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      <title>Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</title>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R</link>
      <description>Table of Contents for American Journal of Political Science. List of articles from both the latest and EarlyView issues.</description>
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      <copyright>© Midwest Political Science Association</copyright>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 07:46:52 +0000</pubDate>
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      <dc:title>Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</dc:title>
      <dc:publisher>Wiley</dc:publisher>
      <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
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         <title>Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</title>
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         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70060?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 21:39:35 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-03T09:39:35-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
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         <title>The demand for elections under autocracy: Regime approval and the elimination of local elections in Russia</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Most contemporary autocracies hold elections. Does the public value these elections? If so, do they value them enough to punish incumbents that subvert elections? We examine this question in contemporary Russia, examining whether individuals withdraw support from regime leaders when local elections are eliminated. Over the past 25 years, most Russian cities have replaced their directly elected mayors with appointed executives. This paper uses the largest data set on public opinion ever assembled on Russia—over 400,000 responses drawn from two decades by Russia's top polling agencies—to analyze how the elimination of elections in Russia's large cities has affected public attitudes toward the authorities. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that election cancellation reduces support for President Vladimir Putin. This effect is stronger in settings with histories of robust electoral competition. This suggests that the public is more likely to punish incumbents for eliminating elections when individuals have experience with competitive elections.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Most contemporary autocracies hold elections. Does the public value these elections? If so, do they value them enough to punish incumbents that subvert elections? We examine this question in contemporary Russia, examining whether individuals withdraw support from regime leaders when local elections are eliminated. Over the past 25 years, most Russian cities have replaced their directly elected mayors with appointed executives. This paper uses the largest data set on public opinion ever assembled on Russia—over 400,000 responses drawn from two decades by Russia's top polling agencies—to analyze how the elimination of elections in Russia's large cities has affected public attitudes toward the authorities. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that election cancellation reduces support for President Vladimir Putin. This effect is stronger in settings with histories of robust electoral competition. This suggests that the public is more likely to punish incumbents for eliminating elections when individuals have experience with competitive elections.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Quintin H. Beazer, 
Noah Buckley, 
Ora John Reuter
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The demand for elections under autocracy: Regime approval and the elimination of local elections in Russia</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70060</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70060</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70060?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70065?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2026 22:09:59 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-19T10:09:59-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70065</guid>
         <title>Breaking barriers: How an international treaty for women reduces the size of the informal economy</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Prior research on the role the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has improving women's outcomes has shown ratification results in increased political and social rights, yet no improvements in economic rights. I challenge prior findings by providing evidence that CEDAW improves women's economic rights by reducing gendered legal barriers to employment. I also demonstrate CEDAW has unexpected but desirable downstream consequences that further improve women's economic outcomes by facilitating movement from the informal to the formal economy. Through matching within a difference‐in‐differences design, I show ratifying countries experience a significant increase in women's equality of economic opportunity and a significant decrease in the size of the informal economy. These results hold under multiple robustness checks and placebo tests. By examining specific outcomes that are relevant to CEDAW, I offer greater insight into CEDAW's impact on women's economic outcomes than previous research has afforded.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prior research on the role the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has improving women's outcomes has shown ratification results in increased political and social rights, yet no improvements in economic rights. I challenge prior findings by providing evidence that CEDAW improves women's economic rights by reducing gendered legal barriers to employment. I also demonstrate CEDAW has unexpected but desirable downstream consequences that further improve women's economic outcomes by facilitating movement from the informal to the formal economy. Through matching within a difference-in-differences design, I show ratifying countries experience a significant increase in women's equality of economic opportunity and a significant decrease in the size of the informal economy. These results hold under multiple robustness checks and placebo tests. By examining specific outcomes that are relevant to CEDAW, I offer greater insight into CEDAW's impact on women's economic outcomes than previous research has afforded.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Chris Gahagan
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Breaking barriers: How an international treaty for women reduces the size of the informal economy</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70065</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70065</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70065?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70064?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2026 22:05:06 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-19T10:05:06-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70064</guid>
         <title>Post‐instrument bias</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
When using instrumental variables, researchers often assume that causal effects are only identified conditional on covariates. We show that the role of these covariates is often unclear and that there exists confusion regarding their ability to mitigate violations of the exclusion restriction. We explain when and how existing adjustment strategies may lead to “post‐instrument” bias. We then discuss assumptions that are sufficient to identify various treatment effects when adjustment for post‐instrument variables is required. In general, these assumptions are highly restrictive, albeit they sometimes are testable. We also show that other existing tests are possibly misleading. Then, we introduce a sensitivity analysis that uses information on variables influenced by the instrument to gauge the effect of potential violations of the exclusion restriction. We illustrate it using a published study and summarize our results in easy‐to‐understand guidelines.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When using instrumental variables, researchers often assume that causal effects are only identified conditional on covariates. We show that the role of these covariates is often unclear and that there exists confusion regarding their ability to mitigate violations of the exclusion restriction. We explain when and how existing adjustment strategies may lead to “post-instrument” bias. We then discuss assumptions that are sufficient to identify various treatment effects when adjustment for post-instrument variables is required. In general, these assumptions are highly restrictive, albeit they sometimes are testable. We also show that other existing tests are possibly misleading. Then, we introduce a sensitivity analysis that uses information on variables influenced by the instrument to gauge the effect of potential violations of the exclusion restriction. We illustrate it using a published study and summarize our results in easy-to-understand guidelines.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Julian Schuessler, 
Adam N. Glynn, 
Miguel R. Rueda
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Post‐instrument bias</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70064</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70064</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70064?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70063?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 08:50:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-05T08:50:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70063</guid>
         <title>Vote buying and negative agenda control: A problem for the study of money in politics</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Politicians, pundits, and ordinary citizens frequently argue that money has an outsized influence on US politics. Yet research on the effect of money on politicians' behavior finds limited effects, especially on voting behavior. I construct a formal model to show that these limited effects may be an artifact of the institutional powers of agenda setters, and the strategic nature of the data generating process. The model predicts that, under general conditions, vote buying against proposals can occur with no vote held, and that vote buying is most likely when uncertainty is high, the interest group and agenda setter are extreme, and the pivotal legislator is moderate. I argue that these conditions held during the 2021 negotiations over the Build Back Better Act. Using a synthetic control design, I test whether the swing voters in the Senate received more campaign contributions than they would have otherwise, finding evidence consistent with the model.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Politicians, pundits, and ordinary citizens frequently argue that money has an outsized influence on US politics. Yet research on the effect of money on politicians' behavior finds limited effects, especially on voting behavior. I construct a formal model to show that these limited effects may be an artifact of the institutional powers of agenda setters, and the strategic nature of the data generating process. The model predicts that, under general conditions, vote buying against proposals can occur with no vote held, and that vote buying is most likely when uncertainty is high, the interest group and agenda setter are extreme, and the pivotal legislator is moderate. I argue that these conditions held during the 2021 negotiations over the Build Back Better Act. Using a synthetic control design, I test whether the swing voters in the Senate received more campaign contributions than they would have otherwise, finding evidence consistent with the model.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Andre Van Parys
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Vote buying and negative agenda control: A problem for the study of money in politics</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70063</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70063</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70063?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70051?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 08:19:24 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-28T08:19:24-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70051</guid>
         <title>Why are surveys struggling to estimate vote shares?</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Polling in the 2020 US presidential elections significantly underestimated Trump support, calling into question the accuracy of all political surveys. Although many have speculated that this bias is due to Trump supporters refusing to respond to surveys, we have previously lacked the data to directly evaluate this theory. This paper leverages the rich and unique set of data collected alongside the 2020 American National Election Studies (ANES) to identify and quantify sources of error using the Total Survey Error framework. We document evidence of nonignorable unit nonresponse; that is, Trump supporters were less likely to respond and less likely to complete the 2020 ANES if they did respond. We are also able to rule out other potential sources of error. Our analyses identify a fundamental threat to political surveys, and careful diagnosis and quantification of the bias is critical for informing corrections and future survey design.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Polling in the 2020 US presidential elections significantly underestimated Trump support, calling into question the accuracy of all political surveys. Although many have speculated that this bias is due to Trump supporters refusing to respond to surveys, we have previously lacked the data to directly evaluate this theory. This paper leverages the rich and unique set of data collected alongside the 2020 American National Election Studies (ANES) to identify and quantify sources of error using the Total Survey Error framework. We document evidence of nonignorable unit nonresponse; that is, Trump supporters were less likely to respond and less likely to complete the 2020 ANES if they did respond. We are also able to rule out other potential sources of error. Our analyses identify a fundamental threat to political surveys, and careful diagnosis and quantification of the bias is critical for informing corrections and future survey design.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Matthew Tyler, 
D. Sunshine Hillygus, 
Matthew DeBell, 
Ted Brader, 
Shanto Iyengar, 
Daron Shaw, 
Nicholas A. Valentino
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Why are surveys struggling to estimate vote shares?</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70051</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70051</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70051?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70062?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 20:30:50 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-26T08:30:50-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70062</guid>
         <title>Climate exposure drives firm political behavior: Evidence from earnings calls and lobbying data</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
When and how do firms engage in climate politics? We argue that regulatory concerns, business opportunities, and physical risks activate policy preferences and lobbying efforts. We measure firm‐level exposure to opportunity, regulatory, and physical aspects of climate change based on discussion in quarterly earnings call transcripts for 11,705 publicly traded firms between 2001 and 2023. We estimate the effect of climate exposure on climate lobbying instances (extensive margin), amount (intensive margin), and targets (political entities). We find that more exposed companies, especially in terms of opportunities and regulation, are more likely to lobby. The type of climate exposure, both absolute and relative to industry peers, dictates whether firms lobby, how much they spend on lobbying, and their choice of government target. Taken together, our findings demonstrate the importance of disaggregating firm‐level perceptions of climate impacts to understand patterns in political activity.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When and how do firms engage in climate politics? We argue that regulatory concerns, business opportunities, and physical risks activate policy preferences and lobbying efforts. We measure firm-level exposure to opportunity, regulatory, and physical aspects of climate change based on discussion in quarterly earnings call transcripts for 11,705 publicly traded firms between 2001 and 2023. We estimate the effect of climate exposure on climate lobbying instances (extensive margin), amount (intensive margin), and targets (political entities). We find that more exposed companies, especially in terms of opportunities and regulation, are more likely to lobby. The type of climate exposure, both absolute and relative to industry peers, dictates whether firms lobby, how much they spend on lobbying, and their choice of government target. Taken together, our findings demonstrate the importance of disaggregating firm-level perceptions of climate impacts to understand patterns in political activity.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Christian Baehr, 
Fiona Bare, 
Vincent Heddesheimer
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Climate exposure drives firm political behavior: Evidence from earnings calls and lobbying data</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70062</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70062</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70062?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70061?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 01:13:54 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-26T01:13:54-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70061</guid>
         <title>Experience and self‐interest: Diverging responses to global warming</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
People are increasingly feeling global warming's effects through extreme heat and natural disasters. How do these climate shocks affect political attitudes? We argue that the effect of climate‐related experiences depends significantly on self‐interest. People in more vulnerable locations are more likely to respond to climate shocks with greater concern and more support for mitigation policy. We test this hypothesis with a macroeconomic model of climate change, geospatial data on climate shocks, and survey data of 148,712 people across 137 countries, and over time with the same 9,500 individuals in the United States. The results show that climate shocks heighten risk perceptions and lead to greater support for mitigation policies only among people in climate‐vulnerable places. This responsiveness to experience is most evident in democratic countries and among people whose livelihoods depend on the weather. Integrating political economy and behavioral theories helps to explain how political attitudes change.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;People are increasingly feeling global warming's effects through extreme heat and natural disasters. How do these climate shocks affect political attitudes? We argue that the effect of climate-related experiences depends significantly on self-interest. People in more vulnerable locations are more likely to respond to climate shocks with greater concern and more support for mitigation policy. We test this hypothesis with a macroeconomic model of climate change, geospatial data on climate shocks, and survey data of 148,712 people across 137 countries, and over time with the same 9,500 individuals in the United States. The results show that climate shocks heighten risk perceptions and lead to greater support for mitigation policies only among people in climate-vulnerable places. This responsiveness to experience is most evident in democratic countries and among people whose livelihoods depend on the weather. Integrating political economy and behavioral theories helps to explain how political attitudes change.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Alexander F. Gazmararian, 
Helen V. Milner
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Experience and self‐interest: Diverging responses to global warming</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70061</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70061</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70061?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12949?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12949</guid>
         <title>A strike for democracy? Migration, the bigot's veto, and the electoral use of force</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 491-502, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Politicians and philosophers alike have warned that the spread of anti‐migrant bigotry in the Western world requires a tragic trade‐off regarding immigration policy: Although millions of asylum‐seekers might be owed admission to Western democracies, there are many cases where they nonetheless ought to be denied entry, because their admission is overly likely to increase the electoral appeal of extreme rightwing figures and parties, thus endangering the host country's liberal democracy. This article scrutinizes this influential view, by juxtaposing electorally driven migration policy with electorally driven military strikes abroad. If turning millions of asylum‐seekers away can be tragically appropriate as a means of thwarting the electoral rise of the extreme right, why cannot the same be true for military strikes overseas that might harm a far smaller number of innocent outsiders? I examine what—if anything—explains the difference between these two cases.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Politicians and philosophers alike have warned that the spread of anti-migrant bigotry in the Western world requires a tragic trade-off regarding immigration policy: Although millions of asylum-seekers might be owed admission to Western democracies, there are many cases where they nonetheless ought to be denied entry, because their admission is overly likely to increase the electoral appeal of extreme rightwing figures and parties, thus endangering the host country's liberal democracy. This article scrutinizes this influential view, by juxtaposing electorally driven migration policy with electorally driven military strikes abroad. If turning millions of asylum-seekers away can be tragically appropriate as a means of thwarting the electoral rise of the extreme right, why cannot the same be true for military strikes overseas that might harm a far smaller number of innocent outsiders? I examine what—if anything—explains the difference between these two cases.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Shmuel Nili
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>A strike for democracy? Migration, the bigot's veto, and the electoral use of force</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12949</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12949</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12949?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12953?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12953</guid>
         <title>Power, costs, collective action, bargaining, and solidarity</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 441-452, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Some argue that the more costly it would be to exercise one's power over an issue, the less power one inherently has over it. I challenge this thesis with two major objections—one conceptual, the other practical or explanatory—contending that costs influence issue‐power not inherently but contingently in specifically strategic contexts. Since agents’ strategic dispositions are partly shaped by their perception of others’ strategic incentives or dispositions, costs may affect—for better or worse!—one's bargaining power (in cases of conflict) or power to act in concert with others (in cases of shared preferences or aims). In many significant political contexts, greater costs increase actors’ social power. Moreover, a group's collective power, and so its members’ power‐with, depend not only on the external cost structure, but also on opportunities for forging solidarity. The role of costs and solidarity explains why subjection to others can, paradoxically, sometimes increase one's power.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Some argue that the more costly it would be to exercise one's power over an issue, the less power one inherently has over it. I challenge this thesis with two major objections—one conceptual, the other practical or explanatory—contending that costs influence issue-power not inherently but contingently in specifically strategic contexts. Since agents’ strategic dispositions are partly shaped by their perception of others’ strategic incentives or dispositions, costs may affect—for better or worse!—one's bargaining power (in cases of conflict) or power to act in concert with others (in cases of shared preferences or aims). In many significant political contexts, greater costs increase actors’ social power. Moreover, a group's collective power, and so its members’ power-with, depend not only on the external cost structure, but also on opportunities for forging solidarity. The role of costs and solidarity explains why subjection to others can, paradoxically, sometimes increase one's power.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Arash Abizadeh
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Power, costs, collective action, bargaining, and solidarity</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12953</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12953</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12953?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12964?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12964</guid>
         <title>Enchanted democracy: Religion and democratic thought in nineteenth‐century Latin America</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 658-672, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This article recovers an overlooked strand of nineteenth‐century Latin American political thought that I call, “enchanted democracy.” It is epitomized in the work of the Chilean radical democrat, Francisco Bilbao (1823–1865). Deployed in the generation after the Spanish American Wars of Independence, “enchanted democracy” was a postcolonial democratic theory that aimed to justify mass expansion of suffrage, direct democracy, and social equality. This political vision was inescapably theological. Bilbao relied upon scripture, the lives of saints, and sacraments to justify political inclusion, construct a theory of democratic solidarity, and to motivate affection and sacrificial love among citizens. By using theological concepts and popular religious expression to build a future politics, I argue that “enchanted democracy” broadens theoretical approaches to the relationship between religion and democracy. This article also signals the importance of Latin American political thought for contemporary democratic theory.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This article recovers an overlooked strand of nineteenth-century Latin American political thought that I call, “enchanted democracy.” It is epitomized in the work of the Chilean radical democrat, Francisco Bilbao (1823–1865). Deployed in the generation after the Spanish American Wars of Independence, “enchanted democracy” was a postcolonial democratic theory that aimed to justify mass expansion of suffrage, direct democracy, and social equality. This political vision was inescapably theological. Bilbao relied upon scripture, the lives of saints, and sacraments to justify political inclusion, construct a theory of democratic solidarity, and to motivate affection and sacrificial love among citizens. By using theological concepts and popular religious expression to build a future politics, I argue that “enchanted democracy” broadens theoretical approaches to the relationship between religion and democracy. This article also signals the importance of Latin American political thought for contemporary democratic theory.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Michael S. Thomas
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Enchanted democracy: Religion and democratic thought in nineteenth‐century Latin America</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12964</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12964</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12964?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12975?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12975</guid>
         <title>Tracing the “true liberalism”: F. A. Hayek as a reader of Tocqueville</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 738-751, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
In reaction to diagnoses of a “crisis of liberalism,” scholars are actively engaged in revising our understanding of the tradition's history. This article explores an alternative account of the liberal past that appeared at a parallel moment of “crisis”: the Nobel Laureate economist F.A. Hayek's interwar typology of two liberalisms, true and false. It argues that Hayek mobilized Alexis de Tocqueville as one representative of the “true liberal tradition,” revived to challenge varieties of collectivism and illiberalism in the twentieth century. Hayek's Tocqueville was an evolving exemplar of that true liberalism in reaction to its opponents, left and right, assuming distinct roles for Hayek as he tried to foreclose the road to serfdom. Hayek's idiosyncratic renderings of Tocqueville, this article maintains, offer both normative and methodological lessons for us today about defining the liberal tradition and identifying the sources of its decline.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In reaction to diagnoses of a “crisis of liberalism,” scholars are actively engaged in revising our understanding of the tradition's history. This article explores an alternative account of the liberal past that appeared at a parallel moment of “crisis”: the Nobel Laureate economist F.A. Hayek's interwar typology of two liberalisms, true and false. It argues that Hayek mobilized Alexis de Tocqueville as one representative of the “true liberal tradition,” revived to challenge varieties of collectivism and illiberalism in the twentieth century. Hayek's Tocqueville was an evolving exemplar of that true liberalism in reaction to its opponents, left and right, assuming distinct roles for Hayek as he tried to foreclose the road to serfdom. Hayek's idiosyncratic renderings of Tocqueville, this article maintains, offer both normative and methodological lessons for us today about defining the liberal tradition and identifying the sources of its decline.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Gianna Englert
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Tracing the “true liberalism”: F. A. Hayek as a reader of Tocqueville</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12975</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12975</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12975?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12963?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12963</guid>
         <title>An anatomy of worldmaking: Sukarno and anticolonialism from post‐Bandung Indonesia</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 571-586, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This article analyzes the anticolonial worldmaking of postcolonial Indonesia's first president Sukarno, during Guided Democracy (1959–1965). Using worldmaking as a conceptual interface, the article offers three interconnected interventions. First, Sukarno's range of anticolonial activity allows for a conceptual advance by revealing three dimensions of worldmaking: discursive, institutional, and dramaturgical. This typology works towards arresting worldmaking's conceptual overextension without sacrificing its generative character. Second, it integrates Southeast Asian trajectories of worldmaking into scholarly discussion of anticolonial political thought. Contrary to other anticolonial figures, Sukarno's worldmaking revolved around a postcolonial vision of global order outside the United Nations. By analyzing Sukarno's contextually specific vision of the relationship between international organizations and decolonization, this article underscores the importance of sensitivity to situated understandings of anticolonialism. Third, this article reorients Sukarno scholarship by inter alia resituating him within the Third World. The article closes by laying out some contradictions of Sukarno's anticolonial worldmaking project.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This article analyzes the anticolonial worldmaking of postcolonial Indonesia's first president Sukarno, during Guided Democracy (1959–1965). Using worldmaking as a conceptual interface, the article offers three interconnected interventions. First, Sukarno's range of anticolonial activity allows for a conceptual advance by revealing three dimensions of worldmaking: discursive, institutional, and dramaturgical. This typology works towards arresting worldmaking's conceptual overextension without sacrificing its generative character. Second, it integrates Southeast Asian trajectories of worldmaking into scholarly discussion of anticolonial political thought. Contrary to other anticolonial figures, Sukarno's worldmaking revolved around a postcolonial vision of global order &lt;i&gt;outside&lt;/i&gt; the United Nations. By analyzing Sukarno's contextually specific vision of the relationship between international organizations and decolonization, this article underscores the importance of sensitivity to situated understandings of anticolonialism. Third, this article reorients Sukarno scholarship by inter alia resituating him within the Third World. The article closes by laying out some contradictions of Sukarno's anticolonial worldmaking project.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Say Jye Quah
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>An anatomy of worldmaking: Sukarno and anticolonialism from post‐Bandung Indonesia</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12963</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12963</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12963?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12955?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12955</guid>
         <title>“Welcome to France.” Can mandatory integration contracts foster immigrant integration?</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 425-440, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
European governments, struggling with incorporating diverse immigrant populations, introduced integration contracts. Through language training and compulsory civics courses, these contracts aim to induce new migrants to adopt the host society's culture, respect its values, and improve their labor market outcomes. Despite their popularity, little empirical evidence exists on whether integration contracts catalyze integration or trigger a backlash. To shed light on this question, we leverage the staggered introduction of France's integration contract across metropolitan departments between 2003 and 2006 to implement a regression discontinuity design. We use census data, labor force surveys, and our own survey of refugees to estimate the effect of the contract on integration outcomes. We find the integration contract facilitated employment in the short term without backlash but did not translate into long‐lasting integration gains.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;European governments, struggling with incorporating diverse immigrant populations, introduced integration contracts. Through language training and compulsory civics courses, these contracts aim to induce new migrants to adopt the host society's culture, respect its values, and improve their labor market outcomes. Despite their popularity, little empirical evidence exists on whether integration contracts catalyze integration or trigger a backlash. To shed light on this question, we leverage the staggered introduction of France's integration contract across metropolitan departments between 2003 and 2006 to implement a regression discontinuity design. We use census data, labor force surveys, and our own survey of refugees to estimate the effect of the contract on integration outcomes. We find the integration contract facilitated employment in the short term without backlash but did not translate into long-lasting integration gains.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Mathilde Emeriau, 
Jens Hainmueller, 
Dominik Hangartner, 
David D. Laitin
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>“Welcome to France.” Can mandatory integration contracts foster immigrant integration?</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12955</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12955</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12955?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12957?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12957</guid>
         <title>Polarization over the priority of political problems</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 503-521, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
What drives ideological division about political problems? When prioritizing which problems are most in need of redress, voters might disagree about the severity of individual outcomes that constitute such problems; the prevalence of those problems; or whether such problems are amenable to solution by government action. We field a large survey experiment in the United Kingdom and the United States and develop a new measurement approach that allows us to evaluate how ideological disagreements change when respondents consider the individual badness, social severity, and priority for government action of a set of 41 political problems. We find that large ideological divergences are observed in beliefs about social severity and priority for government action, not individual problem badness, and only in the United States. An important implication of these results is that perceptions of problem prevalence are a key source of polarization over problem‐prioritization in the United States.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What drives ideological division about political problems? When prioritizing which problems are most in need of redress, voters might disagree about the severity of individual outcomes that constitute such problems; the prevalence of those problems; or whether such problems are amenable to solution by government action. We field a large survey experiment in the United Kingdom and the United States and develop a new measurement approach that allows us to evaluate how ideological disagreements change when respondents consider the individual badness, social severity, and priority for government action of a set of 41 political problems. We find that large ideological divergences are observed in beliefs about social severity and priority for government action, not individual problem badness, and only in the United States. An important implication of these results is that perceptions of problem prevalence are a key source of polarization over problem-prioritization in the United States.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Benjamin E. Lauderdale, 
Jack Blumenau
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Polarization over the priority of political problems</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12957</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12957</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12957?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12965?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12965</guid>
         <title>Persuasive lobbying and the value of connections</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 539-554, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The inflow of money into politics and the influence of interest groups on policies are well‐documented, but the monetary value of accessing policymakers is less well‐understood. As a result, it is unclear what inferences researchers can draw from lobbying expenditures about interest groups' strategies and their ideological alignment with policymakers. We study a model of informational lobbying with a collective decision‐making body and endogenous reforms to investigate the determinants of the value of access. We show that the funds flowing to a given policymaker depend not only on this policymaker's ideology and procedural power but also on the overall distribution of preferences and power among other policymakers. Two policymakers with the same ideology and procedural power might therefore attract different amounts of contributions, depending on the preferences of fellow policymakers. Our results help clarify empirical research linking lobbying expenditures by interest groups to politicians' ideologies and power.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The inflow of money into politics and the influence of interest groups on policies are well-documented, but the monetary value of accessing policymakers is less well-understood. As a result, it is unclear what inferences researchers can draw from lobbying expenditures about interest groups' strategies and their ideological alignment with policymakers. We study a model of informational lobbying with a collective decision-making body and endogenous reforms to investigate the determinants of the value of access. We show that the funds flowing to a given policymaker depend not only on this policymaker's ideology and procedural power but also on the overall distribution of preferences and power among other policymakers. Two policymakers with the same ideology and procedural power might therefore attract different amounts of contributions, depending on the preferences of fellow policymakers. Our results help clarify empirical research linking lobbying expenditures by interest groups to politicians' ideologies and power.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Emiel Awad, 
Clement Minaudier
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Persuasive lobbying and the value of connections</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12965</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12965</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12965?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12968?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12968</guid>
         <title>Measuring electoral democracy with observables</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 606-622, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Most cross‐national indices of democracy rely centrally on coder judgments, which are susceptible to bias and error, and require expensive and time‐consuming coding by experts. We present an approach to measurement based on observables that aim to preserve the nuanced quality of subjectively coded democracy indices. Our observable‐to‐subjective score mapping is free of idiosyncratic coder errors arising from misinformation, slack, or biases. It is less susceptible to systematic bias that may arise from coders’ inferences about a country's regime, for example, from the ideology of the ruler. The data collection procedure and mode of analysis are fully transparent and replicable, and the procedure is based on random forests and is cheap to produce, easy to update, and offers coverage for all polities with sovereign or semisovereign status, surpassing the sample of any existing index. We show that this expansive coverage makes a big difference to our understanding of some causal questions.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Most cross-national indices of democracy rely centrally on coder judgments, which are susceptible to bias and error, and require expensive and time-consuming coding by experts. We present an approach to measurement based on observables that aim to preserve the nuanced quality of subjectively coded democracy indices. Our observable-to-subjective score mapping is free of idiosyncratic coder errors arising from misinformation, slack, or biases. It is less susceptible to systematic bias that may arise from coders’ inferences about a country's regime, for example, from the ideology of the ruler. The data collection procedure and mode of analysis are fully transparent and replicable, and the procedure is based on random forests and is cheap to produce, easy to update, and offers coverage for all polities with sovereign or semisovereign status, surpassing the sample of any existing index. We show that this expansive coverage makes a big difference to our understanding of some causal questions.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Daniel Weitzel, 
John Gerring, 
Daniel Pemstein, 
Svend‐Erik Skaaning
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Measuring electoral democracy with observables</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12968</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12968</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12968?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12970?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12970</guid>
         <title>National identity after conquest</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 768-785, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Conquering powers routinely adopt state‐directed nationalization projects that seek to make the boundaries of the nation coterminous with the (newly expanded) boundaries of the state. To this end, they implement policies that elevate the economic status of individuals who embrace the occupier's national identity and discriminate against those who do not. This paper develops a formal model that illuminates when such policies succeed or fail. We show that the effectiveness of discrimination hinges on the perceived longevity of occupation. If occupier rule is expected to be short‐lived, discrimination will backfire, as dissident parents transmit the marginalized national identity to their children; intense intergenerational socialization more than compensates for the negative wealth effects of discrimination. If occupier rule is instead perceived to be long‐lasting, discrimination will achieve its intended aims. Case studies on the Chilean occupation of Tacna, Peru (1880–1929), and the Prussian occupation of Northern Schleswig (1866–1920) illustrate the logic.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conquering powers routinely adopt state-directed nationalization projects that seek to make the boundaries of the nation coterminous with the (newly expanded) boundaries of the state. To this end, they implement policies that elevate the economic status of individuals who embrace the occupier's national identity and discriminate against those who do not. This paper develops a formal model that illuminates when such policies succeed or fail. We show that the effectiveness of discrimination hinges on the perceived longevity of occupation. If occupier rule is expected to be short-lived, discrimination will backfire, as dissident parents transmit the marginalized national identity to their children; intense intergenerational socialization more than compensates for the negative wealth effects of discrimination. If occupier rule is instead perceived to be long-lasting, discrimination will achieve its intended aims. Case studies on the Chilean occupation of Tacna, Peru (1880–1929), and the Prussian occupation of Northern Schleswig (1866–1920) illustrate the logic.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Christopher Carter, 
Daniel W. Gingerich
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>National identity after conquest</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12970</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12970</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12970?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12976?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12976</guid>
         <title>Speaking their language?: Multilingualism in party communication across democracies</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 752-767, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Which parties embrace multilingualism in their communication? Despite growing interest in parties’ multilingualism among normative scholars of deliberative democracy, empirical research has largely overlooked the linguistic aspect of party competition. We leverage large‐scale data on Facebook posts by more than 800 parties in 87 democracies and analyze their day‐to‐day language practices. By so doing, we develop, for the first time, the classification of monolingual and multilingual parties around the world. Moreover, using this novel dataset, we explore what factors are associated with parties’ adoption of multilingualism and how multilingual parties predict the language use of candidates they nominate. Overall, this study provides the most comprehensive picture of parties’ multilingualism in contemporary democracies and sets agendas for future research in the intersection of parties and language representation.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Which parties embrace multilingualism in their communication? Despite growing interest in parties’ multilingualism among normative scholars of deliberative democracy, empirical research has largely overlooked the linguistic aspect of party competition. We leverage large-scale data on Facebook posts by more than 800 parties in 87 democracies and analyze their day-to-day language practices. By so doing, we develop, for the first time, the classification of monolingual and multilingual parties around the world. Moreover, using this novel dataset, we explore what factors are associated with parties’ adoption of multilingualism and how multilingual parties predict the language use of candidates they nominate. Overall, this study provides the most comprehensive picture of parties’ multilingualism in contemporary democracies and sets agendas for future research in the intersection of parties and language representation.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Taishi Muraoka, 
Dahjin Kim, 
Christopher Lucas, 
Jacob Montgomery, 
Margit Tavits
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Speaking their language?: Multilingualism in party communication across democracies</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12976</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12976</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12976?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12984?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12984</guid>
         <title>Shifting power, interstate war, and domestic politics</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 691-704, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
We analyze a model in which shifting power undermines foreign states’ commitments to the status quo, yet domestic leaders cannot credibly communicate the true scale of averted power shifts after preventive war. Publics prefer war only for large prospective power shifts, but preventive war renders the true size of averted shifts unobservable, incentivizing leaders to lie ex post to avoid political punishment. When publics are ex ante skeptical over shift size and war outcomes are middling, the probabilities of war and political punishment, as well as public skepticism over averted shifts and the chances of erroneous punishment, all increase in war outcomes. Public strategies of punishing military failures are particularly unsuccessful at discouraging undesirable preventive wars, yet the same conditions that encourage preventive war undermine its political benefits. We use our model to explain why Japan's leaders failed to convince the public of preventive success against Russia in 1905.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We analyze a model in which shifting power undermines foreign states’ commitments to the status quo, yet domestic leaders cannot credibly communicate the true scale of averted power shifts after preventive war. Publics prefer war only for large prospective power shifts, but preventive war renders the true size of averted shifts unobservable, incentivizing leaders to lie ex post to avoid political punishment. When publics are ex ante skeptical over shift size and war outcomes are middling, the probabilities of war and political punishment, as well as public skepticism over averted shifts and the chances of erroneous punishment, all increase in war outcomes. Public strategies of punishing military failures are particularly unsuccessful at discouraging undesirable preventive wars, yet the same conditions that encourage preventive war undermine its political benefits. We use our model to explain why Japan's leaders failed to convince the public of preventive success against Russia in 1905.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Scott Wolford, 
Yuji Masumura
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Shifting power, interstate war, and domestic politics</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12984</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12984</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12984?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12985?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12985</guid>
         <title>A cause to fight</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 522-538, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Why do individuals participate in civil conflict? Materialist explanations have dominated quantitative scholarship on the causes and conduct of civil wars. Yet, a substantial body of qualitative, historical, and ethnographic evidence suggests that nonmaterial, ideological motives contribute to individuals' decision to enter combat and their battlefield performance. We bridge these two perspectives by developing a model of civil war recruitment where potential fighters trade off ideological and material incentives to enlist. More ideologically committed individuals are (i) more willing to sacrifice income to enlist, (ii) more likely to exert greater effort in combat and accordingly are assigned to riskier tasks, and (iii) less responsive to changes in enlistment costs. Using detailed biographical data on members of the British Battalion of the Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, we find support for all three implications. Individuals indeed trade off economic and ideological incentives to participate and perform in conflict.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Why do individuals participate in civil conflict? Materialist explanations have dominated quantitative scholarship on the causes and conduct of civil wars. Yet, a substantial body of qualitative, historical, and ethnographic evidence suggests that nonmaterial, ideological motives contribute to individuals' decision to enter combat and their battlefield performance. We bridge these two perspectives by developing a model of civil war recruitment where potential fighters trade off ideological and material incentives to enlist. More ideologically committed individuals are (i) more willing to sacrifice income to enlist, (ii) more likely to exert greater effort in combat and accordingly are assigned to riskier tasks, and (iii) less responsive to changes in enlistment costs. Using detailed biographical data on members of the British Battalion of the Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, we find support for all three implications. Individuals indeed trade off economic and ideological incentives to participate and perform in conflict.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Scott F. Abramson, 
Xiaoyan Qiu
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>A cause to fight</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12985</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12985</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12985?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12986?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12986</guid>
         <title>Brook no compromise: How to negotiate a united front</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 643-657, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Negotiating factional conflict is crucial to successful coordination: Political parties, rebel alliances, and authoritarian elites must all overcome internal disagreements to survive and achieve collective aims. Actors in these situations sometimes employ hardball tactics to block outcomes they dislike, but at the risk of causing coordination failure. Using a dynamic bargaining model, I explore how the threat and usage of these tactics impact coordination. In the model, two players who prefer different reforms must jointly agree on one to overturn a mutually unfavorable status quo. Neither knows the other's willingness to compromise—whether they prefer the status quo over their less‐preferred outcome. Players who are willing to compromise delay hardball, balancing incentives to preempt the opponent against the benefit of waiting to gather more information. Finally, I identify factors that incentivize players to exercise caution, thereby reducing the incidence of avoidable miscoordination, which results when players preemptively rule out possible compromises.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Negotiating factional conflict is crucial to successful coordination: Political parties, rebel alliances, and authoritarian elites must all overcome internal disagreements to survive and achieve collective aims. Actors in these situations sometimes employ hardball tactics to block outcomes they dislike, but at the risk of causing coordination failure. Using a dynamic bargaining model, I explore how the threat and usage of these tactics impact coordination. In the model, two players who prefer different reforms must jointly agree on one to overturn a mutually unfavorable status quo. Neither knows the other's willingness to compromise—whether they prefer the status quo over their less-preferred outcome. Players who are willing to compromise delay hardball, balancing incentives to preempt the opponent against the benefit of waiting to gather more information. Finally, I identify factors that incentivize players to exercise caution, thereby reducing the incidence of avoidable miscoordination, which results when players preemptively rule out possible compromises.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Elaine Yao
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Brook no compromise: How to negotiate a united front</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12986</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12986</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12986?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12940?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12940</guid>
         <title>Can norm‐based information campaigns reduce corruption?</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 471-490, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Can norm‐based information campaigns reduce corruption? Such campaigns use messaging about how people typically behave (descriptive norms) or ought to behave (injunctive norms). Drawing on survey and lab experiments in Ukraine, we unpack and evaluate the distinct effects of these two types of social norms. Four findings emerge: First, injunctive‐norm messaging produces consistent but relatively small and temporary effects. These may serve as moderately effective, low‐cost anti‐corruption tools but are unlikely to inspire large‐scale norm transformations. Second, contrary to recent studies, we find no evidence that either type of norm‐based messaging “backfires” by inadvertently encouraging corruption. Third, descriptive‐norm messages emphasizing corruption's decline produce relatively large and long‐lasting effects—but only among subjects who find messages credible. Fourth, both types of norm‐based messaging have a substantially larger effect on younger citizens. These findings have broader implications for messaging campaigns, especially those targeting social problems that, like corruption, require mitigation of collective action dilemmas.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Can norm-based information campaigns reduce corruption? Such campaigns use messaging about how people typically behave (descriptive norms) or ought to behave (injunctive norms). Drawing on survey and lab experiments in Ukraine, we unpack and evaluate the distinct effects of these two types of social norms. Four findings emerge: First, injunctive-norm messaging produces consistent but relatively small and temporary effects. These may serve as moderately effective, low-cost anti-corruption tools but are unlikely to inspire large-scale norm transformations. Second, contrary to recent studies, we find no evidence that either type of norm-based messaging “backfires” by inadvertently encouraging corruption. Third, descriptive-norm messages emphasizing corruption's decline produce relatively large and long-lasting effects—but only among subjects who find messages credible. Fourth, both types of norm-based messaging have a substantially larger effect on younger citizens. These findings have broader implications for messaging campaigns, especially those targeting social problems that, like corruption, require mitigation of collective action dilemmas.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Aaron Erlich, 
Jordan Gans‐Morse
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Can norm‐based information campaigns reduce corruption?</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12940</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12940</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12940?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12954?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12954</guid>
         <title>Compulsory voting increases men's turnout most</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 555-570, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Equal turnout fosters equal representation. As such, researchers have long sought to understand what causes gender differences in voter participation. I argue that compulsory voting increases men's turnout relative to that of women. This is because men are particularly receptive to external incentives, while women are more intrinsically motivated. Within Brazil and across countries, I use administrative data to show that compulsory voting increases men's turnout most. I also argue that, due to social desirability bias, nonvoting women are most likely to claim to have participated under mandatory voting. With comparisons of official and reported turnout, I demonstrate compulsory voting increases women's turnout overreporting relative to that of men. By increasing men's relative turnout, compulsory voting could introduce or accentuate representational disparities in favor of men, and this potentiality can be obscured by survey data.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Equal turnout fosters equal representation. As such, researchers have long sought to understand what causes gender differences in voter participation. I argue that compulsory voting increases men's turnout relative to that of women. This is because men are particularly receptive to external incentives, while women are more intrinsically motivated. Within Brazil and across countries, I use administrative data to show that compulsory voting increases men's turnout most. I also argue that, due to social desirability bias, nonvoting women are most likely to claim to have participated under mandatory voting. With comparisons of official and reported turnout, I demonstrate compulsory voting increases women's turnout overreporting relative to that of men. By increasing men's relative turnout, compulsory voting could introduce or accentuate representational disparities in favor of men, and this potentiality can be obscured by survey data.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Shane P. Singh
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Compulsory voting increases men's turnout most</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12954</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12954</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12954?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12958?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12958</guid>
         <title>Why masses support democratic backsliding</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 720-737, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Concerns over democratic backsliding have proliferated recently, as elected politicians have sought to undermine democratic checks and balances. This study examines the underpinnings of public support for democratic backsliding, delineating five theoretical explanations: personalistic leadership, affective polarization, populism, majoritarianism, and entanglement with the legal system. We test the explanatory power of these accounts within the Israeli context, leveraging panel survey data collected before and after the government announced its plan to curtail the courts. Results indicate that support for the plan is best explained by two forces: prior attachment to the leader heading the backsliding effort and animosity toward partisan opponents. Notably, populist attitudes are not associated with support for the government's plan. The theoretical framework and longitudinal research design help explain who supports democratic backsliding.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Concerns over democratic backsliding have proliferated recently, as elected politicians have sought to undermine democratic checks and balances. This study examines the underpinnings of public support for democratic backsliding, delineating five theoretical explanations: personalistic leadership, affective polarization, populism, majoritarianism, and entanglement with the legal system. We test the explanatory power of these accounts within the Israeli context, leveraging panel survey data collected before and after the government announced its plan to curtail the courts. Results indicate that support for the plan is best explained by two forces: prior attachment to the leader heading the backsliding effort and animosity toward partisan opponents. Notably, populist attitudes are not associated with support for the government's plan. The theoretical framework and longitudinal research design help explain who supports democratic backsliding.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Noam Gidron, 
Yotam Margalit, 
Lior Sheffer, 
Itamar Yakir
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Why masses support democratic backsliding</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12958</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12958</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12958?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12960?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12960</guid>
         <title>Endogenous opposition: Identity and ideology in Kuwaiti electoral politics</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 623-642, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
How do opposition elites succeed in authoritarian elections? Existing theories of authoritarian politics suggest a pivotal role for elections in enhancing the survival of incumbent dictators. Yet, in many contexts, opposition elites attract considerable support and constrain the policymaking authorities of these dictators. This article presents a theory of endogenous opposition that traces the electoral success of opposition elites to the strategic use of symbolic ideological appeals, or campaign appeals that cast politicians as allies of particular ideological movements. I present quantitative and qualitative evidence in support of my argument from Kuwait. I show that minority elites who use symbolic ideological appeals are more likely to capture voters from other minority groups. Once elected, these legislators are more likely to oppose the ruling family in the legislature. These findings challenge existing theories of authoritarian politics and point to ideology as an understudied source of opposition success in authoritarian elections.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How do opposition elites succeed in authoritarian elections? Existing theories of authoritarian politics suggest a pivotal role for elections in enhancing the survival of incumbent dictators. Yet, in many contexts, opposition elites attract considerable support and constrain the policymaking authorities of these dictators. This article presents a theory of endogenous opposition that traces the electoral success of opposition elites to the strategic use of symbolic ideological appeals, or campaign appeals that cast politicians as allies of particular ideological movements. I present quantitative and qualitative evidence in support of my argument from Kuwait. I show that minority elites who use symbolic ideological appeals are more likely to capture voters from other minority groups. Once elected, these legislators are more likely to oppose the ruling family in the legislature. These findings challenge existing theories of authoritarian politics and point to ideology as an understudied source of opposition success in authoritarian elections.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Daniel L. Tavana
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Endogenous opposition: Identity and ideology in Kuwaiti electoral politics</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12960</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12960</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12960?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12961?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12961</guid>
         <title>Opposition rule under autocracy: Evidence from Russia</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 587-605, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
How does the opposition govern under autocracy? Most authoritarian regimes tolerate some degree of internal opposition, allowing it to contest and even take power. Yet we know little about how such power‐sharing dynamics affect governance. In this paper, I exploit a unique instance where an opposition won control of political institutions in a prominent electoral autocracy: the 2017 Moscow municipal elections. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, I find that opposition control of municipal councils reduced the financial returns from office for ruling party deputies. This decrease in earnings comes from opposition‐held councils removing rent‐seeking opportunities by organizing more competitive procurement, reducing unnecessary budget expenditures, and curbing over‐the‐top compensation. Using a survey experiment, I then show that voters prefer opposition candidates with municipal governing experience over ruling party ones without it. Even in repressive environments, challenging autocratic rule may be well served by joining rather than boycotting institutions.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How does the opposition govern under autocracy? Most authoritarian regimes tolerate some degree of internal opposition, allowing it to contest and even take power. Yet we know little about how such power-sharing dynamics affect governance. In this paper, I exploit a unique instance where an opposition won control of political institutions in a prominent electoral autocracy: the 2017 Moscow municipal elections. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that opposition control of municipal councils reduced the financial returns from office for ruling party deputies. This decrease in earnings comes from opposition-held councils removing rent-seeking opportunities by organizing more competitive procurement, reducing unnecessary budget expenditures, and curbing over-the-top compensation. Using a survey experiment, I then show that voters prefer opposition candidates with municipal governing experience over ruling party ones without it. Even in repressive environments, challenging autocratic rule may be well served by joining rather than boycotting institutions.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
David Szakonyi
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Opposition rule under autocracy: Evidence from Russia</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12961</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12961</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12961?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12971?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12971</guid>
         <title>Networks of coercion: Military ties and civilian leadership challenges in China</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 806-823, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Civilian‐led coups are one of the most common routes to losing power in autocracies. How do authoritarian leaders secure themselves from civilian leadership challenges? We argue that autocrats differentiate civilian rivals in part by their social ties to the military. To reduce the threat of coups, leaders buy off civilians with strong military ties by promoting them to lower‐tier institutions—but isolate these same civilians by denying them promotion to higher‐tier institutions that afford opportunities to challenge the leader. We introduce an original data set of over 117,000 postings of 34,140 Chinese military officers and map ties between the entire civilian and military elite between 1927 and 2014. We find that civilian leaders with strong ties to the military improve prospects for promotion to the Central Committee, but degrade the likelihood of promotion to the apex Politburo Standing Committee, particularly for civilians outside the leader's social network.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Civilian-led coups are one of the most common routes to losing power in autocracies. How do authoritarian leaders secure themselves from civilian leadership challenges? We argue that autocrats differentiate civilian rivals in part by their social ties to the military. To reduce the threat of coups, leaders buy off civilians with strong military ties by promoting them to lower-tier institutions—but isolate these same civilians by denying them promotion to higher-tier institutions that afford opportunities to challenge the leader. We introduce an original data set of over 117,000 postings of 34,140 Chinese military officers and map ties between the entire civilian and military elite between 1927 and 2014. We find that civilian leaders with strong ties to the military improve prospects for promotion to the Central Committee, but degrade the likelihood of promotion to the apex Politburo Standing Committee, particularly for civilians outside the leader's social network.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Tyler Jost, 
Daniel Mattingly
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Networks of coercion: Military ties and civilian leadership challenges in China</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12971</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12971</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12971?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12973?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12973</guid>
         <title>Polarization and state legislative elections</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 453-470, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
US state legislatures are critical policymaking institutions that are increasingly polarized, yet data and measurement limitations have prevented researchers from understanding how state legislative elections contribute to this polarization. To address this gap, we construct new measures of candidate ideology based on campaign contributions and roll‐call votes, and we use them to offer the first systematic study of the relationship between candidate ideology and electoral outcomes in primary and general elections in state legislatures, 2000–2022. We find that the set of people running for state legislature has polarized substantially in recent decades. More‐moderate candidates enjoy a meaningful advantage in contested general elections, but that advantage has declined somewhat in recent years. At the same time, more‐extreme candidates are favored in contested primary elections. These new measures and data will allow researchers to build on these basic findings to understand how elections function in lower information, lower salience environments like American state legislatures.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;US state legislatures are critical policymaking institutions that are increasingly polarized, yet data and measurement limitations have prevented researchers from understanding how state legislative elections contribute to this polarization. To address this gap, we construct new measures of candidate ideology based on campaign contributions and roll-call votes, and we use them to offer the first systematic study of the relationship between candidate ideology and electoral outcomes in primary and general elections in state legislatures, 2000–2022. We find that the set of people running for state legislature has polarized substantially in recent decades. More-moderate candidates enjoy a meaningful advantage in contested general elections, but that advantage has declined somewhat in recent years. At the same time, more-extreme candidates are favored in contested primary elections. These new measures and data will allow researchers to build on these basic findings to understand how elections function in lower information, lower salience environments like American state legislatures.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Cassandra Handan‐Nader, 
Andrew C. W. Myers, 
Andrew B. Hall
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Polarization and state legislative elections</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12973</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12973</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12973?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12977?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12977</guid>
         <title>Mano dura: An experimental evaluation of military policing in Cali, Colombia</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 673-690, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Governments across the Global South rely on their militaries for domestic policing operations. We experimentally evaluate the social and political consequences of a military policing intervention in Cali, Colombia, one of the world's most violent cities. The intervention, Plan Fortaleza, involved recurring, intensive military patrols randomized at the city block level. Our evaluation combines administrative crime and human rights data, surveys of more than 10,000 residents, a conjoint experiment, a “costly” behavioral measure, and qualitative interviews with 49 civil society leaders. Despite null or adverse effects on crime and human rights, we show that Plan Fortaleza improved citizen’ attitudes toward the military and increased their demand for military involvement in domestic law enforcement. It also strengthened citizens’ support for extrajudicial punishment and—alarmingly—for military coups in response to rising crime, potentially signaling a diminished commitment to democracy and the rule of law among the program's intended beneficiaries.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Governments across the Global South rely on their militaries for domestic policing operations. We experimentally evaluate the social and political consequences of a military policing intervention in Cali, Colombia, one of the world's most violent cities. The intervention, &lt;i&gt;Plan Fortaleza&lt;/i&gt;, involved recurring, intensive military patrols randomized at the city block level. Our evaluation combines administrative crime and human rights data, surveys of more than 10,000 residents, a conjoint experiment, a “costly” behavioral measure, and qualitative interviews with 49 civil society leaders. Despite null or adverse effects on crime and human rights, we show that &lt;i&gt;Plan Fortaleza&lt;/i&gt; improved citizen’ attitudes toward the military and increased their demand for military involvement in domestic law enforcement. It also strengthened citizens’ support for extrajudicial punishment and—alarmingly—for military coups in response to rising crime, potentially signaling a diminished commitment to democracy and the rule of law among the program's intended beneficiaries.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Robert A. Blair, 
Lucía Mendoza‐Mora, 
Michael Weintraub
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Mano dura: An experimental evaluation of military policing in Cali, Colombia</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12977</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12977</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12977?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12983?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12983</guid>
         <title>Argumentation strategies in party competition</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 705-719, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Political parties' rhetorical strategies play a crucial role in shaping public opinion and electoral outcomes. To gain insight into what kind of arguments parties present to the public, and under what conditions, we develop a model of argumentation where parties compete to persuade voters before engaging in platform competition. Our model allows us to explore when parties present arguments that highlight the strengths of their ideological positions, as opposed to those that expose the weaknesses of their opponents'; when parties try to persuade voters on the same or on different dimensions; and when parties tacitly collude on an dimension, neither truly attempting to change voters' preferences.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Political parties' rhetorical strategies play a crucial role in shaping public opinion and electoral outcomes. To gain insight into what kind of arguments parties present to the public, and under what conditions, we develop a model of argumentation where parties compete to persuade voters before engaging in platform competition. Our model allows us to explore when parties present arguments that highlight the strengths of their ideological positions, as opposed to those that expose the weaknesses of their opponents'; when parties try to persuade voters on the same or on different dimensions; and when parties tacitly collude on an dimension, neither truly attempting to change voters' preferences.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Catherine Hafer, 
Federica Izzo, 
Dimitri Landa
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Argumentation strategies in party competition</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12983</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12983</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12983?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12995?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.12995</guid>
         <title>Unpacking the role of in‐group bias in US public opinion on human rights violations</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 786-805, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Which actor identities and social and political cleavages drive public opinion on human rights violations? While in‐group bias is known to influence public responses to government abuses, the relative impact of different identity characteristics has not been directly tested. Building on social identity theory and moral typecasting theory, I use a conjoint survey experiment in the United States of 3,200 respondents to examine the causal effects of in‐group bias across multiple actor identities (perpetrator, target, and elite cue giver) and social and political divides (partisanship, race, religion, and citizenship). Party loyalty to the perpetrator dominates other group identities; simply changing the perpetrator's political identity can be an important determinant for whether respondents oppose violations. Surprisingly, the target's race, religion, and citizenship has mixed impact, and partisan cues have little effect. These findings highlight when group loyalty outweighs human rights concerns and where public demand for government accountability may be reduced.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Which actor identities and social and political cleavages drive public opinion on human rights violations? While in-group bias is known to influence public responses to government abuses, the relative impact of different identity characteristics has not been directly tested. Building on social identity theory and moral typecasting theory, I use a conjoint survey experiment in the United States of 3,200 respondents to examine the causal effects of in-group bias across multiple actor identities (perpetrator, target, and elite cue giver) and social and political divides (partisanship, race, religion, and citizenship). Party loyalty to the perpetrator dominates other group identities; simply changing the perpetrator's political identity can be an important determinant for whether respondents oppose violations. Surprisingly, the target's race, religion, and citizenship has mixed impact, and partisan cues have little effect. These findings highlight when group loyalty outweighs human rights concerns and where public demand for government accountability may be reduced.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Rebecca Cordell
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Unpacking the role of in‐group bias in US public opinion on human rights violations</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.12995</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.12995</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12995?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70000?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70000</guid>
         <title>Public participation and constitutional compliance</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 824-841, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Many constitutions are ratified by referendum, and public participation in earlier stages of constitution‐making is increasingly common. Participation may increase the perceived legitimacy of a constitution and citizens' knowledge about it. If this is true, one expects participation to lead to greater constitutional compliance. We explore this hypothesis using data on public participation in constitution‐making and compliance. Employing matching methods, we find little evidence of a positive effect of participation on compliance generally. However, there is compelling evidence of a positive effect on provisions specific to property rights and the rule of law.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Many constitutions are ratified by referendum, and public participation in earlier stages of constitution-making is increasingly common. Participation may increase the perceived legitimacy of a constitution and citizens' knowledge about it. If this is true, one expects participation to lead to greater constitutional compliance. We explore this hypothesis using data on public participation in constitution-making and compliance. Employing matching methods, we find little evidence of a positive effect of participation on compliance generally. However, there is compelling evidence of a positive effect on provisions specific to property rights and the rule of law.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Jamie Bologna Pavlik, 
Andrew T. Young
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Public participation and constitutional compliance</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70000</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70000</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70000?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70072?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 22:09:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-17T10:09:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70072</guid>
         <title>Issue Information</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 2, Page 421-424, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator/>
         <category>ISSUE INFORMATION</category>
         <dc:title>Issue Information</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70072</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70072</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70072?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ISSUE INFORMATION</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70046?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 04:38:16 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-07T04:38:16-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70046</guid>
         <title>Veto players and policy development</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
We analyze the effects of veto players when the set of available policies is not exogenously fixed, but rather determined by policy developers who work to craft new high‐quality proposals. If veto players are moderate, there is active competition between developers on both sides of the ideological spectrum. However, more extreme veto players induce asymmetric activity, as one side disengages from development. With highly extreme veto players, policy development ceases, and gridlock results. We also analyze effects on centrists' utility. Moderate veto players dampen productive policy development, and extreme ones eliminate it entirely, either of which is bad for centrists. But some effects are surprisingly positive; somewhat extreme veto players can induce policy developers who dislike the status quo to craft moderate, high‐quality proposals. Our model accounts for changing patterns of policymaking in the U.S. Senate and suggests that if polarization continues centrists will become increasingly inclined to eliminate the filibuster.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We analyze the effects of veto players when the set of available policies is not exogenously fixed, but rather determined by policy developers who work to craft new high-quality proposals. If veto players are moderate, there is active competition between developers on both sides of the ideological spectrum. However, more extreme veto players induce asymmetric activity, as one side disengages from development. With highly extreme veto players, policy development ceases, and gridlock results. We also analyze effects on centrists' utility. Moderate veto players dampen productive policy development, and extreme ones eliminate it entirely, either of which is bad for centrists. But some effects are surprisingly positive; somewhat extreme veto players can induce policy developers who dislike the status quo to craft moderate, high-quality proposals. Our model accounts for changing patterns of policymaking in the U.S. Senate and suggests that if polarization continues centrists will become increasingly inclined to eliminate the filibuster.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Alexander V. Hirsch, 
Kenneth W. Shotts
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Veto players and policy development</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70046</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70046</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70046?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70058?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 21:50:26 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-31T09:50:26-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70058</guid>
         <title>What exploitation is</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
We experimentally elicit views of what exploitation is from over 2,000 subjects. Our experimental design does not test existing theories of exploitation. Rather, it focuses on more fundamental properties that are the building blocks for these theories. We find, first, that exploitation is not a vacuous concept: Not all economic interactions are deemed exploitative. Second, contrary to several of the major approaches in the literature, both inequalities in the distribution of economic gains and asymmetric power relations contribute to exploitative relations. What matters most is the interaction of power and inequality: The effect of both elements together is significantly greater than the sum of each on their own. Finally, and perhaps remarkably, we found no major differences in exploitation ascriptions between experts and lay subjects. These findings have implications for the ethics of employment contracts, particularly in the context of sweatshop labor.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We experimentally elicit views of what exploitation is from over 2,000 subjects. Our experimental design does not test existing theories of exploitation. Rather, it focuses on more fundamental properties that are the building blocks for these theories. We find, first, that exploitation is not a vacuous concept: Not all economic interactions are deemed exploitative. Second, contrary to several of the major approaches in the literature, &lt;i&gt;both&lt;/i&gt; inequalities in the distribution of economic gains &lt;i&gt;and&lt;/i&gt; asymmetric power relations contribute to exploitative relations. What matters most is the interaction of power and inequality: The effect of both elements together is significantly greater than the sum of each on their own. Finally, and perhaps remarkably, we found no major differences in exploitation ascriptions between experts and lay subjects. These findings have implications for the ethics of employment contracts, particularly in the context of sweatshop labor.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Benjamin Ferguson, 
Peter Hans Matthews, 
David Ronayne, 
Roberto Veneziani
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>What exploitation is</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70058</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70058</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70058?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70059?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 21:51:09 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-25T09:51:09-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70059</guid>
         <title>Mutual restraint in nondemocratic legislatures</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Nondemocratic regimes sometimes benefit from tolerating the expression of critical opinions and visions for policy in their legislatures. Doing so enables them to gather important information about societal preferences, to co‐opt potential challengers, and to address other threats to their control. In these cases, regimes and deputies exhibit mutual restraint: deputies respect regime‐set limits on their freedom to express critical opinions, while regimes refrain from punishing deputies for expressing negative views when the stakes are acceptably low. By examining both the responsiveness of individual deputies and how regimes police the limits of acceptable behavior, we are better able to identify both the functions and strengths of nondemocratic legislatures. I illustrate these dynamics using data about deputy voting behavior and legislative success in the Kyrgyz Jogorku Kenesh (2016–2020).
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nondemocratic regimes sometimes benefit from tolerating the expression of critical opinions and visions for policy in their legislatures. Doing so enables them to gather important information about societal preferences, to co-opt potential challengers, and to address other threats to their control. In these cases, regimes and deputies exhibit mutual restraint: deputies respect regime-set limits on their freedom to express critical opinions, while regimes refrain from punishing deputies for expressing negative views when the stakes are acceptably low. By examining both the responsiveness of individual deputies and how regimes police the limits of acceptable behavior, we are better able to identify both the functions and strengths of nondemocratic legislatures. I illustrate these dynamics using data about deputy voting behavior and legislative success in the Kyrgyz Jogorku Kenesh (2016–2020).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Sarah Hummel
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Mutual restraint in nondemocratic legislatures</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70059</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70059</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70059?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70056?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 21:46:10 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-25T09:46:10-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70056</guid>
         <title>What is (de)politicization and what is wrong with it?</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This article attempts to clarify the meaning of (de)politicization. Politicization sometimes refers to the inappropriate intrusion of partisan loyalties in nonpolitical social domains (affective politicization). Politicization can also constitute an ideal of civic agency and energy (contestatory politicization). In other contexts, politicization is meant as a kind of institutional corruption, in which government decisions are made for the sake of sectional advantage (patrimonial politicization). It can also refer to the imposition of controversial values judgments by ostensibly neutral institutions like the courts and bureaucracy (values politicization). These concepts raise divergent normative considerations of varying weightiness. This article motivates the potency of a fifth concept of politicization, which centers on the category of authoritative rule (archic politicization). It offers an ideal–typical contrast between political rule and depoliticized power, and it treats the distinct justifications for and objections to the substitution of depoliticized, impersonal reason for authoritative, political will.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This article attempts to clarify the meaning of (de)politicization. Politicization sometimes refers to the inappropriate intrusion of partisan loyalties in nonpolitical social domains (&lt;i&gt;affective politicization&lt;/i&gt;). Politicization can also constitute an ideal of civic agency and energy (&lt;i&gt;contestatory politicization&lt;/i&gt;). In other contexts, politicization is meant as a kind of institutional corruption, in which government decisions are made for the sake of sectional advantage (&lt;i&gt;patrimonial politicization&lt;/i&gt;). It can also refer to the imposition of controversial values judgments by ostensibly neutral institutions like the courts and bureaucracy (&lt;i&gt;values politicization&lt;/i&gt;). These concepts raise divergent normative considerations of varying weightiness. This article motivates the potency of a fifth concept of politicization, which centers on the category of authoritative rule (&lt;i&gt;archic politicization&lt;/i&gt;). It offers an ideal–typical contrast between political rule and depoliticized power, and it treats the distinct justifications for and objections to the substitution of depoliticized, impersonal reason for authoritative, political will.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Dimitrios Halikias
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>What is (de)politicization and what is wrong with it?</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70056</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70056</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70056?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70042?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 23:01:17 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-24T11:01:17-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70042</guid>
         <title>Correction to “Partisan temporal selective news avoidance: Evidence from online trace data”</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator/>
         <category>CORRECTION</category>
         <dc:title>Correction to “Partisan temporal selective news avoidance: Evidence from online trace data”</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70042</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70042</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70042?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>CORRECTION</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70054?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 22:10:43 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-24T10:10:43-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70054</guid>
         <title>Unraveling authoritarian reform decision‐making: A metacognitive–subcognitive model</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Recent research indicates that state reforms in East and Southeast Asia have been predominantly top‐down and authoritarian‐led. However, this significant observation implicitly relies on important assumptions about authoritarian decision‐making behavior and psychology that remains understudied. Using a dynamical‐systems approach, this paper introduces a “metacognitive–subcognitive” model of cognitive uncertainties to analyze decision‐making in authoritarian‐led reforms. The model predicts that major authoritarian‐led political reform, such as democratization, is most likely to occur if the leader is “wishfully optimistic” enough to view the expected outcomes of the reform, despite the associated risks and pressures. Applying the model to six cases in East and Southeast Asia demonstrates the effectiveness of the model in decoding the state‐led reform decision‐making dynamics of authoritarian regimes. Overall, the paper proposes a new framework and methodology that can both distinguish and relate causal, structural, and contingent factors contributing to authoritarian decision‐making dynamics.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Recent research indicates that state reforms in East and Southeast Asia have been predominantly top-down and authoritarian-led. However, this significant observation implicitly relies on important assumptions about authoritarian decision-making behavior and psychology that remains understudied. Using a dynamical-systems approach, this paper introduces a “metacognitive–subcognitive” model of cognitive uncertainties to analyze decision-making in authoritarian-led reforms. The model predicts that major authoritarian-led political reform, such as democratization, is most likely to occur if the leader is “wishfully optimistic” enough to view the expected outcomes of the reform, despite the associated risks and pressures. Applying the model to six cases in East and Southeast Asia demonstrates the effectiveness of the model in decoding the state-led reform decision-making dynamics of authoritarian regimes. Overall, the paper proposes a new framework and methodology that can both distinguish and relate causal, structural, and contingent factors contributing to authoritarian decision-making dynamics.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Eugene Yu Ji
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Unraveling authoritarian reform decision‐making: A metacognitive–subcognitive model</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70054</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70054</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70054?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70047?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 19 Mar 2026 23:10:57 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-19T11:10:57-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70047</guid>
         <title>Rulers on the road: Itinerant rule in the Holy Roman Empire, AD 919–1519</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Itinerant rule, rule exercised through traveling, was a common yet insufficiently researched, premodern form of governance. Studying the determinants of ruler itineraries in the Holy Roman Empire, AD 919–1519, we argue that rulers' visits targeted “marginal” elites. Powerful rulers could count on family members and thus targeted unrelated local elites. Weak emperors had to monitor their less loyal relatives and left unrelated nobles unvisited. We reconstruct emperors' itineraries from 72,665 dated and geolocated documents and measure territorial control by their relatives. Exploiting the weakening of imperial power through the Great Interregnum (1250–1273), we find that strong, pre‐1250 emperors frequented areas controlled by their relatives relatively less. In contrast, family control increased visits post‐1273. Causal identification rests on the discontinuous reduction of emperors' power through the Great Interregnum and differences in family relations between subsequent emperors. The results show strategic itinerant rule as an important but understudied form of governance.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Itinerant rule, rule exercised through traveling, was a common yet insufficiently researched, premodern form of governance. Studying the determinants of ruler itineraries in the Holy Roman Empire, AD 919–1519, we argue that rulers' visits targeted “marginal” elites. Powerful rulers could count on family members and thus targeted unrelated local elites. Weak emperors had to monitor their less loyal relatives and left unrelated nobles unvisited. We reconstruct emperors' itineraries from 72,665 dated and geolocated documents and measure territorial control by their relatives. Exploiting the weakening of imperial power through the Great Interregnum (1250–1273), we find that strong, pre-1250 emperors frequented areas controlled by their relatives relatively less. In contrast, family control increased visits post-1273. Causal identification rests on the discontinuous reduction of emperors' power through the Great Interregnum and differences in family relations between subsequent emperors. The results show strategic itinerant rule as an important but understudied form of governance.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Carl Müller‐Crepon, 
Clara Neupert‐Wentz, 
Andrej Kokkonen, 
Jørgen Møller
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Rulers on the road: Itinerant rule in the Holy Roman Empire, AD 919–1519</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70047</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70047</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70047?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70055?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 19 Mar 2026 23:00:09 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-19T11:00:09-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70055</guid>
         <title>You and whose economy? Group‐based retrospection in economic voting</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
When managing the economy, governments make decisions that influence not only overall growth but also its distribution. How do voters judge incumbents for this? I revisit the idea of group‐based retrospective voting and argue that voters assess the economic performance of their social in‐groups relative to the national economy. By sanctioning the incumbent for in‐group performance, voters can incentivize policy‐making that better aligns with their interests. I test the theory, first, by estimating the relationship between in‐group performance and incumbent support in panel data. This relationship is comparable in magnitude to sociotropic voting. I further conduct three experiments in Denmark and the United States, randomizing information about the performance of groups defined by geography, age, education, ethnicity, and class. The findings suggest there are limits to sociotropic voting, as voters want their groups to follow or beat the national trend. This has important implications for electoral accountability and party competition.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When managing the economy, governments make decisions that influence not only overall growth but also its distribution. How do voters judge incumbents for this? I revisit the idea of &lt;i&gt;group-based retrospective voting&lt;/i&gt; and argue that voters assess the economic performance of their social in-groups relative to the national economy. By sanctioning the incumbent for in-group performance, voters can incentivize policy-making that better aligns with their interests. I test the theory, first, by estimating the relationship between in-group performance and incumbent support in panel data. This relationship is comparable in magnitude to sociotropic voting. I further conduct three experiments in Denmark and the United States, randomizing information about the performance of groups defined by geography, age, education, ethnicity, and class. The findings suggest there are limits to sociotropic voting, as voters want their groups to follow or beat the national trend. This has important implications for electoral accountability and party competition.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Christoffer Hentzer Dausgaard
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>You and whose economy? Group‐based retrospection in economic voting</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70055</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70055</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70055?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70050?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 19 Mar 2026 22:38:03 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-19T10:38:03-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70050</guid>
         <title>Using large language models to analyze political texts through natural language understanding</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Large language models (LLMs) offer scalable alternatives to human experts when analyzing political texts for meaning, using natural language understanding (NLU). Qualitative NLU methods relying on human experts are severely limited by cost and scalability. Statistical text‐as‐data methods are scalable but rely on strong and often unrealistic assumptions. We propose a systematic, scalable, and replicable method that can extend existing qualitative and quantitative approaches by using LLMs to interpret texts meaningfully rather than as mere data. Our ensemble means of LLM‐generated estimates of party positions on six key issue dimensions correlate highly with equivalent mean ratings by country specialists. When applied to coalition policy declarations, LLM estimates align more closely with standard models of government formation than hand‐coded estimates. We conclude with a discussion of the profound implications of modern LLMs for political text analysis.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Large language models (LLMs) offer scalable alternatives to human experts when analyzing political texts for &lt;i&gt;meaning&lt;/i&gt;, using natural language understanding (NLU). Qualitative NLU methods relying on human experts are severely limited by cost and scalability. Statistical text-as-data methods are scalable but rely on strong and often unrealistic assumptions. We propose a systematic, scalable, and replicable method that can extend existing qualitative and quantitative approaches by using LLMs to interpret texts meaningfully rather than as mere data. Our ensemble means of LLM-generated estimates of party positions on six key issue dimensions correlate highly with equivalent mean ratings by country specialists. When applied to coalition policy declarations, LLM estimates align more closely with standard models of government formation than hand-coded estimates. We conclude with a discussion of the profound implications of modern LLMs for political text analysis.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Kenneth Benoit, 
Scott De Marchi, 
Conor Laver, 
Michael Laver, 
Jinshuai Ma
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Using large language models to analyze political texts through natural language understanding</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70050</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70050</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70050?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70052?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2026 07:18:41 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-11T07:18:41-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70052</guid>
         <title>Encouraging crossover voting in the 2024 presidential primary</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Will voters participate in the primary of a party they oppose to prevent the nomination of a candidate they fear? Partnering with a political action committee, we conduct a first‐of‐its‐kind, large, preregistered field experiment (N = 83,902) in the lead‐up to the 2024 Republican presidential primary in New Hampshire. A specialized get‐out‐the‐vote intervention increases turnout in the Republican primary among undeclared voters who are modeled as likely to vote for Democratic candidates in the general election. Our treatment increased Republican primary turnout in this sample by 1.6 percentage points while reducing turnout in the Democratic Primary by .5 percentage points. Supplementing our experiment with surveys before and after the primary, we estimate that each vote cast by Democratic‐leaning voters in the Republican primary had between a 78% and 95% probability of supporting the relatively moderate Republican primary candidate. We argue that voters are capable of sophisticated, risk‐mitigating behavior in primaries.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Will voters participate in the primary of a party they oppose to prevent the nomination of a candidate they fear? Partnering with a political action committee, we conduct a first-of-its-kind, large, preregistered field experiment (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 83,902) in the lead-up to the 2024 Republican presidential primary in New Hampshire. A specialized get-out-the-vote intervention increases turnout in the Republican primary among undeclared voters who are modeled as likely to vote for Democratic candidates in the general election. Our treatment increased Republican primary turnout in this sample by 1.6 percentage points while reducing turnout in the Democratic Primary by .5 percentage points. Supplementing our experiment with surveys before and after the primary, we estimate that each vote cast by Democratic-leaning voters in the Republican primary had between a 78% and 95% probability of supporting the relatively moderate Republican primary candidate. We argue that voters are capable of sophisticated, risk-mitigating behavior in primaries.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Hayley M. Cohen, 
Daniel B. Markovits
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Encouraging crossover voting in the 2024 presidential primary</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70052</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70052</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70052?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70053?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sat, 07 Mar 2026 01:10:02 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-07T01:10:02-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70053</guid>
         <title>Long‐run confidence: Estimating uncertainty when using long‐run multipliers</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Researchers are often interested in the long‐run relationship (LRR) between variables where the dependent variable has dynamic properties. Though determining the long‐run multiplier (LRM) for an independent variable is straightforward, correctly estimating the significance of the LRM is often difficult, especially when time series are short and tests for series’ stationarity are uncertain. We propose a Bayesian framework for estimating the LRM by using a bounded prior on the lagged dependent variable to constrain estimates for dynamic processes to the plausible range of values arising from either stationary or integrated series, and then taking draws of the posterior distribution to summarize the credible region. Doing so provides direct estimates of the LRM and its uncertainty, even for short time series. We highlight the advantages of this approach via Monte Carlo experiments and replicate several studies to show that our method clarifies LRRs that were inconclusive using existing techniques.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Researchers are often interested in the long-run relationship (LRR) between variables where the dependent variable has dynamic properties. Though determining the long-run multiplier (LRM) for an independent variable is straightforward, correctly estimating the significance of the LRM is often difficult, especially when time series are short and tests for series’ stationarity are uncertain. We propose a Bayesian framework for estimating the LRM by using a bounded prior on the lagged dependent variable to constrain estimates for dynamic processes to the plausible range of values arising from either stationary or integrated series, and then taking draws of the posterior distribution to summarize the credible region. Doing so provides direct estimates of the LRM and its uncertainty, even for short time series. We highlight the advantages of this approach via Monte Carlo experiments and replicate several studies to show that our method clarifies LRRs that were inconclusive using existing techniques.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Mark David Nieman, 
David A. M. Peterson
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Long‐run confidence: Estimating uncertainty when using long‐run multipliers</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70053</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70053</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70053?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70040?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 05 Mar 2026 22:54:53 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-05T10:54:53-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70040</guid>
         <title>Politics transformed? Electoral competition under ranked choice voting</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
We compare multicandidate elections under plurality rule versus ranked choice voting (RCV). We examine a widely held presumption that RCV more effectively incentivizes candidates to pursue broad campaigns that can appeal to all voters, rather than targeting a narrow segment of the electorate. That presumption is correct when preference transfers are competitive, that is, when multiple candidates have a reasonable chance of securing voters' second‐choice support. However, when transfers are uncompetitive due to partisan, ethnic, or cultural alignments, that presumption is reversed: RCV can strengthen candidates' incentives to pursue targeted campaigns.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We compare multicandidate elections under plurality rule versus ranked choice voting (RCV). We examine a widely held presumption that RCV more effectively incentivizes candidates to pursue broad campaigns that can appeal to all voters, rather than targeting a narrow segment of the electorate. That presumption is correct when preference transfers are competitive, that is, when multiple candidates have a reasonable chance of securing voters' second-choice support. However, when transfers are uncompetitive due to partisan, ethnic, or cultural alignments, that presumption is reversed: RCV can strengthen candidates' incentives to pursue targeted campaigns.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Peter Buisseret, 
Carlo Prato
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Politics transformed? Electoral competition under ranked choice voting</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70040</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70040</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70040?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70048?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 05 Mar 2026 08:44:05 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-05T08:44:05-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70048</guid>
         <title>The declarations of independents: Open‐ended survey responses and the nature of non‐identification</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
While many Americans identify as politically “independent,” conventional wisdom suggests most are covert partisans, especially “leaners.” However, we argue that independents exhibit distinct attitudes toward political parties. Analyzing American National Election Studies open‐ended responses from 1984 to 2020, we employ structural topic models and support vector machines to explore differences in how independents and partisans express “dislikes” about the major parties. Our results show that leaning independents differ significantly from self‐identified partisans in their language and align more closely with pure independents. Furthermore, we find that independents are more likely than partisans to mention issues related to “politics”—such as political cynicism, concern about special interests, or distaste for partisan conflict—when discussing their “dislikes.” These findings suggest that independents have meaningful distinctions from partisans beyond voting behavior, cautioning against overlooking the nuances between these groups.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While many Americans identify as politically “independent,” conventional wisdom suggests most are covert partisans, especially “leaners.” However, we argue that independents exhibit distinct attitudes toward political parties. Analyzing American National Election Studies open-ended responses from 1984 to 2020, we employ structural topic models and support vector machines to explore differences in how independents and partisans express “dislikes” about the major parties. Our results show that leaning independents differ significantly from self-identified partisans in their language and align more closely with pure independents. Furthermore, we find that independents are more likely than partisans to mention issues related to “politics”—such as political cynicism, concern about special interests, or distaste for partisan conflict—when discussing their “dislikes.” These findings suggest that independents have meaningful distinctions from partisans beyond voting behavior, cautioning against overlooking the nuances between these groups.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Maxwell B. Allamong, 
Benjamin Beutel, 
Jongwoo Jeong, 
Paul M. Kellstedt
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The declarations of independents: Open‐ended survey responses and the nature of non‐identification</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70048</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70048</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70048?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70043?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2026 01:41:47 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-04T01:41:47-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70043</guid>
         <title>Mitigating policy uncertainty: What financial markets reveal about firm‐level lobbying</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Elections can lead to substantial policy changes and, thus, are a significant source of risk. Firms can respond to such policy uncertainty by lobbying, but it is hard to quantify whether they do so and, if so, how much lobbying benefits them. We construct a new dataset and leverage investors’ expectations of variability in stock returns in the aftermath of the 2020 US presidential election to generate a new firm‐level measure of exposure to policy uncertainty. We show that lobbying reduces policy uncertainty, and that this result holds even after controlling for selection into lobbying and sectoral heterogeneity. We then develop and quantify a model of heterogeneous firms with endogenous lobbying. We find that affecting policy through lobbying is costly and the returns from it are highly skewed and rapidly diminishing. Thus, while lobbying expenditures reduce the impact of policy risk, few firms anticipate sufficient gains to invest in it.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Elections can lead to substantial policy changes and, thus, are a significant source of risk. Firms can respond to such policy uncertainty by lobbying, but it is hard to quantify whether they do so and, if so, how much lobbying benefits them. We construct a new dataset and leverage investors’ expectations of variability in stock returns in the aftermath of the 2020 US presidential election to generate a new firm-level measure of exposure to policy uncertainty. We show that lobbying reduces policy uncertainty, and that this result holds even after controlling for selection into lobbying and sectoral heterogeneity. We then develop and quantify a model of heterogeneous firms with endogenous lobbying. We find that affecting policy through lobbying is costly and the returns from it are highly skewed and rapidly diminishing. Thus, while lobbying expenditures reduce the impact of policy risk, few firms anticipate sufficient gains to invest in it.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Kristy Buzard, 
Nathan Canen, 
Sebastian Saiegh
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Mitigating policy uncertainty: What financial markets reveal about firm‐level lobbying</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70043</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70043</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70043?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70041?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2026 01:40:26 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-04T01:40:26-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70041</guid>
         <title>The economic foundations of powersharing: Evidence from Africa</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
How—and with whom—do rulers share power? Existing research focuses on the strategic logic of powersharing. In this paper, we analyze its economic foundations. Powersharing is modeled as a subnational fiscal contract, in which rulers allocate political representation based on constituencies’ revenue potential. Empirically, we combine historical geospatial data on different types of primary commodity production—mineral point resources and diffuse smallholder cash crop agriculture—with the ethnic affiliation of cabinet ministers across 15 African countries. We find that cash crop groups are overrepresented in post‐independence cabinets, while mining or food crop production does not translate into higher shares of power. Consistent with a revenue bargaining framework, we find that rulers traded political representation and targeted public services for indirect taxation of cash crops. Overall, this suggests powersharing serves not only as a means to distribute resources and co‐opt potential challengers but also to expand the pie and the rents at the ruler's disposal.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How—and with whom—do rulers share power? Existing research focuses on the strategic logic of powersharing. In this paper, we analyze its economic foundations. Powersharing is modeled as a subnational fiscal contract, in which rulers allocate political representation based on constituencies’ revenue potential. Empirically, we combine historical geospatial data on different types of primary commodity production—mineral point resources and diffuse smallholder cash crop agriculture—with the ethnic affiliation of cabinet ministers across 15 African countries. We find that cash crop groups are overrepresented in post-independence cabinets, while mining or food crop production does not translate into higher shares of power. Consistent with a revenue bargaining framework, we find that rulers traded political representation and targeted public services for indirect taxation of cash crops. Overall, this suggests powersharing serves not only as a means to distribute resources and co-opt potential challengers but also to expand the pie and the rents at the ruler's disposal.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Yannick I. Pengl, 
Philip Roessler
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The economic foundations of powersharing: Evidence from Africa</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70041</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70041</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70041?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70049?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 25 Feb 2026 20:35:17 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-25T08:35:17-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70049</guid>
         <title>Perversity, futility, complicity: Should democrats participate in autocratic elections?</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Electoral authoritarianism is receiving increasing attention from political scientists, yet it has been mostly ignored by political philosophers. This paper aims to fill some of this gap by considering whether it is morally permissibly for democrats to participate in autocratic elections as candidates or voters. Autocratic elections allow meaningful multiparty competition but are systematically unfair and partly unfree, and therefore, arguably, normatively illegitimate. The paper considers three objections to participation in autocratic elections. These objections hold, respectively, that participation has bad consequences for democratization, that it is normatively futile, and that it is morally wrong in itself. The paper argues that the objections are not decisive, and that participation is usually morally permissible and even preferable over alternative forms of challenge. However, the objections establish that the normative superiority of electoral challenge over the alternatives is only a matter of degree, and that participants often dirty their hands.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Electoral authoritarianism is receiving increasing attention from political scientists, yet it has been mostly ignored by political philosophers. This paper aims to fill some of this gap by considering whether it is morally permissibly for democrats to participate in autocratic elections as candidates or voters. Autocratic elections allow meaningful multiparty competition but are systematically unfair and partly unfree, and therefore, arguably, normatively illegitimate. The paper considers three objections to participation in autocratic elections. These objections hold, respectively, that participation has bad consequences for democratization, that it is normatively futile, and that it is morally wrong in itself. The paper argues that the objections are not decisive, and that participation is usually morally permissible and even preferable over alternative forms of challenge. However, the objections establish that the normative superiority of electoral challenge over the alternatives is only a matter of degree, and that participants often dirty their hands.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Zoltan Miklosi
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Perversity, futility, complicity: Should democrats participate in autocratic elections?</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70049</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70049</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70049?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70037?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 25 Feb 2026 20:29:25 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-25T08:29:25-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70037</guid>
         <title>Latinos mobilizing beyond threats: The role of fear and hope in issue activism</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Interest groups intent on spurring political participation often highlight potential threats to galvanize audiences into action. However, while loss aversion is typically seen as a strong motivator, it is important not to neglect the motivational effect of hope and reward‐seeking behavior as people navigate their political landscape. By drawing on a renewed focus on the simultaneous role of positive and negative emotions when processing risk appraisals, this paper reassesses the most effective ways to frame threat messages surrounding immigration activism. I test the major claims of this model with two original online survey experiments of Latino adults in the United States (n = 1,001; n = 1,266), including a vignette and emotion‐induction design. The results demonstrate that a mobilizing message combining elements of both threat (loss) and opportunity (gain)—primed by negative and positive emotions—is a significant catalyst of various forms of collective action, including informal and formal forms of political participation.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Interest groups intent on spurring political participation often highlight potential threats to galvanize audiences into action. However, while loss aversion is typically seen as a strong motivator, it is important not to neglect the motivational effect of hope and reward-seeking behavior as people navigate their political landscape. By drawing on a renewed focus on the simultaneous role of positive and negative emotions when processing risk appraisals, this paper reassesses the most effective ways to frame threat messages surrounding immigration activism. I test the major claims of this model with two original online survey experiments of Latino adults in the United States (&lt;i&gt;n&lt;/i&gt; = 1,001; &lt;i&gt;n&lt;/i&gt; = 1,266), including a vignette and emotion-induction design. The results demonstrate that a mobilizing message combining elements of both threat (loss) and opportunity (gain)—primed by negative and positive emotions—is a significant catalyst of various forms of collective action, including informal and formal forms of political participation.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Vanessa Cruz Nichols
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Latinos mobilizing beyond threats: The role of fear and hope in issue activism</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70037</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70037</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70037?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70036?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 18 Feb 2026 01:07:16 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-18T01:07:16-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70036</guid>
         <title>Abortion policy preferences are structured, stable, and consequential</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Do Americans have structured, stable, and consequential policy preferences that shape political outcomes? We explore this question through the case of abortion, using a large‐scale panel dataset (n ≈ 130,000) and applying three key diagnostics: coherence, stability, and changes in vote choice. First, we demonstrate that abortion policy preferences exhibit logical coherence, both within and across reasons for seeking an abortion. Second, we show that these preferences are highly stable over time–more so than personality traits–suggesting that abortion attitudes are deeply engrained rather than fleeting opinions. Lastly, we find that abortion policy preferences, measured before the U.S. Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade in 2022, predict shifts in intended voting behavior between 2020 and 2024. This overall pattern helps rule out key theoretical alternatives, such as non‐opinions, attitudes following vote choice, and elite cues. Additionally, these findings highlight the significant and independent role of abortion attitudes in shaping American political behavior.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Do Americans have structured, stable, and consequential policy preferences that shape political outcomes? We explore this question through the case of abortion, using a large-scale panel dataset (&lt;i&gt;n&lt;/i&gt; ≈ 130,000) and applying three key diagnostics: coherence, stability, and changes in vote choice. First, we demonstrate that abortion policy preferences exhibit logical coherence, both within and across reasons for seeking an abortion. Second, we show that these preferences are highly stable over time–more so than personality traits–suggesting that abortion attitudes are deeply engrained rather than fleeting opinions. Lastly, we find that abortion policy preferences, measured before the U.S. Supreme Court overturned &lt;i&gt;Roe v. Wade&lt;/i&gt; in 2022, predict shifts in intended voting behavior between 2020 and 2024. This overall pattern helps rule out key theoretical alternatives, such as non-opinions, attitudes following vote choice, and elite cues. Additionally, these findings highlight the significant and independent role of abortion attitudes in shaping American political behavior.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Natalie Hernandez, 
Mackenzie Lockhart, 
Alan S. Gerber, 
Gregory A. Huber
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Abortion policy preferences are structured, stable, and consequential</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70036</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70036</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70036?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70035?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 17 Feb 2026 08:19:37 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-17T08:19:37-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70035</guid>
         <title>What political theory can learn from conceptual engineering: The case of “corruption”</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Conceptual change is commonplace in political theory. Recent scholarship argues that improving a concept, or “engineering” it, can sharpen its normative and explanatory power. This article illustrates what political theory can learn from conceptual engineering (CE) by examining the evolution of “corruption” as a case study. Traditionally defined as the “use of entrusted power for private gain,” corruption has been revisited to capture broader institutional dysfunctions. We show how the recent re‐engineering of corruption as a “deficit of office accountability” enhances the concept's ability to capture uses of office power that may undercut institutional functioning beyond illegal acts, including individual wrongdoing and faulty institutional design. Re‐engineering corruption has normative value insofar as it helps policymakers and scholars alike to identify and address questionable uses of office power—including in nondemocratic regimes and nonpublic organizations. The article thereby argues that CE can enhance political theory's methodological toolkit and corroborate its practical relevance.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conceptual change is commonplace in political theory. Recent scholarship argues that improving a concept, or “engineering” it, can sharpen its normative and explanatory power. This article illustrates what political theory can learn from conceptual engineering (CE) by examining the evolution of “corruption” as a case study. Traditionally defined as the “use of entrusted power for private gain,” corruption has been revisited to capture broader institutional dysfunctions. We show how the recent re-engineering of corruption as a “deficit of office accountability” enhances the concept's ability to capture uses of office power that may undercut institutional functioning beyond illegal acts, including individual wrongdoing and faulty institutional design. Re-engineering corruption has normative value insofar as it helps policymakers and scholars alike to identify and address questionable uses of office power—including in nondemocratic regimes and nonpublic organizations. The article thereby argues that CE can enhance political theory's methodological toolkit and corroborate its practical relevance.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Emanuela Ceva, 
Patrizia Pedrini
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>What political theory can learn from conceptual engineering: The case of “corruption”</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70035</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70035</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70035?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70039?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 17 Feb 2026 00:00:00 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-17T12:00:00-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70039</guid>
         <title>Why did Putin invade Ukraine? A theory of degenerate autocracy</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Many dictatorships end up with a series of disastrous decisions such as Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. Even if a certain policy choice is not ultimately fatal for the regime, such as Mao's Big Leap Forward or the Pol Pot's collectivization drive, they typically involve both a miscalculation by the leadership and an institutional environment in which better informed subordinates have no chance to prevent the decision from being implemented. We offer a dynamic model of nondemocratic politics in which repression and bad decision making are self‐reinforcing. Repression reduces the immediate threat to the regime, yet raises future stakes for the dictator; with higher stakes, the dictator puts more emphasis on loyalty than competence, which in turn increases the probability of a wrong policy choice. Our theory offers an explanation of how rational dictators end up in an informational bubble even in highly institutionalized regimes.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Many dictatorships end up with a series of disastrous decisions such as Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. Even if a certain policy choice is not ultimately fatal for the regime, such as Mao's Big Leap Forward or the Pol Pot's collectivization drive, they typically involve both a miscalculation by the leadership and an institutional environment in which better informed subordinates have no chance to prevent the decision from being implemented. We offer a dynamic model of nondemocratic politics in which repression and bad decision making are self-reinforcing. Repression reduces the immediate threat to the regime, yet raises future stakes for the dictator; with higher stakes, the dictator puts more emphasis on loyalty than competence, which in turn increases the probability of a wrong policy choice. Our theory offers an explanation of how rational dictators end up in an informational bubble even in highly institutionalized regimes.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Georgy Egorov, 
Konstantin Sonin
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Why did Putin invade Ukraine? A theory of degenerate autocracy</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70039</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70039</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70039?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70045?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 13 Feb 2026 01:28:45 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-13T01:28:45-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70045</guid>
         <title>The limits of AI for authoritarian control</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
An emerging literature suggests that artificial intelligence (AI) can greatly enhance autocrats' repressive capabilities. This paper argues that while AI presents a powerful new tool for authoritarian control, its effectiveness is constrained by the very repressive institutions it is designed to serve. This constraint stems from what I term the “authoritarian data problem”: citizens' strategic behavior under repression diminishes the amount of useful information in the data for training AI. The more repression there is, the less information exists in AI's training data, and the worse the AI performs. I illustrate this argument using an AI experiment and censorship data in China. I show that AI's accuracy in censorship decreases with increasing repression, especially during times of political crisis. I further show that this problem cannot be easily fixed with more data. Ironically, international data—especially data from less repressive settings—can help improve AI's ability to censor.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An emerging literature suggests that artificial intelligence (AI) can greatly enhance autocrats' repressive capabilities. This paper argues that while AI presents a powerful new tool for authoritarian control, its effectiveness is constrained by the very repressive institutions it is designed to serve. This constraint stems from what I term the “authoritarian data problem”: citizens' strategic behavior under repression diminishes the amount of useful information in the data for training AI. The more repression there is, the less information exists in AI's training data, and the worse the AI performs. I illustrate this argument using an AI experiment and censorship data in China. I show that AI's accuracy in censorship decreases with increasing repression, especially during times of political crisis. I further show that this problem cannot be easily fixed with more data. Ironically, international data—especially data from less repressive settings—can help improve AI's ability to censor.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Eddie Yang
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The limits of AI for authoritarian control</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70045</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70045</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70045?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70038?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2026 07:10:38 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-10T07:10:38-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70038</guid>
         <title>Does external threat bring the nation together? Evidence from the United States</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Do external security threats unify the nation in countries with high social polarization? War and other forms of interstate competition for power may increase the salience of national identity, but the effect may be weak if the nation is divided. Empirical evidence of a trade‐off between national (superordinate) and subnational (subordinate) identification during times of crisis is sparse. We present an experimental framework to measure effects of external threat on national identification in the United States, exploring whether effects are driven by attachment to the nation (ingroup love), hostility toward other nations (outgroup hate), or both simultaneously. We find that even in a context of partisan polarization, external threat strengthens national identification, expressed mainly as increased hostility toward the national outgroup. National identification need not come at the expense of salient partisan identities as long as these are not perceived to be in competition with the national identity.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Do external security threats unify the nation in countries with high social polarization? War and other forms of interstate competition for power may increase the salience of national identity, but the effect may be weak if the nation is divided. Empirical evidence of a trade-off between national (superordinate) and subnational (subordinate) identification during times of crisis is sparse. We present an experimental framework to measure effects of external threat on national identification in the United States, exploring whether effects are driven by attachment to the nation (ingroup love), hostility toward other nations (outgroup hate), or both simultaneously. We find that even in a context of partisan polarization, external threat strengthens national identification, expressed mainly as increased hostility toward the national outgroup. National identification need not come at the expense of salient partisan identities as long as these are not perceived to be in competition with the national identity.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Nicholas Sambanis, 
Amber Hye‐Yon Lee
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Does external threat bring the nation together? Evidence from the United States</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70038</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70038</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70038?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70033?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2026 01:16:45 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-09T01:16:45-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70033</guid>
         <title>Seeing like a citizen: Experimental evidence on how empowerment affects engagement with the state</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Building a strong and effective state requires revenue. Yet, in many low‐income countries, citizens do not make formal payments to the state or forego engaging with the state altogether due to vulnerability to opportunistic demands by state agents. We study two randomized interventions in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, designed to empower citizens in their negotiations with opportunistic state agents: one provided information about statutory payment obligations, the other offered protection from abusive officials. We examine the effects not only on citizen payment amounts (intensive margin effects) but also on whether citizens start making formal payments, or any payments, to the state (extensive margin effects). We find that protection, and to a lesser extent information, had clear extensive margin effects, increasing the share of citizens making formal payments and engaging with the state. These findings show how empowering citizens can help countries transition away from a low‐revenue, low engagement equilibrium.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Building a strong and effective state requires revenue. Yet, in many low-income countries, citizens do not make formal payments to the state or forego engaging with the state altogether due to vulnerability to opportunistic demands by state agents. We study two randomized interventions in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, designed to empower citizens in their negotiations with opportunistic state agents: one provided &lt;i&gt;information&lt;/i&gt; about statutory payment obligations, the other offered &lt;i&gt;protection&lt;/i&gt; from abusive officials. We examine the effects not only on citizen payment amounts (intensive margin effects) but also on whether citizens start making formal payments, or any payments, to the state (extensive margin effects). We find that protection, and to a lesser extent information, had clear extensive margin effects, increasing the share of citizens making formal payments and engaging with the state. These findings show how empowering citizens can help countries transition away from a low-revenue, low engagement equilibrium.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Soeren J. Henn, 
Laura Paler, 
Wilson Prichard, 
Cyrus Samii, 
Raúl Sánchez de la Sierra
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Seeing like a citizen: Experimental evidence on how empowerment affects engagement with the state</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70033</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70033</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70033?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70034?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sun, 01 Feb 2026 21:31:17 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-01T09:31:17-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70034</guid>
         <title>Migrating to stay or commuting to work? How fairness perceptions and exposure shape attitudes toward labor migration</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Existing literature posits that attitudes toward immigration are shaped by the impact of migrants on native workers' wages and employment, as well as by various other material, cultural, and social concerns. However, empirically disentangling these influences can be challenging. By taking advantage of the fact that different types of labor migrants, namely either taking residence and working in a country or commuting over an international border, equally affect labor market competition but have different cultural and social implications, we strive to identify the effect of labor migration on attitudes toward migration. We empirically investigate this phenomenon using two experiments embedded within a representative survey in Switzerland, one priming and one conjoint experiment. Results robustly show that natives evaluate resident foreigners more positively than cross‐border commuters and that levels of exposure and fairness aspects explain this preference.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Existing literature posits that attitudes toward immigration are shaped by the impact of migrants on native workers' wages and employment, as well as by various other material, cultural, and social concerns. However, empirically disentangling these influences can be challenging. By taking advantage of the fact that different types of labor migrants, namely either taking residence and working in a country or commuting over an international border, equally affect labor market competition but have different cultural and social implications, we strive to identify the effect of labor migration on attitudes toward migration. We empirically investigate this phenomenon using two experiments embedded within a representative survey in Switzerland, one priming and one conjoint experiment. Results robustly show that natives evaluate resident foreigners more positively than cross-border commuters and that levels of exposure and fairness aspects explain this preference.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Lena Maria Schaffer, 
Gabriele Spilker
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Migrating to stay or commuting to work? How fairness perceptions and exposure shape attitudes toward labor migration</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70034</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70034</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70034?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70031?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 30 Jan 2026 22:04:46 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-01-30T10:04:46-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70031</guid>
         <title>How shifting priorities and capacity affect policy work and constituency service: Evidence from a census of legislator requests to U.S. federal agencies</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
When elected officials gain power, do they use it to provide more constituent service or affect policy? The answer informs debates over how legislator capacity, term limits, and institutional positions affect legislator behavior. We distinguish two countervailing effects of increased institutional power: shifting priorities and increased capacity. To assess how institutional power shapes behavior, we assemble a massive new database of 611,239 legislator requests to a near census of federal departments, agencies, and subagencies between 2007 and 2020. We find that legislators prioritize policy work as they gain institutional power (e.g., become a committee chair) but simultaneously maintain their levels of constituency service. Moreover, when a new legislator replaces an experienced legislator, the district receives less constituency service and less policy work. Rather than long‐serving and powerful elected officials diverting attention from constituents, their increased capacity enables them to maintain levels of constituency service, even as they prioritize policy work.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When elected officials gain power, do they use it to provide more constituent service or affect policy? The answer informs debates over how legislator capacity, term limits, and institutional positions affect legislator behavior. We distinguish two countervailing effects of increased institutional power: shifting priorities and increased capacity. To assess how institutional power shapes behavior, we assemble a massive new database of 611,239 legislator requests to a near census of federal departments, agencies, and subagencies between 2007 and 2020. We find that legislators prioritize policy work as they gain institutional power (e.g., become a committee chair) but simultaneously maintain their levels of constituency service. Moreover, when a new legislator replaces an experienced legislator, the district receives less constituency service and less policy work. Rather than long-serving and powerful elected officials diverting attention from constituents, their increased capacity enables them to maintain levels of constituency service, even as they prioritize policy work.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Devin Judge‐Lord, 
Eleanor Neff Powell, 
Justin Grimmer
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>How shifting priorities and capacity affect policy work and constituency service: Evidence from a census of legislator requests to U.S. federal agencies</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70031</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70031</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70031?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70032?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 30 Jan 2026 21:45:07 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-01-30T09:45:07-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70032</guid>
         <title>Race, gender, and party in EEOC cases, 1996–2006: Assessing the role of judge attributes in case outcomes in the US district courts</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
We study the relationship between trial judge attributes and monetary outcomes in cases brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. We define an estimand, the average feature comparison (AFC), that addresses whether or not a case outcome would differ were it assigned to a judge of one type as opposed to another—here male versus female, White versus non‐White, or Republican versus Democratic appointee. We develop a framework for estimating the AFC that takes into consideration which judges are eligible to be randomly assigned to given cases. We find the probability a case results in nonzero relief is greater if that case were assigned to a non‐White judge than to a White judge, but the relief amount is not. For gender (party), we do not find evidence that the monetary outcome of a case would be different if it was assigned to a male (Democrat) rather than a female (Republican) judge.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We study the relationship between trial judge attributes and monetary outcomes in cases brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. We define an estimand, the average feature comparison (AFC), that addresses whether or not a case outcome would differ were it assigned to a judge of one type as opposed to another—here male versus female, White versus non-White, or Republican versus Democratic appointee. We develop a framework for estimating the AFC that takes into consideration which judges are eligible to be randomly assigned to given cases. We find the probability a case results in nonzero relief is greater if that case were assigned to a non-White judge than to a White judge, but the relief amount is not. For gender (party), we do not find evidence that the monetary outcome of a case would be different if it was assigned to a male (Democrat) rather than a female (Republican) judge.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Sean Farhang, 
Gregory J. Wawro, 
Michael E. Sobel
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Race, gender, and party in EEOC cases, 1996–2006: Assessing the role of judge attributes in case outcomes in the US district courts</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70032</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70032</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70032?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70030?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 07 Jan 2026 01:10:55 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-01-07T01:10:55-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70030</guid>
         <title>To fight or to govern? Political capital and electoral competition</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
We examine the endogenous development of specialized political capital and its use, by both governing and opposition parties, within a model of policymaking and electoral competition. The opposition party can use political capital to impede the governing party's policy agenda—to throw sand in the gears—but may make itself less electorally desirable in the process. We characterize conditions that give rise to different equilibrium patterns of political capital, including, among others, entrenched parties. Our results suggest that, in the special circumstances in which they arise, entrenched parties offer the voter a silver lining: In these cases, the incumbent and opposition parties have acquired different specialized political capital, and voters benefit from the opposition's developed capacity to curb the governing party's excesses. Due to the underlying conditions, policy outcomes are still poor, but, under relevant conditions, party entrenchment mitigates them, rather than exacerbating them as conventionally supposed.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We examine the endogenous development of specialized political capital and its use, by both governing and opposition parties, within a model of policymaking and electoral competition. The opposition party can use political capital to impede the governing party's policy agenda—to throw sand in the gears—but may make itself less electorally desirable in the process. We characterize conditions that give rise to different equilibrium patterns of political capital, including, among others, entrenched parties. Our results suggest that, in the special circumstances in which they arise, entrenched parties offer the voter a silver lining: In these cases, the incumbent and opposition parties have acquired different specialized political capital, and voters benefit from the opposition's developed capacity to curb the governing party's excesses. Due to the underlying conditions, policy outcomes are still poor, but, under relevant conditions, party entrenchment mitigates them, rather than exacerbating them as conventionally supposed.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Catherine Hafer, 
Scott A. Tyson, 
Congyi Zhou
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>To fight or to govern? Political capital and electoral competition</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70030</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70030</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70030?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70022?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sun, 04 Jan 2026 21:41:24 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-01-04T09:41:24-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70022</guid>
         <title>The policy adjacent: How affordable housing generates policy feedback among neighboring residents</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
While scholars have documented feedback effects among a policy's direct winners and losers, less is known about whether such effects can occur among the indirectly affected—“the policy adjacent.” Using 458 geocoded housing developments built between two nearly identical statewide ballot propositions funding affordable housing in California, we show that policy generates feedback effects among neighboring residents in systematic ways. New, nearby affordable housing causes majority‐homeowner blocks to increase their support for the housing bond, while majority‐renter blocks decrease or do not change their support. We attribute the positive effect among majority‐homeowner blocks to the housing's replacement of blight. In contrast, the lack of a positive effect among majority‐renter blocks may be driven by the threat of gentrification. Policy implementation can win support for expansion among unexpected beneficiaries, while failing to do so even among the policy's presumed allies.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While scholars have documented feedback effects among a policy's direct winners and losers, less is known about whether such effects can occur among the indirectly affected—“the policy adjacent.” Using 458 geocoded housing developments built between two nearly identical statewide ballot propositions funding affordable housing in California, we show that policy generates feedback effects among neighboring residents in systematic ways. New, nearby affordable housing causes majority-homeowner blocks to increase their support for the housing bond, while majority-renter blocks decrease or do not change their support. We attribute the positive effect among majority-homeowner blocks to the housing's replacement of blight. In contrast, the lack of a positive effect among majority-renter blocks may be driven by the threat of gentrification. Policy implementation can win support for expansion among unexpected beneficiaries, while failing to do so even among the policy's presumed allies.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Michael Hankinson, 
Asya Magazinnik, 
Melissa Sands
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The policy adjacent: How affordable housing generates policy feedback among neighboring residents</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70022</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70022</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70022?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70029?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 29 Dec 2025 21:15:01 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-29T09:15:01-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70029</guid>
         <title>Globalization, internal migration, and public goods provision in emerging economies</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Globalization can introduce new employment opportunities to emerging economies in multinational corporations and exporting firms. Who is best positioned to benefit, and what are the political consequences for “left behind” areas? We argue that primarily advantaged groups seize these opportunities through internal migration toward centers of global production—a costly activity not everyone can undertake. This selective out‐migration creates demographic shifts in left‐behind areas, weakening public goods provision. We test our argument in India, first documenting selective internal migration of advantaged groups. We then leverage the Indian information technology (IT) export boom and explore its consequences for public goods provision. We find that the IT boom increased migration toward centers of production and away from left‐behind localities. We also find that public goods provision was relatively weaker in unexposed localities, especially geographically distant ones. We identify migration as a mechanism through which globalization drives political change even in unexposed areas.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Globalization can introduce new employment opportunities to emerging economies in multinational corporations and exporting firms. Who is best positioned to benefit, and what are the political consequences for “left behind” areas? We argue that primarily advantaged groups seize these opportunities through internal migration toward centers of global production—a costly activity not everyone can undertake. This selective out-migration creates demographic shifts in left-behind areas, weakening public goods provision. We test our argument in India, first documenting selective internal migration of advantaged groups. We then leverage the Indian information technology (IT) export boom and explore its consequences for public goods provision. We find that the IT boom increased migration toward centers of production and away from left-behind localities. We also find that public goods provision was relatively weaker in unexposed localities, especially geographically distant ones. We identify migration as a mechanism through which globalization drives political change even in unexposed areas.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Benjamin Helms, 
Junghyun Lim
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Globalization, internal migration, and public goods provision in emerging economies</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70029</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70029</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70029?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70024?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 10 Dec 2025 17:30:15 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-10T05:30:15-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70024</guid>
         <title>An ecclesiastical court: Christian nationalism and perceptions of the US Supreme Court</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Recently, scholars have increasingly examined the unique blending of Christian and political ideology known as Christian nationalism. During this period, the US Supreme Court has increasingly ruled in ways that favor Christian nationalism, and Court watchers have criticized several justices for showing bias toward Christianity at best and Christian nationalism at worst. We use two large, nationally representative samples to examine the connection between Christian nationalism and attitudes about the Court. Observationally, we ask if this ideology relates to support for the Court's decision to overturn abortion rights and agreement with the use of nonlegal and religious logic in decisions. Experimentally, we test whether exposure to a story about Justice Alito flying a Christian nationalist flag can legitimate the use of religious decision‐making logic. We find support for all three propositions, indicating the Court's recent turn has real effects on its supporters, its legitimacy, and, potentially, its future behavior.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Recently, scholars have increasingly examined the unique blending of Christian and political ideology known as Christian nationalism. During this period, the US Supreme Court has increasingly ruled in ways that favor Christian nationalism, and Court watchers have criticized several justices for showing bias toward Christianity at best and Christian nationalism at worst. We use two large, nationally representative samples to examine the connection between Christian nationalism and attitudes about the Court. Observationally, we ask if this ideology relates to support for the Court's decision to overturn abortion rights and agreement with the use of nonlegal and religious logic in decisions. Experimentally, we test whether exposure to a story about Justice Alito flying a Christian nationalist flag can legitimate the use of religious decision-making logic. We find support for all three propositions, indicating the Court's recent turn has real effects on its supporters, its legitimacy, and, potentially, its future behavior.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Miles T. Armaly, 
Jonathan M. King, 
Elizabeth A. Lane, 
Jessica A. Schoenherr
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>An ecclesiastical court: Christian nationalism and perceptions of the US Supreme Court</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70024</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70024</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70024?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70023?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 10 Dec 2025 17:26:36 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-10T05:26:36-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70023</guid>
         <title>The public agglomeration effect: Urban–rural divisions in government efficiency and political preferences</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Why and when do cities vote for the left? The emergence of the urban–rural divide in the United States in the 1930s is inconsistent with canonical theories of cleavages. This paper introduces an explanation: agglomeration effects. The provision of government services is more efficient in urban environments because of nonrivalries, economies of scale, and access costs. If the public sector in cities is more efficient, and voters face a trade‐off between taxation and government spending, urban voters support more spending. When redistribution is salient, one should observe an urban–rural electoral divide. As predicted by a formal model, more‐urban locations faced lower costs of providing public services and shifted toward the Democrats as the party implemented the New Deal. In addition, urban voters were more supportive of government spending. In the United Kingdom, the urban–rural divide also accompanied the rise of redistributive politics. Agglomeration effects influence preferences for redistribution and create political cleavages.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Why and when do cities vote for the left? The emergence of the urban–rural divide in the United States in the 1930s is inconsistent with canonical theories of cleavages. This paper introduces an explanation: agglomeration effects. The provision of government services is more efficient in urban environments because of nonrivalries, economies of scale, and access costs. If the public sector in cities is more efficient, and voters face a trade-off between taxation and government spending, urban voters support more spending. When redistribution is salient, one should observe an urban–rural electoral divide. As predicted by a formal model, more-urban locations faced lower costs of providing public services and shifted toward the Democrats as the party implemented the New Deal. In addition, urban voters were more supportive of government spending. In the United Kingdom, the urban–rural divide also accompanied the rise of redistributive politics. Agglomeration effects influence preferences for redistribution and create political cleavages.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Theo Serlin
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The public agglomeration effect: Urban–rural divisions in government efficiency and political preferences</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70023</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70023</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70023?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70018?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 01 Dec 2025 00:00:00 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-01T12:00:00-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70018</guid>
         <title>Reviewing fast or slow: A theory of summary reversal in the judicial hierarchy</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Appellate courts with discretionary dockets have multiple ways to review lower courts. We develop a formal model that evaluates the trade‐offs between “full review”—which features full briefing, oral arguments, and signed opinions—versus “quick review,” where a higher court can summarily reverse a lower court. We show that having the option of costless summary reversal can increase compliance by lower courts but also distorts their behavior compared to relying only on costly full review. When the higher court is uncertain about the lower court's preferences, the threat of summary reversal can lead an aligned lower court to “pander” and issue the opposite disposition to that preferred by the higher court. Access to summary reversal can therefore harm the higher court in some circumstances. Our analysis provides a theoretical foundation for growing concern over the U.S. Supreme Court's “shadow docket”—of which summarily reversals are a component—which has been empirically focused to date.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Appellate courts with discretionary dockets have multiple ways to review lower courts. We develop a formal model that evaluates the trade-offs between “full review”—which features full briefing, oral arguments, and signed opinions—versus “quick review,” where a higher court can summarily reverse a lower court. We show that having the option of costless summary reversal can increase compliance by lower courts but also distorts their behavior compared to relying only on costly full review. When the higher court is uncertain about the lower court's preferences, the threat of summary reversal can lead an aligned lower court to “pander” and issue the opposite disposition to that preferred by the higher court. Access to summary reversal can therefore harm the higher court in some circumstances. Our analysis provides a theoretical foundation for growing concern over the U.S. Supreme Court's “shadow docket”—of which summarily reversals are a component—which has been empirically focused to date.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Alexander V. Hirsch, 
Jonathan P. Kastellec, 
Robin A. Taboni
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Reviewing fast or slow: A theory of summary reversal in the judicial hierarchy</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70018</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70018</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70018?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70025?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sun, 30 Nov 2025 01:20:52 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-11-30T01:20:52-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70025</guid>
         <title>A drag on the ticket? Estimating top‐of‐the‐ticket effects on down‐ballot races</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Campaign staff, journalists, and political scientists commonly attribute the poor performances of a party's down‐ballot candidates to low‐quality or extreme top‐of‐the‐ticket candidates, but empirical evidence on this conventional wisdom is scant. We estimate the effect of candidate quality and ideology in gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections on co‐partisan vote shares in down‐ballot U.S. House races. While naive estimates imply that top‐of‐the‐ticket candidates influence down‐ballot outcomes, after accounting for correlations in candidate quality/ideology across offices, we estimate near‐zero statewide top‐of‐the‐ticket effects on U.S. House elections. We similarly observe near‐zero top‐of‐the‐ticket effects in the further‐down‐ballot settings of state‐legislative and county‐legislative elections. Overall, voters exhibit a strong capacity to discern differences in quality and ideology across offices and incorporate this information into their vote choice throughout the time period under investigation. However, in line with other research, this link between candidate quality/ideology and election outcomes has weakened considerably in recent years.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Campaign staff, journalists, and political scientists commonly attribute the poor performances of a party's down-ballot candidates to low-quality or extreme top-of-the-ticket candidates, but empirical evidence on this conventional wisdom is scant. We estimate the effect of candidate quality and ideology in gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections on co-partisan vote shares in down-ballot U.S. House races. While naive estimates imply that top-of-the-ticket candidates influence down-ballot outcomes, after accounting for correlations in candidate quality/ideology across offices, we estimate near-zero statewide top-of-the-ticket effects on U.S. House elections. We similarly observe near-zero top-of-the-ticket effects in the further-down-ballot settings of state-legislative and county-legislative elections. Overall, voters exhibit a strong capacity to discern differences in quality and ideology across offices and incorporate this information into their vote choice throughout the time period under investigation. However, in line with other research, this link between candidate quality/ideology and election outcomes has weakened considerably in recent years.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Kevin DeLuca, 
Daniel J. Moskowitz, 
Benjamin Schneer
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>A drag on the ticket? Estimating top‐of‐the‐ticket effects on down‐ballot races</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70025</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70025</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70025?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70026?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 26 Nov 2025 22:37:52 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-11-26T10:37:52-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70026</guid>
         <title>Filling the tax gap: How private donations compensate a faltering fiscal contract</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Do individuals contribute to public service provision when others in the community shirk on their taxes? The long‐standing literature on conditional cooperation has widely documented a knock‐on effect of freeriding. I argue that individuals may turn to civil society as an alternative way to fund public services. First, I leverage a natural experiment in Slovakia, based on the timing of a naming‐and‐shaming tax policy. Communities exposed to a public disclosure of noncompliance donate 16% more. Second, I replicate this via a survey experiment, showing an increase in charitable giving of 9% as well as eroding faith in the tax system. Highlighting the role of altruism, donations increase the most among respondents who believe their town relies on public services. In a conjoint, treated respondents also preferred public donations, suggesting an additional reputation mechanism. Finally, cross‐country survey evidence bolsters external validity, showing a robust correlation between perceived tax cheating and local volunteering.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Do individuals contribute to public service provision when others in the community shirk on their taxes? The long-standing literature on conditional cooperation has widely documented a knock-on effect of freeriding. I argue that individuals may turn to civil society as an alternative way to fund public services. First, I leverage a natural experiment in Slovakia, based on the timing of a naming-and-shaming tax policy. Communities exposed to a public disclosure of noncompliance donate 16% more. Second, I replicate this via a survey experiment, showing an increase in charitable giving of 9% as well as eroding faith in the tax system. Highlighting the role of altruism, donations increase the most among respondents who believe their town relies on public services. In a conjoint, treated respondents also preferred public donations, suggesting an additional reputation mechanism. Finally, cross-country survey evidence bolsters external validity, showing a robust correlation between perceived tax cheating and local volunteering.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Simone Paci
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Filling the tax gap: How private donations compensate a faltering fiscal contract</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70026</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70026</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70026?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70027?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 17 Nov 2025 22:21:26 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-11-17T10:21:26-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70027</guid>
         <title>Brokerage and patronage: Regional chambers of commerce and firm subsidies in China</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Although conventional wisdom suggests that corporations form groups to obtain policy benefits through lobbying, we argue that business interest groups can secure distributive benefits for their members without advocating for policy changes. We introduce broker theory, which posits that interest groups act as intermediaries, linking member firms with political patrons who deliver tangible favors. We test this theory by examining China's interprovincial chambers of commerce (CoCs). We show that firms receive more distributive benefits—measured by subsidies from local governments—after obtaining CoC memberships. We present two forms of heterogeneity that support the broker role of CoCs. First, patronage benefits emerge only in chambers with officials‐turned‐brokers, who facilitate access to political patrons. Second, transparency weakens subsidy brokering: The membership premium diminishes in regions with greater transparency in subsidy allocation. We also show that these patronage benefits are not driven by the policy influence of CoCs or by reduced local protectionism.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although conventional wisdom suggests that corporations form groups to obtain policy benefits through lobbying, we argue that business interest groups can secure distributive benefits for their members without advocating for policy changes. We introduce broker theory, which posits that interest groups act as intermediaries, linking member firms with political patrons who deliver tangible favors. We test this theory by examining China's interprovincial chambers of commerce (CoCs). We show that firms receive more distributive benefits—measured by subsidies from local governments—after obtaining CoC memberships. We present two forms of heterogeneity that support the broker role of CoCs. First, patronage benefits emerge only in chambers with officials-turned-brokers, who facilitate access to political patrons. Second, transparency weakens subsidy brokering: The membership premium diminishes in regions with greater transparency in subsidy allocation. We also show that these patronage benefits are not driven by the policy influence of CoCs or by reduced local protectionism.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Zeren Li, 
Shenghua Lu
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Brokerage and patronage: Regional chambers of commerce and firm subsidies in China</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70027</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70027</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70027?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70020?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 17 Nov 2025 22:20:32 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-11-17T10:20:32-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70020</guid>
         <title>Grounding the diasporic turn in political theory: Meta‐commitment, transnationalism, and political obligation</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Diasporas remain understudied in political theory. To ground a robust engagement with diasporas and their normative challenges, we expand on current transnationalism literature to offer a non‐statist framework of political community. This framework is necessary as the diaspora is a transnational community that shares overlapping narratives and practices but lacks unified institutional structures and objectives. Tracking these features, we posit that individuals constitute a diasporic community by expressing, through their practices and narratives, a joint meta‐commitment to act as part of that community. Meta‐commitments do not require the parties to have substantial agreements beyond mutually recognizing each other as acting on behalf of the same community. The diasporic meta‐commitment grounds an obligation of answerability: Diasporic members owe each other an answer as to how their choices relate to the future of the diaspora. This account contributes to transnational political theory by explaining the conditions under which transnational relations generate obligations.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Diasporas remain understudied in political theory. To ground a robust engagement with diasporas and their normative challenges, we expand on current transnationalism literature to offer a non-statist framework of political community. This framework is necessary as the diaspora is a transnational community that shares overlapping narratives and practices but lacks unified institutional structures and objectives. Tracking these features, we posit that individuals constitute a diasporic community by expressing, through their practices and narratives, a joint meta-commitment to act as part of that community. Meta-commitments do not require the parties to have substantial agreements beyond mutually recognizing each other as acting on behalf of the same community. The diasporic meta-commitment grounds an obligation of answerability: Diasporic members owe each other an answer as to how their choices relate to the future of the diaspora. This account contributes to transnational political theory by explaining the conditions under which transnational relations generate obligations.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Kai Yui Samuel Chan, 
Anna Closas
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Grounding the diasporic turn in political theory: Meta‐commitment, transnationalism, and political obligation</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70020</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70020</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70020?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70021?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 12 Nov 2025 03:33:05 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-11-12T03:33:05-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70021</guid>
         <title>Why women's equal representation increases policy losers’ consent: Revisiting the double‐edged sword of procedural fairness</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Studies show that procedural fairness in the form of equal representation has the potential to increase decision legitimacy. At the same time, several studies point to potential adverse effects, where, for instance, the equal inclusion of women in decision‐making bodies might serve to legitimize anti‐feminist decisions in particular. We argue that such conclusions result from a failure to consider the importance of outcome favorability, a factor long recognized to be of crucial importance in other fields of research. We incorporate outcome favorability theoretically and empirically in several experimental studies and show that what has previously been interpreted as a “dark side” of descriptive representation, instead should be viewed as the power of fair procedures to increase losers’ consent. We contribute to the literature on representation and legitimacy and show how appropriate research design and measurement can shape substantive conclusions on high‐stakes issues.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Studies show that procedural fairness in the form of equal representation has the potential to increase decision legitimacy. At the same time, several studies point to potential adverse effects, where, for instance, the equal inclusion of women in decision-making bodies might serve to legitimize anti-feminist decisions in particular. We argue that such conclusions result from a failure to consider the importance of outcome favorability, a factor long recognized to be of crucial importance in other fields of research. We incorporate outcome favorability theoretically and empirically in several experimental studies and show that what has previously been interpreted as a “dark side” of descriptive representation, instead should be viewed as the power of fair procedures to increase losers’ consent. We contribute to the literature on representation and legitimacy and show how appropriate research design and measurement can shape substantive conclusions on high-stakes issues.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Mattias Agerberg, 
Lena Wängnerud
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Why women's equal representation increases policy losers’ consent: Revisiting the double‐edged sword of procedural fairness</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70021</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70021</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70021?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70016?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2025 09:27:29 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-31T09:27:29-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70016</guid>
         <title>Police department design, political pressure, and racial inequality in arrests</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This paper theorizes a source of bias in discretionary arrests: strategic limits on police officer learning. Officers have a variety of tactics at their disposal besides arrest that they use for less serious offenses when they judge the underlying behavior to be less severe. In departments led by a chief with special expertise in crime control, the chief's directives to change the severity threshold at which officers make arrests are a source of information about the most effective practices. However, if officers are uncertain whether their chief is swayed by political pressures, those directives will be less persuasive, especially when they align with what influential advocates want. This mechanism represents a constraint on the effectiveness of departments where chiefs have limited means to force subordinate compliance. With increasing Black political influence in cities since World War II, this inefficiency would have generated a form of anti‐Black structural racism in policing.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This paper theorizes a source of bias in discretionary arrests: strategic limits on police officer learning. Officers have a variety of tactics at their disposal besides arrest that they use for less serious offenses when they judge the underlying behavior to be less severe. In departments led by a chief with special expertise in crime control, the chief's directives to change the severity threshold at which officers make arrests are a source of information about the most effective practices. However, if officers are uncertain whether their chief is swayed by political pressures, those directives will be less persuasive, especially when they align with what influential advocates want. This mechanism represents a constraint on the effectiveness of departments where chiefs have limited means to force subordinate compliance. With increasing Black political influence in cities since World War II, this inefficiency would have generated a form of anti-Black structural racism in policing.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Andrew J. McCall
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Police department design, political pressure, and racial inequality in arrests</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70016</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70016</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70016?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70017?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2025 01:11:53 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-31T01:11:53-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70017</guid>
         <title>Learning by lobbying</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Effective lobbying requires understanding politicians' preferences, while the act of lobbying itself can reveal those preferences. How does this link between lobbying and learning shape relationships between interest groups and politicians? We develop a game‐theoretic model where an interest group can lobby a politician while learning about their ideological alignment. Our analysis highlights strategic tensions where interest groups balance information‐gathering against policy influence in their lobbying, while forward‐looking politicians manage their reputations to shape future interactions. These forces shape dynamics: Policies and transfers shift over time as uncertainty resolves, with early‐career politicians showing greater policy variance and extracting larger benefits through reputation management than veterans. Politicians with secure positions receive more favorable treatment due to their stronger incentives to appear less aligned than they truly are. Our results address empirical regularities and provide a theoretical foundation for understanding how lobbying relationships evolve across political careers and institutional contexts.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Effective lobbying requires understanding politicians' preferences, while the act of lobbying itself can reveal those preferences. How does this link between lobbying and learning shape relationships between interest groups and politicians? We develop a game-theoretic model where an interest group can lobby a politician while learning about their ideological alignment. Our analysis highlights strategic tensions where interest groups balance information-gathering against policy influence in their lobbying, while forward-looking politicians manage their reputations to shape future interactions. These forces shape dynamics: Policies and transfers shift over time as uncertainty resolves, with early-career politicians showing greater policy variance and extracting larger benefits through reputation management than veterans. Politicians with secure positions receive more favorable treatment due to their stronger incentives to appear less aligned than they truly are. Our results address empirical regularities and provide a theoretical foundation for understanding how lobbying relationships evolve across political careers and institutional contexts.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Emiel Awad, 
Gleason Judd, 
Nicolás Riquelme
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Learning by lobbying</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70017</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70017</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70017?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70015?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2025 21:45:35 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-06T09:45:35-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70015</guid>
         <title>Defiant pride: Origins and consequences of ethnic voting</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Why do voters often remain loyal to ethnic parties despite receiving little in terms of material welfare? I develop a theory focused on the role of dignity concerns in explaining within‐group variation in ethnic party loyalty. Group members who face discrimination from state agencies dominated by outgroups respond with defiant pride, which manifests as ethnicity becoming a larger part of the self‐concept. This heightened ethnic identification creates a demand for recognition through descriptive representation. Consequently, high‐identifying group members—often from lower social classes—are more forgiving of malfeasance by ethnic parties and more likely to trade off material for symbolic goods. I provide experimental, descriptive, and qualitative evidence for this argument from Karachi, Pakistan—a megacity ruled for three decades by a poorly governing ethnic party. This article pushes the literature on ethnic voting beyond dominant instrumental approaches and underscores the necessity of systematically unpacking heterogeneity within ethnic groups.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Why do voters often remain loyal to ethnic parties despite receiving little in terms of material welfare? I develop a theory focused on the role of dignity concerns in explaining within-group variation in ethnic party loyalty. Group members who face discrimination from state agencies dominated by outgroups respond with defiant pride, which manifests as ethnicity becoming a larger part of the self-concept. This heightened ethnic identification creates a demand for recognition through descriptive representation. Consequently, high-identifying group members—often from lower social classes—are more forgiving of malfeasance by ethnic parties and more likely to trade off material for symbolic goods. I provide experimental, descriptive, and qualitative evidence for this argument from Karachi, Pakistan—a megacity ruled for three decades by a poorly governing ethnic party. This article pushes the literature on ethnic voting beyond dominant instrumental approaches and underscores the necessity of systematically unpacking heterogeneity within ethnic groups.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Mashail Malik
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Defiant pride: Origins and consequences of ethnic voting</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70015</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70015</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70015?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70013?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2025 08:58:57 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-09-30T08:58:57-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70013</guid>
         <title>The electoral politics of immigration and crime</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Concern that immigration worsens crime problems is prevalent across Western publics. How does it shape electoral politics? Prior research asserted a growing left–right divide in immigration attitudes and voting behavior due to educational realignment. In contrast, I argue that leftist voters are more conservative on immigrant crime than leftist parties, which can drive highly educated progressives (so‐called “cosmopolitans”) to right‐wing parties. I demonstrate this voter–party mismatch using survey data from 14 Western European countries linked with expert ratings of party positions. A panel survey from Germany further shows that concern about immigrant crime increases vote intention for the center right among voters of the Greens—the party of leftist cosmopolitans. A conjoint experiment among German voters replicates this defection effect and shows that it persists even if the center right stigmatizes immigrants or adopts conservative sociocultural issue positions. Repercussions of immigration can in fact drive leftist cosmopolitans to the right.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Concern that immigration worsens crime problems is prevalent across Western publics. How does it shape electoral politics? Prior research asserted a growing left–right divide in immigration attitudes and voting behavior due to educational realignment. In contrast, I argue that leftist voters are more conservative on immigrant crime than leftist parties, which can drive highly educated progressives (so-called “cosmopolitans”) to right-wing parties. I demonstrate this &lt;i&gt;voter–party mismatch&lt;/i&gt; using survey data from 14 Western European countries linked with expert ratings of party positions. A panel survey from Germany further shows that concern about immigrant crime increases vote intention for the center right among voters of the Greens—the party of leftist cosmopolitans. A conjoint experiment among German voters replicates this defection effect and shows that it persists even if the center right stigmatizes immigrants or adopts conservative sociocultural issue positions. Repercussions of immigration can in fact drive leftist cosmopolitans to the right.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Jeyhun Alizade
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The electoral politics of immigration and crime</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70013</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70013</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70013?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70007?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2025 22:10:55 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-09-26T10:10:55-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70007</guid>
         <title>Unpacking gendered co‐participation in political violence: Women perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
How does gender influence participation in violence? Research shows that women are less likely than men to engage in direct violence. However, women remain consequential actors in conflicts. Drawing on gendered understandings of conflict, we argue that mobilization is shaped by gendered homophily within social networks. We theorize that both men and women are likely to mobilize with individuals of the same gender. However, this effect is more pronounced for women due to differences in how men and women are mobilized for conflict as well as other forms of political engagement. To test this argument, we utilize data from the 1994 genocide that targeted Tutsi in Rwanda. Using network analysis, we demonstrate the pivotal role women played in mobilizing other women to commit violence. This article broadens our understanding of network dynamics in conflict and emphasizes the importance of gendered differences in mobilization patterns for political processes.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How does gender influence participation in violence? Research shows that women are less likely than men to engage in direct violence. However, women remain consequential actors in conflicts. Drawing on gendered understandings of conflict, we argue that mobilization is shaped by gendered homophily within social networks. We theorize that both men and women are likely to mobilize with individuals of the same gender. However, this effect is more pronounced for women due to differences in how men and women are mobilized for conflict as well as other forms of political engagement. To test this argument, we utilize data from the 1994 genocide that targeted Tutsi in Rwanda. Using network analysis, we demonstrate the pivotal role women played in mobilizing other women to commit violence. This article broadens our understanding of network dynamics in conflict and emphasizes the importance of gendered differences in mobilization patterns for political processes.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Jared F. Edgerton, 
Elizabeth L. Brannon, 
Dagmar Heintze, 
Hollie Nyseth Nzitatira
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Unpacking gendered co‐participation in political violence: Women perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70007</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70007</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70007?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70014?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2025 17:58:36 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-09-16T05:58:36-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70014</guid>
         <title>The effect of real‐news party cues</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
News media routinely offer cues about the stances of party elites, but to what extent do these cues shape the policy opinions of the public? While numerous experiments find that partisans adopt the stances of their leaders, these findings may not generalize easily to the context of real news, which often contains richer policy information and more subtle, ambiguous party cues than the artificial stimuli commonly employed. To investigate the impact of party cues as they naturally appear in news coverage—what I term real‐news party cues—I develop a new experimental paradigm. I first sample 70 articles covering political proposals from a large pool of real news and prepare two versions of each: one with and one without these cues. These articles then serve as stimuli in survey experiments among representative samples of Americans (n = 12,177). I find that real‐news party cues have mostly modest effects on policy opinions.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;News media routinely offer cues about the stances of party elites, but to what extent do these cues shape the policy opinions of the public? While numerous experiments find that partisans adopt the stances of their leaders, these findings may not generalize easily to the context of real news, which often contains richer policy information and more subtle, ambiguous party cues than the artificial stimuli commonly employed. To investigate the impact of party cues as they naturally appear in news coverage—what I term &lt;i&gt;real-news party cues&lt;/i&gt;—I develop a new experimental paradigm. I first sample 70 articles covering political proposals from a large pool of real news and prepare two versions of each: one with and one without these cues. These articles then serve as stimuli in survey experiments among representative samples of Americans (&lt;i&gt;n&lt;/i&gt; = 12,177). I find that real-news party cues have mostly modest effects on policy opinions.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Rasmus Skytte
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The effect of real‐news party cues</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70014</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70014</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70014?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70005?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2025 17:55:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-09-16T05:55:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70005</guid>
         <title>Classification algorithms and social outcomes</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Classification algorithms are increasingly important in areas such as obtaining credit, employment, health care, housing, law enforcement, and national security. These classification decisions affect people's lives and, accordingly, can shape their behaviors. We present a formal model of optimal classification by an algorithm designer who may want to affect the distribution of behavior in a population. Our model allows the designer to have a wide array of objectives (such as maximizing compliance or maximizing accuracy, among many others), and these objectives shape equilibrium behavioral outcomes in the population, sometimes in surprising ways. Our results also speak to questions of algorithmic fairness in settings where behavior and algorithms are interdependent, and where measures of fairness focusing on statistical parity across groups may not be appropriate.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Classification algorithms are increasingly important in areas such as obtaining credit, employment, health care, housing, law enforcement, and national security. These classification decisions affect people's lives and, accordingly, can shape their behaviors. We present a formal model of optimal classification by an algorithm designer who may want to affect the distribution of behavior in a population. Our model allows the designer to have a wide array of objectives (such as maximizing compliance or maximizing accuracy, among many others), and these objectives shape equilibrium behavioral outcomes in the population, sometimes in surprising ways. Our results also speak to questions of algorithmic fairness in settings where behavior and algorithms are interdependent, and where measures of fairness focusing on statistical parity across groups may not be appropriate.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 
John W. Patty
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Classification algorithms and social outcomes</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70005</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70005</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70005?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70010?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2025 22:04:48 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-09-12T10:04:48-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70010</guid>
         <title>How FDI reshapes host markets’ trade profile and politics</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
A fast‐growing literature indicates that firms’ engagement in foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade is key to understanding deepening global value chains and their political implications. However, existing studies have mainly focused on the ramifications for FDI home countries while often overlooking the firm‐product level interactions between FDI and trade, where their interdependencies manifest. This study examines how firms’ FDI reshapes host countries’ trade profiles at this level, empowering new political coalitions for trade liberalization. Analyzing greenfield FDI projects globally since 2003, we find that hosts experienced an average increase of over 45 export products in the following year. To overcome the challenges of connecting firms to products, we link FDI data with Vietnamese customs records. We find that Vietnamese export (import) volumes of FDI‐related products increased by 90% (30%) within 4 years of initial investments. Importantly, these products also benefited from more substantial tariff cuts in bilateral Free Trade Agreements.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A fast-growing literature indicates that firms’ engagement in foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade is key to understanding deepening global value chains and their political implications. However, existing studies have mainly focused on the ramifications for FDI home countries while often overlooking the &lt;i&gt;firm-product level&lt;/i&gt; interactions between FDI and trade, where their interdependencies manifest. This study examines how firms’ FDI reshapes host countries’ trade profiles at this level, empowering new political coalitions for trade liberalization. Analyzing greenfield FDI projects globally since 2003, we find that hosts experienced an average increase of over 45 export products in the following year. To overcome the challenges of connecting firms to products, we link FDI data with Vietnamese customs records. We find that Vietnamese export (import) volumes of FDI-related products increased by 90% (30%) within 4 years of initial investments. Importantly, these products also benefited from more substantial tariff cuts in bilateral Free Trade Agreements.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
In Song Kim, 
Steven Liao, 
Sayumi Miyano
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>How FDI reshapes host markets’ trade profile and politics</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70010</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70010</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70010?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70011?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2025 03:35:59 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-09-11T03:35:59-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70011</guid>
         <title>The nation‐state, non‐Western empires, and the politics of cultural difference</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
While empires have been central to political theory, they almost always refer to Western forms of imperialism and colonialism to which non‐Western societies are subject. But precolonial empires have ruled much of the world for much of known history. Building on recent International Relations (IR) scholarship, this article reconstructs an ideal type of empires based on three non‐Western ones: the Qing, the Ottoman, and the Mughal empires, showing how they aim at cultural incorporation. I argue that this incorporation is made possible by three institutional features: the plural composition of their governing structures, the heterogenous relations between center and periphery, and the absence of a territorial basis for imperial authority. These features, in turn, make possible a normative ideal of inclusive peace. This historical foray shows how dependent multicultural ideals central to political theory today are on the contingent institutional features of modern states; it also helps us think beyond these.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While empires have been central to political theory, they almost always refer to Western forms of imperialism and colonialism to which non-Western societies are subject. But precolonial empires have ruled much of the world for much of known history. Building on recent International Relations (IR) scholarship, this article reconstructs an ideal type of empires based on three non-Western ones: the Qing, the Ottoman, and the Mughal empires, showing how they aim at cultural incorporation. I argue that this incorporation is made possible by three institutional features: the plural composition of their governing structures, the heterogenous relations between center and periphery, and the absence of a territorial basis for imperial authority. These features, in turn, make possible a normative ideal of inclusive peace. This historical foray shows how dependent multicultural ideals central to political theory today are on the contingent institutional features of modern states; it also helps us think beyond these.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Loubna El Amine
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The nation‐state, non‐Western empires, and the politics of cultural difference</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70011</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70011</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70011?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70012?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2025 03:34:49 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-09-11T03:34:49-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70012</guid>
         <title>Change in migrants’ political attitudes: Acculturation and cosmopolitanization</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This paper investigates change in international migrants’ political attitudes. It theorizes a novel attitudinal typology distinguishing polity‐specific attitudes influenced by national contexts and transnational attitudes forged by migratory experience. It applies the typology to four dimensions of political competition in contemporary Europe: redistribution, homosexuality, European integration, and immigration. The paper tests the new theory using cross‐sectional and panel data spanning nearly 380,000 observations from 104 sending and 28 destination countries. It introduces a new strategy to model cross‐classified hierarchical data, addresses issues inherent to group comparison, and pioneers two empirical inquiries into migrants’ self‐selection. The results show that migration prompts the acculturation of polity‐specific attitudes and the cosmopolitanization of transnational attitudes. Migrants adopt their host countries’ attitudes toward redistribution and homosexuality while developing a uniquely liberal outlook on European integration and immigration. These findings carry major implications for our understanding of attitudinal change and the dimensionality of the ideological space.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This paper investigates change in international migrants’ political attitudes. It theorizes a novel attitudinal typology distinguishing polity-specific attitudes influenced by national contexts and transnational attitudes forged by migratory experience. It applies the typology to four dimensions of political competition in contemporary Europe: redistribution, homosexuality, European integration, and immigration. The paper tests the new theory using cross-sectional and panel data spanning nearly 380,000 observations from 104 sending and 28 destination countries. It introduces a new strategy to model cross-classified hierarchical data, addresses issues inherent to group comparison, and pioneers two empirical inquiries into migrants’ self-selection. The results show that migration prompts the acculturation of polity-specific attitudes and the cosmopolitanization of transnational attitudes. Migrants adopt their host countries’ attitudes toward redistribution and homosexuality while developing a uniquely liberal outlook on European integration and immigration. These findings carry major implications for our understanding of attitudinal change and the dimensionality of the ideological space.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Eva Krejcova, 
Filip Kostelka, 
Nicolas Sauger
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Change in migrants’ political attitudes: Acculturation and cosmopolitanization</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70012</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70012</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70012?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70009?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 28 Aug 2025 08:39:31 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-08-28T08:39:31-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70009</guid>
         <title>Testing the stability and temporal order of People of Color Identity and People of Color Solidarity: New evidence from a survey panel of Asian, Black, Latino, and multiracial adults</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Two crucial variables in the study of people of color (PoC) are identity and solidarity. Existing work construes identity as more stable than solidarity, with identity shifting solidarity between PoC. However, this view rests on cross‐sectional evidence, limiting researchers’ ability to formally appraise these key variables’ stability and sequence. We report the first longitudinal evidence on these matters by leveraging a unique two‐wave survey of Asian, Black, Latino, and multiracial adults. First, contrary to the current conceptualization, we find PoC solidarity is as stable as PoC identity, suggesting two alternate but durable sources of political unity among these groups. Second, consistent with its present conceptualization, we show PoC identity is associated with shifts in solidarity, but not vice versa. Third, we offer evidence that the dynamics between these variables hold uniformly across different PoC subgroups, highlighting this mega‐group's coherence and political relevance. We conclude by discussing our results’ implications for US inter‐minority politics.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two crucial variables in the study of people of color (PoC) are &lt;i&gt;identity&lt;/i&gt; and &lt;i&gt;solidarity&lt;/i&gt;. Existing work construes &lt;i&gt;identity&lt;/i&gt; as more stable than &lt;i&gt;solidarity&lt;/i&gt;, with &lt;i&gt;identity&lt;/i&gt; shifting &lt;i&gt;solidarity&lt;/i&gt; between PoC. However, this view rests on cross-sectional evidence, limiting researchers’ ability to formally appraise these key variables’ stability and sequence. We report the first longitudinal evidence on these matters by leveraging a unique two-wave survey of Asian, Black, Latino, and multiracial adults. First, contrary to the current conceptualization, we find PoC &lt;i&gt;solidarity&lt;/i&gt; is as stable as PoC &lt;i&gt;identity&lt;/i&gt;, suggesting two alternate but durable sources of political unity among these groups. Second, consistent with its present conceptualization, we show PoC &lt;i&gt;identity&lt;/i&gt; is associated with shifts in &lt;i&gt;solidarity&lt;/i&gt;, but not vice versa. Third, we offer evidence that the dynamics between these variables hold uniformly across different PoC subgroups, highlighting this mega-group's coherence and political relevance. We conclude by discussing our results’ implications for US inter-minority politics.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Andrew M. Engelhardt, 
Efrén Pérez, 
Seth K. Goldman, 
Yuen J. Huo, 
Tatishe Nteta, 
Linda R. Tropp
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Testing the stability and temporal order of People of Color Identity and People of Color Solidarity: New evidence from a survey panel of Asian, Black, Latino, and multiracial adults</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70009</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70009</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70009?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70008?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 27 Aug 2025 03:09:06 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-08-27T03:09:06-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70008</guid>
         <title>Electoral responses to economic crises</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
How do voters respond to economic crises: Do they turn against the incumbent, reward a certain political camp, polarize to the extremes, or perhaps continue to vote much like before? Analyzing extensive data on electorates, parties, and individuals in 24 countries for over half a century, we document a systematic pattern whereby economic crises tend to disproportionately favor the right. Three main forces underlie this pattern. First, voters tend to decrease support for the party heading the government when the crisis erupts. Second, after crises, voters tend to assign greater importance to issues typically owned by the right. Third, when center‐right parties preside over a crisis, voters often drift further rightward to nationalist parties rather than defect to the left. The far‐right thus serves as an effective vehicle for keeping the center‐right in power even when facing postcrisis disaffection by its voters.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How do voters respond to economic crises: Do they turn against the incumbent, reward a certain political camp, polarize to the extremes, or perhaps continue to vote much like before? Analyzing extensive data on electorates, parties, and individuals in 24 countries for over half a century, we document a systematic pattern whereby economic crises tend to disproportionately favor the right. Three main forces underlie this pattern. First, voters tend to decrease support for the party heading the government when the crisis erupts. Second, after crises, voters tend to assign greater importance to issues typically owned by the right. Third, when center-right parties preside over a crisis, voters often drift further rightward to nationalist parties rather than defect to the left. The far-right thus serves as an effective vehicle for keeping the center-right in power even when facing postcrisis disaffection by its voters.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Yotam Margalit, 
Omer Solodoch
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Electoral responses to economic crises</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70008</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70008</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70008?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70006?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2025 21:30:24 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-08-12T09:30:24-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70006</guid>
         <title>Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition. The ability to compete for leverage generates a new channel through which the nature of potential war affects the quality of peace. First, costs of war grow the bargaining surplus, fueling the battle for leverage and reducing welfare even if war never occurs on the path of play. Second, competitive diplomacy erodes the gains from peace, making it possible that war is relatively efficient. An extension of the model finds that frictions to cooperation create a risk of costly delay but also protect against erosion of the surplus. Moreover, I find that reliable deals avert “efficient” wars but introduce a trade‐off between welfare and timely settlement.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda-setting power is endogenous to pre-bargaining diplomatic competition. The ability to compete for leverage generates a new channel through which the nature of potential war affects the quality of peace. First, costs of war grow the bargaining surplus, fueling the battle for leverage and reducing welfare even if war never occurs on the path of play. Second, competitive diplomacy erodes the gains from peace, making it possible that war is relatively efficient. An extension of the model finds that frictions to cooperation create a risk of costly delay but also protect against erosion of the surplus. Moreover, I find that reliable deals avert “efficient” wars but introduce a trade-off between welfare and timely settlement.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Joseph J. Ruggiero
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70006</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70006</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70006?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70004?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2025 21:29:41 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-08-12T09:29:41-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70004</guid>
         <title>Balancing bossism: State expansion in the face of elite capture</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Central states have often relied on local elites to implement policies in peripheral areas. These strategies may allow otherwise weak states to impose their directives, but they can also be inefficient, particularly when a single elite commands total control over local politics (monopolist capture). We argue that weak states can overcome this equilibrium by creating new subnational positions with distinct appointment rules from existing ones (balancing). We evaluate our argument leveraging a natural experiment and novel data on 12,000 sub‐municipal units from turn‐of‐the‐twentieth‐century Peru. We exploit as‐if random variation in population‐based appointment rules for a justice of the peace, the chief institution through which monopolist capture was established. We provide evidence that the Peruvian government responded to monopolist capture by creating local‐level executive positions (lieutenant governors). We further demonstrate that this balancing allowed the state to conduct a 1902 education census, which was otherwise opposed and often blocked by entrenched elites.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Central states have often relied on local elites to implement policies in peripheral areas. These strategies may allow otherwise weak states to impose their directives, but they can also be inefficient, particularly when a single elite commands total control over local politics (&lt;i&gt;monopolist capture&lt;/i&gt;). We argue that weak states can overcome this equilibrium by creating new subnational positions with distinct appointment rules from existing ones (&lt;i&gt;balancing&lt;/i&gt;). We evaluate our argument leveraging a natural experiment and novel data on 12,000 sub-municipal units from turn-of-the-twentieth-century Peru. We exploit as-if random variation in population-based appointment rules for a justice of the peace, the chief institution through which monopolist capture was established. We provide evidence that the Peruvian government responded to monopolist capture by creating local-level executive positions (lieutenant governors). We further demonstrate that this balancing allowed the state to conduct a 1902 education census, which was otherwise opposed and often blocked by entrenched elites.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Anna F. Callis, 
Christopher L. Carter
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Balancing bossism: State expansion in the face of elite capture</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70004</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70004</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70004?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70003?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2025 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-08-04T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70003</guid>
         <title>Injustice, relational violence, and the foster system</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Political theorists have not paid sustained attention to the foster system or treated it as a political institution. Despite this, scholars and social movement advocates have identified the system as a site of social and political injustice. This paper develops an account of racial, class, and relational injustice in the contemporary US foster system and provides an ethical framework for evaluating moral harms to intimate relationships. I propose the novel ethical concept of relational violence, which I suggest occurs when an external force damages an intimate bond by substantially disrupting an intimate relationship. Relational violence is generally wrong, and we have moral reasons to avoid it. But in the foster system, poverty, housing insecurity, and racial prejudice can lead to unnecessary relational violence through child removals. The foster system, then, emerges as an unjust institution that can compound the existing harms of racial and economic inequality with painful relational injustices.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Political theorists have not paid sustained attention to the foster system or treated it as a political institution. Despite this, scholars and social movement advocates have identified the system as a site of social and political injustice. This paper develops an account of racial, class, and relational injustice in the contemporary US foster system and provides an ethical framework for evaluating moral harms to intimate relationships. I propose the novel ethical concept of relational violence, which I suggest occurs when an external force damages an intimate bond by substantially disrupting an intimate relationship. Relational violence is generally wrong, and we have moral reasons to avoid it. But in the foster system, poverty, housing insecurity, and racial prejudice can lead to unnecessary relational violence through child removals. The foster system, then, emerges as an unjust institution that can compound the existing harms of racial and economic inequality with painful relational injustices.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Emma Ebowe
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Injustice, relational violence, and the foster system</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70003</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70003</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70003?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70001?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sat, 19 Jul 2025 22:58:36 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-07-19T10:58:36-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907?af=R">Wiley: American Journal of Political Science: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/ajps.70001</guid>
         <title>The Troubles and Beyond: The impact of a museum exhibit on a post‐conflict society</title>
         <description>American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
In divided societies, can museums contribute to healing and recovery? While efforts to memorialize past violence typically aim to promote tolerance and reconciliation, remembering could exacerbate divisions in recovering societies where the past is deeply contested. We examine a transitional justice museum exhibit in Northern Ireland. We combine evidence from nearly 1,400 participants across focus groups, a field experiment at the Troubles and Beyond exhibit in the Ulster Museum, and a survey that randomly exposed respondents to exhibit materials. Our findings indicate that although individuals experience strong emotional responses to the exhibit materials, these emotions do not correspond to shifts in perceptions of past violent conflict or preferences for addressing it. These results may reflect the balanced curation of the museum exhibit, which avoids imposing a singular narrative. While this approach prevents further polarization, it also limits the potential for fostering social cohesion.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In divided societies, can museums contribute to healing and recovery? While efforts to memorialize past violence typically aim to promote tolerance and reconciliation, remembering could exacerbate divisions in recovering societies where the past is deeply contested. We examine a transitional justice museum exhibit in Northern Ireland. We combine evidence from nearly 1,400 participants across focus groups, a field experiment at the Troubles and Beyond exhibit in the Ulster Museum, and a survey that randomly exposed respondents to exhibit materials. Our findings indicate that although individuals experience strong emotional responses to the exhibit materials, these emotions do not correspond to shifts in perceptions of past violent conflict or preferences for addressing it. These results may reflect the balanced curation of the museum exhibit, which avoids imposing a singular narrative. While this approach prevents further polarization, it also limits the potential for fostering social cohesion.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Laia Balcells, 
Elsa Voytas
</dc:creator>
         <category>ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The Troubles and Beyond: The impact of a museum exhibit on a post‐conflict society</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/ajps.70001</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>American Journal of Political Science</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/ajps.70001</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.70001?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ARTICLE</prism:section>
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