This is a blog post by Mihoko Matsubara, a cybersecurity analyst and adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii. 

On May 9-10, 2013, American and Japanese governments held the first U.S.-Japan Cyber Dialogue in Tokyo. This meeting comes nineteen months after the two sides met in September 2011, for the first working-level dialogue on cybersecurity. These meetings have set a good foundation for cooperation, but they must be followed by concrete steps if Tokyo and Washington truly want to make cybersecurity a cornerstone of the U.S.-Japan relationship.

The joint statement on U.S.-Japan Cyber Dialogue indicates that policymakers discussed a wide range of issues including cyber defense, the establishment of norms of behavior in cyberspace, and the protection of critical infrastructure. Interestingly, the document makes no mention of cyber espionage, even though the conference was held right after the U.S. Department of Defense report to Congress that accused the Chinese government and military of information and data theft.

There are two possible reasons. First, the participants could not discuss sensitive information about damages, targets, and techniques. Participants came from nine Japanese and four American governmental organizations and did not necessarily share the same level of security clearance. Japan also lacks a security clearance system that encompasses the entire government. That fact might have prohibited the dialogue participants from going beyond merely consulting on“cyber defense” in general. Second, the two governments actually conferred on espionage but refrained from using the word in their diplomatic document to evade speculation about the alliance’s stance toward China, even as growing media reports suggest China’s involvement in cyber espionage. Furthermore, given the continuing tension between Japan and China in the East China Sea, Tokyo and Washington may have wanted to avoid introducing one more sensitive topic that could exacerbate relations with Beijing.

A comprehensive dialogue is needed to bring all the governmental policymakers together, but such an all-encompassing approach risks making it difficult for dialogue participants to focus on, and follow up on, specific policies. In fact, the only concrete recommendation mentioned in the joint statement is the protection of critical infrastructure. The document argues that the Cyber Dialogue “identif[ied] actions government and the private sector entities can take to secure critical infrastructure,” although the document does not elucidate the details.

The protection of critical infrastructure is a good place to start, but Tokyo must identify priority areas for cooperation with Washington. Japan has ten critical infrastructure sectors, whereas the United States identifies eighteen. Both sides categorize communication, financial institutions, transportation, and water as critical infrastructures. Japan does not regard the defense industry as having critical infrastructure, but this is likely to be an area where Washington would like to start information-sharing. There are multiple media reports about cyber espionage against Japanese defense contractors including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), Ltd. Such attacks not only expose vulnerabilities in the capability of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but also have a negative impact on operational cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. military.

Although Japan does not regard the defense industry as part of the critical infrastructure, the country already has a system for information-sharing between the public and private sectors, called the Cyber Intelligence Information Sharing Network. After the MHI case was revealed in summer 2011, Japan became more concerned about cyber espionage. In August 2011, the Japanese National Police Agency established public-private partnerships with critical infrastructure companies, defense contractors, and information and communications technology-related companies to share information on hacking and malware.

Still, cooperation in the defense industry is likely to be difficult. The sensitivity of national security-related information requires the Japanese and American governments and private companies on both sides of the Pacific to share the same level of security clearance and information assurance system for the partnership to be effective. Creating such a system, as well as a secure communication method, will take time.

It would be easier to start out with a few critical infrastructure sectors such as communications, electricity, and financial institutions. Then, the two governments can gradually expand the framework to other sectors including the defense industry, once the bilateral cooperative framework is established.

The first Cyber Dialogue heralds a new chapter in the bilateral relationship between Japan and the United States by creating a template for comprehensive cybersecurity cooperation. Now, it is time for Tokyo and Washington to identify specific steps to share information to protect critical infrastructure. This focused effort will certainly help the governments use their resources efficiently to protect cyberspace and make the alliance more robust.

Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan province, has become the latest city in China to be rocked by environmental protest. On May 4 and then again on May 16, 1,000 to 2,000 protesters took to the streets to demonstrate against the construction of an oil and chemical refinery in the nearby city of Anning by the state-run oil company China National Petroleum Corporation.

Kunming Mayor Li Weirong attempted to placate the protesters—offering to open a personal Weibo account through which residents could communicate with him and even promising that the project wouldn’t continue if “most of our people don’t agree with it.” The South China Morning Post offers a fascinating blow-by-blow account of the beleaguered Mayor’s interaction with the protesters.

It is tempting simply to add the Kunming protest to the growing list of Chinese urban environmental protests, and note once again that the Communist Party has not found the right balance between economic development and environmental protection. However, the real significance of these protests is that they signal the failure of Chinese institutions to adapt to the changing needs and demands of the people for a greater voice in the political process. Environmental politics has become a game of crisis management.

Formally, there are a few ways in which Chinese citizens can participate in environmental decision-making. For one, they can take part in reviewing environmental impact assessments for proposed large projects in their neighborhoods. As Chinese scholars have noted, however, there are a number of limitations to this process: only a small percentage of projects are subjected to compulsory public participation; the timing and duration of engaging the public is short; the method of selecting those who can participate is often biased; and the amount of information actually disclosed is often quite limited in an effort to prevent social unrest.

Chinese citizens also have the right to engage the system through a formal complaint system: writing letters to local environmental protection bureaus complaining of air, water, and waste-pollution. According to the 2010 Environmental Statistical Yearbook, in 2010, there were over 700,000 such complaints (Chinese). During the 11^th Five-Year Plan, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, itself, received 300,000 petitions on environmental matters. But complaining is one thing—getting something done about it is another. All told, there were only 980 administrative court cases about environmental impact assessments and only thirty criminal cases from 2006 to 2010. It is estimated that not even 1 percent of environmental disputes are resolved in court.

Non-governmental organizations are an important force in pushing for transparency in China’s environmental situation, but their success is limited. The Institute for Public Environment and the U.S.-based Natural Resources Defense Council have joined forces since 2009 to prod local officials to release the environmental data required by law, and publish an annual transparency ranking for 113 Chinese cities. Some local officials have gotten the message. One official from Hunan Province People’s Congress uses his Weibo account to “name and shame” polluters, leading one named company to put in place new environmental clean-up technology. Many other officials, however, continue to ignore the NGOs’ efforts.

Without effective political institutions, what is emerging in China at the local level is governance by crisis management. Local officials, petrified by these mass protests, simply bow to the will of the demonstrators. While this may keep the peace in the short-term, it is not a recipe for good governance over the longer-term. China need only look at the experience of Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea to understand how failure to address people’s calls for greater participation in environmental decision-making may contribute to far greater political challenges for the ruling government.

Sharone Tobias and Will Piekos look at the top five stories in Asia this week.

1. Tensions between Taiwan, Philippines escalate. The Philippine navy opened fire on a Taiwanese fishing vessel last week in disputed waters, killing one man on board and igniting a new round of tensions in the South China Sea. Though Philippine officials (including the president) have expressed their sympathies, Taiwan has rejected these apologies as lacking “sincerity.”  In response, Taipei recalled its envoy to the Philippines, announced a hiring freeze of Filipino workers, and held military drills. Yesterday, the Philippine envoy to Taiwan advised thousands of Filipino workers not to leave their homes. The incident and the heavy-handed response by Taiwan will likely dim prospects of cooperation between the two neighbors in solving territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

2. Chinese journalist’s scoop leads to sacked top official. Liu Tienan, deputy director of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, was dismissed for corruption this week. Journalist Luo Changping published an online report five months ago of Liu’s off-the-books business deals, threats to kill his mistress, and fabricated academic qualifications. A China Daily editorial mentioned that this is the first time an official at the ministerial level has been investigated under the new administration, and it is the highest-level dismissal amid a crackdown on corruption under Xi Jinping.

3. Four East Asian nations granted permanent observer status in Arctic Council. In addition to Italy and India, China, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan were accepted as permanent observers in the Arctic Council. They will observe the eight Arctic member nations who debate and establish rules for the Arctic, as melting ice opens the area to political and economic competition. Chinese statements generally have been diplomatic, and a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman states that China recognizes Arctic countries’ sovereignty, rights, and jurisdiction in the area. The melting ice has made abundant supplies of oil, natural gas, and minerals far more accessible and have shorten shipping routes for trade and fishing, an economic opportunity these countries do not want to pass up.

4. EU prepares probe into Chinese telecom firms. The European Union (EU) has warned that it is prepared to open an anti-dumping and an anti-subsidy investigation of Chinese telecommunication firms such as Huawei and ZTE. The EU will not act immediately in hopes that the two sides can come to some agreement, but China’s reaction does not bode well for a deal: a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Commerce stated that China would take “assertive” measures to “defend our lawful interests and rights” according to World Trade Organization rules and Chinese laws. The inquiry would be the first initiated by the European Commission itself without a complaint by European companies.

5. Thousands protest petrochemical plant in Kunming. Traffic was shut down on Saturday as over 2,500 citizens marched in Kunming in southwestern China to protest construction of a new petrochemical plant. China National Petroleum Company is planning on building an oil refinery eighteen miles from Kunming’s city center, which would produce 500,000 tons of the chemical paraxylene, a carcinogen, annually. The protest was peaceful and seems to have been somewhat successful—Kunming mayor Li Wenrong sympathized with the protestors and promised immediate change, though did not specify as to what that change might be. This protest is one of a growing number that seem to force local governments to reconsider large-scale polluting investment projects.

Bonus: Massive counterfeit condom factories busted in China. Police in central and eastern China busted multiple factories producing fake condoms, seizing supplies worth nearly $8 million. Counterfeit condoms cost roughly $0.03 to produce and were sold for one yuan, or around $0.16.

Next week, Myanmar President Thein Sein will arrive in Washington, DC, for a historic visit and meeting with President Obama. It will be the first visit by a Myanmar president to the United States in nearly fifty years. Only three years earlier, nearly every top Myanmar leader had been barred from entering the United States (and most other leading democracies) due to sanctions on the country’s military-ruled government and on nearly all exports to and imports from the country. U.S. congresspeople regularly castigated Myanmar as one of the most tyrannical societies on earth, and when former president George W. Bush found himself in a room in the mid-2000s, at an Asian summit, with Myanmar’s then-leader, he essentially refused to even acknowledge the other man’s presence.

Now, the situation had reversed itself so rapidly that many longtime Myanmar-watchers in Washington cannot even keep track of the changes. In these days before the visit, Myanmar is being portrayed positively by nearly every American official. While once American policymakers had blasted Myanmar and its government as a tyranny, now they paint it as a model of emerging democratization, a potential bright spot in a world where democracy has regressed for the past seven years, according to global monitoring group Freedom House.

Yet as this incredibly well-researched new Reuters piece shows, Myanmar actually is poised on the abyss of implosion. A new kind of apartheid against Muslims is being instituted across the country, Reuters reports, leading to growing interreligious and interethnic violence. In some cases, this violence may be encouraged, or at least tolerated, by the state security forces, as Human Rights Watch showed in its own report last month. Will any of these serious, dangerous challenges be brought up during what is expected to be a triumphant visit by Thein Sein? Will President Obama even mention the exploding violence in Myanmar while the president is here? Don’t count on it.

Meredith Weiss is an associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Albany.

Adamantly pro-government newspaper Utusan Malaysia raised hackles among opposition Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance) supporters two days after Malaysia’s May 5 election with its blaring headline, Apa Lagi Orang Cina Mahu? (What more do the Chinese want?) The barb refers to what incumbent Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak has called a “Chinese tsunami:” his Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) coalition’s unprecedented failure to secure a majority of the popular vote—even if a highly disproportionate electoral system has left the BN still with 60 percent of parliamentary seats. It is true that public opinion polls indicated—and campaign staff nationwide confirmed—that Chinese Malaysians were highly dissatisfied with BN rule and likely to vote for the Pakatan Rakyat, instead. And yet as Pakatan supporters were quick to point out, it was not just Chinese voters (who comprise only about one-fourth of the population) who supported the three-party coalition, contesting in its current form for the first time this election. In Malaysia’s political landscape, particularly with the anniversary of post-election riots in May 1969 just around the corner, to suggest that Chinese have been “selfish and greedy” and want to topple the Malay-based order (as the Utusan editorial, plus subsequent coverage, suggests) is clearly race-baiting.

In point of fact, it is not just Chinese voters who want a change from politics-as-usual in Malaysia, nor is race sufficient explanation for why any specific voters have turned toward Pakatan. Much has been made, too, of a rural–urban divide in Malaysia: that rural voters supported the BN, while urban voters supported Pakatan. But just as it is not the fact of being Chinese that turned voters away from BN—of “cultural” or communal interests per se (shown not least by the fact that it was the BN that really touted these)—nor is there something intrinsic to being “rural” that inclines one to BN, particularly given how many voters with a rural address actually live and work in urban areas.

Economics was the main story of this election. Each side had a manifesto including a wide range of issues. One could sum up the difference as: BN = populist economic programs + communal harmony (and the security of a known quantity); and Pakatan = populist economic programs + good governance. But the main stress for both sides was on the first part of those formulae. The BN stressed ad nauseum the government’s raft of “1Malaysia” programs (which it claimed entirely for the party, handily eliding party and state), especially one-time RM500 ($167) payouts of 1Malaysia People’s Aid (BR1M), for which any household earning less than $1000/month is eligible. Though definitively government, not party funds, BR1M payments were frequently dispensed via party offices and/or officials, including during the campaign period itself. (One Kedah BN campaign manager, for instance, noted that his candidate comes to shake hands as citizens collect both their BR1M checks and government loans for entrepreneurs during the campaign; his aides, though, are the ones to handle the checks.)

Pakatan, for its part, argued that its own package of subsidies (for everything from water to cars to education to WiFi) would reduce the cost of living long-term, and thus be a better deal for poor and middle-class citizens. While Pakatan stump speeches I heard nationwide did, for instance, raise issues of corruption, cronyism, and good governance generally, these seemed to carry more clout with the audience when connected back to their own circumstances—for instance, a gifted speaker in a low-cost housing area in Sabah, who gracefully tied a critique of the graft-funded palaces of BN elites to the dilapidated housing of his audience. Such links do resonate, given the extent not just of interethnic, but intraethnic, inequality. Pro-bumiputra (Malay and indigenous peoples) affirmative action policies may indeed irk non-Malays, yet the real gains remain concentrated among a narrow elite, not the Malay masses.

What these elections demonstrated was that as Malaysian electoral politics converges upon a two-party system (taking the two fixed coalitions as parties; the BN is already registered as such), interests and issues are increasingly crowding out identities as grounds for mobilization and voting. In my travels across Malaysia throughout the campaign period, it was clear that issues of land tenure, jobs, the inefficiencies of cronyism and corruption, and the rising costs of living—everything from water to tolls to petrol—raised more hackles on the ground than the tried and true bogies of race and religion. That fact alone tells us little about which coalition might win next time around, but it does suggest that communal politics has lost real ground, no matter how shrill the recriminations.

Sharone Tobias is a Research Associate for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Beijing traditionally has been wary of involving itself in affairs that do not directly relate to its own security. It has taken a non-interventionalist stand on most international issues, from Iranian nuclear proliferation to genocide in Darfur to the Arab Spring, much to the dissatisfaction of the West. Even when Beijing has engaged in international conflict negotiation–for example, releasing a four-point plan for the Syrian conflict last year–it has been half-hearted and under international pressure. But last week, when both Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (separately) visited China, Xi Jinping surprised everyone by releasing a four-point peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The plan received much fanfare in the Chinese press, even though it is conservative and unimaginative–it calls for an independent Palestine built along 1967 borders, as most peace plans do. The plan is more notable for its context rather than its content.

There are several reasons why China might want to engage in the peace process now. First, there has been a relative power vacuum in the Middle East. The Obama administration has been markedly less involved in the Israeli-Palestinian peace conflict than George W. Bush. The main reason for this is the obvious distrust between Obama and Netanyahu; however, America’s pivot to Asia also plays a role, as it has put Israel lower on the list of foreign policy priorities. Beijing might see this vacuum as an opportunity to become more involved in a region of vital importance to its energy security.

Second, Chinese relations with many of its neighbors have soured, and international diplomatic initiatives may help China regain some of its international appeal. Only a few years ago, pundits were discussing China’s trade incentives, cultural exchanges, and no-strings-attached aid as part of a “charm offensive;” today, the phrase is all but forgotten, replaced by “belligerence.” As Chinese relations with Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asia, and the United States worsen, it is well worth their while to get involved in a low-stakes diplomatic effort to charm countries further from home. In particular, Beijing might be interested in bettering relations with Persian Gulf countries, at a time when China is ever-more dependent on Middle Eastern oil. Supporting a freeze on Israel’s settlements in the West Bank and an independent Palestinian state is beneficial to China’s image with the public as well as the ruling elite in that region. As the United States moves towards greater energy independence, China now imports nearly half its oil from the Persian Gulf, a number that is likely to rise in the next decade.

Finally, and most importantly, Beijing may be ready at last to give up its national image as the underdog. China has historically viewed itself as a victim of international colonialism and oppression, stemming from what it calls the “one hundred years of humiliation” at the hands of Japan and the West, beginning with the Opium Wars and continuing through the end of World War II. As a pro-Palestine opinion article in the state-run Global Times asserted, “China is no longer a weak country to be bullied by imperialist powers as it was more than a century ago, but an economic and military power capable of claiming what is rightly China’s. This is justice, and China wants to see justice served in the international arena.” Supporting a peace deal could be part of China’s “coming out” as an international power, ready to stand on the world stage alongside the United States as a major diplomatic force. China released its four-point plan on Syria under great international pressure and without much conviction. But this time, China took initiative, with Xi personally announcing the plan, and seemed genuine in its offer to facilitate a meeting between Netanyahu and Abbas on Chinese soil.

The Chinese peace plan is unlikely to take root in any future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Abbas thanked Xi for his plan but did not engage further. Netanyahu politely shrugged off the plan in favor of discussing trade issues and Iran; the Israeli government has no incentive to include yet another party in the moribund peace talks, especially one with a history of supporting Palestinian independence groups. But Beijing’s peace plan is still of symbolic significance, representing a shift from victimhood to a country that wants to place a leadership role in issues of global importance far beyond its periphery.

Beginning in February 2009, a number of self-immolation incidents have occurred in the greater Tibetan region in China. Since then, at least 116 Tibetan monks and farmers have chosen to set themselves on fire.

These acts are reminiscent of similar incidents that happened in South Vietnam 50 years ago. On June 11, 1963, Thich Quang Duc, a Vietnamese Buddhist monk burned himself to death in Saigon in protest of the government led by Ngo Dinh Diem.  Photos of this dramatic event were circulated across the world, becoming one of the most powerful images of the twentieth century that quickly undermined Diem’s legitimacy and eventually led to his assassination in November.

However, the ongoing self-immolations in Tibet are quite different from those that occurred in Vietnam. In Tibet, most of the self-immolation cases appeared to be spontaneous and each act seemed to be separate from the others.  Perhaps as a result, these ultimate sacrifices have failed to convey any consistent or clear message to the outside world. Based on the data compiled by a well-known Tibetan writer and dissident, a Chinese dissident writer and scholar Wang Lixiong identified seven motives from the wills of 26 self-immolators; and the three top motives are “to serve as an act,” to offer their bodies to Dalai Lama, and to express courage and defend dignity.  These motives are themselves abstract and ambiguous, but they clearly suggest that self-immolation in Tibet was not always out of desperation or driven by the need to seek political independence or international attention.  Sun Yan, a professor at City University of New York, recently quoted two Tibetan scholars and argued that self-immolation was a local phenomenon subject to special regional and religious influences.  It was observed by one Tibetan scholar that those who burned themselves were only from four of the 3,600 temples in the greater Tibet region.  The other Tibetan scholar noted that most of the self-immolation acts and protests in recent years were associated with the Gulden Temple in Ngawa Autonomous Prefecture of western Sichuan Province.

Unlike what had transpired in South Vietnam, the growing number of self-immolations in Tibet has, thus far, failed to generate significant international attention or cause a major shift in China’s Tibet policy.  The United States, while calling on China to permit Tibetans to “express grievances freely, publicly, peacefully and without fear of attribution,” urged Tibetans to “end the(ir) voluntary sacrifice.”  At the same time, the Chinese government has accused Dalai Lama of orchestrating the self-immolations, a charge he strongly rejects.  Instead of leading to China’s reexamination of its policy toward Tibetans, the protests might have given the hard-liners within the Party full ammunition to resist the reopening of the dialogue with Dalai Lama, and, in context of the rising nationalism, also silenced the domestic intellectuals and the general public for any rational and constructive discussion of the problem.

If the self-immolations have failed to galvanize international support, why hasn’t Dalai Lama used his moral authority to issue a public statement asking for Tibetans to stop the practice? It is widely believed that self-immolation cases would drop significantly if he makes such a move.  But Dalai Lama is facing a major dilemma over this issue. As a voice of peace and reason, he privately does not support self-immolation. Indeed, from the outset, he was said to be skeptical of how effective this approach would be.  But he has refrained from calling for an end of self-immolation. While he is still the unrivaled spiritual leader among Tibetans, his Middle Way Approach to resolve the Tibetan issue—which does not accept the status quo or political independence—through nonviolent means is increasingly challenged by the young generation, as represented by the Tibetan Youth Congress, the largest NGO in the exile community.  They are increasingly frustrated and many have been radicalized by the lack of breakthrough in the negotiation between Dalai Lama’s representative and the Chinese central government that began in 2002.  Against this backdrop, self-immolation has been viewed by some as an extreme form of collective frustration and anger among the Tibetans.  Unless Dalai Lama is able to offer a viable alternative, his call for ending the practice would likely alienate his supporters, even draw backlash from the radical wing of his own constituency.  It’s because of this that he has expressed respect for the courage and motives of the self-immolators, despite his general disapproval of their behavior.  But allowing self-immolation to continue is in neither China’s nor Dalai Lama’s interest.  For Dalai Lama, it would undermine his moral authority and become a political liability in pursuing his Middle Way Approach.  For Beijing, failure to take the issue seriously might cultivate a sense of desperation among Tibetans, which in turn could lead to the escalation of violence against the Chinese rule (as has been found in the northwestern Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region).  It’s therefore in both sides’ interest to break the impasse by reopening the dialogue that was stalled in 2010.

Sharone Tobias and Will Piekos look at the top five stories in Asia this week.

1. China offers to play peacemaker, but Bibi and Abbas don’t bite. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas both visited China this week. The Chinese media enthusiastically reported on the possibility that the country could serve as neutral territory for the two leaders to negotiate a peace settlement. However, the Chinese government made sure the leaders stayed far apart throughout the trip and were never in the same city at the same time. Netanyahu, for one, was far more interested in discussing trade and economic issues—China is Israel’s third-largest trading partner—as well as China’s potential role in halting Iran’s nuclear program. This is the first time that China has offered to play a role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and while mostly symbolic, could represent a new era in Chinese diplomacy and international reach. As a recent pro-Palestine opinion article in the state-run Global Times asserted, “China is no longer a weak country to be bullied by imperialist powers as it was more than a century ago, but an economic and military power capable of claiming what is rightly China’s. This is justice, and China wants to see justice served in the international arena.” But is China willing to see justice through to the end? Doubtful, but it will be interesting to see what other kinds of international justice the Chinese government will want served.

2. New Defense Department report calls out the Chinese government and military in cyberattacks. The U.S. Department of Defense released its annual report to Congress this week, and for the first time it explicitly accused China’s military of attacking American computer systems. The report said that cyberattacks around the world “appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese government and military,” a sharp deviation from last year’s report, which describes attacks “which originated within China.” A Chinese defense ministry spokesman expressed “strong dissatisfaction with” and “firm opposition to” the report, and stated that it damaged mutual trust.

3. Malaysia wraps up the closest election in its history, though opposition claims fraud. Barisan Nasional (BN), the political party that has ruled Malaysia since the 1950s, will remain in power after the most recent election, which had a high voter turnout of nearly 85 percent. BN won less than 47 percent of the popular vote but will hold 60 percent of parliamentary seats, thanks to gerrymandering. The Party could face serious difficulties leading a nation where the majority of voters, especially urban and wealthy ones, voted for the opposition.

4. Is China expanding its territorial claims? An editorial (Chinese) in the state-run People’s Daily on Wednesday called for a “reconsideration” of the historical status of Japan’s southernmost Ryukyu island chain, which includes Okinawa. The authors, scholars from the prestigious China Academy of Social Sciences, claim that Japan encroached upon the islands during China’s Qing dynasty, when the country was weakened by foreign forces and could not protect the island chain. Japan lodged a diplomatic protest to the claim, with Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga stating Okinawa “is unquestionably Japan’s territory, historically and internationally.” Okinawa is home to 1.4 million Japanese citizens, as well as over 15,000 U.S. troops. This expansion of territorial claims is likely a tactic to gain leverage in the debates over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

5. Obama backs President Park’s North Korea policy. Recently elected South Korean president Park Geun-hye paid a visit to President Obama this week. Obama declared their approach to North Korea as “very compatible” during a news conference following the meeting, and the two leaders discussed deepening economic ties. Park also addressed a joint meeting of Congress, an honor reserved only for close U.S. allies. Obama had a very close working relationship with former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak; all signs point favorably towards the development of a similar relationship with Park, despite the fact that she is generally considered to be more conservative and hawkish than her predecessor.

Bonus: Rodman asks Kim to do him ‘a solid.’ Dennis Rodman, former basketball star and junior statesman (in light of his February visit to North Korea), tweeted, “I’m calling on the Supreme Leader of North Korea or as I call him ‘Kim’, to do me a solid and cut Kenneth Bae loose.” Kenneth Bae is an American tour operator who was arrested in North Korea in November for unspecified “hostile acts” and sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor. No tweets from Kim yet.

The Defense Department released its annual report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013. Besides being delivered relatively early compared to past editions and being almost twice as long as the 2012 version, this year’s version has at least three interesting points about Chinese cyber activities.

First, as many have noted, the sharpest break from the past is that the report directly ascribes blame for cyberattacks to the Chinese government and military, saying, “numerous computer systems around the world, including those owned by the U.S. government, continued to be targeted for intrusions, some of which appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese government and military.” The 2012 report, by contrast, speaks of attacks “which originated within China” and active and persistent “Chinese actors.” The 2011 report describes cyber intrusions, “some of which appear to have originated within the People’s Republic of China (PRC).” The 2010 report seemed to split the difference, stating it was “unclear if these intrusions were conducted by, or with the endorsement of, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or other elements of the PRC government.”

Second, as David Sanger notes in the New York Times, the report tries to describe Chinese thinking about offensive cyber operations by citing two works of military doctrine, “Science of Strategy” and “Science of Campaigns.” This is not new—the 2011 report mentions them by name, while the 2010 report uses the same phrase “authoritative PLA military writings.” Sanger uses the report’s claim that neither Chinese document “identifies specific criteria for employing computer network attack against an adversary” to turn the mirror back on its authors, and note that the Defense Department has also been opaque about the conditions under which it would employ offensive capabilities. This lack of transparency is extremely destabilizing; the military doctrine of both countries emphasizes the importance of early attacks to gain information dominance, creating intense pressure to “use it or lose it,” but there is little knowledge of the other sides’ red lines and how they might escalate.

Third, despite the announcement of a U.S.-China working group on cybersecurity during Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to China, and General Fang Fenghui’s declaration that China was willing to set up a cyberserurity “mechanism” during a meeting with chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin E. Dempsey, the report does not give much reason for optimism that the two sides will find common ground on the rules of the road. For the first time, the report calls China out for playing a “disruptive role in multilateral efforts to establish transparency and confidence building measures in international fora such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, and the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.”

Mistrust between the two sides was always going to make cooperation hard. The week before General Dempsey’s visit, the PLA Daily ran a piece with the headline, “U.S. Cybersecurity Strategy is Fake Cooperation and Real Confrontation.” Playing a spoiler in international meetings, however, suggests how broad and deep the divide really is.

North Korea’s efforts to legitimize itself as a nuclear weapons state and its cut-off of access to the Kaesong Industrial Complex have diminished prospects for peaceful coexistence on the Korean peninsula. American and South Korean tolerance of North Korean provocations has waned, and it is increasingly clear that strategic patience in dealing with North Korea may only result in increasingly unattractive options.  When they meet today, Presidents Park and Obama must pursue an even more closely coordinated effort to change the North Korean leadership’s calculus sooner rather than later or North Korea’s capacity to impose higher costs and burdens on the allies will only grow.

Kim Jong-un’s pride in North Korea’s nuclear deterrent and satellite launch capabilities has fed the perception in Pyongyang that North Korea can enhance its deterrent and gain respect through intimidation of the United States and South Korea.  Far from driving up the price that North Korea might demand for keeping the peace, Kim Jong-un has priced the nuclear program out of the market and raised the risk premium on inter-Korean economic cooperation to unacceptable levels.  No negotiation with the United States will yield acceptance of a nuclear North Korea, and North Korea’s abandonment of Kaesong has wiped away a decade of South Korean investment in a peaceful and stable modus vivendi with the North.

North Korea has overplayed its hand and faces either a humiliating climb down or the prospect of losing it all. But either scenario will impose unwanted costs on North Korea’s neighbors.  Kim’s neighbors will have to save his face as the cost of avoiding immediate conflict.  But the cost of buying time will include further provocations from an insecure North Korean leadership whose strategy for survival imposes instability on its neighbors.

Despite the Korean Workers Party’s recent commitment to the dual priorities of nuclear and economic development, North Korea is in a cul de sac.  It insists on pursuing nuclear development as a right of self-defense in the face of international condemnation, but its expanding threat capacity undermines the likelihood that nuclear North Korean leaders can ever be accepted in the international community.

At present, there is no intersection of interests between the positions of North Korea and the United States that can justify a return to negotiations.  North Korea demands the end of U.S. hostility toward the North as a prerequisite for denuclearization, while the United States seeks North Korea’s denuclearization in return for an improvement of relations based on the 2005 six party joint statement.  The loss of Kaesong represents a lost decade of sunk costs in infrastructure inside North Korea, returning the inter-Korean relationship to square one.  New South Korean investment cannot continue until economic governance trumps the whims of North Korea’s political leaders as the guiding principle for managing North Korea’s external relations.

A combined U.S.-South Korea vision should urgently insist that North Korea must change, but the allies have not yet developed a detailed joint strategy for bringing about those changes. Diplomatic engagement with North Korea should be a part of the strategy, but diplomacy should not enable North Korea to buy time, lead to acceptance of a nuclear North Korea, or extend its disruptive influence in the region.

The United States and South Korea should reach out to China based on the understanding that there is a time limit for North Korea to come back to negotiations and that denuclearization must be a main agenda for any new dialogue, recognizing that China is vested in the status quo.  Only by trying to bring China along will it be possible to prove that peaceful options for transforming North Korea have been exhausted.

The two presidents should also deepen coordination designed to prepare for the possibility that there is no pathway to peaceful co-existence under the North Korean leadership.  This approach would involve a joint examination of the most severe potential costs of confrontation with North Korea and develop strategies to minimize the costs if North Korea continues down the wrong path.