Yesterday, the Japanese people remembered the tragedy of March 11, 2011 as the nation looked back on the year since a devastating earthquake and tsunami struck the northeastern Tohoku region. A large public ceremony in Tokyo included the emperor and empress of Japan as well as Japan’s prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda, and his cabinet.

Elsewhere, I have written of the broader political and economic challenges Japan confronts, challenges that have become vastly more acute as a result of the March 11 disasters. Yet today it is important to note where Japanese attention has focused.

Throughout these weeks leading up to March 11, the Japanese media as well as the global media have focused on the public policy agenda that these natural disasters created. The immediate focal point, of course, is the reconstruction of Tohoku’s devastated coastal communities. Included in these are the communities evacuated because of the nuclear reactor meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi power plant. Beyond that, it is Japan’s nuclear energy sector that has come under the most intense scrutiny.

Criticism of the slow pace of national government action on behalf of these communities has been widespread over the past year. This week most of the Japanese commentary highlighted the administrative bottlenecks and decision-making paralysis that seemed to keep the central government from pressing forward with reconstruction. The Sunday Debate show on NHK hosted Minister Tatsuo Hirano of the newly created Reconstruction Ministry and Minister Goshi Hosono, now minister of the environment as well as the cabinet lead on nuclear cleanup at Fukushima, who came forward to explain the immense scope of disaster management Japan confronts. Yet in the parliament on Monday, both ministers argued the need for greater responsiveness and intervention by the central government in processes that have traditionally rested on the shoulders of local governments.

As Japan struggles to understand how to interpret the lessons learned over this past year, it is imperative to remember that March 11 presented one of the world’s most advanced industrial democracies with a crisis of unprecedented complexity. What Japan did right in the wake of that disaster is equally important to remember as what needs to be improved, and this pertains to non-governmental responses as well as national and local government response.

The nuclear meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi added another dimension to the complexity of the crisis. As former prime minister Naoto Kan and former U.S. National Security Council director for Asia Jeffrey Bader explain in their ForeignAffairs.com essays, it was the third of Japan’s “triple disasters” last March that made it so terribly difficult to manage. Thus Japan’s experience offers much for those outside of Japan to consider and absorb. It could so easily have happened to us.

The security of so many around the globe is deeply dependent on our ability to improve the resilience of our communities in the face of natural disaster. The Japanese people have lived and developed this knowledge for generations, and yet March 11 demonstrated the need to learn more and to become even more resilient.

Yesterday throughout Japan, those who survived the tragedy took time to light candles and pray for the more than 19,000 Japanese who lost their lives in the worst natural disaster in their modern history. It will be these survivors who must now build an even more resilient society, and who must now turn their attention to restoring confidence in Japan’s future.

Yesterday Japan’s foreign minister Koichiro Gemba announced a new effort by the U.S. and Japanese governments to adjust the plan to relocate U.S. Marines currently stationed in Okinawa. The announcement was widely welcomed in Japan, especially in Okinawa.

The U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on Defense Posture issued on February 8 was very brief, and had very few details. It reiterates the goals of the bilateral agreement to move U.S. Marines off of Okinawa, but media reports suggest that while the total number of Marines leaving the island will remain unchanged, their destination will. The number of Marines heading to Guam is reported to be 4,700, and the remaining 3,300 will be dispersed to other bases in the Asia Pacific.

This is a considerable shift in the U.S. position on Futenma. Since 2009, the U.S. government has insisted on linking agreement on the construction of a new runway in Henoko in the northern part of Okinawa to any troop movements off island. Now, the reduction in Marines can move forward, and the Japanese government can return the land used by the Marines in central Okinawa back to commercial use. This will go a long way to meeting the governor’s hopes for economic development and job creation on the island.

Japan’s foreign and defense ministers appeared rather jubilant at the press conference announcing the new direction of talks over Futenma relocation. The important signal in the statement is the return of five facilities south of Kadena Air Base, and the timing of that base return will no longer be linked to approval of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). When asked about the delinking of what the United States had referred to as an all or nothing “package deal,” Japan’s foreign minister acknowledged that Tokyo had felt “pressured” by Washington.

Yet it may be too early for celebrations. Both governments remain adamant that they need to relocate Futenma Marine Air Station, and argue that there is “no viable alternative” to Henoko bay in Nago City. Activism against this construction plan will likely remain high. Indeed as the two governments were talking this week, the mayor of Nago City, Susumu Inamine, was also making his way around Washington, meeting with think tank experts and Congressional staff on the Hill. Two weeks earlier another delegation of Okinawan politicians and civil society leaders were also here, meeting with ten Congressmen and over forty congressional staff members as well as other Japan experts. There seems little doubt that sentiments in Okinawa opposing the current relocation plan remain high.

For now, this new more flexible approach is truly welcome. For too long the two governments stuck with a plan that could not be implemented. There is still much creative thinking to be done on how to reconfigure U.S. military bases in Japan. Ultimately, we need a comprehensive approach that looks forward to the next decade and beyond, and that fully considers the political transitions underway in Japan and in Asia more broadly. Unpacking the Futenma “package” is an important first step in that direction.

Cutting off Iranian oil imports has put Tokyo in a difficult position. The United States and its European allies have already agreed to up the ante on sanctions against Iran, but the domestic costs that Japan has to bear in order to cooperate are higher.

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s government has indicated its desire to cooperate, and last December the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced new restrictions on the operations of 106 entities as well as one individual with potential links to proliferation-sensitive activities in Iran. But the real effort now is to reduce Japan’s oil imports from Tehran, and to negotiate an exemption from more stringent restrictions on Japanese banks included in the new U.S. sanctions law.

Rebalancing Japan’s energy supply is even more delicate at the moment, as most of the nations’ nuclear power plants remain offline. Efforts to compensate by increasing access to overseas sources of supply, including oil and LNG imports, have ensured Japan’s national power supply since the disasters of March 11 last year. The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan estimated an additional twenty-nine million kiloliters of demand for crude and heavy oil since 2010, and an added cost of 3.3 trillion yen, or $43.2 billion, for imports of fossil fuel for thermal plants. Thus, suddenly imposing more severe oil import restrictions would be difficult and expensive at a time when the economy is fragile.

Japan has been decreasing its reliance on Iranian oil steadily since the 2006 sanctions took effect. Since 2007, Japan has reduced its imports from Tehran by roughly 40 percent, according to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Roughly 500 barrels per day of Iranian crude oil imports have dwindled to 316 barrels per day over this period. That works out to be an 11 percent annual rate of reduction, which by 2010 had brought Japan down to the third largest importer from Iran after the European Union and China. In contrast, South Korea’s crude oil imports from Iran increased by 20 percent in 2011, and China’s imports rose by 30 percent.

Tokyo now must accelerate this rate of reduction to satisfy U.S. legal requirements and the rising political interest of the U.S. Congress. Japan has already promised to do so, but what remains to be negotiated is the speed of those reductions. Officials from the Japanese government are expected to visit Washington, DC, on Thursday to discuss how much faster Japan must cut its imports.

Part of that answer depends on alternate suppliers. Japan has already diversified its sources considerably. In 2010, Iran accounted for only 9.6 percent of Japan’s oil imports, with Saudi Arabia (28.8 percent), the UAE (20.4 percent), and Qatar (11.8 percent) taking a leading role as Japan’s crude oil suppliers. The continued cooperation of alternative crude oil suppliers, of course, will be critical to sustaining Tokyo’s ability to meet its energy needs and find alternative source of supply. Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba’s visit to the region from January 5 to 12 demonstrates how keenly Tokyo depends on their willingness to continue upping their production.

Two additional challenges are also in the mix for Tokyo. The first is the financing of oil imports from Iran. Annually, Japan’s oil trade with Iran runs around one trillion yen, or $13.1 billion. On January 19 the Nikkei Shimbun reported that 80 to 90 percent of those transactions are done by the Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ, and the remainder by the Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation. An exemption of Japan’s banks from immediate affect of the new sanctions law, therefore, would allow Tokyo to manage the risk involved for two leading financial institutions as it moves forward in reducing its Iranian oil imports.

Beyond these specific calculations on the new sanctions, the deeper challenge for Japanese policymakers is the domestic politics of the sanctions debate itself. The growing perception in Japan is that cooperation in the sanctions effort against Iran only benefits other economic competitors, most notably China. In 2006, the Japanese government at the urging of the Bush administration ended its petroleum development project at Azadegan, seen to be one of the most promising untapped oil fields in Iran. Almost immediately thereafter the Chinese government concluded a deal with Tehran to take over the development project, ensuring that Beijing would have preferential access to the long-term oil stream that would result.

Today too most Japanese watch Chinese efforts to ensure its oil supply in Iran as well as efforts to negotiate preferential treatment from other alternative suppliers, and see direct competition to Japanese interests. Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to the capitals of Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the heels of Foreign Minister Gemba upped the ante, and resulted in a deal with Saudi Arabia for development access to the Manifa oil field. Within Japan, while the government does its best to cooperate with Washington on the most recent round of sanctions, critics charge that China seems to be—yet again—eating into Japan’s energy supply streams (at much lower cost, by the way) and getting immediate gains from Japan’s decisions. It doesn’t help that South Korea remains cautious about cutting its imports from Iran, and that India has flat out refused to curtail its Iranian oil purchases. South Korean president Lee Myung-bak’s upcoming trip to Saudi Arabia and the UAE reveals the heated competition for crude oil among Asia’s leading economies.

Over the last several years, Tokyo has become one of Washington’s closest allies in the effort to gain international support for the sanctioning of Iran’s nuclear program, both through the United Nations and now with the United States and the EU. Yet we should remember that Japan has much at stake, especially this year. Ensuring that Tokyo can manage a reduction in its imports is one important piece of the puzzle. Allowing a graceful exit for its banks, already significantly engaged in cooperating with existing sanctions and major financial partners in the U.S. domestic market, is an important step in ensuring continued Japanese cooperation over time. At all costs, U.S. policymakers must ensure that Tokyo’s cooperation in nuclear nonproliferation efforts in Iran does not exact a higher economic or political cost than Beijing, Seoul, or Delhi’s lack of cooperation.

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda is about to reshuffle his Cabinet, and my friends here in DC are looking at me in amazement, asking “not again?!” Prime Minister Noda’s reshuffle brings some new faces into the leadership, and removes a few that were less than exemplary at their job.

The real story is less about these faces, and more about the frequency with which Japan’s top policymakers change. Parliaments operate differently than the U.S. presidential system, and so the reconstitution of Japan’s Cabinet is always more sudden than the four-year transitions of presidential administrations here in Washington.

The mechanics of Japan’s leadership transitions matter to the management of U.S.-Japan relations. Leadership transitions seem to come fast and furious in Tokyo, and the media is full of stories of political rivalries, personal and party. I’m sure no one in Washington these days will be surprised to hear that much of the politics of the moment in Japan have little to do with policy debate, and everything to do with who might emerge on top in the next election.

Yet it is important that we understand the habits that have developed to accompany Japan’s move away from single party dominance, what I am calling Japan’s “new politics.” Since I get asked so many questions about what is going on over there, I will share some of them, and hope that others will join in the conversation to explore the texture of political change today as it relates to governance challenges.

The habits of Japan’s parliament, specifically the prolific use of Upper House censure motions to embarrass and weaken governments, is the back story to Prime Minister Noda’s decision to reshuffle tomorrow.

Q: “What is a censure motion, and do Cabinet members have to resign when they’re censured?”

On December 9, 2011, opposition members in Japan’s Upper House censured two Cabinet members, the minister of defense, Yasuo Ichikawa, and the minister in charge of consumer affairs and food safety, Kenji Yamaoka. The censure motion in the Upper House is not binding, and thus cannot force the resignation of a member of the Cabinet. Yet it suggests that he (or she—none have been women to date) is no longer welcome in the chamber, and that the government therefore cannot effectively present its ideas and argue for legislation in the Upper House. In other words, it limits the ability of the ruling party to govern, and therefore pressures the prime minister to remove the individual minister from the Cabinet.

Similarly, the Cabinet of former prime minister Naoto Kan was deeply wounded by censure motions against then chief cabinet secretary, Yoshito Sengoku, and then minister of land, infrastructure, and transport, Sumio Mabuchi, on November 26-27, 2010, for their roles in the Japanese response to the Chinese fishing trawler incident in the waters off of the Senkaku islands. The confrontation with China, and the handling of the crisis, was condemned by Japan’s opposition parties in the Upper House, and their censure forced the hand of an already besieged prime minister to weaken his Cabinet by replacing two of his key decisionmakers.

Censure motions thus have become the weapon of choice for opposition parties in the Upper House to undermine and embarrass Cabinets. The more powerful no-confidence vote in the Lower House, of course, can remove a prime minister from office, but the Upper House has no such power. Yet, the censure motion today in Japan’s parliamentary battles is deployed frequently and without consideration of what it effectively does to weaken Japan’s government.

Before we point the fingers too fully in the direction of today’s opposition parties, it is useful to remember that this weapon was used liberally by the DPJ when it was in opposition. The first Cabinet resignation as a result of Upper House censure was under an LDP government in 1998, when then director-general of the Japan Defense Agency Fukushiro Nukaga resigned over a widespread procurement scandal. That set the precedent—or expectation—that censure could in fact be a successful tactic for opposition control over Cabinet choices.

The DPJ then used it with greater impact, in the waning years of LDP rule when the opposition for the first time passed a censure motion against a sitting prime minister, Takeo Fukuda in 2008. A vote of confidence in Fukuda was passed in the Lower House, demonstrating his legitimacy as Japan’s leader, but the Upper House censure was an embarrassment coming as it did just prior to his hosting of the G8 Summit. They did it again against his successor, Prime Minister Taro Aso in 2009, but Aso managed to get his Lower House vote of confidence passed in the morning before the Upper House could hold its vote.

This acrimony between the ruling and opposition parties may now be acceptable in Japan’s “divided Diet,” where the lack of a majority in the Upper House makes this slash and burn approach feasible. Yet it is worth asking as Japan struggles with unprecedented economic, social, and strategic challenges, what does this say about the role of Japan’s parliamentarians in building and strengthening good governance practices? Are they helping or hindering governance?

Outside of Japan, the fear is that Prime Minister Noda’s decision to change his line-up only four months into his tenure signals a weakening of his government, and the opposition’s tactic of trying to force him to reshuffle only signals to the rest of the world Japan’s continued inability to focus its political energy on solving the nation’s challenges.

What do you think?

Japan's prime minister Yoshihiko Noda inspects a guard of honour during his ceremonial reception at the presidential palace in New Delhi December 28, 2011 (B Mathur/Courtesy Reuters).

Unlike many of us, Japan’s prime minister did not sit back and rest at year’s end. Rather, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda took to the road to visit two of Asia’s ascending powers. He spent Christmas in Beijing, after a planned visit for earlier in December was unexpectedly postponed by China’s leaders. Yet it was his trip to New Delhi on December 27–28 that energized Tokyo’s diplomatic agenda.

Noda’s willingness to rearrange his schedule to accommodate China’s desire to change the summit dates reflects an awareness of the delicacy of the moment for Beijing. The original date of the summit coincided with the deeply painful anniversary of World War II atrocities, the day Japanese Imperial Army troops captured the city of Nanjing. Postponing a planned summit meeting may be unprecedented, yet it leaves us wondering why Beijing’s leaders did not appreciate the domestic impact of hosting Japan’s leader when they picked the date. That they saw fit to ask Tokyo to reschedule reveals perhaps a bit more confusion in Beijing than is usual. But it also reveals the efforts Japanese and Chinese governments together are making to get this important bilateral relationship back on a sound footing.

Meeting on December 26 allowed Prime Minister Noda and President Hu Jintao to focus on a much anticipated event, the death of Kim Jong-il and his succession by then underway in North Korea. As it has in the past, change in North Korea opened the way for Beijing and Tokyo to move beyond some of the more difficult bilateral issues between them and concentrate on their common interests in Northeast Asia. Prime Minister Noda had already declared his interest in sharing information with Beijing, and on consultations that would lead to regional cooperation on managing any issues that might arise as a result of instability on the Korean peninsula.

Yet it was the prime minister’s visit to India that suggested more immediate promise. Where often the Sino-Japanese relationship seems fraught, the Japan-India strategic partnership has been a source of growing potential for Tokyo. Economic relations are growing, although private sector investment by Japanese corporations seems slower than might be expected. Japan’s assistance to India in the construction of vital infrastructure projects, most notably the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor Project, has been consistent and of obvious importance to integrating India’s growing local economies. Japan too has found a ready partner in India for diversifying their access to rare earth materials, a stinging concern since the fall of 2010 when China abruptly reduced its exports to Tokyo of these vital metals.

Less appreciated is the growing strategic harmony between Japan and India. When I visited New Delhi in November, I was astounded at the extent of interest in the Indian strategic community in furthering the bilateral cooperation with Japan on everything from the development of space technology to nuclear cooperation and cyber security efforts. Already Japan and India have had five ministerial-level meetings to flesh out the contours of their new strategic partnership, and have agreed to institute a two-plus-two meeting each year to include defense and foreign ministers. The interaction between the Japanese and Indian militaries is also increasing, as the two navies have worked closely on anti-piracy and other maritime security missions. The armies have had several high-level exchanges, and will soon initiate staff talks. In 2012, the two nations’ air forces will also upgrade their consultations. The East Asia Summit provided an important opportunity to consider how Japan and India might work together to help shape the regional environment as well.

Tokyo and Delhi’s concerns about a rising China are certainly part of the impetus for the acceleration of strategic cooperation, and this has not gone unnoticed in Beijing. China’s military and media have been alert to this burgeoning strategic conversation between Delhi and Tokyo. I was surprised to find that even my discussion at the Observer Research Foundation, reported in Asian News International, got some air time as evidence of containment in the China Daily.

Yet Japan’s renewed diplomatic outreach is not all about China. It is clearly all about Japan, and its need for an active agenda of strategic engagement in Asia. As the prime minister’s China visit attests, Tokyo wants a strong relationship of strategic trust with Beijing. But perhaps that will take more time.

Prime Minister Noda’s diplomatic energy is reassuring, and signals clearly that he has his eye firmly on Japan’s strategic interests even as he seeks to work through the complex array of domestic issues on his agenda.

A Japan Self-Defense Forces officer smiles as he holds a four-month-old baby girl who was rescued along with her family members from their home in Ishimaki City, Miyagi Prefecture in northern Japan, after an earthquake and tsunami struck the area. (Yomiuri Yomiuri / Courtesy of Reuters)

2011, of course, will be forever remembered as the year of Japan’s “triple disasters.” Only time will tell what this devastating experience will mean for the Japanese people and their society. For so many Americans, March 11 and its aftermath reminded us of why we so admire the accomplishments of Japan, and the civility and humanity of so many Japanese. From Kandahar to Canberra, from Seoul and Beijing, Japan’s friends around the globe responded—in part because of the tremendous scope of the tragedy, but also out of a sense of gratitude for Japan’s own effort to assist and befriend those beyond their own shores.

The impact of the disasters is too broad to discuss here. But as a long time Japan watcher, several aspects of the disaster and its aftermath stood out. The first, and most widely recognized, is the depth of gratitude expressed by the Japanese people for their military, the Self Defense Forces (SDF). As Japan’s “first responder,” the SDF performed search and rescue operations, opened and sustained supply routes, and filled in the manpower for the local governments that lost staff as well as infrastructure and communications. In June, when I visited Ishinomaki, the SDF were just beginning to hand back governance tasks to an inundated municipal staff.

Second, the disasters brought back into focus Japan’s Imperial family as the symbol of national unity. The Emperor spoke out in the early days as the nuclear disaster at Fukushima Daiichi unfolded to remind Japanese to remain calm and to have hope. He and the Empress also traveled back and forth to the devastated regions of Tohoku, visiting evacuation shelters and reassuring those who lost not only their homes but their family members as well.

A third impression I had was how effectively Japan’s civil society coped with the trauma. Corporations and households alike jumped in to conserve energy at much higher rates than anticipated. The nascent disaster relief community was buoyed by an incredible wave of support, so much so that the NGO community found their capacities sorely tested. Volunteers streamed into the devastated areas, rolled up their sleeves, cleared debris, and dug out the remnants of homes from the tsunami’s mud. Anonymous donors left schoolbags, much needed personal goods, and in many instances, large envelopes full of cash for the hundreds of thousands of Tohoku residents stranded in evacuation centers. Nothing spoke louder to me of the national mood than the day that Japan’s women’s soccer team, Nadeshiko Japan, brought the World Cup home. It seemed that Nadeshiko’s victory released the country from the shock of the disasters, allowing a new sense of determination and pride to emerge.

Several other trends in Japan this year were brought into sharp relief by the nation’s challenges. Japan’s process of political transformation remains a work in progress, and the search for a new form of governance and for new political leaders continues to keep all of us Japan watchers busy. We have a new prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda—the third from the new ruling Democratic Party of Japan. Legislators continue to wrestle with a parliament that seems designed more for the old single party system than for the new politics of alternating power. The “twisted Diet” may be with us for some time, but in 2011 it revealed a structural weakness that demands more attention from Japan’s politicians. An effort by the Liberal Democratic Party to vote then prime minister Naoto Kan out of office in June failed miserably, but it called attention to the fact that an opposition party could raid the ruling party in an effort to undermine the government.

Local politicians took center stage this year, however. From the governors of Tohoku responsible for Japan’s quake response to the local mayors in the devastated towns and cities along the coastline, local leaders were the heroes on the front line of disaster relief efforts in Miyagi, Iwate, and Fukushima prefectures. Okinawa’s intrepid governor, Hirokazu Nakaima, continued his efforts to articulate his constituents’ sentiments in the never ending saga of disconnect between Tokyo and Okinawa. As the year ended, a dramatic electoral victory in Osaka’s double election transformed a governor into a mayor. Once elected, Toru Hashimoto immediately took his cause of reimagining Osaka on the road, and visited politician after politician in Tokyo to alert them that local leaders served their constituents rather than the national decision-makers.

This year too was the year of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Operation Tomodachi, the U.S. name for its assistance to Japan after the Great East Japan Earthquake, was deeply appreciated, and almost all of us who visited Japan this year were thanked repeatedly and sincerely for the outpouring of U.S. aid, both public and private, in Japan’s time of need. For all of the political hiccups of the past couple of years, the Washington-Tokyo corridor was well traveled. Vice President Joseph Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta all visited Tokyo. All told, high level meetings between American and Japanese leaders totaled ten, with many of those occurring in the multiplicity of meetings in and around the Asia-Pacific.

Finally, 2011 has put the economy back on top of Japan’s priority list. The cost of rebuilding in the wake of the earthquake will be far greater than anyone initially imagined, especially if we include the cost of reorienting Japan’s energy policy away from its 30% reliance on nuclear power. The yen soared in value, a defining if uncomfortable reality for those in government and in business. The decision to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership topped the list of “to dos” on the diplomatic agenda, and the drive to open the Japanese economy, symbolized by Prime Minister Noda’s gamble on trade talks with Washington and its partners, brings back some divisive tensions within both of Japan’s political parties.

For all of the political and economic challenges that remain, I suspect that most Japanese will be grateful to see the end of 2011. 2012 will be a brighter year.

Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi (R) is accompanied by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to a conference room for their landmark summit in Pyongyang in this September 17, 2002 file photo (Japan Pool/Courtesy Reuters).

The sudden announcement of Kim Jong-il’s death yesterday came just as Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and his colleagues in the Democratic Party of Japan were to speak at an afternoon rally. The prime minister instead convened an emergency national security council meeting, and later in a statement to the press suggested a mix of concern and caution. Noda warned the Japanese people that instability on the Korean peninsula could be a factor in the days ahead.

In the early hours, this raised both economic and security concerns as the ripples of response around the region began to be felt. The initial market responses in Asia were erratic, with both South Korea’s Kospi and Japan’s Nikkei responding to the news. As the U.S. and South Korean militaries moved into defense readiness, Japan’s military, the Self Defense Forces, were also put on alert.

Tokyo will be working closely with Washington, and working to be part of a regional response to the death of Kim Jong-Il. Japan’s foreign minister Koichiro Genba is now in Washington, and will be meeting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Noda has already spoken to South Korean president Lee Myung-bak, who was just in Tokyo over the weekend. This trilateral coordination between Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington has a strong precedent when it comes to coping with North Korea. China too has agreed to share information on what is emerging.

Kim Jong-Il’s death raises many of the unresolved challenges Tokyo faces in its relations with North Korea. Kim Jong-Il presided over a complex effort to normalize relations with Tokyo, an effort that created deep domestic divisions within Japan over its erratic neighbor. The North Korean test of an intermediate range missile, the Taepodong, in 1998 began a rethinking in Tokyo of Japan’s strategy towards Pyongyang.

For a time, creative diplomacy seemed to offer the possibility of normalization between the two Northeast Asian nations. Former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2002 made a breakthrough visit to North Korea, concluding the Pyongyang Declaration with Kim Jong-Il that not only included a moratorium on future missile tests but also resulted in the acknowledgement and release of five Japanese citizens abducted by the NK regime since the 1970s. A second visit in 2004 brought home the family members of the previously released  Japanese abductees.

Koizumi’s effort to negotiate with Kim Jong-il fell short of normalization. Domestic outrage in Japan over the abductions effectively constrained the ability of the Japanese government to follow up on the promise of the Koizumi Cabinet’s Pyongyang Declaration. Moreover, the resumption of missile tests in July 2006—and of course the first nuclear test by North Korea in October 2006—prompted Japan to work closely with the United States, South Korea, and others at the United Nations to sanction Pyongyang.

Yesterday, the former prime minister made a rare public statement after hearing the news of Kim’s death. A grave Koizumi expressed his wish that Japan and North Korea had concluded their interrupted process of normalization while Kim Jong-Il was still alive, suggesting that the prospects for pursuing Japan’s interests with a new regime in the North could be even more difficult.

Also last night, the unresolved fate of twelve Japanese thought to have been abducted by North Korea returned to the forefront of Japan’s diplomacy with the North. Family members of several of the Japanese abductees visited the prime minister’s office to demand that Japan’s government continue its efforts to find them.

In these early hours of Japanese reaction to Kim Jong-il’s death, Prime Minister Noda ’s approach of working closely with Washington and Seoul to ensure Japan is prepared for any instability is wise. A well coordinated yet calm response is not only in Japan’s interests, but remains the best strategy for ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula as the region waits to see how events unfold within Pyongyang.

Defense Minister Yasuo Ichikawa, left, apologizes to Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima December 2, 2011 (Tadashi Mizowaki/Courtesy to the Asahi Shimbun).

It is difficult to write about the events of this week in Japan. There are moments that are simply inexplicable, and this is such a moment. Offensive statements by Japanese government officials have exacerbated the tense relations between the national government and the Okinawa governor.

For more than fifteen years now, the effort to reduce the footprint of U.S. forces in Okinawa, and to build a better understanding between local communities and U.S. forces there has been at the top of the U.S.-Japan alliance agenda.

The U.S. and Japanese governments have agreed on a plan to relocate Futenma Marine Air Station, and a new runway is to be built in the northern region of Okinawa for the use of Marine helicopters. The local city mayor has rejected the plan, however, and the governor has suggested that more main island Japanese communities share in the hosting of the U.S. military in Japan.

But officials in Tokyo are now embroiled in yet another controversy that has inflamed local sentiment, making it even less likely that the governor will be able—or willing—to work with the Ministry of Defense. If badly handled, this latest controversy could significantly weaken the Noda Cabinet.

So what happened?

The Ministry of Defense is preparing to initiate environmental assessment procedures that will call on Governor Hirokazu Nakaima to make a decision to approve or reject the construction of a runway on Camp Schwab. In an off-the-record evening with reporters, the Ministry’s director general in Okinawa, Satoshi Tanaka, reportedly said that Tokyo was preparing to force itself on Okinawa if necessary. The story that ran the next day alleged that Tanaka had used the word “rape,” and while there is some dispute over his choice of language, there seems to be little dispute over the import of his statement. The allegation that he referred to Tokyo’s intent this way has added shock value because of the horrific incident in 1995, when three U.S. military personnel were sentenced for the rape of a 12-year-old school girl. But at the very least, at a time when the country’s ministers for foreign affairs and defense have repeatedly visited Okinawa to ask for their understanding of Japan’s need to move forward with the bilateral agreement, the callousness of Tanaka’s statements have now poisoned the effort to build trust between the Noda government and Okinawa prefecture.

On Tuesday, an obviously angered Governor Nakaima refused to comment on the incident, claiming he would not lower himself to address the media report. On Wednesday, the minister of defense, Yasuo Ichikawa, announced that Tanaka had been removed from his post, and issued an apology. But he also added that the government would go forward with the submission of request for an environmental assessment for the runway as planned. The vice minister of defense, Kimito Nakae, quickly flew to Okinawa to apologize to the governor and the people of Okinawa.

But it got worse. On Thursday, in the Upper House, opposition lawmaker Masahisa Sato confronted the defense minister about the use of sexually offensive language. When Sato referred to the shocking 1995 rape that prompted island-wide demonstrations, Ichikawa looked confused and uncertain, prompting even further opposition questioning about his knowledge of the rape incident. In the end, Japan’s defense minister had to confess that he didn’t know all that much about it.

Yesterday, Minister Ichikawa flew to Okinawa to meet with Governor Nakaima. After listening to his apology for about eight minutes, Nakaima abruptly ended the conversation.

For now, the Okinawa public simply seems stunned. Outrage is likely to come in the days ahead, however. In Tokyo, opposition lawmakers across various parties are gearing up for a censure motion against the defense minister. If passed, this will effectively end Ichikawa’s ability to work on the Futenma relocation plan.

For more than a decade, officials on both sides of the U.S. and Japanese governments have worked hard to develop a plan to remove the irritants to Okinawa residents associated with the operations of U.S. forces there. The current plan in its broad conception reduces the number of U.S. Marines on the island by almost half, and would return more than 850 hectares of base land in the congested urban central region of the island to civilian use. Up until last week, the Japanese and U.S. governments were trying hard to persuade Okinawans that this would in the end dramatically reduce the U.S. military footprint, and ameliorate many of the issues that have confounded local governments.

Today, I doubt that anyone in Okinawa is willing to listen. The days and weeks ahead will provide a better sense of whether the policy conversation between the Noda Cabinet and the governor can be restored.

Ultimately, the prime minister will need to be decisive. These next few days are likely to determine the future of the U.S.-Japan effort to relocate Futenma.

South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak (front R) walks with Japan's Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda (front L) into the presidential Blue House before their meeting in Seoul October 19, 2011 (Kim Jae-hwan/Courtesy Reuters).

Japan’s prime minister Yoshihiko Noda has just completed a two-day visit to South Korea. Noda personally insisted on carrying with him five volumes of the 1,205 royal scrolls confiscated under Japanese colonial rule. Noda spent time with South Korean president Lee Myung-bak, and the tenor of the meeting suggested that the two Northeast Asian neighbors were determined to get their relations back on a more positive footing.

Economic relations were the highlight. Japan and South Korea agreed to a currency swap arrangement that sought to convey to markets that South Korea’s delicate won would have Japanese backing. Likewise, there is talk of Korean encouragement for greater Japanese foreign direct investment, yet another way for Japan to signal its confidence in a vibrant Korean economy.

Yet the real accomplishment was restarting bilateral talks on a Japan-South Korea free trade agreement. The effort to outline an FTA began in December 2003, but talks were suspended in November 2004. Japan was sensitive about its competition in agriculture, while South Korea worried about its auto market. The passage of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement this month may make this an easier discussion.

Japan’s Democratic Party arrived in power with a commitment to addressing some of the longstanding sore points in the relationship with South Korea, including the return of royal records from Korea’s Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910). Moreover, public sensitivities in Korea during the 100^th anniversary of Japan’s occupation of South Korea created a challenge for Tokyo in 2010.

Contemporary security concerns, however, also created new opportunities. Pyongyang’s use of force, first in the Cheonan sinking and then in the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, raised new fears of a conflict on the peninsula. By December 2010, U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton met with South Korean foreign and trade minister Kim Sung-hwan and Japanese foreign minister Seiji Maehara to produce the strongest joint statement of cooperation by the three countries ever. This led to a visit to South Korea for the first time by Japanese minister of defense Toshimi Kitazawa in January 2011, and the agreement to work with South Korea on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement that would allow Japanese cooperation in the case of a conflict on the peninsula.

Historical sensitivities re-emerged this year, however, related to the islands claimed by both countries. At one point, South Korea was so incensed that it refused entry to three Japanese conservative lawmakers who wanted to visit the region. When Prime Minister Noda was elected, he too drew Korean wrath for his past statements about the status of Japanese wartime leaders. South Korean ire seemed to wane, however, after Prime Minister Noda clearly stated that he would not reopen the Yasukuni Shrine issue.

This latest round of Japan-ROK summitry comes at an important time in the region’s diplomacy. South Korean president Lee has just returned from a tremendously successful state summit with President Obama, and there are the beginnings of signs of a new push to engage with North Korea on how to stabilize—and denuclearize—the Korean peninsula.

Japan too has great interest in restarting the trilateral conversation with Washington and Seoul. With U.S. secretary of defense Leon Panetta heading for both Tokyo and Seoul this week, Prime Minister Noda and President Lee’s ability to forge a positive and forward-looking agenda for the two U.S. allies will bring new energy to trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation.

Japan's new Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda speaks during a high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security at the United Nations headquarters in New York September 22, 2011 (Shannon Stapleton/Courtesy Reuters).

Japan’s newest prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda, arrived in the United States this week for his much anticipated first meeting with President Obama, and a debut at the UN General Assembly—the first conversation there since the March 11 earthquake-tsunami disaster struck.

U.S. officials seemed upbeat about the prime minister’s meeting with President Obama. Yet, media questioning about the infamous Futenma Marine base on Okinawa set off another round of speculation about the state of the relationship. Earlier in the week, at a George Washington University conference hosted by Professor Michael Mochizuki, the governor of Okinawa, Hirokazu Nakaima, laid out current political realities in Okinawa and argued the U.S.-Japan governments’ plan to relocate the marine airfield was too difficult to realize. The governor presented his thinking on how to proceed, a position that surprised few of us who have been watching Okinawa politics of late. Pressure is building again here in Washington, as Congressional budget cuts loom, and the governor spent some time on Capitol Hill with Senators Levin, McCain and Webb sharing his thoughts.

But Prime Minister Noda presented a broader—and more strategic—agenda during his New York visit.

He clearly articulated his priorities for Japan. In the public remarks before his private meeting with President Obama, Noda forcefully reminded us that his top priority is the recovery of Japan from the devastation of the great East Japan earthquake and the restoration of Japan’s economy. He thanked the United States for its support in the immediate aftermath of that tragedy, and singled out U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos for his tremendous effort in leading the U.S. response on the ground.

The prime minister startled some by speaking out on his immediate concerns about the global economy, saying he worried about a double dip recession. The need for the United States and Japan to help stabilize the global economy as they seek to address their own national economic needs was clearly on his mind. This week, as the specter of Greece’s default looms large, and as the volatility of global markets continues, Noda clearly understands the need for the United States, Japan, and Europe to find a common approach to avoid catastrophe.

The next day, at the UN High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security, Prime Minister Noda presented an update on the situation at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. He expects that cold shutdown of the reactors will be accomplished within this year, ahead of schedule, and thanked the 2,000 workers on the plant site who have made this possible. In addition, he outlined Japan’s reporting to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its efforts to analyze the accident, and its plans to convene an international conference next year co-hosted with the IAEA to announce the results of the analysis and “lessons learned.”

Nuclear safety reform is one of Japan’s top priorities, and Prime Minister Noda made it clear that he is committed to having Japan play a leading role in enhancing the safety of nuclear power generation worldwide. Reform of Japan’s own nuclear safety standards, and the oversight mechanisms for implementing them, will be completed in concert with the IAEA, and the development of the global capacity to respond to—as well as prevent—any future nuclear accidents will be strengthened. In addition, Japan’s prime minister made a personal pledge to continue to work with Washington and others on nonproliferation and nuclear security enhancements.

Let’s hope that Prime Minister Noda’s calm and clear articulation of his priorities, and of our bilateral agenda for cooperation, sets the tone for our next several months of alliance dialogue. Squabbling over Futenma is an indulgence we can no longer afford. We need a serious review of alternative options to solve this problem now so that Washington and Tokyo can turn their attention to their broader strategic agenda.