split. Aoun and his allies (Frangieh, Tashnag) will still have the largest Christian bloc (the seats in Jezzine will not be counted because they were never in play for M14, and they were gifts from Hezbollah -- and, incidentally, a setback for Berri).

The Tashnag Party, which huffed and puffed (and was puffed up by Western journos) mightily before the elections, ends up with a dud, getting only two seats (keeping the seat in Metn, and gaining a seat in Beirut 2). The other Armenian seats (Zahle, Beirut 1) went to M14.

Similarly, Michel Murr didn't pull off the kind of performance many thought he would, keeping only his seat in the Metn. He fielded a candidate in Baabda (Gharios) who lost. His companion in the Metn, Sarkis Sarkis, also lost.

Similarly, the so-called centrist bloc that was touted before the elections, comes out decidedly smaller than even initially thought. The bloc was supposed to be affiliated with the President, Suleiman, with candidates close to him, or effectively putting themselves in his corner, not breaking through: Nazim Khoury in Jbeil, al-Bone and Farid Haykal Khazen in Keserwen, Edmond Gharios (and even perhaps Pierre Daccache) in Baabda, and even Murr himself. Although there are others who did make it (people like Robert Ghanem, etc. can still support the President), the bloc as initially conceived did not quite materialize.

This balance of power will now be transferred to the battle over the cabinet formation. M14 has a clear victory, and so will pick the Prime Minister. The battle, however, will be over the heresy of the "veto third" -- which has no existence in the constitution or the Taef Accord. Hariri has been consistently rejecting its continuation in the future cabinet, and he got support today from Jumblat as well, who called it a "fallacy." M14 will agree to a national unity government, though its principled position now is that it rejects the "veto third" formula. They are making plenty of noise about giving a boost to Suleiman, and how that will materialize remains to be seen. M8 is almost certainly going to reject it and will cite the relatively weak performance of the so-called independents/centrists as support for their position. This is a potential looming crisis on the horizon, as I argued in my pre-election briefing, especially since Hezbollah and the March 8 groups have shown themselves to be anti-democratic and violent forces who wouldn't hesitate to paralyze the country and ultimately attack people in their homes to get what they want.

Let's see how this plays out.

Major Victory for March 14

2009-06-07T16:57:00.022-04:00

March 14 is headed for an impressive victory in the elections. Michel Aoun's Wunderkind son-in-law in Batroun has lost, and there's a slight possibility that Aoun himself will not be reelected in Keserwen, though that remains to be seen.

Results so far (some final, some preliminary) have March 14 winning big in basically all the battle districts: all seven seats in Zahle, all three in Koura, both seats in Batroun, all five in Beirut 1, and it's looking very good in Metn, with only Baabda not looking good.

The big news so far is a very strong showing for the independent-M14 alliance in Keserwen, where Aoun has his seat, but the final results have yet to come out.

So much for Bashar's "imaginary majority" and "transient condition" (as he famously referred to M14), in spite of all his terrorism, bombing, murder, violence, intimidation, coup attempts and information warfare over the last four years. And cheers to Andrew Lee Butters, Mitchell Prothero, Hugh Mcleod, Robert Worth, et al. Good call there, gentlemen.

Hezbollah, showing its high democratic spirit, has spent the day assaulting rival Shiite candidates and clashing with the majority's supporters in some districts.

And now, as I noted in my pre-election briefing, for the real, post-election battle. Jumblat gives us a preview: He rejected the idea of having an obstructing third, calling it a “fallacy.”

UPDATE: Al-Arabiya is quoting sources "close to Hezbollah" as conceding that M14 has won circa 70 seats. In other words, they have kept the numbers they won in 2005, despite everything.

UPDATE 2: Alas, Keserwen was swept by the Aounists, despite a really strong showing for the independent-M14 list. Mansour al-Bone and his list put up a strong fight in Keserwen, losing by less than two thousand votes out of 30 thousand. Gone are the days of Aoun's "tsunami."

Hezbollah, the Elections, and Beyond

2009-06-05T18:23:00.004-04:00

Here are my two cents, amidst the plethora of unvaryingly crappy analysis and reporting as we draw close to Lebanon's elections on Sunday.

David Schenker also weighed in a couple of days ago. For more on this subject, see Jonathan Spyer's piece and Michael Young's interview as well as his latest column in the Daily Star yesterday.

Make sure you check them out as well.

More Undeclared Uranium Discovered in Syria

2009-06-05T17:04:00.003-04:00

Must be those Israelis throwing uranium-laced bombs to frame poor innocent, yet utterly genius, Bashar. After all, everyone knows that, as that flame of caricature brilliance, Imad Mustapha told us, "Syria has never, ever contemplated acquiring nuclear technology. We are not contemplating it today. We are not contemplating doing this in the future – neither for military nor for civilian purposes." I mean, duh!

Reuters:

More undeclared uranium discovered in Syria

International Atomic Energy Agency finds traces of processed uranium at second site in Syria, leading to fears of covert nuclear activity

The UN nuclear watchdog has discovered traces of processed uranium at a second site in Syria, the agency said on Friday, heightening concern about possible undeclared atomic activity in the Arab state.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has been examining U.S. intelligence reports that Syria almost built a North Korean-designed nuclear reactor meant to yield weapons-grade plutonium before Israel bombed it to rubble in 2007.

Inspectors who found uranium particles at the remote desert site a year ago also found similar traces at a small research reactor in the capital Damascus which the IAEA knew about and checks once a year, a IAEA report said. These traces were different from Syria's declared nuclear material inventory.

The IAEA said in February that inspectors had found enough traces of uranium in soil samples taken from the bombed site a year ago to constitute a significant find.

Friday's report said "anthropogenic natural uranium particles" had also turned up in environmental swipe samples taken from hot cells of the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) facility in Damascus.

Syria, told of the IAEA's discovery last month, sent a written response to the IAEA on Monday. But this did not not address the presence and origin of the particles and the UN watchdog was investigating a possible connection with the uranium particles found at the bombed site, the report said.

The IAEA said previously satellite pictures taken before the Israeli bombing revealed a building resembling a reactor.

Syria still withholding evidence
But the new report said Syria, citing national security, was still ignoring IAEA requests for wider access and documentation to back up its assertion that Israel's target at Dair Alzour was a conventional military building.

The IAEA again urged Syria to provide additional data and trips to Dair Alzour and other, allegedly related locations to allow test-sampling of destroyed or salvaged equipment and debris removed before investigators were let into the country.

"It is clearly in Syria's interest to render to the agency the necessary cooperation and transparency if it wishes the agency to be able to corroborate its assertion about the nature of the Dair Alzour site," the report said.

Syria's only declared nuclear site is the old research reactor and it has no known nuclear energy-generating capacity.

The report said Syria was also refusing to discuss satellite pictures the IAEA had offer to share with it. Syria had provided information regarding procurement of certain equipment and materials including a large quantity of graphite and large quantities of barium sulphate", a compound sometimes used as a radiation shield in nuclear structures.

Syria had indicated the procurement efforts were civilian and non-nuclear, relating to water purification, the steel industry and shielding material for radiation therapy centers. It has claimed that the uranium particles retrieved from samples taken at Dair Alzour came from depleted uranium used in Israeli munitions, an assertion dismissed by the IAEA.

Syria has also suggested IAEA analyses were faulty and that satellite imagery Washington gave to the IAEA was fabricated.

Vienna diplomats said in March that Syria had told the IAEA it had built a missile facility on the desert tract hit by Israel, a disclosure apparently meant to reinforce the Syrian refusal to grant more IAEA access on national security grounds.

Recent Items on Hezbollah

2009-06-02T15:12:00.002-04:00

Here are a few recent items on Hezbollah: First, a discussion between Gary Gambill and myself on the subject of Hezbollah, its arsenal and its participation in politics.

Second, a sharp piece by Jonathan Spyer on what it would mean if the Hezbollah-led coalition won the elections.

This question is discussed in further detail in this CFR interview with Michael Young.

Lastly, add this item to the illustrious annals of Hezbollah's "Lebanonization" and its very clearly non-existent "global reach."

Young on the Der Spiegel Story

2009-05-27T09:39:00.003-04:00

Michael Young provides the best, in fact the only real analysis on the Der Spiegel story on Hezbollah. It's worth quoting in full:

Understanding the Der Spiegel upheaval
By Michael Young
Daily Star staff
Wednesday, May 27, 2009

The article published in Der Spiegel accusing Hizbullah of being behind the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, appears to use conceivably correct information to arrive at a conclusion the article itself never really substantiates: namely that "it was not the Syrians, but instead special forces of [Hizbullah] that planned and executed the diabolical attack." At most, the article declares that Syria "is not being declared free of the suspicion of involvement," but that "President Bashar Assad is no longer in the line of fire."

The author, Erich Follath, tells us what French journalist Georges Malbrunot already did in an August 2006 article for the daily Le Figaro. Malbrunot, like Follath, reported that the investigation of telephone intercepts after Hariri’s killing revealed that one of those involved in the crime had broken protocol by calling a friend outside the circle of assassins. This mistake led Lebanese investigators to discover that the alleged assassin had ties with Hizbullah.

Malbrunot did not name the person, but Follath does. He may be Abd al-Majid Ghamlush, he writes, whose "recklessness led investigators to the man they now suspect was the mastermind of the terrorist attack: Hajj Salim ... considered to be the commander of the ’military’ wing of Hezbollah ... [whose] secret ’Special Operations Unit’ reports directly to Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah."

The differences between Malbrunot’s article and Follath’s are essential. In his article, Malbrunot cited "someone close to Saad Hariri", as well as "a source close to the [Internal Security Forces]" who evidently had information on the telecommunication intercepts. At the time, the investigation of the intercepts was headed by ISF Captain Wissam Eid, later killed in a car-bomb attack in January 2008. Significantly, however, the Hariri source did not believe that Hizbullah had carried out the Hariri assassination on its own initiative. "Who had the capacity to bring the equivalent of 1,200 kilos of TNT into Lebanon", the source asked, before answering: "Syria, a Lebanese security service working with it, and Hizbullah." The direction of Malbrunot’s article was that the operation was Syrian, but that Hizbullah may have somehow been brought into it.

Follath’s informants appear to be different. He says his information comes from sources "close to the tribunal and [was] verified by examining internal documents." In other words Follath’s source appears not to be an employee of the tribunal, but someone who has contacts with it and access to documents the tribunal is working with. That leads to suspicion that the sources are Lebanese who, to corroborate their information, showed Follath Lebanese documents from, or on, the Eid investigation, copies of which must also be in the possession of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon - hence the vague formulation "internal documents."

Who would leak such documents, and why, remains to be seen. It seems improbable that this was done by a pro-Hariri source to affect Lebanon’s upcoming elections. After spending four years accusing Syria, the Hariri camp is not about to exonerate Damascus for uncertain electoral gains. The broader conclusions reached by Follath are his own, however, and are poorly argued. Nothing in his piece allows him to make the jump and push the burden of responsibility for the killing on Hizbullah. There appear to have been at least two "circles" participating in the crime; that Hizbullah members were, let’s say, in the second circle, which presumably was involved in shadowing Hariri, does not necessarily mean they were in the first circle, which supervised the actual assassination, whether directly or through a suicide bomber. Eventually, the Hariri tribunal may tell us the specifics of how Hariri was eliminated, but Follath’s article never even makes it clear which circle Ghamlush was in.

If Hizbullah did plan and execute the attack, a theory long discussed in Lebanon, it is virtually impossible to envisage that the party would have taken this action without receiving prior Syrian approval to do so. In fact, it is virtually impossible to envisage that it would have taken such action without Syrian direction to do so - direction that only Bashar Assad, given the centralized nature of Syria’s regime, would have signed off on.

Follath provides motives for the assassination that are laughable. He says that Hizbullah got rid of Hariri because his "growing popularity could have been a thorn in the side of the Lebanese Shiite leader Nasrallah. In 2005, the billionaire began to outstrip the revolutionary leader in terms of popularity." Hariri also stood for what Nasrallah hated, Follath continues: close ties to the West and to moderate Arab regimes, as well as "an opulent lifestyle, and a membership in the competing Sunni faith."

This is nonsense. Those who had an overriding motive to kill Hariri were the Syrians, because his expected successes in the summer 2005 parliamentary elections, so soon after passage of Resolution 1559 by the Security Council, would have seriously threatened their hold on Lebanon. Successive reports by the United Nations commission investigating the crime repeated that hypothesis, which has never been challenged.

Follath, intentionally or unintentionally, is being used to draw the light away from Syria by casting it on Hizbullah. However, all the evidence that has filtered out from the UN investigation, as well as circumstantial evidence, leads in the direction of a principal mastermind: the regime in Damascus, regardless of who was implicated in the crime to guarantee everyone’s silence. It was only Syrian participation that could have pushed the Lebanese security agencies, then completely dominated by Syria, to corrupt the crime scene; it was only Syrian participation that could lead a Lebanese security chief to distribute the video of Ahmad Abu Adas claiming responsibility for the crime; and it was above all Syrian insistence after 2006 that pushed Hizbullah and Amal to block the creation of the tribunal through Lebanese state institutions.

Recall this crucial exchange in April 2007 between UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and Assad in Damascus. The Shiite ministers had left the government, and there was talk of establishing the Hariri tribunal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Ban asked Assad to support the tribunal. Instead, Assad replied that Lebanon was a country of instability, which "will worsen if the special tribunal is established. Particularly if it is established under Chapter VII. This might easily cause a conflict that would degenerate into civil war, provoking divisions between Sunnis and Shiites from the Mediterranean to the Caspian Sea ..."

Echoes of Assad’s message permeate the Der Spiegel article, which implicitly asks whether the truth about who killed Rafik Hariri merits a Sunni-Shiite war. The Damascus conversation was leaked by a UN source to the daily Le Monde, and stands as a telling document. For why would Assad have been so worried about a tribunal passed under Chapter VII authority had Syria been innocent of Hariri’s elimination?

If Follath was given documents from or on Wissam Eid’s investigation, that means someone may also be trying to discredit Eid’s work by generating such a furor now over the accusation against Hizbullah, that it will be very difficult in the future to use the disclosures in such a way that they won’t be tainted by politics. The article may also imply that Eid, unlike the UN commission, actually did his work properly, and that someone is worried about the results. Who showed the "internal documents" to Follath, and are they the same people who might have earlier revealed to Eid’s killers that he was on to something?

These questions will continue to remain unanswered, and the tribunal process will continue to be open to manipulation, for as long as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon does not come out with a formal accusation. We are witnessing the consequences of a slipshod UN investigation since 2006. The prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, may have lost control of his case, and those who leaked to Der Spiegel could well be pushing for its complete collapse.

Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR.

Hezbollah's Agenda In Lebanon

2009-05-19T16:25:00.003-04:00

Here's my essay on Hezbollah, which appears in the latest issue of Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. It contains, along with my argument, a critique of prevalent theories that have dominated the literature.

Much in recent events and statements by Hezbollah officials, which I highlighted here and here, has bolstered a number of my conclusions.

Ibrahim Mussawi, or Hezbollah Disinformation 101

2009-05-13T11:56:00.019-04:00

Some of you may not know who Ibrahim Mussawi is. Others may have recently heard of him after the controversy surrounding his invitation to lecture in England, and his subsequent barring from entering the UK in March 2009.

Mussawi is essentially the head of disinformation and propaganda for Hezbollah, a.k.a, "media relations officer." He is the editor of the Party's weekly rag, al-Intiqad, and the head of political programs at the organization's TV station, al-Manar.

People like him, and Ali Fayyad for example (as well as Ghaleb Abu Zainab, et al.), are handlers who ensure that the party line is properly disseminated. I gave a rundown of this in a post last year about how Hezbollah ensured that pretty much the entire body of literature relating to its ties to Imad Mughniyeh toed the party line. That was the necessary "nihil obstat" to gain the group's imprimatur and guarantee continued access for the authors.

What this line is, however, is a flat out lie. And Mussawi gives us a perfect example of this in a recent article by David Samuels in TNR:

I ask Mousawi about a quote from Hezbollah's number two, Naim Qassem, in which he talked about submitting Hezbollah's decision to become a political party in 1992 to Iran. He reaches into his bookshelf and tosses me a copy of Qassem's book, translated into English. "Find it," he says. Score one for Mousawi.

This is quite remarkable, if only for its brazenness. The mendacious Mussawi tries to catch Samuels on the fly and imagines that nobody will have the wherewithal to sound him out in his lies. His request was clearly a tactic to throw Samuels off-balance and to change the subject. Samuels had the option of wasting 20 minutes trying to find the quote in the book, or proceed with the interview. Of course, he chose the latter option, but proceeded to show how much of a con artist Mussawi is.

But Samuels hardly made up the quote, which is why Mussawi's trick was so brazen, and so telling. Anyone who's read the book knows it's there. I reproduce it in the original Arabic (followed by my translation), for the record. The quote comes from the fifth chapter entitled, "Participation in the System's Institutions" (al-musharaka fi mu'assasat al-nidham), in the section entitled "Participation in the Parliamentary Elections" (al-musharaka fil-intikhabat al-niyabiyya), pages 257-263 in the edition I have, and pp. 277-283 in the 2008 edition of the book. Perhaps the most relevant quote comes on page 263 (or 283 in the 2008 edition):

ثم جرى استفتاء سماحة الولي الفقيه الإمام الخامنئي (حفظه الله) حول المشروعية بعد تقديم اقتراح اللجنة فأجاز وأيّد، عندها حُسمت المشاركة في الانتخابات النيابية، ودخل المشروع في برنامج وآلية عمل الحزب، فعقد الأمين العام سماحة السيد حسن نصرالله مؤتمراً صحفياً في ٣ تموز ١٩٩٣، أعلن فيه عن قرار حزب الله بالمشاركة في الانتخابات النيابية

Translation:

Then the legal ruling of the noble Jurisprudent [al-wali al-faqih] Imam Khamenei (may God keep him) was sought on the legality [al-mashrou'iyya] [of participation in elections] after the [Party's] committee presented its proposal, and he granted permission [ajaza] and support, and then the [decision of] participation in the parliamentary elections was settled, and the project was admitted into the Party's program and mechanism. And so, the Secretary General the noble Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah held a press conference on July 3, 199[2] in which he declared Hezbollah's decision to participate in the parliamentary elections... [Emphasis mine.]

Qassem earlier states clearly that, on its own, Hezbollah's own committee "cannot answer the question regarding the legality [of the participation]," since it is "the specialization of the Jurisprudent [al-wali al-faqih]." (p. 258 in my edition).

In other words, Mussawi engaged in deliberate disinformation, and his job is to ensure that Western journalists writing on the subject reflect the Party line, as was the case with Mughniyeh and Hezbollah's "global reach." He failed with Samuels. But he has other venues, such as the so-called "Beirut Exchange Program." And there is no shortage of compliant journalists, "experts," and flacks.

But now you know, whenever you read reports quoting him (or even presenting him as some sort of academic), or books where his "assistance" and "encouragement" are duly noted by the author, that you should always apply due caution. The man's job, after all, is to lie.

Update: The always gracious Barry Rubin picks up on this issue and offers his own unique take. For those of you who don't know, Barry now has his own blog, which you should all bookmark.

Addendum: The below statements by Mussawi (which set up the quote addressed in the post above) are equally remarkable for their blatant, yet hilariously transparent, dishonesty:

The formalities concluded, I ask Mousawi to explain the conditions under which Hezbollah asks Iran for advice. "It has nothing to do with Iran," he says. "These are purely religious questions. In Shia Islam," he continues, in his modest, scholarly way, "we have a concept called the Wilayat Al Faqih, the mandate of the jurisconsult, or Supreme Guide. I wrote my dissertation in England on this subject. The Wilayat Al Faqih is a concept that is central to Islam, but it was crystallized in the thought of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Even when the Ayatollah Khomeini was living in France, he was still the Wali Al Faqih. So you see that this is a purely religious question that has nothing to do with Iran. The followers of the Wali Al Faqih would emulate him wherever he is, and wherever they are."

This is amusing on a number of fronts -- and Mussawi lies on each and every one of them. First, the notion that the consultation of the Jursiprudent is somehow "purely religious" is utterly ridiculous. After all, as noted above, he was consulted on whether Hezbollah's participation in Lebanese parliamentary politics was permissible or not! Moreover, as Naim Qassem writes in his book, as I note in this essay, that "the al-wali al-faqih alone possesses the authority to decide war and peace" (huwa lladhi yamtalik salahiyat qarar al-harb wa as-silm), along with the authority “to make the major political decisions related to the interests of the umma” (ittikhadh al-qararat as-siyasiya al-kubra allati tartabit bi masalih al-umma), pp. 72, 76.

Secondly, the notion that somehow Khomeini's theory is "a concept central to Islam" but that somehow it was only "crystallized in the thought of the Ayatollah Khomeini", is your average boiler plate revisionism (which you can find in Qassem's book as well). If it were so, then how come all the other senior Shiite scholars, e.g., Kho'i, Fadlallah, Sistani, et al., who are superior to Khomeini's successor, the current Jurisprudent, Ali Khamenei, rejected Khomeini's thesis?

Moreover, the bit about France and how this has "nothing to do with Iran" is just beyond ridiculous. Yes, it's totally unrelated that the only figure to "crystallize" this theory was an Iranian cleric. It was also mere coincidence that its only application was in Iran. It is equally haphazard that the successor of the first Jurisprudent (Khomeini) is the current Supreme Guide of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Ali Khamenei)!

One could go on refuting this nonsense in more detail, but I'll spare you. (And the guy wrote a "PhD dissertation" on this!).

Hussain Abdul Hussain wrote to me commenting on the above quote. I'll conclude with his thoughts:

It does not look as though my friend Ibrahim Moussawi has a full grasp of the thought of Khomeini. Khomeini’s idea is based on what he called the Islamic Government [TB: Khomeini's book is entitled Hokumat-e Islami: Velayat-e Faqih], and when you give your ideology such a name, it hardly stays “purely religious” and rather becomes an issue of how Shiites perceive of themselves as citizens, or not, in the various states they live in around the world.

Even if we go by Moussawi’s definition of the concept of Wilayat Al Faqih, we will get a virtual Shiite state, unrestricted by geography or time. This undermines the idea of citizenship for every Shiite, in whatever state he or she lives in. It is the equivalent of demanding political allegiance of every Catholic in the world, regardless of their national identity, to the Pope in Rome. This undermines the allegiance of these Catholics toward their states and will inevitably bring them into clash with their co-nationals, exactly similar to the conflict that Khomeini has created for the Shiites with their co-nationals in the different countries around the world.

Khomeini’s concept of Wilayat Al Faqih is in contradiction not only with the idea of a nation-state, a product of centuries of human intellect and experiences, but also with whatever international conventions the different nation-states have drafted. Khomeini’s thought belongs to early political thought that renders individuals members of tribes assembled along perceived divine teachings. This kind of thought clearly has no place in the 21st century, and a clash between the followers of Khomeini and the world is apparent. Unfortunately there is no reconciliation between Khomeini’s thinking and world ideologies, and one of them should eventually cave or defeat the other, whether now or in the future.

Can We Finally Dispense with the "Lebanonization" Myth?

2009-05-12T12:20:00.004-04:00

To follow up on my previous post on this subject, check out the following interview with Naim Qassem in the FT:

FT: Let’s move on to the recent arrests of 49 men in Egypt who were alleged to be part of a Hizbollah cell there. Hizbollah has always said it gave only moral support to the Palestinians in Gaza but has that now changed? Are you helping on the ground? Are you expanding your operations?

We have always said that we supported the resistance in Palestine but we have not mentioned how or given details of such support, we have avoided giving details of our support. But Egypt has now revealed that we have given military support to Palestine. We have done so for a while but we have not talked about it. For us it is a great honour and not just an honour but a duty for us to support the Palestinians, and it should also be an honour and a duty not just for us but for all Arabs and all Muslims to support the Palestinians in their resistance. We are asked about our specific and limited support for Gaza while nobody questions the US about their total and unflinching support for Israel. We are always questioned but nobody questions the US.

FT: For how long have you been supporting the Palestinians in Gaza?

SNQ: It is one of the secrets of the resistance that we don’t talk about the details of our support, but suffice to say that we are giving them every type of support that could help the Palestinian resistance. Every type that is possible.

FT: Have you been giving them military arms? Rockets? Training? Logistical support?

SNQ: We don’t talk about the details of our support or how or what we support them with. We leave this to be seen in time to come.

It's well past due to relegate Norton's (et al.'s) "thesis" (if it can be called that), which always went against empirical evidence, to where it always belonged: the trash bin.

US renews sanctions against Syria

2009-05-08T10:20:00.007-04:00

Much to the chagrin of the Syrian regime and its flacks (such as the pathetic regime court jester cited in the article below), I'm sure, who have been flooding the media with leaks about how they "expect" the Obama administration to lift the sanctions.

The Financial Times:

The Obama administration has renewed its sanctions against Syria for another year, citing a continuing “national emergency” facing the US from Syria’s support for terrorist organisations and weapons trade.
...
The sanctions, which were introduced by the Bush administration in 2004, will remain in place for another year, a state department official told the Financial Times.
...
“The national emergency with respect to Syria remains in effect because Syria continued to not meet its international obligations. We continue to have serious concerns about Syria’s actions,” the US official said.

Oh and just for good measure, here's DoS spokesman Robert Wood the other day:

They know what they need to do...

Sounds rather familiar.

Update: More from Wood.

More on Hezbollah's "Lebanonization"

2009-04-24T21:38:00.005-04:00

Hezbollah's Naim Qassem has once again vindicated the perceptive scholarship of the likes of Dick Norton and, more recently, Joseph Alagha, who preached the "Lebanonization" of Hezbollah among other cute delusional fantasies. Here, can't you tell?

Qassem confirmed that “Hezbollah’s path goes beyond the electoral battle, and it crosses domestic boundaries to regional ones, because our enemy is Israel, and we must believe that the region will be exposed to Israeli attacks in the future. This enemy understands one language, which is the language of resistance.”

I explore all this in depth in an upcoming essay in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. For an older critique of Hezbollah scholarship, see this post from February 2008, after the Mughniyeh assassination.

The latest journalist to carry water on behalf of Hezbollah is Borzou Daragahi over at the LAT, who, without blinking or offering a single critical qualifier, wrote the following even as a Hezbollah cell was arrested operating in Egypt: "[Qassem] rejected Western accusations that Hezbollah conducts operations overseas."

It was amusing, however, to see Qassem in that interview trash the basis of the British decision to engage Hezbollah's so-called "political wing," and along with it, trash the whole dominant "evolutionary" model which holds that somehow by "integrating in the Lebanese political process" Hezbollah "transitions away" from "the military option":

"All political, social and jihad work is tied to the decisions of this leadership," he said. "The same leadership that directs the parliamentary and government work also leads jihad actions in the struggle against Israel."

Instead, as we found out from the Egypt cell case, Hezbollah used its penetration of state institutions like the Surete Generale and the Foreign Ministry to subordinate them in the service of its external military operations, through the issuance of forged documents, carrying official seals.

The delicious irony (or hypocrisy) of the British position, of course, lies in the possibility that their overture towards Hezbollah may be directly tied to hostage negotiations involving Hezbollah operatives and British hostages in Iraq, all of which of course highlights and confirms, beyond any doubt, Hezbollah's "Lebanonization," its lack of global reach, its non-involvement in overseas terrorist activities, and all that jazz that since the 1990s has passed for "scholarship."