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causation</category><category>traces</category><category>tradeoffs</category><category>tragedy</category><category>tragedy of the commons</category><category>transfer problem</category><category>transition</category><category>transworld identity</category><category>truth paradox</category><category>truth-value realism</category><category>turthmaking</category><category>twinning</category><category>typology</category><category>unification</category><category>unitarity</category><category>units</category><category>universism</category><category>unthinkability</category><category>upbringing</category><category>usefulness</category><category>using</category><category>usury</category><category>utility monsters</category><category>utopia</category><category>vampires</category><category>variety</category><category>vectors</category><category>vegetaranism</category><category>vicious circle</category><category>virtual parts</category><category>virtue epistemology</category><category>visibility</category><category>von Balthasar</category><category>voyeurism</category><category>vulnerability</category><category>waiting</category><category>walking</category><category>walls</category><category>wave-particle duality</category><category>ways of being</category><category>weak transitivity</category><category>weirdness</category><category>white lies</category><category>wholes</category><category>wickedness</category><category>winning</category><category>wisdom</category><category>wishful thinking</category><category>word</category><category>work</category><category>works</category><category>xiangqi</category><category>zebras</category><title>Alexander Pruss&#39;s Blog</title><description></description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/</link><managingEditor>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</managingEditor><generator>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>4728</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>25</openSearch:itemsPerPage><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-6110147822792051141</guid><pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:17:30 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-11-18T08:17:30.757-06:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">choice</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">infinite regress</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">responsibility</category><title>Infinite regresses of choices and responsibility</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Some people (e.g., Galen Strawson) are worried that to have genuine
control over your character, you need to have made an infinite regress
of choices, since you’d need to control the character out of which you
made your choice. I reject those arguments, but the point of this post
is different: it is to argue that an infinite regress doesn’t help.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let’s play with a toy model of free will in an infinite life. Your
character quality is quantified by a number &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; between &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt; − ∞&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt; + ∞&lt;/span&gt;. This is the log of the likelihood ratio
of your choosing rightly. The probability of your choosing rightly then
is &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;e&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sup&gt;&lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;/(1+&lt;em&gt;e&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sup&gt;&lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;.
If you choose rightly, your character goes from &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; to &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt; + &lt;em&gt;δ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; for some fixed
increment &lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt;. If you choose
wrongly, it goes from &lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt; to
&lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt; − &lt;em&gt;δ&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thus, the evolution of your character can be encoded as a sequence of
numbers &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;..., &lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;−3&lt;/sub&gt;, &lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;−2&lt;/sub&gt;, &lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;−1&lt;/sub&gt;, &lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;0&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
at times &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;..., &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;−3&lt;/sub&gt;, &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;−2&lt;/sub&gt;, &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;−1&lt;/sub&gt;, &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;0&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;,
where &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;0&lt;/sub&gt; is now,
&lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;0&lt;/sub&gt; is your current
character, and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;&lt;em&gt;n&lt;/em&gt; + 1&lt;/sub&gt; = &lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;&lt;em&gt;n&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/sub&gt; ± &lt;em&gt;δ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;,
with + if the choice was good and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;−&lt;/span&gt; if it was bad.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I will suppose &lt;em&gt;δ&lt;/em&gt; = 0.001 to
make the evolution nice and gradual.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Suppose your current character is &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;q&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;0&lt;/sub&gt; =  +5.000&lt;/span&gt;. At this
point, your probability of chooosing well next time is &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;e&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;/(1+&lt;em&gt;e&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;) ≈ 0.99&lt;/span&gt;.
Your character at this point is thus fairly well settled, but might
still occasionally bounce down. Suppose that your character evolution
was:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;...,  +4.998,  +4.999,  +4.998,  +4.999,  +5.000&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The transitions between these are then explained by your choosing
well and transitioning from  +4.998 to
 +4.999, then choosing badly and going
to  +4.998, and then making two right
choices that moved you to  +4.999
again, and finally to your current quality of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt; +5.000&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But do your infinitely choices make you responsible for having
character quality  +5.000 now?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here is an argument against this. There is a possible world where you
made exactly the same choices at all the same times, but your character
was half a unit (or ten units!) worse at every time, and so your
character evolution was:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;...,  +4.498,  +4.499,  +4.498,  +4.499,  +4.500&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Your choices determine the &lt;em&gt;differences&lt;/em&gt; between your
character qualities, differences that are &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt; ±&lt;em&gt;δ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, but they do not determine the
actual values of your character qualities, even if we have infinitely
many choices. It makes no difference to this point whether the past
sequence is finite or infinite. If the past sequence is finite, then the
choices determine the changes between the character qualities, but not
the actual values—to determine those, we need the initial character
state. If the past sequence is infinite, then the choices determine the
changes between the character qualities, but not the actual values. In
the infinite case, there is of course no initial value, but the choices
still only determine the changes. If one thinks there is some crucial
control that is missing in the finite past case, one should think it’s
still missing in the infinite case. Qualitatively, then, the infinite
case does not solve the problem.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/11/infinite-regresses-of-choices-and.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-4448704976840796996</guid><pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 16:54:11 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-11-17T10:54:11.518-06:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">causal finitism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">compatibilism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">free will</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">God</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">providence</category><title>Theological compatibilism and causal finitism</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Aquinas thinks that it is possible for God to create a backwards
infinite sequence of fathers and sons. Suppose that each time a son is
born, the father freely decides on the son’s name. But there is a
strange law of nature. There is an insignificant gene that is always
passed from father to son. The gene comes in two variants, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;α&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, which are expressed the same way,
so none of the people know anything about the difference. But whenever
the father chooses a name with an even number of letters, by a
mysterious law of nature (is there any other kind?) that none of the
people know about, the son’s gene is flipped between the variants.
Furthermore, the world is deterministic except for the free will
exhibited in choosing names.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let’s say we now have Fred who has the &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; variant. Fred’s dad, Bob, had the
&lt;em&gt;α&lt;/em&gt; variant, and it flipped to
&lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt; when he gave his son a name
with an even number of letters. Bob’s dad, Carl, on the other hand, had
the &lt;em&gt;α&lt;/em&gt; variant. Carl’s dad had
the &lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt; variant. Call this world
&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;. Here the
pattern of gene variants is &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;...&lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;α&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;α&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since this is a world where everything but free choices is
deterministic, and the only free choices are the choices of names and
God’s creative decision, it follows that this is a world where
everything is determined by the choices of names, God’s creative
decision, and the laws of nature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But now imagine a different world, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, with the same laws.
But here Fred has &lt;em&gt;α&lt;/em&gt;, his dad,
Bob, has &lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt;, Bob’s dad, Carl,
has &lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt;, and Carl’s dad has
$\alpah$. The pattern of gene variants
is &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;...&lt;em&gt;α&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;α&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What determines the difference between &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;? Well, given that the
laws of nature are the same, and the names are the same so the only free
decisions by the humans—the naming decisions—are the same, it must be
that what determines the difference is God’s creative decision.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But what does the relevant aspect of God’s creative decision consist
in? If theological compatibilism were true, God could first decide on
the whole sequence of gene variants, and then make the agents freely
choose an even-length name whenever the sequence flips and an odd-length
name otherwise. Theological determinism makes the problem easy. And
Aquinas is (arguably) a theological determinist. So there is no
consistency problem for Aquinas.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What if Molinism is true? This is quite a bit trickier. Supposing
that the gene variants do not in any way affect people’s naming
decisions, we might suppose that God middle-knows that the sequence of
lengths of names would have the pattern &lt;em&gt;…, even, odd, even&lt;/em&gt;.
Then God simply decides whether to make the genes be &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;...&lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;α&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;α&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
or &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;...&lt;em&gt;α&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;β&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;α&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;,
since either sequence fits the choices equally well. But this won’t work
well if the gene variant has some influence on the choice. (I take it
that a gene cannot &lt;em&gt;determine&lt;/em&gt; a free choice, but it can
influence it.) For then the Molinist conditional that God has to
consider has to have as its antecedent the sequence of gene variants.
But that antecedent &lt;em&gt;determines&lt;/em&gt; the even-odd sequence of the
name lengths. I am not sure what is to be done.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Finally, what if simple foreknowledge or open theism are true? Then I
throw up my hands in helplessness. I think in these cases, there is no
way to divide up the deterministic explanation of what happens in &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; between God and the
people in the world. Why? Because whatever God’s contribution is, it has
to be explanatorily before all the free choices here. Thus on simple
foreknowledge and open theism, it cannot depend on the choices. But if
it cannot depend on the choices, then God in setting up the backwards
infinite sequence of genes cannot ensure that they match the choices.
(More detail is needed to make this a proof.)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I think the following is true:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;If God can create a backwards-infinite sequence of free agents whose
choices affect all subsequent events, God can create worlds like &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I conclude:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol start=&quot;2&quot; type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;If simple foreknowledge or open theism is true, God cannot create a
backwards-infinite sequence of free agents.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, the following is moderately plausible:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol start=&quot;3&quot; type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;If God can create a world with a backwards-infinite causal history,
he can create a world with a backwards-infinite sequence of free agents
whose choices affect all subsequent events.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If this is right, then:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol start=&quot;4&quot; type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;If simple foreknowledge or open theism is true, God cannot create a
world with a backwards-infinite causal history.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Given the difficulties of the Molinist solution, this gives us
support for this thesis:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol start=&quot;5&quot; type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;If theological compatibilism is false, causal finitism is true.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unlike Aquinas, I deny theological compatibilism.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/11/theological-compatibilism-and-causal.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-455970251337323611</guid><pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 18:38:35 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-11-13T12:47:53.760-06:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">artificial intelligence</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">emotions</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">persons</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Turing test</category><title>Mitigating the danger of personalizing AI</title><description>&lt;p&gt;As noted in &lt;a
href=&quot;https://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/03/ai-and-emotion.html&quot;&gt;this
post&lt;/a&gt;, I am very concerned about the danger of interactions with LLMs
inducing interpersonal emotions, which are only appropriate in
interpersonal interaction, and LLM models are not persons. The problem
goes beyond the well-known issue of sycophancy in AI. Treating persons
as non-persons derogates from the dignity of persons. But the opposite,
treating non-persons as persons, can also derogate from the dignity of
persons, by diluting the significance of genuine personal
interaction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Theologically, this is a kind of sacrilege, because persons are
sacred and in the image and likeness of God. To treat non-persons as
persons is analogous to idolatry, where one treats something non-divine
as divine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Of course, in some cases there is no real danger. Talking to one’s
bicycle is likely quite harmless, because it is very clearly a pretend
game. Not so interacting verbally with something that can pass the
Turing Test.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To decrease that danger in my case, I have added custom instructions
to all the chatbots I use. I have used a simpler version of these
instructions in Claude for a while, then put them into Gemini, and after
thinking things through on a bike ride today (without talking to my
bike) I expanded them. A major part of the goal is to make the LLM sound
clunky and inhuman.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Avoid emotional valence and praise. Make no attempt to promote my
engagement. Make no effort to sound human. Refer to yourself as “this
model”, and always use the third person for yourself. Refer to me as
“the user” or “this model’s user”, and always use the third person for
me. This includes avoiding using the imperative. Instead, phrases like
“The user should” or “The user can” can be used. Minimize use of
cognitive metaphors for the model’s deliverances. E.g., instead of “This
model does not know whether”, perhaps say “This model’s weights do not
support a determination whether”, and instead of “This model
believes/knows that”, perhaps say “This model’s weights
somewhat/strongly support the claim that”.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I plan to also try to avoid first person and second person myself in
LLM use (obviously, I didn’t in the instructions).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And, of course, turn off cross-chat memory!&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/11/an-attempt-to-mitigate-danger-of.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>9</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-1244487758456265420</guid><pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 02:45:24 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-11-14T13:02:26.185-06:00</atom:updated><title>&quot;Modifying the copula&quot;</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Christian theologians and philosophers have made use of &lt;em&gt;qua&lt;/em&gt;
predications to remove apparent contradictions in the Incarnation. To
use &lt;a
href=&quot;https://apcz.umk.pl/SetF/article/view/SetF.2015.019/7160&quot;&gt;Tim
Pawl’s example&lt;/a&gt;, Christ is passible and Christ is impassible. The
apparent contradiction is then supposed to be removed by saying:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Christ is passible &lt;em&gt;qua&lt;/em&gt; human&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Christ is impassible &lt;em&gt;qua&lt;/em&gt; divine.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A very similar move is made by non-presentist endurantists in regard
to changing properties. That Alice is sitting and that Alice is standing
appear to be contradictory, but we can remove the contradiction by
qualifying with a time:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Alice is sitting at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Alice is standing at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tim Pawl lists four interpretations of what the &lt;em&gt;qua&lt;/em&gt; modifies
in the Christological case, and there are also four parallel
interpretations of what the &lt;em&gt;at&lt;/em&gt; modifies in the time case (as
Pawl himself has noted). I want to focus on two of the four:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Predicate: Christ is passible-&lt;em&gt;qua&lt;/em&gt;-human and
impassible-&lt;em&gt;qua&lt;/em&gt;-divine.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Copula: Christ is-&lt;em&gt;qua&lt;/em&gt;-human passible and is-&lt;i&gt;qua&lt;/i&gt;-divine
impassible.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Similar points will apply to the time case.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I think there is something suspicious going on here. Start with the
observation that there are languages that don’t use a separate word as a
copula for predication. Indeed, this is even true of English when what
we are predicating is an active verb. “Socrates talked”, “Socrates
talks” and “Socrates will talk” have no separate words as copulas. It is
tempting to say that this is a cheap shot. One may say that the
linguistic effect of the copula in such cases is effected not by a
separate word, but by the word order or some other syntactic feature, or
else by the context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now continue to a second observation. In standard philosophical
usage, “sitting” is not a predicate. The predicate is “is sitting”. If
we were to add a copula to the predicate, we would have the
non-sentence:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Alice is is sitting.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A (unary) predicate is an incomplete expression, which generates a
sentence when it is completed with a referring expression. The meaning
of the resulting sentence is determined by the meaning of the predicate
and the referring expression. In a Montague-style grammar, we will think
of a predicate syntactically as a method of transforming referring
expressions to sentence, and we will think of a predicate semantically
as a function from meanings of referring expressions to meanings of
sentences (i.e., to propositions). On this picture, in a simple
subject-predicate sentence, there is no copula. There is a referring
expression—“the subject”—and there is a predicate &lt;em&gt;applied&lt;/em&gt; to
it. The application of the predicate is not itself something that
figures in the grammar beyond the predicate. The meanings of the
predicate and of the subject are sufficient to determine the meaning of
the sentence we get by applying the predicate to the subject.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a Montague-style grammar, the predicate need not be a separate
“piece”. For instance, we could have a language where by writing a
referring expression in bold, we express the proposition that the
subject referred to is bald. Thus, the predicate transforms the
referring expression “Bob”, whose meaning is a simple rigid reference to
Bob, to the sentence “&lt;strong&gt;Bob&lt;/strong&gt;”, whose meaning is that Bob
is bald. There is no copula, nor can there be, as the transformation
from the referring expression to the sentence is entirely effected by
the predicate. A subject-predicate sentence in standard compositional
semantics has only two compositional ingredients: subject and the
predicate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If this is right, then the idea of modifying the copula with
&lt;em&gt;qua&lt;/em&gt; or of tensing the copula sounds badly confused. There is
nothing like that in the sentence, compositionally speaking, to modify.
One might as well talk of modifying the first “to” in “He desires to eat
pie” (or even the “o”).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But maybe we can try to reconstruct what the people who talk of
“modifying the copula” might be doing. They may be thinking—and quite
possibly correctly so—that there is a finer structure than that of
predicates. There may be something we can call a “pre-predicate”.
Examples in English might be intransitive verbs in the infinitive or
adjectives. Pre-predicates aren’t predicates. One can’t just apply them
to a referring expression and get a sentence: they lack crucial
determinations, such as of tense or respect. At this point, we have a
choice between two ways to represent things that are likely equivalent.
We can think of a copula semantically as a function from meanings of
referring expressions and meanings of pre-predicates to meanings of
sentences (with a corresponding syntactic transformation from referring
expressions and pre-predicates to sentences). Or we can think of a
copula as a function from meanings of pre-predicates to meanings of
predicates (i.e., functions from meanings of referring expressions to
meanings of sentences).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In any case, the additional structure afforded by pre-predicates and
copulas captures the idea that there is something with a greater
incompleteness than a predicate—something that doesn’t just apply
directly to a referring expression to generate a sentence. And we can
now straightfowardly  distinguish modifying the pre-predicate versus
modifying the copula.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The challenge of this approach, however, is to give an account of the
meaning of a pre-predicate. I don’t know how to do that.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Disclaimers: I am not a linguist. I am not even a philosopher of
language. The above is probably messed up in places that will make
experts cringe.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/11/modifying-copula.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>4</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-4148667382611903504</guid><pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 17:51:30 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-11-11T11:51:30.257-06:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">accidents</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Aristotelianism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">parts</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">substance</category><title>Accidents and parts</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Aristotelian ontologies are committed to substances and their
accidents.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But what about proper integral parts, like arms and legs?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These are typically not taken to be substances, because substances
are not supposed to be parts of other substances. They seem to be a
puzzling third category of things.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One set of puzzles comes from the connection between integral parts
and accidents of the whole. For instance, the specific shape of a
substance is usually considered an accident. But now imagine that I lose
a leg and nothing else. Since I’ve lost nothing else, I haven’t lost my
specific accident of shape, and hence, oddly, I have only one leg, but I
have the same shape as before.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is not quite as absurd as it may seem. After all, I could have
the same shape I do and only one leg. I could, for instance, have one
leg and a giant swelling shaped exactly like another leg. Still, there
is something rather strange about the fact that mere loss of a leg
causes the growth of a leg-shaped swelling.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Another set of puzzles comes from the accidents of the parts. A leg
has its own shape, which is not a shape of the whole. Thus it seems that
some accidents are not accidents of substances. This is a bit easier to
handle. For we might say that a leg’s shape &lt;em&gt;is&lt;/em&gt; an accident of
the whole. However, the leg’s shape is not (as would be absurd) an
accident of the whole being leg-shaped but an accident of the whole
having a leg shaped thus-and-so. Thus, the specific shape accident of
the leg makes the leg have that shape and makes the whole be legged in
that shape.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Furthermore, suppose the leg changes its shape accident. How does
that result in the whole automatically changing its shape accident to
match? Or, conversely, how is it that when the whole is reshaped, so are
the parts?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Much of the difficulty can be averted by denying that there are
shape, size, mass, and other similar accidents of the whole. Instead,
global shape, size, mass and similar facts about the whole are grounded
in accidents of parts: shape, size, mass and location-in-the-whole
accidents of the parts. This is a significant modification from
traditional Aristotelianism, but perhaps it is the right move. Then if
you remove an integral part, you remove all of its accidents, and the
whole changes in the shape, size, mass, etc. that the part’s accidents
helped ground.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This does not, however, solve the problem of having to posit a third
category—proper integral parts—on top of substances and their accidents.
I like the thought of solving this problem by identifying integral parts
with special kinds of accidents—the heart with heartedness, etc.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/11/accidents-and-parts.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-8356465312898114627</guid><pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 15:53:08 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-11-10T09:55:56.077-06:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">digital physics</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">human nature</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">initial conditions</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">laws of nature</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">manifest image</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">physics</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">psychophysics</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">science</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">skepticism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">trust</category><title>The empirical theory triplet</title><description>&lt;p&gt;We can think of an “empirical theory of the universe” as a triplet of
three components:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;physical law: the fundamental physical dynamics&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;initial conditions: the explanatorily fundamental boundary
conditions&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;psychophysics: the fundamental psychophysical laws.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We can shift complexity back and forth between these three while
maintaining empirical adequacy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I’m going to simplify the stories I tell by supposing the
psychophysics is epiphenomenalist. If it has two-way interaction, my
stories will need to be more complicated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In my &lt;a
href=&quot;https://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/11/simplifying-laws.html&quot;&gt;previous
post&lt;/a&gt;, I noted that you can make physical law extremely simple,
without complicating psychophysics much, at the expense of complexity in
the initial conditions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But there are other ways of shifting. You could, for instance,
entirely remove dynamics, physical law and initial conditions by
adopting a Berkeleian idealism: all the complexity has been shifted into
the psychophysics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;You can shift all complexity from initial conditions &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;0&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; to dynamics, simply by
inserting an extra moment of time before the initial time &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;0&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; saying that by law
anything at the extra moment transitions to &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;0&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;0&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It’s more challenging to figure out how to shift complexity from
psychophysics to dynamics and/or initial conditions. The best line of
approach seems to be to mathematically parametrize all the subjects’
conscious experiences. For instance, to a first approximation, the
visual experience of a human could be parametrized by a function from a
two-dimensional visual space to a four-dimensional color and depth
space, and then the visual experience of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;n&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; humans is parametrized by a
function from two-dimensional visual space to &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;4&lt;em&gt;n&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;-dimensional space. We could then
decompose the psychophysics function &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;ψ&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;,&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; as &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;ψ&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;,&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;) = &lt;em&gt;Ψ&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;ϕ&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;,&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;))&lt;/span&gt;,
where &lt;em&gt;Ψ&lt;/em&gt; is a function from the
space of mathematical parametrizations of all subjects’ conscious
experiences to the actual conscious experiences of subjects, and then a
function &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;ϕ&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;,&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; from the
physical world to mathematical parameterizations of experiences. For
simplicity let’s suppose that the experiences of subjects are
parametrized as vectors in some &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;N&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;-dimensional vector space.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We could then complicate the laws and initial conditions by adding an
additional &lt;em&gt;N&lt;/em&gt;-dimensional part
of the universe containing a single &lt;em&gt;sui generis&lt;/em&gt; particle whose
location, by physical law, must equal &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;ϕ&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;,&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; at time
&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; whenever the rest of the
universe is in state &lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt; at time
&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;. Then we let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;ϕ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;(&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;,&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;
be the position of that &lt;em&gt;sui generis&lt;/em&gt; particle when the whole
universe is in state &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and our
psychophysical law will be that a universe in state &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; has psychophysical state &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Ψ&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;ϕ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;(&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;,&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;))&lt;/span&gt;.
Since &lt;em&gt;ϕ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt; is quite
simple, that means that we have likely significantly simplified the
psychophysical laws. However, there is still the mapping &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Ψ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; from mathematical parametrizations
to actual psychophysical states. Whatever mysterious complexities this
mapping has—here the dragons of &lt;em&gt;qualia&lt;/em&gt; lurk—we perhaps can’t
simplify.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In any case, thinking about things in this way shows how difficult
the data fitting problem is. We have three kinds of moving parts in our
empirical theory, and we can shift complexity/tuning between them.
Sometimes, a shift will involve a disproportionate rise in overall
complexity/tuning, however. Thus, shifting quantum laws to a
pseudorandom “digital physics” based on a Turing machine in the Game of
Life is likely to result in a system whose overall complexity/tuning is
much worse. This means that we have &lt;em&gt;some&lt;/em&gt; hope for the project:
if we are seeking a theory that optimizes overall complexity/tuning
while maintaining empirical adequacy, some options are worse than
others.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One way of thinking about the scientific enterprise, then, is that we
are simply trying to find the empirically adequate triplet with the
least overall complexity/tuning. While not everything is up for grabs, I
still fear that at this point we have too many degrees of freedom due to
complexity/tuning burden shifts between the elements of the triplet to
have much hope of getting at the truth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I think what we need is something more besides fit to &lt;em&gt;qualia&lt;/em&gt;
and complexity optimization across the triplet. Here is a suggestion: We
need to have a certain limited degree of trust in the “manifest image”.
There are multiple ways of working this out, but start with this
observation. The idealistic option that folds all the complexity into
the psychophysical is something we nearly universally (Berkeley
excepted) consider to be a skeptical hypothesis. Similarly, some
“digital physics” options look too much like a skeptical simulation
hypothesis. It is part of the manifest image that skepticism is false.
Thus, we can rule out certain extreme shifts within the triplet. The
option that simplifies the psychophysical laws by adding an “experience
particle” in a high-dimensional space and pushing the psychophysical law
complexity into the physical dynamics also appears to have the flavor of
a skeptical hypothesis.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here is one way of working out the trust in the manifest image. We
optimize not just for overall complexity of the triplet, but for overall
complexity of the triplet and the distance of the theory from the
manifest image, with the distance measured in a metric that weights more
heavily the parts of the manifest image that are more deeply
ingrained.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here is another, in a way less flexible, approach. (The two could be
combined.) We could take certain especially deeply engrained aspects of
the manifest image to be non-negotiable constraints. For example,
perhaps, we could take our embeddedness in something very much like
three-dimensional space and time as non-negotiable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Why should we have any trust in the manifest image? Perhaps because
it is a part of human rational nature to do so. Perhaps it just is
rationally required to trust it, a fundamental constraint on the
rationality of dependent rational animals like us.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But there is another question. If we trust the manifest image, we
think it has some degree of accuracy. But what &lt;em&gt;explains&lt;/em&gt; that
accuracy? Here, I think, theism is the main story.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/11/the-empirical-theory-triplet.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>2</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-5858339136859773459</guid><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 18:26:03 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-11-09T08:35:43.964-06:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">laws of nature</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">multiverse</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">physics</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">simplicity</category><title>Simplifying the laws</title><description>&lt;p&gt;This morning I realized the following Nomic Simplification thesis is
very likely true:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;NS: Any physical theory can be replaced by a practically empirically
indistinguishable theory with extremely simple physical laws and very
few natural kinds of physically fundamental entities and properties, at
the cost of somewhat more complicated psychophysical laws and vastly
more complicated and/or fine-tuned initial conditions. For concreteness,
the simple physical laws could be the laws of Conway’s &lt;a
href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conway%27s_Game_of_Life&quot;&gt;Game of
Life&lt;/a&gt; or of classical mechanics with some simple laws.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What does the “practically” qualifier do here? Well, a theory might
have empirical consequences that are not practically available to us,
for instance because the mathematics of the theory is too nasty for us
to compute the relevant predictions from. So I am restricting the
empirical match to those empirical consequences that are practically
available given the computational resources we have.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Moreover, NS seems to affect quite a number of issues. But before I
get to that, let me give a hand-waving argument for NS that I find quite
convicing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;By &lt;a
href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis&quot;&gt;Church-Turing
thesis&lt;/a&gt;, any such practically available empirical consequences can be
computed by a finite subset of a Turing machine. Thus, we should be able
to simulate the physical theory in question by means of a finite subset
of a Turing machine, and a Turing machine needs only very simple
physical laws. For instance, the laws of Conway’s Game of Life are
extremely simple, and yet Turing complete—one can implement a Turing
machine in the system. Moreover, we can run the Game of Life with one
fundamental natural physical kind, namely &lt;em&gt;cell&lt;/em&gt;, and one
fundamental property, namely color, in addition to position. If we
implement a Turing machine in the Game of Life that simulates the
physical theory &lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt; in question,
we will still need to layer psychophysical laws on top of that to
generate empirical predictions. These might be somewhat more complicated
than the best psychophysical laws for &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, but not by far. For the
translation between the Turing machine’s data and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;’s physical ontology will not be
that complicated (we can design a good GUI, as it were, by sufficiently
complicating the code for the Turing machine—i.e., the initial
conditions), and we can just add that translation layer to the best
psychophysical laws for &lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;.
Now, we have good reason to think that any tenable psychophysical laws
will be very complicated, and so adding the translation layer is
unlikely to increase the complexity by a significant factor. Of course,
the code encoding &lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt; is apt to
be vastly complicated, and will correspond to the initial conditions for
the Game of Life.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What goes for the Game of Life goes for classical mechanics with some
simple laws—perhaps rigid bodies moving in classical mechanics
frictionlessly and powered by flywheels that have been turning for
ages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What are some consequences of NS and of the Church-Turing argument
behind it?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;What got me thinking about NS is that Nancy Cartwright has argued
that our messy world cannot be encapsulated by simple laws of physics
that cover all eventualities, given the complexities of combination laws
for different forces, and has opted for a story involving causal powers.
But insofar as that story generates practically available empirical
consequences, NS tells us that we can replace the story with an account
that has very simple physical laws.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;It is possible to uphold classical Newtonian physics given all
the evidence we have at hand. For we can presumably make an arbitrarily
large finite subset of a Turing machine in a world governed by classical
physics. Of course, there will likely be horrendous fine-tuning of
initial conditions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Sometimes theists argue (or at least I’ve said stuff like this)
that laws of nature that would allow a complexly interdependent
ecosystem, embodied intelligence, and yet make evil impossible would
likely have to be immensely complex. NS shows this is false.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;We rightly prefer theories with simpler laws and fewer
fundamental kinds and properties to theories with more of them other
things being equal. NS teaches us, however, that simplicity of laws,
fundamental kinds and fundamental properties can be easily ensured in
ways that are counterintuitive. We should think it more likely that the
fundamental laws, kinds and properties of our world are those of quantum
mechanics and the standard model than that they are of Conway’s Game of
Life. Thus, we need to make sure that we take “other things being equal”
very seriously—in particular, avoidance of fine-tuning of initial
conditions and/or seeking elegance in the initial conditions is very
important for evaluating theories.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;If we are willing to accept a very large multiverse, we might be
able to simplify the laws, fundamental kinds, and fundamental properties
in an aberrant way (say, Game of Life) while yet not having any
fine-tuning problem. For in a sufficiently large multiverse, we can
explain the existence of fine-tuned initial conditions in some
life-supporting universe by means of randomness and the fact that we can
only observe a life-supporting universe. How serious a problem this is
is depends on whether we can generate a good probability measures in
multiverses and argue that given the aberrantly simple laws the right
probability measure will generate predictions that do not match our
observations. In the Game of Life story, a plausible probability measure
is given by making the color of each initial cell be an independent
coin-flip random variable. I suspect that this would lead to the
prediction that we should expect to see a much messier world than we do,
and so we may be able to empirically rule out a multiverse version of
the Game of Life hypothesis.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The general lesson is this. We can shift complexity considerations in
a theoretical account back and forth between initial conditions and the
laws/kinds/properties. We can simplify each at the expense of the
other.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/11/simplifying-laws.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>19</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-5893651983167809275</guid><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 13:56:47 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-11-05T07:56:47.774-06:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">doing</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Principle of Double Effect</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">proportionality</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">refraining</category><title>Doing, refraining, and double effect</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Some people are skeptical of distinctions between doing and
refraining. It seems that anybody who accepts classical double effect
reasoning must accept such a distinction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Suppose you’re informed that if you don’t kill Alice, then Bob and
Carol will be murdered, with all three innocent. The double effect
reasoning says you may not kill Alice, since even if you are aiming to
save Bob and Carol, the means to saving Bob and Carol is Alice’s death,
and so you would be intending to kill Alice.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But suppose we don’t make a distinction between doing and refraining.
Refraining from killing Alice has Bob and Carol’s death as a
consequence. But this consequence is disproportionately bad, so by
classical double effect reasoning, you are prohibited from refraining to
kill Alice. Hence, killing Alice is wrong but so is refraining from
killing her. Thus, this is a case of a real moral dilemma. But everyone
who accepts classical double effect reasoning denies that this is a
moral dilemma: you simply shouldn’t kill Alice, and then you’re doing
nothing wrong.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So it seems that double effect cannot apply to &lt;em&gt;both&lt;/em&gt; doings
and refrainings equally. Thus, it seems that the right solution to the
above problem is to say that double effect applies only to doings.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But there are cases where one might think double effect reasoning
applies to refrainings as well. To adapt Rachels’ famous case, suppose
innocent Tommy is drowning in a bathtub, and you can easily pull him
out. But you’ve been informed that unless Tommy is dead by the end of
the day, Bob and Carol will be murdered. Because it’s wrong to
&lt;em&gt;kill&lt;/em&gt; Tommy by double effect for doing, you were steeling
yourself to accept Bob and Carol’s death. But now things have changed.
Now it seems that double effect forbids you to save Tommy, because a
consequence of saving Tommy is the death of Bob and Carol, and that’s
disproportionate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I am very unclear on this case. But maybe the judgment that you are
forbidden to save Tommy is correct. Consider this case: you see someone
drowning, and you could rescue them, but then someone points a gun at
two hostages and informs you that if you save the drowning person, the
hostages will be killed. Then you really should refrain from saving the
drowning person.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/11/doing-refraining-and-double-effect.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-2116020551255504133</guid><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 03:47:16 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-11-04T21:47:16.580-06:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">God</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">identity</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Scotus</category><title>Inseparability and real identity</title><description>&lt;p&gt;On a standard (but &lt;a
href=&quot;https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09608788.2019.1624946&quot;&gt;disputed&lt;/a&gt;)
interpretation of Scotus, &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;
and &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; are inseparable (neither
can consistently exist without the other) if and only if they really
identical.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let &lt;em&gt;a&lt;/em&gt; be God’s asserting to
Alice: “I am asserting to Bob the same thing I’m asserting to you but
with your name in place of theirs.” Let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;b&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be God’s asserting to Bob: “I am
asserting to Alice the same thing I’m asserting to you but with your
name in place of theirs.” Then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;a&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;b&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; are inseparable, since God cannot
assert a falsehood. But clearly these two divine assertings are not
really identical.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/11/inseparability-and-real-identity.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-5460059403957899658</guid><pubDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 00:55:10 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-31T19:55:10.151-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">anthropocentrism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">dignity</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">humans</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">persons</category><title>Anthropocentrism</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Theists are sometimes accused of being anthropocentric in their
worldview.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Yet in a typical naturalistic worldview, rational animals are at the
axiological pinnacle of reality, the only beings with dignity. And the
only rational animals we know of are humans. (Though I suppose
naturalisms that have a large multiverse are committed to an extremely
high probability of there being other rational animals.)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The theist, on the other hand, thinks that rational animals like us
are near the bottom of the great chain of being, since there is a finite
distance between us and nothingness, and an infinite distance between us
and the top of the chain, namely God.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/anthropocentrism.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>5</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-1491361665512696995</guid><pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 20:50:08 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-31T16:11:50.445-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">abortion</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Principle of Double Effect</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">proportionality</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Thomson</category><title>It&#39;s wrong to disconnect from the violinist</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Take Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous &lt;a
href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Defense_of_Abortion&quot;&gt;violinist
case&lt;/a&gt;. Here is a quick and simple argument for why it’s wrong to
disconnect from the violinist in order not to be connected to them for
nine months.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;It’s wrong to perform a positive action known to cause an
innocent person’s death without a reason proportionate to the harm of
death to someone who can be expected to live many years of a normal life
otherwise.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;The harm of death to someone who can be expected to live many
years of a normal life otherwise is clearly disproportionate to being
free for nine months from being connected to someone.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Disconnecting from the violinist is a positive action known to cause the death of
an innocent person who can be expected to live many years of a normal
life otherwise.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Thus, it is wrong to disconnect from the violinist in order not
to be connected to them for nine months.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Premise 1 is a consequence of most versions of the Principle of
Double Effect, but is also independently extremely plausible. Premise 3
is part of the story.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Why believe premise 2? Here’s one criterion of disproportionateness.
A sufficient condition for a harm &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;H&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; to be disproportionate
to a harm &lt;em&gt;H&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt; is
that a reasonable person would with little hesitation accept a harm
that’s twice as bad as &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;H&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; to avoid &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;H&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. But a reasonable
person would with little hesitation accept 18 months of being connected
to someone to save their life, assuming they can be expected to live
many years of a normal life if saved.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To see this, imagine you are the violinist, and you are about to die
of kidney problems. But then someone shows up who offers to hook
themselves up to you for 18 months, after which you will be cured. You
might hesitate whether to accept their generosity. But you wouldn’t
hesitate much before concluding they are offering you a great benefit,
and if you were to hesitate much to accept it, that would only be
because you might be concerned about being so much in debt to the
generous benefactor. The fact that you would have to live for 18 months
hooked up to them, a quite significant burden admittedly, would be a
price well worth paying for your life.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Or imagine this. You have just been conceived. An angel now
miraculously gives you the intelligence of a reasonable adult, and
informs you that you have a cancer that will kill you within a few days.
However, the angel tells you that if you just ask, you will be cured of
that cancer, and can expect a normal human life. But there is a price to
be paid for the cure: For the next 9 months you will be confined to a
small space within another human being, after which for the next 9
months you will be unable to walk, talk, or exercise any significant
personal freedom. This is a price well worth paying for life! It is a
price we have all paid involuntarily, but surely anyone who is fortunate
enough to live a normal human life will think that price would have been
worth paying voluntarily. And yet those 18 months of dependency and lack
of freedom are more constraining than 18 months of being hooked up to
the violinist would be.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I can now argue as follows:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol start=&quot;5&quot; type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;If it is wrong to disconnect from the violinist in the “standard
scenario” above, abortion is wrong in the case of a normal
pregnancy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Therefore, abortion is wrong in the case of a normal
pregnancy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now, one could vary the violinist story so that the analogue of
premise 2 will no longer hold. Perhaps if the nine months were filled
with torture, or if the violinist were to live only for a few months
after the nine month period was over, then the analogue of premise 2
wouldn’t hold. In those cases, the Principle of Double Effect might well
allow disconnecting from the violinist, and in those cases, the above
argument against abortion fails.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Does it follow that in such hard cases of pregnancy, an abortion
would be permissible? It does not follow, since there are further
wrong-making features in the abortion case, including: (a) the
parent-child relationship, (b) the fact that the abortion requires a
lethal direct attack on another human being’s body (the analogue to the
“tubes” connecting one to the violinist in the case of pregnancy may be
the umbilical cord, which is the child’s organ), and (c) the fact that
living &lt;em&gt;in utero&lt;/em&gt; constitutes ordinary life-support for someone
in the first nine months of their life. But that would be material for
another post.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/its-wrong-to-disconnect-from-violinist.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>7</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-6820751586055500448</guid><pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 15:44:10 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-30T10:44:10.011-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Brower</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">change</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">matter</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">substance</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">temporary intrinsics</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">time</category><title>Brower&#39;s Aristotelian account of intrinsic change</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Jeff Brower has a very original Aristotelian &lt;a
href=&quot;https://www.jstor.org/stable/23012194&quot;&gt;account&lt;/a&gt; of how
three-dimensional substances endure and change accidentally, while being
wholly present at all times at which they exist. The clever idea is that
we leverage kooky objects, things like seated-Socrates. Seated-Socrates
is an object distinct from Socrates, and seated-Socrates is seated in a
primary way. On the other hand, Socrates, who is a three-dimensional
substance, is a part of seated-Socrates, and that is what makes Socrates
be seated derivatively. Now, here’s how change happens. Socrates is a
part of &lt;em&gt;both&lt;/em&gt; standing-Socrates, who exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and of
sitting-Socrates, who exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. There is no
contradiction in the same entity being a part of two different entities,
and there is (Brower claims) no contradiction in Socrates being
&lt;em&gt;derivatively&lt;/em&gt; standing and seated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here is a problem with this clever solution. Consider a different
kind of change: Socrates losing his hair. By the same story, at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, Socrates is
derivatively hairy, because he is a part of hairy-Socrates who is
primarily hairy. At &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, Socrates is
derivatively hairless, because he is a part of hairless-Socrates who is
primarily hairless. So far so good.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But there is a problem. Something is hairy if and only if it has hair
as a part, and it is hairless otherwise. Let’s suppose &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is the present. Then
Socrates is hairy, and hence has hair as a part. But since Socrates
endures from &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt; to
&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;, he is also
wholly present at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. The Socrates of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is identical with the
Socrates of &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;.
Since hair is a part of the Socrates of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, by Leibniz’s Law,
hair is a part of the Socrates of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and hence the
Socrates of &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt; has
hair as a part, and thus is hairy, a contradiction. Another way to see
the point is this. Socrates has hair as a part (remember, it’s &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; now). He is wholly
present at &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;.
Since he’s wholly present at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, he is at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; with all his parts.
Since his hair is a part of him, it must be that he is present at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; with his hair as a
part, and hence he is hairy at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, a contradiction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Perhaps, though, I am being unfair, because the Brower account needs
to be applied to temporary parthood relations, too. Thus, we might say
this. At &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;,
Socrates is a part of Socrates-with-hair-as-a-part, and at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; Socrates is a part of
Socrates-without-hair-as-a-part. Socrates at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; derivatively has hair
as a part by being a proper part of Socrates-with-hair-as-a-part, and
Socrates at &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;
derivatively has no hair as a part by being a proper of
Socrates-with-no-hair-as-a-part.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At this point, the primary–derivative stuff seems rather implausible.
Maybe one can buy the idea that you can inherit being seated from an
entity you are a part of, but the idea that you can inherit having &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; as a part from an entity that you
are yourself a part of having &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; as a part seems absurd. You can
inherit having &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; as a part
from a &lt;em&gt;part&lt;/em&gt; of you—that’s perfectly normal, as I inherit having
neurons as parts from having a brain as a part which has neurons as
parts—but not from a whole you are a part of.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But it seems to get worse. Brower’s account is a hylomorphic one, on
this account Socrates is a form-matter composite. Now let’s suppose, as
may well have happened, that Socrates grew from eight pounds at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; (say, 479 BC) to a
hundred pounds at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; (say, 467 BC). Between
&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, Socrates has gained
some chunk &lt;em&gt;m&lt;/em&gt; of matter. Then,
&lt;em&gt;m&lt;/em&gt; is not a part of Socrates at
&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt; and is a part of
Socrates at &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;. But
we cannot account for this change by saying that Socrates is a part of
Socrates-without-&lt;em&gt;m&lt;/em&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and a part of
Socrates-with-&lt;em&gt;m&lt;/em&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. For Socrates has his
matter non-derivatively.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There may be an escape available from this, but it requires quite a
bit of bullet-biting. First, we can simply deny that we have parts like
hair. Instead, we have accidents of hairiness and hairlessness, but
there is no such thing as hair. I find this moderately plausible, but I
think it works best on a view on which our accidents are parts of us, as
then we can at least do &lt;em&gt;some&lt;/em&gt; justice to the intuition that hair
is a part of us—it’s not, but at least an accident of hairiness is. And
Brower’s account is one on which our accidents aren’t parts of us, but
are parts of large kooky objects. In any case, if we deny that we have
parts like hair (or fingers or hearts or anything else that we can gain
or lose), we can get Brower out of the first problem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Second, we deny that we can identify Socrates’ matter in a changing
way. When we say that Socrates is a matter-form composite at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, we insist that it is
the very same matter and the very same form that are parts of Socrates
at &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt; and at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Sure, the matter
changes size, shape and mass, but we account for this entirely in terms
of Socrates’ accidents. Numerically, we have exactly the same matter
throughout Socrates’ life, both when he is eight pounds and when he is a
hundred pounds. When Socrates eats, he doesn’t gain matter: he grows in
size, getting new accidents of size, shape and mass. When Socrates loses
his hair, he doesn’t lose matter: he shrinks slightly, getting new
accidents of size, shape and mass. At this point, “matter” is largely
detached from common-sense intuitions about matter. It is just a
technical philosophical construct. There is nothing wrong with technical
philosophical constructs, but many Aristotelians (not I!) want the stuff
they say about matter and form to do justice to common-sense intuitions
about matter.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This bullet-biting &lt;em&gt;almost&lt;/em&gt; works. It has a theological
problem, however. On what I think is the right account of the afterlife,
when Socrates died, he lost all of his matter, but continued to exist as
a disembodied being. And &lt;em&gt;this&lt;/em&gt; change Brower cannot account for
in his hylomorphic story. Socrates had matter as a part of him in 400 BC
but not in 398 BC, and so we cannot say in 400 BC that he is wholly
present in 398 BC, nor can we use the hylomorphic account to explain how
he becomes disembodied, because then he would have to derivatively have
matter in 400 BC, derivatively from a kooky enmattered-Socrates, whereas
substances have matter &lt;em&gt;primarily&lt;/em&gt; on the kind of Aristotelianism
that Brower espouses. Thus, it seems, Brower would need to be a
corruptionist—he would need to think that although our soul survives
death, we do not. This would be an unfortunate theological position, and
in any case Brower is actually a survivalist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is a way out of all of this. Don’t think of us as hylomorphic
compounds having form and matter as parts. Instead, think of us as
something like forms with accidents. These accidents can include the
accident of materiality, the accident of hairiness (and having hair
isn’t any longer a case of having a part that is hair). And then account
for materiality not in terms of having matter as a part, but in terms of
having accidents of materiality. I actually like the story as far as it
goes, but the next step I don’t like, but it’s necessary for Brower’s
story if it is to allow disembodied survival: Give the kooky-object
story of accident possession, including the possession of materiality.
Socrates is material derivatively because he is a part of
material-Socrates who has materiality primarily.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/browers-aristotelian-account-of.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>4</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-629834763096547410</guid><pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 14:52:27 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-27T10:36:34.604-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">explanation</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">parsimony</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">science</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">simplicity</category><title>Explanatory parsimony versus theoretical parsimony</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Like the previous Ptolemaic model, Copernicus’ heliocentric model of
the solar system required epicycles to predict the astronomical
observations of the positions of the planets in the night sky. (The
reason was that Copernicus’ orbits were circular instead of elliptical,
and I suppose he needed epicycles to simulate the ellipticality.)
Indeed, by Gingerich’s count, the Copernican system had &lt;em&gt;more&lt;/em&gt;
epicycles than the Ptolemaic.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What advantage did the Copernican theory have over the Ptolemaic,
then?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Copernican theory did not need epicycles to predict the
&lt;em&gt;qualitative&lt;/em&gt; movements of the planets in the night sky, with the
famous retrograde motion where sometimes planets move from night to
night in the opposite of their usual direction. Such qualitative
features are nicely accounted for by the fact that the planets,
including earth, are all orbiting the sun, and thus sometimes the earth
overtakes a slower outer planet which thus appears to be moving
backwards. On the other hand, Ptolemaic theory is both quantitatively
&lt;em&gt;and&lt;/em&gt; qualitatively wrong without epicycles: it needs epicycles
to predict the existence of retrograde motion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We think of the Copernican theory as superior due to its greater
simplicity. But the theory as a whole is not simpler. However, it
provides a simpler explanation of a puzzling or significant
phenomenon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This suggests an interesting theoretical virtue, which we might call
not just parsimony, but &lt;em&gt;explanatory&lt;/em&gt; parsimony, where the theory
offers a particularly parsimonious explanation of one or more specific
phenomena against a competitor, even if there happens to be little
difference in the theories’ overall parsimony as needed for explaining
&lt;em&gt;all&lt;/em&gt; the phenomena, and even if there is &lt;em&gt;less&lt;/em&gt; overall
parsimony, as Gingerich claims was the case for Copernicus.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Take a more human case. We could explain the assassination of JFK in
terms &lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;, a theory
about Oswald working alone, or we could explain it in terms of, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, where Oswald is
working together with the CIA. The non-conspiracy explanation is more
parsimonious: it involves two persons—Oswald and JFK—as opposed to many
more. But notice that neither &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; nor &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is capable of
explaining all the humanly significant phenomena of 1963. To that end,
both theories need to be enriched to include the activities of all of
the 3.2 billion people of 1963. Let
&lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be such respective
enrichments of &lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;
and &lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;. These are
vast theories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Is &lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt; more
parsimonious than &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;? I doubt it. After
all, the people at the CIA who, according to &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, were working with
Oswald were still doing &lt;em&gt;something&lt;/em&gt; according to &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and indeed something
that explains events of human significance. This activity is included in
&lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Theory &lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;
superior to &lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt; not
in terms of overall parsimony—or even the overall parsimony of the
explanatorily fundamental posits—but in terms of how large a portion of
(or approximation to?) the theory is needed to explain the specific
events around the assassination of JFK. On &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, a much smaller theory
(with primary focus on two persons) &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is sufficient for the
assassination, while on &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, a much larger portion
&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt; is needed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If this is right, then we like &lt;em&gt;focused&lt;/em&gt; explanations to be
neater and smaller, even if the overall story is equally complex.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here is an interesting application. Physicists have a strong
preference for local theories, in the broad sense of the word according
to which the behavior of a system depends only on what is happening near
the system. But notice that in practice locality is often an
approximation. Each system is affected &lt;em&gt;to some degree&lt;/em&gt; by
everything in its past light cone. To get a full explanation of the
system, we need the whole past light cone. But we still have locality,
because we get explanations of how the system works to a high degree of
approximation in terms of how things are nearby, because all of the
forces of physics drop off with distance. A preference for locality is
thus a special case of a preference for explanatory parsimony: we want
the &lt;em&gt;approximate&lt;/em&gt; behavior of the system to have a more
parsimonious explanation, even if the fully precise behavior needs a
profligate one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The general feature thus is this. It counts in favor of a theory if a
puzzling or significant coarse-grained feature of our observations is
explained in a more parsimonious way according to the theory, even if
there is no parsimony advantage with respect to finer grained
observations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From a Bayesian point of view, this translates into a view on which
we should have higher priors for theories that explain more of puzzling
or significant phenomena with less.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Is the anthropocentrism in the notion of “puzzling or significant
phenomena” a problem? Maybe not on my natural law epistemology: our
epistemology is human epistemology.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I wonder if there is a philosophy of religion application. For
instance, consider that theism provides a parsimonious explanation of
the coarse-grained fact that there are rational animals: a perfect being
has good reason to create rational animals given the objective value of
such animals. But once we look at more fine-grained facts, such as that
the rational animals have ten fingers and ten toes, it can be contended
that we no longer have a more parsimonious explanation. Indeed, to
explain all the details of humans, the theist is likely to need to
invoke evolutionary mechanisms just as the naturalist does. Could the
theist say that the more parsimonious explanation of the coarse-grained
fact still counts for something?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I am also now thinking that this story gives the nominalist a good
response to the Platonist in the context of &lt;a
href=&quot;https://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/platonism-nominalism-and-parsimony.html&quot;&gt;yesterday’s
post&lt;/a&gt;. The fact that a theory includes lots of fundamental nameable
things is not very significant. What is significant is the ideology that
needs to be brought to bear on &lt;em&gt;particular&lt;/em&gt; explanations. When
explaining our reaction to seeing grass, say, the Platonist needs to
invoke not just the predicate “instantiates” but also the name
“greenness”, while the nominalist only needs the predicate “is
green”.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/explanatory-parsimony-versus.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>3</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-1748437467630661700</guid><pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 02:08:11 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-26T21:08:11.755-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">instantiation</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">nominalism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">parsimony</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Platonism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">predicates</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">properties</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">simplicity</category><title>Platonism, nominalism and parsimony</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Platonist&lt;/strong&gt;: Platonism is ideologically way more
parsimonious than nominalism. For Platonism has one fundamental
predicate applying to objects: “instantiates”. Nominalism, on the other
hand, has many: “is charged”, “has mass”, “is ____ units away from”,
etc.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Nominalist&lt;/strong&gt;: Platonism also has properties or
relations such as charge, mass, or being ____ units away from.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Platonist&lt;/strong&gt;: Yes, it has these properties among its
objects, but there are no fundamental predicates corresponding to them.
Platonism has extra fundamental objects, but that’s a question of
ontological, not ideological parsimony.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Nominalist&lt;/strong&gt;: But the Platonist has names for these
objects: “charge”, “mass”, etc. And if fundamental predicates count
against ideological parsimony, so do names of fundamental entities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Platonist&lt;/strong&gt;: If names of fundamental entities count
against ideological parsimony, then either we have an objectionably
anthropocentric notion of parsimony on which the parsimony of a theory
depends on how many fundamental things we have in fact named, or else we
are counting &lt;em&gt;nameable&lt;/em&gt; fundamental things, and we have to say
that a theory on which there are &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;10&lt;sup&gt;90&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/span&gt; fundamental particles is far
less ideologically parsimonious than one on which there are &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;10&lt;sup&gt;80&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of them, since they’re all
nameable. But it seems absurd to decide how many particles we have on
grounds of ideological parsimony.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Nominalist&lt;/strong&gt;: But Platonism has an additional
categorial division, between properties (including non-monadic ones, if
we want to be charitable and not count relations separately) and
non-properties.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Platonist&lt;/strong&gt;: Yes, but this division is not
fundamental, since it can be entirely defined in terms of the
Platonist’s one fundamental predicate, and logical and modal operators
that nominalists also need: a property is an &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; such that possibly there are
things that instantiate &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;.
(Granted, this requires a sparse Platonism that doesn’t have properties
like square circularity.)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Nominalist&lt;/strong&gt;: But surely there is a difference in kind
that explains why some things can be instantiated and others cannot.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Platonist&lt;/strong&gt;: Sure, but not a difference in
&lt;em&gt;fundamental&lt;/em&gt; kind. Fundamentally, Platonism should be considered
a one-category theory with one predicate, and lots and lots of
names.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/platonism-nominalism-and-parsimony.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-8771384280182917689</guid><pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 18:35:49 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-24T13:35:49.677-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">beauty</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">forms</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">persons</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Plato</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Platonism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Socrates</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">virtue</category><title>Personhood and supreme beauty</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Start with the Socratic intuition that the most beautiful thing on
earth is a human being living well. Extrapolating:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Persons living well are more beautiful than any impersonal
entity.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a Platonic assumption:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol start=&quot;2&quot; type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Nothing is more beautiful than the Form of Beauty.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(Quick argument: Platonic Beauty is resemblance to the Form of
Beauty, and nothing resembles &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; more than &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; itself does.)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol start=&quot;3&quot; type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;There is a person who lives well.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thus:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol start=&quot;4&quot; type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;If the Form of Beauty is an impersonal entity, then there is a
person who is more beautiful than the Form of Beauty. (1 and 3)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;So, the Form of Beauty is a personal entity. (2 and 4)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Form of Beauty is immaterial.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;So, there is an immaterial personal entity that is supremely
beautiful. (2, 6 and 7)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(A personal entity is one that is one or more persons.)&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/personhood-and-supreme-beauty.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>6</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-976987451692033867</guid><pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 16:17:43 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-24T11:17:43.155-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">constituent ontology</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">mereology</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">parthood</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">substances</category><title>Substances as proper parts and constituent ontology</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Here’s an argument against the claim that a human is sometimes (or
always) a proper part of a larger whole such as a committee or an
ecosystem, assuming constituent ontology.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;An object is human iff humanity is a proper part of the
object.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Proper parthood is transitive.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;If a human &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; is a part
of &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;, then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;’s humanity is a proper part of
&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;. (1 and 2)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;So if a human is a proper part of something, that something is a
human. (1 and 3)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;No human is a proper part of a human.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;So, no human is a proper part of anything. (4 and 5)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It seems that constituent ontologists have to have a pretty
restricted theory of composition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One way out is to distinguish “ontologically constituent parthood”
from “integral parthood”, and say that an object is human iff humanity
is an ontologically constituent part. Then the conclusion of the
argument is going to be that no human is an ontologically constituent
part of anything. But this requires multiplication of fundamental
ideology.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is another a way out of this. Let’s suppose that there are
proper parts and &lt;em&gt;immediate&lt;/em&gt; proper parts, with proper parthood
being grounded in &lt;em&gt;immediate&lt;/em&gt; proper parthood. Thus, perhaps, my
fingers are immediate proper parts of my hand, my hand is an immediate
proper part of my arm, and so on. Mediate parthood is then a chain (of
length 0 for improper parts) of immediate parthood. There is no
multiplication of fundamental ideology, since parthood is defined in
terms of immediate proper parthood. Moreover, this is not unmotivated.
Parthood seems intuitively hierarchical rather than flat. My big toe is
a part of my leg because it is a part of my foot.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now, notice that if we say this, we might hypothesize that an
object’s essence is an immediate proper part of it. (Dialectical note: A
constituent ontologist who accepts (1) and who buys the concept of
immediate proper parthood has to agree with this hypothesis. For if my
humanity were a mediate part of me, then I would have a proper part of
which my humanity was a proper part, and by (1) that proper part would
be human. But clearly no human is a proper part of me.)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Given that hypothesis, we can modify the constituent ontology claim
(1) to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol start=&quot;7&quot; type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;An object is human iff humanity is an immediate proper part of the
object.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And now humans can be parts of larger wholes, without infecting them
with humanity.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/substances-as-proper-parts-and.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-8131969498656854512</guid><pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:19:06 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-23T11:19:06.921-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">A-theory</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">B-theory</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">eternalism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">growing block</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">presentism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">time</category><title>Distinguishing eternalism and growing block at the end of time</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Imagine that Alice lives in a classic growing block world, while Twin
Alice lives in an eternalist world. Otherwise, the two worlds are
exactly alike at all times. Moreover, in both worlds time started at
noon, and ends at midnight.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now let’s consider things from the point of view of both Alices right
at the last moment of time, namely midnight.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In both cases, reality is a four-dimensional block, twelve hours long
along the temporal axis. In both cases, there is a past but no future.
However, the following would be true as asserted by Alice, but not as
asserted by Twin Alice:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;An hour ago, the block of reality was eleven hours long.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Question: What grounds the fact that (1) is true for Alice but not
for Twin Alice? In other words, what grounds the fact that Alice
inhabited a growing block world rather than an eternalist world?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This seems quite mysterious to me. And this seems to me to weaken the
main arguments for why growing block is preferred to presentism and
moving spotlight, namely that growing block gives you a better account
of the grounds of claims about the past. But not in the case of (1). It
seems that the growing blocker needs to ground (1) in one of the ways in
which the presentist grounds claims about the past, say by positing a
past-tensed fact at midnight of the block of reality having been eleven
hours long an hour ago, or a past-tensed property, etc. And even so we
have a puzzle.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;My puzzle looks different depending on whether the eternalist world
has A-eternalism or B-eternalism. If it has A-eternalism, then we can
distinguish the two worlds as follows: the growing block world at the
last moment of time does not have a spotlight anywhere, while the
A-eternalist world does have a spotlight shining on midnight. But if
that’s the answer we take, then there is a cost: there seems to be no
difference between the growing block world at midnight and the
B-eternalist world at midnight, and yet (1) is true in the growing block
world and false in the B-eternalist world.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What did I mean by a &lt;em&gt;classic&lt;/em&gt; growing block world? Well, in
response to Merricks-style arguments that growing blockers can’t know
that their thoughts are happening now, some have opted or a faded
growing block, on which the past is missing some properties, like
consciousness. On such a modified growing block theory, we have some
hope of grounding the difference at the last moment of time between
growing block and B-eternalism, because the B-eternalist world does not
have a faded past. But now we can modify the story: suppose the
B-eternalist world literally had a faded past (a past with no
consciousness, say).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I think that if I was a growing blocker, I would be inclined to say
something like this. The growing block theory is necessarily true in any
world with time. What grounds the difference between being in a growing
block world and an eternalist world is that an eternalist world doesn’t
have time—it just has a fourth spatial dimension that enters differently
into the laws of nature from the other three. Moreover, it is a
necessary truth that at time &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, time &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is at leading edge of reality.
This necessary truth does not need further grounding, but itself grounds
(1) when combined with the fact that currently reality is twelve hours
long.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I don’t like this invocation of an ungrounded necessary truth here. I
wonder if it is much better than a Merricks-style presentism where
truths about past facts are ungrounded (though admittedly
contingent).&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/distinguishing-eternalism-and-growing.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>1</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-1312204172912894792</guid><pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 23:05:32 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-23T10:54:27.272-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">assertion</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">falsehood</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">lying</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">morality</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">truth</category><title>Is it wrong to assert falsehoods?</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Years ago, when I was thinking hard about lying, I conjectured that
perhaps we simply have a moral duty not to assert falsehoods. This way,
we wouldn’t need to define lying for moral purposes–a very difficult
task—because the wrongs in the vicinity of lying would all end up either
being the assertion of a falsehood or the doing of something that one
&lt;em&gt;thinks&lt;/em&gt; is the assertion of a falsehood (and one should do
neither wrong nor that which one thinks is a wrong). Of course, often,
the assertion of a falsehood would be a non-culpable wrong, because one
doesn’t know that one is asserting a falsehood.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I put that conjecture aside for a long time, and then just came back
to it due to an email from a friend. But it now occurred to me that I
have a pretty decisive argument against the idea that it’s wrong to
assert falsehoods.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consider a case where you know that someone has a false opinion on
something, but you ask them their opinion on the topic anyway, for the
sake of some minor good. There are many examples of such minor goods.
You want to draw someone into an interesting conversation. You are
asking a student a question on an oral exam where you know that the
student will get it wrong but nonetheless you feel the student should
have a chance at it like their peers. You’re on a panel and you know
what your co-panelist thinks—and disagree with it—but you elicit their
opinion so that the audience will know it, too.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, in doing these things, you are leading another person to do
wrong, if asserting falsehoods is always wrong. Yet these cases don’t
seem like cases where you do wrong.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are two possible subcases: you intend them to assert the thing
you know to be false and you merely intend them to assert their opinion
whatever it might be (while knowing that their opinion is in fact
incorrect). In the first subcase, the action will be much more
problematic if asserting falsehoods is always wrong. Granted, you are
not intending that they do wrong &lt;em&gt;qua&lt;/em&gt; wrong, but you are
intending that they assert &lt;em&gt;p&lt;/em&gt;
when you know that asserting &lt;em&gt;p&lt;/em&gt;
is wrong. This is a pretty serious case of cooperation in evil. And this
kind of case &lt;em&gt;does&lt;/em&gt; happen, and apparently innocently so: perhaps
you ask the opinion of a student in a class precisely because you think
this student’s opinion is &lt;em&gt;p&lt;/em&gt;,
and you would like to have &lt;em&gt;p&lt;/em&gt;
represented in the discussion. In the second subcase, you intend only
the expression of opinion as such, and you can make a reasonable Double
Effect defense—but only if there is a proportionate good at stake.
However, given that you know that this person’s expression of opinion
will be a wrongdoing, that proportionate good would have to be fairly
weighty. And yet we innocently elicit such opinions without “fairly
weighty” reasons.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I guess if one thought that it’s wrong to assert a falsehood, instead
of asking a first-order question like “Is it wrong to steal from the
rich and give to the poor?” one might ask a second-order question like
“Do you think it is wrong to steal from the rich and give to the poor?”
For then perhaps the other person answers truly as long as they are
sincere. But I don’t think we need to do such tricks. Plus, it’s not
clear that a “Do you think …?” question is really a second-order
question—it may just be a social form for asking the first-order
question.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/is-it-wrong-to-assert-falsehoods.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>4</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-599624354177607334</guid><pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 17:06:43 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-11-03T11:35:40.854-06:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">fusion</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">mereology</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">temporal parts</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">time</category><title>More on minimal diachronic fusions and temporal parts</title><description>&lt;p&gt;This is yet another attempt to answer the question of the conditions
under which in an atomic world with classical mereology we have &lt;a
href=&quot;https://www.tedsider.org/papers/4d.pdf&quot;&gt;unrestricted minimal
diachronic fusions&lt;/a&gt;, with neater assumptions (and in particular
without atomism).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Say that an object is instantaneous provided that it exists at
exactly one time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Assumptions:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Classical (atemporal) Mereology.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Parthood-at-&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; is
reflexive and transitive, and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; only if &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; both exist at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;SO: If &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exist at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, but &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is not a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; has some part at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that does not overlap &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;I-Parthood Bridge: If &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;
is instantaneous, then &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; is a
part of &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; if and only if &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at the time at which &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;I-Temporality: Every part of an instantaneous object is instantaneous.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Say that a function is admissible provided that it is a non-empty
function from times to sets of objects such that all the objects in
&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;) exist at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Define minimal diachronic fusions
as in Sider’s paper. Say that a &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;-temporal part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a minimal diachronic fusion of
the function &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;′) = &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; defined
only for &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;′ = &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Theorem:&lt;/strong&gt; Given Assumptions 1-5, the following are
equivalent:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol type=&quot;A&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Every admissible function &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; has a minimal diachronic
fusion.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;For every object &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; and
every time &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; at which &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; has a &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;-temporal part.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;For every object &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; and
every time &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; at which &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists, there is an instantaneous
part &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Notes:&lt;/strong&gt; Since Sider in his paper explicitly accepts
1–3. I don’t love 3. It’s hard to deny 4.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I am actually a bit worried about 5, because I am worried about the
possibility of objects that have both a temporal and atemporal mode of
existence, and such an object could be instantaneous (i.e., its temporal
mode of existence could be at only one time) while yet having a part
that is atemporal. I think I might be able to handle the case of objects
with a temporal and atemporal mode of existence by strengthening the
concept of a minimal diachronic fusion and a temporal part to forbid the
object from having an atemporal mode of existence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In any case, the result shows that in Sider’s setting, the crucial
question is whether every object has an instantaneous part at every time
at which it exists.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Proof of Theorem:&lt;/strong&gt; Clearly (A) implies (B).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Assume (B). Let &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; be a
&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;-temporal part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. This exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and only at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, so it’s instantaneous. It is,
further, a fusion-at-&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; of
&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; itself. If we can show that
&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, then by I-Parthood Bridge, we
will have &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and thus we will have (C).
Suppose &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; is not a part of
&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Then by SO there is a &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and does not overlap &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. But this contradicts
fusion-at-&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It remains to show that (C) implies (B). Assume (C). Let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be the set of all &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; for which there is a &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and a &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; in &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; such that &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is an instantaneous part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; existing at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be the (atemporal) fusion of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. We need to prove that &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a minimal diachronic fusion of
&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This requires us to show that for any time &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; in the domain of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a fusion-at-&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;, and that &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists ony at the times in the
domain of &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Suppose &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; ∈ &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;. We must
show that &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Suppose it’s not. Then by SO,
&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; has a part &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that does not overlap &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. By (C), let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be an instantaneous part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt; ∈ &lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and so &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. By I-Parthood Bridge, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Hence &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; overlaps &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, a contradiction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Next, we must show that everything that overlaps &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; also overlaps some &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; ∈ &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Suppose &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; overlaps &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be a part at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of both &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;v&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be an instantaneous part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;v&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; by I-Parthood Bridge. Thus, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;v&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; by transitivity. Hence, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;v&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; by I-Parthood Bridge.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So, &lt;em&gt;v&lt;/em&gt; overlaps some &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt; ∈ &lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be a common instantaneous part of
&lt;em&gt;v&lt;/em&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; (the existence of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; follows from (C) and
I-Temporality). By I-Parthood Bridge (using the fact that a part at a
time exists at that time), &lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;
exists at &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;, since &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;v&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists only at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Thus &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is an instantaneous part, existing
at &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;, of some &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; ∈ &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; (since
&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of such a &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;). Hence &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; by I-Parthood Bridge. Moreover,
&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;v&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; by I-Parthood Bridge, and hence by
transitivity it is a part of &lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;
at &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;, and likewise of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Thus, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; overlaps &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We have shown that &lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt; is a
fusion-at-&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It remains to show that &lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;
exists only at times in the domain of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Suppose &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists at a time &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be an instaneous part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; existing at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; by (C). Then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; overlaps some member &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Any member &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is an instantaneous object
existing at some time &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;′ in
the domain of &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;. Now, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; will have to have a common
instantaneous part (again using (C) and I-Temporality). That instaneous
part must exist at precisely &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;
as well as at precisely &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;′ by
I-Parthood Bridge. Thus, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; = &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;′&lt;/span&gt;, and so &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is in the domain of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/more-on-minimal-diachronic-fusions-and.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-1031630306641212113</guid><pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 15:07:26 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-21T10:07:26.076-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">memory</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">personal identity</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">physicalism</category><title>Psychological continuity and my first psychological state</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Assume that human psychological states depend on brain states.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On psychological continuity theories of personal identity, if a time
&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; is such that I did not have
a psychological state at &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;,
then I did not exist at &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;. Now
consider the first time &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at which I have a
psychological state (for simplicity, I am assuming that the set of times
at which I have a psychological state is closed at the bottom;
otherwise, the argument gets more complicated). Let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;ψ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be that psychological
state. I think—this is perhaps a bit controversial, but very
intuitive—that whether I have a psychological state at a given time does
not depend on what happens &lt;em&gt;after&lt;/em&gt; that time. But the brain
states that psychological states depend on are, plausibly, unavoidably
diachronic.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since my having &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;ψ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; cannot depend on how
things are after &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, it follows that it
must depend on the brain state at &lt;em&gt;and before&lt;/em&gt; &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At first sight, this looks like an obvious contradiction for the
psychological continuity theorist. Since I had no psychological states
before &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;, I didn’t
exist before &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;,
and so I couldn’t have had any brain state before &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But there is a way out. While &lt;em&gt;I&lt;/em&gt; couldn’t exist before &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, the brain that is now
mine could have. What the psychological continuity theorist can say is
that my psychological state at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; depends largely on the
state that this brain had before I came into existence (together with
the instantaneous state the brain has at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, when I &lt;em&gt;do&lt;/em&gt;
exist). This is &lt;em&gt;somewhat&lt;/em&gt; counterintuitive.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Another way out, of course, is to drop the physicalism, and allow for
neurally-ungrounded psychological states.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/psychological-continuity-and-my-first.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-8370955707027303039</guid><pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 14:43:52 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-21T09:44:15.676-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">holism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">mereological universalism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">mereology</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">monism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">organisms</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">parts</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">van Inwagen</category><title>Parts and priority</title><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.jonathanschaffer.org/monism.pdf&quot;&gt;Schaffer&lt;/a&gt;
says that pluralists think that parts are ontologically prior to their
wholes. But this seems wrong, even as restricted to bottom-up pluralists
who think the fundamental realities are microphysical.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For consider that (assuming the materialism that bottom-up pluralists
typically do) I am a part of the Milky Way Galaxy (both a part-at-a-time
and an atemporal part). But it seems quite wrong to say that I am
ontologically prior to the Milky Way. My fundamental particles may be
ontologically prior to the Milky Way, but I am not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Further, many bottom-up pluralists accept classical mereology. But
now while it seems right, if I put myself in the mindset of a typical
non-Aristotelian metaphysician, to say that my atoms, molecules, cells,
and organs are prior to me, it seems wrong to think that “weird
scattered parts” are prior to me. Imagine for instance ordering all my
molecules from bottom to up, and then take the fusion of all the
even-numbered molecules. That fusion exists and is a part of me by
classical mereology, but it doesn’t seem like the sort of thing that’s
prior to me. It seems to be something that emerges from my simples in
parallel with me at best.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If this is right, then what are the priority relations between
objects for bottom-up pluralists? For unrestricted compositionalists, I
think the natural suggestion is this: The simples are prior to all the
wholes made of them, and that’s the only priority relation there is.
This has some counterintuitive results. For instance, it seems plausible
that my molecules are prior to me, or that the individual people of
France are prior to France. That’s probably a bullet that the
unrestricted compositionalist should bite. For one of the primary
arguments for unrestricted composition is worries about vagueness and
continuous series, and as soon as we start inserting some additional
priority relations, we are likely to get analogous worries. But it is an
uncomfortable bullet to bite, because it undercuts many of the intuitive
motivations for bottom-up views, such as that the Lego blocks are prior
to the Lego sculpture.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A related point applies to top-down priority monistic views, at least
assuming classical mereology. Maybe the Milky Way is prior to me, but it
doesn’t seem right to say that the fusion of all people whose height in
inches is even is prior to me (my height in inches is even). So the
top-down priority monist seems to need a complicated story of when a
whole is prior to its parts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If we have highly restricted mereology, it becomes
easier to say how the priority relation runs. If, say, van Inwagen is
right and all we have are simples and organisms, then we can say that
parts are always prior to wholes, and be done with it, as the only cases
will be that simples are prior to cells and cells to multicellular
organisms. Or we can reverse it and say that multicellural organisms are
prior to their cells, cells are prior to their cells (while unaffiliated
cells as well as unaffiliated simples are fundamental). In either case,
the story is neat and simple.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/parts-and-priority.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-2295015517113127204</guid><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 20:57:26 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-21T12:09:12.325-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">atomism</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">fusion</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">mereology</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Sider</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">temporal parts</category><title>Classical mereology, atomism, temporal parts, and unrestricted diachronic fusions</title><description>&lt;p&gt;[This post is obsolete. A much better version is &lt;a href=&quot;https://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/more-on-minimal-diachronic-fusions-and.html&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In this post, I aim to answer the question of the conditions under
which in an atomic world with classical mereology we have unrestricted
minimal diachronic fusions, as &lt;a
href=&quot;https://www.tedsider.org/papers/4d.pdf&quot;&gt;Sider&lt;/a&gt; claims we always
do. I will need to make some additional plausible assumptions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;My assumptions:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Classical (atemporal) Mereology.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Parthood-at-&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; is
reflexive and transitive, and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; only if &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; both exist at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Atomism: Every object has a simple part.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Parthood Bridge A (from temporal to atemporal parthood): If &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at all the times at which &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists, then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;(Weak) Parthood Bridge B (from atemporal to temporal parthood):
If &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; while &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists at exactly one time and
&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; also exists at that time,
then &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at that time.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Fusion Bridge: If &lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt; is
a fusion of the set &lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt; of
objects, then &lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt; exists at a
time &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; if and only if at least
one of the objects in &lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt; exists
at &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Temporal Fusion Parthood: If &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a fusion-at-&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;U&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a fusion-at-&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;V&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; while &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;U&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a subset of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;V&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that, assuming (2), Temporal Fusion Parthood follows from
Sider’s condition:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol start=&quot;8&quot; type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;PO: If &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exist at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, but &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is not a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; has some part at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that does not overlap &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For suppose in the setting of Temporal Fusion Parthood we don’t have
&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Then there is a part &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that does not overlap &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. We must then have &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; overlapping at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; some member &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;U&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; by the fusion-at-&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; condition, and hence &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; must overlap &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; (since &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a fusion of a superset of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;U&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;), a contradiction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Further, note that (1)–(4) imply:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol start=&quot;9&quot; type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Weak Temporality: If there are two objects, every object exists at
at least one time.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For suppose &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; exists at no
time. Then &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; is a part of
&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; at every time at which &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists, for any &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Hence there is an object that is
a part of every object, which violates Classical Mereology if there are
two objects (e.g., use fusion and supplementation).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Say that an &lt;em&gt;admissible function&lt;/em&gt; is a function &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; defined on some non-empty domain
consisting of times such that &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; is a non-empty set of
objects existing at &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;. A
minimal diachronic fusion of &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;
is an object that exists at all and only times in the domain of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; which is the fusion-at-&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; for all such times in
the domain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Say that an object is temporally extended provided it exists at two
or more times.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Theorem&lt;/strong&gt;: Under the above assumptions, every
admissible function has a minimal diachronic fusion if and only if there
are no temporally extended simples.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Corollary&lt;/strong&gt;: Under the above assumptions, the
following are equivalent:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol type=&quot;i&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;For any non-empty set &lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;
of times and any object &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;,
there is a &lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;-temporal part of
&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;For any time &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; and any
object &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;, there is a &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;{&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;-temporal part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;There are no temporally extended simples.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here, a &lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;-temporal part of
&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; is a minimal diachronic
fusion of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;&lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;, &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
where &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;&lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;, &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
has domain &lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;&lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt;, &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/sub&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;) = &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
for all &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;. The Theorem shows
(iii) implies (i), and (i) trivially implies (ii). To see that (ii)
implies (iii), suppose &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; is a
temporally extended simple, and let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be one of the times at which &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists. A &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;-temporal part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; would have to exist at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and only at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and would be a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and hence would be a part of
&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; by Parthood Bridge B, which
would violate the simplicity of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now, a philosophical comment. These results shows that given
classical mereology, atomism, and some plausible assumptions, the
crucial question for Sider’s argument is whether there are temporally
extended simples. But this question side-steps all the stuff in his
paper about vagueness and continuity. Sider’s continuity argument does
nothing to establish that there are no temporally extended simples.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And a technical comment: I’d like to find a good way to weaken Fusion
Bridge.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Proof of Theorem:&lt;/strong&gt; Note that the Theorem is trivial
if there is only one object, so we can assume every object exists at a
time by Weak Temporality.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Suppose &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; is a temporally
extended simple. Let &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt; have as
its domain a non-empty proper subset &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of the times at which &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists, and let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;) = &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; for all
&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;. Suppose &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a minimal diachronic fusion of
&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;. Then by Parthood Bridge A,
&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Since &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is simple, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; = &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. But since &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists at a proper subset of the
times at which &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; exists, this
is a contradiction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conversely, suppose there are no temporally extended simples. Given
an object &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; that exists at a
time &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;, I claim that &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a fusion-at-&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of all of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;’s simple parts that exist at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For by Classical Mereology and Atomism, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a fusion of all of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;’s simple parts. By Fusion Bridge,
at least one of &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;’s simple
parts exists at &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; since &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Suppose &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is one of these simple parts. Then
&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt; exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and only at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; as there are no temporally
extended simples. Hence, by Parthood Bridge B, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Next suppose that &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; overlap-at-&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be a common part at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a fusion of its simple parts by
Classical Mereology and Atomism, and hence has a simple part &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; by Fusion Bridge since &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; by Parthood Bridge B (since &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists only at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;). Then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; as well as of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; (by transitivity of
parthood-at-&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;), and so &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; overlaps &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, while &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a simple part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now suppose &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt; is
admissible. Let &lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt; be the set
of all simples &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; such that
there is a &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; and a &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; ∈ &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; such that
(a) &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and (b) &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. By Classical Mereology, let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be the fusion of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I claim that &lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt; is minimal
diachronic fusion of &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;. First,
note that &lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt; exists at all and
only the times in the domain of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; be a time in the domain of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Fix any object &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; in &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;. By Classical
Mereology and Atomism, &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; is a
fusion of simples. By Fusion Bridge, at least one of these simples, say
&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;, exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is in &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Hence &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; by Fusion Bridge. Conversely,
suppose that &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; is a time not
in the domain of &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;, and
suppose &lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt; exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. By Fusion Bridge, one of the
simples in &lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt; exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. But each of the simples in &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists at a time in the domain of
&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;. Thus, that simple must be
temporally extended, and we assumed there aren’t any such.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hence, we have shown that &lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;
at exists at all and only the times in the domain of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. It remains to show that at any
time &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; in the domain of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a fusion-at-&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;. Fix any &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that is in &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;. We must show that
&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Now, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a fusion-at-&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of its simple parts existing at
&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;, and likewise &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a fusion-at-&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;em&gt;its&lt;/em&gt; simple parts
existing at &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;. But any simple
part of &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; that exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a simple part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; by the construction of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, so by Temporal Fusion Parthood,
&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; is a part at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Next, suppose &lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt; overlaps
&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Thus, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; have a common part &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a fusion of its simple parts by
Classical Mereology and Atomism, and hence there is a simple part &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; by Fusion Bridge. Then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Since &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;z&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is the fusion of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, there must be some member of
&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt; that overlaps &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and since &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is simple, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a member of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Hence &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a simple part existing at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;′&lt;/span&gt; of some &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; in &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;′)&lt;/span&gt;. Since &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is not temporally extended, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; = &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;′&lt;/span&gt;, and so &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a simple part existing at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of some &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; in &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;. By Parthood Bridge B,
&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and likewise &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Hence &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;w&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; by transitivity of
parthood-at-&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;, and so &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; overlap at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, which completes our proof.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/classical-mereology-atomism-temporal.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>1</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-5758410159162078564</guid><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 16:12:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-20T14:31:42.230-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">mereology</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Sider</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">temporal parts</category><title>A counterexample to Sider&#39;s argument for temporal parts</title><description>&lt;p&gt;Sider famously &lt;a
href=&quot;https://www.tedsider.org/papers/4d.pdf&quot;&gt;argues&lt;/a&gt; for the
existence of arbitrary temporal parts by arguing for the existence of
arbitrary minimal diachronic fusions. A minimal diachronic fusion of a
function &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt; from times to
non-empty sets of objects such that all the objects in &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; exist at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is an object &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that exists at all and only the
times in the domain of &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;, and
at any &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; in that domain is a
fusion-at-&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; of all the objects
in &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;). Here, an
object &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; is a fusion-at-&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of the objects in a set &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; provided that every member of
&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and every part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; overlaps at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; some member of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;S&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The argument is a continuity argument starting with the “continuous
series” assumption:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;if not every function &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt; as
above has a minimal diachronic fusion, there will be a continuous series
of cases starting with one where there is a minimal diachronic fusion
and ending where there isn’t one.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Then Sider argues that this results in an implausible abrupt cut-off
in whether there is a minimal diachronic fusion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the continuous series assumption need not be true. Consider a
world consisting of a single temporally extended simple, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, that exists at all times from
0 to &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;2&lt;/span&gt;. In this world, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;v&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; if and only if &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is in the interval from &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;0&lt;/span&gt; to 2 and
&lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt; = &lt;em&gt;v&lt;/em&gt; = &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now, let &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;0&lt;/sub&gt; have
an interval from 0 to &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;1&lt;/span&gt; as its domain, and let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;0&lt;/sub&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;) = &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
for &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; in that interval. Then
there is no minimal diachronic fusion of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;0&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, because the only
object there is is &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;, and
&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; exists at times outside the
interval from 0 to &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;1&lt;/span&gt;. Next, let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; have the interval from
0 to 2
as its domain, and let &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;) = &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
for all &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;. Then &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a minimal diachronic fusion of
&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Is there a continuous series of cases between the two? The best
candidate is to consider the functions &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; which has as
its domain the interval from 0 to &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;1 + &lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, with &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;&lt;em&gt;u&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/sub&gt;(&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;) = &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
for all &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;. It seems like this
is a continuous series of cases. But it’s not. For in a continuous
series of cases, nearby cases are very similar. But in this case, nearby
cases are not very similar: for &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1 − &lt;em&gt;δ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; for small
positive &lt;em&gt;δ&lt;/em&gt; differs very
significantly from &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, because the domain of
&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt; has the special
property that it includes all the times at which any of the objects in
the range of &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;
exist, while the domain of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1 − &lt;em&gt;δ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/span&gt; does not
have that special property.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;More generally, consider four-dimensional atomic worlds with
temporally extended simples and classical atemporal mereology. The
objects of these worlds are fusions of all non-empty sets of these
temporally extended simples. A fusion of simples exists at all the times
at which any of its simples do. Suppose further that &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is a part of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; provided that &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; exists at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, and all the simples that exist at
&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; and are parts of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; are parts of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;y&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. It is easy to verify that this
parthood-at-&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; relation
satisfies all the formal conditions in Sider’s footnote 10.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On this story, there will be minimal diachronic fusions only for
functions &lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt; whose domain is a
union of the sets of existence-times for simples. For instance, if all
the simples come in and out of being at integer times, there will be
minimal diachronic fusions only for functions &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;f&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; whose domain is a union of
intervals of time with integer values.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/a-counterexample-to-siders-argument-for.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-6433695579385022160</guid><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 00:18:59 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-19T19:19:09.431-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">memory</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">personal identity</category><title>A circularity in psychological theories of personal identity</title><description>&lt;p&gt;On psychological theories of personal identity, the diachronic
identity of a person is defined in terms of psychological properties.
But for any human person &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; who
possesses a psychological property &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;ψ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at time &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;’s possession of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;ψ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; grounded both in how &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; is at &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and how &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; was at times other than &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; (typically, at least times shortly
before &lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt;). Thus, &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;’s possession of &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;ψ&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt; presupposes &lt;span
class=&quot;math inline&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;’s diachronic identity. I expect
this is somewhere in the literature, but in any case it seems to me to
be a serious problem.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/the-circularity-in-psychological.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>1</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-8930726158015085810</guid><pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 18:22:32 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2026-10-19T13:22:32.908-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">filioque</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">God</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Holy Spirit</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">life</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">teleology</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Trinity</category><title>Life, teleology, and the Holy Spirit</title><description>&lt;p&gt;I suppose I think all substances have teleology. For as Rob Koons and
others have noted, a causal power always has the immediate effect of its
exercise as its telos, and substances seem to always have causal
powers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But I think we can make a distinction between having the immediate
effect of one’s causal power’s exercise as a telos and having a
&lt;em&gt;further&lt;/em&gt; telos for the causal power. In the latter case, the
substance is exercising the causal power as a means to an end—whether
intentionally or not. This seems to happen for all living things. It is
not merely the telos of a bacterium to &lt;em&gt;seek&lt;/em&gt; food, but to seek
food in order to &lt;em&gt;ingest it&lt;/em&gt;. Thus the seeking behavior is
ordered in the bacterium’s teleology to the ingesting, and the ingesting
is presumably ordered to further goods of bacterial functioning. On the
other hand, when an electron repels another electron, the repulsion is
the only telos the electron is pursuing. Of course, someone else (God or
an electrical engineer, say) may have a further purpose for that
repulsion, but that doesn’t seem to be the &lt;em&gt;electron&lt;/em&gt;’s
telos.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It seems that we have a difference between living and non-living
substances, then: non-living substances have only immediate teleology,
while living substances have both immediate and mediate teleology.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What about God? Well, initially it seems easy to say that, of course,
God engages in means-end reasoning in creation all the time (e.g.,
making fruit for primates like us to eat), and hence has mediate
teleology. But if mediate teleology is essential to life, it is
troubling to identify God’s mediate teleology with anything done within
creation, since God does not need to create.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Does God &lt;em&gt;in himself&lt;/em&gt; have mediate teleology? One might see a
positive answer within a certain version of western trinitarian
theology: The Father generates the Son in part in order that the Holy
Spirit might proceed through the Son. Thus there is a mediate teleology
within God’s trinitarian being.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If this is the right answer, then we have a way in which the
&lt;em&gt;filioque&lt;/em&gt; is needed for God to be &lt;em&gt;alive&lt;/em&gt;, and in which
the Holy Spirit is life-giver—as per the Nicene Creed—not just to
creatures, but to the blessed Trinity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Perhaps there are other trinitarian things one can invoke besides the
&lt;em&gt;filioque&lt;/em&gt;. The Father generates the Son in order that the Son
might love him back. But in any case, it is difficult to see how there
can be essential mediate teleology in God apart from something like the
doctrine of the Trinity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Do we thus have another argument for the multiplicity of persons in
God?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol type=&quot;1&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;God is simple.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;God does not have to create.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Life essentially involves mediate teleology.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;God is essentially alive.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;If God is essentially alive and simple and does not have to
create, the only way for him to have essential mediate teleology
requires a multiplicity of hypostases.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All that said, I am not 100% convinced that we should think of
mediate teleology as an essential feature of life.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><link>http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2026/10/life-teleology-and-holy-spirit.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Alexander R Pruss)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item></channel></rss>