Along the Malecón

Statue of Freedom

2013-05-22T22:42:00.000-04:00

Statue of Freedom

I am in Washington, D.C., this week interviewing a range of experts on U.S. policy toward Cuba. I stopped by the U.S. Capitol after one interview and shot a few photos. The 19-foot-6 bronze figure atop the Capitol building is called the Statue of Freedom.

Flag at half-staff

House Speaker John Boehner ordered flags to be flown at half-staff at U.S. Capitol after a huge tornado killed dozens of people in Oklahoma.

A plane passes the Washington Monument.

Workers are repairing the Washington Monument after an August 2011 earthquake damaged the structure.

Breakdown of the $20 million

2013-05-22T16:56:00.002-04:00

The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development plan to spend $20 million to promote democracy in Cuba. Below is a breakdown of the budget:

Pan American Development Foundation: $259,342. Previously, the foundation received a three-year grant as part of a program called, "Facilitating the Free Flow of Information." "... At the request of civil society groups inside the island, PADF expanded the program to include the provision of humanitarian assistance to civil society groups." The current grant will help activists distribute "independent non-censored information at the grassroots level" and it will also support the ongoing provision of humanitarian aid.

TBD (Contractor to be determined): Exchange of Ideas on Human Rights: $1,350,000. "This program will provide community leaders in Cuba with the opportunity to experience first-hand fundamental freedoms like freedom of expression and assembly, and how these freedoms are exercised in a an open and democratic context."

Grupo de Apoyo a la Democracia: $100,000. These funds will continue to support GAD's three-year grant to provide human aid, including food and over-the-counter medicines.

TBD: Labor Rights: $750,000. "These funds will be used to raise awareness of the current state of labor rights on the island and Cuba's obligation under international labor law." The program will help Cuban activists draw attention to labor law violations. Funds will go toward training, outreach and awareness.

TBD: Afro-Cuban Equality and Advocacy:$500,000. Funds will be used to "raise awareness of issues affecting Afro-Cubans and assist in the development of a network of independent Afro-Cuban groups in Cuba."

International Relief and Development: $1,470,026. The funds continue to support the organization's ongoing three-year grant, which is related to "community empowerment through action."

National Democratic Institute: $895,184. The money support the institute's ongoing three-year grant aimed at "strengthening civil society through community-level engagement." The program helps boost Cuban activists' leadership skills and self confidence at the community level and is designed to "create a strong foundation for independent civil society over time."

Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba: $1,399,351. The money supports the foundation's three-year project called Poder - Program to Develop Empowerment Reliably. The program involves training activists and civil society to address their community needs. "Activities will provide an opportunity for participants to model democratic behavior by building expectations for an opening an window toward a future where collaborative meaningful engagement between citiziens and local officials to address community needs is possible." The program is aimed at continuing to enhance the skills of Cubans so they will be better able to "advocate for community needs, thereby increasing expectations and accountability for improved governance."

PADF: $1,704,658: Support three-year award to "disseminate independent information by encouraging opportunities among various civil society groups and networks to exchange ideas, resolve issues of common concern and potentially pool resources to achieve common objectives." Money will be used to facilitate production and distribution of audio-visual and print material, and support the organization of workshops, discussions, reading circles and debates to inspire critical thinking. The program will also include "demand-driven specialized training" on leadership, technology, vocational training and education.

TBD: Independent Journalism: $1,500,000. A program to continue to improve professional capacity of independent journalists in Cuba.

TBD: Digital Tools for Safe and Effective Civil Society: $850,000.

TBD: Social Analysis and Advocacy: $750,000. Funds to be used to "support the capacity of nacent independent Cuban think tanks to produce and disseminate data-driven analysis on issues concerning Cubans on the island."

National Endowment for Democracy: $4 million. Funds will be used to support independent democratic civil society activists in Cuba. Among the goals: to "cultivate the analytical capacity of existing civil society actors" and to promote greater knowledge and adherence to international norms laid out in regional and global multilateral institutions." This includes political, civic and human rights, including freedom of association and expression.

TBD: Promoting Democratic Principles to Cubans and Material Support. $500,000. The money will boost understanding of democratic norms, including the rule of law and ethics, and will help activists learn to empower communities and help press for an "independent non-political justice system."

Administration and oversight: $3,971,439, which will go to the following agencies:

USAID/LAC (Latin America & the Caribbean): $2,271,439.
State, DRL (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor): $1,500,000.
State/WHA (Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs): $200,000.

Grand total: $20 million.

Note: This article was shared with the Center for Democracy in the Americas as part of a six-month collaborative project with non-profit group. See more about our collaboration here.

Breaking news: $20 million in democracy funds for Cuba (corrected)

2013-05-22T16:29:00.002-04:00

The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development on May 17 told Congress how they intend to spend $20 million in funds that date to fiscal 2012.
Lawmakers Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Marco Rubio and Bob Ménendez had complained earlier this month about the federal government's plans to cut fiscal ~~2013~~ 2014 Cuba democracy funds from $20 million to $15 million.
I reported earlier today that this was all the same pot of money, but it's money from two different fiscal years. Sorry for the mistake - all this fiscal year stuff and delayed spending is confusing to me.
The way I understand it now is that the government has two years to spend the fiscal 2012 money for Cuba programs and it is just now telling Congress its intentions.
State and USAID told Congress how they plan to spend the fiscal 2012 funds, according to the May 17 notification. I don't have a copy of the document, but here's the gist of it (See a detailed breakdown of the $20 million here).

$13,069,219 for programs related to civil society and the media.
$2,959,342 for human rights.
$3,971,439 for program support and administration.

The congressional notification stated:

State and USAID are committed to implementing these programs with all due oversight and appropriate mechanisms that will help measure better results in support of the Cuban people. State and USAID will ensure these funds are allocated on a competitive basis and reach a broad representation of civil society; that as few funds as possible are spent outside of Cuba; and that funds support the actions of Cubans on the island who are working for peaceful democratic change.

Mark P. Sullivan, a specialist in Latin American affairs at the Congressional Research Service, published a great explanation of the funding process for the Cuba democracy programs in a March 29 report called, "Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress."
He wrote:

Since 1996, the United States has provided assistance—through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)—to increase the flow of information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise to Cuba.

USAID and State Department efforts are largely funded through Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the annual foreign operations appropriations bill. From FY1996-FY2012, Congress appropriated some $225 million in funding for Cuba democracy efforts. In recent years, this included $45.3 million for FY2008 and $20 million in each fiscal year from FY2009 through FY2012. The Administration’s FY2013 request was for $15 million. Generally, as provided in appropriations measures, ESF has to be obligated within two years. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), USAID has received the majority of this funding while the State Department has also received funding since FY2004.

FY2011. The Administration again requested $20 million in ESF for FY2011 to support democracy and human rights projects. According to the Administration’s request, the assistance would focus on providing humanitarian assistance to prisoners of conscience and their families, strengthening civil society, supporting issue-based civic action movements and coalitions, and promoting fundamental freedoms, especially freedom of expression and freedom of the press. The Senate version of the State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations measure, S. 3676, reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 29, 2010 (S.Rept. 111-237), would have provided that $2 million of the ESF appropriated for Cuba be transferred and merged with funds for the National Endowment for Democracy for democracy programs in Cuba. Congress did not complete action on FY2011 appropriations until April 2011 when it approved a full-year appropriations measure (P.L. 112-10). In August 2011, the Administration made known its FY2011 foreign aid allocations by country, which included the full $20 million for Cuba democracy assistance that had been requested.

As notified to Congress in April 2012, of the $20 million, USAID would administer $8.9 million, the State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs would administer $1.6 million, and the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) would administer $9.5 million, of which $4 million would be transferred to the National Endowment for Democracy. In terms of programs for the $20 million, $12.43 million would for democracy, civil society and media programs; $4.7 million would support human rights initiatives; and $2.87 million will be for program support.

FY2012. The Administration once again requested $20 million in ESF for FY2012 with the promotion of democratic principles as the core goal of assistance, and Congress supported the full amount in the conference report to the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.Rept. 112-331 to H.R. 2055, P.L. 112-74). The budget request stated that there was an increased effort to manage programs more transparently, focus efforts on Cuba, and widen the scope of the civic groups receiving supports. According to the Administration’s request, U.S. assistance would strengthen a range of independent elements of Cuban civil society, including associations and labor groups, marginalized groups, youth, legal associations, and women’s networks. The programs would be designed to increase the capacity for community involvement of civil society organizations and networking among the groups. The program would also support Cuban efforts to document human rights violations, provide humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families, and build leadership skills of civil society leaders. Finally, the budget request maintained that U.S. assistance also would support the dissemination of information regarding market economies and economic rights.

The Senate Appropriations Committee-reported version of the FY2012 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bill, S. 1601 (S.Rept. 112-85), would have provided $15 million in ESF for Cuba ($5 million less than the request), including humanitarian and democracy assistance, support for economic reform, private sector initiatives, and human rights. In its report to the bill, the committee maintained that it expected that funds would be made available, and programs carried out, in a transparent manner. The committee also would have directed that the USAID Administrator provide regular updates to the committee on the number of Cubans who receive assistance and the types of assistance. In contrast to the Senate bill, a draft House Appropriations Committee bill and report (marked up by the Subcommittee on
State, Foreign Operations, and Relations Programs on July 27, 2011) would have recommended $20 million in ESF for Cuba (the full Administration’s request), and would have directed that the funds be used only for democracy-building, and not for business promotion, economic reform, social development or other purposes expressly authorized by Section 109(a) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114). (See the draft committee report, available here).

FY2013. For FY2013, the Administration requested $15 million for human rights and democracy programs for Cuba. According to the request, “U.S. assistance will continue to support human rights and civil society initiatives that promote basic freedoms, particularly freedom of expression. Programs will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to prisoners of conscience and their families, as well as strengthen independent Cuban civil society, and promote the flow of uncensored information to, from, and within the island.”
The Senate Appropriations Committee-reported version of the FY2013 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, S. 3241 (S.Rept. 112-172), would have provided $15 million in ESF for Cuba (the same as the Administration’s request), including “for humanitarian assistance, support for economic reform, private sector initiatives, democracy, and human rights.” In contrast, the House Appropriations Committee-reported version of the bill, H.R. 5857 (H.Rept. 112-94), would have provided $20 million in ESF ($5 million more than the Administration’s request), but would transfer and merge the aid with funds available to the National Endowment for Democracy “to promote democracy and strengthen civil society in Cuba.” The report to the House bill maintained that assistance “shall not be used for business promotion, economic reform, social development, or other purposes not expressly authorized by section 109(a)” of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (P.L. 104-114). Congress did not complete action on FY2013 appropriations before the beginning of the fiscal year, but in September 2012, it approved a continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 117, P.L. 112-175) that continued FY2013 funding through March 27, 2013, at the same rate for projects and activities in FY2012, plus an across-the-board increase of 0.612%, although specific country accounts were left to the discretion of responsible agencies. On March 21, 2013, Congress completed action on full-year FY2013 appropriations with the approval of H.R. 933. This continues FY2013 funding for Cuba democracy programs, although the amount that ultimately will be allocated is uncertain because of the effects of sequestration set forth in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act (P.L. 112-240).

Note: This article was shared with the Center for Democracy in the Americas as part of a six-month collaborative project with non-profit group. See more about our collaboration here.

Harley-Davidson riders in Cuba

2013-05-19T21:27:00.002-04:00

"Cuban Thunder," my book about Harley-Davidson riders in Cuba, is now out in paperback. There's a Kindle version, too.
The first edition of the book was for iPad only, but now four versions of "Cuban Thunder" are available.
Prices range from $4.99 for the Kindle version to $33.24 the 172-page paperback. Links are below.

Kindle version of with 77 photos: $4.99

172-page paperback version with 67 photos: $33.24

128-page paperback version without photos: $7.19.

iPad version with more than 1,000 photos and a video, available on the iBookstore: $5.99.

Dog's eye view

2013-05-19T17:05:00.003-04:00

Havana balcony

Babalú blog nears 10th anniversary

2013-05-18T16:08:00.000-04:00

Alberto de la Cruz

Babalú, touted as the world's most popular Cuban-American blog in English, marks its 10th anniversary in June.
I spoke to the blog's managing editor, Alberto de la Cruz, the other day in Miami as part of a series of interviews that I'm doing in South Florida, Washington and Havana.
Watch my interview with de la Cruz here or see transcript below:

Question: How do you see the democracy movement in Cuba?

Answer: Right now I think the democracy movement is probably as strong as it’s ever been.
The opposition on the island has been coming together. Different groups are starting to communicate with each other. They’re starting to create a coalition of democracy activists who are coming together.

And obviously if you really want to gauge how the democracy movement in Cuba has grown, one easy way to do that is to see reaction of the Castro regime. And the almost 7,000 arrests that took place just last year is I think an incredible indication that the Cuban government is worried about what’s going on with the dissidents. They're worried about the opposition and they’re cracking down, and I think that is probably the best evidence there is that the opposition, that the democracy movement in Cuba, is growing exponentially.

Question: Should the U.S. government be doing anything differently to support democracy activists in Cuba?

Answer: Well, I'm a strong supporter of the current sanctions that are in place and I'm a strong opponent to the current Obama policy of people-to-people contacts and the cultural exchanges because in reality there is no cultural exchange.

American tourists who travel from the United States to Cuba are being shown a Potemkin village. They're being taken to restaurants. They're being taken to schools. They're being taken to art schools and to shows that are all run by the Cuban government. They're not really contacting the dissidents. They're not helping the dissident movement. They're not really promoting democracy. They can't. They're not allowed to.

I believe that sanctions are really the only thing that the United States can do from our side and putting pressure on the Castro government to let go of its tyrannical grip on the island. To allow elections without the support of the rest of the world, which has which many of them have business interests in Cuba, it's a difficult task. But it comes down to one of what is right and doing what is necessary. At the end of the day, Cuba will be freed by Cubans, and it's up to the Cubans on the island and the Cubans who are exiled to come together and bring freedom to Cuba.
But the United States, the role I believe the United States would be to help facilitate that, and to help that movement. I don't really believe in – I read an interesting editorial written by Juan Abreu who made a pretty strong argument for an American invasion. Right now that's (interview is interrupted as a plane passes overhead).

I read an interesting article that I ended up translating putting on Babalú by Juan Abreu, a Cuban exiled in Spain, who, he basically said if you're against an American invasion of Cuba, it's akin to being for Cubans being under a dictatorship. And it's sort of a stretch on the logic, but it sort of also makes you look at it from a different perspective.

This is not really about an invasion. This is about the Castro dictatorship. And going back to my original point, I think the American government, the best thing you can do in my opinion, and I'm sure there's other things they can do, but right now, thinking about it right now, the best thing they can do it is continue to support and continue to support, provide even stronger support for the dissidents on the island, for the movements that are going on on the island, for the exiles that are working hard for freedom on the island, and not to give any concessions whatsoever to the Castro regime.

Question: Could the U.S. government run its democracy programs more efficiently?

Answer: Well, I'm not an expert on the democracy programs and government-sponsored USAID or anything of that nature. But I can, I mean, simple logic would dictate that the best people to reach Cubans and to deal with Cubans and to help Cubans are other Cubans.

I mean, a perfect example of that is Alan Gross, who has, you know, for over two years has been held hostage in Cuba. It's pretty difficult to send someone like Alan Gross, a North Amer- you know an American, a Jewish-American. Doesn't speak Spanish. Sending him into Cuba to carry out these types of operations, you're sort of almost setting him up for failure.

And you know, but it goes back to your original point where you have these large inside-the-Beltway NGOs that are just machines, and I really don't see the logic or how they can deem that to be effective. We're not talking about a country that people can freely enter and leave and you don't have an issue, like the issues you have in Cuba. In Cuba, you have to, it's almost, you have to have someone who can go in and get out without getting into trouble and I'm sorry, not to disparage Alan Gross or his work or his abilities, but he's at a severe disadvantage in a country where he doesn't look like anybody there and he doesn't speak the language.

Question: What is your reaction to USAID’s plans to cut the budget for Cuba democracy programs from $20 million per year to $15 million per year?

Answer: I was disheartened by it. I think this reaction or that decision comes from the top of the government, from our State Department, from the White House, who I believe have an incorrect idea that the best way to deal with the Castro dictatorship is to not offend them, and obviously the Castro dictatorship is complaining about democracy programs.

And I imagine the State Department and the White House is trying to find a way to, I don't want to use the word appease, but it does come down to appeasement, which is - we're not really trying to undermine you, let's work together, let's work something out - which I think the 53-year-long history of the Castro regime pretty much shows that it does not react well or does not react favorably when weakness is shown.

I've always, in my writings over the years, I've likened them, the Castro regime, to basically a mafia. It's run like an international crime organization. You have your top. You have the family boss. Then you have your lieutenants, you have your capos, and everyone has to kick up to the boss, and even when you see the so-called corruptions sweeps, where officials are arrested, the reason they're arrested is because they were making money without kicking money up to the Castros, because they were doing business outside. So you really, you'd never go to a mafia and say, hey, we're not going to arrest so many of you, we're gonna kind of go easy on you. Why don't you just stop being so criminal? It doesn’t work.

They see weakness, they're just going to take advantage of it. And that's what's happening. And I’m afraid that's going to be the end result of this policy is, the more you cut back, the more the Castro regime's going to take, and I have never seen them give anything in return for nothing. So I don't see how they're going to you know, I don't see why they would believe this is going to, you know, be different.

Everybody likes to talk about the embargo and Einstein's definition of insanity being doing the same thing over and over again and waiting for another result, expecting another result. I look at people that advocate engagement and business with the Castro regime and I'm like you know, that's the definition of insanity. Europe's been doing it for 20-some odd years. Canada's been doing it. And the Castro regime's only gotten richer and more repressive.

You know, what makes you think pouring more money, as someone once told me, you know you pour all this money into it, they won't know what to do. I've never heard of a dictatorship being toppled because they were drowning in cash. So it's, it's a policy that I think history shows will not work and not only will it not work, it will only serve to entrench them further and feed the machine of repression there.

Question: How did you get started with the blog, which is one of the most popular Cuba blogs?

Answer: I like to say we're the most popular Cuban-American blog in the world because we're read by Cuban-Americans and if you're a Cuban somewhere else you're no longer a Cuban-American, are you? I like to throw that in. We are probably, I think it's probably pretty safe to say we are the most popular English-language Cuba-centric blog or website on the internet. 2013 happens to be our 10th anniversary. In June, it will be our 10th year, which in Internet years is an eternity, for a website to have lasted this long.

The website was founded in 2003 by Val Prieto, and I came on board in 2007. And in 2010, I became the managing editor. And it is a labor of love. It's, you know, people say, is it a non-profit? I say, no, it's a pro-cost. It costs us money, but we do it. It's a labor of love. We do it because we're all, most of us there are Cuban-Americans. We all grew up in exiled families, and it's how we keep our heritage going. It's a lot of work. It's a lot of hours, obviously. It's not something, none of us make a living off of, and have no interest in making a living off of it. We do it because we love freedom, because we love Cuba.

We love the Cuba of our parents and I think amongst all of us, we love the United States for giving our parents freedom and allowing individuals such as myself who was born here to be born a free person. So it's a basically a Camero, it's a very strange combination. But we realize we're the first and last generation of children of Cuban exiles that will experience this and we're happy that we're able to keep it alive and keep it going on the internet.

Question: What will Cuba be like when Babalú celebrates its 20th anniversary?

Answer: I'm certainly hoping that we'll have our Spanish version being run out of Cuba, in a free Cuba. And I hope it won't be for our 20th anniversary. It'll be for our 11th anniversary. But I don't want to fall into the trap of next year in Cuba. My parents were saying that, I grew up hearing and listening to that every single year. So it's all we can do is keep working, keep praying and keep helping those who are looking for freedom. Eventually everything must fall, so you know, we will continue to be a voice in the United States in English for the freedom fighters in Cuba, for the democracy activists, because as long as there's one of them standing outside, getting beat up, getting arrested, we have to help them. We have to promote their voice. We have to make sure the rest of the world hears them.

Judy Gross: "We want Alan back home"

2013-05-16T22:46:00.000-04:00

Judy Gross, left, and Jim Boomgard

Below is the joint statement from Development Alternatives, Inc., and Judy Gross after the Gross family on Thursday settled its lawsuit against DAI.

May 16, 2013

Gross Family and DAI Settle Case Relating to Cuba Imprisonment

Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) and Judy Gross today announced the settlement of the lawsuit brought by Judy and Alan Gross against DAI in the wake of Alan Gross’s imprisonment by Cuban authorities in December 2009 for his work for DAI to implement the U.S. Government’s Cuba Program.

The parties agreed to a settlement in which neither admits fault. DAI has agreed to pay an undisclosed monetary amount to help address the injuries the Gross family has sustained in connection with Alan’s arrest and imprisonment in Cuba. DAI and Judy Gross have also agreed to continue working together to seek Alan’s release.

“We are very pleased that DAI has committed to help address the injuries sustained by our family,” said Judy Gross. “We want Alan back home, safe and sound,” she said.

“We have been clear from day one that Alan’s safe return to his family is our first priority,” said Jim Boomgard, DAI’s President and CEO. “Settling this litigation allows us to work together on that overriding goal, which should be the focus for everyone involved in this case.”

Dr. Boomgard described Alan Gross as “a committed development professional with many years of experience providing humanitarian and development assistance worldwide.”

DAI was chosen by USAID to implement the U.S. Government’s Cuba Program through an open bidding process. Since 1970, DAI has worked in more than 150 countries, tackling development problems caused by inefficient markets, ineffective governance, or instability and delivering results across the spectrum of international development contexts, from stable societies and high-growth economies to challenging environments racked by political or military conflict.

The U.S. Government, which is also a defendant in the lawsuit, did not participate in the settlement.

Media Inquiries: Steven O’Connor, 301.771.7834

Revisiting "Operation Surf"

2013-05-16T18:20:00.001-04:00

Dalexi González Madruga. Photos: Ismael Francisco

An Internet freedom activist linked to the smuggling of satellite dishes to Cuba said he wouldn't feel safe going back to the island "until the situation changes there."
"The security threats are real," Robert Guerra said Thursday. "It's very important for democracy groups and others that are doing work there to be very aware of the very nuanced security threats and issues that are there."

Robert Guerra

Guerra, the former director of the Internet Freedom Project at Freedom House in Washington, D.C., declined to give details on the projects he has carried out in Cuba.
"I wouldn't be in a position to talk about them right now," he said. "I did some projects...I can say that I've been to the island, but I'm not necessarily in a position to talk about it other than to say that Cuba's a complex country in regards to digital activism."
Cuban authorities allege that Guerra took part in "Operation Surf," aimed at disguising satellite dishes as boogie boards and smuggling them to Cuba.
Guerra said, "I can't comment other than saying that if you're familiar with the technology, it's ridiculous. It's just that satellite dishes don't look like surf boards. I won't comment any further on that."
So was Guerra saying that the operation didn't take place - that no one smuggled the satellite dishes to Cuba, as Cuban officials claimed in March 2011 video?
"I have not seen the video, so I cannot comment on that," replied Guerra, a founding director of Privaterra, which assists non-governmental organizations with matters of data privacy, information security and human rights.

Barry Fink. Photo: LinkedIn

The Cuban government's version of events is that a California man named Barry Fink smuggled satellite dishes to Cuba as part of a U.S. government-financed operation in 2008.
The satellite dishes wound up in the hands of a Cuban electronics technician named Dalexi González Madruga.
González went to Cuban authorities with what he knew and became an informant, nicknamed Agent Rául.
González said when he met Fink in 2008, Fink introduced himself with the code words: "How's the surf in the south of France?"
González answered with the correct password and they got on with business. Cuba's state-run Granma newspaper reported:

They headed for a minibus parked a few meters away, and Barry gave him four satellite dishes, camouflaged as surf boards...

Fink, a commercial video producer based in Marina Del Rey, Calif., declined to talk about the supposed operation.
"I'm just not in a position to discuss it," he said Thursday. "I can't."

Cuban gov't photo of Barry Fink

Asked if he had signed a confidentiality agreement, Fink said no, but preferred not to comment.
"I do not think it would be appropriate."

Guerra is an expert on Internet freedom and cybersecurity, according to his LinkedIn profile. Cuban officials allege that he acted as González's handler.
Asked if he worried he could be arrested in Cuba, Guerra said he "took a lot of care" to be discreet while on the island.
"I was in Cuba for a long period of time," he said. "You just expose yourself to problems."
The working environment is challenging, he said.
"It's no different than the Cold War with the Russians," he said. "If you're experienced, you can deal with it. If you're naive, it can be more of a problem."

What does Guerra think of the plight of Alan Gross, the American development worker jailed in Cuba in December 2009 while carrying out a U.S. government-financed democracy program?
"I'm familiar with that case and I think one has to be aware of that," he said.
Gross is in a difficult spot, Guerra said, because the U.S. government doesn't have diplomatic relations with Cuba, making it more difficult for American officials to negotiate for his release.
Cuban officials contend that the Internet freedom activists smuggled the satellite dishes into Cuba as part of a plan to set up an illegal communications network in Cuba. They hoped to set up a mobile Internet connection free from socialist government control.
"The internet works VERY RAPIDLY!" a technician told his Cuban contact while describing the equipment. " ...You may use Skype, Yahoo video + voice... Next week we will be talking FOR FREE!"
Guerra said he hasn't been involved in any Cuba projects "for the last couple of years," but imagines that democracy activists have changed their approach.
The Cuban government has loosened travel restrictions, making it easier for such activists as Cuban blogger Yoani Sanchez to travel to and from the island.
"Yoani, who would have thought many years ago that she would be on a world tour?" Guerra asked. "Others can travel, as well. That changes the dynamic. There's a lot that is changing on the island."

Note: This article was shared with the Center for Democracy in the Americas as part of a six-month collaborative project with non-profit group. See more about our collaboration here.

Breaking news: Secret settlement in Gross case

2013-05-16T16:46:00.002-04:00

Alan Gross

The family of Alan Gross has settled its lawsuit against DAI, the federal contractor that hired Gross to carry out a democracy project in Cuba.

Here's the text of the settlement (see notice):

Plaintiffs Alan and Judith Gross (“Plaintiffs”) and Defendant Development Alternatives, Inc. (“DAI”) respectfully submit this Notice of Settlement and inform the Court as follows:

Plaintiffs and DAI executed a settlement agreement that resolves the dispute between Plaintiffs and DAI on Thursday, May 16, 2013.

Pursuant to the settlement agreement, which is confidential and subject to a nondisclosure agreement, the Plaintiffs will file a Notice of Dismissal to dismiss this action with prejudice as to Defendant DAI. Absent any excusable delays, the latest that Plaintiffs will file a Notice of Dismissal is Wednesday, June 5, 2013.

Note to readers: "With prejudice" means the case is settled and the Gross family cannot sue DAI again. But the settlement is with DAI only – it does not include the U.S. government. That means the lawsuit against U.S. government agencies will continue.

Democracy activists end hunger strike

2013-05-08T07:37:00.004-04:00

Cuban authorities have released dissident Luis Enrique Lozada, prompting nearly 60 democracy activists to end hunger strikes they had started to protest his jailing.
Lozada had been in custody at the Boniato prison in Santiago de Cuba. He went on a hunger strike on April 9 to denounce his jailing and what he described as an arbitrary arrest.
His wife, Darmis Aguedo; their son, Enrique Lozada Aguedo; and the dissident's brother, Arnold Lozada, began hunger strikes on April 13 to demand that he be freed.

José Daniel Ferrer

More than 50 other activists soon joined them. Dissident leader José Daniel Ferrer now says Lozada has been released and the hunger strikes are over. Via Twitter, his supporters quoted him as saying:

End of the strike! Thanks to God and those who supported the cause.

Luis Enrique Lozada is a member of the Unión Patriótica de Cuba, or Patriotic Union of Cuba, which Ferrer leads from Cuba.

Luis Enrique Lozada. Photo: UNPACU

Different creatures

2013-05-06T06:34:00.004-04:00

Lawmaker: $15 million for Cuba programs not enough

2013-05-04T17:46:00.001-04:00

Lawmaker: More aid needed for democracy activists in Cuba from Tracey Eaton on Vimeo.

U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-Fla., is protesting planned cuts to USAID's budget for democracy programs in Cuba.
Cuban dissidents are "risking their lives, yet we are cutting their support," the lawmaker said.
In the Senate, Florida Republican Marco Rubio has similar complaints, calling the budget reduction "a terrible idea." (See "USAID may slash Cuba program").
During an April 25 budget hearing, Ros-Lehtinen told USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah that the budget cut was "not prudent."
Here is their exchange:

Ros-Lehtinen: In addition, Dr. Shah, I continue to be concerned over the administration’s attempts to cut much needed democracy programs to the Cuban people.

Forty pro-democracy activists remain on hunger strikes in Cuba to call attention to the dozens of Cubans who are being detained by Castro’s state security forces.
These brave heros are risking their lives yet we are cutting their support, which is not prudent, especially at a time when the crackdown by Castro’s thugs is actually on the rise on the island.

Shah: And on Cuba, again, the goals there are support for civil society and democracy with some small humanitarian efforts. And we have worked closely with our partners. We believe the administration’s budget of $15 million reflects an appropriate investment that they have the capacity to implement.
We recognize and take some faith in the fact that GAO reviewed our approach to implementing this program and very strongly commented on the effective reforms we’ve put in place, to have a clear and compelling implementation strategy for this effort.

Shah's message: GAO signed off on USAID's Cuba programs and there's nothing else to debate.
Yet the GAO report was limited to "management and financial accounting as opposed to measuring impact and effectiveness in Cuba," Cuba analyst Phil Peters wrote.
GAO only examined a few basic points:

Is USAID following U.S. law?
Is the agency minimizing risk to participants?
Are official monitoring use of the money?

GAO's conclusion: USAID is doing just fine. (See "No Godiva chocolates: Sweet news for USAID").
It's unclear whether any U.S. officials are asking if there are any alternatives to USAID's largely covert democracy programs.
For the record, I don't oppose U.S. government efforts to boost democracy in Cuba. But I have questions about U.S. government tactics, and believe that a more thorough investigation of USAID's programs is warranted.
GAO investigators examined only 10 of the 111 awards give to USAID and the State Department from Oct. 1, 2005, through 2012.

Note: This article was shared with the Center for Democracy in the Americas as part of a six-month collaborative project with non-profit group. See more about our collaboration here.

Spy can stay in Cuba, will lose citizenship

2013-05-03T15:18:00.002-04:00

Rene Gonzalez

Convicted agent Rene Gonzalez does not have to serve the rest of his parole in the United States as long as he renounces his American citizenship and never returns to the U.S, a judge ruled Friday.
The judge's order is below:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 98-721-CR-LENARD
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RENE GONZALEZ,
Defendant.
_______________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S RENEWED MOTION TO MODIFY CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE (D.E. 1826) AND MODIFYING CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Rene Gonzalez’s Renewed Motion to Modify Conditions of Supervised Release (D.E. 1826, 6/26/12).
The Government initially filed a Response in Opposition (D.E. 1829, 7/16/12), and Defendant filed a Reply (D.E. 1830, 7/30/12). Upon Order of this Court (D.E. 1831, 10/1/12), the Parties filed supplemental Memoranda on Defendant’s Proposed Loss of Nationality (D.E. 1836, 10/26/12; D.E. 1837, 11/16/12; D.E. 1838, 11/30/12). Defendant has since filed a Supplement to his Memorandum (D.E. 1845, 4/29/13). The Government filed a Response to Defendant’s Supplement (D.E. 1846, 5/2/13), and Defendant filed a Reply
(D.E. 1847, 5/3/13). Having considered the referenced filings and the record, the Court finds as follows.

In 2001, Defendant was convicted in the above-captioned matter of acting as an agent of a foreign government, the Republic of Cuba, without notifying the Attorney General, 18 U.S.C. § 951, and conspiring to act as an agent of a foreign government and to defraud the United States of and concerning its governmental functions and rights, id. § 371. The Court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate term of fifteen years’ imprisonment plus three years’ supervised release. (See Judgment, D.E. 1437 at 2.) Defendant was released from federal custody on October 7, 2011, and is now serving his term of supervised release.

On June 26, 2012, Defendant filed the present Renewed Motion to Modify Conditions of Supervised Release. (See Renewed Motion, D.E. 1826 at 1.) Defendant moves to modify his conditions of supervised release so that he may return to Cuba and serve the remainder of his term on a non-reporting basis. (Id.) Defendant argues that he has fully complied with all current conditions of supervised release and that various factors favor modification under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3853(e)(2) and 3553(a). (Id. at 2–4.)

Defendant, who is a dual citizen of Cuba and the United States, further states that he is “willing to renounce his United States citizenship if it means that he is permitted to return to his home and his family.” (Id. at 15.) Defendant offers to renounce his United States citizenship, in Cuba, “to give the United States confidence that he will never reenter this country.” (Id. at 6.)

The Government originally opposed Defendant’s Motion, arguing in relevant part that Defendant’s proposed renunciation in Cuba was an unsound and unenforceable condition on which to modify Defendant’s supervision. (See Response, D.E. 1829 at 16.)

On April 3, 2013, while the present Motion was still pending, Defendant filed a Motion to Travel, seeking leave to visit Cuba for two weeks to attend a memorial service for his deceased father. (See Motion to Travel, D.E. 1839 at 2.) The Court granted that Motion on various conditions. (See Order Granting Motion to Travel, D.E. 1844 at 1–2.) Defendant departed for Cuba on April 22, 2013, and is now in Havana. He is scheduled to return to the United States on May 6, 2013.

On April 29, 2013, Defendant filed a Supplement in further support of his Renewed Motion to Modify Conditions of Supervised Release. (See Supplement, D.E. 1845 at 1.) Defendant states that, with the Court’s permission, he is willing to proceed to the United States Interests Section in Havana and formally renounce his citizenship pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) if allowed to serve the remainder of his supervised release term in Cuba. (Id. at 2.)

The Government filed a Response to Defendant’s Supplement on May 2, 2013, indicating that it does not oppose Defendant’s request. (See Response to Supplement, D.E. 1846 at 1.) The Government proposes the following modified supervised-release condition: “If the defendant voluntarily renounces his U.S. citizenship pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) while he is authorized by this Court to be in Cuba and is issued a certificate of loss of nationality by the U.S. Department of State, then thereafter the defendant shall serve the remainder of his supervised release term in Cuba, the remainder of that supervised release term shall be non-reporting, and the defendant shall not return to the United States.” (Id. at 1, 2–3.) The Government indicates that “the FBI has concluded that the security interests of the United States are furthered if the defendant, Case 1:98-cr-00721-JAL Document 1848 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2013 Page 3 of 74 while already in Cuba, is allowed to voluntarily renounce his United States citizenship and thereafter does not return to the United States.” (Id. at 2.)

In reply, and in light of the Government’s conditional agreement to Defendant’s proposal, Defendant asks that his current leave to travel be extended by ten days for the purpose of completing renunciation procedures with his attorney present and obtaining a certificate of loss of nationality. (See Reply in Support of Supplement, D.E. 1847 at 2–3.)

“The court may, after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7),” “modify, reduce or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of supervised release, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to the modification of probation and the provisions applicable to the initial setting of the terms and conditions of post-release supervision.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); United States v. Baker, 497 F. App’x 874, 875 (11th Cir. 2012).

Relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) include the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), and the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Rule 32.1(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure further allows the Court to modify conditions of supervised release without a hearing if (A) the person waives the hearing; or (B) the relief sought is favorable to the person and does not extend the term of probation or of supervised release; and (C) an attorney for the government has received notice of the relief sought, has had a reasonable opportunity to object, and has not done so. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)(2).

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5), a person who is a national of the United States shall lose his nationality by, among other things, making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State, with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5). When such a renunciation is made—or whenever a consular officer of the United States has reason to believe that a person while in a foreign state has lost his United States nationality—that
officer shall certify the facts upon which such belief is based to the Department of State, in writing, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of State, and if the report of the consular officer is approved by the Secretary of State, then a certificate of loss of nationality shall issue. Id. § 1501.

The Court has considered the relevant modification factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), and the Court has considered the proposals and representations of the Parties. In light of the Section 3553(a) factors and the security interests of the United States, the Court finds Defendant’s proposed modification of supervised release appropriate, contingent upon his voluntary renunciation of his United States citizenship and the issuance of a certificate of loss of nationality by the U.S. Department of State. It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant Rene Gonzalez’s Renewed Motion to Modify Conditions of Supervised Release (D.E. 1826, 6/26/12) is GRANTED. The conditions of Defendant’s term of supervised release are hereby modified as follows:

If Defendant voluntarily renounces his United States citizenship pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) while presently authorized by this Court to be in Cuba, and if he is issued a certificate of loss of nationality by the U.S. Department of State, then Defendant shall serve the remainder of his supervised-release term in Cuba on a non-reporting basis, and he shall not return to the United States.
If Defendant does not voluntarily renounce his United States citizenship while presently authorized by this Court to be in Cuba, and/or he is not issued a certificate of loss of nationality by the U.S. Department of State, Defendant shall return to the United States and to the district of his supervised release as previously ordered (see Order Granting Motion to Travel, D.E. 1844 at 2), and all original conditions of supervised release shall remain in full force and effect (see Judgment, D.E. 1437 at 3–4).
Defendant’s present leave to travel pursuant to this Court’s Order Granting Motion to Travel (D.E. 1844, 4/12/13) is extended until May 16, 2013, for the purpose of completing renunciation procedures and obtaining a certificate of loss of nationality from the U.S. Department of State.
By May 23, 2013, Defendant shall file with the Court a status report as to renunciation and a certified copy of any issued certificate of loss of nationality.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 3rd day of May, 2013.
_________________________________
JOAN A. LENARD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Assata Shakur: Cuba is on moral high ground

2013-05-03T10:38:00.002-04:00

Fugitive Assata Shakur recorded this message to Pope John Paul II before his visit to Cuba in 1998. She said:

This is not a country that is rich in material wealth. It is a country that is rich in human wealth, spiritual wealth and moral wealth.

Fugitive disputed "domestic terrorist" label

2013-05-03T09:44:00.000-04:00

The FBI's pursuit of Assata Shakur has me wondering about some of the others who have taken refuge in Cuba over the years.
One of those is Charles Hill, who is wanted in the murder of a New Mexico state police officer.
Hill and two other members of a black separatist group met the officer on Nov. 8, 1971, on a New Mexico highway. Police say one of the three suspects shot officer Robert Rosenbloom, killing him. The men hijacked a plane and forced the pilot to fly to Cuba.
In a 2009 interview, Hill told me that police targeted blacks in the 1970s. He said:

They went after us. If you had an Afro hairdo and got stopped by a cop, they went after you. We were being persecuted. There's no doubt about it.

He said he didn't agree with the label "domestic terrorist." He said:

Back in those days, we were considered 'black revolutionaries.' Now we're considered 'black terrorists.' That's a whole misconception.

Hill told me he had a Cuban wife, two children and a grandson, and had a life that would be difficult to give up if he had to return to the United States. He said:

Basically, if I had an opportunity to go back to the States and be free on the streets and I couldn't come back to Cuba, that would be a tough choice. Right off the top of my head, I don't think I would leave my son and my daughter and my grandson here and not be able to come back to Cuba.

He pointed out that health care is free in Cuba.

No, no, I wouldn't give it up, man. You know, I'm too old now. I don't have any retirement plan back in the United States.

He said the socialist government had made mistakes, but was "constantly trying to work for the people." He said:

See, this is the basic difference. I don't think the United States government works for the American people.

Into the Cuckoo's Nest

2013-05-02T17:55:00.001-04:00

My Schizophrenic Brain

If Washington's policies toward Havana were a person, the poor soul would likely be confused, maybe even schizophrenic.
U.S. officials try to starve Cuba into submission with economic sanctions for more than five decades.
Then they undermine sanctions by allowing Cuban-Americans to travel freely to the island, dumping fistfuls of cash on the island.
Regime-change programs - democracy programs, whatever you call them - are another peculiar feature of the U.S. approach.
The U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, has spent more than $200 million on these programs since 1996. They are explicitly designed to influence internal affairs in Cuba and boost freedom. And no matter how noble the cause might be, the programs are at odds with development work in most parts of the world.

The programs also operate under increasing secrecy at a time when governments and NGOs move toward greater transparency. See, for instance:

Publish What You Fund, a global campaign for aid transparency
aidinfo, which promotes development aid accountability, and
Avco openaid, designed to show people how development funds are being spent around the world.

Even the U.S. government has gotten into the act - the push toward greater transparency - with its Foreign Assistance Dashboard, which tracks foreign aid, and its so-called Greenbook, a historical record of U.S. aid to the rest of the world.
USAID's has also released new datasets and technological tools meant to boost transparency (See April 30 announcement).
But Uncle Sam's initiatives have done little to reduce the secrecy surrounding USAID's Cuba programs, which remain unlike development programs in most of the world.
Take the case of the United Kingdom. The foreign secretary there dispenses development aid only if he is convinced that the money "is likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty."
It's not just a pledge - it's written into the law. See International Development Act 2002.
In sharp contrast, a key U.S. government goal in Cuba is to increase poverty, not reduce it. Author

Keith Bolender. Photo: Juventúd Rebelde

Keith Bolender writes in his 2012 book "Cuba Under Siege":

...There is ample evidence to suggest that America is enacting collective punishment on the people of Cuba with the intent of precipitating the overthrow of the socialist experiment..."

Douglas Dillon, under secretary of state during the Kennedy administration, helped set the tone in 1960 when he said it was Washington's duty to cause "rising discomfort among hungry Cubans."
The strategy continued in the 1970s, according to "Cuba Under Siege," which quotes a CIA officer as saying:

We wanted to keep bread out of the stores so the people would go hungry.

Efforts to suffocate Cuba continue today. Yet while trying to squeeze the Cuban economy, American officials also allow Cuban-Americans to send more than $1 billion in remittances to their families every year. It's a sensible humanitarian gesture, but it erodes the impact of the sanctions that U.S. officials so carefully enforce.
Time passes and these contradictory measures remain in place, ever more ingrained, part of an institutionalized machinery that has cost American taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars.
In February 2012, Desmond Butler of the Associated Press focused on one piece of that machinery - a USAID program that sent American Alan Gross to Cuba to set up a satellite Internet network. Butler's article began:

Piece by piece, in backpacks and carry-on bags, American aid contractor Alan Gross made sure laptops, smartphones, hard drives and networking equipment were secreted into Cuba. The most sensitive item, according to official trip reports, was the last one: a specialized mobile phone chip that experts say is often used by the Pentagon and the CIA to make satellite signals virtually impossible to track.

Tom Paulson. Photo: Infinity Box

Tom Paulson, a former reporter at the Seattle Post Intelligencer, wrote that the AP story added to an "ongoing discussion within the federal government about 're-inventing foreign aid.'"
Paulson runs a website called Humanosphere, which analyzes the latest news in global health, development and poverty. He was struck by the AP's claim that Gross was smuggling satellite telephone cards that aren't available to the public and are “provided most frequently to the Defense Department and the CIA.”
Paulson said U.S. officials said Gross "was just carrying out the normal mission of USAID." He wrote:

Huh? This is the normal mission of USAID?
This is certainly normal for the CIA, or those other branches of government legitimately set up to undermine authoritarian regimes around the world....
But is it wise, and in our long-term interest, to be enlisting USAID in this cause as well?
Should the agency that was set up primarily to bring food to the starving, medical supplies to the injured or otherwise engage in America’s humanitarian causes overseas also be doing covert political work against hostile foreign governments?
Is there a need to more clearly delineate foreign aid from foreign policy?

Some countries have objected to USAID's intrusions. Russia kicked out the agency in September 2012.
On Wednesday, President Evo Morales announced that his government would expel USAID from Bolivia.

Juan Ramón Quintana

USAID had operated in Bolivia since 1964. Juan Ramón Quintana, minister of the presidency, said today that the agency did not reduce poverty in the country. Instead, it directly interfered in Bolivian affairs from 1985 to 2005 and sought to maintain "political control" over Bolivia, Quintana said.
"No one said anything" because ruling political parties benefitted from the "rain of dollars," he said.

We have done rigorous research and what Bolivia should know is that the United States has not destined money for distribution to the poor, but rather to preserve its strategic interests outside its borders.

State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell told reporters that Bolivia's accusations were "baseless." He said the agency's goal was not political meddling, but "to help the Bolivian government improve the lives of ordinary Bolivians."

Patrick Ventrell

Whatever the case, Bolivia's move was not a surprise.
In June 2012, Bolivia along with Cuba, Ecuador, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Nicaragua and Venezuela signed a document calling for the expulsion of USAID from their borders.
The document stated:

...USAID, through its different organizations and disguises, acts in an illegal manner with impunity, without possessing a legal framework to support this action, and illegally finances the media, political leaders and non-governmental organizations, among others.

Despite that glaring diplomatic red flag, "Bolivia's decision to expel USAID came as a shock to the United States, as no one in Evo Morales' government had complained about the U.S. development agency's activities," Agence France-Presse reported Thursday.

Mark Lopes

Mark Lopes, deputy assistant administrator for USAID's Bureau for Latin America and Caribbean, told AFP that the agency had heard grumblings about USAID from the Bolivian government, but "we always found cooperative partners and government officials within all levels of government."
Either the AFP story is inaccurate or Lopes is incredibly disingenuous. Bolivian officials had signed a document calling for the expulsion of USAID. That is not a mild complaint or a "grumbling." That is a message telling USAID to start packing its bags.
On the issue of transparency, Lopes told AFP:

This idea that we're not transparent, not telling who we're funding, is simply false.

Link:
State Department cable outlining USAID strategy in Venezuela in 2006.

Note: This article was shared with the Center for Democracy in the Americas as part of a six-month collaborative project with non-profit group. See more about our collaboration here.

$2 million for Assata Shakur (update)

2013-05-02T10:10:00.001-04:00

The FBI announced it is offering $1 million for information leading to the capture of Joanne Chesimard, also known as Assata Shakur, among other aliases. The state of New Jersey is pitching in another $1, boosting the reward to $2 million.
The FBI puts her crime under the category of: "Act of Terrorism - Domestic Terrorism."
I'm not condoning any crimes that Chesimard may have committed, but this doesn't seem like an appropriate use of the term terrorism.
Chesimard is accused of being involved in a bank robbery and a shootout with state troopers that ended in the death of one of the troopers.
Tragic, yes. But is that terrorism?
According to the FBI's Newark office:

Chesimard is wanted for escaping from prison in Clinton, New Jersey, while serving a life sentence for murder. On May 2, 1973, Chesimard, who was part of a revolutionary activist organization known as the Black Liberation Army, and two accomplices were stopped for a motor vehicle violation on the New Jersey Turnpike by two troopers with the New Jersey State Police.
At the time, Chesimard was wanted for her involvement in several felonies, including bank robbery. Chesimard and her accomplices opened fire on the troopers, seemingly without provocation. One trooper was wounded and the other was shot and killed execution-style at point-blank range. Chesimard fled the scene, but was subsequently apprehended. One of her accomplices was killed in the shoot-out and the other was also apprehended and remains in jail.

In 1977, Chesimard was found guilty of first degree murder, assault and battery of a police officer, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault with intent to kill, illegal possession of a weapon, and armed robbery. She was sentenced to life in prison.

On November 2, 1979, Chesimard escaped from prison and lived underground before being located in Cuba in 1984. She is thought to currently still be living in Cuba.

Links:
FBI flyer about Joanne Chesimard.
"The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI's Manufactured War on Terrorism" by Trevor Aaronson

Report: U.S. will keep Cuba on terrorism list

2013-05-01T08:14:00.002-04:00

The Hill reported on Tuesday:

The State Department is expected to release its annual Country Report on Terrorism in the latter half of May, missing today's deadline by a few weeks, according to a State Department spokesperson.
The much-anticipated annual report was released much later last year -- in July.
And while several news outlets have reported that the annual report may include a new finding on whether Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism, those reports are incorrect — the report will in fact make no changes to the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Instead, the report will remain a snapshot of the prior year, 2012 in this case.
"We don't use this report to announce designations," the State spokesperson said.
As such, the report will continue to list Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism. "They won't be coming off the list," the spokesperson said.

Mega Cuban art auction

2013-05-01T08:07:00.000-04:00

Luis Cruz Azaceta, "Fragile Crossing" (1992)

Centro Cultural Cubano de Nueva York is putting on a big auction of Cuban art on Friday in New York.
Organizers say they plan to auction off:

some of the most sought-after Cuban and Cuban-American artists today, as well as outstanding new talent.

Many of the featured artists will be at the event, including Orlando Luis Pardo, a Cuban photographer, writer and democracy activist.
Other artists involved in the event include:

José Acosta
Susan Bank
José Bedia
Guido Betancourt
Humberto Calzada
Chari Castro-Marín
Luís Cruz Azaceta
Enrique Cubillas
Liliam Cuenca
Aurora De Armendi
Pablo Díaz
Ofill Echevarría
Félix Esquivel
Pedro Esteban
Galindo Landeira
Florencio Gelabert
Frank Guiller
Gisela Hernández
Eliana Iturbe
Juan Lopetegui
Luís Mallo
David Martínez
Mysora
Jay Palacio
Manuel Pardo
René Portocarrero
Rolando Pulido
Jesús Rivera
Gilberto Ruiz
Baruj Salinas
Mario Torroella
Gladys Triana
Víctor Varela and
Raúl Villareal

To register for the event, click here.

Shared secrets?

2013-04-29T22:23:00.001-04:00

U.S. authorities accuse Marta Rita Veláquez of conspiracy to commit espionage. I wonder if her husband, a Swedish diplomat, gave her state secrets that she passed along to the Cuban government.
The diplomat's name is Anders Kviele. He has held high-level diplomatic posts in Europe. He has been, for instance, Sweden's representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which promotes "safe, secure and peaceful" use of nuclear technologies (see IAEA document listing Kviele).
Isn't that a sensitive post? And he's sleeping with an accused spy?
In any case, I sent Kviele an email asking if he would like to comment. I'll post any responses I receive from him.

Sweden drawn into spy web

2013-04-29T21:47:00.002-04:00

Arrest warrant for Veláquez

U.S. authorities wrote to accused spy Marta Rita Velázquez in December 2011 to ask if she would be interested in settling the accusations against her, but she "declined the government's invitation to communicate," court records show.
That led the U.S. Attorney's Office on April 24 to ask a federal judge to unseal the 2004 indictment against Velázquez.
Royce C. Lamberth, chief judge in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, granted the motion on April 26, allowing the indictment to be disclosed.
The Feb. 5, 2004, indictment accuses Velázquez, 55, a former U.S. government employee, of a single count of conspiracy to commit espionage. The charge is punishable by up to life in prison or even death under certain circumstances - not that such a punishment would apply in Velázquez's case.
U.S. authorities issued an arrest warrant for Velázquez the day after she was charged, but the indictment was sealed so that she wouldn't find out about the accusations and evade capture.
At the time, Velázquez was living in Guatemala City with her husband, Anders Kviele, a Swedish diplomat. She had worked for the U.S. Agency for International Development in Guatemala, but quit that job before her indictment.
USAID had stationed her in Guatemala so she could be with Kviele. Since the indictment, prosecutors say, Velázquez has been with her husband on diplomatic missions in Europe and has avoided traveling to any areas that are within U.S. jurisdiction, court records show.
An Oct. 5, 2011, motion to modify the 2004 order sealing the indictment stated:

Defendant Velázquez has become a Swedish citizen, but has not renounced her United States citizenship. She has traveled on a Swedish passport with the privileges extended to families of diplomats.

An April 24, 2013, motion said Velázquez has been trying to avoid arrest for more than a decade.

Defendant Velázquez is well aware that she is subject to arrest if she places herself within the jurisdiction of the United States. She has studiously avoided doing so since at least 2002.

Some Swedish blogs are reporting that Velázquez:

Sought Swedish citizenship to make it more difficult for the U.S. government to extradite her.
Was denied citizenship in 2002 when she had been in Sweden for only a few months.
Was granted citizenship after the Swedish Foreign Ministry in January 2003 "more or less ordered" Sweden's Migration Board to grant citizenship.

The 2011 motion said Velázquez likely knew U.S. authorities sought her capture and was purposely trying to avoid capture. It stated:

To date, the United States has been unable to effect the arrest of defendant Velázquez. Since the time of the Indictment, defendant Velázquez has avoided placing herself within the reach of United States authorities and the government has reason to believe that this is purposeful. Defendant Velázquez is undoubtedly aware that her co-conspirator, convicted Cuban spy Ana Belen Montes, has cooperated with the United States and would have exposed defendant Velázquez’s role in the conspiracy, namely, that defendant Velázquez helped recruit Montes to serve as an agent of the Cuban Intelligence Service as alleged in the Indictment.

There was, among other things, extensive media coverage of the prosecution of Montes dating to September 2001, which would have informed defendant Velázquez of Montes’s cooperation with the government.

Given those facts, and the amount of time that has passed since the Indictment was returned, the government believes that it is in the interest of the United States to inform defendant Velázquez of the fact of her Indictment and the nature of the charge against her, and seek to meet with her counsel to seek her cooperation and/or a negotiated disposition of this matter. If defendant Velázquez declines the government’s invitation, the government will take additional steps that it deems necessary to resolve this matter including, if necessary, seeking leave to unseal the Indictment.

Prior to contacting defendant Velázquez, the government will also need to notify the U.S. Department of State and the Government of Sweden that it is communicating with one of Sweden’s citizens regarding an indicted espionage matter. The government will instruct representatives of the Department of State and the Government of Sweden not to publicly disseminate the fact of the Indictment or the nature of the charge against defendant Velázquez.

Court records show that U.S. District Judge James Robertson on Dec. 17, 2008, granted a motion allowing the government to disclose the sealed indictment to the FBI and to the "United States intelligence community for the purpose of collecting evidence in a related investigation."
It seems plausible that authorities might have showed some lenience toward Velázquez if she had cooperated and assisted with any U.S. investigations into Cuba-related espionage.
Instead it appears she has avoided capture, possibly with the help of her diplomat husband, and now faces dire legal consequences.
The indictment accuses Veláquez of violating the espionage statutes of U.S. Code, specifically, sections (a) and (c) of 18 USC § 794 - Gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign government.
Sections (a) and (c) is described as follows:

(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national defense, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, except that the sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury or, if there is no jury, the court, further finds that the offense resulted in the identification by a foreign power (as defined in section 101(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) of an individual acting as an agent of the United States and consequently in the death of that individual, or directly concerned nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft or satellites, early warning systems, or other means of defense or retaliation against large-scale attack; war plans; communications intelligence or cryptographic information; or any other major weapons system or major element of defense strategy.

(c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy.

The prosecutors who requested that the indictment be made public this month are:

Gordon Michael Harvey, of the National Security Section of the U.S. Attorney's Office,
Laura A. Ingersoll, of the U.S. Attorney's Office.

1977 photo of accused spy

2013-04-29T16:24:00.000-04:00

Marta Rita Velazquez is at right

On June 3, 1992, Princeton Alumni Weekly published a photo of a woman it identified as Marta Rita Velazquez.
A woman of the same name was accused of conspiracy to commit espionage in an indictment that was unsealed on April 25.
Velazquez and others in the 1977 photo were protesting against apartheid, according to Alumni Weekly.

Tale of a quirky bank robber

2013-04-29T10:28:00.001-04:00

Kindle edition now available on Amazon.com.

I met John Stanley by chance in Cuba more than a decade ago. He was a crime consultant and lectured at universities. He had a radio show, “Crime Wise With John Stanley,” which aired every Sunday on KRLD-AM in Dallas.
But in 2003, he snapped, robbing - by his estimate - 34 banks in Texas and five other states. The FBI nicknamed him the “Bubba Tooth Bandit” for his habit of wearing ugly fake teeth with dirty gums.
He was convicted and sent to prison, where he's Inmate No. 16051-077 and has a scheduled release date of May 18, 2062.
Now 69, Stanley went into seclusion after his latest conviction. He has not told his story to anyone - until now.
I interviewed Stanley at the Federal Correctional Complex in Beaumont, Texas, where he is serving a 57-year sentence.
You can read about his exploits in the "Bubba Toothed Bandit," now available on Amazon.com.

Indictment details spy accusations

2013-04-26T09:26:00.001-04:00

The U.S. government's case against Marta Rita Velázquez is a tale of intrigue and clandestine travel, false passports and secret meetings.
Prosecutors say Velázquez introduced Ana Belén Montes to Cuban agents in 1984 and later helped Montes land a job with the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.
Montes went on to become one of the most damaging spies in U.S. history, authorities say. She was arrested in 2001, convicted in 2002 and sent to prison.
In 2003, a grand jury charged Velázquez with one count of conspiracy to commit espionage. The indictment was filed on Feb. 5, 2004, but remained under court seal until Thursday. It's unclear why U.S. authorities unsealed it now, more than nine years after the indictment.
Velázquez is thought to be living in Stockholm, Sweden. I called what I believe to be her mobile phone number. I heard a message in a language I do not understand, and left a message.
A Swedish reporter also called Velázquez's number and said that a woman answered, irritated, and said, "What? Who is it? Oh, OK," and then hung up.
The Swedish TT news agency reported that Velázquez is now a Swedish citizen.
The Washington Post reported that U.S. authorities in December 2011 told Velázquez "she was under suspicion."
The U.S. extradition treaty with Sweden does not include espionage in crimes requiring extradition. See treaty. (H/T Phil Peters).

Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Local, an English-language newspaper in Sweden, reported Friday that Velázquez's husband was an official in Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The paper did not name the husband, but said:

The acts of espionage were carried out while the two were married.
Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Charlotta Ozaki Macías confirmed that the ministry had been aware of the case for years.
"The Foreign Ministry official with a connection to the case is not guilty of criminal activity," she told the TT news agency.
The Swedish man remains in service at the ministry.
Sweden has not received any requests to extradite the woman to the US, according to Per Claréus, press secretary to Justice Minister Beatrice Ask.
He told TT that if the US was to send an extradition request, it would be refused.

The indictment (H/T Capitol Hill Cubans) alleges that Velázquez carried out the following overt acts:

September 1983: Traveled secretly to Mexico City, intending to meet Cuban agents, but they evidently did not show up.
Spring of 1984: Took Montes to dinner and told her she "had friends who could help Montes in Montes' expressed wish to assist the people of Nicaragua."
July 31, 1984: Wrote Montes a letter stating, "It has been a great satisfaction for me to have had you as a friend and comrade (compañera) during this time we've spent as students. I hope our relationship continues outside the academic sphere."
Fall of 1984: Invited Montes to travel with her from Washington, D.C., to New York "ostensibly to meet a friend who could provide Montes with an opportunity to assist the Nicaraguan people."
Dec. 16, 1984: Went with Montes by train to New York and met with a Cuban intelligence official who worked at the Cuban Mission to the United Nations and was identified in the indictment only as "M." Velázquez later told Montes that "M" told Velázquez that Montes "would be one of the best."
Early 1985: Gave Montes and typewriter and instructed her to write a detailed biography, including a description of the Justice Department job she had at the time. The two again traveled to New York to meet with "M."
March 1985: Traveled with Montes to Spain on a purported vacation. Met with a Cuban man who supplied false passports. Traveled clandestinely from Madrid to Prague using the false passports. Met with two Cuban men, including an agent referred to only as "F." Picked up clothes at an apartment, then traveled with Montes and "F" to Cuba.

U.S.: Velázquez wanted to practice taking a lie detector test.

April 1985: Met with a Cuban agent referred to only as "A." The agent explained that no one met her in Mexico City in 1983 because Mexican authorities on Sept. 1, 1983, had arrested, detained and interrogated two Cuban officials who had been trying to meet with Cuban exiles from Miami. Velázquez and Montes "received Cuban Intelligence Service training, including instruction in receiving encrypted High Frequency radio broadcast messages of the Cuban Intelligence Service." Velázquez asked Cuban agents to give them "practice" polygraph exams "so that they would be able to pass polygraphs they might have to take in connection with future United States government employment." Cuban agents gave Velázquez a code name: Barbara. Velázquez and Montes traveled back to Spain, via Prague, posing for a photo in Madrid so they'd have evidence of their "vacation."
1988: "Provoked a dispute with Montes and publicly broke off their relationship."
June 15, 1992: "Traveled to Panama to clandestinely meet with Cuban Intelligence Service officers and/or agents."
Mid-1996: "Received encryption/decryption software from the Cuban Intelligence Service, and used it for her clandestine communications with the Cuban Intelligence Service."
June 2002: Quit from her U.S. government job after Montes pled guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage and agreed to cooperate with law enforcement. Since then, Velázquez has lived continuously outside the U.S.

Federal Medical Center, Carswell

FBI agents arrested Montes on Sept. 21, 2001. (See FBI affidavit explaining case against her). She pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage and is now serving a prison term at the Federal Medical Center, Carswell, a Texas facility that provides specialized medical and mental health services to female inmates. Her scheduled release date is July 1, 2023.
Velázquez, like Montes, is from Puerto Rico. She was born in the town of Ponce and grew up in the United States. Her degrees include:

A bachelor's degree in political science and Latin American studies from Princeton University.
A law degree from Georgetown University.
A master's degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, or SAIS.

The Daily Princetonian reported that Velázquez helped organize the Third World Center Cultural Festival at the school. The Dec. 13, 1976, issue of the Princetonian quoted her as saying:

We are all part of oppressed nationalities throughout the world. Here at the university, which is very conservative and white-male-oriented, if we can put together a performance as successful as this one was, it's almost unbelievable.

Velázquez: "We are all...oppressed..."

While at SAIS from 1982 to 1983, Velázquez was a legal intern at the U.S. Agency for International Development. The indictment says she:

Worked for the Department of Transportation from 1984 to March 1989, and had a SECRET security clearance. Unauthorized release of SECRET information could reasonably be expected to cause "serious" damage.
Became an attorney adviser for USAID in March 1989, and had a TOP SECRET security clearance. Unauthorized release of TOP SECRET information could reasonably be expected to cause "grave" damage. Her responsibilities at USAID included Central America.
Was posted at the U.S. Embassy in Managua from June 1990 to September 1994.
Worked for USAID in Washington from September 1994 to May 1998.
Was on leave without pay from May 1998 to June 2000 and lived with her husband in Sweden.
Returned to USAID in June 2000 and worked at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City. She was director of the agency's Regional Office of Trade and Economic Analysis.
Left USAID in June 2002, but continued to live in Guatemala.

The indictment says Velázquez began spying for Cuba as early as 1983. It states:

From at least in or about 1983 and continuing until the present, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendant, Marta Rita Velázquez, also known as Marta Rita Kviele, also known as "Barbara", unlawfully combined, conspired, confederated, and agreed together with persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to communicate, deliver and transmit, directly and indirectly, to the government of the Republic of Cuba and to representatives, officers, agents and employees thereof, documents, writings, and information relating to the national defense, with the intent and reason to believe that they would be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of the Republic of Cuba, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(a).

Montes, right, at a party in Madrid. Photo: Washington Post

The indictment also gives background information about the Cuban Intelligence Service and explains the accusations against Montes. It states:

The Cuban Intelligence Service has long had an aggressive program aimed at spotting and assessing persons within the United States academic community who may be suitable for recruitment to serve a variety of roles on behalf of Cuba's interests. The most important role is that of agent - that is, a person who is not an employee of a hostile intelligence service (such as the Cuban Intelligence Service) but who is aware that he or she is working for that service and who is willing to engage in clandestine operational activity, including intelligence gathering, for that service.

An agent-in-place is a recruited agent who occupies a position in which he or she has authorize access to current intelligence information, and who acts under the direction of a hostile intelligence service so as to obtain such information for that intelligence service. In order to protect recruited agents, and maintain operational security, intelligence services often limit discernible contact between agents; this practice is called compartmentalization.

The Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York City, and the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C., are the principal establishments to which Cuban government officials having diplomatic immunity - including Cuban Intelligence Service officers - are assigned in the United States.

FBI: Belén used this "cheat sheet" to help her encrypt and decrypt messages.

The Cuban Intelligence Service often communicates clandestinely with its officers and agents operating outside Cuba by broadcasting encrypted radio messages at certain high frequencies; such clandestine communications were used by Ana Belén Montes and by some of the defendants convicted in June 2001 in the Southern District of Florida, in the case of United States v. Gerardo Hernandez, et al., 98-721-CR-Lenard, of committing espionage on behalf of Cuba and acting as unregistered agents of Cuba.

Ana Belén Montes is a United States citizen who was employed by the United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DAI) in Washington, D.C., as an intelligence analyst from September 1985 until September 2001; beginning in 1992, she specialized in Cuban matters. Between 1982 and 1984, Montes had been a part-time graduate student at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C., together with defendant Velázquez. On September 21, 2001, Montes was arrested in the District of Columbia on charges of committing espionage against the United States on behalf of Cuba, in United States v. Ana Belén Montes, Criminal No. 02-131 (RMU). In a public proceeding on March 19, 2002, she pled guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage and she stated that she agreed to cooperate with the United States government in its continuing investigation into Cuban espionage activities against the United States.

Ana Belén Montes receives an award. Photo: DIA

On April 18, the Washington Post published a fascinating story about Montes. Jim Popkin, a former NBC News reporter and senior investigative producer, wrote the piece. It was entitled, "Ana Montes did much harm spying for Cuba. Chances are, you haven’t heard of her." The story said:

Like Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen before her, Ana Montes blindsided the intelligence community with brazen acts of treason. By day, she was a buttoned-down GS-14 in a Defense Intelligence Agency cubicle. By night, she was on the clock for Fidel Castro, listening to coded messages over shortwave radio, passing encrypted files to handlers in crowded restaurants and slipping undetected into Cuba wearing a wig and clutching a phony passport.
Montes spied for 17 years, patiently, methodically. She passed along so many secrets about her colleagues — and the advanced eavesdropping platforms that American spooks had covertly installed in Cuba — that intelligence experts consider her among the most harmful spies in recent memory.

FBI suspect at home in Stockholm?

2013-04-25T16:33:00.003-04:00

Possible residence of Marta Rita Velazquez, 55, accused Thursday of conspiracy to commit espionage. See FBI press release.