Körber-Stiftung: Is the fall of Assad at the hands of the Sunni Islamist political organization and paramilitary group Hayat Tahrir al Sham the end result of the Arab Spring, or the opposite?

Rime Allaf: The Arab Spring died before Assad fell when the world left Syrians with no other choice but the regime and its backers. Every attempt by the democratic opposition and the Free Syrian Army to secure real assistance was ignored; that pushed many Syrians towards the only groups still able to fight: Islamists and jihadis. That is why they succeeded where others failed – and why many Syrians resent 14 years of international inaction, including by the United Nations.

In April, you wrote an article about the mix of hope and fear that followed Assad’s fall. What do the Syrians you speak to feel now: optimism or frustration with the new authorities?

A bit of both. To be honest, most Syrians care firstly about their basic needs. When will we get electricity, water and housing? How can I feed my children? These issues are rarely discussed in the media, which tends to focus on political conflicts such as with Kurdish groups, or with the southern province of Suwayda. These are not daily concerns for the 90 per cent of Syrians still struggling to rebuild their lives and country.

Is Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the new interim president, the right person to solve these issues?

Many believe in his intent and see his change in recent years. Coming after 54 years of Assadism, I think he now wants to be a national leader rather than the Jihadist he was 20 years ago. He shaped his leadership style while running Idlib but governing all of Syria is different. One of his mistakes is trying to do everything himself – there is no prime minister and only a few trusted advisers, which is not sustainable.

Under Assad’s rule, people were abducted, tortured and oppressed. This leaves scars on the soul of society. Can Al-Sharaa heal them?

He probably wants to do so, but the expected transitional justice process has been a big disappointment so far. It seems he fears sparking a new conflict with regime remnants backed by Iran, which lost the most with Assad’s fall. This is partly why he made deals with powerful Assad-era figures. The consequence is that Syrians feel justice is absent, but without it, peace and reconciliation, as seen in countries like Germany, are impossible.

Germany and the EU invested in supporting Syrian civil society to promote democratic values. What role are these organizations playing now?

Germany and Europe funded groups like The Day After, whose board I have served on since its founding to promote democracy, equality, and justice. But funding dried up around COVID -19 and Assad’s slow rehabilitation, forcing many programs to stop. Now, with the regime gone, some funding has returned, and we have reopened an office in Damascus. The worst thing Europe could do now is abandon those still working toward a democratic transition.

Talking about democratic transitions. How do you view the elections held in October?

Syria’s last genuinely democratic parliament was dissolved in 1963. Now, 210 members are either appointed or selected, so it is misleading to call these elections futile and to ask for what is currently impossible. The new parliament will pass laws, giving some structure to the governing system and connecting local officials to the central government. They may also address citizens’ priorities, but without a constitution and real elections, they cannot be representative decision-makers.

For all those years, Syria has been rather isolated due to the rule of Assad. How did you obtain your information?

As a Syrian writer and researcher with 25 years of experience at home and abroad, I have built expertise through frequent travels, my diplomatic family ties, and a broad network across Syrian society. I have spoken with regime insiders, members of the new authorities, and people from diverse social and economic backgrounds – from public employees struggling daily to the ʻVelvet Society,’ the wealthy elite that thrived under Assad.

Immediately after the fall of Assad, politicians in Europe started to pressure Syrians refugees to return to Syria. Do these Syrians even want to return?

Some do but do not have a serious option to do so. Others have integrated and are not considering going back in current circumstances. It is hard to uproot a family settled in Berlin or Vienna and send them to a devastated town with no infrastructure. The either-or choice – permanent return or permanent stay – will not work. Syria needs a mix of young, educated people and experienced professionals familiar with its old institutions. People should be able to keep ties to both their homeland and host country, and it is in Europe’s interest to support those considering return or contributing to Syria’s reconstruction. 

With that in mind, do you have a concrete idea for how Germany and Syria could cooperate?

Germany’s expertise could greatly benefit both sides. For example, a company like Siemens could help rebuild and train workers in one small area, coordinating with the Syrian government to bring European experts together with Syrian professionals from the diaspora to train locals and restore essential services and management systems. Having rebuilt after war themselves, Germany and France understand the process well and could offer incentives for Syrians to return. ↖

The interview was conducted on 19 September 2025 by Leona Harting and Jonathan Lehrer and updated in October 2025.

Rime Allaf is a Syrian-born political analyst, writer and communication strategist.

https://koerber-stiftung.de/site/assets/files/50167/the_berlin_pulse_202526.pdf

Reductive descriptions of recent violence and flawed elections distract from President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s shortcomings in delivering the democracy that Syria’s complex society demands, writes Rime Allaf.

The euphoria that Syrians felt after Bashar al-Assad’s hurried flight from the country in December 2024 came laden with expectations that a better future would quickly follow the collapse of his violent regime. Most understood, however, that this would partly depend on international recognition of the new Islamist authorities.

Reassuring signs came swiftly. Officials from major powers rushed to Damascus to meet Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s new leader, and launched fresh diplomatic and economic ties. In May, President Donald Trump announced the lifting of US sanctions that had stifled the Syrian economy for decades.

But as Sharaa prepares to address the UN General Assembly later this month – the first Syrian head of state to do so in six decades – encouraging developments abroad contrast starkly with increasingly serious problems at home. Many expectations remain unfulfilled in a tense and divided society, from reining in undisciplined security forces, to initiating transitional justice and building a participatory political process. These failings are laid bare in this month’s parliamentary election. For those who anticipated a new era of political pluralism after 50 years of waiting, is Syria heading in the wrong direction?

Firm control 

After overthrowing the Assad regime in December, Sharaa’s group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, appointed him president in January and announced its dissolution. The following month, the new authorities hastily convened a national dialogue conference in Damascus, involving one thousand delegates, although the selection criteria were never disclosed. It concluded after just one day with a pre-drafted statement setting out Syria’s path for the next five years, which would culminate in a permanent constitution and yet-to-be-defined presidential elections.

The statement also introduced a constitutional declaration that decreed Islam as the main source of legislation and gave Sharaa sweeping executive, legislative and judicial authority. This included the power to directly appoint not only one third of the members of the forthcoming parliament, but to form the committees that would choose the remaining two thirds of the candidates. 

These selections are due to take place by September 20, although most Syrians struggle to see how this will result in a people’s assembly. The desire for representative governance is strong. In a recent survey, almost two thirds of Syrians said they believed that a democratic system was best for the country. However, by not appointing a prime minister and with a government that he has tailored mostly to fit his own ideological leanings, Sharaa has, in effect, become the law himself.

Violent confrontations

Despite this, support for Sharaa remained relatively widespread during his first few weeks in Damascus. This changed in March when government security forces were attacked by Assad loyalists in the coastal town of Jableh, leading to violent reprisals and massacres of Alawite civilians over the following days. Sharaa’s general amnesty – declared promptly after taking power to encourage former soldiers to surrender their weapons –had worked with the lower ranks, but senior officers who had stayed in hiding, fearing war crimes trials, spearheaded the rebellion.

Four months later, a similar pattern unfolded in the southern region of Suweida. After entering the city to intervene between Druze and Bedouin armed groups, government security forces were attacked by Druze militia and Israeli airstrikes. Still claiming they were acting to protect the Druze, the Israelis then bombed the Ministry of Defence in central Damascus. As they had in March, government forces responded violently to these attacks, targeting Druze civilians as well as militias. In both of these confrontations, it was clear that state forces committed numerous crimes and that several armed groups continue to claim a stake in their respective regions in defiance of the state.

Sectarian labels don’t help

These events and the ensuing social discord shocked many Syrians, even those willing to give the new authorities a chance. Amid this shock, however, a concerning pattern has emerged. Over the past few months, these clashes have been increasingly portrayed in purely sectarian terms by regional and foreign media, those living in affected areas and inciters outside Syria. This framing often distinguishes between the large Sunni majority – which comprises roughly 75 per cent of the population – and the smaller minority groups, including Druze, Alawites and Christians.

The media has invoked this narrative repeatedly, often headlining the clashes as ‘sectarian violence’ and describing ‘fearful minorities’ that are resisting the state’s control. Moreover, sectarian hate speech is continuing to inflame many, despite attempts by Sharaa’s government to clamp down on this incitement, including at universities. In May, a BBC Arabic investigation revealed a coordinated network of foreign-based accounts on X spreading disinformation and inciting sectarian tensions.

While the confrontations showed the need for stronger protection of civilians across the country, depicting these tensions and Syria’s wider problems as inherently sectarian carries its own substantial risks. For one, this framing – whether pitting Sunnis against Druze or other minorities – perpetuates many of the colonial era’s ethnic fault lines and the terminology of the French Mandate (1920-1946).

In Syria today, emphasizing a precarious position for minorities implies that there is a threatening, Damascus-led Sunni majority. But this oversimplification is damaging. Even the idea that Sunni Syrians constitute a monolithic grouping is inaccurate, let alone the suggestion that they uniformly agree with the agenda of Sharaa’s government. Nor do the new authorities necessarily reflect the views of a majority of Syrians, particularly on the question of religion. For example, many Syrians object to the imposition of Islam as the main source of legislation. Vigorous debates on Syrian media and social networks following the national dialogue showed that even those born into the same faith do not agree on what constitutes an acceptable degree of religion in their lives. 

This complexity is reflected across the rest of Syrian society, which has long been considered one of the most diverse in the Middle East. Religious and ethnic pluralism is just one part of this picture. Other elements, including class, education and regional origins, play a much larger role in shaping people’s lives and identity than sectarian categories allow. The range of civil society initiatives launched after the events in Suweida indicates the extensive efforts to reduce sectarian divisions. 

The social landscape is further complicated by the legacy of the country’s 14-year civil war, which displaced 14 million Syrians – 60 per cent of its population – and forced between six and seven million of those to become refugees. While reliable data is scarce, the reactions of many displaced Syrians – most of whom come from the Sunni majority – suggest that divisions among this demographic have more to do with education, lifestyle and experience than with belonging to a specific sect.

Syrians, like others from pluralistic societies, have varying perspectives on governance, the role of women, family and faith in their life, and their appetite for modernisation and conserving certain traditions. Only by consolidating the idea of citizenship around these differences can Syrians begin to move past the divisions that the Assad regime spent half a century sowing.

Towards pluralism and stability

Inclusivity and pluralism must trickle down from the top and be nurtured from the ground, hence the urgent need for a true national dialogue involving every segment of society. While Syrians disagree on many issues, they are united in expecting their opinions to be heard. The only way to plan such a dialogue is through a thorough and transparent consultation process, with discussions starting at local council levels, and spreading out regionally across Syria’s 14 state governorates.

For the first time in decades, there is a consensus from regional and western states on preventing Syria from sliding back into chaos or isolation. For that to happen, they must strongly encourage a participatory process with more democratic principles, the enlargement of Sharaa’s circle of advisers, and ensure the national dialogue includes refugees, millions of whom remain abroad. They must support the accountability process and the rehabilitative training of national armed forces to ensure all Syrians are protected, as well as the promised transitional justice that has yet to begin healing this wounded society. These steps are not just a best-case scenario: they are prerequisites for the success of Syria as a cohesive modern state.

Rime Allaf, Syrian writer; Former Associate Fellow, Chatham House, is the author of It Started in Damascus: How the Long Syrian Revolution Reshaped Our World (Hurst, November 2025).

The world has spent decades brandishing arbitrarily drawn maps depicting Syrians in sectarian and separatist terms. Yet this reductive approach ignores another, deeper tradition of Syrian communality that must now be nurtured and protected.

When the reign of the Assads finally came to an abrupt end in December 2024, most Syrians expected there would be a period of uncertainty, but not such tough jostling from several sources.

On one side, they are being pulled by those who believe the new government can guide their immediate future and bring them to long-term safety, despite initial hiccups and a failure to rein in zealous militias. On another, they are being jerked by those who refuse to give up the privileges they lost with Bashar Assad’s escape, and who now promise to fight for the former president’s equally violent brother, Maher.

Helping to inflame the situation are two regional enemies, united in their efforts to undermine the new Syria: Iran, whose vast political and military gains over decades crumbled in ten days when Assad fled to Moscow, and Israel, whose shock at the fall of the regime triggered a campaign to occupy even more of the Syrian Golan Heights and to carry out some 500 airstrikes all over Syria in the 48 hours that followed the liberation of Damascus.

As we reached the hundred-day mark of the post-Assad era this month, a milestone that coincided with the 14th anniversary of the Syrian Revolution, evaluations poured in on what the violent tyrant’s successors have done right, and, mostly, on what they have done wrong or not done at all. Assessing the latter has not been difficult; Syrians are frustrated by a lack of communication and transparency from the new government headed by Ahmed al-Sharaa. In particular, they criticise his non-inclusive decision-making process, which has been limited to a closed circle of like-minded conservative advisors, and by his government’s announcements of positive steps that did not materialise, including the formation of an inclusive, representative government, initially set for the start of March.

A recent conference on national dialogue, widely expected to become a protracted consultative process, turned out to be a hastily summoned convention lasting just a few hours. Hundreds of Syrians (whose invitation criteria remains a mystery) were divided into large groups to discuss important transitional issues during hurried sessions, before the organisers issued a closing statement that clearly did not result from consultations of any depth or scope. Many Syrians considered it to be just another display of form over content, one that ignored their visceral need to participate in moulding their country’s future.

This was followed by a constitutional declaration that determined the law of the country for a period of five years, drawn up by a committee of seven Syrians whose relevant legal expertise was unconvincing. They confirmed Islamic law as the main source of jurisdiction and placed an alarming amount of power in the sole hands of al-Sharaa, whose group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, had already named him president upon dissolving itself and joining the Syrian army. The concept of democracy and its derivative civic freedoms, which most Syrian revolutionaries and activists spent the last 14 years demanding, shone by its absence.

With the formalities of defining the transitional period settled, for better or for worse, Syrian circles have categorised these developments under the maxim that ‘the liberator decides’. The implication is that there is little else that can be done. Yet there is an alternative, a path that avoids ideological excesses and privileges a single identity: that of the Syrian citizen.

Some question whether this is a feasible option, or merely an illusion built by a smaller group of secular dreamers who want neither military nor clergy to govern their lives, and who believe that the mutual respect of personal freedoms and duties is the best guarantor of a peaceful society. Would more Syrians agree on this premise? There is only one way to find out and only one way to prepare for it; with national elections due in 2030, there are fewer than five years to turn it into an attractive prospect through serious political and civic engagement.

The truth is that no population coming out of 54 years of the most archaic kind of tyranny, and which has endured a savage and brutal civil war, would have the luxury of prioritising popular participation in its transitional phase. This has been observed in most post-conflict countries, where reconstruction, rebuilding national confidence, and strengthening social harmony had to take precedence.

Assad, Iran and Russia were allowed to destroy the country to a degree that beggars belief; even just clearing the rubble strewn over hundreds of kilometres is a gargantuan task that must be tackled before Syrians can establish how and where to rebuild homes, services and infrastructure from scratch. The areas that weren’t destroyed by Assad and his allies were bombed by Turkey in its war with Kurdish factions, and by the international coalition that fought ISIS.

Today, two-thirds of Syrians are displaced or refugees, and 90 per cent of those who remained in regime-controlled areas all these years now live under the poverty line, many in homes needing repair and reinforcement. As they wait for international aid to start their road to recovery, they have become deeply invested in the governance of their domestic affairs.

The 14 million who lost their homes in Syria have not had a chance to properly debate the issues now animating Syrian circles. So far, the interim authorities have not tried to impose censorship à la Assad, and critical opinions are shared freely and loudly in every Syrian context. But the voices of refugees in camps are not being heard, even though they have the same right as every other Syrian to partake in decisions that will affect their lives.

It would be a miracle if most Syrians were able to return within the next few years, and there is an urgent need for a census that brings the Syrian population clarity after such vast forced displacements, the war’s huge death toll, and the unknown number of births that have yet to be recorded since the beginning of the conflict. During this interim period, as preparations begin for a common future, a growing number of Syrians believe that international assistance will be vital to aid such critical endeavours.

All along, Syrians have been watching reactions to their travails, understanding that global acceptance of al-Sharaa’s interim leadership is necessary before reconstruction can begin. His reassurances to world leaders on Syria no longer being a source of trouble were a prerequisite for economic support, and the lifting of sanctions. Important steps in this direction have been taken this month, first by Canada easing sanctions and offering humanitarian aid, and then by Germany, whose foreign minister personally reopened its embassy in Damascus and offered support conditional on the freedom and security of all Syrians.

These sanctions, originally intended to put pressure on the Assad regime, remain in place following its collapse. They have been turned into a lever of influence, reminding al-Sharaa that their full abolition is contingent on certain steps that he must take, such as inclusivity and diverse representation in his government. And therein lies part of the problem – as Syrians push forward, their priority should not be the the nominal representation demanded from these outside powers, but putting the best qualified people in the right positions, regardless of their ideological leanings or demographic classification.

Some European countries, despite having spent millions of euros since 2011 on NGO programmes training Syrians to embrace concepts of democratisation, citizenship, equality and fairness, spent the last years of Assad’s reign shirking what they preached. They even encouraged or forced refugees to return to Syria, claiming the country had become safe. They had been considering normalisation and sanction relief, encouraged by the first steps taken by Arab states to reintegrate Assad into their fold. If these sanctions were voidable and the refugees returnable while Assad stayed, how could they not be after he was gone, wonder Syrians? Should they not now be encouraging the kind of governance so many Syrians say they want?

The world has spent decades brandishing arbitrarily drawn maps depicting Syrians in sectarian and separatist terms, even while Syrians themselves have spent over a century arguing the exact opposite, considering what unites them to be so much greater than what separates them. With this insistence on division rather than unity, the Assad regime’s weaponisation of sectarianism continues to fester, and enemies of Syrian democratic aspirations – and they are many – continue to engrain ideas of sectarian partition that few Syrians want.

The recent massacre in Latakia Province, triggered by regime remnants killing government security forces, were rightly described as sectarian killings targeting Alawi civilians as well as the armed militias. So were the massacres of thousands of Sunni opponents of Assad during Syria’s long civil war. Yet despite these atrocities, and despite Assad’s best efforts to perpetuate sectarian divisions, most Syrians refuse to fall into this dangerous dichotomy, and nobody should still be pushing this tired and dangerous classification that intensifies grievances and does nothing to heal the country’s wounds. The healing process will not be easy, and Syrians are right to clamour for the accountability of all war criminals. The general amnesty that was offered to the rank and file of security forces was a good start on the road to peace, but there are also thousands of senior officers who must face justice for the good of society.

Even as Syrians reeled from the horror of these sectarian massacres, the Syrian government announced that Ahmed al-Sharaa had reached an agreement with Kurdish leader Mazloum Abdi. Social media platforms were inundated with maps of Syria covered in the vibrant green of a fertile land scattered with jasmine. It was a celebration of the united Syria so many crave. Such is the simplicity of Syrian dreams for unity and dignity, even while arsonists try to set sectarian fires anew.

It is this sense of Syrian communality that must be nurtured and protected, not the age-old divisions of sectarian or ethnic quarrels. For over 50 years, Assad abused all Syrians by claiming to protect minorities, instilling in them the fear of an allegedly menacing majority. For the next five years, as other nations have done before them, Syrians must find strength from this diversity and eradicate such harmful narratives; it is their unity that will protect all communities and citizens, equal under the rule of law.

There will always be sour, opinionated observers who cling to old academic narratives of division, scoffing at idealistic Syrians for dreaming of equality. As Syria prepares to rebuild, it must first deconstruct the frameworks that have led to the same mistakes being imposed for years. That is the freedom Syrians wanted, and that is the Syria that the world should protect, support, and help rebuild.

Author

Rime Allaf is a Syrian-born writer, consultant and public speaker. She is the author of the book It Started in Damascus - How the Long Syrian Revolution Reshaped Our World, published by Hurst Publishers in November 2025.

Rime Allaf, November 17, 2021

Download the paper: https://www.kas.de/en/web/syrien-irak/single-title/-/content/legitimizing-assad

Despite proclamations to the contrary just one year ago, there is now little doubt that the US and the European Union (EU) have given their tacit agreement to some countries’ normalization with the Assad regime, even as the latter’s grip on power continues to cement and strengthen the hold of Iran and its militias on the region. If Assad’s rehabilitation happens without exacting concessions from the regime and its main supporters, the ground is being laid for long-term failure and continuous instability in Syria and the region, leading to an inevitable perpetuation of the cycle of revolt and repression.

Functional Paralysis

Foreign policy under President Donald Trump was considered erratic by most observers. With the exception of his position on Iran, made clear at the beginning of his term with the annulment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Trump repeatedly surprised allies and foes alike with random decisions that didn’t seem to fit into a studied strategy. It was expected that the election of President Joe Biden would bring American leadership back to the world stage, a hope that was partly based on Biden’s own declarations to that effect. In February 2021, he confidently told allies gathered at the Virtual Munich Security Conference that “America is back.”[1]

As he nears his first anniversary in office, however, Biden has not met most foreign policy expectations, leaving allies unsure about the direction the US is choosing to take. The recent AUKUS[2] political fiasco (whereby the US pressured Australia to renege on a $66 billion deal with France for the sale of French diesel-electric submarines, and purchase US-made nuclear submarines instead) was an unexpected indicator that US-EU relations were neither a priority for Biden, nor considered a solid basis for confronting current global challenges. Biden has decided to focus on South East Asia, in particular on future challenges with China. This not only leaves Europe alone to deal with issues closer to home, such as Russia, but also disregards the potential of change with new leadership in Germany and possibly in France. These factors not only affect cooperation between global powers themselves, but also affect the weight of their influence over trouble spots such as the Middle East, and above all Syria, where China will also be consolidating its political and financial presence.

By having provided no direction on his policy for the most pressing and central issue of the Middle East, Biden has by now made it clear that he is unwilling to spend either additional time or resources there. Syria has barely been mentioned in US foreign policy addresses, whether by the president or by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, whose diplomatic team is still missing a Special Representative for Syria Engagement following the departure of Ambassador James Jeffrey; this leaves only Ethan Goldrich, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Levant affairs and Syria Engagement,[3] in charge of the Syria dossier. US officials have limited themselves to making occasional statements, such as the obligatory protests at the Security Council when debating the border crossings allowing humanitarian aid to flow into Syria. The US has presented the ensuing resolution UNSCR 2585,[4] allowing a mere 6-month extension of the current open border crossing of Bab Al Hawa (to be renewed for another 6 months), as a success[5] of its diplomacy, even though the UN-approved border crossings have gone down to just one.

Looking the Other Way

As concerning as this apparent detachment may be, it is not this intentional inaction that is the most worrying aspect of US policy under the Biden administration. The current lack of US direct engagement on Syria is supplemented by a clear – if not yet entirely overt – decision to facilitate the rehabilitation of the Assad regime by traditional allies in the Middle East, such as the Arab Gulf states. This casual largesse is also noticeable from a number of EU governments. While the US continues to claim it will not support such a rehabilitation or normalization,[6] it has not protested other countries’ overtures, unconvincingly claiming it was a step it would “not encourage.” Moreover, the US is also disregarding the stated desire of some European countries, including EU states, to re-establish relations with the Syrian dictator.

The US has also allowed regional transactions for oil, gas, and electricity from Egypt and Jordan to pass through Syria, under the guise of helping Lebanon avoid economic collapse.[7] By blessing these deals, the US is contravening its own obligations under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act,[8] which mandates that countries, entities, and individuals dealing with the Assad regime be sanctioned.

All of this points to a notable shift in US policy on Syria, despite the perceived inaction of the Biden administration. With none of Trump’s rash judgements and knee-jerk diplomacy, Biden is following a deliberate policy of delegating – and even sub-contracting – the problem to forces already in place to work it out among themselves, leaving the rest of the region to fall back into tried and tested arrangements.

America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has led to questions on US troops still stationed elsewhere in the world; for the time being, this is not likely to have a direct effect on some 900 US troops in northeastern Syria. Stated US policy on the subject is that the small contingent will remain as long as the US continues to support the fight against the terror organization Islamic State.[9]

However, with the much publicized abandonment of many Afghan nationals who had worked with the US,[10] the assurance of future US support now carries lighter weight, leaving local allies such as Kurdish factions and the Syrian Democratic Forces uneasy about the reliability of their strongest sponsor.

As long as they do not drag the US further into the Syrian quagmire, Biden is resigned – if not outright happy – to let Russia, Turkey, and various regional actors deal with Syria and other troubled spots. While US policy previously appeared to be indecisive, signs now point to determination in this calculated estrangement from the region, with the rationale that it has no impact on America. In reality, this distancing does nothing to protect US or global interests, and is a de facto embrace of Iran’s entrenchment, through its numerous violent militias, in every country to its western border, namely Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

Regression of International Principles

Like the United States, international organizations are slowly but surely reverting to treating the Assad regime’s survival as a fait accompli; in turn, this means considering Syria to be a regular, functioning member state on the global arena, despite the immense amount of evidence documenting the regime’s crimes against humanity, and despite the ensuing sanctions that Western democracies have imposed on the ruling clique. Suddenly, none of that seems to count or matter.

Most notably, in May 2021, with no objections from its member states, the World Health Organization appointed Syria to sit on its Executive Board.[11] This was allowed to happen even though the United Nations had already declared that the Syrian regime and its allies were deliberately attacking hospitals, clinics, ambulances, and first responders (often with the help of the Russian air force), and had even launched an inquiry[12] on these attacks. The airstrikes on hospitals in Syria have also been thoroughly documented by international medical organizations and independent media.[13]

In October 2021, Interpol[14] announced it had allowed Syria to rejoin its network, giving it renewed access to its database – a powerful tool for a regime with no tolerance for dissent. The Syrian regime had been subject to “corrective measures” since 2011, as the regime’s military repression of the peaceful uprising began. For many Syrians around the world, this move has triggered fears that the regime would now find it easier to pursue its critics, wherever they are.

A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, published in October, highlighted how the Assad regime was appropriating for itself millions of dollars in humanitarian aid,[15] by forcing the United Nations to use its Central Bank’s official exchange rate. In 2020, this amounted to $60 million, or half of the foreign aid money, going straight into the pockets of the Syrian regime. The amount increases to $100 million[16] when taking into account transactions made in 2019.

Many Syrians were taken by surprise when the United Nations declared in October that the death toll, in what the UN terms Syria’s civil war, is now calculated to be “at least 350,000”[17] (a far lower figure than most human rights organizations’ tolls). While the UN did state that this figure was an undercount, it contradicts its own previous Special Envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura, who five years earlier had already estimated the death toll to be at least 400,000 Syrians.[18] Given that de Mistura’s estimate preceded the Syrian regime’s and Russia’s fierce military assaults on Aleppo (2016), Ghouta (2018), and Idlib (ongoing), in addition to the regular regime and Russian airstrikes, or killings by torture all over Syria, it is challenging to accept that the UN could find no further victims in the last five years. In contrast to the UN, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect estimates that at least 580,000[19] Syrians have been killed since 2011. The estimates of most Syrian organizations are much higher.

With its questionable arithmetic, the UN contributes to the weaving of a new narrative that conveniently fits proponents of normalizing the Assad regime. A lower death toll to be touted as the civil war’s sad result, and a blurring of the lines between civilians and armed combatants, makes it easier to justify the increasingly rampant storyline that Syrians and the world should now turn the page and rebuild the country. No regard is given to achieving justice, or even the prerequisite accountability for the massive crimes against humanity committed by the regime since 2011.

At the same time, however, the United Nations, and the international community, persist in paying lip service to the Constitutional Committee mandated by UNSCR 2254, even as Special Envoy Geir Pedersen continues to describe the rare talks as a disappointment,[20] blaming the regime for the latest failed round.[21] This comes after Pedersen’s ever vaguer and weaker stipulations that the talks should follow a “step-for-step, step-by-step” approach. In the current climate of pre-rehabilitation of the regime, with not even the slightest pressure on Assad to budge on minor points, it is clear that no real pressure will be exerted on Assad to comply with the other basic demands of Resolution 2254, such as the release of up to 200,000 arbitrarily detained persons who have disappeared in the regime’s prisons.

Elsewhere on the international arena, Assad allies, and allies of his allies, are using refugees and migrants as pawns. To retaliate against European sanctions, imposed because of President Alexander Lukashenko’s repression of peaceful protests and his hijacking a flight to arrest a journalist,[22] Belarus has resorted to weaponized migration[23] by luring Syrians and nationals of other countries to Minsk, and then depositing them on the border with Poland. The latter throws them back into freezing woods, triggering the “Fortress Europe” advocates and reigniting the debate on how to send them – and other refugees – back. Lukashenko is also giving Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has faced minimal consequences for his invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, another chance to flex his muscle with the EU.[24]

In Denmark, after arbitrarily deeming Syria a safe country to which refugees could return, authorities have revoked the temporary residence from dozens of refugees[25] and forced them to choose between immediate return to Syria or life in a deportation camp.[26] All respected international human rights organizations, however, continue to decry such practices and stress how unsafe Syria remains for Syrians, including in the latest Human Rights Watch report describing the abuses Syrians face upon return.[27]

And while nobody seems to attach great importance to the matter any longer, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has just confirmed, yet again, that the Syrian regime continues to use chemical weapons, including a “new chemical weapons agent found in samples collected in large storage containers in September 2020.”[28] The Assad regime’s well documented[29] usage of chemical weapons in attacks on civilians continues to have long-term repercussions, causing a wide range of physical ailments in survivors and deformities in newborn babies on which more studies are necessary.[30]

The New Arab Dome

There is certainly no love lost between even the closest Arab regimes, and Bashar Assad had particularly excelled in infuriating various leaders at different times of his reign. Today, they all seem to agree that their collective interest supersedes their personal distaste for the Syrian dictator. For the Arab League’s members, the time is nigh to put to bed, once and for all, notions that protests and revolutions could be tools of change or reform in the region. In this respect, once again, united they stand.

In 2018, the United Arab Emirates was the first to re-open its embassy in Damascus, and to speak of a new economic and financial relations era. While several Arab countries such as Bahrain and Oman quietly followed suit, no substantial changes were made until recently. The pace of normalization quickened considerably at the United Nations General Assembly this year, where Assad’s foreign minister met with a dozen of his Arab counterparts. A phone call between Assad and King Abdullah of Jordan ensued, leading to a resumption of flights between Jordan and Syria, and to renewed cooperation between their respective intelligence chiefs. In preparation for this rapprochement, Jordanian authorities had begun targeting Syrian organizations and media, even forcing Syria Direct to close its Amman office.[31]

To further facilitate Assad’s reintegration, even when important states such as Saudi Arabia have not yet taken a public stance on rehabilitation, Egypt is now openly lobbying for a return of Syria to the League of Arab States,[32] a simple formality which would mark the official end of Assad’s estrangement from the Arab fold. On November 9, 2021, the UAE’s Foreign Minister arrived on an unannounced visit to Damascus with a senior delegation to meet with Bashar Assad.[33] The taboo has been broken, allowing other Arab countries to extend their hands to the regime.

As Arab world leaders begin to rally once more around their collective need to kill – figuratively and literally – the younger generations’ dreams of democratization and freedom, some European countries have also begun to normalize relations with Damascus, while others are speaking about the necessity of re-establishing diplomatic ties. They include Greece, Hungary, Austria, Cyprus, and Bulgaria, and a growing number of political parties in other European countries that are pushing the issue, and the expulsion of refugees, into the public agenda.

Full reintegration into the Arab League is just a matter of time, and Assad is gradually being liberated from the burden of waiting for the EU’s financial contributions to the selective reconstruction he will choose to make; soon, he will be able to rely partly on Arab funding – with a push from select European states – to direct money to the areas and the fields he wants.

These developments impact not only Syrians, but also indirectly affect the lives of a majority of people in the region. For the most part, all pretense of reform in the Arab world has evaporated as the old mantras of stability and security retake precedence, and as advancements on democratic, judicial, and all social indicators are relegated to a fleeting period of history. All over the Arab world, people are being given the illusion of choice between two absolutes: a strongman, or chaos (or worse).  

Civil liberties are eroding even further for Arabs, while stagnation in the economy and other sectors continues. For the ever-growing youth component in the region, prospects are dim. For Syrians, hope has practically evaporated. In all cases, frustration and despair are inevitable consequences of this regression, with serious repercussions of their own.

Déjà Vu

While these developments are in many ways unprecedented, given the sheer magnitude of the toll paid by Syrians and others, this is not the first time that the region has witnessed a volte-face of this nature. For the Assad regime, it is déjà vu.

After the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in February 2005, attributed to Assad and his ally Hezbollah, Syria experienced a sudden isolation similar to one it had gone through in the 1980s; that had followed Hafez Assad’s entanglement in the attempted downing of an El Al flight from London, in what became known as the Hindawi Affair.[34] Hafez Assad had reintegrated the international community with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and with his agreement to take part in the coalition to liberate the Gulf state in 1991. For his troubles, Assad was offered the multilateral Arab-Israeli peace process launched in Madrid,[35] after having gained support for Syrian influence over Lebanon with the Taif Accord.[36]

The assassination of Hariri and the forced retreat of Syrian troops from Lebanon pushed Syria into isolation again, both from the international community and from the Arab world. After Israel attacked Lebanon in July 2006, destroying much but unable to crush Hezbollah, the latter grew even stronger and began dictating its demands on other Lebanese parties, paralyzing the country for nearly two years before turning its arms on fellow Lebanese in May 2008.[37] This precipitated the Qatar-sponsored Doha Agreement,[38] which catapulted Bashar Assad, Hezbollah’s ally, back to the international arena. Weeks later, he was seen beaming in Paris as he mingled with other heads of state on the Champs-Élysées, watching the July 14 parade.[39]

In its 51 years of power, the Assad regime has learned the lesson well: as long as there are no credible threats to its survival or serious pressure to change its actions, it pays to wait, especially with the support of consistent and dedicated allies with long-term imperial ambitions, like Russia, or with unshakable religiously-mandated goals, like Iran.

This looming rehabilitation, however, does not resemble previous rehabilitations the Assad regime has been granted. This time around, it comes after the complete destruction of Syria (mostly through the regime’s and Russia’s airstrikes, missiles, and heavy artillery), the killing of hundreds of thousands of Syrians, the forced disappearance, arbitrary detention, and torture until death of tens of thousands, and the creation of well over 13 million refugees and displaced persons. Under every definition and according to every legal document to which UN member states adhere, the Assad regime has committed massive crimes against humanity – including several chemical massacres – for nearly 11 straight years.

In anticipation of his return, Bashar Assad treated himself to an unparalleled celebration for his so-called re-election, taking the notorious Assadist cult-of-personality obsession to insane new heights. Videos taken in the streets of every Syrian city, and particularly Damascus, showed an Orwellian scene of giant posters of Assad lining practically every inch of the city’s main avenues. The icing on the cake was an alleged score of 95.1%[40] of votes he accorded himself (with voting only allowed in government-controlled areas,[41] and in Syrian embassies abroad). And with 95.1% of  14 million votes, Assad even managed the prodigious feat of receiving more votes than there were people eligible to vote (under the regime’s own rules) in the first place.[42]

The victorious Assad was merciless with Syrian opposition after the events of 2005 and 2006, jailing many of the Syrian writers and intellectuals who had dared express their support to the Lebanese[43] seeking justice; there is little doubt he would be even more ruthless today with all those who stood in opposition to the regime over the last decade.

Cui Bono?

It is once again through the good graces of Iran’s regional militias, primarily Hezbollah, that circumstances are returning Assad to the limelight. The effect of Russia’s military intervention in Syria since 2015 was certainly catastrophic, with relentless airstrikes and carpet bombing all over the country. However, it was Iran’s militias that were the actual boots on the ground for most of the war, sent to repress the peaceful uprising from the beginning. On behalf of the regime, these militias besieged towns and areas, carried out urban warfare on a massive scale, committed massacres, and actively organized and implemented the demographic engineering that has changed the face of the Syrian landscape. Without them, Russia would have had to bomb a lot more Syrians, over a lot more ground, for a lot longer.

The impunity of Hezbollah is manifested not just in Syria, but even more so in Lebanon where the powerful militia no longer pretends to play politics. Not only did Hezbollah demand that Judge Tarek Bitar[44] be removed from the inquiry over the August 4, 2020, explosion in Beirut, but its leader Hassan Nasrallah then boasted, threateningly, that his militia counts over 100,000 fighters.[45] Hezbollah also arranged for Iranian oil shipments[46] to enter Lebanon, demonstrating that Iran’s flex in the country is now stronger than it has ever been, and that circumventing sanctions was feasible in broad daylight.

Iran’s militias have dug their heels in the rest of the region as well, becoming the most powerful and most lethal non-state actors. In Iraq, while no group has claimed responsibility for a failed assassination attempt by drone on November 7, 2021 on Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi,[47] the Iran-backed militia Kata’eb Hezbollah gave a sinister statement claiming there were “less expensive and more guaranteed ways to cause harm to the prime minister.”

Before he took office, some observers had hoped that President Biden would try to condition a re-negotiated nuclear deal with Iran and exact some concessions from the Islamic regime, curbing Iran’s influence and interventions in the region. The US is said to seek the removal of the JCPOA’s sunset clause, and to address Iran’s missile program in a new agreement.[48] At his General Assembly speech in September, however, Biden stated he was prepared to return to full compliance if Iran was ready to do the same.[49] In response, Iran has demanded that the US first guarantee it would not leave the deal again.[50]

The rehabilitation of Assad, and the full normalization of relations between Arab states and Syria, is of huge political, military, and financial benefit to Iran. If Arabs revive economic and trade ties, they will be lifting some of Iran’s financial burden in supporting the Assad regime, leaving it more flexibility in financing the never-ending war efforts of its various militias. Ironically, while Arab states, led by the Gulf, have tried to limit Iran’s reach over the past years, even orchestrating an embargo on Qatar in the process to counter some influence, it is those same Arab states that are strengthening Iran even more by normalizing with Assad, and by imposing an embargo[51] on Lebanon in protest at statements critical of Saudi Arabia’s role in Yemen, made by its Hezbollah-backed minister of information.

Russia also stands to gain considerably from a reset on Syria. While it has enjoyed the clout of serious influence over a region once dominated by US interests, it now needs to claim total victory, and to reap the financial rewards that will come with it. For now, US and European sanctions stand in the way. During his October meeting in Sochi with Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennet, Russian President Vladimir Putin even asked for Israel’s help in easing US sanctions on Syria.[52]

Putin also recognizes that he needs a long-term solution to Russia’s cohabitation with Iran, with Turkey, and with the small US presence in Syria. While the overall status quo in Idlib is unlikely to change drastically in the near future, Assad’s reintegration into the international community would certainly give Putin some advantages over his Turkish counterpart, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with whom he dances the most delicate pas de deux.[53]

Both need to navigate relations with the European Union. President Erdogan does hold several cards that hold sway over Europe, and to a certain extent over the US and other fellow NATO members, most important of which are the Syrian refugees over whom Erdogan has made a lucrative deal with the EU to prevent their migration. At the same time, on the same subject, he is facing increased popular resentment and intense backlash from Turkish opposition leaders, some of whom have publicly promised they would send Syrians back if elected.[54] On the other hand, President Putin holds the “Nord Stream 2” card, forcing Europeans to rely on Russia for the flow of gas.[55]

If Assad is rehabilitated with no counter-concessions from his sponsors, Assad will have won big, but Putin will have won even bigger, on a much broader world stage.

Syrians Still Waiting for Godot

Meanwhile, as various powers decide on their fate, Syrians have been dutifully waiting for the justice and accountability they have not only been promised, but that they have been made to learn and adopt in their civil society initiatives in exile. Countless millions of dollars continue to be spent on Syrians to cruelly make them parrot, if not apply, noble norms of democracy, inclusivity, and other aspirational concepts – even while reality shows them that they are unattainable, and even while bombs continue to fall on Syrian areas that the regime and Russia are keen to recapture. Some European governments simultaneously hold on to a different fantasy, that of Syrian refugees’ prompt return to the motherland, en masse, as soon as the world has declared that the war is over.

As they wait, Syrians are being forced to pay extortionate amounts of money to the regime to delay their military service ($8,000) or to renew their passports ($800).[56] In all areas where the regime is in control, Syrians are just as much prisoners and hostages to the regime as their displaced or exiled compatriots are. And yet, the economic downfall in Assad-controlled Syria is now increasingly portrayed as a consequence of Western sanctions, rather than of Assad’s destruction and plundering of the country. To continue financing the regime, in addition to the millions siphoned off Syrian citizens and international humanitarian aid, Syria has become a narco-state,[57] with the mass export of the drug Captagon bringing the regime more of the hard currency it needs.

For millions of refugees and displaced Syrians, there seems to be no way out of their predicament. Even if they were able to come back to Syria, or to move back to their original areas within Syria, their homes have either been bombed, confiscated, or assigned to others in the extensive demographic engineering strategy that has redrawn lines in numerous cities. Returning refugees (over 6 million between Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan) would have no prospects, even if they were lucky enough to escape arrest, or worse, upon their return to the country.

Refugees are not even certain of their future in their current host countries. The mood is increasingly anti-refugee in Lebanon as the country collapses, and there is uncertainty about refugees’ fate in Jordan following the reconciliation between the two regimes. In Turkey, home to the largest Syrian refugee community in the world, anti-Syrian sentiment is also rising and more vocal, and the Turkish government is taking stringent measures following even the most banal incidents. For instance, the recent planned expulsion of several Syrians has created much uproar in the diaspora; their offense was posting sarcastic videos of themselves eating bananas on TikTok,[58] in response to Turkish citizens’ complaints about inflation and their inability to afford the fruit.

Everywhere they find themselves, in varying degrees of danger and uncertainty, Syrians’ resentment and bitterness is growing, especially when they begin to consider that all their suffering may have been for nothing as the world continues to turn away from them. Societal chasms have multiplied and expanded everywhere, and it is difficult to imagine that anything short of accountability, justice, and some form of transition could allow the country to move forward – especially when this is what Syrians have been told was needed for over a decade.

Accepting the prevailing situation and moving on, as the international community is pushing them to do, still leaves an entire generation of Syrians without education, without sustenance, without prospects. Just as importantly, it also still keeps them under the suffocating stranglehold of a ruthless regime on its way to a second half-century of power.

Relentless Dereliction of Duty

President Biden has promised Americans and the world that relentless diplomacy[59] would henceforth replace relentless war. While this is an admirable aspiration, the past decade has amply demonstrated that diplomacy, statements, and empty warnings have failed to deter perpetrators of horrific crimes against humanity. In fact, they have had the opposite effect: they have empowered authoritarian regimes and their authoritarian sponsors, and given the latter an ever-expanding realm of influence as they carry out repression with increasing audacity. Aspiring dictators have taken note of this indifference and have been encouraged to up the ante: if nobody stopped the genocidal Assad regime, nobody will stop them either for similar crimes.

With Syria, the international community has consistently demonstrated an acute lack of leadership and a relentless dereliction of duty. This has cost Syrians nearly everything, but it has also cost the region –and even Europe – much as well.

As history has shown time and time again, appeasement cannot be mistaken for diplomacy. Normalization with proven perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity is guaranteed to be a harbinger of even bigger problems yet to come, especially as this will be at the expense of real stability, peace, and democracy – and not just in Syria.

On the sidelines of global diplomacy and backstage bargaining, disinformation on Syria, and on the alleged conspiracy that has been in the works for a decade against Assad, is adding to the social unrest in the region and beyond, fueling both extreme left and extreme right political discourse. Such disinformation is “proving” that Western intentions had always been bad and are nefarious by default, whereas the involvement of Russia and China brings the necessary balance to help people live in peace.

It is dangerous for democracies to remain passive as authoritarian regimes gain increasing control (both physical and ideological) over hotspots, from the Middle East to various points in Eastern Europe and beyond. And it is sheer folly to allow them to control the narrative, creating a revisionist version of events that brazenly denies facts and discredits people’s sincere ambitions to live in basic dignity, one of the most important triggers of the peaceful Syrian uprising of 2011.

Diverting from the Incoming Impasse

The only solution to ending Syria’s war has so far been a military one, waged by the regime, Russia, and Iran and its numerous militias which are running wild all over the region, exerting significant control in four Arab countries (Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq). There is no place any longer for traditional diplomacy, as relentless as President Biden promises it would be.

That said, the window to empower defected Syrian soldiers and armed resistance to the regime has closed years ago, as has the window for the no-fly-zone that Syrians pleaded for and that would have prevented much of the catastrophe.

The only real tool available remains strong and consistent sanctions, but only coupled with real pressure to comply with the only legal instrument that could start to fix Syria: UNSC Resolution 2254. Both proponents and enemies of Assad know full well that for the time being, there is absolutely no serious international will to make this happen – perhaps a reflection of the international community’s own conviction that this is only a pretend solution. Even so, this inadequate and weak resolution is rumored to have become outdated for Russia, now said to be looking for ways to re-negotiate previously accepted parameters on the way forward for Syria.

It is not enough for the United States to declare it does not encourage countries to normalize ties with the Assad regime. It is not serious for the US to pretend adherence to its own sanctions regime when it allows for waivers that maintain the regional status quo, while simultaneously imposing the most puzzling sanctions this summer on selected Syrian prisons, which one would assume would have been subject to sanctions anyway.[60]

It is ludicrous and immoral to push Syrians back “home” while doing absolutely nothing to retrieve their dwellings and create the conditions (above all, safety) enabling a real mass return. The international community is merely delaying the inevitable outcome: the implosion, once again, of a people that have nothing left to lose, and the renewed vicious cycle pitting the Davids of the region against the Goliaths that America and Europe have allowed to grow, unhindered.

Neither rehabilitation, normalization, nor ad hoc sanctions relief can help Syrians and the region move forward and rebuild. There must be accountability and justice, and the region’s authoritarian leaders and their swarms of violent non-state actors must be reined in to avoid more wars. Imagining that the whiplash will be contained regionally is pure fantasy; for 11 years, what happened in Syria has reverberated across the world.

As longtime advocates of human rights, democratic values, and personal freedoms, the US and the EU should stop selectively practicing what they preach and demand war criminals’ accountability. Anything less than that would be Chamberlainian.

[1] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference/

[2] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/29/biden-admits-macron-us-was-clumsy-submarine-deal

[3] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/09/biden-administration-appoints-new-syria-policy-chief

[4] https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/security-council-extends-use-border-crossing-humanitarian-aid-syria

[5] https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-by-ambassador-thomas-greenfield-at-a-un-security-council-stakeout-following-the-adoption-of-a-resolution-on-the-syria-cross-border-mechanism/

[6] https://apnews.com/article/abdullah-ii-antony-blinken-bashar-assad-damascus-lebanon-ffcf492a15c5b9363c9cf8e5c531ff54

[7] https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/lebanons-desperation-gives-opening-assads-salvation

[8] https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/31/text

[9] https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/27/troops-to-stay-in-syria-biden-500848

[10] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-withdrawal-leaves-afghan-allies-grappling-fear-anger-panic-n1278144

[11] https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/06/12/1005283283/syria-bombs-hospitals-now-it-will-help-lead-the-world-health-organization

[12] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-un/strikes-on-syrian-medical-facilities-appear-deliberate-u-n-idUSKBN1XI1JG

[13] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/31/world/middleeast/syria-united-nations-investigation.html

[14] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/05/interpol-faces-criticism-allowing-syria-rejoin-network

[15] https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-assad-regime-systematically-diverts-tens-millions-aid

[16] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/oct/21/assad-regime-siphons-millions-in-aid-by-manipulating-syrias-currency

[17] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-58664859

[18] https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2016-04-22/note-correspondents-transcript-press-stakeout-united

[19] https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/syria/

[20] https://apnews.com/article/europe-middle-east-syria-geneva-united-nations-b3a9817918611ceaddee97e125dfbf37

[21] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-envoy-blames-to-syria-for-failure-of-constitution-talks/2021/10/27/4a3b1218-3776-11ec-9662-399cfa75efee_story.html

[22] https://apnews.com/article/immigration-business-belarus-poland-middle-east-e3debda6f6f8cbc9ba6b59fa8aa322d8

[23] https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/amp/1276364/beirut-to-belarus-syrian-refugees-embark-on-new-perilous-route-toward-longed-for-eu-asylum

[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-blames-eu-looming-catastrophe-over-migrants-belarus-poland-border-2021-11-10/

[25] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/14/denmark-revokes-syrian-refugee-permits-under-new-policy

[26] https://www.euronews.com/2021/06/18/the-danish-immigration-decisions-tearing-syrian-refugee-families-apart

[27] https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/20/syria-returning-refugees-face-grave-abuse

[28] https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-07/news-briefs/opcw-confirms-chemical-weapons-use-syria

[29] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/24/world/middleeast/douma-syria-chemical-attack-augmented-reality-ar-ul.html?smid=yt-nytimes&smtyp=cur&smvar=yd-article

[30] https://theworld.org/stories/2021-05-14/she-survived-chemical-attack-syria-could-her-baby-have-been-impacted

[31] https://eaworldview.com/2021/10/jordan-targets-journalists-syria-direct/

[32] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/11/egypt-intensifies-efforts-bring-syria-back-arab-fold

[33] https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/09/middleeast/uae-assad-syria-damascus-intl/index.html

[34] https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1986-10-24/debates/dc4df4f0-b870-4177-a878-15565b3f33ea/Anglo-SyrianRelations#1505

[35] https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/madrid-conference

[36] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201022-remembering-the-taif-accord/

[37] https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/lebanon/lebanon-hizbollah-s-weapons-turn-inward

[38] https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/21/world/africa/21iht-lebanon.4.13105564.html

[39] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/12/france.syria

[40] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-57277336

[41] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-57277336

[42] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/05/syrias-assad-wins-fourth-term-election-us-calls-fraudulent

[43] https://web.archive.org/web/20080207083503/http://www.free-syria.com/en/loadarticle.php?articleid=6924

[44] https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-religion-explosions-lebanon-beirut-2c813a38a3ab2789f07fa48799aac82a

[45] https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211018-lebanon-hezbollah-chief-declares-militant-group-has-100-000-trained-fighters

[46] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/28/lebanon-hezbollah-fuel-patronage-energy-crisis

[47] https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/06/middleeast/iraq-prime-minister-drone-attack-intl-hnk/index.html

[48] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/05/world/europe/iran-nuclear-talks-explained.html

[49] https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/biden-speaks-at-un-general-assembly-679951

[50] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iran-wants-us-assurances-it-will-never-abandon-nuclear-deal-if-revived-2021-11-08/

[51] https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211102-what-political-economic-consequences-will-lebanon-face-over-saudi-arabia-row

[52] https://www.axios.com/putin-israel-us-sanctions-syria-fcd5300c-44ce-41a4-870f-e7f72d4ed538.html

[53] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/are-putin-and-erdogan-doing-territorial-swaps-in-syria-again/

[54][54] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/3/uncertainty-for-syrians-in-turkey-as-opposition-warms-up-to-assad

[55] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/europe-must-defend-itself-against-vladimir-putins-energy-weapon/

[56] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/28/why-syrian-exiles-are-having-to-pay-up-to-skip-military-service?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_News_Feed

[57] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/07/19/syria-has-become-a-narco-state

[58] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59133076

[59] https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-general-assembly-joe-biden-6dd0382e93987500d714f9fa497602af

[60] https://www.state.gov/imposing-sanctions-in-defense-of-human-rights-in-syria/

Download the paper: https://www.kas.de/en/web/syrien-irak/single-title/-/content/legitimizing-assad

President Joe Biden’s first foreign policy address at the State Department on February 4 was heavy on platitudes and light on substantive positions, especially for a region that has always been an important focus of previous US administrations for decades.

Like its two predecessors—the Donald Trump and Barack Obama administration—the Biden administration has kept expectations low regarding its Syria policy. Veterans of the Obama administration are back at the White House and Foggy Bottom, with little indication that their remit involves significant changes in position, with one major exception: the stated desire to rekindle the Iran nuclear agreement from which the Trump administration withdrew in 2018. For those who have waited for a decade—in vain—for US leadership to reign in some of the most incendiary forces in the region, it is another potential catastrophe.

This is the time to exact concessions from Iran, which needs the financial benefits of a full nuclear deal, and from Russia, which needs reconstruction money.

Since starting their popular uprising a decade ago, Syrians have watched, helplessly, as Iran’s military might propped up the ruthless Bashar al-Assad regime. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) took over many ground operations to brutally crush the rebellion as numerous Syrian soldiers defected to form the Free Syrian Army. As Iranian-backed militias went from strength to strength in Syria, set loose over large areas of the country under the strategic leadership IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani—until his assassination by the US in January 2020—they also gained strength in neighboring countries buckling under their unmatched power. Iranian officials have even boasted they count several Arab capitals as their own—Sanaa, Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut.

In this desolate political landscape, the US only seems to see the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), currently the least lethal of the many groups operating in the Middle East, as a reason to maintain a small foothold in a devastated Syria. It continues to ignore the massive repercussions that millions of refugees have on the region and European shores as they multiply exponentially. The US continues to look the other way as Iran’s unopposed imperialism becomes entrenched throughout the region, leaving a trail of destruction in several countries. And it continues to imagine that Russian power could eventually achieve a fragile stability, allowing the US and its allies to remain mere spectators to the changing dynamics in the region.

Militant group Hezbollah now reigns supreme as a regime in and of itself in Lebanon, tying its fate to that of the Assad regime and leading the country to implosion. While it had been gradually encroaching on power over the years, Iran’s unchecked ascendancy in the region has allowed Hezbollah to spread its wings and become more assertive, openly threatening all other political forces in the country and continuing to carry out assassinations of critics, most recently with the murder of journalist Lockman Slim in Beirut.

While Iran-backed militias rule by terror from Lebanon to well beyond the east of Syria and Iraq, Russia has established itself as the unavoidable kingmaker from its military bases in Syria, micromanaging Syrian defense and political affairs and leaving Assad free to repress the population.

Still, Russia can neither find a way out of the Syrian quagmire nor coax the European Union (EU) into funding even a partial reconstruction of the areas its air force has decimated. Russian President Vladimir Putin acts like a winner, but his victory depends on his ability to cash in on his Syrian investment since Russia’s armed intervention began in 2015. His Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, has even been dispatched to the Gulf to rally support from US allies, such as the United Arab Emirates, which have stated that it is time to welcome Syria—under its current regime—back into the fold of Arab nations.

The US says it is looking to change the behavior of the Assad regime and its helpers, but it has gone out of its way to avoid enabling that change. The US’s only actions have been a sanctions regimen through the Caesar Act and token support to the political process mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254. The farcical constitutional committee it has mandated, with no mechanism to enforce the achievement of its stated goals, has allowed Assad yet another opportunity to drag his feet as he prepares for his fourth regime-style election to maintain a pretense of normalcy over patches of Syria, while the population collapses under the crushing weight of economic downfall.

As long as the US and EU make no new approaches, the situation will continue to worsen for the Syrian people, for the refugees, and for the increasingly volatile neighborhood. With this status quo, refugees are unwilling to return; humanitarian aid only serves the regime; millions of Syrians are barely surviving in Idlib province; and Syrians in regime areas are collapsing under hyperinflation and continued repression. Not only are circumstances not improving, they are worsening by the day.

It is imperative for the Biden administration, in coordination with the EU, to turn a new page in its dealings with the Assad regime’s backers and the greater Syrian conflict. The mantra that the regime and its supporters only react to credible threats has never been more accurate.

President Biden recently declared that “America is back” and Secretary of State Antony Blinken has told NATO allies the US wanted to build back its partnerships and revitalize the alliance. Considering the repercussions the Syrian conflict has had on them all, Syria is a good place to start.

The US and EU must take the opportunity of new negotiations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to condition any agreement with the Islamic Republic on a withdrawal of all the militias it supports from Syria and Lebanon. The two countries should be considered inseparable in this respect.

Syrian public opinion is scathing of the constitutional committee and of the formal opposition’s well-publicized squabbles, but, recently, ideas of a military council to enable a transition from Assad have gained more positive traction in the Syrian rumor mill. The US and EU should withdraw support for the Russian-managed constitutional committee process until Russia pressures Assad and his forces into the release of all detainees, as required by UNSCR 2254. They must also impose unhindered humanitarian aid access to all Syrians, making Putin pay a high cost for vetoing cross-border humanitarian aid.

The US and EU hold strong political and financial cards vis-à-vis Russia—cards they have been unwilling to use in the Syrian context or any other. Yet, Putin is desperate to find a resolution to his Assad problem so that reconstruction funds can make their way to Syria and alleviate the current financial burden on the regime’s supporters. Unless Putin forces Assad’s hand and contains the regime’s numerous militias sowing terror around the country, he knows he bears the burden alone.

The time for making moral arguments about the need to contain the Syrian catastrophe has come and gone long ago. But the time for making deals and putting credible pressure on Assad’s allies is now. The regime is bursting at the seams—about to implode as only its most violent elements manage to maintain their hold on power and as only its most ruthless cronies manage to siphon all incoming aid for their benefit, keeping the spoils of war beyond Putin’s reach.

Without decisive steps, the US will find itself dealing with much greater issues as problems continue to grow in magnitude. The region may be the first to pay the price, but the outcomes cannot be contained within imaginary borders. Neither the US nor its regional allies can escape unscathed. After ten years of catastrophic international indecision and inaction, Syria is now the epicenter of the greatest crimes against humanity in modern history, and the global community’s collective failure. It is high time to snap out of the fantasy that US interests are untouched by this conflict and that what happens in Syria stays in Syria.

Rime Allaf is a writer and Syria specialist. She is on the Advisory Council of the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program, and a board member of Syrian organization The Day After. Follow her on Twitter: @rallaf.

Originally published on https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/in-the-game-of-syria-the-us-and-europe-hold-the-cards/

Hope still springs eternal for many young people in the Arab world today. The electrifying chants of thousands suddenly demanding the fall of their regimes had sent chills down everyone’s spines in the region, filling some with awe and excitement, others with apprehension. There were no precedents for this collective cry of rage as protesters followed their instincts and took to the streets; in response, regimes resorted to their tried and tested campaigns of intimidation, violence, and mass murder.

On the cusp of the tenth anniversary of the Syrian revolution, itself only a few months younger than similar revolts in the region, mainstream analysis seems to suggest that the Arab Spring has been a failure everywhere it manifested itself, with the exception of Tunisia. Given the immense magnitude of the death and devastation which rained upon Syrians, it may seem inappropriate to claim not only that the uprising cannot be considered a complete failure, but also that it is not over. Indeed, well over half a million people were killed and over half the population became homeless and displaced; mass torture, disappearances, and numerous crimes against humanity were committed. Yet it is precisely because Syrians have lost so much that many feel they have no choice but to continue.

Despite the hardship they face in the region, the millions of Syrian refugees will not go back to Syria while the Assad clan remains in power. Nor will many Syrians within the country hide again behind the walls of fear that had silenced them for decades. The revolution gave them a voice which they will not relinquish, and it brought them the civic governance systems and civil society networks (such as the early Local Coordination Committees) which allowed them to organise themselves in the service of their communities.

Stunned by the international community’s apathy, Syrians have shown initiative, creativity, and great courage in standing up to the regime in the worst possible circumstances – and, years later, in standing up to extremist religious groups. They have shown resilience, grabbing freedom with both hands and painstakingly documenting their history, to bear witness to the regime’s crimes and to prepare for the day after, when they can rebuild a new Syria devoid of the remnants of the past. None of this would have been possible without the Syrian Revolution of Dignity, a revolution of the mind in every sense of the word, in political, social, cultural and even religious terms.

It would be a grave mistake to imagine that the Arab Spring is on its deathbed; it may be in remission as it attempts to gather its forces again, and it may come through different iterations of the revolutionary spirit, but despite everything they have lost, Syrians still demand dignity and freedom, as do many around the region. Dictatorships would have to maintain a costly, high level of repression to kill that spirit in the next generation, a generation already born free-minded and strong-willed as it watched the world disintegrate around it.

Rime Allaf is a writer, researcher, international political analyst, and Syria specialist.

https://reaction.life/ten-years-later-how-the-arab-spring-changed-the-world/

50 years of the Assad regime:

An analysis of the European Union's policy towards Syria

November 16, 2020 marks 50 years to the military coup that brought Hafez Assad to power in Syria. Dubbed the “Corrective Movement” by his regime, the coup allowed the Assad family to consolidate the control of the Baath Party. In the 20 years Bashar Assad has been in power, how did the European Union's policy towards Syria develop under his leadership? Have past lessons been learned? And what's still in for Europe in the Syrian conflict?

Download the paper: https://www.kas.de/en/web/syrien-irak/single-title/-/content/europe-s-untapped-sway-in-syria

1 Half a Century of Regression

November 2020 marks the 50th anniversary of the military coup which brought Hafez Assad to power in Syria. Dubbed the “Corrective Movement” by his regime(1), the coup allowed Assad to consolidate the control of the Baath Party, itself in power since 1963, guiding it to gradually encroach control over every aspect of Syrians’ lives through an indoctrination system beginning in primary school. With socialist and pan-Arab slogans, Assad appropriated Damascus as his “beating heart of Arabism” and made this the leitmotiv of his rule.

The trajectory of the regime’s gradual descent into absolute authoritarianism is well documented, as is its notorious meddling in the region, foremost in Lebanon, and around the world - including in the notorious attempt to bomb an El Al flight in 1986, known as the Hindawi affair (2). Following an uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood and a massacre in Hama, said to have killed up to 40,000 people under the orders of the dictator’s brother, Rifat Assad (3), the worst was yet to come for Syrians; they lived in total isolation, cut off from the Arab world because of the regime’s support for Iran in its war with Iraq (the only Arab country to do so, despite the self-proclaimed Arabism), and denied most human rights and basic necessities like regular access to water or electricity.

It was only a US wish for a pan-Arab participation in the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 (4), and the subsequent launch of the unprecedented Madrid Peace Process, that finally brought Assad back into the respectable international fold; this paved the way for his son Bashar to take power smoothly in 2000, turning Syria into the region’s first hereditary republic. For the first time since 1970, many Syrians thought that they were turning a corner, and that the apple would fall far from the tree. The next decade would quickly show them it hadn’t, and in the years that followed, they realized the son would even exceed his father’s brutality.

1.1 Bashar’s Tumultuous First Decade

Relative to the perceived maturity of Assad senior’s policies, Assad junior’s first decade in power showed the limitations of inexperience, with his predilection for rash judgements paired with unmeasured conceit. On the domestic front, the buzz about increased freedoms, marketed by core Assad loyalists, was quickly smashed by Assad’s intolerance for dissent and his heavy-handed response to calls for reform. Numerous civil society activists, writers and intellectuals were silenced and jailed, accused of threatening national security when they dared to speak of human rights and freedom of expression.(5)

With the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration began to depict Assad as a low-hanging fruit (6) following his open defiance of the US and his open support for armed resistance to foreign troops in Iraq. While military action was never really considered, the US nevertheless promptly passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, pulling the rope a little tighter on Assad in the hope this would change his behavior.(7)

Bashar Assad also instigated a sequence of events with the other uneasy neighbor, forcing Lebanese politicians to unconstitutionally extend the presidential term of the incumbent, Emile Lahoud. This was an ill-advised diktat, as Assad could have ensured the loyalty of numerous candidates rather than impose Lahoud.(8) This triggered international condemnation and the adoption of the Franco-American sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 of 2005(9), calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. The humiliating retreat of Syrian troops followed, weeks after the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri which was immediately blamed on Syria and its ally, Hezbollah.

The Lebanon debacle was accompanied domestically by a renewed campaign against critics of the regime, particularly those who dared to voice solidarity with Lebanese peers.(10) Isolated from most of the Arab world once again, the Assad regime found unexpected relief in the aftermath of the Israeli war on Hezbollah in 2006; with Israel unable to crush the Iranian-backed militia, the latter successfully paralyzed Lebanon, turning its arms on fellow Lebanese in a drastic and bloody reversal of stated positions,(11) and becoming the kingmaker in a Qatar-hosted agreement in 2008(12). Against all odds, Bashar Assad was once again rehabilitated through his partnership with Hezbollah, taking his place among world leaders in Paris at the invitation of President Nicolas Sarkozy for the July 14 parade.

Less than three years later, before a popular uprising erupted in southern Syria and spread like wildfire over the country, Bashar Assad assumed he was invincible.

Having repeatedly survived numerous upheavals unscathed, he boasted in February 2011 to the Wall Street Journal about his country’s stability while the Arab Spring moved around the region.(13) A few weeks later, the fuse had been lit in Daraa with the imprisonment and torture of young boys who had written on their school wall: It’s your turn, Doctor.(14)

1.2 Bashar’s Ruthless Second Decade

When Syrian civilians turned into revolutionaries, braving the regime despite knowing its formidable power and its proven willingness to violently crush any dissent, they assumed that the international community would not allow another Hama, nor remain idle as it watched civilians be slaughtered. Syrians expected that the regime which had been designated as a sponsor of terrorism for decades would be warned and stopped dead in its tracks, following years of rhetoric on the need to reform. They quickly realized no help was coming their way; nevertheless, they persisted.

The astounding death toll and destruction at the hands of Assad and his allies have created a new reality in the region and beyond, with absolutely no evidence that it is possible to turn back the clock and regain a semblance of normalcy.

Actual figures are estimates at best, undercounts at worst. Even though the United Nations declared it would stop counting the number of victims early in the war, claiming accurate figures were difficult to get, the then-special envoy Stefan De Mistura stated in April 2016 that the number of deaths had already reached at least 400,000. This conservative estimate was given before the bulk of Russia’s bombing campaign and the regime’s violent assaults on Aleppo later that year, on Ghouta in 2018, and on Idlib as of 2019.(15)

Syrian civil society organizations and international human rights organizations, however, have been keeping close count and according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, this war has already killed at least 586,000 Syrians.(16) Moreover, the regime and its allies’ atrocities have been thoroughly documented by numerous independent observers, such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, which estimates the death toll to top 560,000.(17)

If the last twenty years of Bashar Assad’s reign have shown anything, it is that the country’s stability thus far had only been ensured by drastic repression and by international wavering on Syria. The economy was adapted to benefit only Assad cronies, while basic infrastructure, education and health were deteriorating at an alarming speed, accompanied by a high population growth rate, rampant unemployment, and a new generation coming of age with absolutely no prospects for even the simple life their parents had.

With or without the Arab Spring, Syria had long been on the slippery path to implosion.

1.3 Flawed Conclusions

In spite of these shocking developments, at the 50th anniversary of the Assad regime’s power grab in Syria, and coming up to 10 years after the popular uprising of March 2011 and ensuing war, a chorus of European voices is countering Syrians in the opposition and civil society by playing devil’s advocate in a literal way, arguing for an acceptance of what is called “facts on the ground.”

This narrative simplistically advocates that after the regime’s military victory and reconquest of a large part of Syria, it may be time to recalibrate Europe’s (and the world’s) approach to the Assad regime, with a de facto recognition of Assad as the Syrian leader and a lifting of sanctions “to help Syrians” who are hurting from them much more than the regime.

Further, the narrative argues that a significant European contribution to the reconstruction of Syria is necessary in order to allow for a repatriation of Syrian refugees from their European bases, now that their security is allegedly no longer an issue.

In other words, Syria is described as a post-war case and Assad is marketed as a necessary evil, if that.

Such arguments seem to rest solidly on wishful thinking to get rid of Syrians in Europe, and to prevent others from attempting to find asylum there. They have, however, absolutely no relation to current realities or prospects for the future. For most Syrians, with half a century’s worth of evidence to support their position, the Assad regime remains the worst possible alternative, and its continued hold on power remains an impediment to their return.(18) For the time being, the EU’s official position remains that “conditions inside Syria at present do not lend themselves to the promotion of large-scale voluntary return, in conditions of safety and dignity in line with international law.“(19)

There is much Europe could have done – and there is still much it can do now – to mitigate some of the ravages of the last ten years in Syria and around Syria. As Syrians fled the brutality of Assad and his allies, Europe was generous with its purse strings but stingy with its support for the very principles it preaches on human rights, accountability, justice, and democracy.

Of course, the European Union is a massive institution whose decisions hinge on – and are often slowed down by – the policies of its sovereign members. Nevertheless, it has a President of the European Commission, a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and numerous senior officials who have sway and whose job it is to work for the collective interests of the Union. They need to reconsider their position and evaluate new courses of action.

After fifty years of brutal Assadism which have afflicted not only Syrians and their neighbors, but have also created waves across the Mediterranean, the time is ripe for a reassessment of European policies towards the Syria conflict, if only for long-term European interests. For the European Union, taking a leading role in solving Syria is not only a matter of foreign policy: it is a matter of strategic interest and domestic security, both of which will remain unattainable while Assad remains in power.

2 Europe’s Decade of Chosen Passivity

The twenty-first century had started well for Bashar Assad, whose ascent to power seemed to be sanctioned by most world leaders, particularly French President Jacques Chirac, the only world leader to attend the funeral of Hafez Assad in June 2000. With French support, Syria was supposed to engage in serious reforms on economic and administrative platforms, and eventually on a political level. The frustration from Paris was replicated in other EU capitals, however, as Bashar Assad quickly showed his true colors domestically and regionally.

2.1 The Elusive EU Association Agreement

The EU’s early frustrations with Syria started with Assad’s dithering on the EU Association Agreement(20) and his refusal to accept the inclusion of references to human rights and to weapons of mass destruction. But in a manner typical of Assad diplomacy, the Syrian regime suddenly showed eagerness for the Association Agreement when its regional and international standing was at risk, or worse. Hence, in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, the regime would have welcomed signing the Agreement. But in 2006, Bashar Assad issued a dual warning – to Europeans, and to Syrians hoping for European help; speaking to journalist Hamdi Kandil on Dubai Television, he said that he had warned Europeans not to interfere with internal Syrian affairs, and that any foreign embassy’s intervention on behalf of a Syrian prisoner would be considered as treason on part of the detainee.(21)

When Syria’s regional position had been strengthened again and Europe was willing to relaunch the negotiation process, Assad once again balked and refused. All hopes for an agreement evaporated with the start of the Syrian uprising, but such examples of European complacency unfortunately abound with regards to the Assad regime. It was blatantly obvious all along that Assad sought European funding while refusing to fundamentally reform economically (lest his crony network be affected) or politically, and that he would not become the kind of partner for whom the EU had created this Agreement.

2.2 Sanctions and Indecision

In 2011, the EU introduced sanctions against the Syrian regime in response to its violent repression of the civilian uprising(22). The sanctions targeted companies and business people associated with the regime, and included a ban on the import of oil; they restricted some investments and the export of equipment and technology to Syria; and they froze the assets of the Syrian Central Bank held in the EU. Official condemnations of the regime’s violence were also made regularly, but little else was attempted to rein in Assad, his army, and his growing militias.

The EU’s lukewarm decisions were also weighed down by divergences from within about the way to tackle Assad, with some member states less eager to take a strong position against the regime. Britain, France, The Netherlands and Germany’s strong initial stances were countered by the reluctance of countries like Greece, Italy, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic (the latter, unlike the rest of the EU members, having never even closed its embassy in Damascus). Those differences remain today, with growing calls for a resumption of diplomatic relations with Assad coming from the same group.

While exercising only the mildest of pressures on the Assad regime that had no chance of effecting real change, the EU gave no concrete help to the political opposition which was beginning to look for consensus on major policy lines, and for support from powerful democratic countries. It was always understood by all that a military European involvement was never an option; moreover, even serious political support to a coalition of Syrian opposition groups was hindered by a European and international insistence for the opposition to be unanimous and comprehensive. Unlike other oppositions around the world, Syrians were not given the right to disagree amongst themselves, and they were told in no uncertain terms that they would be given no substantial support until they reached a harmonious agreement amongst themselves on practically everything. This wasted valuable time while Assad was struggling militarily, giving him indirect reassurance that the opposition could not yet be a threat to his hegemony.

Europe also did not attempt to seriously pressure other countries supporting the Assad regime. In fact, the opposite occurred in the case of Iran, with which several nations were negotiating a nuclear deal at any price. The latter, in effect, came at the heaviest of costs to Syrians who experienced the brunt of the regime’s growing dependence on a flow of Iranian material, financial and military aid – all unhindered in the slightest by the nuclear deal. On the contrary, it was precisely because of the nuclear deal that Iran was able to spread its wings and encroach its influence on Syria further.

Despite its formidable power as an institution, or as the sum of its various parts, the EU demonstrated complete immobility when Assad and his allies started committing the greatest war crimes this century has seen. The world condemned but watched, immobile, the mass slaughter of civilians such as the one in Houla(23), chemical massacres(24), the sieges of Ghouta(25), Aleppo(26) and other cities, massive bombing campaigns with the infamous barrel bombs(27), the launch of Scud missiles on civilian areas(28), demographic engineering(29), forced displacement, torture of civilians on an industrial scale(30), the specific targeting of schools, hospitals(31) and markets, and the destruction of all buildings and infrastructure which could benefit any Syrian who had chosen to rise up against Assad.(32)

This European passivity was not an inadvertent result of influential nations having their hands tied, nor the unfortunate consequence of blockages at the Security Council: it was deliberately chosen as a constant course of inaction. From the beginning, there was a concerted European effort to be part of a broad international consensus - namely the large Friends of Syria group(33) - while simultaneously ensuring that the baton was passed to the US to take the lead on Syria.

When the Obama administration refused to budge on tangible support for the opposition (delivering night-vision goggles, for example, which could have no impact on the barrel bombs falling from Assad’s helicopters), and when President Obama took the easy way out in response to the first large scale chemical massacre in Ghouta despite his “red line” warning(34), the EU was more than happy to follow suit, paying lip service to this alleged incapacity to do more.

2.3 The Russia Factor

With Russia’s military entrance into the Syrian conflict in 2015, alleging it was fighting ISIS while in fact only bombing opposition and civilian areas(35) (leaving the targeting of ISIS in Raqqa mostly to the US-led coalition), the EU continued its retreat into irrelevance on the Syrian scene, despite a simultaneous upsurge in refugees seeking asylum in its midst, later causing great political tumult within the Union and in different states.

Of course, this European paralysis was not limited to Syria. In the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, the EU could have also taken a much stronger position and demonstrated its might as an institution, but it was quickly made clear to Russia that it had very little to fear in terms of real retaliation. Unlike the more limited consequences on the EU of allowing Ukraine to fall prey to the Russian push for greater influence, events in Syria, in contrast, had a real and tangible effect on European Union member states. But with its own troubling developments, experiencing a rise in populist movements, a retreat of the US from international forums, and an unprecedented refugee crisis, and faced with the sudden reality of Brexit (itself at least partly influenced by the refugee crisis), the EU seemed to lose its common political direction as it became overwhelmed with domestic politics and policies in terms of migration, security, and integration.

2.4 European Aid to Syria

With Syria, the EU has focused its approach on humanitarian aid. Since 2011, it has thus far distributed approximately 20 billion euros to Syrians, with a further 4.9 billion pledged for 2020 and beyond, through aid organizations and local civil society organizations.(36) However, this massive amount has neither fixed real problems nor alleviated the suffering of Syrians. Without serious political pressure to contain Assad and his allies’ military onslaught, no amount of aid could have protected the intended beneficiaries, especially as the regime has secured – through Russian vetoes at the Security Council – a monopoly on deliveries through limited border controls.(37)

At the same time, since the beginning of the uprising, the EU has rightly continued to provide financial and logistical support for numerous Syrian civil society organizations, investing in capacity-building and awareness-raising on democratization, accountability, justice, and citizenship. Just like with humanitarian aid, however, this important investment in the future of Syrians will become meaningless and have been for nothing if the recipients are unable to apply what they have learned, and if their only lesson from the EU is “do as we say, not as we do.”

3 After-Effects of Inaction

As the Syrian revolution approaches the tenth anniversary of its ignition, after an ebb and flow of control on various parts of the country by opposition forces (the military resistance having been formed by defected soldiers who refused to obey orders to shoot to kill, joined gradually by civilians who took up arms to join them in the Free Syrian Army), the Assad regime has been able to recapture large areas of Syria with the support of solid allies who had assured it of a military victory. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, Assad and Russia still need to live with the presence of US troops in the northeast, and that of Turkish troops in the north of the country.

3.1 Military Victory

With the majority of attacks having come from the air, whether from helicopters or fighter jets, the Syrian rebels’ initial victories were inevitably overturned without the capacity to neutralize Assad’s planes. Neither the adequate armaments (namely MANPADS), nor the no-fly-zone for which most of the Syrian opposition at large and civil society so forcefully pleaded, were ever delivered or even seriously considered.

Still, without the actual support of Iran (on the ground) and Russia (in the air), Assad had been unable to retake a single village from the poorly armed rebels. This military victory, therefore, is not Assad’s, nor the Syrian army’s, which itself gradually took a less prominent role while Iran-backed militias (most powerful of which being Hezbollah), under the strategic direction of Qasem Soleimani until his assassination in 2020, with the Russian air force doing the heavy lifting. As for Assad’s army and militias, they were in full control of the arrest, imprisonment, and torture of tens of thousands of Syrians, as graphically documented by the Caesar photos smuggled out of Syria.(38)

This is a crucial point to consider as Europe begins to plan for post-war scenarios; if no accountability ensues for these war criminals, a state of peace and effective Syrian conviviality will be impossible to achieve – especially when Assad, by himself, has proved incapable of holding his ground without serious help, and will again resort to heavy violence at any sign of protest.

3.2 Economic Dire Straits

Even with this military victory for Assad, nothing else is improving for the regime. In fact, the situation of all Syrians has worsened exponentially, with military advances proving inconsequential for the economy. Sanctions are only a small part of the equation, however, and a sanctions relief decision would be unlikely to greatly alleviate the suffering of Syrians. As has been seen repeatedly, every injection of help meant for needy Syrians is confiscated by Assad to prioritize his militias, warlords and cronies, leaving nothing to trickle down for the population.

The financial liberties taken by the regime, as proven once more by recent domestic developments, show that Assad turns against his even closest allies and family when needed, to ascertain his own rule. Assad’s very public disempowerment of his cousin Rami Makhlouf, until then the Assad regime’s portfolio manager, is just the latest example. Sanctions relief without strings attached will not reach those who need it the most.

In addition, through the vetoes of his allies on the Security Council, Assad has also ensured that international aid comes only through borders he controls.(39) This allows him to distribute the aid according to the alliances that suit him, ensuring the people he needs are profiteering to their satisfaction, and completely neglecting the issue of where the aid is actually most needed.

The overall effect of these combined factors has led Syrians in regime-controlled areas – even Syrians the regime likes to portray as active supporters – to experience the most drastic circumstances since the beginning of the war. Social media networks have been flooded in recent weeks by photos posted by Syrians in Damascus, Homs and other major cities in Syria under regime control, showing huge lines in front of bakeries, or even videos showing Syrians having to run after the bread delivery truck, and often going back home empty handed to hungry children. At the same time, massive lines of cars have been shown waiting in line entire days to fill their gas tanks, all over the country.(40)

While average Syrians are struggling to get by, rich ones affiliated to the regime are continuing to enjoy their crony capitalist privileges. EmmaTel (the newest Syrian telecommunications company after Rami Makhlouf was stripped of his Syriatel monopoly) has boasted on its own social media pages of being the first company – and Syria being the first country – to sell the iPhone12, Apple’s latest offering which itself had only been launched ten days before it could be found in Damascus.(41)

These are not the actions of a regime with any intention of securing its remaining citizens’ livelihood with EU aid.

3.3 Refugees Without Refuge

Perhaps the Syrian issue which most resonates in Europe is that of refugees, considered to be an unbearable burden for the continent. After an initial welcome in 2015, especially in Germany which declared it would accept 1 million refugees(42), the welcome has dampened in some places and has been completely withdrawn in others. Some political parties in various states (such as the far-right AfD party in Germany, and the People’s Party in Denmark) have even begun to run political campaigns to return Syrian refugees to their country of origin, claiming the war is over and it would be safe for them there.(43)

A return for most refugees is still not safe, even with the end of the air bombing campaigns in most of Syria. Until today, citizens are being harassed, intimidated, threatened and imprisoned for the slightest deviation from the total obedience and silence demanded from the regime.

Sadly, and ironically, these refugees find themselves unwanted not only in the countries where they sought refuge, but also in their country of origin. Even those desperate enough to return to an unsustainable position in Syria are discouraged through various means by the regime, the most recent one being the de facto entry tax (equaling some $100) for merely crossing the border.(44)

Even if they do make it across, there is almost certainly nowhere for a Syrian refugee to go, except perhaps to the already distressed governorate of Idlib. In every area retaken by the Assad regime, homes which were not destroyed have been reallocated in a massive demographic engineering exercise, guided by Iran. The regime has confiscated countless Syrian properties and grabbed a large amount of land parcels, to which refugees could not return even if the situation were as simplistically safe as some parties have been describing.

By striking a deal with Turkey to rein in would-be refugees from seeking refuge in Europe, the European Union has not only reneged its own humanitarian principles, but it has put Syrian refugees – and to a certain degree the EU itself – in the untenable position of being pawns on President Erdogan’s chess board.(45)

In the meantime, the bulk of the Syrian refugee population is left to its own devices, stuck in dire straits around the Middle East with no prospects for the future, not feeling welcome anywhere. Whether in formal camps or informal dwellings, refugees are experiencing rampant illiteracy, child marriages, idleness, and frustration, all of which tend to lead to a retreat into more fundamentalist mindsets – a dangerous slope for Syrians and for Europeans alike.

This is the lost generation of Syria, and it will multiply exponentially if no measures are taken to change the path refugees are treading against their collective will.

3.4 Doomed Opposition

In the midst of these circumstances that, for the most part, are outside of Syrian control, the Syrian people have also been failed by the dismal performance of the opposition at large, now gathered in a broad National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. While its creation and initial achievements had been supported by a significant portion of Syrians, especially during official negotiations following the 2013 chemical massacre in Ghouta, the Coalition has slipped into insignificance despite the sub-groups that have been created specifically to negotiate.

When global and European tacit support began to weaken for Syrian revolutionaries, various factions of the opposition found themselves relying solely on the support of various undemocratic sponsors who dictate the broad lines their protégés must take. Today, some answer to Ankara, others to Riyadh, some to Moscow, and all are criticized by a large portion of Syrians who feel they have become spokespeople of the respective governments supporting them, rather than spokespeople for the opposition at large and for the Syrian people still awaiting deliverance from their despair.

The opposition is also strongly criticized for having failed to engage the international community, to make its case rationally and succinctly in the world’s influential capitals and media, and to explain the essence of the conflict in Syria to European and global audiences. Instead, Syrians watched dismayed as numerous opposition figures bickered amongst themselves on social media and on Arabic language channels.

The revolution’s chants for the downfall of the regime were always meant by Syrians to be understood as demands for the downfall of an entire system, and not an exchange from one system to another similar one. There has been much Syrian criticism of the opposition’s recent “musical chairs” games, where the leader of the Coalition and the leader of the High Negotiations Committee simply traded places in the last elections, in a Putin-Medvedev manner.(46) The fact that the top ladders of the Coalition did not even consider how this would be perceived by the Syrians they supposedly represent spoke volumes to Syrians around the world. Instead of leading by example, many opposition members have merely demonstrated that their attachment to “the chair” (a Syrian euphemism for power) differed little from that of the regime.

It is still impossible for Syrians to elect their representatives or their opposition, but it is doubtful they would choose many from the formal self-formed opposition to represent them one day, after their spectacular failures in upholding the very values demanded by the popular civilian uprising.

These issues have left most Syrians bitter and disillusioned, feeling let down by their own recognized opposition, let down by superpowers preaching but not enabling human rights and democracy, and let down by a region which has continuously mistreated them.

4 Engagement Delusions

Despite all the numerous negative consequences of regime actions and global inaction, formal rhetoric from leading global powers now only alludes to changes in regime behavior – a significant regression even though regime change was never really on the table.

The current narrative speaks of regime victory and survival as a fait accompli, reverting the entire issue of Syrians into one of refugees who must be returned to a “safe” country despite all evidence to the contrary.

Arguments have also been made about the inability of Assad to rebuild destroyed areas of Syria while sanctions remain. However, there is no sign that Assad ever had the intention in the first place of rebuilding the areas he and his allies destroyed. In fact, regime loyalists have never hidden the fact that a smaller population is easier to manage in terms of obedience, especially one which has been already subdued from sheer exhaustion, with nowhere else to go.

Arguments for engagement “for the sake of Syrians” (heard increasingly in Europe and in the US) are a consequence of an erroneous reading of developments. The war is not over while Idlib looms large on the resolution of the conflict. Nearly 200,000 innocent civilians and prisoners of conscience remain in the custody of the regime,(47) their location and fate unbeknownst to their loved ones; despite the regime’s obligation to liberate them to comply with Security Council Resolution 2254, and despite repeated requests by the United Nations Special Envoy Geir Pedersen, Assad is refusing to budge on this matter which would cost him nothing.

Refugees are not going back to Syria even if they wished they could go back, prohibited not only by the cost of this new virtual entrance visa, but also by the terrifying prospects awaiting those who return, rightly fearing continued repression – or even death – from the regime.(48) Those who still manage to go back, despite all odds, find themselves abandoned to their own devices, with their homes either destroyed, confiscated or unattainable with no deeds to prove ownership.

Russia (and Iran) are in Syria for the long haul. President Putin has achieved his military goals, but he is struggling to contain the conflict and to get a return on his investment. He needs an out that saves face and solves several problems at once. Signs of Russian impatience with Assad have been appearing more frequently this year, with Russian media beginning to openly criticize Assad’s incompetence in resolving governmental issues.(49) In October, Putin even withheld wheat shipments to Syria to pressure Assad to engage in the constitutional committee, causing an immediate shortage of bread in the country.(50)

Following recommendations for re-engagement, therefore, would merely guarantee that Russia, Iran and of course Assad can be relieved of the burdens and difficulties of appeasing the population’s anger and frustration, while the crony system continues to enrich itself at the expense of everyone.

In the long run, such a re-engagement would be a precursor for an endless flow of refugees, for rampant illiteracy, for child marriages and population explosion, and for radicalism, extremism, and possibly jihadism. Long-term, the current problem will be compounded and out of control.

It would also enable the Assad regime to continue being a major impediment to solutions in the region, especially in Lebanon whose fate is tied to that of the Syrian regime (through Hezbollah).

Thus far, appeasement has benefitted no one but Assad, personally responsible for the greatest humanitarian catastrophe of the 21st century. His actions have also allowed populist and autocratic leaders with delusions of grandeur (in Turkey and Russia, amongst others), to enlarge their playing field with no real risk of repercussions, turning them into actual players able to impose their own agendas on a self-weakened EU.

5 Defining Parameters for a Syrian Transition

5.1 Loyalists and Oppositionists?

Some European proponents of engagement with Assad claim that a majority of Syrians did not turn against the Assad regime and continue to support it, in all regime-held areas. And just as they undercount the number of Syrians killed, they also underestimate the number of Syrians who have fled their homes (at least 7 million internally displaced people) and their country (well over 6 million). These already count for a simple majority, at the very least.

It is also a major mistake – or, for some, a deliberate deception – to count Syrians under regime control as “pro-Assad.” Syrians are under no illusion that the space for even the slightest dissent has vanished; nevertheless, discontent remains rife and most people are realizing that the end of the war does not equate an improvement in their lives. The open demonstrations in Suweida this year,(51) and others on the Syrian coast in areas considered to be regime strongholds, have shown that even Syrians who remained silent for years are now speaking out.

It is not through a calculation of territory won and controlled by Assad, but rather through a calculation of the number of people who would give their open opinions – if they could – that the balance of loyalists and oppositionists can be calculated. The clear majority of Syrians remains outside Assad’s control, and the Syrians under his control are far from being all loyalists.

This means that at the very least, a majority (if not an overwhelming majority) of Syrians would actively support a political transition to move forward, with very few segments of the population still willing to fight for Assad (the militias, warlords, cronies).

Besides, if Europe were to follow its own laws on human rights and accountability, the possibility of engaging with the Assad regime after its massive crimes would not even be an issue to consider, regardless of how many people still support him.

5.2 Alternative Actors

For years, the Assad regime and supporters spreading disinformation have used the tired narrative that it was either Assad or the extremists. This equation continues to be used as an excuse to do nothing, despite the many examples of civil society and opposition at large initiatives which prove there has always been a third option. This is not to say that there is a custom-made team ready to take over; rather, it means that the wishes of a majority of Syrians can be granted in a pluralistic, participatory democratic exercise.

Today, new local leaderships have emerged. After years of exercising their newly-found capacity for civic duties, with networks of civil society groups spanning Syria, the region and most of the Western world, many Syrians combine knowledge with a strong aspiration to be part of their country’s future. Together, they form a formidable base with a wealth of expertise and have founded a grassroots force which can contribute to the rebuilding of Syria – physically and otherwise.

5.3 EU Options

While the notion of European involvement on a military level was never on the table, there are still many avenues for the EU to take its rightful place as a leading actor on Syria, and to protect its interests. For this, it can use diplomatic, legal, and financial tools, in partnership with Syrians in Europe who should be seen as assets and partners – not just burdens – and who can make a big contribution to the long-term resolution of the conflict.

There is an opportunity to restore the agency of Syrians already within the EU, by giving them a role in the rebuilding of their communities and in the future of their country of birth. Even if all do not choose to return after having made a new life in Europe, they nearly all have extended families and social networks to support, and a shared traumatic need to do something – as demonstrated over the years by the huge efforts and the countless civil society organizations Syrians have mounted and led for nearly 10 years. They should be working together with EU policy makers.

The EU can also play a crucial role in supporting new opposition voices, so that they do not feel obligated or pressured to toe the line of the non-democratic governments backing the established political opposition. Only a Western democracy can truly support and uplift the numerous qualified Syrians who can make qualitative contributions to the political transition of their country, and to its rebuilding.

Of course, refugees are one of the Syrian regime’s (and Russia’s) major cards. They know how desperately most countries are to get rid of them, and therefore dangle the notion of return and normality only if the West would agree to lift sanctions. But the regime will not rebuild areas it has destroyed; rather, it is building gigantic luxury real estate projects on illegally grabbed lands(52) (with most inhabitable areas having already been demographically engineered with Iran’s help). Forcibly sending back refugees to unsafe areas would only cause greater chaos in the region – chaos which would affect Europe as well.

By continuing to focus only on the symptoms and not daring to tackle the root cause of the Syrian crisis which has become a European problem, the EU would be condemning itself to years of heightened tensions, of refugee waves, and of increased insecurity on its collective borders. It is time to choose another path which will benefit Syrians and benefit the EU.

Assad is holding the Syrian population hostage, waiting for the democratic world to take pity on the suffering people in areas he controls and to remove sanctions so he can pretend to help them. But Assad is not interested in a functioning society; he is more than happy with barely surviving communities that are too afraid to demand more than the bare minimum any longer, thus keeping people in check while the avid elite gets its fill.

Syria can therefore not survive as a viable entity, nor contribute to the stabilization of the eastern Mediterranean, while the Assad regime is still in place.

6 Recommendations

The EU should consider effecting the following major recommendations on Syria, under several umbrellas: firstly, a new people approach; secondly, a joint economic and educational incentive; thirdly, a push for a judicial process; fourthly, a realistic political development with Russia; and, lastly, a realignment of global alliances with regard to Syria.

1 Connect Opposition and Civil Society Efforts in Europe and Around Syria

The EU should support a new selection of independent opposition figures, including those within the Syrian diaspora throughout Europe (in opposition at large and in civil society), who can become new leaders and create a strong link between the EU and Syria. They will build new bridges of trust, contribute to the formation of Syrians in and around Syria, and rekindle civil society’s faith in the possibility for a new beginning back home.

It is partly because of sustained support and organization that religious-leaning groups managed to get ahead in the Syrian revolution – financially, politically and militarily. By seriously helping secular Syrians do the same outside the military realm and without the restrictions of being supported by regional undemocratic regimes, the EU would effect a real change in both dynamics and narratives about the transition - a transition mandated by Security Council Resolution 2254(53). It is in the interest of Europe, and of the future Syria, that the religious and sectarian groups which have infiltrated many opposition alliances – and regime ones for that matter – be weakened, through the rise of strong, independent, secular political forces.

2 Set New Economic and Educational Roots

The EU should reconsider the overall effect of its aid packages, and it must rethink the usefulness of scattered grants that limit themselves to broad advocacy on democratization issues. Instead, it should start investing in targeted education and vocational training programs that are interlinked to family schemes, aiming to help communities achieve self-sustainment on a longer term. This would ensure that while parents (women and men) are receiving formal training in useful skills which will be needed to rebuild the country, children are being educated with a new curriculum merging a national base with international citizenship concepts. The curricula should be prepared in coordination and consultation with independent Syrian figures and civil society in the region and in the diaspora, including those in Europe, to ensure no agenda (political, religious, or ethnic) can influence the educational approach.

These hubs of education and vocational training must be built in areas which are off-limits to Assad, and the EU can and must use its formidable political and economic clout to impose guarantees of non-interference from Russia and Turkey. Even without a no-fly-zone and even without an armed presence or boots on the ground, the EU would be contributing to the stabilization and reconstruction of parts of Syria that are out of Assad’s control in a physical and abstract sense, building a model which can be replicated elsewhere in the country when the transition happens.

In particular, the EU should aim at spreading actionable secular citizenship and gender policies in deeds and not just words. Such EU schemes should give women vocational training that goes beyond the typical ones currently given (sewing, soap making, baking, etc.). It should also begin to educate girls and young women in skills generally dominated by men in conservative societies, to actively contribute to their own sustainability and to their country’s economic development. To change the mindset of the next generation, women must also be trained in business and commercial skills, languages, program management, and traditional professional fields such as medicine, engineering, or architecture.

After the establishment of these new hubs, the EU should offer incentives to asylum seekers and refugees to return to their country and move to these new sustainable areas, offering jobs to those who commit to these programs.

To effect a drastic change in outlook for the future, and to satisfy the needs and demands of a vast majority of Syrian civil society over the last decade, the EU should do everything in its power to move away from concepts of “minorities” and “majorities” – in religious, sectarian, ethnic, and national terms. It should embrace actionable programs and language that promotes a more profound but demonstrably more equitable concept of democracy, citizenry, and secularism. These are necessary concepts which have their place in Syrian society at this stage of the conflict.

3 Advance the Accountability Processes for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity

The EU should give strong and full-blown support to human rights and war crimes trials in the respective European jurisdictions where legislation allows for this. It must expedite legal support for the trials of war criminals, and of people guilty of sanctions evasion, to follow on the declared EU policy to pursue justice and accountability for Syria.

This is one of the developments which have given Syrians the most hope that some closure could be reached in Syria (with the trials in Germany, and the recent decision by the Dutch government to sue the Assad regime). These trials are reinstating Syrian confidence in European values, a needed development for a smooth recalibration of the EU’s role in Syria’s future and for its relations with its own refugees.

4 Apply Tangible Political Pressure to Achieve Transition

Russia, Assad’s greatest asset on the international arena, is in serious need of things, which the European Union has in abundance, namely money and resources, both key to resolving his Syria quagmire. Putin’s goal was never the survival of Assad per se, as many observers erroneously say: Putin’s objective was the establishment of solid Russian military, economic and political influence in Syria and the region. Assad was the means, not the end. While Putin has achieved this goal, he is now stuck with a big Assad problem, a problem so thorny Russia has had to appoint four Syria envoys to deal with various files.(54) Putin is also pushing for the return of refugees to Syria, assuming this would nudge Europe towards financing and rebuilding what Russia’s air force, Iran’s militias and Assad’s army have decimated.

Putin must be persuaded to enforce the political transition mandated by Security Council Resolution 2254, which will not threaten his interests in the least. Therefore, the EU should apply serious political pressure directly to Russia regarding the facilitation of the only items currently being discussed under the resolution: the constitutional committee, the ensuing referendum, and elections under international supervision. There are enough big projects in the pipeline between Russia and the EU for the latter to attach some strings to agreements with Russia; the North Stream II project is one such area of possible negotiation, where Putin could be convinced to give concessions in Syria which relate to the EU’s security interests.

5 Lead the Drive to Regain International Consensus on Syria

As Syrians gloomily observe the 50th anniversary of the Assad coup, and the 10th anniversary of a revolution which the regime turned into a bloody conflict, the US is transitioning from years of international uncertainty under President Trump to an expected era of more familiar diplomacy under President Biden.

The change will be felt not only in style, but also in policy on important issues such as Syria. In an encouraging comment, Vice President-Elect Kamala Harris said that the Biden administration “will once again stand with civil society and pro-democracy partners in Syria, and help advance a political settlement where the Syrian people have a voice.”(55)

A big Syria-related change will occur in the declared decision of President-Elect Biden, already working with a team that has driven policy during the Obama administration, to rejoin the JCPOA (the Iran nuclear deal) within months of his taking office.(56) This is music to the Iranian regime’s ears, and to most EU countries, still believing that engagement of this scale with Tehran reaps benefits. But the EU would be damaging its own interests if it does not take this opportunity to advise the US to take a more forceful approach towards the Iranian regime’s continued interference in Syria (and in Lebanon), not only through the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019(57) but with determined and consistent political pressure.

Reining in Iran in the Syrian context would not be opposed by Russia, which itself will have its own recalibration issues with the US following the turbulent past few years. A joint US-EU position on both Russia’s and Iran’s involvement in Syria would lead to much more workable solutions in the different courses of action advocated in this paper.

The EU can and should lead its allies into learning the right lessons from having allowed Assad to escalate an uprising into a conflict, generating so much bloodshed, destruction, and repercussions far beyond the confines of Syria. The EU must be proactive and take control of the foreign policy decisions which affect its security.

To avoid another 50 years of regional Assad-led chaos, renewed engagement for and with Syrians – but certainly not with the Assad regime – will benefit those who have suffered the tragic consequences of this laisser-faire, leading to a new understanding and modus vivendi between the EU and some of its Mediterranean neighbors.

About the Author: Rime Allaf is a Syrian-born writer, editor, and public speaker. A former Associate Fellow at London’s Chatham House for nearly ten years, she has researched, spoken and written about Syria, the region and international affairs. On Syria, she focuses on domestic, geopolitical, cultural and socio-economic affairs. She has written and spoken extensively about the country in the decade preceding the revolution of 2011, and in the decade since then. She is a Board Member of the Syrian civil society organization The Day After. She is also on the Advisory Council of the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program.

Endnotes

1. See, “Profile: Syria’s Ruling Baath Party”, BBC, July 9, 2012.

2. See Francis X. Clines, “Britain Breaks Syrian Ties; Cites Proof of Terror Role; El Al Suspect is Convicted; US Recalls Envoy”, New York Times, October 25, 1986.

3. See Deborah Amos, “30 Years Later, Photos Emerge from Killings in Syria”, NPR, February 2, 2012.

4. See Andrew Glass, “George H.W. Bush Creates Coalition to Liberate Kuwait”, Politico, August 7, 1990.

5. See “A wasted decade; Human rights in Syria during Bashar al-Assad’s first ten years in power”, Human Rights Watch, July 16, 2010.

6. See Alex Shone, “A low hanging fruit: Engagement with Syria and its role in the Middle East”, Defence Viewpoints, 25 November, 2010.

7. See “Fact Sheet: Implementing the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003”, The White House Press Release, May 11, 2004.

8. See Brian Whitaker, “By unpopular demand; Syria increased its international alienation by pushing Lebanon into extending Emile Lahoud's presidential term”, The Guardian, September 6, 2004.

9. See “Security Council Declares Support for Free, Fair Presidential Election in Lebanon; Calls for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces There”, United Nations, September 9, 2004.

10. See Robert G. Rabil, “Syria’s Regime Writes its Future in the Sand”, The Daily Star, May 24, 2006.

11. See, “Hezbollah Takes Over West Beirut”, BBC, May 9, 2008.

12. See Robert F. Worth and Nada Bakri, “Deal for Lebanese Factions Leaves Hezbollah Stronger”, New York Times, May 22, 2008. 13 See “Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad”, Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011.

14. See Jamie Tarabay, “For Many Syrians, the Story of the War Began with Graffiti in Dara’a”, CNN, March 15, 2018.

15. See John Hudson, “U.N. Envoy Revises Syria Death Toll to 400,000”, Foreign Policy, April 22, 2016.

16. See “Syrian Revolution Nine Years On: 586,100 Persons Killed and Millions of Syrians Displaced and Injured”, The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, March 15, 2020.

17. At least 580,000 people have been killed in Syria since March 2011. See “16 UNSC vetoes blocking action and accountability”, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, September 15, 2020.

18. See Ben Hubbard, “Syria Seeks Return of Refugees, but They Fear Leader’s Wrath”, New York Times, November 12, 2020.

19. See the European Council’s “Declaration by the High Representative on Behalf of the EU on the Refugee Conference in Damascus”, November 10, 2020.

20. See Andrew Rettman, “EU Clears Way for New Treaty with Syria”, EU Observer, October 8, 2009.

21. See “Hamdi Kandil’s interview with Bashar Assad” (الرئيس بشار الأسد مع حمدي قنديل ), Dubai TV, August 23, 2006.

22. See the European Union’s “Council Decision 2011/782/CFSP of 1 December 2011, concerning restrictive measures against Syria and repealing Decision 2011/273/CFSP”.

23. See “Houla Massacre: UN Blames Syria Troops and Militia”, BBC, August 15, 2012.

24. See Joby Warrick, “More than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says”, Washington Post, August 30, 2013.

25. See United Nations’ report, “Syria’s Siege of Eastern Ghouta ‘Barbaric and Medieval‘ Says UN Commission of Inquiry”, June 20, 2018.

26. See Lyse Doucet, “Aleppo Siege: 'We Are Crying and Afraid'”, BBC, December 3, 2016.

27. See, Kenneth Roth, “To Stem the Flow of Syrian Refugees, Stop the Barrel Bombs”, Human Rights Watch, September 23, 2015.

28. See Spencer Ackerman. “Syria Fires Scud Missiles, Burning Bombs and Even Sea Mines at Rebels”, Wired, December 12, 2012.

29. See David Gardner, “Syria is Witnessing a Violent Demographic Re-Engineering”, Financial Times, October 2, 2019.

30. See Anne Barnard, “Inside Syria’s Secret Torture Prisons: How Bashar al-Assad Crushed Dissent”, New York Times, May 11, 2019.

31. See Malachy Browne et al, “Hospitals and Schools Are Being Bombed in Syria. A U.N. Inquiry Is Limited. We Took a Deeper Look”, New York Times, December 31, 2019.

32. See Ben Taub, “The Assad Files: Capturing the Top-Secret Documents That Tie the Syrian Regime to Mass Torture and Killings”, The New Yorker, April 18, 2016.

33. See Marc Daou, “Friends of Syria Push for Tougher Sanctions”, France 24, July 6, 2012.

34. See Romain Houeix, “A History of the Syria Chemical Weapons ‚Red Line‘”, France 24, April 14, 2018.

35. See Helene Cooper et al, “Russians Strike Targets in Syria, but Not ISIS Areas”, New York Times, September 30, 2015.

36. See “Syrian Crisis: EU Mobilizes an Overall Pledge of €6.9 Billion for 2020 and Beyond”, European Commission, June 30, 2020.

37. See Edith M. Lederer, “Russia and China Veto Cross-Border Aid to Syria’s Northwest”, Associated Press, July 8, 2020.

38. See the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights’ report, “Caesar Photos Document Systematic Torture”.

39. See “UN Restarts Syria Cross-Border Aid But With Only One Access Point”, The Guardian, July 12, 2020.

40. See Ben Hubbard, “Syria’s Economy Collapses Even as Civil War Winds to a Close”, New York Times, June 15, 2020.

41. See Emmatel’s Facebook announcement on the “Launch of the iPhone12 in Damascus”, 23 October, 2020.

42. See Luke Harding, “Angela Merkel Defends Germany's Handling of Refugee Influx”, The Guardian, September 15, 2015.

43. See “Denmark’s Government at Risk in Row With Nationalists Over Syrian Refugees”, Reuters, December 12, 2017.

44. See Sara Kayyali, “Syria’s 100 Dollar Barrier to Return”, Human Rights Watch, September 23, 2020.

45. See “Migrant Crisis: EU-Turkey Deal Comes Into Effect”, BBC. March 20, 2016.

46. See “Internal Strife, Accusations of Cronyism Amid Syrian National Coalition Elections”, North Press Agency, July 16, 2020.

47. See Katarina Montgomery, “Assessing the State of Syria’s Detainees”, The New Humanitarian, June 6, 2014.

48. See “Returning Syrian Refugees Face Death and Disappearance”, The New Arab, November 7, 2018.

49. See “Russia’s Media Campaign Against Al-Assad Regime: Causes and Consequences”, Emirates Policy Center, April 30, 2020.

50. See Bethan McKernan and Ahmad Haj Hamdo, “Syria Introduces Limits on Subsidized Bread as Economic Crisis Bites”, The Guardian, October 5, 2020.

51. See Sarah Dadouch, “Syrian Protesters Raise Rare Anti-Assad Chants Amid Economic Plunge”, Washington Post, June 11, 2020.

52. See Zeina Karam, “A Luxury City Shows Blueprint for Syria’s Rebuilding Plans”, Associated Press, November 5, 2018.

53. See the United Nations’ Resolution, “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2254 (2015), Endorsing Road Map for Peace Process in Syria, Setting Timetable for Talks”, December 18, 2015.

54. See “Four Russian Envoys to Syria: Kinshak as a Special Envoy for …”, Al Khaleej Times, October 2020.

55. See “Kamala Harris: US Will Reverse Trump-Era Policy, Restore Relation with Palestine”, Middle East Monitor, November 3, 2020.

56. See Katrina Manson and Michael Peel, “Biden Team Considers Options on Iran Nuclear Deal”, Financial Times, November 10, 2020.

57. See the U.S. Department of State’s fact sheet on the “Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act”, June 17, 2020.

Jimmy Carter’s proposal to rehabilitate Assad and ignore Syrians’ demands for justice isn't just morally bankrupt in the extreme, it also would fail to produce even the “ugly peace” of his imagination.

US President Jimmy Carter has dedicated much time in the last decades to building homes for those in need. He has laid foundations, put up walls brick by brick, and provided solid roofs over many people’s heads, helping them secure the basic human rights of shelter, safety, and, just as importantly, dignity.

Yet the very rights he helped support and provide for so many, he would deny to Syrians who have been bearing the brunt of unrivaled savagery for over seven years, at the hands of the Bashar al-Assad regime and its accomplices. For Carter, the house of horrors crumbling over millions of Syrian heads should be left untouched; instead, the international community should refurbish the Assad regime’s standing in the world with near-unconditional engagement; cheerlead alleged reforms; and ignore the fundamental issue of accountability.

This is the gist of his appeal, published in the New York Times last month, to give Syria what he calls an “ugly peace,” after a war whose longevity he seems to blame on an imagined international push for regime change in Syria, and on the fact that much of Syria still remains outside Assad’s control. If only these two factors were to change, and if the world instead immediately lifted sanctions, opened embassies in Damascus, and basically let bygones be bygones, peace would ensue, he argues. Why does he then call it ugly? If these sole reasons for war, according to Carter, were resolved, wouldn’t the result be a peace so beautiful it could win pageants?

President Carter is far too knowledgeable to be unaware of the real causes of this brutal war. He knows that responsibility for what the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, amongst others, has called a genocide, and for what UN Secretary General António Guterres has called "hell on earth,” is on the bloody hands of the Assad regime. For the thousands of killings by (not under) torture, for the barbaric barrel bombs which have destroyed most of the country and buried innumerable innocents in the rubble, for the sarin gas attacks on civilians, for the primitive sieges on millions of Syrians, for the forced displacement of over half the population, there is no argument about who the perpetrators are, no matter how carefully Carter avoids naming them. Indeed, there is enough documentation to hold the regime accountable to eternity for war crimes and crimes against humanity on a scale unprecedented this century.

Even more strangely, Carter deems that the Assad regime’s eventual release of detainees, as a “confidence-building measure” (and not as a prerequisite for peace), would include accountability for their treatment. While this is the only violation of human rights he is willing to attribute to its authors, and the only crime he deems worthy of accountability, this proposition is absurd. Privatized, denationalized dynastic power, the essence of this regime, is completely at odds with the notion of a public, institutional construct which is able and willing to dispense justice even to its own members. Had Bashar al-Assad held Atef Najib, his cousin, accountable in 2011 for his detainment and torture of children in Daraa, and for his deliberately insulting taunt of their parents, the uprising may not have been ignited.

But for most Syrians, accountability is not just about the past, nor is it even about the present as we impotently watch Idlib, like numerous Syrian areas before it, meet its inevitable fate under Assad’s assault, with Russian cover and Iranian support. For most Syrians, accountability is precisely about the shape of their future, and about the place of justice in it.

By denying Syrians their political and civic agency, by shrugging off their rights to a just and dignified life worth living, by ignoring their long struggle to break free of the criminal dynasty which has gone and will always go to every length imaginable to perpetuate its own existence against any opposition, peaceful or armed, Carter is offending not just Syrians but the very notions of peace and justice for which he has claimed to fight.

Such blatant disregard for human lives, and disrespect for human deaths, was to be expected from war criminals, but not from esteemed peacemakers. What President Carter is advocating is full and total appeasement of mass-murderers, and the abandonment of an entire nation and future generations to their tormentors and executioners. By doing so, he is applying the same false dichotomy that the Assad regime itself has been unashamedly pounding, literally and figuratively, on a weary population: Assad, or the country burns.

Whether on ethical or on geopolitical grounds, there is not a single scenario in which imposing the Assad regime on battered Syrians can work in the long term, and fantasies of reconstruction and normalization with this same regime fail to consider even the most basic consequences of ninety months of genocide and demographic engineering by this extremist sectarian regime. When foundations have been shaken to their core, and when the putrid smell of death has infested every stone, Carter’s proposed lick of paint to the decaying remnants will merely delay the inevitable. What is needed for a peace that does not end all peace, to borrow from David Fromkin, is a deep rebuilding from the ground up—without Assad.

Like the rest of humankind, Syrians are entitled to meaningful lives without oppression, which is why they named their peaceful uprising the Revolution of Dignity. Humanizing the regime which has dehumanized them for half a century would be an immense mistake, a regression towards the ominous state of nature on a global level, and not contained by any means to a Syria which has been denied a just peace.

Rime Allaf is a Syrian writer, political analyst, and former Associate Fellow at Chatham House's Middle East & North Africa Programme. Yassin al-Haj Saleh is a Syrian writer, former political prisoner, and co-founder of Al-Jumhuriya. His latest book is The Impossible Revolution: Making Sense of the Syrian Tragedy (Hurst, 2017).

https://www.aljumhuriya.net/en/content/syrians-need-fresh-start-not-ugly-appeasement

The United Nations says it has run out of words on Syria, but we, the undersigned, still have some for the governments, parliamentarians, electorates, and opinion leaders of the powers upon whom the international legal order has hitherto depended.

The world is a bystander to the carnage that has ravaged the lives of Syrians. All has happened in full view of a global audience that sees everything but refuses to act.

Through Russian obstruction and western irresolution, the UN Security Council has failed to protect Syrians. To the extent that it has been able to pass resolutions, they have proved ineffectual. All they have done is provide a fig leaf to an institution that appears moribund. Perhaps conscious of the stain this might leave on its legacy, the UN has even stopped counting Syria’s dead. After seven years, these nations appear united only in their apathy.

It will be redundant to list the nature and magnitude of all the crimes that the Assad regime has committed against Syrians, aided by local and foreign militias, by Iranian strategic and financial aid, by Russian airpower and mercenaries — and by international indifference. The world that watched and averted its eyes is its passive enabler.

Syrians were shot and killed in broad daylight for protesting injustice. They were imprisoned, tortured, and executed. They were bombed and shelled. They were besieged, raped, and humiliated. They were gassed. They were displaced and dispossessed.

Those with the power to act have been generous with expressions of sympathy but have offered nothing beyond the wish that this war on civilians — which they grotesquely call a “civil war”— would end. They call on “all parties” to show restraint, even though one side alone has a virtual monopoly on violence; they encourage all parties to negotiate, even though the opposition is entirely without leverage. They say there is “no military solution” though the regime has given no indication that it believes in a solution of any other kind. Meanwhile, pleas from aid agencies and endangered Syrians fall on deaf ears.

Refugees — the only Syrians to have received some assistance — have seen their plight depoliticized, isolated from the terror that forced them to flee.

Today, as Idlib and Afrin burn, the inevitable is unfolding in Ghouta, the huge open-air concentration camp about to enter its fifth year under siege. What happens next is predictable because the same formula has been applied repeatedly over the past seven years. After holding a civilian population hostage, blocking food, medicine, and aid of any kind, the regime bombs the area relentlessly, in particular its medical facilities, until it capitulates. Those who survive are then forced from their homes that are then expropriated for demographic engineering with the aim of creating politically homogeneous geographies.

While there are no longer any illusions about the role of the Security Council, every member state has nevertheless adopted and pledged to uphold the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine under the UN’s Office on Genocide Prevention. The destruction of Syria was preventable, and can now only be ended by the elected and appointed members of democratic bodies if they fulfill their obligations under R2P to protect Syria’s endangered population from war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and what UN war crimes investigators have themselves labeled the “crime of extermination.”

For the agony of the people of Syria to come to an end, this must be forcibly stopped. The perpetrators of these colossal crimes against humanity must be halted, once and for all. There are myriad geopolitical reasons why this is an imperative, but none as immediate and important as the sanctity of life and the exercise of free will. Inaction would reduce these principles to the status of platitudes devoid of all meaning. To their misfortune, Syrians dared to believe in these principles; they dared to believe that while their struggle for dignity was theirs alone, they wouldn’t be abandoned to such a fate in the twenty-first century.

Today, appealing once more to the ethics and the codes of moral conduct on which democracy and international law are built, we ask you to act now to stop the Syrian genocide: demand an immediate ceasefire, an immediate lifting of all sieges, immediate access for relief aid agencies, release of political detainees, and immediate protection for all Syrian lives.

Affiliations, where given, are for the purpose of identification only:

Yassin al-Haj Saleh, writer, Berlin
Robin Yassin-Kassab, writer, Scotland
Rime Allaf, writer and researcher
Mohammad Al Attar, Syrian playwright, Berlin
Michel Kilo, Syrian writer and politician, Paris
Moncef Marzouki, former president of Tunisia
Burhan Ghalioun, Syrian scholar and politician, Paris
Karam Nachar, Syrian writer and academic, Istanbul
Mohammad Ali Atassi, journalist and filmmaker, Beirut 
Ossama Mohammed, filmmaker, Paris
Yasmin Fedda, filmmaker, UK
Fadel Abdul Ghany, chairperson of the Syrian Network for Human Rights
Nisrin Al-Zahre, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris
Nadia Aissaoui, sociologist, Paris
Leila Nachawati Rego, writer, Spain
Yasser Munif, Emerson College
Mohammed Hanif, writer and journalist
Mutaz Al-Khatib, writer, Syria
Hala Mohammad, Syrian poet, Paris
Samih Choukaer, Syrian musician, Paris
Abdul Wahab Badrakhan, journalist, UK
Ammar Abdulhamid, Syrian-American author and activist
Fares Helou, Syrian actor, Paris
Assem Al Basha, Syrian sculptor, Spain
Ibrahim Al-Jabeen, Al-Arab, Germany
Marie-Thérèse Kiriaky, Social Activist
Professor, Martti Koskenniemi, University of Helsinki
Professor Gilbert Achcar, SOAS
Professor Nader Hashemi, University of Denver
Professor François Burgat, L’Institut de Recherches et d’Études sur les Mondes Arabes et Musulmans (IREMAM)
Professor Fawaz A. Gerges, London School of Economics
Professor Joseph Bahout, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Professor Michael Nagler, UC Berkeley
Professor Wendy Pearlman, Northwestern University
Professor Steven Heydemann, Smith College
Professor Joseph E. Schwartzberg, University of Minnesota
Professor Murhaf Jouejati, National Defense University
Professor Lars Chittka, Queen Mary University, London
Professor Amr Al-Azm, Shawnee State University
Professor Ghassan Hage, Melbourne University
Professor Ahmad Barqawi, Palestinian-Syrian
Professor Jamie Mayerfeld, University of Washington
Professor Stephen Zunes, University of San Francisco
Professor Anna Kathrin Bleuler, University of Salzburg
Professor Carola Lentz, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
Professor Love Ekenberg, UNESCO Chair, Stockholm University, Sweden
Professor Annie Sparrow, Icahn School of Medicine, Mount Sinai
Professor James Simpson, Harvard University
Professor Ziad Majed, political scientist, Paris
Haid Haid, Syrian researcher, Chatham House, London
Yassin Swehat, Syrian journalist, Istanbul
Loubna Mrie, Syrian journalist, New York
Rafat Alzakout, theater director and documentary filmmaker, Berlin
Khaldoun Al-Nabwani, writer and scholar, Paris
Ghayath Almadhoun, poet, Palestine, Syria, and Sweden
Subhi Hadidi, writer, Syria and France
Stephen R. Shalom, New Politics
Barry Finger, New Politics
Jason Schulman, New Politics
Omar Kaddour, writer, France
Najati Tayara, writer, Syria and Paris
Marcelle Shehwaro, Syrian activist, Istanbul
Kenan Rahmani, Syrian campaigner
Muhammad Idrees Ahmad, University of Stirling
Lydia Wilson, University of Oxford
Thomas Pierret, researcher, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France
Kelly Grotke, writer and academic, visiting scholar at Cornell University
Danny Postel, Northwestern University
Stephen Hastings-King, writer and researcher, Massachusetts
Anna Nolan, human rights campaigner
Rafif Jouejati, Foundation to Restore Equality and Education in Syria
Mohja Kahf, Syrian-American poet and scholar, US
Rami Jarrah, journalist, Turkey
Shiyam Galyon, Books Not Bombs
Afra Jalabi, Syrian writer, Canada
Miream Salameh, Syrian refugee and visual artist, Melbourne
Şenay Özden, researcher, Istanbul
Faraj Bayrakdar, poet, Stockholm
Hanna Himo, Syrian poet, Stockholm
Theo Horesh, author and journalist, Colorado
Christin Lüttich, political scientist, Berlin
Sarah Hunaidi, writer, Chicago
Véronique Nahoum-Grappe, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, France
Husam Alkatlaby, human rights activist, The Netherlands
Maen al-Bayari‏, journalist, Jordan
Michael Karadjis, Western Sydney University
Stefan Tarnowski, translator
Mutasem Syoufi, The Day After
Najib Ghadbian, scholar and activist
Ammar Abd Rabbo, journalist
Laila Alodaat, lawyer, UK
Fares Albahra, Syrian poet and psychiatrist, Berlin
Paweł Machcewicz, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw
Oz Katerji, journalist
Charles Davis, writer, Los Angeles
Pastor David Tatgenhorst, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
Necati Sönmez, filmmaker, Turkey
Kris Manjapra, fellow, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin; associate professor, Tufts University
Zeynep Kivilcim, Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin
Housamedden Darwish, assistant professor, University of Cologne
Vladimir Tarnopolsky, musician, Russia

A full list of the more than 200 signatories can be found here.

https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/02/27/the-world-must-act-now-on-syria/

Syria's opposition and civil society - which have demanded change for decades - has made it clear what it wants. Are we listening?

One of the oldest, most consistent and most offensive cliches about Syria is that “there is no alternative to Assad".

That regime loyalists would claim such nonsense is a given. But that it would be repeated ad nauseam by various governments and mainstream media is ludicrous, especially when millions of Syrians have now paid the ultimate price for begging to differ.

The Syrian opposition did not magically appear in 2011. Civil society movements have attempted to establish dialogue and demand changes for decades, even knowing full well how this notoriously brutal regime was likely to react.

In fact, much of what happened in the first decade of Bashar Assad’s reign was a precursor to how today’s larger opposition would form itself, because way before the Syrian revolution, there was a Damascus Spring.

The threat of pens

Syrians always had the right to remain silent, and anything they said could and would be used against them, not only in the repressive 1980s and 1990s, but at the turn of the century when the Syrian regime graduated to a new level, becoming the modern era’s first hereditary republic.

On 10 June 2000 - the day “the eternal leader” died - a parliament of minions changed the constitution in minutes to proclaim: Assad is dead, long live Assad. This blatant, formalised inheritance of power left no room for maneuver, but civil society activism persevered nonetheless.

In September 2000, 99 Syrian intellectuals, writers and artists published “The Statement of the 99”, a restrained yet incredibly bold open letter to the regime calling for increased freedoms. Published in Al Hayat and circulated in hushed tones by stunned Syrians, it was ignored by Assad as many of those 99 found themselves invited for the infamous cups of coffee in intelligence buildings.

This warning did not subdue them, and they penned a bolder statement known as “The Basic Document”, this time signed by 1,000 Syrians in January 2001. Demands then were already formulated around the basics of a more democratic and pluralistic system, including freedoms of speech and assembly, democratic practices, open elections, liberation of political detainees, equality of citizens, and independence of the judiciary.

While this document may seem tame in today’s context, it was a phenomenon and a testament to growing political maturity. As always, their pens were a threat to the regime, and in an interview with Asharq Alawsat a few weeks later, Assad claimed that these signatories thought of themselves as elites but represented no one, and that they were either simpletons or foreign agents hurting the country, a leitmotif from which he never veered.

The “simpletons” and “foreign agents” dared to continue with the publication of the “National Social Contract” of April 2001, but Bashar Assad was already killing the Damascus Spring, closing the civil society forums and throwing well known dissidents into jail for “threatening state security".

After relative quiet during the invasion of Iraq, with a state of regime alert palpable all over Syria, the opposition demonstrated its tenacity with its “Damascus Declaration” of October 2005, signed by over 250 figures of whom several ended up in jail.

When hundreds more signed the brave “Beirut-Damascus Declaration” of May 2006, as dissidents were jailed in Damascus and assassinated in Beirut, the regime’s wrath was fully unleashed on those who dared to question its authoritarianism in Syria and beyond.

Hard to miss

These events, and many other details of serious Syrian activism over the years, have been either forgotten or ignored when discussing the travails of the opposition today as it tries to effect change in the most difficult of circumstances. Adding insult to injury, it is often claimed today that “we don’t know what the opposition stands for” or that its commitments to democracy and pluralism are unclear.

Yet, it was those same opposition figures, now joined by a new generation of bloggers, activists and revolutionaries, who helped carry the voice of the uprising to those who were willing to listen in 2011, and whose troves of statements and positions are readily available to anyone willing to read them.

The first major post-uprising document on which most in the Syrian in opposition agreed was the “Cairo Document” of July 2012. In essence, it repeated what Syrian activists had been demanding for years, in very different conditions: democracy, pluralism, equality, good governance and the works.

Further iterations of all these principles and outlines of transition plans have been issued at various stages of the uprising by different formal groups. To name but a few, the Syrian Coalition issued “Basic Principles for a Political Settlement” in February 2014, and the High Negotiations Committee a “Transition Plan” in September 2016.

These documents and others have been tirelessly circulated amongst Syrians, delivered to UN officials and governments, and distributed through mainstream and social media. One would have to try hard to miss them - or to miss the multitude of principles and positions which have been issued by increasingly active civil society groups, demonstrating acumen and commitment.

False logic

As the Syrian opposition’s decades-long civil and political struggle continues, there is much room for improvement in both planning and consensus, and accusations of disunity and lack of cohesion, even from exasperated supporters, are routine.

But Syrians never wanted to replace the regime with another, exchanging one set of leaders with a custom-made alliance supposed to tick everyone’s boxes; the whole point of their struggle, as idealistic as it may have once been, was for transition to an equitable, participative system - not regime change.

Observing the politics of any senate or parliament true to its name is a reminder that democracy can be chaotic, noisy, adversarial and, at times, infuriating. Having only recently found an open stage to air their similarities and differences, should Syrians be treated like minors, made to parrot lines in unison and show good behaviour before they can be considered as part of an alternative to a genocidal regime?

Syrian opposition and civil society groups already agree on the fundamental issues and already commit to a transition to democracy, as they have written and declared repeatedly, a transition which takes into account the integration and adaptation of current state institutions into the new system of governance to which they aspire. Demanding much more of them at this stage neither makes sense, nor saves Syrians from unabated horror.

There are a multitude of reasons why a transition has not yet been approved by those in control, but it is certainly not because there are no alternatives to Assad, and it is certainly not because nobody knows what the opposition’s aspirations are.

https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/there-clear-alternative-assad-say-otherwise-nonsense

Many Syrians would still be alive, safe and home today had there been a response to the Assad regime’s first massive chemical massacre in 2013.

Everyone seems to have misread President Donald Trump, or at least underestimated his capacity for decisive action, considering older statements to be proof of his positions.

Indeed, his tweets to then President Barack Obama appealing that he abstain from striking Assad after the massive chemical massacre of 2013 were understood by most of us as a staunch position on the matter. But Trump was neither in power nor even a politician at that time; inside the Oval Office, perspectives vary, information is precise, and the quality of advisers matters.

For Syrians waiting for an end to the hell raining down on them, two elements positively distanced Trump from his predecessor. Whereas President Obama intended from day one for his legacy to be a nuclear deal with Iran, and intended to do - and more importantly not to do - everything it took to achieve that, President Trump doesn't pretend to know yet what his own specific legacy will be, beyond generally making America great again.

Apart from a solid opposition to the Iran deal, he has no claim to eventual fame in the tumultuous Middle East.

And whereas President Obama was too arrogant to admit he was ever wrong, even after his infamous red-line inaction resulted in doubling the number of Syrian victims, unleashing a flood of refugees from Syria, and allowing the Islamic State (IS) to strengthen, Trump's own legendary ego nevertheless left room for what he described as flexibility, admitting that something changed his mind.

Whether it was really upon seeing new images of Syrian children choking to death, or whether purely upon consultation with his senior advisers, Trump did not hesitate to change course on Syria - even if it meant going back on his word.

Russia misread

President Trump did in two days what his predecessor failed to do in six years: he showed clarity of purpose when the occasion called for direct action, an action whose consequences have yet to be determined.

An abundance of commentators had warned repeatedly that eventual US attacks against the Assad regime would bring great catastrophe, including direct conflict with Russia, a complication of the war, and more Syrian civilian deaths, a matter supposedly of great concern to the suddenly vocal "Hands Off Syria" crowd which remained silent when Russian bombs tore Syrians to shreds.

But if this doomsday scenario has not materialised, it is possibly because it is Russia which misread Trump and his advisers the most.

For all the experts waxing poetic about President Vladimir Putin's chess-master qualities and his alleged cunning, Russia was left with no option but to stand aside while the US carried out its punitive strike on Assad's assets. Usually well-spoken and calm Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, could only give a disjointed, moot statement suspending cooperation with the US in Syrian airspace.

And Russia’s strange, rather lame sudden recognition of West Jerusalem as Israel's capital on Thursday took even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by surprise. When push came to shove, Russia was impotent and immobile; the presence of a smiling Chinese President Xi Jinping at Trump's dinner table shortly after the strike was ordered merely added to the humiliation.

Five factors to consider

None of this means that Russia remains without options next time, nor indeed that there may be a next time. But this week's developments have exposed a number of factors which can't be brushed aside again. They are on the table.

First, Assad's blatant renewed use of chemical weapons demonstrates that Russia is either unable or unwilling - or both - to rein him in. As Secretary of State Rex Tillerson bluntly stated: "Clearly Russia has failed in its responsibility. Either Russia has been complicit or either Russia has been simply incompetent in its ability to deliver on its end of that agreement."

Second, the fact that the Assad regime did not hand over all of its chemical arsenal means that someone still has to rid him of it. According to National Security Advisor General HR McMaster, the US strike was targeted to avoid a storage unit that was stockpiling the nerve agent in order to protect civilians.

Third, in contrast to the Obama administration's attempts to minimise the strike that never was, the Trump administration is neither shy nor apologetic about its actions: "This was not a small strike," McMaster said.

Fourth, while the strike was a response to the specific use of chemicals, it is hard to envisage that the Trump administration will retreat from condemning, and possibly acting on mass killings by other means in Syria. Statements from various cabinet members have indicated a much stronger involvement that initially planned.

Finally, the surprise reshuffle in the National Security Council and the removal of Steve Bannon from it, days before the US took action against Assad, seems to have finally placed the right advisers at their rightful places, giving studied and measured assessments.

It is the presence of McMaster, and that of General James Mattis at the head of the Pentagon, which is likely to have shaped President Trump's swift action. Both these senior military advisors happen to have remarkable acumen and experience in Middle East matters in particular; while their personal positions on Syria are not yet public, their history in the region implies an understanding that fighting IS while ignoring the Assad regime would be counterproductive, especially when Islamist extremists use Western inaction as rallying cries.

The right signals

In one fell swoop, President Trump's strike on Assad has exposed the limits of Russian bravado and revived the notion of a coalition to change the status quo.

While he did not repeat the empty "Assad has to go" mantra, Trump's address to the nation, calling "on all civilised nations to join us in seeking to end the slaughter and bloodshed in Syria" seems to be a sign that the US is, finally, reclaiming a leadership position under the careful guidance of able and experienced military advisors.

Many Syrians would still be alive, safe and home today had there been a response to the Assad regime's first massive chemical massacre in 2013. While Trump cannot undo the damage, his administration has now signalled it is both able and ready to solve the conflict. 

http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/it-took-trump-two-days-do-what-obama-never-would-1009440608

Six years of inaction have simply allowed the Assad regime to continue its crimes. But donor states can act now to give Syrian children a future.

In the age of innocence of their revolution, Syrians observed with hope and trepidation every international meeting convening to discuss their fate. “Friends of Syria” and co-sponsors of peace talks, it was initially expected, would at least have their own best interests at heart and put an end to the Assad regime’s merciless brutality, if only to stop Syrians from seeking refuge beyond their crowded borders. That was the theory.

In practice, international policy turned out to be one of irresponsible laissez-faire for Bashar al-Assad and his backers, on a political, military and economic level with disastrous consequences for countries near and far. These six years of deliberate inaction have borne fruit, resulting in more than half a million Syrians dead, millions maimed and wounded, and well over half the population displaced.

The magnitude of challenges facing Syrians today beggars belief, and yet this week’s Brussels conference will probably not deviate much from previous exercises in futility. If anything, regional and global powerhouses are distancing themselves ever further from notions of political transitions, let alone of accountability and justice for crimes against humanity.

Dealing with the Islamic State while letting Assad be Assad is the bizarre new modus operandi, under the guise of damage control; this allows an emboldened regime, protected by Russia, to escalate its murderous campaign, even with chemical weapons supposedly confiscated under the 2013 deal, on the very day the Brussels meeting appeals again for peace talks.

This seventh year of war portends adjustments to prevailing declared positions: ideally, Syrian dust - and skeletons - would be swept under the proverbial rug, safe zones yet to be defined or designated would magically absorb millions of endangered Syrians, rubble in select areas would make way for new and improved crony capitalist infrastructure, and hurried, basic social dwellings would house forcibly displaced people.

After premature self-congratulatory speeches, the Syria problem would be declared - mostly - fixed. In other words, madness.

First, do nothing

Depoliticising the conflict, emphasising the danger of the Islamic State while downplaying that of the far more lethal ongoing Assad regime killing machine, sanctioning Iran and Russia’s sponsorship of demographic change and forced population displacement, and considering reconstruction in these circumstances is not only political cowardice of the highest order, but above all an unworkable and self-defeating strategy.

Moreover, it will do practically nothing to relieve the issue of utmost concern to our beacons of freedom and democracy: the problem of refugees. Overwhelmed aid agencies have sounded increasingly strident alarms about present conditions, but assessments of a frightening near future don’t seem to have sunk in. Without immediate and concerted action, the refugee problem will intensify, not recede.

There are well over six million Syrian refugees abroad, and at least seven million displaced inside their own country. A very large number of these current 13-plus million refugees are children.

The vast majority of these children are now illiterate, having received no formal education for years. Even those who had initial basic literacy have mostly forgotten the little they knew, and there is neither the will nor the infrastructure to change this so far.

The vast majority of these children live in abject misery, in tents, in ruins, in dirt, in hell and in high water. Whether in the few agency-run camps or the more numerous makeshift ones, in urban areas ravaged by Assad or in scattered pockets in the region, aid is insufficient and irregular.

The vast majority of these children are forced to beg or to work in unacceptable conditions, or are idle and roaming around aimlessly, unsupervised and unprotected.

The vast majority of these children are in urgent need of professional help, of physical and mental health care, of structure and purpose, and of formal education. These children are bored, frustrated, tired, angry, traumatised, depressed, and abandoned to their fate.

Mathematical certainty

As these children turn into teens and young adults in physical and psychological isolation, they will find only a couple of outlets to unleash their frustrations: sex, and religion. Syrians already had a high population growth rate, and forced exile and dispossession has triggered a drastic increase in underage marriages.

If this trend is not reversed, today’s illiterate children will marry illiterate children like them, together procreating their own children who will be illiterate like their young parents, with only rigid and charged religious teachings to impart some meaning to their miserable lives.

This explosive mixture is not a worst-case scenario: it is a mathematical certainty.

So as so-called realists begin to sketch a map of a “useful” Syria to be rebuilt and of a “useless” one to be allowed to die, and as they begin vague plans for “safe zones” (which, after years of claims that no-fly-zones and humanitarian corridors were impossible, may well be politically correct terms for de facto ghettos), what is in store for these millions of refugees?

Will they be willing to “return” to such misery, or will they be forcibly transferred to these zones in yet more green buses, possibly unleashing a desperate massive new exodus across the Mediterranean?

The alternative to doing nothing

There are more questions than answers as the time bomb ticks, but some actions need not wait for a comprehensive solution to the Syrian tragedy. There is already much the international donor community should have done and can still do, if only to confront the threats facing refugee children.

It is possible for every single government with an international aid programme to commit to undertake in full the cost and the logistics of educating an agreed number of children in specific areas, sketching this map before all others in collaboration with aid agencies.

It is possible for each of these governments to rapidly erect simple and cheap on-site schools connected to water, electricity and internet. It is possible to provide books, cheap computers and school accessories for these children. It is possible for education experts and Syrian civil society specialists to develop a basic curriculum - for all Syrian children - that can make up for lost time and cover new ground as they learn to write, to count, to think and to programme. It is possible to send teams of qualified instructors to train educated Syrians to become teachers themselves.

It is possible to teach these children not only academics but also, importantly, civics. It is possible to create a system of school twinning (in the spirit of town twinning), to connect Syrian children with students in donor countries, adding cultural exchange to benefit both. It is possible to teach these children skills and give them a fighting chance to live a decent life once their country is able to turn the page and to rebuild itself.

Political considerations and bureaucratic red tape are often used to justify inaction, but donor countries have both the interest and the capacity to make the possible happen. Rescuing an otherwise lost generation is not just a magnanimous action for Syrians’ sake, but an initial contribution to defusing an explosive refugee problem.

There has always been an alternative to laissez-faire; it’s as simple as ABC.

http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/defusing-child-refugee-time-bomb-lit-syria-648477674

Many more Syrians were killed by Assad and Putin yesterday than there were MPs who bothered to attend what was clearly mislabelled an “emergency” debate on Aleppo. If this is how the House of Commons deliberates on emergencies, it’s a shame for issues less urgent than live genocide.

Nevertheless, one would have hoped that quality would trump quantity, even with the expectation that the devil’s advocates would go out of their way to absolve criminals from responsibility for the carnage in Syria. Indeed, since Ed Miliband’s shameful posturing after the August 2013 chemical massacre, most Labour MPs continue to disgrace themselves by refusing to denounce Assad’s – let alone Russia’s – massively documented war crimes. Jeremy Corbyn and Stop The War’s deafening silence on Syria speaks volumes when compared to their outrage to Israeli bombings.

But members of a government whose declared policy is to stop the Assad regime were expected to do better than foreign secretary Boris Johnson saying he would “like to see demonstrations outside the Russian embassy.” As bombs continue to obliterate Syria, Whitehall, Westminster and Downing Street seem to have adopted a new doctrine of phoney outrage which had hitherto been a speciality of the so-called resistance front dictatorships. When the US bombed an al-Qaida camp in northeast Syria in 2008, Assad closed down the American School of Damascus and ordered demonstrations - because that will show them.

Many Syrians were crushed when MPs voted to deny a small Kindertransport for a mere 3,000 unaccompanied children. As pitiful a spectacle as that debate was, it left some feeble hope that Britain would strive to do more to protect these Syrian children’s lives, precisely so they wouldn’t need to seek shelter elsewhere. That hope dissipates with every empty declaration reassuring Assad and his allies that nothing, absolutely nothing, will be done to halt their aggression.

All that remains to complete this theatre of the absurd is for Johnson to suggest that people organise candle-lit vigils while singing Kumbaya to help the people of Syria. But Johnson is tragically wrong: the wells of outrage on Syria are not growing exhausted. Rather, what grows are wells of outrage at powerful nations’ inaction in the face of this century’s greatest catastrophe.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/12/how-should-uk-respond-syria-crisis

Syria's leader knows that the toothless talks of Geneva I and II give him the ideal cover to continue terrorising the population

There is nothing Bashar al-Assad's regime loves more than a process, and the international community has just delivered one that could maintain the status quo inside Syria indefinitely. It is undoubtedly better to talk than to fight, but nothing about the Geneva II talks between the Syrian regime and the opposition portends an outcome that would relieve the suffering of the Syrian people, or begin to end the war.

Had Geneva truly been an attempt to resolve the Syrian stalemate, influential nations would have insisted on the regime's adherence to the basic recommendations of the Geneva I talks in 2012, including the provision of humanitarian aid, the release of prisoners of conscience, and the cessation of Assad's relentless air strikes on civilians. These have continued to be a basic demand of the Syrian opposition; but since Geneva I Assad has increased his assault and even imposed new draconian blockades on the most helpless of people in vast areas of Syria's major cities, including the Palestinian refugee camp of Yarmouk. In greater Damascus, Homs and Aleppo, people are starving to death as the world watches.

Assad believes he has time on his side. With the political, financial and military backing of powerful global actors such as Russia and Iran, and with the reluctance of the US and its allies to engage in more than vapid condemnations or declarations of intent, he can continue to terrorise most of the population into submission. Simultaneously, the regime can allow itself to be engaged in an endless process – or so it hopes.

For its part, the opposition Syrian National Coalition came to Geneva under duress, after warnings that even the meagre non-lethal aid provided by western countries would dry up if it refused to participate in what most Syrians opposed to Assad believe is an elaborate charade. Expectations were not really low: they were non-existent.

Nevertheless, the diplomatic process has delivered some surprises. For one, the Syrian regime's delegation exasperated even its Russian backer with belligerent statements and a disrespectful flouting of the meeting's protocol; the abusive and obnoxious speech by the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Muallem, was in particular received very poorly. In contrast, the president of the national coalition, Ahmad Jarba, was rational and constructive, impressing even the most sceptical of watchers.

While Assad's delegation launched into absurd tirades, hysterical interviews and petty time-wasting tactics during various encounters with the media, the coalition's outreach was disciplined and open-minded. Most importantly, for the international community and Syrians of all persuasions, the meeting proved a few points. First, by agreeing to the process, the Assad regime has recognised that there is a formal, organised opposition, and that the uprising is not the global conspiracy or the terrorist invasion it has always claimed.

Second, by discussing issues such as prisoner exchanges, the regime has recognised that this opposition is the only political entity capable of co-ordinating with the Free Syrian Army, and that the foreign Islamist factions in Syria, therefore, have no relation with either the opposition or the Free Syrian Army.

On these fronts, the Syrian regime's propaganda has been exposed, and the national coalition has managed to call the regime's bluff, demonstrating more political maturity than many expected. Even those anti-Assad activists who are notoriously critical of the formal opposition have been generally supportive of its delegation to Switzerland.

But if this toothless process goes on for months, if not years, the regime will continue to pound the country. Meanwhile, the rebels will continue to fight back not only against Assad's forces, but against Isis (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) brigades as well, which have been left to roam unhindered, and even encouraged, by Assad.

Regardless of the propaganda, the fact remains that the vast majority of rebels took up arms against Assad to join defecting soldiers who refused to turn their weapons on the population. Once Assad is gone, there is no reason to believe that these soldiers will not go back to being regular soldiers, and that civilians will not go back to rebuilding their lives, with the help of the increasingly confident civil society organisations that continue to carve a socioeconomic and political role in the midst of all this destruction.

The worst thing the international community could do is push talks for the sake of talks, to wash its hands of the problem that is Syria. Leaving the catastrophe to sort itself out in Geneva's corridors while continuing to refuse more direct engagement merely empowers Assad in the long run, and pushes his opponents further into a zero-sum calculation. Geneva would then be doing more harm than good to Syria, leaving Assad and his followers with the delusions that he is invincible and an irreplaceable partner in Syria.

With the immensity and the monstrosity of the crimes he has committed against the entire nation, including the minorities he purports to protect, it beggars belief that anyone could push for a solution that would keep Assad in power, even partly, even temporarily.

It is up to the international community to ensure that Geneva doesn't remain a mere process if it is serious, as most Syrians are, about ending the war.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/26/geneva-peace-process-bashar-al-assad-syria

After nearly three years of empty international condemnations, and generalities about the alleged complexity of the Syrian situation, the Assad regime continues to savagely repress both peaceful and armed opponents, hoping to terrorize them all back into submission. In this, Assad has been helped not only by the generosity and assistance of his allies, but also by the incompetence and cowardice of his presumed critics.

Even with foreign extremists playing an increasing role in the conflict, the fact remains that most Syrians are fleeing into neighboring countries in increasing numbers mainly because of the regime’s massive military and air campaign. Yet, ridiculous claims that things will get worse if Assad goes continue to circulate, while planted leaks now test the grotesque idea of his remaining in power even after Geneva.

To Syria’s great misfortune, Responsibility to Protect was never on the international agenda. But to contain the Syrian situation, the Geneva charade can’t resume without decisions to make a serious change.

We don’t need a referendum to know that most Syrians want the carnage to stop immediately. Most realize, however, that violence won’t end if the Assad clan is allowed to stay as a de facto winner, continuing to impose collective punishments on those guilty of nothing more than civil disobedience or intellectual opposition. This would push armed opposition even more to a “death or liberty” mode, straight into the arms of better-organized extremists.

The false dichotomy of Assad or the current opposition (or worse, of Assad or the extremists) has forced many Syrians into making a choice. But the vibrant civil society which has flourished in spite of – or perhaps because of – the war presents a third option of transition to reconciliation and justice on an equal platform of citizenship, led by independent Syrians with no blood on their hands, empowered by real international support.

Today, the two safest buildings in Syria are the presidential palace in Damascus and the headquarters of the militant ISIS in Raqqa. If the United State and Russia don’t cut their wings, there will be no containment of the catastrophe until both sets of warlords have left those buildings.

https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/12/21/for-peace-in-syria-will-assad-have-to-stay/syrian-war-victims-want-no-one-with-blood-on-their-hands

Instead of pushing to end the conflict, the Geneva conference looks more like a US ploy for endless talks.

A group of foreign ministers declared last week that Bashar al-Assad "would not have a role in Syria" when a transitional governing body was established to move the country forward. For all the media excitement over the announcement, this Friends of Syria grouping merely reiterated a basic condition of the Syrian National Coalition, the main political opposition group, recognised by more than 100 countries as "the legitimate representative of the Syrian people".

The public sidelining of Assad was a mere formality while efforts continue to convince the opposition not only to remain united in a single delegation, but to show up at an international conference in Geneva on 23 November. With many earlier promises still unfulfilled, Syrians opposed to Assad are used to lowering their expectations from the international community – but there are limits, and many are troubled by the current plans.

Instead of demanding an unconditional ceasefire, a lifting of Assad's sieges on civilian areas and immediate access to humanitarian aid agencies, the Friends of Syria merely suggest the regime should take "confidence-building measures" before the talks. Meanwhile, without real international pressure, the Assad regime – which has Russia's full support – continues to regard Geneva as a PR platform on which it will make deals with what it calls the "patriotic opposition" (small groups outside the mainstream opposition), which it has been nurturing so that when the times comes it can pretend it is reforming.

But if there is no push towards a real political transition and, more important, a cessation of hostilities, there is little point in the meeting – especially when the decisions of the first such conference over a year ago (Geneva I) are yet to be applied. So why so much lobbying by so many international powers?

Clearly, the US is desperate to move the Syria file off its desk and to pass it elsewhere – crucially, not to a specific entity, but to a process. After the Assad regime's chemical massacre and President Obama's backtracking on his declared red lines, Washington is eager to avoid future situations that could lead to calls for its direct involvement. It hopes to internationalise diplomatic efforts and lock everyone into unlimited rounds of talks, while paying lip service to the need for transition. But Obama's "no more wars" position will merely allow others to fuel the conflict, and make the world more vulnerable.

Let's be clear, most Syrians remain horrified by the prospect of US military engagement; they expected a diplomatic one, and the application of the UN's responsibility to protect initiative. Yet without tangible support for Syria's battered population and the opposition, Assad has been unhindered in his simple strategy of brute force until total victory, sustained by military intervention from Russia, Iran and their respective militias.

All hell has broken loose in Syria, with jihadist groups competing with the regime in savagery as both unleash attacks on revolutionaries and opponents. People are begging for a solution, but all the Obama administration seems to be seeking in Geneva is a process for the sake of a process, akin to the infamous Palestinian-Israeli Oslo process engaging two far from equal parties to negotiate interminably without ever reaching a deal.

An Oslo-style engagement would suit Assad very well, but his aspirations have graduated to something even better: in Geneva, the Syrian regime is looking for a new Taef agreement (the deal that ended Lebanon's civil war to the Assad regime's advantage), giving it free rein over the immediate region while undertaking cosmetic reform by placing token figures of the "patriotic opposition" in inconsequential government positions.

For many Syrians, either of these options would be catastrophic after two and a half years of utter misery; to close this painful page of their history, rebuild and move on without this brutal regime, many are now seeking their own version of the Dayton agreement, which brought peace to Bosnia.

But with Assad and his allies thinking Taef, and with Obama leading his allies towards Oslo, there will be no chance for a Dayton. Without international pressure on Russia to stop facilitating Assad's murderous reign, there may be a Geneva process – but no Geneva agreement.

For all Obama's platitudes about the world's responsibilities, it is the US foremost that has the power, interest and obligation to help bring justice and peace to Syria and end the conflict. Real friends of Syria would break Assad's siege, neutralise his air power, and convince Syrian people and revolutionaries alike that there is hope in Geneva, that a transition is imminent, that the nightmare is ending. Anything less than that merely pushes Syrians into further despair, and the region into even greater instability.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/27/syrian-peace-process-geneva-conference

In August, when President Obama first stated that Bashar al-Assad's use of chemical weapons would be a "red line," the message to Assad was loud and clear: Everything else was permissible.

More than three months and many more thousands of Syrian victims later, Obama has inexplicably reiterated this objection. But by warning against the use of chemical weapons, he has once again merely reassured Assad that barrel bombs, missiles, cluster bombs and bullets are acceptable tools to slaughter his people.

What could have been interpreted as political caution in a pre-election climate must be considered in a different context now that Obama has settled comfortably into his second term. In fact, his latest statement sounds rather like a promise: If Assad doesn’t change the current parameters, the U.S. won’t either.

Semantics aside, it is clear that his refusal to increase pressure on the Assad regime, which many had expected would happen in November, means that Obama is encouraging the status quo. Indeed, the only pressure the U.S. seems to have been exerting recently has been on its allies.

The U.S. has done everything it could to impede actions that could have tipped the balance against Assad. From urging its Gulf allies to refrain from arming the resistance, to holding back a fellow NATO member, Turkey, from responding even when the Assad regime shot one of its fighter jets, to refusing to immediately recognize the coalition that the Syrian opposition finally managed to put together, every overt or covert U.S. action has been a protraction of its first response to the uprising, in March 2011. This is when the secretary of state, Hillary Rodham Clinton, said members of Congress had described Assad as a reformer, just days after the massacre of dozens of peaceful demonstrators.

Far from being indecisive on Syria, the U.S. has demonstrated that it is consistent, albeit with a questionable rationale, when it comes to letting Syrians fight it out among themselves before deciding to swoop in, perhaps, when the country is at a breaking point. With most cities destroyed beyond recognition, with some five million refugees and displaced Syrians, with hundreds of thousands disappeared in Assad’s jails and well over 40,000 killed by the regime, and with extremist factions fighting their own battles to boot, it seems that we are now close to such a breaking point.

Could this explain the sudden buzz about chemical weapons? It is peculiar that the U.S. would still rely on the "weapons of mass destruction" line, à la Iraq, to justify intervention of some kind after having lost the moral high ground and allowed the bloodshed to continue unhindered. If the U.S. were counting on eventually playing a leading role at this late stage, it should have factored in Syrians’ current reactions. Whether by design or by mistake, the Obama administration has diminished any influence over Syrians it once had.

Syrians fighting the regime were at first perplexed by Obama’s attitude. With time, they have become more indignant and more determined. Oddly, it was the realization that no help would come without U.S. approval that gave revolutionaries their impetus, bringing the battle to the regime’s ultimate stronghold, Damascus. After the brutality he unleashed all over the country, the horror Assad will try to impose on the capital is certain to reach unimaginable levels. Had the U.S. allowed others to help restrain Assad, the outcome could have been different.

Russia and Iran have actively supported the Assad regime, but the U.S. allowed the massacre to go on. On Monday, Obama said: "Today I want to make it absolutely clear to Assad and those under his command: The world is watching." Indeed, as Syrians fight for survival, the world is watching -- and forming its own opinions.

https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/12/05/recognizig-the-opposition-in-syria/the-us-is-offering-too-little-too-late-on-syria

The reports from Syria of the journalist Robert Fisk raise serious questions over his credibility, say Yassin Al Haj Saleh & Rime Allaf.

The international media has not always been kind to Syria’s revolutionary people. For months on end, many of the latter turned themselves into instant citizen-journalists to document their uprising and the violent repression of the Syrian regime, loading clips and photos taken from their mobile-phones to various social networks; still, the established media, insinuating that only it could really be trusted, covered these events with an ever-present disclaimer that these images could not be independently verified. Since the Damascus regime was refusing to allow more than a trickle of foreign media personnel into the country, chaperoned by the infamous minders, what the Syrians themselves were reporting was deemed unreliable.

Nevertheless, an increasing number of brave journalists dared to sneak into Syria at great personal risk, reporting the same events which activists had attempted to spread to the world. For the most part, experienced journalists were perfectly capable of distinguishing between straight propaganda from a regime fighting for its survival and real information from a variety of other sources. Overwhelmingly, ensuing reports about Syria gave a voice to "the other side" or at least quoted opposing points of view, if only for balance. In some cases, journalists found no room to cater for the regime’s claims, especially when reporting from civilian areas under relentless attack by Bashar al-Assad's forces.

It was from the wretched Homs district of Baba Amr, under siege and shelling for an entire month, that the late Marie Colvin, amongst others, testified on the eve of her death under the regime’s shells about the "sickening situation" and the "merciless disregard for the civilians who simply cannot escape." Like her, most of those who managed to get into Syria have testified about the regime’s repression of a popular uprising, even after the latter evolved to include an armed rebellion.

The Daraya massacre

Robert Fisk, a seasoned war correspondent who has covered the region for decades, surprisingly broke a mould, gradually allowing himself to become a part, and not simply a witness, of the Syrian regime’s propaganda campaign.

On 30 October 2011, Fisk - who works for the Independent newspaper, and whose reports are widely republished - was a guest of Syrian state television for an extended interview during which his legendary directness seemed subdued, as he meekly advised his host that he feared the Syrian authorities were running out of time to turn the situation around. In an article entirely dedicated to Bouthaina Shaban, one of Assad’s advisors, he quoted some of her extraordinary tales without adding one of his trademark comments: thus, he didn’t challenge the claim that a Christian baker in Homs was accused (supposedly by the extremists the regime says are leading the uprising) of mixing whisky in the bread.

Over the last few months, Fisk’s pieces on Syria have consisted more of commentary than of reporting, with a growing emphasis on the conspiracy scenario as he reminds readers that the governments criticising the Assad regime were themselves hardly examples of freedom or democracy. This is indeed true in many cases, but is not directly relevant to the Syrian people’s uprising, which moreover he increasingly reports in the sectarian terminology he had previously criticised when covering the invasion and occupation of Iraq.

But even copious editorialising of this nature could not have heralded Fisk’s shocking decision to embed with the Syrian regime’s armed forces, when he had previously stated (on 22 January 2003) that "war reporters should not cosy up to the military". In Syria, Fisk embedded first in Aleppo with the commander of operations in the embattled city, and then in Damascus and its suburbs under attack by the regime. In particular, his piece on Daraya’s gruesome massacre has shocked many Syrians.

In his article of 29 August 2012, Fisk relates that an alleged exchange of prisoners was being negotiated between the regime and rebels in Daraya; when talks failed, he explains, regime forces had no choice but to storm the town, an attack during which several hundred inhabitants were killed. In Fisk’s account, however, there is no room for even the possibility that they were killed by security forces; on the contrary, his narration consistently points to "rebel" snipers. Fisk even reveals that a mortar-round landed on a large military base in Damascus from which he set out, "possibly fired from Daraya itself" (from the rebels, the reader may assume); and that the rebels supposedly attacked the armoured vehicle in which Fisk had "cosied up" with officers of the elite Assad army while driving through Daraya. Likewise, he ascribes to rebels the stormed homes, broken utensils, burned carpets and confiscated computer parts, speculating that these were "to use as working parts for bombs, perhaps?"

All the firing he describes is never attributed to the regime’s armed forces which stormed the town, but to the Free Syrian Army which he implies is the only violent party; nor does the Free Syrian Army seem to have a cause or a logical reason, from its perspective at least, to carry out such violent actions.

Daraya’s Local Coordination Committee (LCC), commenting on this article, points out that Fisk met with neither opposition nor activists while there (nor, for that matter, at any other time). And after days of our liaising with Daraya friends, activists and inhabitants, it is clear that nobody has even heard of this prisoner-exchange story which Fisk attributes to people there.

Furthermore, what could the relation be between this alleged failed prisoner-exchange and the massacre? And why would fighters in the opposition kill inhabitants of a town that is one of the centres of the Syrian revolution because of this supposed exchange? Fisk presents no explanation for that, limiting himself to showing that the Free Syrian Army fighters were responsible for this failure, in contrast to the regime’s forces which (according to the testimony of the officer in charge with whom Fisk was embedded) went out of their way to free hostages before storming the town. Claims that the Daraya victims were relatives of government employees - including a postman killed simply because he was such an employee - are equally quoted without sourcing.

This account closely resembles the regime’s tale about the Houla massacre in May 2012, whereby the victims of Houla were also said to be regime supporters killed because they were relatives of a member of parliament. It is known today that this is pure invention, and that the massacre - as confirmed by the United Nations human-rights inquiry - was carried out by the regime’s armed forces and shabbiha (armed gangs). Is it possible that this embedded journalist’s source about the new massacre is the same "temple of truth" who had revealed facts of the governmental enquiry committee on the Houla massacre?

As in Houla, the story that the massacre victims were somehow related to regime or government members is false. Furthermore, Fisk manages to say nothing about the five-day long shelling of Daraya, as is the regime’s norm before storming a town; nor does he even give the correct number of fully documented victims (which is nearly double the 245 he quotes).

It seems incredible that Fisk cannot imagine that Daraya’s inhabitants could be too afraid of the regime’s forces, infamous since decades for their exceptional criminal capacity, to tell him who actually killed those victims. Indeed, Daraya LCC’s trusted sources from the field-hospital confirmed that a regime sniper killed the parents of Hamdi Koreitem, named by Fisk, and that they also shot Khaled Yehia Zukari’s wife and daughter.

The prison visit

As if being embedded on the day of the Daraya massacre wasn’t enough, Fisk had no objection to being taken to a jail (more likely one of the regime’s intelligence centres) where he was presented with four detained "jihadists" - two Syrians, a Frenchman of Algerian origin, and a Turk - accused of various terrorism charges, including a bombing in March 2012. While they all sat in the bureau of the officer in charge, the prisoners proceeded to tell Fisk the kind of stories the regime had been spreading for months. At a certain point, Fisk asked the officer to leave, which after mild prompting he did, just like that. Alone with their interviewer, who was allowed to offer them chicken and chips, the terrorists answered his questions, shared their stories, and informed Fisk that they had only been subject to bad treatment (but not torture) on the first day of their imprisonment; one had even received family visitors. A situation which few other prisoners in Syria, let alone Islamists or terrorists, can dream of.

As each of the men explained his specific case to Fisk, it may be wondered if he marvelled at the incredible good fortune of meeting jihadists who fitted the exact profile the Syrian regime has painted of those sowing havoc in the country. Indeed, the terrorists explained they had turned to jihad because of indoctrination in Turkey or Afghanistan, because of Al-Jazeera’s incitement, because of some sectarian sheikh’s hate-mongering, and (last but not least) because the Emir of Qatar was stirring revolution in Syria.

It is notable that Fisk neglects to mention how the visit came about, who organised it for him, or even why he thinks he was the chosen one for this largesse from a regime known to ban, jail and kill journalists (sixty-two killed so far while covering the Syrian revolution, including citizen-journalists). Nor does he give much thought to the possibility that he was brought to these detainees (if they really were detainees and not acting on the intelligence service’s orders) because they would say precisely what suited the regime. But everything repeated by Fisk toes the regime’s propaganda line: Syrian revolutionaries are terrorists, foreign fighters are among them, many are thieves, rapists and murderers, all have been influenced by the conspirators. It is understandable that the regime would want to say this, but it is not understandable why Fisk would say it, or why he wouldn’t be suspicious of being taken for a ride.

One of the co-authors of this article [Yassin] spent many years in jail in Syria on charges much less serious than those of these terrorists, but no foreign or local journalist visited me or hundreds of my acquaintances and friends who have been detained for decades. From my personal experience of intelligence in jails, I assume that the director of the jail Fisk visited felt that the journalist was "one of us", and would be impressed at the regime’s capacity to gain such support. What is also strange is that Fisk, whose requests seem to be heard in Damascus, did not ask to visit his peers, such as journalist and human-rights activist Mazen Darwish, who was allowed no visits from his young wife or any of his relatives after nearly seven months of detention; or his colleague Hussein Ghreir, who left behind him a young wife and two children; or Yehia Shurbaji, who could inform him about the realities of his home town of Daraya.

Perhaps Fisk’s good relations with the regime will allow him to visit other jails, overflowing with tens of thousands of detainees, prisoners of conscience, denied their freedom for having demanded the right to free expression and choice. This would certainly be a journalistic exclusive; they are no less in need of chicken and chips than the detained jihadists, and the stories they would tell would give him a much more reliable account of the Syrian revolution.

In Syria, Robert Fisk has done what he long admonished other reporters for doing. Is it because he has fallen under the spell of the regime, has become indoctrinated or has suddenly lost his instincts? Or has he become a willing accessory to the Assad regime’s propaganda, if only for the sake of being in a league of his own?

The first casualty of war isn’t truth, it’s helpless civilians, and Robert Fisk has forsaken both.

https://www.opendemocracy.net/yassin-al-haj-saleh-rime-allaf/syria-dispatches-robert-fisks-independence

Syrians are approaching the first anniversary of one of the most unexpected implosions of people power and psychological liberations the region has seen. But they have yet to experience the exhilaration of watching a dictator flee the country or be forced to resign.

One year ago, as Syrians saw the fast pace of the Tunisian and the Egyptian popular uprisings, most knew that if they ever were to face the same situation, they would pay a much heavier price and that the regime would not hesitate to mow them down in order to keep the Assad dynasty in place. Having already lived through one of the most vicious massacres in modern history, the Syrian populace knew that the ruling clique would just as easily do another Hama, possibly more, to keep its grasp on the country.

Save for a few die-hard civil society activists and intellectuals who kept banging on the drums of freedom, continuously paying with their own freedom for this lèse-majesté, most Syrians became realists by necessity. By seemingly letting bygones become bygones, and by humoring the regime with odes to its empty rhetoric about the Assad du jour’s eternal leadership, they thought they were buying themselves a slow but sure upgrade to a less stifling life, at the discretion of a corrupt and power-mad clique.

This was, in many ways, a reverse Faustian bargain, with the regime getting the power and the people getting the scraps – socially, economically and politically. As incredible as it may sound in this revolutionary era, Syrians felt they had no choice but to coax the regime into complacence in order so that they could breathe.

This de facto pact could have survived beyond the revolutionary era, had it not been for the arrest and torture of 15 schoolchildren in Daraa, triggering an uprising that spread through Syria. As their indignation finally manifested itself, the deal fell through as people’s demands for justice and dignity were met with live fire, and as brute force once again erased all pretense of civility.

What few people expected in the midst of this unprecedented situation was that the traditional pillars of regime support would extend beyond the security and party forces; surprisingly, a portion of the population declared its allegiance to the regime even as it went on a rampage, parroting age-old dire premonitions of civil strife and national disintegration should the regime fall. In the grips of a previously undetected Stockholm syndrome, the regime faithful are now chanting “after Bashar, the deluge!”

The regime accomplices’ cheering as it unleashed unequalled brute force against a mostly defenseless population have certainly bought it some time, as have powerful allies who blocked an Arab League proposal with humanitarian and political lifelines. Likewise, the disarray of opposition forces unable to find a way out of the maze after 40 years of dictatorship only adds to the indecisiveness of the powers who could made a difference. But all these factors are stumbling blocks that merely slow down the liberation of a determined population.

It doesn’t matter how much support Bashar al-Assad’s regime still commands, nor does it ultimately matter why his fans still cling on to the illusion of his ability to remain in power. The regime has gone on a killing, torturing and jailing spree for nearly a year, and is still unable to crush the resistance that has now begun to arm itself and to exercise self-defense. It is a matter of time, and it is unclear how the transition will be achieved, but the majority of Syrians are sure of one thing: we have reached the end of an era.

Rime Allaf, a Syrian writer, is an associate fellow at Chatham House in London. She is on Twitter as @rallaf.

https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/02/06/is-assads-time-running-out/this-time-assad-has-overreached

On January 10, while President Bashar Assad addressed his supporters in Damascus, Syrian authorities handed the tiny tortured body of a four-month old baby girl to her uncle in Homs. Arrested with her parents a few days earlier, one can only assume, knowing the Syrian regime's documented brutality, that baby Afaf had been thrown into a cell with her mother and submitted to horrific treatment, terrorizing her and her mother and leading to her untimely death.

In its violent repression of the uprising, the Syrian regime has made no distinction between men and women or between adults and children. There has been equality in oppressing, and equality in suffering. But there has also been equality in protesting, albeit in varying degrees of visibility and in different forms.

For the last ten months of the Syrian revolution, many skeptics have repeated the tired refrain that women have been absent from the uprising and that it seems to be a male- dominated (read "Islamist-leaning") protest movement. Such generalizations, meant to discredit the revolution, do much injustice to the women who have lived the uprising from the start at the side of their compatriots.

It is true that the initial Friday-centric demonstrations were, by default, overwhelmingly comprised of men. With no other possibility to gather freely, protesters met at the mosque and grouped at the end of Friday prayers to start marching and chanting, and week after week the presence of women in these demos was negligible. Moreover, there is little doubt that the sheer brutality of the regime, with its blind random shootings, would have led many men to insist that their female relatives remain at home in an attempt to keep them out of harm's way.

In this, the Syrian revolution may have differed from others where women were visible from the start, especially as most other revolutions have begun in big cities. But no other revolution has been suppressed with the ferocity of the Syrian regime, nor has any other country (save for Libya after the military intervention started) endured so many casualties. Declaring the Syrian uprising to be woman-less, therefore, would reflect a rather skewed view on the situation and a superficial understanding of how the Syrian regime acts.

As repression got more brutal, the demonstrations spread throughout the country and extended beyond Friday prayers. This resulted in a noticeable increase of women on the streets of Syria, chanting alongside the men and running under fire alongside men. Some organized women-only demonstrations, others mingled in the mixed crowds and some took microphones to lead gatherings' defiant chants, such as the woman who electrified Homs when she shouted to a roaring crowd that her children would not attend a school that had been used as a torture center.

Even when they weren't taking to the streets, women's participation in the revolution has been constant. They have made signs, helped give first aid to the wounded, and run charity networks to distribute aid to the neediest families under siege from the army. While these activities were not undertaken exclusively by women, they played an important role in the logistics behind the protests.

At the same time, civil activism began to develop into new forms, unveiling Syrian creativity and a pressing urge to raise the voice of the revolution. Initiatives included numerous film clips of women in nondescript interiors, their faces hidden with masks and scarves to protect their identity, holding signs that often centered around a single message that the viewer discovered as the camera went around the room. Such events made the rounds of the social networks in the most YouTubed revolution of the "Arab spring", letting the internet amplify the power of these peaceful protests.

Syrian women have also been essential components of the now famous flash mobs that have so angered the regime with their speed and their efficient messages. Often, women will join the group and start chanting while wearing a headscarf, then separate at the first sign of the infamous "shabbiha" and yank their hijabs off their heads as they melt into the crowd.

Examples of such varied participation are plentiful enough and put to rest the shaky theories about women in Syria's revolution. In fact, when considering the number of prominent female activists, Syria seems to be a leader rather than a follower, rightfully boasting of the women active in civil society and in revolution. Activists such as Suheir Atassi and Razan Zeitouneh, veterans on the socio-political underground scene at the grassroots level, and writers such as Samar Yazbek, have been part and parcel of the civil society movement challenging the regime openly from inside Syria. Since the revolution began, more women have become focal points for the protest movement, including actresses May Skaf, who was one of the first artists to participate in protests and to be arrested, and Fadwa Suleiman, who has been chanting defiantly from the heart of embattled and besieged Homs.

Moreover, the women who have been politically vocal and active in opposition, including in the main organized groups, seem to easily outnumber, especially proportionally, those in other revolutionary countries. There have been numerous Syrian women discussing Syrian affairs on pan-Arab media, and most are well-known among their compatriots.

While they never imagined that their children would be such easy prey for the regime nor intended them to be part of the movement, Syrian women have from the start been an integral element in the revolution. There is no doubt that they will also be an integral component of post-revolution Syria.

-Published 12/1/2012 © bitterlemons-international.org

Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at Chatham House in London.

http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=364#1483