With the ousting of the military regime in 1992, Thailand emerged as a regional beacon of democracy. The international monitoring organization Freedom House even ranked Thailand a “free” country in its 1999 report—one of only a few Asian countries to receive this designation. Over the past six years, however, democracy has retreated rapidly in Thailand. Today, the imminent return of Thaksin, the current government’s oppressive wielding of the draconian lèse-majesté law, and the deteriorating health of the beloved King, all suggest that this fragile “democracy” may be on the precipice of yet another crisis.

In my new piece for Foreign Policy, I explore the numerous factors that have led to the decline of democracy in Thailand. You can read the piece in its entirety here.

The ongoing uprisings in the Arab world, as well as transformations in Myanmar and several other closed countries, have led to predictions that we are in the beginnings of a global Fourth Wave of democratization, following the three previous waves over the past century. I disagree —and I think the data supports my argument that in reality democracy in many developing nations remains in serious crisis. In the new issue of Bloomberg Businessweek, I review William Dobson’s book The Dictator’s Learning Curve, which deals with many of these questions of whether a Fourth Wave is upon us. Read the review on Bloomberg Businessweek.

The dramatic political reforms underway in Myanmar have lead to readmission of the one-time pariah into the international community, and the suspension of sanctions by Western governments such as the European Union and Canada. The result is an inundation of foreign investment, which brings with it both opportunity and cause for concern.

There is a wealth of new material being published on Myanmar’s once opaque economy. Here are some of the best pieces:

• “Myanmar: Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation” from the International Monetary Fund
• “Myanmar Economy: Open for Business?”  from the Economist Intelligence Unit
• “Dividing the Spoils” by Jared Bissinger
• “Burma Gold Rush” by Joshua Kurlantzick
• “The Threats to Myanmar’s Economy” by Simon Roughneen
• “Gold Rush to Burma” by the Washington Post Editorial Board

Recent international media attention related to Thailand has been (quite reasonably) focused on the tragic story of Ampon Tangnoppakul, also known as “Ar Kong,” an elderly grandfather who had been sentenced to twenty years in prison for allegedly sending four text messages defaming the monarchy. This despite the fact that he had no previous political experience, and the state could not even prove he had actually sent the messages, but instead simply applied the standard that he could not disprove he sent them — obviously not a reasonable standard of proof in a democracy. Sick with cancer and other ailments, and separated from his entire family, Ampon died in jail earlier this week. There have been many stories on him but one of the most insightful, and provocative, is “A Tale of Two Grandfathers.”

Ampon’s death may finally help catalyze a broader movement to reform Thailand’s archaic and now brutal Lèse-Majesté (LM) laws. Unfortunately, the Yingluck government continues to say that it will not favor reforming LM laws.

Yet, at the same time as this case is getting media attention, other more under-the-radar news in Thailand should prove extremely worrying to U.S. policymakers. In an interesting piece in Asia Times, two retired U.S. army officers who frequently write on the Thai military note that the Thai armed forces are currently beefing up their strength, working to promote closer intra-army unity, and essentially preparing for a potential conflict with the elected government should Thaksin return to the country, or should the elected government try to carve into the army’s political independence.

Though these two writers can be at times hyperbolic and incredibly pro-army in their writings, the news they detail echoes stories from other army sources, and suggests that another coup in Thailand is hardly out of the question after Thaksin’s imminent return. U.S. policymakers should be prepared for such a possibility —and should be prepared with extremely harsh measures should the Thai military stage a coup.

Today Asia Times has an excellent overview of the political fallout from this past weekend’s large protest in Kuala Lumpur, which focused on reforming election laws. The turnout, as Asia Times noted, was far higher than the government expected (though figures of size were of course debated). What’s more, the fact that it was largely peaceful, and then resulted at the end of the protest in the use of excessive force by police against demonstrators, will cut into the image of Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak as a reformer, an image he has worked hard to cultivate in the past two years, and which is critical to his election prospects as the prime minister is far more popular personally than his party is. Any serious dents in Najib’s popularity, thus, will be critical to the election, since his party is unlikely to be able to win over voters who have not made up their mind; only Najib’s personal attractiveness seems to be able to win these voters back from the opposition. Now, it appears Najib is likely to delay new elections until at least the summer, to try to give himself time to reburnish his reputation.

Though Najib has instituted some important reforms, including attempting to change the national economic model and changing the Internal Security Act, his problem will remain that, because he is linked to the ruling party —and its election irregularities, its pork, its control of the print media, and its still-smoldering scandal involving graft in defense contracting—he is never going to seem as reformist as the opposition, and he may not even have good control of his own forces. Meanwhile, in order to win the election Najib will also have to continue to appeal to the hard-core ethnic Malay base, which disdains many of his proposed reforms, and which has much to lose from real changes in the affirmative action programs.

As Asia Times and other reports noted, the protests last weekend drew sizable numbers of young Malaysians, and it also attracted a broad range of protesters including Malays, Chinese, and Indians. These young people will eventually be the future of Malaysian politics, and even if the ruling coalition holds it together to win again in the upcoming election, the long-term trends do not look favorable for the United Malays National Organisation and its allies.

Thus far, Ban Ki-moon’s trip to Myanmar has proven surprisingly productive, and the UN chief has been far more vocal than on previous visits, when he deferred too readily to the then-military regime, and at times even seemed unprepared for the complexities of dealing with Burmese politics, including the tricky ethnic issues. Of course, a lot is changing in Myanmar, opening up room for the UN to play a larger role, and the apparent retirement of former senior general Than Shwe, who appeared to have a visceral disdain for international institutions and outside interlocutors, also plays a role. But Ban seems better briefed, more comfortable, and clearer in his view on Myanmar’s progress. For one, prior to his trip his staff clearly enunciated the enormous potential of Myanmar as a destination for investment, talking it up (over-talking it, in my opinion) in a way that surely pleased both the business community and allies of President Thein Sein, who need results from the reforms in order to stave off hard-liners.

Then, in the country, Ban ki-Moon struck a solid, thoughtful compromise position that, while hardly letting the government off the book, pushed the National League for Democracy (NLD) and Aung San Suu Kyi to begin moving away from being an opposition party in (internal) exile and toward becoming a working political party. Suu Kyi seemed to understand this, and gave up her protests over swearing in to the current wording of the Myanmar constitution, thus allowing Parliament to open and the NLD to take its places and launch its agenda. “Politicians sometimes will continue to have differences of opinion, but real leaders demonstrate flexibility for the greater cause of people and for the country,” said Ban.

In addition, rather than simply praising Myanmar’s reforms while ignoring the continuing severe human rights abuses in areas like the Kachin State, Ban —who did call for all countries to end or suspend sanctions —talked in a speech to Parliament of the need for further serious shifts in the Tatmadaw, as well as (somewhat obliquely) the need for a more federal, representative government that is not heavily Burman dominated.

Although Burmese insiders say that Suu Kyi does not yet have a warm relationship with the UN head, who was too willing to defer to the generals in the past, their interactions appear to be improving, which will be critical for a future in which UN agencies, the UN itself, and, potentially in the long-term, peacekeepers, play a growing role in Myanmar.

The UN secretary general is shortly headed to Myanmar to observe the country’s reforms, and ahead of his visit his special advisor on Myanmar, Vijay Nambiar, told the press that the country had the potential to be the next Asian tiger, as it emerges from its hibernation and begins to attract significant investment. But Ban, who in the past has taken a relatively meek approach to the Myanmar government and military, should be coming in this time more empowered, able to go where he wants, and able to try and answer some of the big questions about the reform process. During his visit, he should try to address the following themes:

• Who is in charge of the conflict in the Kachin area? While the government has worked effectively and promisingly toward ending, for good, many of the conflicts in ethnic minority areas, the conflict in the Kachin area continues to spiral downhill toward full-scale war. Some Burmese officials suggest that the president does not support the way the military has handled the Kachin conflict. Is this true —which would suggest that the military has an enormous amount of freedom still in its regional commands? Is it false, and is Thein Sein just being used as reformist cover? Either way, some clearer answers need to emerge, as well as a comprehensive policy for handling Kachin refugees.
• Is the international community going to have any coordination in how it handles the reforms, as well as new investment going into Myanmar? During the past two decades, most major democracies, including the United States, Japan, Australia, Europe, and Canada operated relatively cohesively in dealing with Myanmar. Sure, there were divisions on Myanmar policy —Japan often wanted to engage more, and at times so did Australia and several European nations. The types of sanctions differed somewhat; the type and nature of aid differed among democracies. But overall, a general consensus held. Now, with reforms happening quickly, sanctions being suspended or lifted, and aid and investment beginning to flow in, any consensus seems to have been lost. The problem could arise as has happened in Cambodia, where savvy prime minister Hun Sen has learned to play different donors off of each other, with the result of him almost always getting his way —to the detriment of Cambodia’s rule of law and approach toward corruption. Some more effective consensus needs to arise on Myanmar among the major Western democracies, in order to avoid aid duplication, provide channels for effective investment, coordinate policies on refugees and rights, and other issues. The UN would be the obvious player to lead that coordination.
• What are the new red lines in Myanmar for civil society? Until two years ago, the red lines were pretty clear: There was basically no freedom of the press, assembly, speech, etc, and there was no allowed opposition to government. Now, the red lines have become blurrier — and in some ways, harder for Myanmar civil society to interpret. The press is freer, and yet officials are still pushing editors to censor some publications, and still arresting some journalists. As a result, as in China, journalists in Myanmar now do not know what will or won’t get them in trouble. The same blurriness applies to union protests, political campaigning, NGO work, and other types of civil society actions.
• How engaged will China be with the leading democracies during the reform process?  In some other countries, China has participated in donor groups, even if it has not been willing to coordinate its aid with other countries. China also has an enormous stake in Myanmar’s stability and prosperity, more so than any other country except Thailand; I do not believe that China necessarily prefers an authoritarian government in Myanmar, especially if that authoritarian government pursued policies that led to poverty and conflict. A stable, democratic government would, I think, be fine with China, but in the period between authoritarian rule and a stable democracy (a period which could be a long, long, long time) will China be a net positive actor pushing toward that democracy, even if that push leads to instability for a period of time? Or will it prove nostalgic for the more closed, authoritarian Myanmar during the reform period, and its instability?

Pretty soon everyone you know will have been to Myanmar, so you better get there fast. The UN Secretary General is headed there, Canada just suspended sanctions (following the EU earlier this week), and Japan is gearing up for sizable investments in the country, as are many European businesses. In the new issue of Prospect, I explore Myanmar’s looming gold rush.

You can read the entire piece “Burma Gold Rush” here.

Over at New Mandala, there is a detailed report by longtime correspondent Nick Nostitz of Thaksin Shinawatra’s visit to Cambodia during the Thai New Year. For followers of Thailand and Indochinese politics, it is well worth a read.

As with Nostitz’s prior reports and books, this one is full of on-the-ground details, but what struck me the most was the intense feeling poured out by some of the Thais who traveled to meet Thaksin, the kind of emotion I previously associated in Thailand with Thais’ meetings with, er, a man whose title ends with “Nine.” That is not to say that these same supporters hugging Thaksin and crying care only for Thaksin, or that Thaksin, when in power, was a moral and wise leader. But it does show, once again, that in trying to push Thaksin out of Thai politics, demonizing him (i.e, former foreign minister Kasit Piromya comparing Thaksin to Hitler and Mussolini), and trying to downplay the intense emotional connection many northern and northeastern Thais feel with Thaksin, Thaksin’s opponents actually have in some ways inflated the man’s myth and intensified the bonds that those supporters feel. The backfiring of this demonization of Thaksin is evident in Nostitz’s reporting.

Over at New Mandala, there have been a series of excellent posts on the continuing conflict between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Myanmar military. Several have suggested that, as the Kachin area is increasingly covered in the state press in Yangon, it suggests that the government may no longer be trying to downplay the conflict, and may instead be trying to wins hearts and minds both in the Kachin area and among the majority Burman population for its handling of the fighting, in order to isolate Kachin regions from the broader reform effort and possibly split them from sympathy in the National League for Democracy (NLD). Of course, a recent report by Human Rights Watch  suggests that serious abuses by the government forces continue in the Kachin area, and it still seems unclear whether Thein Sein’s government even has total control of military policy in the Kachin area, or whether regional commanders are making policy on the ground. This lack of control would be a highly disturbing trend but not surprising, given the fact that Thein Sein is not respected by all field commanders and that field commanders have a long history of being able to run regional commands with sizable autonomy.

No matter what the truth of the government side’s command structure, the conflict has now risen as the biggest obstacle to reform, permanent peace, and the creation of some new federal structure, a Panglong II. In addition, as New Mandala rightly notes, the claimed high casualty figures in the Kachin conflict —KIA sources claims 3,000 Burmese soldiers have been killed in recent fighting—means that, even if the war is ended, it is becoming harder and harder for an effective post-war settlement to be crafted, since both sides are losing so many people that acrimony could keep any real peace from emerging.