Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan province, has become the latest city in China to be rocked by environmental protest. On May 4 and then again on May 16, 1,000 to 2,000 protesters took to the streets to demonstrate against the construction of an oil and chemical refinery in the nearby city of Anning by the state-run oil company China National Petroleum Corporation.

Kunming Mayor Li Weirong attempted to placate the protesters—offering to open a personal Weibo account through which residents could communicate with him and even promising that the project wouldn’t continue if “most of our people don’t agree with it.” The South China Morning Post offers a fascinating blow-by-blow account of the beleaguered Mayor’s interaction with the protesters.

It is tempting simply to add the Kunming protest to the growing list of Chinese urban environmental protests, and note once again that the Communist Party has not found the right balance between economic development and environmental protection. However, the real significance of these protests is that they signal the failure of Chinese institutions to adapt to the changing needs and demands of the people for a greater voice in the political process. Environmental politics has become a game of crisis management.

Formally, there are a few ways in which Chinese citizens can participate in environmental decision-making. For one, they can take part in reviewing environmental impact assessments for proposed large projects in their neighborhoods. As Chinese scholars have noted, however, there are a number of limitations to this process: only a small percentage of projects are subjected to compulsory public participation; the timing and duration of engaging the public is short; the method of selecting those who can participate is often biased; and the amount of information actually disclosed is often quite limited in an effort to prevent social unrest.

Chinese citizens also have the right to engage the system through a formal complaint system: writing letters to local environmental protection bureaus complaining of air, water, and waste-pollution. According to the 2010 Environmental Statistical Yearbook, in 2010, there were over 700,000 such complaints (Chinese). During the 11^th Five-Year Plan, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, itself, received 300,000 petitions on environmental matters. But complaining is one thing—getting something done about it is another. All told, there were only 980 administrative court cases about environmental impact assessments and only thirty criminal cases from 2006 to 2010. It is estimated that not even 1 percent of environmental disputes are resolved in court.

Non-governmental organizations are an important force in pushing for transparency in China’s environmental situation, but their success is limited. The Institute for Public Environment and the U.S.-based Natural Resources Defense Council have joined forces since 2009 to prod local officials to release the environmental data required by law, and publish an annual transparency ranking for 113 Chinese cities. Some local officials have gotten the message. One official from Hunan Province People’s Congress uses his Weibo account to “name and shame” polluters, leading one named company to put in place new environmental clean-up technology. Many other officials, however, continue to ignore the NGOs’ efforts.

Without effective political institutions, what is emerging in China at the local level is governance by crisis management. Local officials, petrified by these mass protests, simply bow to the will of the demonstrators. While this may keep the peace in the short-term, it is not a recipe for good governance over the longer-term. China need only look at the experience of Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea to understand how failure to address people’s calls for greater participation in environmental decision-making may contribute to far greater political challenges for the ruling government.

The bad news doesn’t stop coming. First, Beijing residents learned that breathing their air on a daily basis was akin to living in a smoking lounge. Then Guangdong residents learned that Hunan rice sold in their province in 2009 was contaminated with cadmium, which is carcinogenic and can cause severe pain in joints and the spine. And just this past weekend, Shanghai residents watched more than three thousand diseased pigs float down part of the city’s Huangpu River.

The good news is that the Chinese people finally know what they are up against. The bad news is that addressing these problems requires not only the technical fixes that are typically proposed but also the proper policy environment for the technical fixes to work. These problems are emblematic of a systemic challenge, and nothing short of an overhaul in how the environmental protection is managed from top to bottom will suffice. Here are a few things that the Chinese people appear to be seeking.

1)      Transparency. While far from perfect, the ability of the Chinese people to gain access to environmental information is at an all-time high thanks to the Internet. That doesn’t mean that the government provides the information willingly. The Beijing government, for example, had no intention of offering up the air quality statistics they now post regularly; it was a combination of U.S. Embassies and Consulates tweeting some of the information and the Chinese public demanding more that forced the government to do the right thing. Similarly, the Guangdong government has yet to admit to a problem with its rice; only the dogged determination of Chinese journalists keeps the truth coming. (And Beijing still refuses to release specific data from its most recent soil survey, despite a legal appeal by Chinese environmental lawyer Dong Zhengwei.) While the Shanghai government can’t deny the existence of the pigs; they are saying that the tap water is safe. Of course, one Chinese lawyer took to the Internet to ask the Shanghai authorities to drink the “meat soup” to verify the claim. Sooner or later, the Chinese leadership will realize that transparency will do far more to earn it the credibility that it desires than any campaign to strengthen Communist Party values.

2)      Rule of Law. Wang Canfa, one of China’s most renowned environmental lawyers and activists, stopped by to visit in early March and he laid out for me some of what is happening in this arena and what more needs to be done. Putting aside separating the Party from the judicial system, which would be the grand-daddy of all legal reform, at the top of Wang’s wish list is increasing the range of people who can bring environmental lawsuits through the court system. As it stands, China now has one hundred specialized environmental courts, an astonishing achievement. Unfortunately, as Wang commented, there aren’t enough cases. It is too difficult to gather evidence, and individuals can’t bring cases to court; only organizations formally registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs have that right. Wang could name just three such organizations. Still, Wang remains optimistic. More and more environmental lawyers and judges are being trained—some are even being funded by environmentally-concerned businesspeople—and he is excited about the collaboration among journalists, NGOs, and lawyers that is forcing change through the system.

3)      Official Accountability. One of the great weaknesses of environmental protection in China is the gap between what Beijing says and what actually happens at the local level. Official accountability on the environment arises in two manners most directly: “before-the-fact” and “after-the-fact.” Beijing has attempted to inspire “before-the-fact” accountability through its environmental responsibility system, which is supposed to link the environmental performance of Chinese officials with their prospects for promotion. However, a recently published study, involving professors from China, Singapore, and Canada, indicates that there is no correlation between how much officials spend on the environment and their chances for promotion; rather—and rather unsurprisingly—promotions correlate directly with investment in transportation infrastructure (which correlates nicely with both GDP growth and land prices). If Beijing really did promote officials on the basis of their environmental record, it could be transformative for the environment and for the Party. Beijing has had some better luck with “after-the-fact” accountability. In recent years, any major pollution disaster is likely to be followed by the dismissal or even imprisonment of a few local officials on grounds of mismanagement or corruption. Still, Xie Zhenhua, who was forced to resign in 2005 as head of China’s State Environmental Protection Administration in the wake of a massive chemical spill on the Songhua River and the subsequent cover-up, now sits as vice chairman of the far more powerful National Development and Reform Commission.

There are many more systemic changes needed: greater ease in registering non-governmental organizations, greater investment in environmental protection, and more human capital devoted to environmental management, chief among them. The fundamentals, however, rest in the nature of the governance system. The current leadership has raised the need for officials to be more transparent, to be more accountable, and to institute the rule of law. What this means remains to be seen. Over the next six to twelve months, however, the Chinese people will learn whether their understanding of the need for change and that of Chinese leadership is one and the same.

When it came to China, Secretary of State John Kerry’s confirmation hearing touched on a little bit of everything. Here is what he said he wants:

• To compete with China economically in Africa—this will be tough given the extraordinary government resources China pours into its trade and investment effort in the continent;

• To use the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as leverage with China to ensure commonly accepted rules of the road on trade—of course the TPP has to move forward for this to happen;

• To cooperate with China more closely on North Korea—that’s been an item on the U.S. wish list for twenty years…but the chances are better than ever before;

• And to work together with China on the full range of regional and global challenges, such as climate change. Excellent, but it would really help if Secretary Kerry could persuade his former colleagues in Congress to pass climate legislation here at home.

What has garnered all the attention, however, is what the Secretary said with regard to the pivot:

I’m not convinced that increased military ramp-up is critical yet. I’m not convinced of that. That’s something I’d want to look at very carefully when and if you folks confirm me and I can get in there and sort of dig into this a little deeper. But we have a lot more bases out there than any other nation in the world, including China today. We have a lot more forces out there than any other nation in the world, including China today. And we’ve just augmented the president’s announcement in Australia with additional Marines. You know, the Chinese take a look at that and say, what’s the United States doing? They trying to circle us? What’s going on? And so, you know, every action has its reaction. It’s the old — you know, it’s not just the law of physics; it’s the law of politics and diplomacy. I think we have to be thoughtful about, you know, sort of how we go forward.

Secretary Kerry’s apparent unease with the pivot has unsurprisingly set the Chinese press all atwitter and given Chinese analysts some hope that President Obama has appointed a kinder, gentler Secretary of State. The major Chinese state-supported newspapers—the Global Times, People’s Daily, and Xinhua—highlighted his remarks on the pivot and then offered some thoughts on Kerry’s likely diplomatic approach:

China Institute of International Studies’ Ruan Zongze: “Compared with Clinton’s tough diplomatic approach, Kerry as a moderate democrat is expected to stress the role of bilateral or multilateral dialogues”;

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Ni Feng: Kerry’s “diplomatic measures” will “greatly embody Obama’s concepts.”

In reviewing Secretary Kerry’s congressional voting record, Chinese observers also noted that he “generally voted in favor of bills conducive to promoting the development China-U.S. relations and generally voted against or expressed different opinions for bills not conducive to China-U.S. relations.” Overall, as People’s Daily observed, “Kerry stresses more on coordination rather than confrontation in foreign relations.”

Secretary Kerry does not, of course, stand alone in his questioning of the pivot. CSIS Senior Associate Edward Luttwak recently suggested in a panel discussion at the Council on Foreign Relations that the United States should refrain from putting itself front and center in Asia; instead, it should give the other countries in the region time to coalesce among themselves. This is an attractive idea—it conserves U.S. resources and keeps the United States out of Beijing’s crosshairs, at least a little bit. However, it’s not entirely practical. Some of our allies—such as Japan and South Korea—don’t actually get along that well right now and may need a gentle push from the United States. Also, a relatively inchoate set of cross-cutting alliances or joint military exercises in the region is quite different from a well-thought-out, well-designed regional security effort that can mobilize assets efficiently.

By suggesting that the pivot may be out of favor, Secretary Kerry has also drawn into question U.S. credibility. Officials and analysts abroad have already raised doubts about U.S. staying power in the Asia Pacific; Secretary Kerry’s doubts will only add fuel to the fire.

And Secretary Kerry might recast his “action-reaction” narrative. For most observers outside China, it was Chinese assertiveness that was the action, while the U.S. pivot was, in large measure, the reaction.

Secretary Kerry understandably wants to make his mark on U.S. foreign policy over the next few years, and he appears to be setting himself a challenging agenda, including making progress on a free trade agreement with Europe and restarting the Middle East peace talks. However, the original logic of the pivot—ensuring security in the Asia Pacific and taking advantage of the region’s economic dynamism through a free trade agreement—still stands. It’s too early to pivot away.

A few months ago, the eminent Chinese scholar Wang Jisi noted that China had achieved “first class power status” and “should be treated as such.” The current situation with North Korea suggests two responses: There is scarcely a more opportune moment for Beijing to step up to the plate; and be careful what you wish for.

Here is what we know about China and the current crisis with North Korea: Beijing doesn’t know what to do. Before North Korea’s nuclear test, the state-supported newspaper Global Times asserted that China should “seize initiative in NK issues” and argued, “…if North Korea insists on a third nuclear test despite attempts to dissuade it, it must pay a heavy price. The assistance it will be able to receive from China should be reduced.” After the test, the official news agency Xinhua argued that the “DPRK’s defiance was deeply rooted in its strong sense of insecurity after years of confrontation with South Korea, Japan and a militarily more superior United States.”  In other words, Beijing was back to blaming everyone else for the DPRK’s actions.

Chinese foreign policy analysts are also divided over how to approach North Korea. As early as December 2010, Chinese scholar Zhu Feng referred to China’s continued support of North Korea as an example of Beijing’s “obsolete ideology” and noted that Chinese thinking on North Korea is “no longer monolithic” and, in fact, “no foreign-policy issue is more divisive.” The BBC’s roundup of Chinese scholars’ views suggests Zhu is right. Ruan Zongze, deputy director of the China Institute of International Studies, stated that China had already “made huge efforts” and “developments on the Korean Peninsula do not just depend on China.” And Fudan University scholar Shen Dingli argued that the United States “will eventually accept North Korea’s nuclear weapons.” Major-General Xu Guangyu, however, said that North Korea’s “military first politics is wrong” and UN sanctions will be unavoidable.

Another thing we know about China and North Korea is that the potential of Beijing’s leverage — the life-sustaining economic, food, and energy assistance it provides to the DPRK—is not in any way influencing North Korean decision-making. In addition to Pyongyang ignoring Beijing’s warnings over the third nuclear test, let’s not forget that late last year a $40 million investment in North Korea by one of China’s largest mining companies went belly-up when the North Koreans reportedly mastered the mining processes themselves and evicted the Chinese workers. The Chinese company is still trying to recoup some of its investment. Moreover, efforts by the Chinese to persuade Kim Jong-un to undertake more significant economic reform have apparently fallen on deaf ears. North Korea appears to be the tail that is wagging the China dog.

While we wait for Beijing’s foreign policy to coalesce, we might look to Beijing’s north for some help. Mongolian officials have regularly hosted their North Korean counterparts for national security and economic discussions. They have even acted as a third party host for delicate negotiations involving the DPRK; most recently in November 2012, Mongolia brought Japanese and North Korean negotiators together in Ulaanbaatar to discuss the long-standing problem of North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens. Like China, Mongolia has a long-standing relationship with the DPRK; it was the second country to grant diplomatic recognition to North Korea after the Soviet Union. It is unlikely that a simple talk with Mongolia’s personable President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj will have an immediate impact, but at the very least backchannel lines of communication can be exploited. More insight into Kim Jong-un’s thinking and the broader political situation within North Korea is clearly needed.

Beijing has options—chief among them is adopting tougher sanctions both through the United Nations and bilaterally (such as turning off the spigot of the Daqing pipeline that supplies the DPRK with much of its oil, as Beijing did nearly a decade ago in March 2003). Whatever Beijing decides to do, however, it has likely already realized that in the world of “first-class power,” high-stakes foreign policy, you don’t get points for trying, only for succeeding.

These days, China books are a dime a dozen and so, too, are China analysts. Journalists, scholars, businesspeople, general foreign policy analysts, and random people living in Beijing all have something to say. To stand out, you have to bring something unique to the table—a new finding, a new framing, or, unfortunately, too often, just a willingness to say something controversial.

A new book, My First Trip to China, edited by Hong Kong-based journalist Kin-ming Liu, manages to be exceptional in a few respects. At one level, it is a great coffee table book—no pictures, but some truly fascinating reminiscences of first trips to China by a range of great scholars, as well as officials, businesspeople, activists, and journalists. The time span covering the authors’ first visits is vast—with the first trip recorded in 1942 and the last in 1986. Through the eyes of people such as Andrew Nathan, Jonathan Mirsky, Lois Snow, Sidney Rittenberg, Jerome Cohen, Steven Mosher, and others, the small details of modern—but not too modern—China come alive. The vast majority of stories are quite engaging and, since many of the authors write for a living, quite well-written as well.

At a deeper level, however, what makes this book so valuable is the entry it provides into understanding how some of the most important thinkers and actors in U.S.-China relations have had their perspectives shaped by their first trip to China. To a one, the authors approached their first trips to China with openness and excitement. Almost immediately, however, differences in outlook emerged. Ed Friedman and Jonathan Mirsky, who traveled as members of delegations and were shown a Potemkin world of China, became skeptics; their writings today reflect a continued skepticism of official Chinese proclamations. (No doubt the fact that Chinese officials locked Mirsky in his hotel room did little to endear official China to him.)

There is a special section devoted to first visits to China by Chinese expatriates, such as businessman David Tang, scholar Steve Tsang, and journalist Frank Ching that is quite moving. Each felt a sense of “going home,” although by the end of their first visits, their perspectives were radically different: Steve Tsang, for example, developed a stronger “Hong Kong” identity, while David Tang embraced the mainland as his motherland.

Still others, such as Steven Mosher and Lois Snow, had their views of China upended by a singular experience: for Mosher, it was bearing eyewitness to a forced abortion campaign; for Snow, it was Tiananmen and the heartbreaking case of Ding Zilin, a Tiananmen mother who lost her son. And of course, no “first visit to China” book could be complete without the story of Sidney Rittenberg, whose chance meeting with a group of children changed his life and made his story one of the great personal dramas of U.S.-China relations.

One of my favorite stories is that of my friend and colleague Jerome Cohen, who despite encountering numerous annoyances during his trip—such as having his hotel room bugged—manages to weave together the beauty, darkness, and absurdity of the country and its politics in one thoughtful and humorous account.

If I have one bone to pick with Kin-ming’s story selection, it is that there are so few stories written by women—only two-and-a-half (since one is a husband and wife recounting) out of thirty. I would, for example, have loved to hear from Jan Berris, who was involved in the 1972 ping-pong diplomacy and has been engaged in U.S.-China diplomacy through her work as the vice president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations ever since. However, this really is my one criticism of an otherwise wonderful book that manages to be a great read for the China novice, the China expert, and everyone in between.

President Obama,

You and your foreign policy team have steered the United States on a constructive course in Asia over the past few years. There is thus no need for a policy overhaul. However, the dynamics of the region—from exploding trade and investment to rapidly rising security tensions and emerging flashpoints—leave no room for complacency.

With a new leadership in China and your new foreign policy team coming together in Washington, it is a good time to take a step back and assess what more you can do to advance U.S. interests in the bilateral U.S.-China relationship, as well as in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly. Here are three suggestions:

1)      Breathe life into the pivot (or rebalance) in Asia

The pivot was a singularly deft move. It gave economic and strategic purpose to a previously aimless U.S. policy in Asia, while simultaneously addressing the very real concerns of many U.S. allies and partners over China’s aggressive rhetoric and actions in the Asia-Pacific region. The pivot also helps secure the U.S.-China relationship in a larger regional context, which is helpful given the wide range of shared trade and security interests.

Now it is time to put our money and muscle where our mouth is. The economic opportunities, as well as the security risks in the region, are only growing. The United States needs to devote real energy to negotiating the high-end regional free trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership; and it needs to start restocking the region with our military personnel and hardware. Otherwise you run the real risk that the pivot will prove without real substance and the naysayers—those who keep questioning the long-term commitment of the United States to the Asia Pacific—will win the day.

2)      Welcome the Chinese proposal for a “new type of relations between major countries,” then ask what it means and what the Chinese are planning to do to realize it

Chinese foreign policy scholars and officials have adopted a new mantra: it is time for a “new relationship” between the United States and China. Yet probe a little bit, and it is almost impossible to find someone who can define what this new relationship might entail.

To the extent that there is some collective understanding within China of the broad contours of this new “major country” relationship, it seems to rely overwhelmingly on the United States changing the way it does business. According to Chinese foreign policy analyst Jia Xiudong, the ability to achieve this new relationship depends on how the United States views China’s strategic intention; how the United States moves forward on rebalancing; and how the two countries “develop their potential” for win-win cooperation. Senior foreign affairs official Wang Yusheng similarly says this about the “new type of relations”: “The ball is in the U.S. court. So long as the U.S. can make efforts in the same direction as China does, there is hope.”

The Chinese have been relatively reluctant in the past to help construct bilateral or international agreements and architecture, so it is important to encourage such efforts. But before a new type of relations between the two countries can come to fruition, Chinese thinkers and officials will have to do more than say it is up to the United States.

3)     Get the U.S.-China economic relationship right

The good news is that the U.S.-China economic relationship is one of the world’s most robust. We are each other’s second-largest trading partners, and China represents the fastest-growing market for U.S. exports. Chinese firms also invested more than $6.5 billion in the United States in 2012, over 10 percent more than the previous high in 2010.

At the same time, challenges in the trade and investment relationship are proliferating, including intellectual property rights theft, fraudulent reporting of assets by Chinese companies, and concerns over burgeoning investment in the United States by Chinese state-owned enterprises with weak corporate governance.

The United States would benefit from a trade and investment architecture that offered greater protection to U.S. economic interests. Both a bilateral investment treaty and, over the longer term, a free trade agreement fit the bill. President Obama, your team should make moving forward with these negotiations one of the top priorities of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue.

Mr. President, the United States can continue to help drive an economically dynamic and strategically secure Asia by keeping the region front and center in U.S. policy priorities. Given all the other demands on your foreign policy team, this will not be easy. However, there is much to gain and more to lose if you don’t continue to assert U.S. leadership in the region.

In recent weeks, the Chinese and western media have been all atwitter over the shocking levels of air pollution in Beijing and a number of other Chinese cities. But it really shouldn’t be all that shocking. After all, in 2007, the World Bank and China’s own State Environmental Protection Administration (now the Ministry of Environmental Protection) found that that as many as 700,000 people die prematurely annually from respiratory disease related to air pollution. And more recently, Greenpeace Beijing reported that in 2011 in four major cities, more than 8,000 people died prematurely as a result of just one pollutant, PM 2.5. Anyone who spends any time in Beijing knows that the city has not yet found a way to tackle the myriad sources of air pollution from construction to cars to coal.

As frightening as the country’s smog-filled skies might be, the country’s water pollution is easily as alarming.  According to one 2011 report, in 2010, “up to 40 percent of China’s rivers were seriously polluted” and “20 percent were so polluted their water quality was rated too toxic even to come into contact with.” Part of the explanation may rest in the “estimated 10,000 petrochemical plants along the Yangtze and 4000 along the Yellow rivers.” (And the Yellow and Yangtze are not even the most polluted of China’s seven major rivers.) On top of whatever polluted wastewater might be leaching or simply dumped into China’s rivers from these factories, the Ministry of Supervision reports that there are almost 1,700 water pollution accidents annually. The total cost in terms of human life: 60,000 premature deaths annually.

While the macro picture is concerning, even more worrying is that individual Chinese don’t know whether their water is safe to drink or not. A Chinese newspaper, the Southern Weekly, recently featured an interview with a married couple, both of whom are water experts in Beijing (available in English here). They stated that they hadn’t drunk from the tap in twenty years, and have watched the water quality deteriorate significantly over just the past few years, even while state officials claim that more than 80 percent of water leaving treatment facilities met government standards in 2011.

It is difficult to get the straight story. According to one report by Century Weekly, there are a number of reasons for differing assessments of the country’s water quality: 1) the frequency of testing at treatment plants is too low, and only 40 percent of the treatment plants in China’s thirty-five major cities have the capacity to test for all 106 indicators in any case; 2) there are only a few independent water-quality monitoring bureaus, and most water testing is done in-house by the same water-treatment plant being evaluated; 3) there is weak transparency from local governments as to the results of the tests; and 4) no water testing accounts for the contamination that occurs from the aging and degraded pipes through which the water is transmitted to Chinese households.

China’s environmental challenges are long in the making, not simply a function of the past thirty years of reform. As one reporter has noted, Beijing in the 1950s transformed from a city that “did not produce even pencils” to one that boasted “700 factories and 2000 blast furnaces belching soot in the air.” In his 1991 book Environmental Management in China, Qu Geping, China’s first director of the country’s National Environmental Protection Agency, further commented about that time: “The environmental situation quickly deteriorated. A lot of places were polluted by either smog, sewage waters or rubbish. Biological resources, forests in particular, were seriously damaged, causing several losses to the ecosystem. There was extensive destruction of the natural environment of our country.”

In the 1950s, China, like other countries, neither understood well nor had the capacity to deal effectively with the environmental and health challenges its rapid development was creating. Today, however, China has both the knowledge and the capability. In the midst of the recent air pollution crisis, Premier-elect Li Keqiang said it would take time to address the air pollution problem: “There has been a long-term buildup to this problem, and the resolution will require a long-term process. But we must act.”  In the meantime, the Chinese people can only wear their masks, buy their bottled water, and hope they are not in this year’s batch of pollution-related casualties.

When a noted American columnist wrote recently that he expected Xi Jinping to spur real reform because reform is “in his genes,” I realized just how desperate we had become. In fact, the sound of speculation around Xi has become deafening. Even though he will not formally assume the presidency of China until March, Xi’s every utterance is now being fed into an evolving Xi Jinping narrative. The reality, however, is that we know very little of Xi’s actual policy proclivities save his desire for a more informal and direct style of governance and a Communist Party that is corruption-free.

A review of what Xi has said—not done, because unsurprisingly he actually hasn’t accomplished much of anything since he was named Communist Party General Secretary and president-elect just two months ago—suggests that trying to divine Xi’s inner-most desires is a relatively fruitless exercise. Like all Chinese leaders before him, he is capable of using symbols and slogans to hold out the promise of change, voicing seemingly contradictory views on a single issue, and advancing and then modifying a policy initiative leaving behind substantial confusion in the process.

Symbols and Slogans: Through symbols and slogans, Xi has raised expectations of reform to come and bolstered his reform credentials. When Xi traveled to Guangdong and Shenzhen in mid-December, observers were quick to herald the trip as a sign that Xi was going to advance breakthrough economic reform, akin to that pushed by Deng Xiaoping two decades earlier during his trip south. Xi did announce that there would be “no stop in reform and no stop in opening up,” but understanding what Xi really wants to do and what he can do on the economic reform front must wait for another day.

Xi’s call to implement the constitution has also given rise to some hope among Chinese reformers. However, without actual implementing guidelines, it is difficult to know whether Xi’s call to “persevere in upholding the constitution and the law” and his statement that “the greatness of the constitution lies in the true faith the people have in it,” will bring the type of basic rights protection that reformers are hoping for. Only time will tell.

The Absoluteness of Contradiction: On the foreign policy front, Xi has called for a win-win relationship with China’s neighbors and articulated a desire for China to be an engine of economic growth for the region. At the same time, he has called for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and declared that Beijing is “firm in safeguarding China’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity,” while demonstrating no inclination to negotiate with his neighbors over thorny territorial disputes. Xi’s leadership of the Party’s South China Sea small group since 2011 has been marked not by a “rising tide lifts all boats” but by limiting the navigational freedom of others’ boats. Is change yet to come?

Two steps forward and one step back: Since assuming power, Xi has put forth one bold policy initiative, only to withdraw and modify it immediately. Xi’s top cop Meng Jianzhu, who heads the Party’s political and legal affairs commission, issued a statement indicating that China’s much despised system of re-education through labor, which has allowed citizens to be arrested and held without trial for up to four years, would be ended. That same day, however, Party-supported media replaced “ended” with “reformed,” leaving a not insignificant amount of confusion over what the leadership actually has planned for the policy’s future.

Speculation over Xi Jinping and the new Chinese leadership is understandable: Chinese citizens, as well as the rest of the world, are eager to understand what a Xi Jinping presidency will mean. While such speculation may seem like harmless fun, the danger is that we impute intentions and capabilities to Xi that are not there—leading to misguided expectations, and, even worse, miscalculations. Xi himself has said, “Making empty talk is harmful to the nation, while doing practical jobs can help it thrive.” So let’s stop speculating and predicting what Xi might or might not do, give him a little time to cross the river while feeling the stones, and see where he ends up.

One of the most enjoyable aspects of Dan Blumenthal and Phillip Swagel’s new book on U.S.-China relations, An Awkward Embrace, is its lack of nuance. The authors—both of whom have served in the U.S. government and now share an affiliation with the American Enterprise Institute—clearly define U.S. interests with regard to China and address directly the opportunities (great) and challenges (greater) that China presents to those interests. They are equally no-nonsense in their prescriptions for U.S. policy, which they see as necessarily proceeding on two separate economic and security tracks (given the relative greater opportunity for successful cooperation on the economic than on the security front). Most important, Blumenthal and Swagel accomplish what many analysts attempt and most fail—to provide a road-map for U.S. policymakers in managing the relationship with China.

Still, after finishing the book, I found myself with a number of additional questions for the authors.  I reached out to Dan, and he graciously agreed to respond.  What follows is our online exchange.

Liz: You argue that the United States has two key and enduring strategic objectives: preventing the “domination of Asia by a hostile power or coalition,” and “nurturing a prosperous, peaceful and free Asia.” What are the two or three most important steps the United States should take to achieve these goals?

Dan: First, the United States should do what it can to ensure the strength of its allies and the durability of its alliances. Second, the United States should continue to engage in intense diplomacy with China, particularly on clear mutual interests such as structural reform of both economies. 

Liz: What does it mean for China to become a “responsible stakeholder?” How well is it doing? How, if at all, should we be accommodating Chinese interests in emerging international regimes, such as cybersecurity?

Dan: Then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick defined what it means to be a responsible stakeholder very well in 2005. He defined it, though, in very American-terms, by outlining what it means to be a 21^st century great power in a liberal order created by the West. The tough challenge for China is that great powers in the 21^st century have been less respectful of sovereignty, intervening in the affairs of others for humanitarian reasons, or because of state failure that can lead to terror havens or proliferation problems. China seems to be more of a late 19^th century or Cold War power—sovereignty is sacrosanct to them. But China is still deciding what kind of power it wants to be. The established powers have been very accommodating of China, pushing for its inclusion in most international institutions. But the fact is that China will not be included in every institution because at times its interests and values diverge from ours.

Liz: Are there issue areas where the United States and other countries need to become responsible stakeholders as well? Can we learn from China?

Dan: In terms of the great powers, America has concerns with how responsible or irresponsible Russia is. In terms of the grand strategic questions—in particular, how to exercise power in the 21^st century—the United States is not all that concerned with the behavior of other great powers aside from China. The authoritarian nature of China’s system is what concerns us, as it increases the likelihood that China will be less respectful of international rules than would democracies.

We can learn from the Chinese people. The Chinese people are very entrepreneurial and have pulled themselves out of poverty to accomplish great things. There is much to learn from how the Chinese people achieved that.

Liz: You highlight three domestic issues that drive China’s behavior in the Asia Pacific: nationalism, regime insecurity, and a zero-sum view of international politics. What factors—internal or external—might lead to an evolution in Chinese thinking and behavior?

Dan: The three drivers of China’s competitive behavior—the book points to cooperative behavior as well—are nationalism, regime insecurity and a view of international politics as highly competitive. These domestic drivers are linked to one another. The Party is scared of its own people. It makes sense, then, that it is also suspicious of great powers such as the United States. For example, many Chinese leaders believe, no matter what we say, that we are trying to contain China’s rise. Nationalism is a useful shield against insecurity. When it wants to, the Party can co-opt much of the public by propagandizing that they are still victims of a rapacious and aggressive West led by the United States. Nationalism of this kind can serve as a great distraction from the manifold problems that Party should be insecure about. Finally, CCP politics is a high stakes game, with the losers often humiliated, or destroyed in some way. This brand of politics is externalized, at times, in China’s dealings with the world. The source China’s current views are inherent in the nature of its domestic political system. If the regime was bolstered by a firmer form of legitimacy than one based on its performance or righting of past wrongs, its perceptions of the world would change.

Liz: Do you think conflict between the United States and China is inevitable or is there important common ground yet to be found and exploited?

Dan: Nothing in international relations is pre-ordained. An opportunity for common ground is keep a watchful eye on the battles inside China for its soul—whether it is between private entrepreneurs and the state, or between brave reformists and the security forces. The U.S. has little influence over how that battle unfolds. But it can both keep its powder dry and seek opportunities to work with China, particularly during those times when the liberals and reformers gain the upper hand. We need intense and multidimensional diplomatic engagement with China. All great powers have an interest in persuading China that the world order is flexible enough to accommodate it should it play by the rules. But all powers will also prepare for other outcomes.

Liz: Many Chinese analysts are expressing their concern that the U.S. pivot or rebalancing is emboldening actors in the region, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan, to take provocative actions in territorial disputes. Is there any cause for such concern? What role should the United States play as these conflicts continue to develop?

Dan:  I would put Japan in its own category—it is a very strong country with a very strong armed forces. It will stand up for itself. The more dangerous scenarios is what might ensue if Japan loses its confidence in the U.S. alliance. That could be very destabilizing. Japan is in a separate category for another reason: Chinese have been fed a steady diet of anti-Japanese education for quite a long time. In that sense, the Party has boxed itself in; it cannot ever be seen as backing down from Japan. The U.S. should show no split at all between itself and Japan, and it should encourage the Chinese to change its anti-Japan propaganda. If Japan feels secure in the alliance, it will be more constructive when it comes to disputes with China.

Vietnam also has a history of standing up for itself when it comes to China (and the United States), and it will continue to do so. The question for Washington is whether or not we want to influence that process. I think the answer is yes. We have a better chance to avoid conflict if our friends old and new do not feel that they are standing up to China by themselves.

The Philippines, frankly, is too weak to do any harm to China. We have an interest in the Philippines prospering as a democratic ally. We also have an interest in it being able to defend its own territory in accordance with hundreds of years of maritime international law.

All of these countries have experienced the horrors of war and imperialism. They want, as we do, an Asia that can grow and prosper without coercion and intimidation. Our job for the foreseeable future is to provide Asia with the breathing space to continue in that endeavor.

Trying to wrap one’s arms around China today is a significant challenge. It is a global power with a growing economy, rising military, and expanding diplomatic reach. Yet there continues to be a gnawing sense in and outside China that all is not quite right. Whether it is the 180,000 protests annually, the growing flight of capital and people to the West, or the potentially ruinous impact of corruption on the Communist Party’s legitimacy, uncertainty about China and its future is much greater than the country’s impressive global standing might suggest.

In the face of such uncertainty, what we need most is to understand better—issue by issue—what is happening on the ground in the country; and a terrific new book Governing Health in Contemporary China by my CFR colleague and renowned public health expert Huang Yanzhong provides precisely that kind of insight. It details Beijing’s efforts to tackle one critical and politically explosive issue—health care—and helps us understand where and why the country has succeeded and failed, and what more needs to be done.

The statistics are startling. China has one-third of the world’s smokers and suffers around one million tobacco-related deaths annually; the cardiovascular disease death rate is higher in China than in the United States; and close to one hundred million Chinese are believed to suffer from diabetes. Public anger over poor care, rising costs, and corruption in the health care system triggered over 17,000 violent attacks against hospital doctors and health care workers in 2010. Moreover, horrific stories of tainted food and drugs have further undermined the Chinese people’s faith in their government’s capacity to provide an effective health care regime. As Huang notes, over the past ten years, the Chinese people have come to refer to health care as one of the Three New Mountains—health care, education, and social security—modeled after the old Three Mountains (imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic-capitalism) that the Communist Party deployed to bring down the government of Chiang Kai-Shek.

Huang takes the reader on a fascinating journey through the twists and turns of the various efforts by Chinese leaders from Mao Zedong through Hu Jintao to tackle the country’s health care crisis. He explores the political battles surrounding three of the most pressing health care challenges the country faces: provision of good and affordable health care for all Chinese citizens, managing health care crises such as HIV/AIDs and the outbreaks of SARS and Avian flu; and developing an effective regulatory and enforcement system for food and drug safety. In each case, Huang finds evidence that Chinese leaders have learned from experience and from the outside world how to improve their practices. As a result, he can point to a number of advances in areas such as health insurance coverage or the strengthening of grassroots health care providers.

Yet as Huang amply demonstrates, these remain changes at the margin. He quotes a senior official from the Ministry of Health as noting that the most recent set of reforms launched in 2009 have not “solved the fundamental, systematic and structural problems [in China’s health sector].” Even president-elect Xi Jinping’s pledge to bring higher levels of health care to the Chinese people, coupled with increased investment in the health care sector (according to a recent McKinsey & Co. study, Beijing plans to triple its health care investment to $1 trillion by 2020), will not be enough to make the kind of difference in the country’s public health system that China’s leaders desire and its people demand.

Real change needs a far more radical set of political and institutional reforms that address how health care policy is made, financed, delivered, and evaluated. For Huang, that means health care policy “by fiat” cannot continue. What is needed, instead, he proposes, is reform in Beijing’s relations with local governments, greater democratic participation, a robust civil society, the rule of law, and a true market economy. Without such reform, Beijing will never get at the heart of its public health care crisis.