Yemen Post: Yemen Prime Minister Mohammad Salem Basindwia along with other ministers of the interim government failed to persuade judges of ending their protests, well informed sources said.
The sources said that Basindiwa offered the demonstrators to end their protests in return for meeting some of their demands in the coming days, reminding them that Yemen currently witnesses difficult conditions.
They said the judges did not accept any promises, and they would escalate their protests and use all legal means that may lead to achieve their demands.
Judges began their protests last week , demanding to carry out reforms in judiciary , make it independent, give judges complete immunity and cleanse judges of all military and security members.
They also demand to elect members of the Supreme Judiciary Council from the members of the judicial authority and limit the powers of the Justice Minister to the administrative and financial affairs.
Meanwhile, what has become known as the institution revolution hit many public authorities and resulted in the ouster of tens of corrupt officials in Yemen, as employees and students insisted on firing them.
Several military and security units demanded the removal of officers accused of corruption or involvement in the deadly crackdown on protesters.
Hundreds of the Air Forces soldiers have been protesting for weeks , demanding to fire their commander Mohammad Saleh Alahmar, half brother of Saleh.
Protests erupted lately of January inside a camp of the Republican Guard commanded by son of the outgoing President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
However, they were ended after Ahmed cautioned officers and soldiers against arranging any demonstrations, threatening to purge anyone trying to protest.

More on the Air Force uprising from the

YT: ColonelMohamed Saleh Mahyoub is one of thousands of Yemeni air force personnel who have been on strike for more than one month, demanding the removal of air force chief Gen. Mohamed Saleh Al-Ahmar, brother of outgoing President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Although he has commanded the air force for more than 22 years, his subordinates charge Al-Ahmar with bad management and corruption.

“Our rights as either air force soldiers or officers have been stolen,” said Mahyoub. “Even our food has not been given to us in a fair way, and personal arms have been distributed only to his loyal officers and members,” he charged.

Yemen has about 42,000 military air force members. In January, the nationwide air force uprising calling for Al-Ahmar’s ouster was triggered when an officer threw one of his boots at the general. According to Mahyoub, the demand for his resignation comes “because he doesn’t give us our rights.”

Some three thousand members of the air force have been protesting for the past three weeks in front of the home of Vice President Abd Rabo Mansour, who has assumed President Saleh’s duties since his incapacitation, demanding that he dismiss General Al-Ahmar.

But despite this massive protest, Al-Ahmar is still performing his duties while vowing not to leave until he is dead, according to a source at the Ministry of Defense.

It is the first time that members of Yemen’s air force have gone on strike and protested, calling for the removal of their leader. The action was apparently triggered by the Arab Spring, which has already seen four Arab leaders ousted from their respective regimes.

In Yemen, since December, employees of other state military and civil institutions have been rising up against their managers, some of whom have been in the same post for more than three decades.

Structure of the Yemeni army

Political researcher Aysh Awas told The Yemen Times that in Yemen, the air force, which is the focal point of the nation’s military infrastructure, is not structured like in other armies in the world. He explained that each commander a respective military unit is an independent power and is not connected to a hierarchal management answering to the defense ministry which presumably would run all military units. Rather, the ultimate power resides with the Saleh family. Outgoing President Saleh’s son is the chief commander of the Republican Guard which accounts for one-third of the nation’s military while Saleh’s nephew, Yahya Mohamed Abdullah Saleh, commands Yemen’s Central Security Forces. Air Force commander Gen. Mohamed Saleh Al-Ahmar is President Saleh’s half-brother.

Ironically, Gen. Ali Mohsen, the former head of the first armored division who defected from Saleh and sided with the popular revolution against his 33-year rule is also a Saleh kinsman.

If the GCC power transition plan, which stipulates the restructuring of Yemen’s army according to national and professional standards, is implemented, all of the Saleh-family officers will be removed from their commands.

Yemen’s air force

Yemen has around 375 military planes for different purposes including warplanes, martial shipment, training and terrorism fighting, according to the 2011 research report by the Abaad Studies and Research Center.

But only 60 percent of the existent planes are ready for use after several shutdown incidents of Yemen’s military planes have been reported during the past seven years in battles with the Houthi rebels in Sa’ada of the north and opposition tribesmen in Arhab, north of Sana’a.

At the moment the defected army is in control of two military airbases of Yemen’s ten airbases, one in Hodeida and the other is in Hadramout.

Yemen: Unlawful Attacks, Denial of Medical Care in Taizz
US, EU, Gulf Should Reject Immunity for Saleh, Aides

(New York, February 8, 2012) – Yemeni security forces stormed and shelled hospitals, evicted patients at gunpoint, and beat medics during an assault on Yemen’s protest movement that killed at least 120 people in the flashpoint city of Taizz last year, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who is in the United States receiving medical treatment, received amnesty in Yemen for such attacks.

In the 75-page report, “‘No Safe Places’: Yemen’s Crackdown on Protests in Taizz,” Human Rights Watch called on the United States, the European Union, and Persian Gulf states to publicly acknowledge that the domestic immunity granted Saleh and his aides last month has no legal effect outside Yemen.

“President Saleh’s forces killed and wounded hundreds of civilians, evicted hospital patients, and blocked war wounded from reaching care,” said Letta Tayler, Yemen researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Saleh is entitled to medical treatment, but he and his aides have no right to immunity from prosecution for international crimes.”

When Yemenis took to the streets in January 2011 to demand an end to Saleh’s 33-year rule, Taizz, 250 kilometers south of the capital, Sanaa, became a center of both peaceful and armed resistance – and the scene of numerous human rights abuses and violations of the laws of war. “No Safe Places” is based on more than 170 interviews with protesters, doctors, human rights defenders, and other witnesses to attacks in Taizz by state security forces and pro-Saleh gangs from February to December 2011.

Yemeni security forces repeatedly used excessive and lethal force against largely peaceful protesters in Taizz. During attacks on opposition fighters that began in mid-2011, they also indiscriminately shelled populated areas of the city. Government troops conducted much of the shelling from al-Thawra Hospital, the city’s biggest medical center, which they occupied from June to December, virtually closing it to medical care.

One of the biggest attacks on protesters took place on the night of May 29-30 at Freedom Square, in Taizz, when state security forces and armed gangs fired on protesters, set fire to their tents, and bulldozed an outdoor area they had occupied since February. Fifteen protesters were killed and more than 260 wounded. Arif Abd al-Salam, 32, a history teacher and protester, described the security forces’ attack:

They had tanks and bulldozers. They were throwing petrol bombs into the tents and firing from many directions. I saw with my own eyes a man with a loudspeaker calling on the security forces to stop attacking and killing their brothers. He was shot dead with a bullet.

Victims of the Taizz crackdown included both protesters and bystanders. Qaid al-Yusifi, a teacher, was killed on July 9, as he was bringing milk to his children in al-Rawdha, an opposition stronghold that was repeatedly struck by government artillery. Al-Yusifi’s wife, Labiba Hamid Muhammad Saif, told Human Rights Watch that she heard at least three shells hit the area around the couple’s house:

We tried to look out the window because we heard screaming. There were a number of wounded and there were people from the neighborhood trying to rescue them. The electricity was cut and I could not recognize the injured. Then I recognized one of them as my husband, Qaid. He was carrying juice, milk, and water, not bombs or bullets.

Of the 120 deaths Human Rights Watch confirmed in Taizz, 57 were protesters and bystanders killed in attacks by security forces and gangs on largely peaceful rallies and 63 were civilians killed in shelling and other attacks during military operations against tribal opposition fighters. At least 22 victims of the attacks in Taizz were children.

On May 30, during the attack on Freedom Square, security forces and armed gangs forcibly entered five medical facilities receiving injured protesters. At one medical facility, a doctor described a security officer smashing the face of a wounded protester with his gun butt, knocking him unconscious. Inside a mosque on Freedom Square serving as a field hospital, security forces thrust gun butts into protesters’ wounds, witnesses told Human Rights Watch.

On November 11, the military shelled al-Rawdha hospital, as civilians wounded that day in other security force attacks rushed there for treatment. Ordnance from the attack on the hospital suggests direct-fire impacts from tanks, indicating that it was deliberate. One patient fell to his death through a hole in the wall created by the blasts.

Many of the unlawful attacks documented in the report were committed by Republican Guards, an elite army unit commanded by Saleh’s son, Brig. Gen. Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, and by Central Security, a paramilitary unit run by the president’s nephew, Gen. Yahya Muhammad Saleh.

The attacks on protesters by Yemeni security forces violated international human rights law, including the right to peaceful assembly and expression, and were contrary to international standards on the use of force and firearms. Denial of medical assistance to injured protesters violated the right to health.

International law governing armed conflict was applicable to the fighting between the security forces and opposition fighters commanded by local sheiks. The security forces violated international law by indiscriminately shelling populated neighborhoods. The security forces’ occupation of hospitals and mistreatment of medical workers violates the principle of medical neutrality and the duty to respect and protect medical facilities and personnel.

Opposition fighters unlawfully placed civilians at risk by deploying in populated areas, Human Rights Watch said. “We asked them not to shoot next to our house,” one al-Rawdha resident said in September, “but they kept on doing so.”

Saleh blamed bloodshed in Taizz and other cities on “terrorists.” In a written response to Human Rights Watch’s findings, the government in December blamed casualties involving protesters and civilians on “sudden attacks … launched by the [opposition] armed militias.” Human Rights Watch’s field research found no evidence of this.

Since April, an accord brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and backed by the US and EU, promised Saleh and his aides blanket immunity if the president ceded power. Saleh signed the deal in November and on January 21, 2012, the Yemeni parliament granted immunity to the president and his aides. As a head of state, Saleh also enjoys diplomatic immunity abroad until he formally leaves office on February 21.

In addition to dismissing the immunity law, the US, EU, and GCC member states should encourage the new Yemeni caretaker government to revoke the measure on grounds it violates Yemen’s international legal obligations, Human Rights Watch said. International law does not recognize amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of human rights.

“The US, and EU and Gulf states should make loud and clear that the immunity is no good abroad and should be revoked at home,” Tayler said. “No one responsible for grave international crimes should get a free pass.”

To read the Human Rights Watch report, “‘No Safe Places’: Yemen’s Crackdown on Protests in Taizz,” please visit:

http://hrw.org/reports/2012/02/06/no-safe-places-0

For more Human Rights Watch reporting on Yemen, please visit:

http://www.hrw.org/middle-eastn-africa/yemen

Yemen Post: We the Ambassadors of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the European Union (EU), wish to reiterate to the people of Yemen our full commitment to the political transition process taking place on the basis of the November 2011 GCC Agreement and in the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2014 (2011). The 21 February Interim Presidential Elections are an important step. We call upon all the political parties, military authorities, tribal and regional leaders, youth and non-governmental civil society actors to work together to ensure that the elections are as inclusive as possible and take place without violence and in a constructive spirit of cooperation.

We look to all parties to work for improved security conditions throughout the country, the protection of civilians and the national infrastructure such as pipelines and electricity supplies, respect for human rights, the release of all political detainees, justice for all those affected by the crisis of the last year, national reconciliation and a unified effort to address the growing humanitarian crisis.

We share the aspiration of Yemeni citizens who seek a more stable and prosperous Yemen and a government that provides all the services citizens can rightly expect. The next two years of continuing transition will be vital to achieve this. We stand ready to support in every way possible this process.

a) Kindly publish the GCC Agreement in full as signed in Arabic and English, no one has seen the full text of the controlling document.

b) The lack of security, stability or services may have instigated the rev and the solution according to Yemenis is democracy. self-determination and an entire regime change. No one is seeking a better dictatorship except the UN.

c) Reiterate is the wrong word as it implies there was any attempt to communicate directly with the Yemeni people previously, and there was not.

d) Lovely the way they lump civilians in with pipelines and infrastructure in the same sentence as items to be protected.

e) Seeking justice for those harmed over the last year will not bring stability, Saleh’s victims prior to 2011 are substantially aggrieved. What kind of justice can the victims in 2011 expect and why are the thousands of prior victims excluded from this justice?

f) What kind of transition is it if Saleh is coming back to vote, many in the GPC retain power and Ahmed is expected to run in two years? The unity government not only freezes out the protesters, Houthis and Southerners but also the GPC officials who had the decency to resign after the March massacre. We are left the same exact players who were in a political deadlock from 2006-2011, with the exception of a few sincere individuals trying to hold back the GPC counter-revolution.

Although the Yemeni Constitution requires two candidates, the UN dictated single candidate election is a foregone conclusion, and I don’t think anybody should waste their time and energy boycotting (although many groups are). The National Reconciliation Conference however is an opportunity for the excluded elements of the Yemeni public to bring forth their demands while the international community is paying attention. It may be a rare chance to force some changes. Most groups and individuals in Yemen already agree on 1) a proportional electoral system that will eventually undermine the larger parties and allow a more representative political process and 2) transparent budget and fair allocation of resources.

It may be wise for all groups to agree to start with these two (or any other) consensual demands and see if the process is actually going to work. The opening goals should be ones that benefit every Yemeni regardless of identity. But what I think is gong to happen is that they are all going to come to the table with a full list of divergent demands and conditions. For example, many southerners remain fully committed to an independent state (as an opening statement), despite the argument for unwinding things slowly or joining the unity government to ensure a fair allocation of aid and resources for now.

Like I said before, if the presidential “election” had a meaningful referendum attached to it, like lets say on the proportional system of elections, more people might vote because their votes would have meaning and give them a voice and a decision. The outcome of this single candidate “election” was determined by the UN last year. Its an absurd proposition that that the UN is seeking the legitimacy of the popular will on an decidedly undemocratic, unconstitutional and unpopular process. Yemenis are not cattle or children, and a strongly worded statement won’t make them behave in a manner convenient to the UN. The letter doesn’t even have a nice or respectful tone. But at the end of the day, the final end to the nightmare of Saleh’s reign will be a positive event, as long as its actually the end and not more propaganda.

Also maybe somebody should explain to the southerners that participation in the elections doesn’t mean acceptance of the unified state or negate their rights and claims but maybe its a step to present those claims and affirm those rights in the coming national reconciliation conference. There are plans for protests against the elections in the near future in certain locations.

Yemen’s government is a hyper-political configuration wherein all state institutions and bureaucracies became an extension of the GPCs power. That is one reason I suggested early last year suspending the established political parties during the transition period, which would also give new parties a chance to develop real constituencies. Instead the current configuration as outlined by the GCC deal attempts to re-balance or tip the gridlock between the GPC and the JMP.

These are the two entities that were unable to agree on (previously agreed upon) electoral reforms from 2006-2011, there was not one shred of progress, not even the most basic reform was enacted. If they keep thwarting the transition maybe its time to go back to my idea from 2007, Disband the GPC. The problem is the GPC is the counter to Islah, so if they both take a two year hiatus, it might allow some breathing room.

To follow is my 2007 article that lays out part of the configurations in place then that are hampering progress now. Published at World Press 9/2/07, the article, written two months after the first southern protest, was disparaged because I said there were simmering tensions in the south: It wasn’t possible to disband the GPC five years ago but I wanted people to for once imagine a world without it in order to better see its hegemony in day to day life.

Disband Yemen’s Ruling Party

Since Yemen’s presidential election last September, the nation is experiencing several areas of instability. Crisis areas include the fourth recurrence of the Saada war in North Yemen, popular protests in the former South Yemen, hostile tribal posturing, and the resurgence of terror attacks directed at the state. One causal factor common to all these conflicts is institutionalized inequality or state discrimination. This inequality is also the foundation of massive corruption that is destroying Yemen. With elitism so engrained and corruption so pervasive, structural reform is nearly impossible. One solution may be to dissolve the national mechanisms that function to perpetuate inequality and enable corruption, starting with Yemen’s ruling party.

Hopes generated before Yemen’s 2006 presidential election were dashed in its wake. Oppositionists were disappointed that the election was a pantomime of democracy with state resources overwhelmingly supporting President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the victor and incumbent of 28 years. Saleh’s supporters were disappointed when his expansive election platform produced few tangible results upon his reelection. In fact, the situation worsened for the average Yemeni with prices rocketing higher.

After the election, Yemen’s military fought an intense war with Shia rebels in Yemen’s northernmost Saada region. Estimates are the war cost over a billion dollars since January. Thousands of soldiers, rebels, and civilians have been killed and wounded. Cities and villages have been laid to waste. Internal refugees number over 50,000. The International Committee of the Red Cross has noted that food in the region is in critically short supply and the local population has been without medical facilities since the inception of the war. Yemen has fought the insurgents three times since 2004. Each time, mediation led to a ceasefire that was then broken by both sides.

Renewal of tensions between Yemen’s major northern tribal confederations was a predictable result of the tribalization of the Saada war. The military inducted thousands of President Saleh’s Hashid tribesmen, and reports of looting and indiscriminate violence emerged. Senior Bakil sheiks issued statements warning of the potential for the broadening of the conflict or years of localized retaliatory tribal warfare. The National Solidarity Council was announced in July and consists of 1,000 tribal sheiks and dignitaries primarily from the Hashid confederation. A hastily formed grouping of Bakil tribal leaders announced their opposition to the National Solidarity Council in August, accusing it of intending to foster conflicts and Libyan support.

With war tapering off in the north, long suppressed tensions have come to the surface in the south. Popular protests are expressing the grievances of tens of thousands of southern military officers who were punitively discharged after Yemen’s 1994 civil war. Despite the regime’s assurances of reconciliation, the southern officers remained unemployed and lived on below-sustenance pensions for over a decade. In August, Yemeni security forces banned “unauthorized” demonstrations in Aden after a series of increasingly large protest marches began in May. Hundreds of demonstrators were arrested. Others were beaten on the street. One died. Regime efforts to quell the movement included promoting about 600 former officers, creating a clone of the pensioners’ organization, and promising to increase the pensions to legally required levels.

Each of these conflicts has its roots in intentional inequality. The 1990 unity between the former South Yemen and North Yemen was subverted by the dominance of the northern General People’s Congress (G.P.C.) party. In the south, state discrimination takes the form of massive land theft, targeted impoverishment, and the withholding of employment and educational opportunities. Geographic discrimination is not unusual. The withholding of water to Taiz is discrimination against a city. The politicized arrest of Al Shura editor Abdulkarim al-Khaiwani is discrimination against a person. The war in Saada, primarily a political one, gained sectarian overtones when security forces began to target Zaidis by identity. The mass arrest of Zaidi preachers, students, and villagers is state discrimination, as is the withholding of food and medicine to the region. The primacy of President Saleh’s Hashid tribe is derived from its association with the tools of the state. The access to economic benefits based on tribal affiliation as well as the immunity of the Hashid from the judiciary is institutionalized inequality. The inequality among groups (political, regional, tribal, sectarian) is reinforced by state media incitement.

In response to these recurring areas of instability and violence, the regime and the opposition parties are reacting predictably and in ways that initially fostered the conflicts. The government has responded with coercion, patronage, and propaganda without addressing any of the underlying factors such as political exclusion. The Houthis remain “monarchists” and the southerners “separatists” according to the official media. Movement leaders are plied with funds and accommodations while the bulk of Yeminis face brutal security forces and a well-armed military.

The Yemeni opposition blames and criticizes the G.P.C.; however, it is just as elitist. Some opposition leaders have also been co-opted by the G.P.C. and work toward the best interest of the ruling party, not the opposition or the people. The opposition coalition, the Joint Meeting Parties (J.M.P.), hopes to wrest control away from the powerful ruling party in Yemen’s 2009 parliamentary elections. The J.M.P. operates in a limited political space with the threat of violence never far away. The constraints on the J.M.P. do not preclude it from operating democratically. However, the J.M.P.’s lack of commitment in practice to equality, transition of power, transparency, and free speech work to limit its credibility. For the J.M.P.’s promises to ring true, the coalition would need to demonstrate the ability to reform itself and engage in internal democratic practices.

Yemen is facing dramatic times that require new and dramatic solutions. One way to disentangle corrupt relationships and encourage a merit-based hierarchy is to dissolve the ruling party. The G.P.C. functions similarly to the Syrian Baath party and the former Iraqi Baath party, as a party of access, influence, and patronage. The party merged with state institutions and bureaucracies that have become politicized. The party operates in its own self-interest and has grown to dominate public space.

Dissolving the G.P.C. would enable space for authentic reform by removing the structure that determines inclusion and exclusion. The G.P.C. is a primary mechanism of discrimination. It discriminates against all Yeminis but does so by identity, thereby reinforcing social divisions. Party affiliation is a factor in education, employment, judicial rulings, and public services, where they exist. Through G.P.C. control of the bureaucracy, the oligarchy absorbs the benefits of donor aid and natural resources while clean water, electricity, and educational and medical facilities are largely unavailable to the bulk of Yeminis. Yemen’s elite routinely deploy state institutions, including security forces and the judiciary, for personal ends as well as to stifle dissent, criticism, and efforts toward reform. Those within the G.P.C. with the foresight and courage to press for real reform can only go so far before the interests of “influential people” are threatened.

Another solution may be to create a new party that models equality and therefore democracy. A party committed to egalitarian principles would abide by its own charter, model financial transparency, hold fair internal elections, make leadership positions available to all members, and follow the expressed will of the majority. Yemen has yet to see a party that uniformly follows those prescriptions. And such a party needs to exist to give political access to ordinary citizens and hope to its 10 million youth. Democracy is the choice of the Yemeni people and therefore so is equality. A state or a party that discriminates by identity is inherently undemocratic.

Yemen Post: Shiite Houthi leader, Abdulmalek al-Houthi, in Yemen called on Saturday for establishing a civil state that lives up to the people of Yemen, who took to streets demanding change.
In a speech he delivered in front of tens of thousands of his supporters, who gathered to commemorate the prophetic cradle anniversary in the northern Yemeni province of Saddah, al-Houthi called on political forces to respect the will and choice of Yemeni people.
A panel of qualified Yemeni experts should be formed to draft a new constitution, the Military Committee quickly restructures the army, and Security and Political intelligent Security should be dissolved, he demanded.
His followers have reportedly closed all routes from and to Saddah and forced the residents to use excessive fireworks, leaving at least one killed and two injured, local media reported.
“Such ceremony of this magnitude in Yemen to celebrate the prophetic birth anniversary is the fruit of the revolution, which brought down the head of the regime,” al-Houthis said.

There’s no use pining for an apolitical transitional council of bureaucrats that was the protesters’ goal instead of the US sponsored re-empowerment of the entrenched forces that spurred the rev in the first place. The GCC deal is all carrot and no stick. The agreement, designed to effect a peaceful transition of power, took away the threats of freezing (stolen) funds, domestic or international prosecution, the “de-Baathification” of the GPC an international arms embargo and exile as an incentives for good behavior. The various fiefdoms are relatively unmolested, protected by the deal, and remain powerful and intertwined. Poor Hadi, he’s single handedly up against one of the most corrupt regimes on the planet and they are all going to fight to retain their cash flows and power. Those in the unity government with good intentions are beginning to despair at the overwhelming forces of the counter-revolution that blocks steps toward reform.

Yemen Vice President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi has threatened to unveil realities about Yemen’s current situations, indicating that nothing of the GCC-brokered power transfer’s provisions was implemented so far, An Emirate newspaper, Albyan, quoted well-informed Yemeni officials
The newspaper said Hadi has recently chaired a committee tasked with following up the GCC deal, pointing out that he cited that his residence was subject to shooting by unidentified men several times.
The officials said Hadi showed a dire picture of Yemen’s situations, pointing out that the capital is still divided into three parts, and oil and electricity lines are damaged
According to Albyan, Haid complained Al-Qaeda control on some towns, saying that the army took no actions to prevent Al-Qaeda expansion.
Armed groups affiliated to Al-Qaeda calling itself as “the Islamic Jihad Group” took over last month Yemeni towns amid claims that Saleh’s aides helped Al-Qaeda have a productive ground to grow and expand.
In the meeting , representatives of the General People Congress headed by Saleh could not justify the storm of some state newspapers by armed men loyal to regime, the newspaper added.
Under the GCC deal, Hadi is the consensus candidate of major parties in a presidential elections scheduled for February, while Saleh remains as a figurehead president for 90 days after he was forced to sign the deal.
After the elections, as GCC deal states, Hadi will oversee national dialogue to consider proposals for constitutional reforms that include replacing the presidential system with a multi-party parliamentary system.
Hadi is additionally tasked with presiding over the military commission, which operates to negotiate the demilitarization of the capital, Sana’a, and other cities.

Related: MSNBC article on the election:

Yemeni officials said Washington would not tolerate attempts to upset Hadi’s ascension to the presidency.

“The American administration told representatives of (both sides within the unity government) that… the U.N. Security Council will strongly confront any attempts to keep Hadi from being elected as the country’s president,” a Yemeni minister who attended a meeting with U.S. officials last week told Reuters.

5/2/2012-YemenOnline

Yemeni vice president Abdrabo Mansor Hadi said in meeting to discuss the situation of the mechanism implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council GCC that none of the GCC Deal has been achieved.

A source who participated the meeting said to Al-Bian Emirates newspaper that Vice President presented a tragic picture of the situation in the country. Hadi said that the capital Sana’a is still divided into three regions, although the problem of electricity not resolved and the pipeline has not been allowed to fix it since blown up ‘ source said.

According to the source, vice president also complained of «Control of the breadth of al-Qaeda on several areas in the country», where the organization is now controlled many areas in the southern provinces of Hadramaut, Shabwa, Abyan and Aden without any military forces are doing to meet this expansion.Vice President Hadi nominated by the Yemeni parliament as a compromised candidate in the next presidential election, which is supposed to be held in February 21,2012.

Washington Post: NYC protest against Yemeni president gets heated when he appears as shoe is thrown

NEW YORK — A protest of the embattled president of Yemen outside the New York hotel where he’s staying got heated when demonstrators saw him leave the building.

The dozen protesters had been kept across the street from the Ritz-Carlton hotel Sunday afternoon. They had been waving flags and yelling in opposition to President Ali Abdullah Saleh. He is visiting the United States for medical treatment.

Saleh exited the hotel and waved and smiled sardonically toward the protesters. One of them attempted to charge across the street, but was restrained by authorities. Someone also threw a shoe in Saleh’s direction.

Saleh got into his car. His motorcade then left.

Original: Spectacular. I was concerned that negotiations with the Taliban would be followed by negotiations with AQAP but it seemed too extreme to be possible, even for Obama. First the GCC deal freezes out (in bulk) all the philosophical forces opposed to the narrow, violent, supremacist al Qaeda worldview (including the protesters, women, southerners, Houthis, civil government advocates and everyone who defected from the GPC on principle) and then the (US endorsed) GCC deal re-empowers the calcified and dysfunctional ruling structure, paving the way for al Qaeda to impose its rigid political agenda on the rest of the nation through legitimate political avenues. While it is possible for hardened jihaddists to mature, the group has to change before they can come engage in the political process including renouncing violence and taqfirism, and endorsing equal rights and protections for all denominations and all Yemeni citizens. They are not there yet.

CNN via Yemen Online: 5/2/2012, Yemen’s highest military authority Sunday announced its willingness to open channels of dialogue with al Qaeda in hopes of reaching a long-term cease-fire agreement.

The military committee was formed as part of the power transfer deal in November. Spokesman Ali Saeed Obaid told CNN that the new Yemeni military leadership is opening its hands and will seek new solutions with al Qaeda fighters.

Al Qaeda currently controls large areas in the southern Abyan and Shabwa provinces of Yemen.

“We are offering al Qaeda a chance to be involved in the political decisions in the country through politics, rather than forcing their views with the use of arms,” Obaid said.

Vice President Abdurabu Hadi is chairman of the committee, which is responsible for rebuilding the Yemeni military.

“The committee is hoping that al Qaeda lays down its arms and participates in seeking change democratically, like the millions in Yemen,” Obaid said, adding that al Qaeda would in return handover all territories under its control to the military and evacuate government posts.

Al Qaeda has not yet responded to the offer, the committee said.

Yemen’s government is in the midst of a transfer of power in which President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a longtime United States ally in the war on terrorism, has agreed to step down after more than 33 years of rule.

Islamist militants seized control of Abyan last May after government positions were suddenly emptied. The province was announced an Islamic emirate a week later, resulting in hundreds of fighters joining their lines.

Hundreds of troops and fighters have been killed daily as part of their efforts to rid the province of the fighters.

More than 100,000 residents of Abyan evacuated the province when clashes intensified last July. They are currently living in shelters in the neighboring provinces of Aden and Lahj.

Last month, a committee formed by Hadi persuaded al Qaeda fighters in Radda, in the nearby province of al-Baitha, to evacuate the area two weeks after they took it over.

Suspected al Qaeda fighters left the town after five days of tense negotiations in exchange for the release of three prisoners, Hadi’s office said at the time. CNN

Related, a Lebanese paper questions whether Tariq al Dhahab is an operative of AQAP or the National Security (but these are not mutually exclusive) and if the take over of Radda was another false flag maneuver. The Abbad report below has al Wahishi physically in Raada with al Dhahab, but Wahishi and the National Security have had easy, if not good, relations for a long time

Before leaving Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh had opened the game of al-Qaeda again. This time occurred from Radda Area where al-Qaeda does not exist. Despite the fact that there is convention that led fundamentalist group to leave the town after occupying it for 4 weeks and the authority undertook to implement some of the armed group’s demands, subsequent developments say that this scenario will be repeated in other parts of Yemen.

It seems that Ali Abdullah Saleh even two weeks before heading for U. S. for treatment had not got bored from using al-Qaeda card, however, he signed (GCC) Imitative which turned him an honorary president with no power. He is still insisting on lifting up the slogan of “Me or al-Qaeda”. He did it in Abyan Province, south Yemen, at the middle of May when he directed security troops to leave the gates of the town opened and showed no resistance in front of attack of hundreds of armed men. Later, the regime said they belong to al-Qaeda.

Now, he is implementing it again but in a way improperly directed. Tribal Sheik from Radda Town called Tariq al-Dhahab, has tribal broad influence and belongs to famous tribe distinguished by its strength and the wide-spread of weapon among its elements in al-Baidha Province south Yemen along with hundreds of armed men, entered the area and faced no resistance from Central Security or Republican Guards present in the area. Nothing stopped Dhahab and his men, they entered the town as if they were going on a picnic or fishing trip not to occupy an entire town, and later declared an Islamic emirate.

After entering, they headed for the main Ameriya Mosque in the town where they prayed Maghreb (Sunset Prayers) and Isha (Evening Paryers). Between the two prayers, Tariq al-Dhahab delivered preach in which he pledged of allegiance to the leader of al-Qaeda in Arab Peninsula Nasr al-Waheshi and to the leader of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan Ayman al-Zawahiri. He announced a set of procedures in the town including forcing owners of petrol station to sell fuel with former price before the outbreak of the Youth Revolution in Yemen.

It is a step through which he aimed at gaining people’s sympathy. After that, they headed for ancient Ameriya Castle overlooking the town. They did not stop but they kept on dominating the rest of the town within the next two days. They, moreover, went to the Central Prison and released all inmates. Deputy Minister of Information Ministry Abdu Janadi commented on this conduct and said they did so in order to increase their number and arm those who want to join them. This was denied by Tariq al-Dhahab as saying he only had released two inmates of his followers. Dhahab later announced through recorded video saying, “Islamic caliphate is coming even if we sacrifice our souls and skulls for that,” He, moreover, threatened to free the Arabian Peninsula after applying Islamic law in Yemen, meeting the need of people.

Simultaneously, the Military Committee, formed in order to demilitarize Yemeni cities in accordance with (GCC) plan, continued holding meetings in the capital Sana’a to search the last results of the removal of barricades and military vehicles from the streets of the cities of Sana’a and Taiz. It issued a statement in which it praised these operations without forgetting to say that it would form investigation committee regarding what happened in Radda Town. It appeared that the Committee was in a side and Radda sheiks of tribes in the other. The sheiks were trying to rectify the deteriorating situation under an overt absence of security showing no resistance towards Dhahab’s elements occupying the town.

Consequently, tribe sheiks announced to hold meeting to discuss the serious situation especially as people there resorted to use their guns and to stand in front of their shops and houses to protect them. More serious than that, the large number of those released prisoners who were detained against a backdrop of revenge issues and crimes such as rape, stealing and murder including approximately 165 prisoners had sentenced to death.

How did the large number of fighters enter the town and how did they pass through all military checkpoints located along the main highways connecting the governorates of Yemen. Local source, who preferred to be in the state of anonymity, said they did not enter the town as rumored but they were gathered from inside the town. He explained to “al-Akhbar” that a number of sheiks repeatedly appealed to the authority the growing presence of strange militants from the town, but their calls faced no response. The sheiks, furthermore, appealed to militants to leave the town, otherwise they would use force to take militants out of the town and they offered them 3 days before Tariq al-Dhahab demanded to extend the deadline in order to discuss with senior sheiks of the tribe to reach to a solution that satisfies everybody without resorting to the strength of weapon. At the end, this resulted to make militants leave the town after the authority accepted some demands of Dhahab to release his younger brother from Political Security’s prison in Sana’a.

Khalid al-Dhahab shocked everybody when he said in statement to the press that his brother Tariq fully coordinated with National Security and with the former Interior Minister, the matter which puts questions regarding the reality of Tariq al-Dhahab link to Qaeda or is he a part of a security apparatus implementing specific task?

“The town of Radda was far from any mentioning of the presence of al-Qaeda inside and it did not happen that its name was linked to al-Qaeda,” said Managing Editor of “Masdar” independent newspaper, Abdul-Hakeem Helal, pointing out that we could never ignore the real presence of al-Qaeda in Yemen unlike what the opposition says through repeatable deny and that al-Qaeda is only a card played by Saleh.

For his part, media source in General People’s Congress (GPC), who did not want to mention his name, said to “al-Akhbar” that these acts done by Ali Abdullah Saleh before leaving Yemen were in the context of his attempts to bring chaos in spite of adopting immunity law which granted Saleh immunity from prosecution for his 33 year reign.

Simultaneously, elements belong to (GPC), headed by Saleh, notably were armed especially in Taiz and Dhale’ south Yemen. Informed sources said that their main goal in the next phase is to hinder early presidential election scheduled on February 21st, so Yemen would return to square number one.

Source: Lebanese al-Akhbar Newspaper

Yemen Post The Yemen-based Abaad Centre for Studies and Researches has cautioned that some factions seek to collapse Yemeni cities militarily under the pretext of Al-Qaeda as happened in Radda and Abyan provinces scenarios.
“This scenario may be carried out in Ibb, Dhala’a, Lahj, and, Hadhramout and other cities would be controlled under the pretext of fighting Al-Qaeda as it is expected to happen in Dhamar, Taiz, and Hodeidah.
In a periodic report, Abaad pointed out that Al-Qaeda has no systematic structure and its goals are foggy, affirming that it lacks strategic visions.
“Therefore, Al-Qaeda was penetrated by local and international bodies, and only those bodies take advantages of Al-Qaeda,” added the centre. “Even some figures benefited from Al-Qaeda as that clearly appeared during its control and withdrawal of Al-Amria in Rada when Tariq Al-Dhahab could get his brother out of the custody.”
“There are figures affiliated to Al-Qaeda, some were in Abyan and others who escaped jails, are currently existed in Sana’a, and some Al-Qaeda fugitives live with the displaced people inside schools in Aden.”
The report ruled out that Al-Qaeda has the ability to take over any town, if it does not receive direct and indirect logistic support by some sides that are in connection to the power transfer process.
“Al-Dhahab withdrew from Radda after he failed to recruit enough numbers to completely control the city as well as he got his main demand, release of his bother” the report added.
The periodic report revealed that Al-Dhahab was not the real leader of Al-Qaeda in Radda.
It further cited that Al-Qaeda senior leaders, Nasser Al-Wohaish, the leader of Al-Qaeda, and Ebrahim Darwish, another Al-Qaeda leader were at Alzahir district of Baidha governorate when Radda was taken over.
“Decisions were taken by Al-Qaeda Shura council consisted of 20 persons who are selected of 60 persons, the real division of Al-Qaeda which is called ” Almuhajreen” which includes a Saudi and Pakistani nationals. Their duties were not external protection. Some Bedouins, tribesmen and other escapees joined Al-Qaeda in its fighting with the aim of getting money and others were contained as a result of Al-Dhahab’s charisma in the area.
“While the real leader was not known in Radda, there was a field leader who is called Abu Hamza and another high-ranking leader called “Abu Hamam” , and they were considered the main decion-makers in Radda”
Abaad said that assassination incidents against officers and soldiers of the Political Security and other security services were clear-cut indicators of Al-Qaeda expansion.
“Before Al-Qaeda control on Radda, three of the Political Security officials were killed in Baidah, capital of the governorate, and Al-Qaeda was behind their assassination,” the report added “One of these officers, Ahmed Samba was kidnapped and executed by Al-Qaeda in Abyan,”
“Security services believe that Al-Qaeda was behind killing of approximately 70 security officers including 20 ones affiliated to the Political Security. Most of them were killed in the eastern and Southern governorates in the period from January 2011 to January 2012. This number is 25 percent of all those officers and soldiers killed since the eruption of anti-regime protests.”
The report affirmed that Al-Qaeda used the Yemeni political gap and the power transfer process to strengthen its control, pointing out that Saleh’s regime directly or indirectly contributed in Al-Qaeda control on Abyan and Radda.

“As Al-Qaeda took over Al-Qaeda in Zinjibar in April 2011 and seized control on the Central Security camp without fighting, it was supposed that Major General Adel Al-Masri, nephew of the Interior Ministry, be investigated.
“However, Al-Masri was appointed as a security director of Radda a day after the signature of the GCC-brokered power transfer deal,” the report added.
“After Almasri became the first security official in Rada, Al-Qaeda could seized control Radda at the same way it took over Zinjibar,”
“As a result of Al-Qaeda operations, some regional and international powers would move to Yemen’s territorial water, particularly the United states,”
“Its military move is motivated by presidential elections race, particularly after it achieved victories in Afghanistan and Yemen as well as the success of its covert operations which led to the killing of Bin Laden and Anwar Al-Awlaki,”
“Pentagon said it deployed a large floating base to serve as a “mother ship” for commando teams to the Middle East as tensions rise with Iran, Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somali pirates, but the main goal was the implementation of an agreement with Taliban for which the American forces would leave Afghanistan in return for allowing Al-Qaeda leaders would exit Afghanistan with guarantees of not endangering their lives,”
“Because Iran is interested in getting Americans and Al-Qaeda out Afghanistan, so it would facilitate the mission,” added the report.
“As for the US-Iranian competition at Bab-el-Mandeb strait, particularly after Tehran threatened to close Hormuz strait, the report said that Americans seek to secure Bab-el-Mandeb, and then expand to the east Africa, but they know that Iran’s existence in the African Horn would make them accept share as happened in Afghanistan and Iraq” the report concluded.

It expected that Washington would support Turkey’s efforts to decrease the ceiling of Iran’s demands which start with the United States’ suspension of its support to the Iranian opposition and ends with turning blind eyes to Iran’s repression against Sunnis in Balochistan , Ahwaz and Kurdistan.
It also cited that Washington and Tehran would reach an agreement that put an end to bargaining, pointing out that the Gulf Cooperation Council states would have their roles in the agreement as they are considered the closest partners to the United States.
“Yemen could be included in bargaining and Iran may abandon its influence in the African Horn, Yemen, Syria , Bahrain, particularly if it felt that it is fragile from inside and that its “Guardianship of the Jurist” system faces collapse in conjunction with parliamentary elections and Arab spring revolutions” it added.
The report concluded that bargaining reveals that Al-Qaeda organization is used as a justification for regional and international race to took over region’s resources.

It ultimately called the Yemeni Consensus government to set an emergency plan to deal with Al-Qaeda which includes economic reforms, political openness, debates and dialogues with all Yemeni forces including Al-Qaeda and the Houthi group.
“The government must take into consideration the military and security action as the last solution,” the report said.

RSF condemns the Takfeer campaign against Yemeni writers

A statement released by Revolution Salvation Front (RSF) on the apostasy campaign against the Yemeni writer, Bushra al-Maqtari

Condemnation Statement

O’ great people..O’ revolutionaries and freedom seekers in all squares of freedom and change
In deliberate abuse to the freedom of belief and approaching elimination and dominance of religion employing, the Yemeni writer Mrs. Bushra al-Maqtari, subjected to Takfeer (apostasy) campaign by known extremist groups.

Recently, these groups issued Fatwa, an Islamic edict by clerics, named as “The Olama’s Fatwa on abuse the Islam and Allah”, in which they named four writers: Bushra al-Maqtari, Fikry Kasim, Muhsin A’aid and Sami Shamsan of being “abused Islam” and described with “apostasy” and “Kufrism”.

The Fatwa elaborated by talking about an article of writer Bushra Maqtari, reported some of severed phrases from the article and interpreted it according their special orientation and political purpose for abuse and incitement to murder against the writer.

The RSF deplores and condemns this unjust Fatwa and that was not in fact Fatwa as it is just exploitation of religion for the liquidation of opponents to insert illegal ambitions, seeking to provoke sedition in society and exclusion of political opponent bigotry and bad interpretation of words away from its meanings.

It rejects the Takfeer at all. The so-called “Olama’s Fatwa on abuse the Islam and Allah” only regarded as a matter of political exploitation of religion to rein the other opinion and intellectually terrify. Such method already used by the same extremist groups against others and authorized the killing of children and women during previous political conflicts especially those infamous fatwa issued against the Yemen southerners during the civil war in 1994, misbelieved as “the war of apostasy and separation”. As well, many writers subjected to such Fatwas, as Dr. Abdul Aziz al-Maqalih and Dr. Hamood al-Awdi.

The RSF warns against going too far in using and monopoly religious and national eligibility by a group extremists and radicalists as Saleh’s regime did to weaken and exclude opposition opponents. Such behavior regarded as a crime must not be silent by the community.

It considered use of the mosques and public spaces to incite against other faiths, beliefs and ideologies as a blatant open call for incitement to murder and crime must be punished.

In this regard, the RSF calls upon the Ministry of Endowment to prevent the use of mosques to religious Takfeer, sedition and hatred in the community.

RSF also calls on political parties, human rights and civil society organizations, social and revolutionary representations, thinkers, writers and all the people to respond to such serious actions that threaten the security, stability and safety of the community.

RSF condemns the sites that published writings of abusive terms such as NabaNews and YemenPress, demanding to be prosecuted in accordance with the law.

Issued by The Peaceful Revolution Salvation Front
Date 03/02/2012

Fatwa is here and Gt’d here in article entitled: “The text of the fatwa, and the image” .. scientists Yemen opinion about insulting the divine: the article described Bushra Maqtari, and demanding closure of sites that published her article, and called for abusers to declare repentance”

Interesting to note that AQAP in Jaar banned some of the same newspapers that the scholars are also railing against.