AFRICOMWatch

The Rwandan Genocide: Who Was To Blame

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Tue, 12 Jul 2011 00:38:00 +0000

I am delighted to see so many of you continue to visit this site despite the lack of new postings. Interestingly, the most viewed pieces continue to be those dealing with the Rwandan genocide. I am guessing students and perhaps historians are reviewing these posts. I would love to hear from you. In the meantime, I am reposting these most popular items. Thanks for your continued interest.

Wednesday, August 6, 2008

The Rwandan Genocide: Who Was Really To Blame?

France today (8/6/08) accused Rwanda of making “unacceptable accusations" by alleging top French officials played an active role in the 1994 genocide. A 500-page report released Tuesday in Kigali alleged that France was aware of preparations for the genocide and said the French military helped plan the massacres and actively took part in the killing. It named 13 senior French politicians and 20 military officials as responsible raises the prospect of Rwandan legal action against them. But the foreign ministry spokesman, Romain Nadal, told reporters: “This report contains unacceptable accusations made against French political and military officials.”

Well, the accusations may not be acceptable to French authorities but they may be true. (See my eyewitness accounts from inside the so-called Zone Turquoise here and here.) And it recalled a piece I did in March 2004 when a French news report, in an adroit effort to muddy the facts, alleged Rwanda's president, Paul Kagame, was responsible for the missile attack that marked the start of the 1994 genocide. What I reported from the Pentagon was that declassified US government documents pointed at another culprit.

The French newspaper Le Monde triggered an international controversy in early March when it reported on an investigation by a French judge into the April 6th, 1994 downing of an airplane carrying the then Rwandan president, Juvenal Habyarimana.

Le Monde, citing the judge's official report, said French authorities have concluded then Rwandan rebel leader Paul Kagame gave the orders for the missile attack that brought down the plane.

Mr. Habyarimana's death marked the start of the Rwandan genocide.

Mr. Kagame is now Rwanda's president. He has rejected the French finding.

Newly-released, declassified US government documents also contradict the French version.

One is a memo to the Secretary of Defense written two days after the plane crash in Kigali. It says Hutu extremists "probably shot down the president's plane."

Another document, a May 9th, 1994 Defense Intelligence Agency report, also points to Hutu extremists -- this time, a group within Rwanda's military. The DIA report explains that President Habyarimana, a Hutu, supported a reconciliation agreement with Mr. Kagame's mainly-Tutsi rebel group. It says Hutu hardliners were against the peace-and-power-sharing deal, especially provisions for integrating Tutsis into a new military.

The report then goes on to say, quoting now, that "fueled antipathy to the president among hardline elements within the Army, particularly the Presidential Guard."

It concludes the plane crash, quoting again, "was actually an assassination conducted by Hutu military hardliners."

The State Department appeared to share that view. Another declassified document says the truth behind President Habyarimana's death may never be known. But there are, in theState Department document's words, "credible but unconfirmed reports that Hutu elements in the military" opposed to a peace deal with the Tutsis "killed Habyarimana in order to block the accords."

Almost immediately after the president was killed, Hutu extremists began the systematic slaughter of ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus who supported reconciliation. The violence was directed by high-level Rwandan government officials.

Bizarrely, that declassified memo to the then US Secretary of Defense written two days after the plane crash took an optimistic view of the situation. It reported what the document termed "a glimmer of hope that this crisis is waning" -- based on the fact there had been a meeting between government and rebel generals and the leader of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda.

But the meeting did not bring about a hoped-for cease-fire or a disengagement of forces. In the bloodshed that followed the assassination of the president, more than three-quarters of a million Rwandans died.

The declassified documents were obtained and released by the National Security Archive, an independent, non-governmental research institute attached to George Washington University in Washington, DC.

Thursday, August 7, 2008

The Rwandan Genocide: Who Was Really To Blame? (Part Two)

Newly-released, declassified documents show senior US government officials were well-informed about the 1994 genocide in Rwanda --- even though they failed to use the word publicly to justify not intervening to halt the bloodshed. I filed this report on March 31st, 2004 – just ahead of the 10th anniversary of the start of the genocide.

Just two weeks after the start of the killings in Rwanda 10 years ago, senior Clinton administration policymakers were told by the Central Intelligence Agency that what was happening in the tiny Central African country was genocide.

The word appears in the CIA's April 23rd, 1994 National Intelligence Daily, a top secret intelligence summary delivered to senior US policymakers. Three days later, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research provided more detail. It noted some Hutu extremists were speaking of a "final solution" to eliminate all Tutsis. It went on to say, quoting now, "the butchery shows no sign of ending."

Despite this and other information flowing into Washington, the Clinton Administration waited until late May to publicly acknowledge that what it termed "acts of genocide" were taking place in Rwanda.

It took then Secretary of State Warren Christopher until early June 1994 to finally use the word "genocide."

Other declassified documents released by the independent National Security Archive of George Washington University show the administration deliberately sought to avoid using the word genocide. Officials feared, in the words of one declassified Pentagon paper, that it "could commit the US government to actually do something" under international law--- something the Clinton administration wanted to avoid.

Alison Des Forges is an authority on the 1994 Rwandan genocide with the organization, Human Rights Watch. She says the US position was inexcusable.

“A genocide should demand an investment of resources, a level of concern beyond other crises in the world.”

The administration felt it was militarily overextended elsewhere in the world and that there were no compelling American interests in Rwanda. It also wanted to avoid any repetition of the bloody experiences of US peacekeeping troops in Somalia.

The Clinton administration later apologized to the Rwandan people for its failure to do more. In 1998, President Clinton travelled to Kigali and met survivors of the genocide. He said the international community did not act quickly to prevent the massacres. Mr. Clinton also said the international community must bear its share of responsibility for the tragedy.

Note: Having seen the butchered bodies, at a time when US officials were still avoiding public use of the word “genocide,” I can tell you I was personally outraged. I agree with Ms. Des Forges that the position taken by the administration at the time was inexcusable.

new weekly Voice of America call-in program called "Angola, Fala Só"

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Fri, 01 Apr 2011 12:32:00 +0000

Washington, D.C.,March 31, 2011 - Social issues, health, politics, unemployment, just about any subject will be debated in a new weekly Voice of America call-in program called "Angola, Fala Só."

The half-hour Portuguese language show, which roughly translates to “just say it” in English, was inspired by a popular expression often used in the Angolan capital, Luanda.

Washington host Luis Costa Ribas will take toll-free calls on a range of subjects for Friday’s premier. Callers from anywhere in Angola are welcome to phone in or text-message their questions or comments, creating a national debate on the topics people are most interested in discussing.

The head of VOA’s Portuguese Service, Ana Guedes, said, “The show will not shy away from controversial issues. Everything will be discussed, from politics to rules on social behavior, freedom of expression, or the controversy over independence for the oil-rich Cabinda region. People will have an open platform to express themselves.”

VOA Director Danforth W. Austin said, “The program highlights our ability to create a truly national conversation in Angola by combining the use of SMS, mobile and Internet platforms to gather questions from around the country for a call-in format radio show that will be broadcast to the nation via shortwave and the Internet.”

The show will air Fridays from 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening local time in Africa. Visit the "Angola, Fala Só" webpage for more details about toll free numbers to call with your questions or to listen on-line.

"Angola, Fala Só" is partly funded by a grant from the U.S. State Department.

For more about the program and the VOA Portuguese Service, visit www.voanews.com/portuguese/news. For the latest news and information in English or any of VOA’s 44 languages, go to www.voanews.com.

Merchant of Death Would Fly Anything Anywhere

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Wed, 24 Nov 2010 15:29:00 +0000

VOA's Andre DeNesnera has interviewed Douglas Farah, author of "The Merchant of Death" -- a reference to Viktor Bout's suspected vast arms trafficking activities -- about Bout's extradition to the United States.

Farah says Bout was a Soviet Air Force officer who saw the potential of selling weapons internationally as the Cold War came to an end.

"And as the Soviet Union ended, he seemed to have a vision that no-one else did, and that was that there were massive amounts of weapons in arsenals where the troops were no longer being paid, officers weren't being paid, and [the weapons were] available for a relatively cheap price," said Farah. "And there were aircraft left on the tarmacs across the former Soviet bloc that weren't being able to be flown because there was no money for fuel or maintenance. And he sort of married up those two commodities and began flying weapons and aircraft out of the Soviet Union and doing business across the world."

Farah gives some examples of Bout's alleged arms trafficking activities.

"The United Nations, the United States, the British and others have accused him of flying weapons into Liberia and Sierra Leone, particularly at the height of the very brutal wars in West Africa. He dealt extensively with the UNITA rebels in Angola," said Farah. "He had a relationship with Mobuto Sese Seko in what was Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo. But he was also in the same conflict arming the rebels that came to power under Laurent Kabila. So he's been around many sides of different conflicts."

Bout's biographer says the accused arms trafficker did not provide weapons to al-Qaida, but that he did have extensive dealings with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

For two decades, Bout allegedly supplied weapons to anyone who would pay him. At the same time, he eluded international authorities.

Farah says Bout was finally arrested in Thailand in 2008 in a sting operation run by U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents posing as members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC guerilla movement.

On Tuesday (11/16/10), Bout was extradited to the United States from Thailand after a two-year legal battle. He says he is an innocent businessman and not involved in arms trafficking -- a claim echoed by Russian officials.

Farah says Bout has influential friends in Russia's intelligence agency.

"They are very anxious to protect him -- one, because they wanted to and two, because of what he knows," he said.

Farah says Russian officials are concerned about what Bout could tell U.S. authorities.

"Viktor also flew for the U.S. in Iraq; he flew for the British; he flew for the United Nations. One of the things that made him so unusual was that he would fly virtually anything, anywhere where the cargo needed to go. So he flew gladiolas, U.N. peacekeepers, frozen chickens, AK-47s -- pretty much for anyone who would pay. And I think many people would be happy if we didn't go into his long history," Farah said.

Appearing in federal court in New York City this week, Viktor Bout pleaded not guilty to terrorism charges.

His wife, Alla Bout says his extradition was illegal because there was still a case against him pending in court here.

VOA quotes her as saying that transferring her husband to the United States before the end of legal procedures breaches legal and humanitarian norms. She says by doing this the government of Thailand has once again demonstrated its complete subservience to Washington and willingness to fulfill any order from their American bosses.

Bout Booted to U.S.

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Tue, 16 Nov 2010 13:55:00 +0000

Thailand has extradited alleged Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout to the United States to face trial on terrorism charges. U.S. authorities accuse Bout of conspiring to kill Americans and supporting a terrorist organization.

VOA reports Thai authorities say Bout was put on a special plane to the United States Tuesday afternoon after the government gave final approval for his extradition. He is accused of selling weapons that have fueled conflicts in Africa, South America, and the Middle East.

Bout will face trial in the United States for conspiring to kill Americans by selling weapons of war to a terrorist organization.

Bout's handover to U.S. authorities ends more than two and a half years of court battles and a face off with Russian authorities.

On Vacation

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Fri, 04 Jun 2010 21:13:00 +0000

AFRICOMWatch is on vacation!

Desert menace: Al-Qaida in West Africa

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Thu, 20 May 2010 14:01:00 +0000

Worth reading: new Economist article on Operation Flintlock and a joint anti-terrorism exercise with U.S. and local forces in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal. Key observation: "When the Americans first started talking about al-Qaeda’s threat in the Sahara, many were sceptical. But a sharp increase in the rate of attacks in the past 18 months by what the jihadists call “al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”, usually abbreviated to AQIM, have convinced even cynics that a threat of sorts does exist."

According to AFRICOM:

"Most of the tactical and strategic training events will occur during the second and third weeks of the exercise. These will include a command post exercise in Burkina Faso, Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPs) in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali and Senegal, Live-fire company assault Military Training Engagements (MTE) in Mauritania, Mali and Senegal, Airborne Operations and aerial resupply drops in Burkina Faso and Mali, Mounted Battle drills and Desert Mobility exercises in Mali and long range reconnaissance and building clearing drills in Senegal. Continue to watch our website as we will regularly post updates."

Somali Pirates Pick On Wrong Ships

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Mon, 26 Apr 2010 20:05:00 +0000

Somali pirates based in the central coastal town of Harardhere are reported to be fleeing with hijacked ships and crews to another neighboring pirate stronghold, before a possible Islamist attack on Harardhere.

VOA correspondent Alisha Ryu quotes sources in Somalia as saying hundreds of al-Shabab militants left the town of Eldhere in the Galgadud region late Saturday and began heading east toward Harardhere in south Mudug. Harardhere is home to hundreds of pirates, who are holding at least six vessels and more than 90 people hostage.

The pirates began retreating with the hijacked vessels and crew to Hobyo, another pirate stronghold about 108 kilometers to the north.

Al-Shabab, which has proclaimed allegiance to al-Qaida and is considered a terrorist group by the United States and several other Western nations, controls most of southern Somalia and has been fighting for several years to topple the U.N.-backed, African Union-protected government in the Somali capital Mogadishu.

In recent days, al-Shabab said it had taken over control of three towns in the Galgadud region from the rival, pro-government Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama'a militia. The three towns, including Eldhere, are on the main road that leads to the capital.

But observers say in targeting Harardhere, al-Shabab's motive may be revenge-driven.

The Program Coordinator for the Nairobi-based East Africa Seafarers' Association, Andrew Mwangura, says he believes al-Shabab could be threatening to take Harardhere from pirates as punishment for the recent hijacking of a ship from Yemen, which was allegedly carrying arms for the extremist group.

He says al-Shabab is also fuming over last month's hijacking of nine Indian-owned vessels off the coast of Somalia. The pirates seized the small ships, called dhows, after they left the southern port of Kismayo with cargo destined for the United Arab Emirates.

The extremist group controls several key sea ports in southern Somalia, including Kismayo. The port is believed to generate millions of dollars in revenue for al-Shabab.

"These nine Indian dhows were laden with charcoal," said Andrew Mwangura. "And you know, charcoal export is part of money-making for al-Shabab. It is part of their revenue. You cannot operate out of the port of Kismayo without paying al-Shabab," he explained.

Most of the dhows have since been freed, but the hijackings prompted the Indian government to ban Indian-flagged vessels from sailing anywhere near Somalia. Mwangura says it is possible al-Shabab is angry about the loss of potential revenue caused by the ban.

This is not the first time al-Shabab has moved against pirates in Harardhere. In May, 2008, al-Shabab briefly seized Harardhere and declared piracy illegal before retreating. Five months later, several carloads of al-Shabab fighters entered Harardhere to demand the release of a hijacked Saudi Arabian supertanker, Sirius Star.

Western counter-terrorism officials have long worried that some of the money from piracy is making its way into the hands of extremists to fund violence in Somalia. But complex clan structures, shifting alliances, and an ungoverned black market have thwarted efforts to establish a solid connection.

Eritrea and Iran: A Deal To Spite US Is Madness

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Fri, 23 Apr 2010 16:19:00 +0000

Gulf News, based in Dubai, has had an interview with Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki. At one point, the issue of Eritrean ties with Iran comes up:

Q: Some media reported in 2008 that you signed in September of that year during your visit to Iran a deal with Tehran giving them an exclusive right to develop the old oil laboratories in the city of Assab, but when I visited the refinery two days ago I did not find any maintenance and it is completely abandoned?

A: [Laughs] We do not have any agreement with Iran to develop the refinery. What was reported in this regard was a part of a wide spread misleading campaign. Thanks to God, you visited the refinery and took photos without finding any such a thing, although we are in 2010 and the misleading media stated that the agreement was signed in 2008 as you said.

Q: There are Gulf, Arab and Western fears from Iranian influence on Bab Al Mandab Strait in the Red Sea through facilities provided by Eritrea, which shares with Iran a hostile stance against the US. Some believe that you can give these facilities just to spite Washington.

A: Dealing with Iran just to spite America at the expense of the governments and peoples of this region is madness and cannot be done by anyone. I believe that the alleged Iranian bogeyman is one of the mechanisms of the US to intimidate countries in the region to achieve its own agenda. If there is a danger from Iran, or from any other foreign source, Arab countries should cooperate to protect the area from any external risks.

Eds note: See http://africomwatch.blogspot.com/2009/01/omigosh-iranians-threatening-african.html
and
http://africomwatch.blogspot.com/2009/12/iranian-arms-offloaded-in-eritrea.html

More Pirate News

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Tue, 13 Apr 2010 18:46:00 +0000

A little late on this one but it too comes from U.S. Navy press affairs:

USS ASHLAND, Gulf of Aden (NNS) -- At approximately 5:00 a.m. local time April 10, USS Ashland (LSD 48), was fired upon by a skiff manned by suspected pirates in the Gulf of Aden, approximately 330 nautical miles off the coast of Djibouti.

During the attack, Ashland received small arms fire on the port side from the six man crew of suspected pirates aboard the skiff. Ashland, in accordance with her rules of engagement, returned fire.

USS Ashland fired two rounds at the skiff from her MK-38 Mod 2, 25mm gun. The skiff caught fire and the suspected pirates abandoned the skiff. Ashland deployed her rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) to assist the pirates who were in the water near their skiff.

Once it was verified that the suspected pirates no longer had weapons on their person, all six were brought on board Ashland where they received medical care. There is no apparent damage to USS Ashland, and there were no injuries to any members of her crew.

Capt. John Bruening, commanding officer, Nassau Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), expressed the commitment of the ships in the Nassau ARG to ensuring the success of creating a stable and secure maritime environment.

"This is why we are here," said Bruening. "It is so much more than just putting a stop to the illegal activities of only one pirate skiff. It is about fostering an environment that will give every nation the freedom to navigate the seas without fear of attack."

Three events over the past ten days have allowed the U.S. Navy to capture a total of 21 suspected pirates. Two of these events were precipitated by attacks on the U.S. vessels, while the third was in response to a fellow mariner's call for help. USS Nicholas (FFG 47) was attacked late in the evening by pirates on March 31, resulting in the capture of five, while today's attack on USS Ashland netted an additional six. The third event, USS McFaul (DDG 74) responded to the distress call from M/V Rising Sun on April 5, helping thwart the attack and capture an additional ten suspected pirates. The U.S. Navy is now reviewing multiple options regarding these suspected pirates' legal dispositions.

Ashland was conducting routine Maritime Security Operations in the Gulf of Aden, when the ship was attacked. Currently, Ashland is supporting 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit sustainment operations in Djibouti.

The Nassau ARG is comprised of ships from Amphibious Squadron Eight (PHIBRON 8) including the Tarawa-class multipurpose amphibious assault ship USS Nassau (LHA 4), the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) and the Whidbey Island-class amphibious dock landing ship USS Ashland (LSD 48). Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (24 MEU) complete the group.

Pirates Captured!

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Fri, 02 Apr 2010 14:52:00 +0000

This is a U.S. Navy news release:

USS Nicholas (FFG 47) captured suspected pirates on Thursday (4/1/10) after exchanging fire, sinking a skiff, and confiscating a suspected mother ship.

While operating west of the Seychelles in international waters, Nicholas reported taking fire at 12:27 a.m. local time from a suspected pirate skiff and returned fire before commencing pursuit of the vessel until the disabled skiff stopped.

At 1:59 a.m. personnel from Nicholas boarded the disabled skiff and detained three personnel. The boarding team found ammunition and multiple cans of fuel on board. After taking the suspected pirates on board, Nicholas sank the disabled skiff at 2:59 a.m.

An additional two suspected pirates were captured on the confiscated mother ship.

The suspected pirates will remain in U.S. custody on board Nicholas until a determination is made regarding their disposition.

Piracy is an international maritime issue that consistently affects the safety and security of the sea. The U.S. Navy works to uphold maritime law in order to prevent an environment conducive to piracy.

Nicholas, an Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate homeported in Norfolk, Va., is currently supporting U.S. Naval Forces Africa. U.S. Naval Forces Africa is the naval component in support of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).

AFRICOM Denies Nigerian Intervention Report

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Fri, 19 Mar 2010 15:59:00 +0000

This has appeared on the AFRICOM website:

STUTTGART, Germany, Mar 19, 2010 — The United States is not preparing for any possible intervention in Nigeria, as was erroneously reported in the Nigerian Compass newspaper, a spokesman for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) said March 19, 2010.

"I have seen the news report, and it is wrong," Vince Crawley, a spokesman for U.S. Africa Command, said. "The United States is not preparing, planning or alerting personnel for military intervention in Nigeria, or, for that matter, any other African nation."

Crawley added, "General William E. Ward, commander of U.S. Africa Command, has issued no military orders with regard to Nigeria. U.S. Africa Command does not have any assigned military forces and has not requested any for operations in Nigeria."

The Nigerian Compass newspaper ran a story headlined: "US plots military strategy for Nigeria’s 'breakup'" The article incorrectly states: "President Barack Obama is preparing American troops for a special intervention in Nigeria, in the event of a widespread chaos that could threaten oil production, a top brass in the U.S. army and a security expert have revealed. According to the Commander, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), General William Ward, American troops have been placed on red alert as the government is monitoring the political situation in Africa’s most populous nation."

Ward has not placed any troop on alert, Crawley said, adding, "The article provides no sources for its allegation. It goes on to quote, without attribution, a March 16 Voice of America article that quotes a longtime critic of U.S. policy in Africa, who speculates about whether unrest in Nigeria would trigger military intervention."

Some critics of U.S. policy in Africa have speculated that U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, was created to militarily protect U.S. oil interests in Africa. U.S. officials continue to deny the allegations.

US Role in African Security Under Scrutiny

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Wed, 17 Mar 2010 13:27:00 +0000

VOA's Nico Colombant, a former West Africa correspondent, has filed an excellent report on concerns over the extent of U.S. military aid in war-torn Somalia as well as challenges for the U.S. military command structure in Africa. He reports American experts are scrutinizing the U.S. security role on the continent.

At a briefing last week, Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson denied recent media reports that the United States is leading military efforts to help Somalia's government, known as the transitional federal government, or TFG, defeat insurgents.

"[The] United States does not plan, does not direct, and does not coordinate the military operations of the TFG," said Johnnie Carson. "And we have not and will not be providing direct support for any potential military offensives. Further, we are not providing or paying for military advisors for the TFG. There is no desire to Americanize the conflict in Somalia."

But important military ties exist. Last year, a State Department official said the U.S. government had provided Somalia's transitional government with millions of dollars to buy weapons and ammunition. U.S. contractors have also been involved in training Somalia's security forces.

Eighteen American soldiers died in Somalia in 1993 in the last major ground operation involving U.S. troops in Africa. But important covert operations in conflict situations reportedly have continued, including in Somalia.

In terms of U.S. security involvement for the continent, the United States established the U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, in 2007. Its commander, Army General William Ward, recently testified on Capitol Hill that the command is still based in Germany because, he said, public opinion in Africa makes it counter-productive to base its command there.

Daniel Volman, director of the U.S.-based Africa Security Research Project, says this does not mean that AFRICOM is inactive.

"Even though, they are based in Stuttgart, General Ward and his people spend about half of their time on the African continent," said Daniel Volman. "They have also begun building up the level of U.S. military personnel at all the U.S. embassies, so they can have mini AFRICOM headquarters in every single country."

Volman says a growing U.S. need for natural resources is one of the main reasons the Defense Department developed AFRICOM, in light of instability in places such as oil-rich Nigeria.

"For the Pentagon, the nightmare scenario is that Nigeria will descend into chaos," he said. "Infighting in Nigeria will reach a point where oil production will actually be directly threatened, and then what do you do? Do you send American troops into Nigeria? And the people at the Pentagon are already doing war-gaming and contingency planning for that - not because they particularly want to do that, but because they recognize how important Nigeria is to the United States."

Mark Davidheiser, director of the newly-created U.S.-based Africa Peace and Conflict Network, says he believes that concerns over terrorism trump all else when it comes to AFRICOM.

"I mean the real concern is terrorism," said Mark Davidheiser. "That is what is motivating this program, I believe. There has been a lot of worry about the lack of robust governance in Africa and the rather loose or patchy rule of law that exists in many places. So the fear is that Africa can become a haven for extremists."

The United States has also had long standing military ties with African countries with fewer resources and no visible terrorist threat, such as Guinea, where recent years have been marked by power struggles within the military. When former coup leader turned long-time president Lansana Conte died in late-2008, a soldier took over in a coup, before barely surviving an assassination attempt by another soldier.

Steven McDonald, an expert with the Africa program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars here in Washington, says the example of Guinea points to some of the challenges the United States faces in helping militaries in Africa.

"Whether they had seen it as a 'poster child' [leading example] in the sense of military relations or not, I kind of doubt that," said Steven McDonald. "I think there was a great deal of hope placed on it that there would be a different kind of transition there. And I am sure there have been attempts behind the scenes to try to dissuade and recoup what has happened. But it is probably just another example of why in smaller countries like that where it does not stand high on our priorities of interests in terms of our own national interest that we have very limited leverage, and we learn it when things like this happen."

Mark Davidheiser of the Africa Peace and Conflict Network regrets the emphasis that has been placed on U.S.-Africa military relations.

"It saddens me that that has been such a pillar of U.S. policy - giving military aid, training, sending advisors, training local military members by U.S. trainers, who often, history has shown, have turned around and then been involved in all sorts of brutalities and human rights violations against the populations there," he said.

In the case of Guinea, human rights groups say the country's military, which received support and training from the United States, was responsible for the killing of 150 demonstrators at a stadium in the capital Conakry last year. Senior military officials have blamed renegade soldiers for the violence.

Guinea's military rulers now say they will not run in elections scheduled for June.

U.S. military officials say they are actively training security forces across the African continent to fight not only terrorism, but also drug and human trafficking as well as piracy.

AFRICOM's African Web Initiative and Operation Objective Voice

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Mon, 15 Mar 2010 15:03:00 +0000

In reviewing General Ward's latest Congressional testimony, our eyes were once again drawn to the section on Operation OBJECTIVE VOICE (OOV). Here is what the General said:

"OOV is U.S. Africa Command's information operations effort to counter violent extremism by leveraging media capabilities in ways that encourage the public to repudiate extremist ideologies. OOV is closely coordinated with U.S. embassies, DOS, and USAID, and employs a variety of messaging platforms, such as the African Web Initiative, to challenge the views of terrorist groups and provide a forum for the expression of alternative points of view. OOV also supports local outreach efforts to foster peace, tolerance, and understanding. Examples included a 'youth peace games' in Mali and a film project in northern Nigeria. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the enhanced dialogue has had a positive impact. We are currently collecting baseline data and developing assessments to quantify the overall effects."

Buried in there we saw the mention of "African Web Initiative" and immediately wondered what that might be, as there have been no previous references we could find. After checking with AFRICOM public affairs, it turns out this is the program name for http://www.magharebia.com/

There is an English-language link at the top. Under the "About this site" section, here is what it says:

"The Magharebia web site is sponsored by the United States Africa Command, the military command responsible for supporting and enhancing US efforts to promote stability, co-operation and prosperity in the region.

"The Magharebia web site is a central source of news and information about the Maghreb in three languages: Arabic, French and English. The goal of Magharebia is to offer accurate, balanced and forward-looking coverage of developments in the Maghreb.

"Six days per week, the site captures the top news from across the region as reported in local and international media. It also features analysis, interviews and commentary by paid Magharebia correspondents in the region.

"Magharebia coverage is distinguished by an in-depth knowledge of local issues - the key players, events and sensitivities that can trigger significant developments - tempered by a cross-regional perspective. It identifies trends, solutions and successes that can serve as models for progress throughout the region."

AFRICOM Commander Testifies Before Congressional Panel

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Tue, 09 Mar 2010 16:49:00 +0000

General William "Kip" Ward, the commander of AFRICOM has appeared before a Congressional committee to provide an overview of the command's strategic approach. According to AFRICOM, the General testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee today as part of an annual requirement for regional military commanders. He is scheduled to testify before the House Armed Services Committee tomorrow.

As part of his testimony, Ward submitted a 48-page written posture statement on U.S. Africa Command, which was released by the committee in conjunction with the hearing. It is posted on AFRICOM's website -- and you can read it here.

I'm going through it now to see if anything new has emerged. Stay tuned.

AFRICOM and Taking Over Ghana And Other African Countries

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Fri, 26 Feb 2010 16:57:00 +0000

The other day my eye was caught by an item on the website of Ghana's Joy FM radio headlined: "AFRICOM will not take over any African country."

Of course my immediate thought was: "Why would anyone even think this?"

You can read the item here. But here are a few quotes:

"General William E. Ward, the Commander of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) based in Stuttgart, Germany, has said the Command would continue to work closely with the navies of African countries and would not take over any African country. He said the United States will not establish a military base in Ghana neither is there any intention to hijack Ghana's oil and natural resources for the sole benefit of the USA....Gen Ward said the increasing suspicion of AFRICOM activities in Africa as a "cover-up" for negative American activities were unjustified."

Does AFRICOM have an image problem? For sure! Following the item were several negative comments:

"Africom is a smokescreen behind which America wants to hide its means to secure Africa's oil and other natural resources, nothing more."

"Tell Africom to stay in Germany.They are not welcome in Ghana."

"We know better than to believe this rubbish. Take your lies elsewhere."

"We know you trying to be a good samaritan only because you smell cheap oil over the gulf of guinea!"

There was only one reasonably positive comment: "THE AMERICANS HAVE BASES IN GERMANY, UK BUT HAVEN'T TAKEN OVER THESE COUNTRIES. GHANA HAS A LOT TO GAIN FROM A COMMAND CENTER BEING SET UP HERE."

What I wondered was, what could anyone at AFRICOM really have told a group of visiting journalists to prompt all this?

I didn't get any immediate answer to my query from the Command but I now see they have posted an item on their own website about the visit of Ghanaian reporters.

In it, the commander of U.S. Africa Command, General William "Kip" Ward is reported to have used the visit to "clarify misunderstood issues about the command, such as how it works with the militaries in Africa and basing."

“We recognize, we appreciate and we respect the sovereignty of our partner nations,” Ward explained. “In no way do we envision directing the navies of Africa, the armies of Africa, the air forces of Africa, the governments of Africa to do anything that they would not do for themselves. We have no design, no intent of telling you what to do, absolutely not.”

One journalist, Samuel Appiah Darko, of Ghana’s Joy FM radio, indicated that his listeners still wonder “what AFRICOM is all about” and whether it intends to establish bases in Africa.

Since the command was created more than two years ago, it has been widely misrepresented that it would establish American bases in Africa. In that period of time... Ward said, “We have done absolutely nothing that would substantiate that impression, and we're not going to do anything. There is no intention of setting up bases in Africa.”

I am now fully convinced the AFRICOM folks can say this a million times and there will still be those who refuse to believe it.

Please NO Headlines: We're AFRICOM

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Mon, 22 Feb 2010 21:44:00 +0000

Some may have thought I was being unkind to AFRICOM in my last post in which I bemoaned the lack of serious hard news on the Command's website. Spokesman Vince Crawley of AFRICOM was quick to reply that there were substantive items to be found and pointed out a few.

One is a new item, the "Commander's Intent 2010" -- and while some might dismiss it at first glance as nothing new, it is actually quite a revealing explanation for the Command's low-profile approach.

General Ward's main point: "We want to help prevent crises rather than only react to them."

How does the Command help prevent crises?

General Ward's "Commander's Intent 2010" spells out the key steps:

Build Partner Security Capacity

Work in Concert with our Partners

Reinforce Success-build upon those
activities that have had positive results

Address Transnational Challenges--such
as terrorism and drug and arms trafficking,
to help prevent the onset or exacerbation of
new tensions.

Respond to Crises-as directed.

You can read the General's statement here.

Many questions can be raised about the Command's approach; about the activities it engages in and the countries it engages with; and about its effectiveness. But the bigger, perhaps tougher question -- what is the overarching aim of U.S. policy in Africa, for example -- is an issue decided not at the Command's level or even at the Pentagon but at the White House and/or the State Department.

Some people forget that the military carries out policy. It doesn't make it.

And that may well mean that some senior non-military official has made clear to AFRICOM that it is not supposed to make headlines.

Maybe AFRICOM Should Be africom (Read On and See Why)

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Fri, 19 Feb 2010 21:12:00 +0000

Sometimes I think an organization can go a little too far in attempting to keep a low profile. I'm talking about AFRICOM. Or should I say "africom"? Go to their website. Not untypically the lead item is about what we might consider a social event:

"Multinational Crew Members of Africa Partnership Station Compete in Soccer Match with French Navy"

Or there are travel entries:

"USS Samuel B Roberts Departs Lagos, Nigeria"

But even when there's a substantive, potentially newsy entry -- like one on anti-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia -- it gets downplayed. Check out this transcript. What does it say right at the top?

"AFRICOM PAO Note: U.S. Africa Command is not directly involved in counter piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia. This transcript is posted to further public understanding of U.S. foreign policy in the region."

Well, we do welcome that.

[Eds Note: sorry about the long gap in posting. Been busy. Then was snowed under. Hope to do better.]

Iranian Arms Offloaded in Eritrea: Interesting But Unconfirmed

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Tue, 29 Dec 2009 16:55:00 +0000

According to informed sources quoted by an opposition Eritrean website, an Iranian vessel carrying a variety of weapons docked at Massawa Port on 7 December.

The report, on Adoulis.com, quoted the sources as saying that the ship, which was also carrying food items, had unloaded at a warehouse near the main dock at Massawa and alleged "that the unloading was seen by a representative of the Somali Mujahidin Youth Movement, a representatives of the Huthis [Yemeni rebel group], and a third person believed to be a representative of the opposition in Djibouti."

The item went on to note that the UN Security Council passed a resolution on 23 December to impose sanctions on Eritrea for its support of the Somali rebels and its
refusal to withdraw from territory in Djibouti.

Editor's Note: Why is it that these reports of Iranian involvement in Eritrea only come from opposition sources without any independent confirmation?

Al-Qaida in the Maghreb Claims Responsibility for West Africa Kidnappings

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Tue, 08 Dec 2009 15:56:00 +0000

The Algerian-based group al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is claiming responsibility for last month's kidnapping of three Spanish aid workers in Mauritania and a Frenchman in Mali. VOA's Scott Stearns reports the kidnapping claim came in an audio tape given to the Al Jazeera television network.

The broadcaster's website reports a man identifying himself as Saleh Abu Mohammad says that France and Spain will be informed later about the kidnappers' demands.

Spain says it can not confirm the validity of the claim, but is investigating the report.

Three Spanish aid workers were kidnapped on November 29th south of the Mauritanian city, Nouadhibou, on the road to the capital, Nouakchott. Gunmen abducted a Frenchman in eastern Mali on November 26th.

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is a Sunni organization which was formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. It began as an insurrection against Algeria's secular military rulers after they canceled parliament elections in 1992, when it appeared a coalition of Islamist groups might take power.

It has since expanded and aligned itself with the broader al-Qaida terrorist network, claiming responsibility for suicide bombings in Algeria last year and the kidnapping of two Austrian tourists in Tunisia who were later freed in Mali.

The group also claimed responsibility for last December's kidnapping of Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler and his aide in Niger, as well as the abduction of four European tourists returning from a nomadic cultural festival in January. One of those tourists was killed.

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb says it killed an American teacher in Nouakchott in June, because he was allegedly trying to convert Muslims to Christianity.

It is considered a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department and the European Union.

Special Operations Forces Doing Media and Marketing?

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Mon, 30 Nov 2009 18:51:00 +0000

AFRICOM has issued a fact sheet on Military Information Support Teams. You can see what it says below or go to this page and look for the file on MISTs:

Military Information Support Teams (MISTs)
are funded by the United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCCOM) and support Department
of State and U.S. Embassies by augmenting or
broadening existing public diplomacy efforts.

The MIST’s partnerships with their respective U.S.
Embassy Country Teams have demonstrated their
ability to successfully provide advice and assistance
to partner nations in the development of information
activities. Synchronized with embassy goals and
objectives and with Country Team oversight, the
teams articulate USG messages by informing,
clarifying and persuading foreign audiences. MISTs
primarily work in coordination with partner nation
agencies in support of U.S. and partner nation’s
objectives, policies, interests and U.S. Africa
Command Theater Security Cooperation objectives.

Deployment of a MIST to support a U.S. Embassy is
initiated by a request from the U.S. Ambassador.

Upon arrival of the team, the Ambassador serves as
the approval authority for all disseminated products
within the partner nation. Likewise, the MIST relies on
the country team’s network to interface with the
partner nation and receive administrative, logistic and
contracting support.

MIST activities

MISTs are trained to use a variety of diverse media
platforms including local radio stations,
newspapers, and various printed materials to
focus attention on particular events or issues. Their
overall programs are synchronized with embassy
goals. These include:

--Countering violent extremist organizations’
ideology along with their recruitment and financing
efforts
--Supporting good governance and the building and
reinforcement of strong, accountable institutions
--Discouraging support for local and trans-national
crimes
--Supporting anti-smuggling/trafficking and counternarcotics
media campaigns

MIST Personnel

Teams typically consist of 3-8 personnel from the
United States Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC) based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Team size is scalable to the needs and
requirements of the mission.

Prior to their assignments, personnel receive
specialized training which includes:
--Media industry training
--Advanced marketing
--Advanced graphic illustration
--Language training
--Regional and cultural familiarity
--Department of State / interagency overview
--Anti-terrorism and personal protection training

Countries

MISTs have provided past support to U.S. Embassies
in countries such as Ethiopia, Chad and Kenya and
other nations throughout the continent.

MIST Guidelines

Under current funding authorities, MISTs can execute
their budget to support the development of
products or services in support of information
activities using various media platforms. However,
below are some examples of prohibitive items that
MIST budgets cannot be used for:
--Build infrastructure or purchase materials
--Scholarships or grants
--Animals or agriculture
--Furniture or electronics

Comment/questions: Special Operations forces doing media and marketing? In Africa? Is this just because the Defense Department has substantially more resources than State and USAID? Is this really what Congress and the American people want the military involved in? Is it effective? (And how do you measure effectiveness?)

Carson on Counterterrorism in Africa

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Wed, 18 Nov 2009 17:20:00 +0000

Opening Remarks for Hearing on Counterterrorism in Africa (Sahel Region)

Johnnie Carson
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa

Washington, DC

November 17, 2009

Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, and Members of the Committee:

I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our counterterrorism approach in Africa’s Sahel region. I look forward to working with the Congress, and especially with this Committee, to identify appropriate tools to support the efforts of the countries in the region to improve their long-term security and constrict the ability of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and a variety of criminal networks to exploit the area’s vast territory.

This hearing is very timely. While the security challenges in the Sahel are not new, several attacks in recent months against African and western targets have drawn additional focus to the situation. Key countries in the area, including Algeria, Mali and Mauritania, have intensified efforts to coordinate their activities against AQIM and address the region’s short, medium, and long-term vulnerabilities. At the same time, we have consulted with African and European partners to identify areas where we can more effectively support regional efforts to improve the security environment in the Sahel over the long-term.

The United States can play a helpful supporting role in the regional effort, but we must avoid taking actions that could unintentionally increase local tensions

or lend credibility to AQIM’s claims of legitimacy. First and foremost, we must be sensitive to local political dynamics and avoid precipitous actions which exacerbate long-standing and often bloody conflicts.

AQIM’s ideology and violent tactics are antithetical to the vast majority of people in the region and the group’s ability to mobilize significant popular support for its objectives has been largely frustrated. It has failed to build and sustain meaningful alliances with insurgencies and criminal networks operating in the region. In fact, AQIM’s murder of a Malian military officer this summer, the unprecedented execution of a British hostage, and the murder of an American citizen in Mauritania may have caused some groups in Northern Mali to sever opportunistic economic arrangements occasionally established to supplement local groups’ efforts to survive in the region’s austere environment. By contrast, the perceptions of the United States have been generally favourable throughout the Sahel, even during periods when our popularity around the world declined. It is instructive that a 2008 poll involving 18 Muslim countries revealed that Mauritanians had the highest opinion of the United States.

The countries in the region continue to demonstrate the political will to combat terrorism and trans-national crime. They have explicitly stated that the Sahel’s security is the responsibility of the countries in the region. They have not asked the United States to take on a leadership role in counterterrorism efforts and

have, in fact, clearly signalled that a more visible or militarily proactive posture by the United States would be counterproductive. We fully concur that the appropriate roles for the United States and other third countries with even more significant interests in the region must be to support regional security efforts while continuing to provide meaningful development assistance to the more remote areas. Moreover, we have emphasized that while the United States will do its part, the burden must be shared.

We recognize, however, that the security environment in the Sahel requires sustained attention to address a wide range of vulnerabilities and capacity deficits. There is insufficient capacity to monitor and protect immense swaths of largely ungoverned or poorly governed territory. The arid northern half of Mali alone covers an area larger than Texas. Niger is the poorest country in the world according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Mauritania and Mali rank near the bottom of the Human Development Index scale.

The vulnerability of the northern Sahel has not only led AQIM to seek out safe-havens in the region, but has also enabled the operations of a range of trans-national criminal networks. Criminal traffickers in human beings, weapons, and narcotics also exploit parts of the region. West Africa has emerged as a major trans-shipment area for cocaine flowing from South America to Europe. Narco-trafficking poses a direct threat to U.S. interests since the proceeds of cocaine

trafficked through the region generally flow back to Latin American organizations moving drugs to the United States.

The Committee has asked how our counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel relate to our long-term goals of good governance, civilian control over security forces, and respect for human rights. The first priority President Obama has identified for our Africa policy is helping to build strong and stable democracies on the continent. This is essential in West Africa. In recent years, the region has witnessed two military coups in Mauritania, deeply flawed elections in Nigeria, and an undemocratic seizure of power in Niger. Our experience in the region has underscored the urgency of improving governance, strongly promoting the rule of law, developing durable political and economic institutions at all levels of society, and maintaining professional security forces under civilian control.

Meaningful progress in these areas is crucial to the success of ongoing efforts against AQIM and other criminal networks. The groups are drawn to areas where they can take advantage of political and economic vulnerabilities to safeguard their operating spaces and lifelines, cross borders with impunity, and attract recruits. They benefit when security forces and border guards lack the necessary training, equipment, intelligence, and mobility to disrupt their activities. Their cause is advanced when human rights abuses undermine the credibility of security forces. Terrorists and criminal organizations also take advantage of weak

or corrupt criminal justice systems unable to effectively investigate, prosecute and incarcerate all forms of criminals.

Underdevelopment in key areas represents a critical security challenge in the Sahel. The region is extremely diverse and the sources of insecurity in the region vary. In Northern Mali, for example, insecurity in isolated border areas and along traditional smuggling routes is perpetuated by unmet economic expectations and the lack of legitimate alternatives to smuggling or opportunistic commerce with criminal networks. Mali is one of Africa’s most stable democracies, but its efforts to address insecurity in the northern part of the country are severely hampered by poor infrastructure and the inability to provide adequate service delivery and educational and vocational opportunities to isolated areas. This dynamic can become particularly problematic in cases where AQIM has provided small amounts of food and other consumables to generate good-will or at least tolerance from groups living in their vicinity.

Although AQIM’s attempts to recruit in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel have been largely unsuccessful, its limited successes in countries such as Mauritania can largely be traced to its ability to capitalize on the frustration among the young over insufficient educational or vocational opportunities. AQIM has also attracted recruits and material support from isolated communities or

neighbourhoods in Mauritania and elsewhere that lack alternatives to schools, media or networking centers that promote violent extremism.

The United States’ primary instrument to advance counterterrorism objectives in the Sahel and the Maghreb is the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). TSCTP is a multi-year commitment designed to support partner country efforts in the Sahel and the Maghreb to constrict and ultimately eliminate the ability of terrorist organization to exploit the region. The rationale and overarching strategy for TSCTP was approved by a National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee in 2005. TSCTP originally included Algeria, Chad, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia; Burkina Faso was added in 2009.

TSCTP serves two primary purposes. The program identifies and mobilizes resources from throughout the interagency to support sustained efforts to address violent extremism in the region. It was understood when TSCTP was created that sporadic engagements without adequate follow-up or sustainment would fail to achieve meaningful long-term results in a region with a multitude of basic needs. The emphasis was therefore placed on key capacity deficits that could be addressed over a period of years. The program draws resources and expertise from multiple agencies in the U.S. government including the State Department, the Department of Defense, and USAID. As the threat levels, political environments and material

needs differ substantially among the partner countries, most engagements and assistance packages under TSCTP are tailored to fit the priorities of the individual countries.

TSCTP was also designed to coordinate the activities of the various implementing agencies. The coordination takes place at several levels. Action Officers representing the various agencies meet periodically in Washington to coordinate activities and share information. Representatives from Washington and AFRICOM also meet regularly with our Embassies in TSCTP countries. The first line of coordination and oversight takes place at our Embassies. While various assessments and inputs from throughout the interagency inform decisions regarding TSCTP programming, Chiefs of Mission must concur with all proposed activities. They are best placed to understand the immediate and long-term implications of various activities and are ultimately the primary interlocutors with the host countries.

Forming a definitive conclusion at this relatively early stage regarding whether our counter-terrorism approach in the Sahel is working is difficult, but we believe that we are making important progress. For example, TSCTP resources contributed to training and equipping more capable and professional security forces in Mauritania. We believe that our work with Mali to support more professional units capable of improving the security environment in the country

will have future benefits if they are sustained. Our public affairs teams and USAID are implementing a range of beneficial exchanges and projects in Mali and promoting outreach to communities potentially vulnerable to extremism in Mauritania, Chad, Senegal, and elsewhere.

The decision in 2005 to focus on long-term capacity-building rather than search for quick fixes was clearly correct, even more so given the limited absorptive capacity of these countries. Clear victories against the underlying security and developmental challenges in the region are unlikely to clearly announce themselves in the near term, but I am confident that a steady and patient approach provides the best opportunity for success.

The recognition that we must take a holistic approach involving multiple agencies was also correct. Efforts to improve interagency coordination and the vital coordination between our Missions and program managers in Washington and Stuttgart have been crucial. We continue to seek a balance between the financial resources for the development and diplomatic pieces of TSCTP and funding devoted to military to military activities. We will continue to work toward a balanced approach envisioned when the program was created.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you have.

Ship Hijackers To Airplane Skyjackers?

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 20:30:00 +0000

VOA's Alisha Ryu in Nairobi has an intriguing news item this week about Somali ship hijackers becoming air pirates.

Here it is in full:

An eyewitness account of an attempted plane hijacking last week in Somalia's northern semi-autonomous Puntland region suggests would-be hijackers were members of a pirate gang, whose operations have been affected by the increased international naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden.

Last Tuesday, about 30 passengers boarded a commercial plane in the northeastern town of Bosasso for a short flight to neighboring Djibouti.

Among the passengers was Yusuf M. Hassan, a Somali-American journalist and the former managing editor of Garowe Online Web site. Hassan tells VOA he noticed two German journalists on board, but he says no one noticed two young Somali men, sitting quietly in the first row.

"The plane was not in the air for more the three minutes when some guy in the very front jumped up and, in the Somali language, said, 'This plane has been hijacked.' When the pilot heard his very loud voice and a woman in the front scream, the pilot closed and locked his door," he said.

The move angered the would-be hijacker, who waved a handgun and fired at the cockpit door several times. Hassan says the bullets glanced off the door and ricocheted above the heads of screaming passengers.

"His demands were - one, he wants the plane landed in Las Qorey, and two, he wants to keep the plane and the two German journalists," he added. "I guess the rest of us were supposed to walk from Las Qorey to wherever we had to walk to."

Las Qorey is a coastal town in the disputed Sanaag region, which straddles Puntland and the breakaway republic of Somaliland, and is home to a gang of pirates.

The gang made international headlines last June by capturing two German tourists sailing off the coast of Yemen. The tourists were freed two months later in exchange for a $1 million ransom.

Hassan says the Russian captain of the Daallo flight turned the plane, making it appear it was flying toward Las Qorey. But the pilot was taking the plane back to Bosasso. Hassan says the lead gunmen, unaware his demand was being ignored, made a call on his cell phone as the plane descended toward Bosasso airport.

"I remember him saying to whomever he was talking to, he said, 'Guys, do you see us? The plane is landing.' I am thinking he is speaking to his gang in Las Qorey, who are waiting," he said.

The plane landed safely in Bosasso. Surrounded by security forces, the gunmen tried to escape from the plane hiding behind passengers, but they were caught.

Hassan says through various contacts, he subsequently learned that at least one of the gunmen was a member of the pirate group in Las Qorey, which has had trouble seizing vessels for ransom in the well-patrolled waters off Somalia's northern coast.

"My understanding is that because of NATO operations, the pirate gangs have lost a lot of money. And any time the pirates do not seize enough boats, they begin kidnapping western people," he explained.

More than 30 warships from 16 nations are patrolling the Gulf of Aden and the surrounding area and their presence has had an effect on the number of ships pirates have been able to seize. According to the International Maritime Bureau, the number of successful hijacks has dropped from an average of one in 6.4 vessels in 2008 to one in nine vessels this year.

But the International Maritime Bureau reports the number of attempted hijackings surged dramatically in 2009. Somali pirates are also shifting their operations farther out to sea. On Monday, a Hong Kong-registered oil tanker was attacked by pirates in the Indian Ocean, more than 1,800 kilometers off the Somali coast.

(From: http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-11-10-voa26.cfm )

Can Anyone Say "Al-Qaida Threat"?

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Wed, 21 Oct 2009 18:39:00 +0000

The United States is giving new vehicles, communications and other equipment, and military clothing to Mali.

According to a U.S. embassy statement in Bamako, in a ceremony at the Ministry of Defense, U.S. Ambassador to Mali Gillian Milovanovic transferred 37 brand-new Land Cruiser pickup trucks, along with powerful communications equipment that will allow Malian security forces to move, transport and communicate across wide expanses of open desert.

In addition, replacement parts, clothing, individual equipment and other supplies will be provided in the next few weeks for a U.S. Government initiative totaling more than 5 million U.S. dollars (2.3 Billion CFA).

"These capacity-building assets are evidence of U.S. long-term support for the Malian government and its people," Milovanovic said. "We remain dedicated to responding to the needs of our Malian friends, allies, and partners to secure their borders and to achieve peace and security."

Is Natural Fire 10 A Cover for Armed Operations Vs the LRA?

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 18:56:00 +0000

No. Not according to a spokesman for AFRICOM. Vince Crawley dismisses the suggestion made in a recent East African article, telling AFRICOMWatch:

"The exercise in Northern Uganda is not related to any action against the LRA. It is focused on building partnership and closer military cooperation between the nations of the East Africa Community."

Q: Why Kitgum?

A: "The government of Uganda requested the exercise be based in Kitgum. It is an area that in the past has been affected by regional conflict and instability, and it's our understanding that the government of Uganda seeks to use the exercise as part of ongoing work to foster closer ties with this community. Planning for this exercise has been under way for well over a year."

And Crawley adds, "If you refer to a map, you'll see that Kitgum is not especially close to the interborder area where the LRA has been operating in recent years."

But aren't the U.S. troops participating in the exercise carrying weapons? Is that standard for what is a primarily humanitarian exercise?

A: "When military personnel take part in exercises, it is routine for to deploy with weapons for training purposes, though they may not carry their weapons at all times."

The East African publication speculated that "the decision to site the exercise in northern Uganda raises questions about whether it may presage a renewed US-supported assault
against the Lord's Resistance Army."

The publication recalled the "US provided operational support to a joint Ugandan-DR Congo-Southern Sudan offensive last December that was aimed at capturing or killing LRA leader Joseph Kony and dealing a decisive blow to an insurgency that has terrorised Ugandan civilians for the past 20 years. But the operation dubbed Lightning Thunder failed in its objectives."

Guess we will just have to wait and see.

Think There Are Any Targets in Africa?

noreply@blogger.com (About AFRICOMWatch) — Thu, 08 Oct 2009 15:06:00 +0000

I'm amused by some of the erroneous "reporting" I see elsewhere on AFRICOM, like one post portraying the recent communications exercise in Gabon a "massive" exercise. [Massive? Fact: 200 people from 26 countries and three international organizations.] No doubt someone will figure out how to attribute 'sinister intentions' to AFRICOM related to this excerpt from yesterday's Pentagon news briefing on contract awarded last week to enable the B-2 bomber to carry massive new 30-thousand pound "bunker-buster" bomb:

Q Geoff, the Pentagon has requested the Congress for $88 million for funding the MOP program, which is the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, which is about 30,000-pound bomb designed to hit the targets 200 feet below --

MR. MORRELL: Yeah, I'm familiar with it. Yes?

Q What I want from you is if you could give us more details about this program and why you are raising this program now.

MR. MORRELL: I think there's been a lot of details about the -- the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, the MOP, out there already. But for those who aren't familiar with it, yes, it is a -- a conventional 30,000-pound penetrator bomb designed to defeat hardened facilities used by hostile states to protect weapons of mass destruction, production stores, delivery systems and command-and-control systems.

So, listen, the reality is that the world we live in is one in which there are people who seek to build weapons of mass destruction, and they seek to do so in a clandestine fashion. And this has been a capability that we have long believed was missing from our -- our quiver, our arsenal, and we wanted to make sure we filled in that gap.

And so it is under development right now and should be deployable in the coming months. And I don't think anybody should read anything into it beyond what it is. And I don't think anybody can divine potential targets or anything of that nature. This is just a capability that we think is necessary given the world we live in these days.

Q So any -- there is no link between this program and the Iranian nuclear program?

MR. MORRELL: I think any attempt to speculate about possible targets is -- is not very helpful.

Hmmm. Great Zimbabwe a hiding place for Mugabe's WMD?