The assumption has been that politicians being lesser-known equates with them having less influence. I believe Maliki’s gamble may prove quite successful for his political interests. It was rumored that Al-Maliki had recruited Jawad Al-Bolani and Bolani’s slowly gathering mini-coalition expected to contain Sheikh Abu Risha and Saleh Mutlaqs followers. It was expected these two Sunni leaders would also join the coalition, however they have apparently not agreed as of this writing. This may not be such a loss. Regarding the major concerns facing Iraqis, electricity, basic needs infrastructure, and crime all rate highly in civilian concerns.

You’ll note, if you review our list below, and compare it with Wikipedia’s list of the “Council of Ministers of Iraq,” neither the Electricity Minister Kareem Waheed, Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, Minister of Water Resources, Abdul Latif-Rashid, nor Riad Ghareeb the Minister of Municipalities and Public Works were present within the State of Law Coalition.

The significance of this is larger than the fact that these are big names and players in the Iraqi government. They are also prime targets for blame regarding the lack of progress in Iraq’s security, stability, and infrastructure. Al-Maliki may be truly aiming to revolutionize the state of politics in Iraq, which would be a huge step forward toward the future progress and integrity of the nation. He may also simply be maneuvering himself to maintain the Prime Ministership. To become Prime Minister all he needs to do is deliver enough of a blow to the numbers of the major opposing coalitions that he becomes Kingmaker. Neither of these situations seems unattainable. He’s also perfectly capable of using the appearance of opposition to his former colleagues in the United Iraqi Alliance for his own political gain.

Given all of these conditions, let’s take a look at what we know about his coalition so far. The best initial roundup I’ve found comes from Al-Sumaria TV.

Firstly it should be know surprise that Hussein Shahristani, the Oil Minister followed the Prime Minister, nor that Education Minister Khudayr Al-Khuza’i followed, as he is a member of Maliki’s own Dawa Party.

Shaykh Khaled Abather al-Attiyah (also transliterated as Attia) is an Iraqi politician who was elected in December 2005 to the Council of Representatatives as an independent member of the United Iraqi Alliance.

On 22 April 2006 he was elected First Deputy Speaker of the Iraqi National Assembly.

Khaled is just one of several members of the United Iraqi Alliance which, while he is only a single independent, in total serve to chip away at the new INA’s potential.

Dr. Salih Mahdi Motlab al-Hasnawi is an Iraqi doctor and politician, who has been the Minister of Health since 30 October 2007. He is a Shi’ite Muslim, but independent of any political party.

Ahtan Abbas No’man, yet another member of the United Iraqi Alliance has been the Tourism Minister since July 2007, after taking over from a Sadrist who was removed from the position in April 2007.

Mahmoud Mohammed al-Radhi is an Iraqi politician from the religious Shi’ite Arab-led Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, and the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs since May 2006.

In June 2007, he strongly criticised the United States Army for publishing pictures of severely malnourished children in a Baghdad orphanage. He accused the soldiers of setting up the photographs and using tricks to “show the Americans as the humanitarian party”. He said it was “a media fabrication exploited by forces opposed to the government”.

Abdul Samad Sultan, a representative of the Fayli Kurd segment of the United Iraqi Alliance is the Minister of Displacement and Migration. Will assisting Iraqis outside the country to return, and success in resettling displaced Iraqis help Maliki’s coalition? It remains to be seen, but certainly I feel that may have as much of an impact as Sultan’s Kurdish heritage.

Jasim Mohammed Jaafar (born 1958) (Turkish: Casim Muhammed Cafer) is the Iraqi Minister for Youth & Sports in the government of Nouri al-Maliki. He was confirmed by the Iraqi National Assembly on 2006-05-20, having previously served as the Minister for Construction and Housing in the Iraqi Transitional Government.

Jaafar may pull a small portion of the Kurdish Alliance, but the Turkmen minority are a small but vocal portion of Iraq’s populace. More influential will be whether Maliki can convince the Kurdish Change List that they should join his coalition. It’s unlikely there would be any agreement with the larger PUK and KDP parties, due to disagreements over the autonomy of the Kurdish region and the control of Kirkuk in particular.

Safa al-Din Mohammed al-Safi is an Iraqi politician who has been acting Justice Minister in the government of Nouri al-Maliki since April 2007. Since May 2006 he has also been Minister of State for Council of Representatives Affairs.

The recent release of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq members, as well as other efforts toward reconciliation may encourage support for Maliki’s list, however it could backfire if citizens blame Maliki’s inaction, or improper action, too much for ongoing crime.

Other members present were mentioned elsewhere.

According to USA Today, Khalid al-Yawer, the leader of minor Sunni political party in the western Anbar province, said that he decided to back al-Maliki, because he seemed serious about reaching beyond the Shiite community.

USA Today also mentioned, Tribal leaders from several provinces, several influential clerics and a Chaldean Catholic archbishop, were among those who attended al-Maliki’s announcement.

Which brings us to the much touted addition of Sheikh Hatem Al-Suleiman, a leader of the Dulaimi tribe, likely to have much influence in Anbar and within the Sunni tribal community. His presence could split the apparent allegiance of Sunnis to a collective Awakening Bloc, or a more Sunni-specific bloc in general. Despite some reports otherwise, it does not appear that his fellow Sunni, Ahmed Abu Risha, was present, although there are rumors that he is still being approached to join the coalition.

Roads to Iraq also mentioned a few others who were present, Ali Al-Dabbagh’s Ka’fat Party, the Iraqi Arab Bloc led by Abdul Karim Alabtan, Jumu’a based in Salahuddin and led by Sabhan Al-Janabi, Mehdi Hafidh’ Al-Tajamu’a, and the Turkmen Islamic Union, led by Abbas al-Bayati.

As Reidar Visser observes, “Maliki’s list represents considerable progress, although it was not quite as wide-ranging as some had hoped for.”

Reidar’s report was taken from reading Arabic language reports on the press conference, which had a bit more detail. Unfortunately Prime Minister’s Daawa Party had not released the full list of participants in the coalition as of this writing.

The New York Times, to its credit, makes a similar point to Reidar, at least thus far, the Coalition represents few “truly national leaders.”

The Washington Post points out that Mahmoud Mashadani and Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, once thought certain supporters of the Prime Minister, have recently withdrawn their support. However, the presence of Ali Hatem Al-Suleiman is telling and will likely be a factor in ongoing negotiations to bring in Sunni leaders.

On the other hand, every English article seems to oversimplify Shi’a politics, as per usual. Ignoring the entwined history of Daawa and the Sadr Movement is done at the peril of accurate political analysis and prediction. Furthermore, I continue to believe the release of so-called “Asaib Ahl Al Haq” members may be playing one of several lesser-seen, but fundamentally important actions by Prime Minister Maliki to influence the election, as well as providing continuing potential for Muqtada Al-Sadr’s followers to have a place at the table.

The “leadership” of this faction has close ties to the Muhammad Baqr Sadr, who is also the ideological father of the Daawa. If Prime Minister Maliki can bring some of the looser Sadrists into his coalition, which is still possible, with at least three months before the election, he may be able to pull in the votes he needs. If State of Law is given the first chance to form the new Iraqi government, whether or not Abu Risha, any more Kurds, or Saleh Mutlaq’s post-Baathist group join, I believe its more likely they will fall in with the Prime Minister than the Iraqi National Alliance.

What the press seems to miss is that the makeup of the “List” doesn’t matter as much as the likelihood that secularists and nationalists would rather see a non-sectarian nationalist government headed by Al Maliki. Despite the perception of some that Maliki may be something of a little Saddam, Ammar al-Hakim, though not his father, is an unknown quantity, while his backers, with a long history of ties to Iran, are not.

Although a State Department trip earlier this year was sold to the media as a trip where new media experts “will provide conceptual input as well as ideas on how new technologies can be used to build local capacity, foster greater transparency and accountability, build upon anti-corruption efforts, promote critical thinking in the classroom, scale-up civil society, and further empower local entities and individuals by providing the tools for network building.”

The media’s breathless excitement in covering this interesting new take on the Iraq conflict failed to mention how Iraqis such as Salam Pax, Raed Jarrar, and “Riverbend” to name a few began using “new media” to tell their stories from the beginning of the conflict in Iraq.

More than two years ago we heard another innovative story about Iraqis utilizing Google Maps to share information about checkpoints and sectarian violence around Baghdad. Although many Iraqis have adopted and adapted digital media tools to fit their special needs, there are still many who would benefit from learning more about new media.

In particular journalists in Iraq, as in many other countries, despite the limitations of technology, internet access, and even basic infrastructure in some cases(such as Iraq!) there are many ways new media could be utilized to improve their reach.

Unfortunately language is a major limitation for promoting stories from the Middle East internationally. Most blogs in English have tended to reflect a small subset of the Iraqi populace, typically the wealthy and educated. News sites that are produced in English by Iraqis, typically do not utilize RSS much less other new media opportunities available to them.

By integrating technologies that emphasize open distribution, such as YouTube or Blip.tv where high-quality videos can be distributed easily and embedded in other websites, agencies producing video content could dramatically broaden their visibility. There are no doubt risks involved, including potentially economic loss by opening access to their content. The enthusiasts and supporters of new media encourage transparency and openness as measures that grow the audience and increase visibility, thus agencies may be able to bring in greater revenue from advertising and sponsorship.

Journalists that produce audio content are coming closer and closer to a world where the convergence of technology, rather than leading to the death of radio, may be extending and encouraging the survival of this niche market. With only a mobile phone a journalist, or a “citizen journalist” who witnesses a bombing, a killing, or even street crime can make a short phone call and create an audio podcast. In fact, with this method they can report on the event live via audio updates posted to the web to an audience only limited by distribution, presence, and interest.

Using the same phone the said individual could conceivably take photos to provide realtime images from the scene. None of this is possible without also opening up the architecture of the distribution point itself. Today, with only a phone, Iraqis could be publishing reports that in 2006 and 2007 might have greatly reduced instances of sectarian violence, by reporting via SMS, MMS, audio, or email the location of a checkpoint or occupation of empty houses by militia elements.

Although widespread sectarian violence has dissipated for the moment, new media still has a place in Iraq. by increasing the participation of the citizenry in the media. This and expanding the reach and depth of coverage produced by Iraqi journalists can help restore bonds and rebuild communities. Transparency provides more than just visibility and access to news. Effective use of transparency and access can produce a wider faith in the strength of the social system and, potentially, the faith citizens have in their government to provide for their needs.

As I wrote previously, when the monopoly on violence, coercion, and security disappear, as occurred in March and April 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, communities fragment. Citizens seek out leaders, solutions for security, and collective protection. Because the United States and the Multinational Forces failed to provide leadership and solutions, locals turned to the leaders they knew, often this meant religious leaders.

Organizations such as the Sadr Movement and the Sunni Endowment and Association of Muslim Scholars were prepared with communications networks and quickly expanded their influence with the equipping of security networks, i.e. militias.

In the fall of 2003, when Paul Bremer officially disbanded the Iraqi Army he dismantled the last best solution to forestall these militias. The connection between Paul Bremer’s decree and the insurgency is usually examined simplistically, with analysis discussing the loss of force and the insidious call of religion. I would argue that individuals were seeking authority, security, and direction.

Crime became virtually unheard of in Sadr City, for example, after the establishment of the Mahdi Army. While the United States was busy fighting Sunni nationalists, jihadists, and, indeed, remnants of the Iraqi Baath Party, the Mahdi Army in Sadr City and elsewhere, the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq, and forces of the Badr Brigades in southern Iraq began filling the holes left by the collapse of the State.

By 2004 the decision of Multinational Forces and in particular the CPA to ally itself with the exiled Iraqi dissidents began to have an impact not only on the intransigent Sunni branch of the insurgency, but was further radicalizing the Sadr Movement and the Mahdi Army. Although there were many options for promoting reconciliation and bringing certain elements in from the cold, Paul Bremer appeared almost to take disagreements with Muqtada Sadr as personal affronts. The order to arrest Muqtada as well as other respected leaders of the Sadr Movement proved too much for the leader to tolerate.

In the spring of 2004 the Mahdi Army took up arms and even began discussions with Sunni elements of the insurgency. The second front became difficult for Multinational Forces to account for. Unfortunately, having bet all their chips on Iraqi exiles who were practically foreigners to their countrymen, it was increasingly difficult to organize productive negotiations.

By 2006 the marginalization of the Mahdi Army, rather than detente and reconciliation, pushed them to become more and more radical. The support of outside elements such as Iran became more and more appealing and even necessary to the continuance of the organization. Some elements turned to crime and smuggling in order to finance their operations. When the Askariya Shrine bombing occurred the transition was complete. Previously fighters and citizens alike recognized the authority of Muqtada Sadr and the Sadr Movement’s principles, but at that moment it seems to have become clear that even this accepted authority was not enough to protect the community. Instead the community further fragmented, and an reinforcing cycle of tit-for-tat violence gripped Baghdad as well as elsewhere in Iraq.

In another way this urged Sunnis back toward the State, as they desperately needed to find someone to support and protect them from the unleashed vengeance of the Shi’a community. They initially formed neighborhood watch groups to defend their neighborhoods, eventually these kinds of groups were brought in from the cold as the “Sons of Iraq.”

Although eventually Muqtada Sadr reasserted control over many of these elements, it wasn’t until Prime Minister Al-Maliki asserted his own sovereignty and control of the Iraqi state in 2008 that a change began to appear. After Al-Maliki’s operations, it appears that Iraqis are widely tending back toward recognition of the Iraqi State as sovereign and a provider of security and stability.

Unfortunately it’s beginning to look as though Al-Maliki really can’t back up his gamble. Crime is on the rise even in Sadr City where, even at the height of Iraq’s chaos crime was virtually unheard of in this district. Combine the ever-present lack of services, six years into the war and occupation, the decimation of a once-respected community leadership, with what now appears to be rising crime directly connected to this decimation, and Prime Minister Maliki may be facing another perfect storm of fragmentation.

Though it seems like a strange time to release 147 militants connected to the Sadr Movement, given the risk of destabilization facing Al-Maliki in the run-up to the elections, perhaps there is a deal between the erstwhile Prime Minister and the released partisans?

The speed with which the Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi State disappeared shocked the world, but perhaps not nearly as much as the violence, looting, and rioting that met the arrival of US troops. Unfortunately, rather than making attempts to understand why these things might happen, too often the international community has looked at events such as transpired with the disdainful eye that one uses to examine the Other.

In 2003 Iraqis rioted because of the utter destruction of the accepted social order. Within a matter of days the illusion of control with which Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq for more than 20 years was revealed for what it was.

Perhaps demonstrating the accuracy of Mr. Rumsfeld’s statements, Iraqis continued ro demonstrate the messiness of their freedom, and their unwillingness to return to the status quo, Iraqis were rioting days after the statements at a bank in Baghdad, and rioted to greet the new governor of Mosul, they rioted over poor infrastructure, and they were still rioting six months later demanding back pay.

Although the implication has been that these were the actions of desperate, ignorant, or savage people (even organized acts by the old regime!) there is another explanation.. What if these are simply understandable symptoms of the utter destruction of an accepted social order? What if these are evidence of citizens, humans, pushing the limits, attempting to discover the rules of the new social order?

In 2005 it appeared Iraq’s social order was reaching a manner of equilibrium, there was the occupation, and there was the resistance. The State may not have existed with a monopoly on coercion and violence, it could be said that there was something of a stalemate between the various competing interests. Some, myself included, might even suggest that the resistance elements were having such success with the establishment of a new social order that there was the risk they might succeed in supplanting the US Occupation as the accepted authority.

In the fall of 2005, just after the referendum on Iraq’s new constitution, preparations were being made for the December elections. Many of the resistance groups and Iraqis in general expected the United States would withdraw after these elections. There were rumors that the various elements of the resistance, from loose affiliations of Sunni insurgents, to the highly organized Al-Mahdi Army of Muqtada Al Sadr, were negotiating toward a collective agreement about administering Iraq in the aftermath of the withdrawal.

In 2006, with the bombing of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra, this fragile new social order was also destroyed. The more radical elements of the Mahdi Army, and Sunni groups in particular Tawhid & Jihad, among others, gained the perfect opportunity to push their agenda of ethnic warfare. 2006 and much of 2007 saw Iraq slipping ever closer to civil war. Ethnic cleansing appeared ever more likely, as did an all-out internecine conflict between Shi’a groups.

This was possible because of competing interests and the success of some at delegitimting the Iraqi state. Until recently a measure of calm had returned to Baghdad and much of Iraq. I would argue that this is due to several factors; the appeasement of Sunni groups via the establishment of the Awakening, providing military support to these groups to defeat more extreme groups, the appeasement of Muqtada al-Sadr, the confrontations last year with the extreme Shi’a elements, and lastly the hard line Prime Minister Maliki has appeared to take with the United States, in particulr regarding the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

Fortunately, the recent Iraqi experience provides many lessons for Iraqi, American, and international politicians alike. Demonstration of Iraqi sovereignty has done a great deal to build the confidence of Iraqi citizens in their nation. More needs to be done to demonstrate the control and reliability of Iraqi security forces to eliminate crime and gang activity.

However, no amount of sovereignty or security will succeed longterm without reconciliation amongst the citizenry of Iraq. Perhaps its time to examine more carefully the potential of an international reconciliation effort in Iraq?

As I wrote recently, one of our difficulties in the last months has been that our Bureau Chief Omar was in hiding in Syria, due to threats related to his work with Alive in Baghdad. He’s since been relocated to Sweden, leaving us without a full-time coordinator in the region. We are also in the process of rethinking how we move forward with Iraq coverage. As Iraq coverage continues to flag, despite the continuing presence of international forces and violence, it is a priority for us to return to regular coverage as well as analysis from Iraq.

Unfortunately with a flagging budget and recent staff losses, we have to figure out how to do Alive in Baghdad smarter, more effective and with more ease. All along our work on Alive in Baghdad has been very time-intensive. This is one of the difficulties inherent in producing documentary and news video. These difficulties are further exacerbated by the necessity of lengthy translations and coordinating staff across multiple countries and timezones.

We have been examining the integration of other social media and journalism tools within the Alive in Baghdad website. Specifically, with the coming Iraqi parliamentary election in January 2010 we hope to implement a process similar to our recent coverage of the Afghan election. We will crowdsource updates from Iraqis, and others present in Baghdad and around Iraq. We plan on integrating mobile submission as well as semi-realtime content.

We will temporarily shift gears, rather than focusing on a few highly produced videos each month, we hope to begin producing a variety of content, primarily short video clips, but possibly audio discussions, as well as photos, and written analysis, in particular examining events leading up to the elections.

We look forward to your comments and critiques, and welcome suggestions about how we can further involve the audience in our coverage of Iraq. We will also continue to need your support. Although we have a small amount of funds in our bank account, we will not be able to continue sustaining Alive in Baghdad, or build our other projects such as Alive in Afghanistan without your help. If you can support us with a one time donation, please do. If you are able to commit to a recurring amount, it would be a huge help to our work. We are currently investigating options for long-term and sustainable funding, but anything donated via PayPal from our audience will go directly to local producers and will not be subject to overhead costs to run support our American contributors.

Our previous translators each moved on to other positions just as Omar’s issues were coming to a head. Without translators we have been unable to continue producing regular content, as the footage is edited from our office in Philadelphia. We are still working on moving forward with Alive in Baghdad and are dedicated to continuing the project. We have recognized over the last months that the project needs to change, we need to be providing news and information in other ways, as well as our regular video series. If you haven’t seen Alive in Afghanistan or Alive in Gaza yet, please check them out, what we are working on will be something of a hybrid between these various projects.

Omar is getting settled into his new life in Sweden and should be back to work helping coordinate the project soon. We are working on integrating mapping tools, as well as preparing for the 2010 Iraqi elections coming up in January, hoping to implement similar tools as we utilized in Afghanistan’s recent election.

In other news two other Alive in Baghdad correspondents, Hayder and Basheer were resettled in the United States last Spring. Other correspondents are still in Baghdad, preparing to get back to work. We are pursuing some larger funding opportunities for Small World News, and would appreciate any input from our viewers on funding opportunities you might suggest.

House demolitions in Adhamiya have been one of many tactics employed by the United States military in its attempts to quell violence and insurgents in the troubled neighborhood. The tactic of house demolition has been a familiar one to the United States, used as early as 2003 to destroy the homes of suspected insurgents. This tactic was taken from the experience of Israeli Defense Forces’ behavior in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

It’s easy to believe the American forces were acting on what they believed to be noble intentions. In 2003 Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt told the USA Today, “If I saw that house go away, I’d feel more secure,” in reference to the destroying the home of a “terrorist across the street“.

Unfortunately Brigadier General Kimmitt was not considering the impact of home destruction in dense urban areas such as Raghiba Khatoon in Adhamiya.

While much has been made of the improved security environment in Iraq and the decision by President Obama to withdraw combat troops, it is important to look back at the lessons learned, and those seemingly unlearned, from the US military campaign in Iraq, particularly as the US escalates its war against insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, or “AfPak” as its commonly referred to in the Western press, the US continues its practice of collective punishment against the population. It does so seemingly unaware of the damages suffered during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. In fact, it appears that the US military may actually be getting worse at it, rather than improving. A study recently released by academics at King’s College and Royal Holloway, University of London reveals that in Iraq, 39 per cent of deaths from US air strikes were children, while 46 per cent were women. Even if its assumed that all of the men killed were legitimate military targets, that still only leaves a bombing success rate of just 15 percent.

In Pakistan, the statistics are much worse. Figures released by the Pakistani government show that of 701 people killed in US air strikes, only 14 could be verified as legitimate al-Qa’eda operatives. That’s a staggeringly low success rate of just 2 percent.

It could be argued that in such active conflict zones as Iraq and “AfPak,” civilian casualties are inevitable. However, the evidence in the King’s College study of Iraq shows that the likelihood of innocent deaths increases dramatically when US air power is introduced. Wired Magazine writes, “On average, around four people were killed in each violent event. Researchers found, however, that civilian casualties tended to be higher when they involved coalition airstrikes or combined air and ground attacks: The average number killed in an airstrike was 17, similar to the average number of civilians killed by suicide bombers on foot (around 16 deaths per event).”

Obviously the US in no way intends to cause these civilian casualties, but no matter the motives, it still amounts to collectively punishing the entire population, as opposed to those directly responsible for a specific crime. It should also be noted that the nuance between “intentional” and “unintentional” collective punishment is understandably lost on those whose friends and loved ones are killed in the attacks.

As the US moves from Iraq to its war in AfPak, can it really afford to continue with collective punishment, rather than focusing on infrastructure and governance? In this classic episode of Alive in Baghdad, we witness the aftermath of one such instance of collective punishment. The reactions to similar violence by civilians in Pakistan is, unfortunately, not difficult to imagine.

Despite this win, it has not been easy keeping the lights on over here at Alive in Baghdad, and we need your support to continue our work in this time of need and, hopefully, expand our techniques to other venues abroad. Please take a moment to visit our support page and give what you can to support our work. -Brian Conley, Director and CEO of Small World News]

While westerners are busy wrestling with their own taboos of government intervention and racial politics, a different taboo is re-entering the consciousness of Iraqis. The improved security environment has allowed the alcohol trade to boom, and while Iraqis welcome the business momentum, they are once again forced to reconcile their dual identities as proud Muslims and vulnerable people grappling with the trauma and depression of war.

Even though it was commonly understood that Saddam Hussein and his inner circle regularly partook of alcohol, the sale of liquor was for the most part banned during his rule. The accepted reasoning behind this was to bolster Saddam’s image as a pious Islamic ruler. However, much like in the United States during its Prohibition period, liquor stores continued to operate in Iraq, albeit as unlicensed dealers on the black market. These underground liquor establishments suffered occasional harassment from Saddam’s security services, but after the American invasion and the anarchy that followed, the harassment escalated to new, hellish heights.

During the chaos of the US occupation, freshly legalized alcohol merchants, and even the customers who attempted to patronize these merchants, were regularly the targets of kidnappings and bombings. And unlike average partisans in Iraq’s civil war, liquor merchants found themselves attacked from all sides of the conflict. Most of Iraq’s alcohol trade is run by Christians and Yazidi operating out of Mosul and other cities in Kurdistan, and while they do close on Fridays and during Ramadan out of respect to Islam, being a Kurd, a different religion, and doing something as “un-Islamic” as selling alcohol were more than enough reason to draw the wrath of everyone from fundamentalist Al-Qa’eda to the more moderate Shi’a militias.

It’s also this fact that betrays one of the most sensitive aspects of alcohol in Iraqi culture: Most liquor merchants are Christian or Yazidi, relatively vinocentric faiths, who abstain from alcohol, while the vast majority of drinkers in Iraq are Muslim, a religion which explicitly forbids it. But it is also this strange dichotomy combined with a reinvigorated attitude toward democracy that have led to fascinating public debates on personal freedom in Iraqi society.

Some Iraqis see alcohol as a shared affinity with westerners (most of the alcohol comes from the European Union via Turkey), while others see the choice to drink alcohol as a personal right guaranteed by no less than the Iraqi constitution. Even some religious parties have begun to question the ban on pubs and bars, if only for the rather condescending reason that drinking in a private establishment is less harmful than secretive drinking at home in view of the impressionable eyes of women and children. This alone is an explosive admission that drinking alcohol in Iraq’s war-torn environment may actually be inevitable, albeit still highly disreputable.

In this week’s episode of Alive in Baghdad, we talk to a handful of Iraqis in the alcohol trade and discover some of the intricacies involved in selling, and imbibing, a seemingly “forbidden” product in the midst of dictatorship, civil war, and democratic evolution.

If you were to judge only from the press coverage in Europe or the United States, you might gather that the conflict in Iraq is all but over and done with. Newspapers, broadcasters, and even wealthy satellite news agencies are all cutting back on their foreign reporters, and the Iraqi bureaus full of producers, editors, and reporters are first on the chopping block.

Alive in Baghdad isn’t leaving. And this week, as a sign of how far we’ve come, and how far left we have yet to go, we bring you this classic episode from the archives on the sectarian walls in Baghdad’s Adhamiya neighborhood.

While the walls of Adhamiya and elsewhere in Baghdad have been credited as a component of the improved security situation in Iraq, the divisions they create are physically indicative of the broader ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraqi society. While the violence has dropped to its lowest levels since the American invasion in 2003, there are still rivalries between ethnic, religious and political groups, simmering just below the surface, rivalries which have a habit of filtering down and embroiling the local population.

With the complete drop-off of reporting, there is yet another wall being constructed in Iraq. This wall, however, is not between neighborhoods in Baghdad, but rather between citizens of the world and the citizens of Iraq. The global financial meltdown along with western media’s sensationalist attention span threaten to sever entirely the communication links between Iraq and the rest of the world, although the fate of both are inextricably linked. To put it plainly, just because the Americans are leaving doesn’t mean Iraq ceases to matter anymore.

Despite the crisis in the mainstream media industry, Small World News and Alive in Baghdad are now well into their fourth year of operation, and we have absolutely no thoughts of stopping. However, we are not immune from the current financial woes. The good news is that we have a plan to deal with it.

The first part of our plan is simple – in order to alleviate the workload on our reporters and translators, we’ll be running a Classic AiB from our archives, including previously unreleased tapes, to supplement all the brand new episodes of Alive in Baghdad, which we’ll still be releasing often. This won’t last for long, only until we regain our financial momentum in the midst of industry turmoil.

But here’s the most exciting part – unlike our compatriots in the television or print business, Alive in Baghdad is in no danger of becoming extinct. Rather, we only need a boost to help alleviate the “Crisis of Confidence” affecting our industry, that is to say, the fear of investment.

That’s where you come in.

We’re asking all of you, our faithful supporters and subscribers, to shoot a quick video of yourself explaining why people should support Alive in Baghdad, particularly in light of the American military – and media – withdrawal from Iraq. Why is an accurate portrayal of Iraq important to you? What issues are still relevant to you, or still yet to cover? Tell us, and help us tell the world.

In October 2006, Saed Mahdi Shlash, a journalist and administrator working for Rayat al-Arab, was murdered along with his wife. Gunmen entered his home in Baghdad’s western neighborhood of al-Aamariyeh and executed Shlash along with his wife. The CPJ has previously highlighted the neighborhood al-Aamariyeh as a focal point of insurgent activity targeting journalists.

In addition to militants and criminal gangs, journalists in Iraq are also alleged to have been targeted by the US military as well as their own government. On April 8, 2003, indepedent journalists reporting from Baghdad’s Palestine Hotel were attacked by US military units, killing cameraman Jose Couso of Telecinco and another photographer for Reuters, Taras Protsyuk. Though the US Department of Defense claimed they acted in “self-defense,” a report issued by Reporters Without Borders states that their investigations concluded “exactly the opposite” of the Pentagon’s statement.

All of these dangers combine to form a type of censorship for Iraqi journalists. While there haven’t been specific laws infringing on Iraqi freedom of speech since the fall of Saddam Hussein, journalists
are often intimidated by the steady stream of kidnappings, bombings and assassinations. Satellite news channels, the most popular media source in Iraq, are also monitored unofficially by the government and political parties trolling for criticism and unfriendly reporting. Newspapers and print media, for their part, are targeting much less by the government due to their low readership and distribution.

In this week’s episode of Alive in Baghdad, we bring you an interview with Hassan Fadhel Allah al-Hussaini, the editor of Rayat al-Arab newspaper in Baghdad. He offers us a personal perspective on the wide variety of dangers facing journalists in Iraq. At the same time he reminds us of these dangers, Hassan remains faithful.

“All Iraqis now are working by way of a miracle,” he tells us. “Everyone who walks in the street, every student who goes to school or university…all of them are working by a miracle, because death is pursuing them in every moment and place.”

Even though it suffered heavily under the UN sanctions in the 1990’s, Iraq’s health care system was still seen as one of the more advanced in the region. This changed after the American invasion in 2003. The vast majority of Iraq’s wealthy and educated population, including the doctors and surgeons, were forced to flee the growing violence in their country. As the violence grew more chaotic during the occupation, the few doctors who were able to remain in Iraq found themselves the targets of assassinations by insurgents, their hospitals the targets of regular car and suicide bombings.

Today in Iraq the security situation has vastly improved, but the hospitals and medical institutions have been forced to, in the words of one Iraqi, “start from zero.”

The continued shortage of Iraqi doctors and surgeons is a constant stress on hospital staff. Many of Iraq’s educated population has returned as of late, but “brain drain,” either from the violence or from Iraqis fleeing the country, continues to be a strain. And while there have been many gains in the treatment of certain infectious diseases like malaria as well as improvements in infant mortality rates, Iraqis are also facing new threats from polluted water supplies to a booming cholera epidemic.

Despite these pressing problems, many Iraqis remain optimistic about the future of health care in Iraq. In this episode of Alive in Baghdad, we talk to several Iraqis: doctors, patients and hospital administrators, each of whom offers us a unique, yet notably hopeful,
perspective on Iraq’s health care system.

Another party in particular who seemed to suffer at the polls was Muqtada al-Sadr’s Movement. In the run up to the elections, rumors circulated of secret deals between the Sadrists and Maliki’s Daa’wa party, and some even speculated that Sadr’s Mehdi Army would once again resume armed resistance. While no violence has yet occurred nor deals confirmed, the Sadrists have announced a plan to appeal the election results with Iraq’s Electoral Commission, citing voting irregularities in several districts. Some of the provinces especially
highlighted by the Sadrists are Baghdad, Najaf, Kadhumiya and Qadisiyah, all heavily Shia provinces and all provinces that showed strong results for secular, nationalist parties like the Daa’wa.

It is in this light that we bring you an unaired interview from our archives. In December 2007, Alive in Baghdad had a chance to sit down with Sayed Hazim Al-A’araji, the top Sadrist representative in the Kadhumiya district of Baghdad. While some of his words may seem like an anachronism with all that has happened in the last year, much of it is worth a new look and a new consideration.

Before the American invasion in 2003, Baghdad’s parks and public squares were known for their traditional games. Men would journey from
all over Iraq on holidays to play games of Mohaibi, dominoes and backgammon. During the occupation, this was impossible due to the
chaotic security situation. Battling between the militias, the Iraqi government, and the US Military made it unlikely that anyone in
Baghdad could come to the parks at all. Now they stay until dawn, unthreatened by terrorists, criminal gangs or militia attacks.

It’s not just old men and their traditions enjoying the new era of freedom and security. Young Iraqi men take full advantage of their country’s experiment with western democracy, using the parks to meet and discuss politics, music, and of course the number one preoccupation of young men worldwide: girls. Indeed, even Iraqi women are able to come out and socialize for hours without fear of harassment.

This week as the final votes are counted in Iraq’s elections, we offer you another side of Iraq’s tenuous relationship with Western-style
democracy - The tales of a few Iraqis able to once again enjoy and take pride in their country’s rich public atmosphere.

Though it functioned effectively even through crushing UN sanctions, the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the security vaccum immediately after in 2003 proved too much for Iraq’s Ministry of Health. It’s ability to regulate the pharmaceutical industry collapsed and as a result Iraq was flooded with black market and counterfeit medications. The Ministry also lost its ability to regulate licensing of
pharmacists, effectively nullifying the line between esteemed
tradesmen and common drug dealers.

Most of the countefeit and substandard drugs in Iraq came from
smugglers bringing in black market product from Iran and China. No
longer required, or rather forced, to undergo rigorous testing by the
Ministry of Health, these counterfeit drugs at best had no effect at
all and at worst could cause serious harm. The black markets stretch into every conceivable pharmaceutical niche, from Viagra to
anti-depressents, even skin care products.There is also no regulation of licensing of pharmacists, so Iraqi patients often have no idea if their pharmacist, or his products, are legitimate.

Lately the Ministry of Health has been attempting to extend its
oversight once again, but the program is still rife with problems.
While the government has been using the Iraqi Army and National Guard to crack down on fraudulent pharmacies, often corrupt soldiers will simply burglarize the business rather than shut down its operations. Even legitimate pharmacists are at risk of this kind of racketeering, often seeing their shops raided and robbed by the very police tasked with regulation. Cell phones and electronics, not counterfeit medications and drug dealers, are more often than not the target of these raids.

In this episode of Alive in Baghdad we talk to some of these Iraqi
pharmacists who have endured Police raids and a regulation vaccum all in the honorable pursuit of their tradecraft, bringing medicine and medical care to all those in Iraq who need it.

Iraqi pastry chefs not only put a lot of care into their creations, but some spend years developing specific specialties. The more unique their dish, the more their fame, and fortune, will grow. Sadr City in Baghdad is known especially for its unique creations, with Iraqis journeying from all corners of the country to sample its Zolabya, Sha’rya, Kanafa and Balorya.

These dishes don’t always come easy though. With Iraq’s unpredictable security situation, often times the price of ingredients will rise sharply and suddenly. This not only causes the price of sweets and pastries to fluctuate wildly, but will sometimes even cause whole items to be removed from the menu. Obviously this can be a devastating blow to a sweet maker who specializes in that item.

Fortunately for these sweets makers, security has been much less of an issue lately. With the threat of violence relatively diminished, more Iraqis are able to freely walk the streets at night and thus the bakeries are able to stay open longer, often late into the night.

In this week’s episode of Alive in Baghdad, we take you inside some of these pastry shops to talk to the chefs themselves about what it takes to be a candy maker on the streets of Iraq today. We only regret that it is only video and you can’t taste the dishes yourselves.

If you enjoy this episode, please feel free to support Alive in Baghdad, and don’t forget to check out the latest from Small World News - Alive in Gaza.

Although in recent years the holiday has been heavily disrupted by violence, this year many Iraqis have noted a dramatic decrease in violence. With the exception of a suicide attack on Iranian pilgrims in Kadhamiya, Shi’a in Iraq were able to celebrate 2009’s Ashura Festival in relative peace.

Iraqi security forces were on high alert after the pilgrims were killed in a Shi’a neighborhood across the Tigris from Adhamiya. Over 20,000 security personnel were deployed to protect the pilgrims and worshippers. The calm of this year’s celebration largely escaped the notice of the media, as most attention has been focused on the events in the Gaza strip. For more, check out Small World News’ newest project, Alive in Gaza.

In this week’s episode of Alive in Baghdad we take you back to the Day of Ashura in 2008. Hear direct from the Iraqis themselves what it means to celebrate this holy day under all the stresses of the ongoing conflict in Iraq.

After the invasion in 2003, and the fall of Baghdad, more than 200 newspapers were published, some of the newspapers were daily, and the rest were released weekly or monthly. The majority of these newspapers belong to political parties, very few of them are completely independent, or working independently. Newspapers such as Al-Sabah are demanded by Iraqis due to the government information they normally publish, and the people living in Baghdad is longing to listen to a true word and a guaranteed sources. Other newspapers belong to political parties which are not liked by Iraqis, some of those newspapers are distributed for free and some are not, such as Tareek Al-Sha’ab and Al-Basha’er newspaper.

The Iraqi citizens now have a variety of newspapers, but it is still difficult to determine which are good or dependable and which are bad. It will still take time to see what direction Iraq’s new journalists will take and whether the new government will allow a free press to grow.

If you appreciate the insightful content provided by Alive in Baghdad, which you won’t find anywhere else, please consider becoming a paying subscriber, or making a donation to Alive in Baghdad. You can also purchase Alive in Baghdad T-shirts and DVDs to spread the word.

Horace Greeley once wrote that “journalism will kill you, but it will keep you alive while you’re at it.” No one understands this twisted fate more than the journalists of Iraq. From Saddam’s police state through the American invasion and occupation all the way through the darkest days of the civil war, Iraqi journalists have endured all manner of peril and treachery in their quest to deliver truth to the people, and in some cases, truth from the people.

After Saddam took control of Iraq in 1979, journalists lost all freedom to express their own views. Saddam’s Ba’ath party dominated all media - radio, newspapers, television, everything. Behind his long winded speeches on personal hygiene and endless slide shows of exotic flowers, Saddam ruthlessly persecuted any journalist he suspected of treason. Many were imprisoned, tortured or executed. Even after Saddam’s deposing in 2003 however, journalists in Iraq still found themselves on the wrong side of the powers that be.

During the American invasion, coalition forces are alleged to have had an unofficial policy of targeting journalists who were unwilling or unable to report from Iraq exclusively through it’s system of “embedded” reporters. While the US military viewed the process of embedding as simply one means of controlling battlefield information, many journalists questioned the ethics of siding so closely with one source, some even calling it propaganda. The response from coalition forces was not kind. Occupation forces weren’t the only threat they faced however. With the invasion came the civil war, and journalists were exposed to yet new terrors.

Though print and radio journalists were sometimes able to operate in relative anonymity, journalists in the booming satellite television news industry found themselves vulnerable to all manner of militant and criminal groups in Iraq. With their faces broadcast directly into the homes of millions of Iraqis, they quickly became a favored and convenient target for even the most unsophisticated militants in Iraq. Even without the exposure of satellite television Iraqi journalists still found little shelter from the violent chaos of the civil war. Ali is one such case.

On this first anniversary of our brave correspondent Ali Shafeya Al-Moussawi’s passing, we offer you this week’s episode in his memory. Hear the tales of just a handful of the Iraqi journalists fighting every day to report the truth from Baghdad, and in some cases, fighting just to stay alive in Baghdad.