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      <title>Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</title>
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      <description>Table of Contents for Asian Politics &amp; Policy. List of articles from both the latest and EarlyView issues.</description>
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      <dc:title>Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</dc:title>
      <dc:publisher>Wiley</dc:publisher>
      <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
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         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70083?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-27T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
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         <title>International Crises and China's Technonationalist Strategies: Chiang Kai‐Shek's Prewar S&amp;T Planning versus Xi Jinping's Amid US‐PRC Rivalry</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
In China's search for modernization since the early twentieth century, international contingencies have served as the systemic catalyst that fostered the Chinese statist economic planning and aspirations in scientific and technological (S&amp;T) advancement. This points to an “outside‐in” trajectory. This paper examines two pivotal junctures of imminent national security challenges confronting China: (1) the Kuomintang (KMT) of the 1930s as Chiang Kai‐shek prepared for military struggles against Imperial Japan; and (2) the People's Republic of China (PRC) today under Xi Jinping and its techno‐security programs amidst heightening strategic competition with the United States. Though the nature of these structural shocks is vastly different, they are determinative of China's push for industrial and high‐tech self‐sufficiency. Both Chiang and Xi interpreted and responded to foreign stresses through an amalgamation of Chinese traditions and technonationalism. However, the extent of the state's propensity for a restrained or assertive strategic posture also matters.
摘要
二十世纪初以来, 中国探寻现代化进程, 而国际形势的变化一直是推动中国国家经济计划和科技发展雄心的系统性催化剂。这表明中国的发展路径是“由外而内”。本文考察了中国面临的两个关键国家安全挑战时期:(1)20世纪30年代蒋介石领导下的国民党, 以及(2)习近平领导下的中华人民共和国, 在与美国日益激烈的战略竞争中, 中国推行技术安全战略。尽管这些结构性冲击的性质截然不同, 但它们都决定了中国追求工业和高科技自给自足的进程。蒋介石和习近平都通过融合中国传统和技术民族主义来解读和应对外部压力。然而, 一个国家采取克制还是强硬的战略姿态的倾向程度也很重要。
Resumen
En la búsqueda de la modernización por parte de China desde principios del siglo XX, las contingencias internacionales han servido como catalizador sistémico que impulsó la planificación económica estatal china y sus aspiraciones en el avance científico y tecnológico (C&amp;T). Esto apunta a una trayectoria de afuera hacia adentro. Este artículo examina dos momentos cruciales de inminentes desafíos de seguridad nacional que enfrenta China: (1) el Kuomintang (KMT) de la década de 1930, cuando Chiang Kai‐shek se preparaba para la lucha militar contra el Japón imperial; y (2) la República Popular China (RPC) actual bajo Xi Jinping y sus programas de tecnoseguridad en medio de una creciente competencia estratégica con Estados Unidos. Si bien la naturaleza de estas conmociones estructurales es muy diferente, son determinantes para el impulso de China hacia la autosuficiencia industrial y de alta tecnología. Tanto Chiang como Xi interpretaron y respondieron a las presiones externas mediante una amalgama de tradiciones chinas y tecnonacionalismo. Sin embargo, también importa el grado de propensión del Estado a adoptar una postura estratégica moderada o asertiva.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In China's search for modernization since the early twentieth century, international contingencies have served as the systemic catalyst that fostered the Chinese statist economic planning and aspirations in scientific and technological (S&amp;amp;T) advancement. This points to an “outside-in” trajectory. This paper examines two pivotal junctures of imminent national security challenges confronting China: (1) the Kuomintang (KMT) of the 1930s as Chiang Kai-shek prepared for military struggles against Imperial Japan; and (2) the People's Republic of China (PRC) today under Xi Jinping and its techno-security programs amidst heightening strategic competition with the United States. Though the nature of these structural shocks is vastly different, they are determinative of China's push for industrial and high-tech self-sufficiency. Both Chiang and Xi interpreted and responded to foreign stresses through an amalgamation of Chinese traditions and technonationalism. However, the extent of the state's propensity for a restrained or assertive strategic posture also matters.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;摘要&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;二十世纪初以来, 中国探寻现代化进程, 而国际形势的变化一直是推动中国国家经济计划和科技发展雄心的系统性催化剂。这表明中国的发展路径是“由外而内”。本文考察了中国面临的两个关键国家安全挑战时期:(1)20世纪30年代蒋介石领导下的国民党, 以及(2)习近平领导下的中华人民共和国, 在与美国日益激烈的战略竞争中, 中国推行技术安全战略。尽管这些结构性冲击的性质截然不同, 但它们都决定了中国追求工业和高科技自给自足的进程。蒋介石和习近平都通过融合中国传统和技术民族主义来解读和应对外部压力。然而, 一个国家采取克制还是强硬的战略姿态的倾向程度也很重要。&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Resumen&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;En la búsqueda de la modernización por parte de China desde principios del siglo XX, las contingencias internacionales han servido como catalizador sistémico que impulsó la planificación económica estatal china y sus aspiraciones en el avance científico y tecnológico (C&amp;amp;T). Esto apunta a una trayectoria de afuera hacia adentro. Este artículo examina dos momentos cruciales de inminentes desafíos de seguridad nacional que enfrenta China: (1) el Kuomintang (KMT) de la década de 1930, cuando Chiang Kai-shek se preparaba para la lucha militar contra el Japón imperial; y (2) la República Popular China (RPC) actual bajo Xi Jinping y sus programas de tecnoseguridad en medio de una creciente competencia estratégica con Estados Unidos. Si bien la naturaleza de estas conmociones estructurales es muy diferente, son determinantes para el impulso de China hacia la autosuficiencia industrial y de alta tecnología. Tanto Chiang como Xi interpretaron y respondieron a las presiones externas mediante una amalgama de tradiciones chinas y tecnonacionalismo. Sin embargo, también importa el grado de propensión del Estado a adoptar una postura estratégica moderada o asertiva.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Dean P. Chen
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>International Crises and China's Technonationalist Strategies: Chiang Kai‐Shek's Prewar S&amp;T Planning versus Xi Jinping's Amid US‐PRC Rivalry</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70083</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70083</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70083?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70082?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-22T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
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         <title>The Guardian of the Votes? Purnawirawan Politics in Indonesia's 2024 National Legislative Elections</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
The trend of nominating retired military and police officers or "purnawirawan" as legislative candidates remains a persistent feature of Indonesian politics. This study examines the dynamic relationship between political parties and purnawirawan. We argue that pragmatism drives political parties' decision to appoint purnawirawan as national legislative candidates. The objectives of this research are twofold. First, it investigates the correlation between these purnawirawan's career background, including their personal networks, and the electoral strategies of political parties in national legislative elections. Second, our study identifies the conditions and contextual factors that motivate political parties to accommodate purnawirawan within their legislative campaign. A closer examination on the case of Perindo (Partai Persatuan Indonesia, Indonesian Unity Party) reveals the over promise and under delivery of purnawirawan in electoral politics as the high number of purnawirawan candidates failed to help the party surpass the 4% parliamentary threshold.
摘要
在印尼政坛, 提名“退役军警人员”(purnawirawan)作为立法候选人的趋势依然存在。本研究探讨了政党与退役军警人员之间的动态关系。我们认为, 实用主义是政党决定任命退役军警人员为国家立法候选人的主要驱动因素。本研究的目标有两个:首先, 考察这些退役军警人员的职业背景 (包括人脉关系) 与政党之间的关联, 以及这种关联如何影响政党在国家立法选举中的竞选策略；其次, 本研究旨在探究促使政党在其立法竞选活动中接纳退役军警人员的具体情况和细微性。我们对印尼团结党(Perindo)的案例进行了深度分析, 发现退役军警人员在选举政治中往往表现为过度承诺而未能兑现承诺, 因为尽管该党提名了大量退役军警人员候选人, 却未能帮助其跨越4%的议会门槛。
Resumen
La tendencia de nombrar a oficiales militares y policiales retirados, o purnawirawan, como candidatos legislativos persiste en la política indonesia. En este estudio, analizamos las dinámicas relaciones entre los partidos políticos y los exmilitares y policías. Sostenemos que el pragmatismo impulsa la decisión de los partidos políticos de nombrar purnawirawan como candidatos legislativos nacionales. Los objetivos de esta investigación son dos. Primero, examina la correlación entre la trayectoria profesional de estos purnawirawan, incluyendo sus redes personales, y la influencia de los partidos políticos en la configuración de su estrategia electoral para las elecciones legislativas nacionales. Segundo, nuestro estudio busca identificar las circunstancias y los matices que llevan a los partidos políticos a incorporar a los purnawirawan en sus campañas legislativas. Un análisis más detallado del caso del partido Perindo (Partai Persatuan Indonesia, Partido de la Unidad Indonesia) revela las promesas excesivas y el bajo rendimiento de los purnawirawan en la política electoral, ya que el elevado número de candidatos purnawirawan no logró que el partido superara el umbral parlamentario del cuatro por ciento.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The trend of nominating retired military and police officers or "&lt;i&gt;purnawirawan"&lt;/i&gt; as legislative candidates remains a persistent feature of Indonesian politics. This study examines the dynamic relationship between political parties and &lt;i&gt;purnawirawan&lt;/i&gt;. We argue that pragmatism drives political parties' decision to appoint &lt;i&gt;purnawirawan&lt;/i&gt; as national legislative candidates. The objectives of this research are twofold. First, it investigates the correlation between these &lt;i&gt;purnawirawan&lt;/i&gt;'s career background, including their personal networks, and the electoral strategies of political parties in national legislative elections. Second, our study identifies the conditions and contextual factors that motivate political parties to accommodate &lt;i&gt;purnawirawan&lt;/i&gt; within their legislative campaign. A closer examination on the case of Perindo (Partai Persatuan Indonesia, Indonesian Unity Party) reveals the over promise and under delivery of &lt;i&gt;purnawirawan&lt;/i&gt; in electoral politics as the high number of &lt;i&gt;purnawirawan&lt;/i&gt; candidates failed to help the party surpass the 4% parliamentary threshold.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;摘要&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;在印尼政坛, 提名“退役军警人员”(purnawirawan)作为立法候选人的趋势依然存在。本研究探讨了政党与退役军警人员之间的动态关系。我们认为, 实用主义是政党决定任命退役军警人员为国家立法候选人的主要驱动因素。本研究的目标有两个:首先, 考察这些退役军警人员的职业背景 (包括人脉关系) 与政党之间的关联, 以及这种关联如何影响政党在国家立法选举中的竞选策略；其次, 本研究旨在探究促使政党在其立法竞选活动中接纳退役军警人员的具体情况和细微性。我们对印尼团结党(Perindo)的案例进行了深度分析, 发现退役军警人员在选举政治中往往表现为过度承诺而未能兑现承诺, 因为尽管该党提名了大量退役军警人员候选人, 却未能帮助其跨越4%的议会门槛。&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Resumen&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;La tendencia de nombrar a oficiales militares y policiales retirados, o purnawirawan, como candidatos legislativos persiste en la política indonesia. En este estudio, analizamos las dinámicas relaciones entre los partidos políticos y los exmilitares y policías. Sostenemos que el pragmatismo impulsa la decisión de los partidos políticos de nombrar purnawirawan como candidatos legislativos nacionales. Los objetivos de esta investigación son dos. Primero, examina la correlación entre la trayectoria profesional de estos purnawirawan, incluyendo sus redes personales, y la influencia de los partidos políticos en la configuración de su estrategia electoral para las elecciones legislativas nacionales. Segundo, nuestro estudio busca identificar las circunstancias y los matices que llevan a los partidos políticos a incorporar a los purnawirawan en sus campañas legislativas. Un análisis más detallado del caso del partido Perindo (Partai Persatuan Indonesia, Partido de la Unidad Indonesia) revela las promesas excesivas y el bajo rendimiento de los purnawirawan en la política electoral, ya que el elevado número de candidatos purnawirawan no logró que el partido superara el umbral parlamentario del cuatro por ciento.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Adhi Priamarizki, 
Muhamad Haripin
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The Guardian of the Votes? Purnawirawan Politics in Indonesia's 2024 National Legislative Elections</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70082</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70082</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70082?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70073?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-22T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70073</guid>
         <title>Rearming Democracy: Japan's Defence Buildup Program and the European Union's ReArm Europe Plan</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
The paper looks a critical look at the parallel defence buildup plans of Japan (Defence Buildup Program/DBP) and the EU (ReArm 2030). The paper highlights how both allowed regional competitors to initiate negative shifts in relative power that undermine the security of both. In response, both Japan and the EU adopted a similar response of defence industrial expansion and enhancing long‐range, autonomous warfare capabilities, responding the economic and political realities of their respective societies. The paper also highlights the foreseeable difficulties in financing these plans in the long term, as well as the potential weaknesses introduced by post‐heroic, anti‐militarist attitudes in both Japan and the EU.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The paper looks a critical look at the parallel defence buildup plans of Japan (Defence Buildup Program/DBP) and the EU (ReArm &lt;i&gt;2030&lt;/i&gt;). The paper highlights how both allowed regional competitors to initiate negative shifts in relative power that undermine the security of both. In response, both Japan and the EU adopted a similar response of defence industrial expansion and enhancing long-range, autonomous warfare capabilities, responding the economic and political realities of their respective societies. The paper also highlights the foreseeable difficulties in financing these plans in the long term, as well as the potential weaknesses introduced by post-heroic, anti-militarist attitudes in both Japan and the EU.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Balazs Szanto
</dc:creator>
         <category>POLICY REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Rearming Democracy: Japan's Defence Buildup Program and the European Union's ReArm Europe Plan</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70073</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70073</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70073?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>POLICY REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70079?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-21T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70079</guid>
         <title>When the Middle East Burns, Asia Pays</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Aries A. Arugay
</dc:creator>
         <category>INTRODUCTION</category>
         <dc:title>When the Middle East Burns, Asia Pays</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70079</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70079</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70079?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>INTRODUCTION</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70081?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-20T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70081</guid>
         <title>Incumbency Advantage and the Role of Political Parties in the Electoral Authoritarianism: Evidence From Hong Kong Legislative Council Election (1998–2016)</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
This study reframes Hong Kong's Legislative Council geographical constituency elections as a case of limited competition produced by institutional design. Using candidate‐level data, we examine how organizational resources and competition structure shape electoral outcomes under a mixed system that combines proportional representation in GCs with functional constituencies. This study finds a strong incumbency effect present but it operates as a background regularity rather than the decisive mechanism. Secondly, party organizational capacity matters asymmetrically: larger grassroots networks—as proxied by the number of same‐party District Council members—are positively associated with winning, while greater same‐party LegCo strength exhibits diminishing, consistent with elite crowding and intra‐camp competition. Third, increasing party fragmentation and candidate crowding depress overall winning probabilities, indicating systemic constraints on entry and cross‐party evaluation. The analysis provides a historical trend for understanding electoral dynamics in a hybrid regime and offers comparable evidence on how institutional rules and meso‐level party infrastructures structure competition.
摘要
本研究将香港立法会地方直选重新定位为由制度设计塑造的有限竞争案例。基于候选人层级数据, 考察在比例代表制地区直选和功能界别并行的混合选举体制下, 组织资源和竞争结构如何影响选举结果。研究发现, 第一， 在任者优势虽然显著, 但更多地体现为一种背景规律, 而非决定选举胜负的关键机制。其次, 政党组织能力的影响是不对称的:以同党区议员人数衡量的基层网络规模与胜选概率正向关联, 而同一政党立法会议席的增加则呈现边际递减效应, 反映出精英聚集和党内竞争的张力。第三, 政党碎片化程度加深和候选人数量增多均显著降低整体获胜概率, 表明制度环境对政治进入和跨阵营竞争构成系统性约束。本研究为理解混合政体下的选举动态提供了历史性分析视角, 并就制度规则与中观层面政党基础设施如何塑造选举竞争提供了可比证据。
Resumen
Este estudio replantea las elecciones de circunscripciones geográficas del Consejo Legislativo de Hong Kong como un caso de competencia limitada derivada del diseño institucional. Utilizando datos a nivel de candidato, examinamos cómo los recursos organizativos y la estructura de la competencia influyen en los resultados electorales bajo un sistema mixto que combina la representación proporcional en las circunscripciones geográficas con circunscripciones funcionales. Este estudio revela un fuerte efecto de la incumbencia, pero este opera como una regularidad subyacente en lugar del mecanismo decisivo. En segundo lugar, la capacidad organizativa del partido tiene una importancia asimétrica: las redes de base más amplias—aproximadas por el número de miembros del Consejo de Distrito del mismo partido—se asocian positivamente con la victoria, mientras que una mayor fortaleza del Consejo Legislativo del mismo partido muestra una relación decreciente, en consonancia con la concentración de élites y la competencia interna. En tercer lugar, la creciente fragmentación de los partidos y la concentración de candidatos reducen las probabilidades generales de victoria, lo que indica limitaciones sistémicas para la entrada y la evaluación entre partidos. El análisis proporciona una tendencia histórica para comprender la dinámica electoral en un régimen híbrido y ofrece evidencia comparable sobre cómo las reglas institucionales y las infraestructuras de los partidos a nivel meso estructuran la competencia.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This study reframes Hong Kong's Legislative Council geographical constituency elections as a case of limited competition produced by institutional design. Using candidate-level data, we examine how organizational resources and competition structure shape electoral outcomes under a mixed system that combines proportional representation in GCs with functional constituencies. This study finds a strong incumbency effect present but it operates as a background regularity rather than the decisive mechanism. Secondly, party organizational capacity matters asymmetrically: larger grassroots networks—as proxied by the number of same-party District Council members—are positively associated with winning, while greater same-party LegCo strength exhibits diminishing, consistent with elite crowding and intra-camp competition. Third, increasing party fragmentation and candidate crowding depress overall winning probabilities, indicating systemic constraints on entry and cross-party evaluation. The analysis provides a historical trend for understanding electoral dynamics in a hybrid regime and offers comparable evidence on how institutional rules and meso-level party infrastructures structure competition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;摘要&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;本研究将香港立法会地方直选重新定位为由制度设计塑造的有限竞争案例。基于候选人层级数据, 考察在比例代表制地区直选和功能界别并行的混合选举体制下, 组织资源和竞争结构如何影响选举结果。研究发现, 第一， 在任者优势虽然显著, 但更多地体现为一种背景规律, 而非决定选举胜负的关键机制。其次, 政党组织能力的影响是不对称的:以同党区议员人数衡量的基层网络规模与胜选概率正向关联, 而同一政党立法会议席的增加则呈现边际递减效应, 反映出精英聚集和党内竞争的张力。第三, 政党碎片化程度加深和候选人数量增多均显著降低整体获胜概率, 表明制度环境对政治进入和跨阵营竞争构成系统性约束。本研究为理解混合政体下的选举动态提供了历史性分析视角, 并就制度规则与中观层面政党基础设施如何塑造选举竞争提供了可比证据。&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Resumen&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Este estudio replantea las elecciones de circunscripciones geográficas del Consejo Legislativo de Hong Kong como un caso de competencia limitada derivada del diseño institucional. Utilizando datos a nivel de candidato, examinamos cómo los recursos organizativos y la estructura de la competencia influyen en los resultados electorales bajo un sistema mixto que combina la representación proporcional en las circunscripciones geográficas con circunscripciones funcionales. Este estudio revela un fuerte efecto de la incumbencia, pero este opera como una regularidad subyacente en lugar del mecanismo decisivo. En segundo lugar, la capacidad organizativa del partido tiene una importancia asimétrica: las redes de base más amplias—aproximadas por el número de miembros del Consejo de Distrito del mismo partido—se asocian positivamente con la victoria, mientras que una mayor fortaleza del Consejo Legislativo del mismo partido muestra una relación decreciente, en consonancia con la concentración de élites y la competencia interna. En tercer lugar, la creciente fragmentación de los partidos y la concentración de candidatos reducen las probabilidades generales de victoria, lo que indica limitaciones sistémicas para la entrada y la evaluación entre partidos. El análisis proporciona una tendencia histórica para comprender la dinámica electoral en un régimen híbrido y ofrece evidencia comparable sobre cómo las reglas institucionales y las infraestructuras de los partidos a nivel meso estructuran la competencia.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Pei ZHI, 
Fen LIN
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Incumbency Advantage and the Role of Political Parties in the Electoral Authoritarianism: Evidence From Hong Kong Legislative Council Election (1998–2016)</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70081</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70081</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70081?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70084?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-20T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70084</guid>
         <title>How Do Emerging Powers Advocate Multilateralism? Examining India's Participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and G20</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
States vary their participation in multilateral institutions based on strategic objectives. This paper explores how emerging powers adopt different participation strategies in multilateral institutions, arguing that they selectively prioritize institutions where they can act as key coordinators to elevate their international status. Agenda‐setting power, support from major states, and the degree of internal rivalry help explain an emerging power's level of engagement. Using India as a case study, this paper analyzes its diplomatic shift from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to the G20. While initially active in the SCO, India's interest subsided as Russian support waned and rivalries with China and Pakistan intensified. Conversely, India was more engaged in the G20 due to strong agenda‐setting power and low rivalry. Support from major G20 members bolstered India's leadership, allowing it to successfully bridge the interests between the G20 and the Global South.
摘要
各国参与多边机构的程度取决于其战略目标。本文探讨了新兴大国如何在多边机构中采取不同的参与策略, 并指出它们会选择性地优先参与那些能够使其发挥关键协调作用、提升自身国际地位的机构。议程设置能力、主要国家的支持、以及内部竞争程度有助于解释新兴大国的参与程度。本文以印度为例, 分析了其从上海合作组织 (上合组织) 到二十国集团(G20)的外交立場转变。印度最初积极参与上合组织, 但随着俄罗斯支持的减弱以及与中国和巴基斯坦的竞争加剧, 其参与興趣也随之下降。相反, 由于强大的议程设置能力和较低的内部竞争程度, 印度在二十国集团中更加积极。二十国集团主要成员国的支持巩固了印度的领导地位, 使其能够成功地在二十国集团和全球南方国家之间搭建桥梁。
Resumen
Los Estados varían su participación en las instituciones multilaterales en función de sus objetivos estratégicos. Este documento explora cómo las potencias emergentes adoptan diferentes estrategias de participación en dichas instituciones, argumentando que priorizan selectivamente aquellas en las que pueden actuar como coordinadores clave para elevar su estatus internacional. El poder de influencia en la agenda, el apoyo de los principales Estados y el grado de rivalidad interna ayudan a explicar el nivel de compromiso de una potencia emergente. Tomando a la India como caso de estudio, este documento analiza su transición diplomática de la Organización de Cooperación de Shanghái (OCS) al G20. Si bien inicialmente fue activa en la OCS, el interés de la India disminuyó a medida que el apoyo ruso se debilitó y las rivalidades con China y Pakistán se intensificaron. Por el contrario, la India se involucró más en el G20 debido a su fuerte poder de influencia en la agenda y la baja rivalidad. El apoyo de los principales miembros del G20 reforzó el liderazgo de la India, permitiéndole tender puentes de interés entre el G20 y el Sur Global.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;States vary their participation in multilateral institutions based on strategic objectives. This paper explores how emerging powers adopt different participation strategies in multilateral institutions, arguing that they selectively prioritize institutions where they can act as key coordinators to elevate their international status. Agenda-setting power, support from major states, and the degree of internal rivalry help explain an emerging power's level of engagement. Using India as a case study, this paper analyzes its diplomatic shift from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to the G20. While initially active in the SCO, India's interest subsided as Russian support waned and rivalries with China and Pakistan intensified. Conversely, India was more engaged in the G20 due to strong agenda-setting power and low rivalry. Support from major G20 members bolstered India's leadership, allowing it to successfully bridge the interests between the G20 and the Global South.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;摘要&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;各国参与多边机构的程度取决于其战略目标。本文探讨了新兴大国如何在多边机构中采取不同的参与策略, 并指出它们会选择性地优先参与那些能够使其发挥关键协调作用、提升自身国际地位的机构。议程设置能力、主要国家的支持、以及内部竞争程度有助于解释新兴大国的参与程度。本文以印度为例, 分析了其从上海合作组织 (上合组织) 到二十国集团(G20)的外交立場转变。印度最初积极参与上合组织, 但随着俄罗斯支持的减弱以及与中国和巴基斯坦的竞争加剧, 其参与興趣也随之下降。相反, 由于强大的议程设置能力和较低的内部竞争程度, 印度在二十国集团中更加积极。二十国集团主要成员国的支持巩固了印度的领导地位, 使其能够成功地在二十国集团和全球南方国家之间搭建桥梁。&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Resumen&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Los Estados varían su participación en las instituciones multilaterales en función de sus objetivos estratégicos. Este documento explora cómo las potencias emergentes adoptan diferentes estrategias de participación en dichas instituciones, argumentando que priorizan selectivamente aquellas en las que pueden actuar como coordinadores clave para elevar su estatus internacional. El poder de influencia en la agenda, el apoyo de los principales Estados y el grado de rivalidad interna ayudan a explicar el nivel de compromiso de una potencia emergente. Tomando a la India como caso de estudio, este documento analiza su transición diplomática de la Organización de Cooperación de Shanghái (OCS) al G20. Si bien inicialmente fue activa en la OCS, el interés de la India disminuyó a medida que el apoyo ruso se debilitó y las rivalidades con China y Pakistán se intensificaron. Por el contrario, la India se involucró más en el G20 debido a su fuerte poder de influencia en la agenda y la baja rivalidad. El apoyo de los principales miembros del G20 reforzó el liderazgo de la India, permitiéndole tender puentes de interés entre el G20 y el Sur Global.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Ping‐Kuei Chen
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>How Do Emerging Powers Advocate Multilateralism? Examining India's Participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and G20</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70084</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70084</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70084?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70080?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-19T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70080</guid>
         <title>The Role of Political Ideology in Shaping South Korea's Foreign Policy and Its Implications</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
South Korea's foreign policy toward its neighbors frequently shifts when there is a leadership change from one ideological group to another. For instance, when power shifts from progressives to conservatives, South Korea's relations with the United States and Japan tend to improve while its ties with China and North Korea deteriorates. In contrast, when progressive administration takes office, South Korea's stance is often reversed. As such, this article demonstrates the critical role of ideology in shaping South Korea's foreign policy. Furthermore, it examines the implications of these policy swings: frequent shifts in South Korea's stance toward its neighbors, depending on the ruling administration's political orientation, may undermine the state's reliability, leading its neighbors to hesitate before making agreements or pursuing long‐term relations. For an in‐depth investigation, the author reviews South Korea's relations with four of its neighbors—the United States, China, Japan, and North Korea.
摘要
韩国对邻国的外交政策经常随着领导层意识形态的更迭而发生变化。例如, 当政权从进步派转移到保守派时, 韩国与美国和日本的关系往往会改善, 而与中国和朝鲜的关系则会恶化。相反, 当进步派政府上台时, 韩国的立场往往会发生逆转。因此, 本文旨在阐明意识形态在影响韩国外交政策中的关键作用。此外, 本文还探讨了这些政策摇摆的影响:韩国对邻国的立场频繁变化, 取决于执政政府的政治倾向, 这可能会损害韩国的国家信誉, 导致邻国在达成协议或建立长期关系时犹豫不决。为了深入分析这一问题, 作者述评了韩国与其四个邻国——美国、中国、日本和朝鲜——的关系。
Resumen
La política exterior de Corea del Sur hacia sus vecinos suele variar cuando se produce un cambio de liderazgo entre grupos ideológicos. Por ejemplo, cuando el poder pasa de los progresistas a los conservadores, las relaciones de Corea del Sur con Estados Unidos y Japón tienden a mejorar, mientras que sus lazos con China y Corea del Norte se deterioran. Por el contrario, cuando una administración progresista asume el poder, la postura de Corea del Sur suele invertirse. En este sentido, este artículo demuestra el papel fundamental de la ideología en la configuración de la política exterior surcoreana. Además, examina las implicaciones de estos cambios de política: las frecuentes variaciones en la postura de Corea del Sur hacia sus vecinos, dependiendo de la orientación política del gobierno de turno, pueden socavar la fiabilidad del Estado, lo que lleva a sus vecinos a dudar antes de firmar acuerdos o entablar relaciones a largo plazo. Para un análisis exhaustivo, el autor revisa las relaciones de Corea del Sur con cuatro de sus vecinos: Estados Unidos, China, Japón y Corea del Norte.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;South Korea's foreign policy toward its neighbors frequently shifts when there is a leadership change from one ideological group to another. For instance, when power shifts from progressives to conservatives, South Korea's relations with the United States and Japan tend to improve while its ties with China and North Korea deteriorates. In contrast, when progressive administration takes office, South Korea's stance is often reversed. As such, this article demonstrates the critical role of ideology in shaping South Korea's foreign policy. Furthermore, it examines the implications of these policy swings: frequent shifts in South Korea's stance toward its neighbors, depending on the ruling administration's political orientation, may undermine the state's reliability, leading its neighbors to hesitate before making agreements or pursuing long-term relations. For an in-depth investigation, the author reviews South Korea's relations with four of its neighbors—the United States, China, Japan, and North Korea.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;摘要&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;韩国对邻国的外交政策经常随着领导层意识形态的更迭而发生变化。例如, 当政权从进步派转移到保守派时, 韩国与美国和日本的关系往往会改善, 而与中国和朝鲜的关系则会恶化。相反, 当进步派政府上台时, 韩国的立场往往会发生逆转。因此, 本文旨在阐明意识形态在影响韩国外交政策中的关键作用。此外, 本文还探讨了这些政策摇摆的影响:韩国对邻国的立场频繁变化, 取决于执政政府的政治倾向, 这可能会损害韩国的国家信誉, 导致邻国在达成协议或建立长期关系时犹豫不决。为了深入分析这一问题, 作者述评了韩国与其四个邻国——美国、中国、日本和朝鲜——的关系。&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Resumen&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;La política exterior de Corea del Sur hacia sus vecinos suele variar cuando se produce un cambio de liderazgo entre grupos ideológicos. Por ejemplo, cuando el poder pasa de los progresistas a los conservadores, las relaciones de Corea del Sur con Estados Unidos y Japón tienden a mejorar, mientras que sus lazos con China y Corea del Norte se deterioran. Por el contrario, cuando una administración progresista asume el poder, la postura de Corea del Sur suele invertirse. En este sentido, este artículo demuestra el papel fundamental de la ideología en la configuración de la política exterior surcoreana. Además, examina las implicaciones de estos cambios de política: las frecuentes variaciones en la postura de Corea del Sur hacia sus vecinos, dependiendo de la orientación política del gobierno de turno, pueden socavar la fiabilidad del Estado, lo que lleva a sus vecinos a dudar antes de firmar acuerdos o entablar relaciones a largo plazo. Para un análisis exhaustivo, el autor revisa las relaciones de Corea del Sur con cuatro de sus vecinos: Estados Unidos, China, Japón y Corea del Norte.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Alec Chung
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The Role of Political Ideology in Shaping South Korea's Foreign Policy and Its Implications</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70080</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70080</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70080?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70078?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-10T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70078</guid>
         <title>Strategic Minilateralism and the Regional Security Architecture of the Indo‐Pacific: The Quad, AUKUS, and the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, By 
Thomas S. Wilkins, Palgrave Macmillan 2025</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Yee‐Kuang Heng
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Strategic Minilateralism and the Regional Security Architecture of the Indo‐Pacific: The Quad, AUKUS, and the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, By 
Thomas S. Wilkins, Palgrave Macmillan 2025</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70078</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70078</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70078?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70070?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-07T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70070</guid>
         <title>The Penchant for Technology in Non‐Democratic Elections: Evidence From Hong Kong's Digital Authoritarianism</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
To complement the emergent inquiry into the threats and opportunities that new technologies pose to political institutions and behavior, this study draws on the emergent scholarly literature on Digital Authoritarianism to shed light on the factors leading to Hong Kong's newly acquired penchant for adopting the digital and information technologies to bring about effective social control in general and the adoption of such tools throughout the course of three electoral cycles that are neither free nor fair. Tracking through the drivers for technological innovations, as exemplified by the patterns of law enforcement, policy papers, budgetary provisions, and judicial rulings over the past 5 years, we argue that as the regime has become increasingly capable of devising new modes of pre‐emptive intimidation and by extension, more targeted forms of surveillance, its technological optimism is paradoxically met with a serious deficit of trust in the system of “patriots only” governance.
摘要
来自香港数字威权主义的证据 摘要 为了补充关于“新技术给政治制度和行为带来的威胁与机遇”的新兴研究, 本研究借鉴了数字威权主义领域的新兴学术文献, 旨在阐明导致香港近期偏好采用数字和信息技术以实现有效社会控制的因素, 以及在三个既不自由也不公正的选举周期中运用此类工具的原因。通过追踪过去五年执法模式、政策文件、预算拨款和司法判决等技术创新驱动因素, 我们认为, 随着该政权越来越有能力设计新的先发制人恐吓模式, 并进而实施更有针对性的监控, 其对技术的乐观态度却与民众对“爱国者至上”治理体系的严重信任缺失形成了悖论。 关键词:数字威权主义, 选举诚信, 投票保密, 信任, 香港
Resumen
La predilección por la tecnología en las elecciones no democráticas: evidencia del autoritarismo digital de Hong Kong Resumen Para complementar la investigación emergente sobre las amenazas y oportunidades que las nuevas tecnologías plantean a las instituciones y el comportamiento político, este estudio se basa en la literatura académica emergente sobre el autoritarismo digital para esclarecer los factores que llevaron a la reciente inclinación de Hong Kong por adoptar las tecnologías digitales y de la información para lograr un control social efectivo en general, y la adopción de dichas herramientas a lo largo de tres ciclos electorales que no fueron ni libres ni justos. Analizando los impulsores de las innovaciones tecnológicas, ejemplificados por los patrones de aplicación de la ley, los documentos de política, las disposiciones presupuestarias y las resoluciones judiciales de los últimos cinco años, sostenemos que, a medida que el régimen se ha vuelto cada vez más capaz de idear nuevos modos de intimidación preventiva y, por extensión, formas de vigilancia más selectivas, su optimismo tecnológico se topa paradójicamente con una grave falta de confianza en el sistema de gobierno de "solo patriotas". Palabras clave: Autoritarismo digital, Integridad electoral, Secreto del voto, Confianza, Hong Kong
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To complement the emergent inquiry into the threats and opportunities that new technologies pose to political institutions and behavior, this study draws on the emergent scholarly literature on Digital Authoritarianism to shed light on the factors leading to Hong Kong's newly acquired penchant for adopting the digital and information technologies to bring about effective social control in general and the adoption of such tools throughout the course of three electoral cycles that are neither free nor fair. Tracking through the drivers for technological innovations, as exemplified by the patterns of law enforcement, policy papers, budgetary provisions, and judicial rulings over the past 5 years, we argue that as the regime has become increasingly capable of devising new modes of pre-emptive intimidation and by extension, more targeted forms of surveillance, its technological optimism is paradoxically met with a serious deficit of trust in the system of “patriots only” governance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;摘要&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;来自香港数字威权主义的证据 摘要 为了补充关于“新技术给政治制度和行为带来的威胁与机遇”的新兴研究, 本研究借鉴了数字威权主义领域的新兴学术文献, 旨在阐明导致香港近期偏好采用数字和信息技术以实现有效社会控制的因素, 以及在三个既不自由也不公正的选举周期中运用此类工具的原因。通过追踪过去五年执法模式、政策文件、预算拨款和司法判决等技术创新驱动因素, 我们认为, 随着该政权越来越有能力设计新的先发制人恐吓模式, 并进而实施更有针对性的监控, 其对技术的乐观态度却与民众对“爱国者至上”治理体系的严重信任缺失形成了悖论。 关键词:数字威权主义, 选举诚信, 投票保密, 信任, 香港&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Resumen&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;La predilección por la tecnología en las elecciones no democráticas: evidencia del autoritarismo digital de Hong Kong Resumen Para complementar la investigación emergente sobre las amenazas y oportunidades que las nuevas tecnologías plantean a las instituciones y el comportamiento político, este estudio se basa en la literatura académica emergente sobre el autoritarismo digital para esclarecer los factores que llevaron a la reciente inclinación de Hong Kong por adoptar las tecnologías digitales y de la información para lograr un control social efectivo en general, y la adopción de dichas herramientas a lo largo de tres ciclos electorales que no fueron ni libres ni justos. Analizando los impulsores de las innovaciones tecnológicas, ejemplificados por los patrones de aplicación de la ley, los documentos de política, las disposiciones presupuestarias y las resoluciones judiciales de los últimos cinco años, sostenemos que, a medida que el régimen se ha vuelto cada vez más capaz de idear nuevos modos de intimidación preventiva y, por extensión, formas de vigilancia más selectivas, su optimismo tecnológico se topa paradójicamente con una grave falta de confianza en el sistema de gobierno de "solo patriotas". Palabras clave: Autoritarismo digital, Integridad electoral, Secreto del voto, Confianza, Hong Kong&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Kenneth Ka‐Lok Chan
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The Penchant for Technology in Non‐Democratic Elections: Evidence From Hong Kong's Digital Authoritarianism</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70070</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70070</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70070?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70071?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-07T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70071</guid>
         <title>Blurring Lines: The Role of Security Forces in Indonesia's Civil Sectors During the COVID‐19 Pandemic</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
This study examines Indonesia's securitized response to the COVID‐19 pandemic, driven by concerns over economic instability and state function disruptions. Using securitization theory, it analyzes governance mechanisms and the expanded roles of security forces, including the military, police, and intelligence agencies. The deployment of security personnel to enforce health protocols, maintain public order, and prioritize economic recovery over public health raises concerns about the normalization of security roles in civilian sectors. This article critiques the broader implications of this trend, particularly its impact on human‐centered governance, civil liberties, and democratic principles. It highlights the challenges of balancing public health priorities, economic stability, and governance within a securitized framework, questioning the long‐term consequences of this approach on Indonesia's democratic resilience.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This study examines Indonesia's securitized response to the COVID-19 pandemic, driven by concerns over economic instability and state function disruptions. Using securitization theory, it analyzes governance mechanisms and the expanded roles of security forces, including the military, police, and intelligence agencies. The deployment of security personnel to enforce health protocols, maintain public order, and prioritize economic recovery over public health raises concerns about the normalization of security roles in civilian sectors. This article critiques the broader implications of this trend, particularly its impact on human-centered governance, civil liberties, and democratic principles. It highlights the challenges of balancing public health priorities, economic stability, and governance within a securitized framework, questioning the long-term consequences of this approach on Indonesia's democratic resilience.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Rosita Dewi, 
Putri Ariza Kristimanta, 
Sarah Nuraini Siregar, 
Mario Surya Ramadhan
</dc:creator>
         <category>POLICY REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Blurring Lines: The Role of Security Forces in Indonesia's Civil Sectors During the COVID‐19 Pandemic</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70071</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70071</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70071?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>POLICY REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70077?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-06T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70077</guid>
         <title>Envisioning a Transition Towards a Circular Economy for Plastics: Policy Narratives in the Extended Producer Responsibility Regulations of the Philippines and Vietnam</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
This article explores the policy narratives that shape the development and early implementation of extended producer responsibility (EPR) regulations in the Philippines and Vietnam, with particular attention to their role in circular economy (CE) transitions for plastics. Using the Narrative Policy Framework, it examines how stakeholders articulate narratives of environmental protection, resource efficiency, economic competitiveness, and social inclusion. Based on interviews and documentary analysis, it finds that EPR is widely framed as a vehicle for CE principles, but narratives diverge in scope and emphasis across the two cases. These differences reflect variation in institutional capacity, stakeholder influence, and the role of informal actors. The findings point to the need for a more holistic and inclusive approach to EPR, grounded in proactive policymaking and stronger attention to social equity. The article contributes to debates on environmental governance in developing countries by showing how policy narratives shape the trajectories of CE transitions.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This article explores the policy narratives that shape the development and early implementation of extended producer responsibility (EPR) regulations in the Philippines and Vietnam, with particular attention to their role in circular economy (CE) transitions for plastics. Using the Narrative Policy Framework, it examines how stakeholders articulate narratives of environmental protection, resource efficiency, economic competitiveness, and social inclusion. Based on interviews and documentary analysis, it finds that EPR is widely framed as a vehicle for CE principles, but narratives diverge in scope and emphasis across the two cases. These differences reflect variation in institutional capacity, stakeholder influence, and the role of informal actors. The findings point to the need for a more holistic and inclusive approach to EPR, grounded in proactive policymaking and stronger attention to social equity. The article contributes to debates on environmental governance in developing countries by showing how policy narratives shape the trajectories of CE transitions.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Ferth Vandensteen Manaysay
</dc:creator>
         <category>POLICY REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Envisioning a Transition Towards a Circular Economy for Plastics: Policy Narratives in the Extended Producer Responsibility Regulations of the Philippines and Vietnam</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70077</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70077</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70077?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>POLICY REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70072?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-05T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70072</guid>
         <title>Quiet Coupling, Vocal Stalemate: Comparative‐Discursive Analysis of LGBTQ+ Policy Agendas in Thailand and the Philippines</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
The policy review examines why comparable LGBTQ+ rights agendas exhibit divergent trajectories despite technically robust policy proposals. Using a discursively reconfigured Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), this analysis draws insights from Thailand's Marriage Equality Law, as well as the stalled SOGIESC Equality Bill in the Philippines. Findings reveal that Thailand's agenda progressed due to a suspected permissive ideological condition that favors technocratic framing, resulting in minimal public backlash. In contrast, Philippine legislation is hindered by a religiously charged moral discourse, preventing the streams from achieving “coupling”. These distinct backdrops shape policy receptivity, underscoring the need for policy analyses to account for the ideological conditions within which agendas unfold. Thus, the review suggests recalibrating rights‐based language in the Philippines to culturally resonant frames and further deepening Thailand's inclusion agenda beyond legal formalism. Most importantly, agenda success hinges on flexible, context‐aware framing that resonates with domestic conditions and realities.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The policy review examines why comparable LGBTQ+ rights agendas exhibit divergent trajectories despite technically robust policy proposals. Using a discursively reconfigured Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), this analysis draws insights from Thailand's Marriage Equality Law, as well as the stalled SOGIESC Equality Bill in the Philippines. Findings reveal that Thailand's agenda progressed due to a suspected permissive ideological condition that favors technocratic framing, resulting in minimal public backlash. In contrast, Philippine legislation is hindered by a religiously charged moral discourse, preventing the streams from achieving “coupling”. These distinct backdrops shape policy receptivity, underscoring the need for policy analyses to account for the ideological conditions within which agendas unfold. Thus, the review suggests recalibrating rights-based language in the Philippines to culturally resonant frames and further deepening Thailand's inclusion agenda beyond legal formalism. Most importantly, agenda success hinges on flexible, context-aware framing that resonates with domestic conditions and realities.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Clyde Andaya Maningo
</dc:creator>
         <category>POLICY REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Quiet Coupling, Vocal Stalemate: Comparative‐Discursive Analysis of LGBTQ+ Policy Agendas in Thailand and the Philippines</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70072</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70072</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70072?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>POLICY REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70074?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-05T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70074</guid>
         <title>Navigating Power Rivalry: Small South Asian States in China–India Competition</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
As China's influence expands in South Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), small states face the challenge of navigating Sino‐Indian rivalry. While there is erstwhile work on the implications of this growing Sino‐India rivalry on South Asia, there is limited analysis of how small South Asian states have been adjusting their foreign policies. This study examines how small states have adapted their strategies since the BRI's initiation in 2013. This study argues that there is a shift from traditional bandwagoning with India to hedging between India and China. By leveraging Chinese economic investments and India's strategic ties, such states pursue strategic autonomy, maximizing economic benefits while minimizing dependency. Understanding these evolving strategies offers insights into the agency of small states by demonstrating their ability to operate between major powers by safeguarding their national interests.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As China's influence expands in South Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), small states face the challenge of navigating Sino-Indian rivalry. While there is erstwhile work on the implications of this growing Sino-India rivalry on South Asia, there is limited analysis of how small South Asian states have been adjusting their foreign policies. This study examines how small states have adapted their strategies since the BRI's initiation in 2013. This study argues that there is a shift from traditional bandwagoning with India to hedging between India and China. By leveraging Chinese economic investments and India's strategic ties, such states pursue strategic autonomy, maximizing economic benefits while minimizing dependency. Understanding these evolving strategies offers insights into the agency of small states by demonstrating their ability to operate between major powers by safeguarding their national interests.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Zahid Shahab Ahmed, 
Salman Ali Bettani
</dc:creator>
         <category>POLICY REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Navigating Power Rivalry: Small South Asian States in China–India Competition</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70074</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70074</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70074?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>POLICY REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70075?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-05T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70075</guid>
         <title>Can Small States Overturn the Negotiating Table? A Case Study of Malaysia's Agency Vis‐À‐Vis China in the ECRL Project</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
Conventional wisdom argues that more powerful states inevitably dictate the foreign policy of small states, but there is a growing body of evidence that suggests otherwise. This paper argues that small states, like Malaysia, can still exercise agency when interacting with bigger states. Using the renegotiation of the East Coast Railway Link (ECRL) as a case study, this paper examines how Malaysia exercises its agency and elucidates several factors that increased Malaysia's bargaining power. First, Malaysia holds intrinsic value for China. Second, the ECRL's status as a key project in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) lends it wider geopolitical significance. Third, the purpose of the ECRL as an alternative trade route creates a significant ongoing economic imperative for China to see the project concluded successfully. Furthermore, Malaysia's ability to cultivate positive relationships with other major powers through the adept political leadership of Mahathir increases the country's leverage.</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conventional wisdom argues that more powerful states inevitably dictate the foreign policy of small states, but there is a growing body of evidence that suggests otherwise. This paper argues that small states, like Malaysia, can still exercise agency when interacting with bigger states. Using the renegotiation of the East Coast Railway Link (ECRL) as a case study, this paper examines how Malaysia exercises its agency and elucidates several factors that increased Malaysia's bargaining power. First, Malaysia holds intrinsic value for China. Second, the ECRL's status as a key project in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) lends it wider geopolitical significance. Third, the purpose of the ECRL as an alternative trade route creates a significant ongoing economic imperative for China to see the project concluded successfully. Furthermore, Malaysia's ability to cultivate positive relationships with other major powers through the adept political leadership of Mahathir increases the country's leverage.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Pei May Lee, 
Chun‐yi Lee, 
Zhe Wei Lau
</dc:creator>
         <category>POLICY REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Can Small States Overturn the Negotiating Table? A Case Study of Malaysia's Agency Vis‐À‐Vis China in the ECRL Project</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70075</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70075</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70075?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>POLICY REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70076?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-01T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70076</guid>
         <title>“The Conflict That Nobody Wants”: Global Media Commentary on the Thai–Cambodian Conflict</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Jeconiah Dreisbach
</dc:creator>
         <category>MEDIA REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>“The Conflict That Nobody Wants”: Global Media Commentary on the Thai–Cambodian Conflict</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70076</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70076</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70076?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>MEDIA REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70069?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 25 Feb 2026 00:00:00 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-25T12:00:00-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70069</guid>
         <title>Functional Hierarchies and Strategic Control: Reassessing the Role of Chinese State‐Owned Enterprises in Chinese Communist Party Statecraft</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) operate within a functional hierarchical structure that allows the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to direct strategic behavior from atop while granting operational flexibility below. This approach challenges the conventional dichotomy that frames SOEs as either profit‐driven firms or mere extensions of the state, offering a more nuanced explanation of how SOEs contribute to China's grand strategic aims—especially in the Xi Jinping era. It shifts the unit of analysis from individual, public‐facing SOEs to the corporate group level, where Party oversight, cadre management, and strategic integration are more visible. Through case studies of two central SOEs—China COSCO Shipping Corporation and the State Grid Corporation of China—the article demonstrates how the CCP translates broad political goals into coordinated global economic activity. This study contributes to the literature on state capitalism and reveals how the CCP mobilizes corporate actors to extend geopolitical influence.
摘要
本文认为, 中国国有企业(SOE)的运作遵循职能层级结构, 这使得中国共产党 (中共) 能够自上而下地指导战略行为, 同时赋予下属企业一定的运营灵活性。这种观点挑战了将国有企业简单地视为以盈利为目的的企业或仅仅是国家延伸的传统二元论, 并对“国有企业如何为实现中国的宏伟战略目标 (尤其是在习近平时代) 作贡献”一事提供了更为细致的解释。本文将分析单元从单个面向公众的国有企业转移到企业集团层面。在集团层面, 党的监督、干部管理和战略整合更为清晰。通过对两家核心国有企业——中国远洋海运集团公司和国家电网公司——的案例研究, 本文展示了中共如何将宏大的政治目标转化为协调一致的全球经济活动。本研究丰富了国家资本主义文献, 揭示了中国共产党如何动员企业行为体来扩大地缘政治影响力
Resumen
Este artículo argumenta que las Empresas Estatales Chinas (EPE) operan dentro de una estructura jerárquica funcional que permite al Partido Comunista Chino (PCCh) dirigir el comportamiento estratégico desde arriba, a la vez que otorga flexibilidad operativa a las bases. Este enfoque desafía la dicotomía convencional que define a las EPE como empresas con ánimo de lucro o meras extensiones del Estado, ofreciendo una explicación más matizada de cómo contribuyen a los grandes objetivos estratégicos de China, especialmente en la era de Xi Jinping. Traslada la unidad de análisis de las EPE individuales, de cara al público, al nivel de grupo corporativo, donde la supervisión del Partido, la gestión de cuadros y la integración estratégica son más visibles. A través de estudios de caso de dos EPE centrales —China COSCO Shipping Corporation y State Grid Corporation of China—, el artículo demuestra cómo el PCCh traduce amplios objetivos políticos en una actividad económica global coordinada. Este estudio contribuye a la literatura sobre capitalismo de Estado y revela cómo el PCCh moviliza a los actores corporativos para extender su influencia geopolítica.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This paper argues that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operate within a functional hierarchical structure that allows the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to direct strategic behavior from atop while granting operational flexibility below. This approach challenges the conventional dichotomy that frames SOEs as either profit-driven firms or mere extensions of the state, offering a more nuanced explanation of how SOEs contribute to China's grand strategic aims—especially in the Xi Jinping era. It shifts the unit of analysis from individual, public-facing SOEs to the corporate group level, where Party oversight, cadre management, and strategic integration are more visible. Through case studies of two central SOEs—China COSCO Shipping Corporation and the State Grid Corporation of China—the article demonstrates how the CCP translates broad political goals into coordinated global economic activity. This study contributes to the literature on state capitalism and reveals how the CCP mobilizes corporate actors to extend geopolitical influence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;摘要&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;本文认为, 中国国有企业(SOE)的运作遵循职能层级结构, 这使得中国共产党 (中共) 能够自上而下地指导战略行为, 同时赋予下属企业一定的运营灵活性。这种观点挑战了将国有企业简单地视为以盈利为目的的企业或仅仅是国家延伸的传统二元论, 并对“国有企业如何为实现中国的宏伟战略目标 (尤其是在习近平时代) 作贡献”一事提供了更为细致的解释。本文将分析单元从单个面向公众的国有企业转移到企业集团层面。在集团层面, 党的监督、干部管理和战略整合更为清晰。通过对两家核心国有企业——中国远洋海运集团公司和国家电网公司——的案例研究, 本文展示了中共如何将宏大的政治目标转化为协调一致的全球经济活动。本研究丰富了国家资本主义文献, 揭示了中国共产党如何动员企业行为体来扩大地缘政治影响力&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Resumen&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Este artículo argumenta que las Empresas Estatales Chinas (EPE) operan dentro de una estructura jerárquica funcional que permite al Partido Comunista Chino (PCCh) dirigir el comportamiento estratégico desde arriba, a la vez que otorga flexibilidad operativa a las bases. Este enfoque desafía la dicotomía convencional que define a las EPE como empresas con ánimo de lucro o meras extensiones del Estado, ofreciendo una explicación más matizada de cómo contribuyen a los grandes objetivos estratégicos de China, especialmente en la era de Xi Jinping. Traslada la unidad de análisis de las EPE individuales, de cara al público, al nivel de grupo corporativo, donde la supervisión del Partido, la gestión de cuadros y la integración estratégica son más visibles. A través de estudios de caso de dos EPE centrales —China COSCO Shipping Corporation y State Grid Corporation of China—, el artículo demuestra cómo el PCCh traduce amplios objetivos políticos en una actividad económica global coordinada. Este estudio contribuye a la literatura sobre capitalismo de Estado y revela cómo el PCCh moviliza a los actores corporativos para extender su influencia geopolítica.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Roberto Flores
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Functional Hierarchies and Strategic Control: Reassessing the Role of Chinese State‐Owned Enterprises in Chinese Communist Party Statecraft</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70069</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70069</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70069?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70068?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 00:00:00 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-16T12:00:00-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70068</guid>
         <title>Hard and Soft Neo‐Mercantilism and the Politics of Resource Security in the Age of Geoeconomic Rivalry</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
As supply chains become weaponized in the context of intensifying geoeconomic rivalry, why do similarly exposed industrialized states adopt divergent strategies toward strategic resource dependence? This article examines how the United States and Japan, both reliant on Chinese rare earth elements (REE), respond differently to China's dominance in this sector. We argue that variation in state responses stems from differences in securitization and state–private sector interaction. The United States pursues a relatively hard neo‐mercantilist strategy, characterized by nationalizing supply chains and treating REE access as a security imperative. In contrast, Japan adopts a soft neo‐mercantilist approach, relying on public–private coordination and market‐based diversification. We reconceptualize resource security by introducing a typology of neo‐mercantilist strategies and show how institutional configurations mediate states' responses to coercive economic dependencies. The article contributes to the literature on geoeconomics and international political economy by illuminating how states adapt to the strategic instrumentalisation of technology.
摘要
强硬与软性新重商主义及其在地缘经济竞争时代下的资源安全政治 摘要 随着地缘经济竞争日益加剧, 供应链被武器化, 面临相似挑战的工业化国家为何会采取截然不同的战略来应对战略资源依赖？本文考察了依赖中国稀土元素(REE)的美国和日本如何应对中国在该领域的主导地位。我们认为, 国家应对方式的差异源于其资源安全化程度和公私部门互动方式的不同。美国奉行相对强硬的新重商主义战略, 其特点是供应链国有化, 并将稀土获取视为一项安全要务。相比之下, 日本则采取软性新重商主义策略, 依赖公私部门协调和市场多元化。本文通过引入新重商主义战略类型学重新构建了资源安全概念, 并阐述了制度配置如何影响国家对强制性经济依赖的应对。通过阐明各国如何适应技术战略工具化, 本文为地缘经济学和国际政治经济学文献作贡献
Resumen
Neomercantilismo duro y blando y la política de seguridad de recursos en la era de la rivalidad geoeconómica Resumen A medida que las cadenas de suministro se convierten en armas en el contexto de la intensificación de la rivalidad geoeconómica, ¿por qué los estados industrializados con una exposición similar adoptan estrategias divergentes hacia la dependencia estratégica de recursos? Este artículo examina cómo Estados Unidos y Japón, ambos dependientes de los elementos de tierras raras (REE) chinos, responden de manera diferente al dominio chino en este sector. Argumentamos que la variación en las respuestas estatales se deriva de las diferencias en la titulización y la interacción entre el sector público y el privado. Estados Unidos sigue una estrategia neomercantilista relativamente dura, caracterizada por la nacionalización de las cadenas de suministro y el tratamiento del acceso a los REE como un imperativo de seguridad. En contraste, Japón adopta un enfoque neomercantilista blando, basado en la coordinación público‐privada y la diversificación basada en el mercado. Reconceptualizamos la seguridad de los recursos mediante la introducción de una tipología de estrategias neomercantilistas y mostramos cómo las configuraciones institucionales median las respuestas de los estados a las dependencias económicas coercitivas. El artículo contribuye a la literatura sobre geoeconomía y economía política internacional al ilustrar cómo los Estados se adaptan a la instrumentalización estratégica de la tecnología.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As supply chains become weaponized in the context of intensifying geoeconomic rivalry, why do similarly exposed industrialized states adopt divergent strategies toward strategic resource dependence? This article examines how the United States and Japan, both reliant on Chinese rare earth elements (REE), respond differently to China's dominance in this sector. We argue that variation in state responses stems from differences in securitization and state–private sector interaction. The United States pursues a relatively hard neo-mercantilist strategy, characterized by nationalizing supply chains and treating REE access as a security imperative. In contrast, Japan adopts a soft neo-mercantilist approach, relying on public–private coordination and market-based diversification. We reconceptualize resource security by introducing a typology of neo-mercantilist strategies and show how institutional configurations mediate states' responses to coercive economic dependencies. The article contributes to the literature on geoeconomics and international political economy by illuminating how states adapt to the strategic instrumentalisation of technology.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;摘要&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;强硬与软性新重商主义及其在地缘经济竞争时代下的资源安全政治 摘要 随着地缘经济竞争日益加剧, 供应链被武器化, 面临相似挑战的工业化国家为何会采取截然不同的战略来应对战略资源依赖？本文考察了依赖中国稀土元素(REE)的美国和日本如何应对中国在该领域的主导地位。我们认为, 国家应对方式的差异源于其资源安全化程度和公私部门互动方式的不同。美国奉行相对强硬的新重商主义战略, 其特点是供应链国有化, 并将稀土获取视为一项安全要务。相比之下, 日本则采取软性新重商主义策略, 依赖公私部门协调和市场多元化。本文通过引入新重商主义战略类型学重新构建了资源安全概念, 并阐述了制度配置如何影响国家对强制性经济依赖的应对。通过阐明各国如何适应技术战略工具化, 本文为地缘经济学和国际政治经济学文献作贡献&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Resumen&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Neomercantilismo duro y blando y la política de seguridad de recursos en la era de la rivalidad geoeconómica Resumen A medida que las cadenas de suministro se convierten en armas en el contexto de la intensificación de la rivalidad geoeconómica, ¿por qué los estados industrializados con una exposición similar adoptan estrategias divergentes hacia la dependencia estratégica de recursos? Este artículo examina cómo Estados Unidos y Japón, ambos dependientes de los elementos de tierras raras (REE) chinos, responden de manera diferente al dominio chino en este sector. Argumentamos que la variación en las respuestas estatales se deriva de las diferencias en la titulización y la interacción entre el sector público y el privado. Estados Unidos sigue una estrategia neomercantilista relativamente dura, caracterizada por la nacionalización de las cadenas de suministro y el tratamiento del acceso a los REE como un imperativo de seguridad. En contraste, Japón adopta un enfoque neomercantilista blando, basado en la coordinación público-privada y la diversificación basada en el mercado. Reconceptualizamos la seguridad de los recursos mediante la introducción de una tipología de estrategias neomercantilistas y mostramos cómo las configuraciones institucionales median las respuestas de los estados a las dependencias económicas coercitivas. El artículo contribuye a la literatura sobre geoeconomía y economía política internacional al ilustrar cómo los Estados se adaptan a la instrumentalización estratégica de la tecnología.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Novi Nurmalasari, 
Moch Faisal Karim
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Hard and Soft Neo‐Mercantilism and the Politics of Resource Security in the Age of Geoeconomic Rivalry</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70068</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70068</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70068?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70067?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 12 Feb 2026 00:00:00 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-12T12:00:00-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70067</guid>
         <title>Media Coverage of Climate Change in Southeast Asia's Largest Muslim‐Majority Country</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Munadhil Abdul Muqisth, 
Rani Sabtelasari, 
Ismail Sualman, 
Rizky Ridho Pratomo
</dc:creator>
         <category>MEDIA REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Media Coverage of Climate Change in Southeast Asia's Largest Muslim‐Majority Country</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70067</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70067</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70067?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>MEDIA REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70064?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 12 Feb 2026 00:00:00 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-12T12:00:00-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70064</guid>
         <title>The Anti‐Fraud Lever: China's Strategic Use of the Scam Crackdown to Invigorate the LMLECC Process Against Thailand's Reluctance</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
China launched an unprecedented crackdown on Myanmar‐based, transnational, Chinese‐led criminal syndicates—particularly telecommunications and Internet fraud rings targeting Chinese nationals. This action was prompted by a public outcry over human trafficking and the increasing number of victims of fraud in China. The Chinese campaign comprised several actions, including organizing joint operations, such as Operation SEAGULL under the Chinese‐led Lancang–Mekong Integrated Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation Center (LMLECC), and authorizing high‐profile extraterritorial activities—most notably Liu Zhongyi's conspicuous actions on Thai soil. Although China's assertive measures have been successful in dismantling major fraud operation centers, its near‐unilateral actions and circumvention of traditional diplomatic norms and protocols have negatively affected Sino–Thai relations, raising concerns regarding sovereignty and the expanding reach of LMLECC cooperation. In this context, the disruption of Chinese‐led criminal syndicates likely served as a pretext for China to advance its political and security influence in the Mekong region.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;China launched an unprecedented crackdown on Myanmar-based, transnational, Chinese-led criminal syndicates—particularly telecommunications and Internet fraud rings targeting Chinese nationals. This action was prompted by a public outcry over human trafficking and the increasing number of victims of fraud in China. The Chinese campaign comprised several actions, including organizing joint operations, such as Operation SEAGULL under the Chinese-led Lancang–Mekong Integrated Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation Center (LMLECC), and authorizing high-profile extraterritorial activities—most notably Liu Zhongyi's conspicuous actions on Thai soil. Although China's assertive measures have been successful in dismantling major fraud operation centers, its near-unilateral actions and circumvention of traditional diplomatic norms and protocols have negatively affected Sino–Thai relations, raising concerns regarding sovereignty and the expanding reach of LMLECC cooperation. In this context, the disruption of Chinese-led criminal syndicates likely served as a pretext for China to advance its political and security influence in the Mekong region.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Watunyu Jaiborisudhi, 
Poowin Bunyavejchewin, 
Kridsana Chotisut
</dc:creator>
         <category>POLICY REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>The Anti‐Fraud Lever: China's Strategic Use of the Scam Crackdown to Invigorate the LMLECC Process Against Thailand's Reluctance</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70064</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70064</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70064?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>POLICY REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70065?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2026 00:00:00 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-11T12:00:00-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70065</guid>
         <title>The Role of Technology Standards in Strategic Hedging</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
This article argues that technology standards provide Southeast Asian states with a distinct mechanism for hedging amid intensifying US–China technological rivalry. Traditional hedging strategies emphasizing economic engagement without political alignment are increasingly constrained by the weaponization of technological interdependence, politicizing previously neutral technology decisions. We develop a framework showing how active participation in global standards‐setting offers strategic ambiguity and preserves autonomy, identifying four standards‐based mechanisms. Descriptive analysis—including Singapore's leadership in AI governance, Malaysia's diversified digital investment policies, and Vietnam's procurement strategies—highlights how these mechanisms help maintain technological neutrality, reduce vendor lock‐in, and protect sovereignty. Theoretically, we advance the hedging literature by showing how economic policies increasingly risk confounding hedging strategies, but that standards embody a logic mitigating these risks. Empirically, we provide evidence of engagement with standards in practice, illustrating how standards can enable smaller states to manage geopolitical pressures while maximizing economic and strategic flexibility.
摘要
本文认为, 在日益激烈的中美技术竞争中, 技术标准为东南亚国家提供了一种独特的对冲机制。传统的对冲策略强调经济参与而非政治结盟, 但随着技术相互依存的日益政治化, 原本中立的技术决策也逐渐被政治化, 这些策略正受到越来越多的制约。我们构建了一个框架, 展示了“积极参与全球标准制定”如何提供战略上的不确定性并维护自主性, 并识别出四种基于标准的机制。描述性分析——包括新加坡在人工智能治理方面的领导地位、马来西亚多元化的数字投资政策以及越南的采购策略——强调了这些机制如何帮助维持技术中立、减少供应商锁定并保护主权。在理论层面, 我们通过展示经济政策如何日益加剧对冲策略的干扰, 以及标准如何体现一种能够缓解这些风险的逻辑, 从而推进了对冲文献的发展。我们通过实证研究提供了实践中运用标准的证据, 阐明了标准如何帮助小国在应对地缘政治压力的同时, 最大限度地提升经济和战略灵活性。
Resumen
Este artículo argumenta que los estándares tecnológicos ofrecen a los estados del Sudeste Asiático un mecanismo distintivo de cobertura frente a la creciente rivalidad tecnológica entre Estados Unidos y China. Las estrategias tradicionales de cobertura, que priorizan la participación económica sin alineamiento político, se ven cada vez más limitadas por la instrumentalización de la interdependencia tecnológica, politizando decisiones tecnológicas previamente neutrales. Desarrollamos un marco que muestra cómo la participación activa en el establecimiento de estándares globales genera ambigüedad estratégica y preserva la autonomía, identificando cuatro mecanismos basados en estándares. Un análisis descriptivo —que incluye el liderazgo de Singapur en la gobernanza de la IA, las políticas diversificadas de inversión digital de Malasia y las estrategias de adquisición de Vietnam— destaca cómo estos mecanismos ayudan a mantener la neutralidad tecnológica, reducir la dependencia de proveedores y proteger la soberanía. En teoría, avanzamos en la literatura sobre cobertura al mostrar cómo las políticas económicas corren el riesgo cada vez mayor de confundir las estrategias de cobertura, pero que los estándares incorporan una lógica que mitiga estos riesgos. Empíricamente, proporcionamos evidencia de la implementación de estándares en la práctica, ilustrando cómo esta puede permitir a los estados más pequeños gestionar las presiones geopolíticas y, al mismo tiempo, maximizar la flexibilidad económica y estratégica.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This article argues that technology standards provide Southeast Asian states with a distinct mechanism for hedging amid intensifying US–China technological rivalry. Traditional hedging strategies emphasizing economic engagement without political alignment are increasingly constrained by the weaponization of technological interdependence, politicizing previously neutral technology decisions. We develop a framework showing how active participation in global standards-setting offers strategic ambiguity and preserves autonomy, identifying four standards-based mechanisms. Descriptive analysis—including Singapore's leadership in AI governance, Malaysia's diversified digital investment policies, and Vietnam's procurement strategies—highlights how these mechanisms help maintain technological neutrality, reduce vendor lock-in, and protect sovereignty. Theoretically, we advance the hedging literature by showing how economic policies increasingly risk confounding hedging strategies, but that standards embody a logic mitigating these risks. Empirically, we provide evidence of engagement with standards in practice, illustrating how standards can enable smaller states to manage geopolitical pressures while maximizing economic and strategic flexibility.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;摘要&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;本文认为, 在日益激烈的中美技术竞争中, 技术标准为东南亚国家提供了一种独特的对冲机制。传统的对冲策略强调经济参与而非政治结盟, 但随着技术相互依存的日益政治化, 原本中立的技术决策也逐渐被政治化, 这些策略正受到越来越多的制约。我们构建了一个框架, 展示了“积极参与全球标准制定”如何提供战略上的不确定性并维护自主性, 并识别出四种基于标准的机制。描述性分析——包括新加坡在人工智能治理方面的领导地位、马来西亚多元化的数字投资政策以及越南的采购策略——强调了这些机制如何帮助维持技术中立、减少供应商锁定并保护主权。在理论层面, 我们通过展示经济政策如何日益加剧对冲策略的干扰, 以及标准如何体现一种能够缓解这些风险的逻辑, 从而推进了对冲文献的发展。我们通过实证研究提供了实践中运用标准的证据, 阐明了标准如何帮助小国在应对地缘政治压力的同时, 最大限度地提升经济和战略灵活性。&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Resumen&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Este artículo argumenta que los estándares tecnológicos ofrecen a los estados del Sudeste Asiático un mecanismo distintivo de cobertura frente a la creciente rivalidad tecnológica entre Estados Unidos y China. Las estrategias tradicionales de cobertura, que priorizan la participación económica sin alineamiento político, se ven cada vez más limitadas por la instrumentalización de la interdependencia tecnológica, politizando decisiones tecnológicas previamente neutrales. Desarrollamos un marco que muestra cómo la participación activa en el establecimiento de estándares globales genera ambigüedad estratégica y preserva la autonomía, identificando cuatro mecanismos basados en estándares. Un análisis descriptivo —que incluye el liderazgo de Singapur en la gobernanza de la IA, las políticas diversificadas de inversión digital de Malasia y las estrategias de adquisición de Vietnam— destaca cómo estos mecanismos ayudan a mantener la neutralidad tecnológica, reducir la dependencia de proveedores y proteger la soberanía. En teoría, avanzamos en la literatura sobre cobertura al mostrar cómo las políticas económicas corren el riesgo cada vez mayor de confundir las estrategias de cobertura, pero que los estándares incorporan una lógica que mitiga estos riesgos. Empíricamente, proporcionamos evidencia de la implementación de estándares en la práctica, ilustrando cómo esta puede permitir a los estados más pequeños gestionar las presiones geopolíticas y, al mismo tiempo, maximizar la flexibilidad económica y estratégica.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Darren J. Lim, 
Anthea Roberts
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The Role of Technology Standards in Strategic Hedging</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70065</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70065</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70065?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70066?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2026 00:00:00 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-11T12:00:00-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.70066</guid>
         <title>Living in the Trust Nexus: Investigating the Interplay of News and Government Trust on Individuals' Subjective Well‐Being in Singapore</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
ABSTRACT
Citizens' trust in the news and the government can affect the success of governments' strategic intervention in the news media to advance their positions. To sustain healthy trust levels in both sources, it is important to ensure that they can enhance their subjective well‐being. Through a survey, this study puts forth a trust‐nexus framework examining how the interplay of government and media trust impacts well‐being in a liberal‐authoritarian media system. The marginal effects of news trust on audiences' emotional and social well‐being are greater at high levels of government trust than at low levels. This interaction effect impacting psychological well‐being is more pronounced when there is high than low social media news consumption. The study interprets, via a critical media sociology perspective, how the building of the different dimensions of news audiences' subjective well‐being via news trust can be conditioned by government trust and social media news consumption.
摘要
公民对新闻和政府的信任会影响“政府通过战略性干预新闻媒体以巩固自身地位”一事的成效。为了维持民众对新闻和政府的健康信任度, 确保其能够提升民众的主观幸福感至关重要。本研究通过一项调查, 提出了一个信任关系框架, 探讨在自由威权媒体体系中, 政府信任与媒体信任的互动如何影响民众的幸福感。研究发现, 在政府信任度较高的情况下, 新闻信任对受众情感和社会幸福感的边际效应大于政府信任度较低的情况。这种影响心理健康的交互作用在社交媒体新闻消费量较高的情况下更为显著。本研究从批判性媒体社会学的视角出发, 阐释了政府信任和社交媒体新闻消费如何制约新闻受众主观幸福感的不同维度。
Resumen
La confianza ciudadana en las noticias y el gobierno puede afectar el éxito de la intervención estratégica de los gobiernos en los medios informativos para impulsar sus posiciones. Para mantener niveles saludables de confianza en ambas fuentes, es importante garantizar que puedan mejorar su bienestar subjetivo. A través de una encuesta, este estudio presenta un marco de nexo de confianza que examina cómo la interacción entre la confianza en el gobierno y los medios impacta el bienestar en un sistema mediático liberal‐autoritario. Los efectos marginales de la confianza en las noticias sobre el bienestar emocional y social de las audiencias son mayores con niveles altos de confianza en el gobierno que con niveles bajos. Este efecto de interacción que impacta el bienestar psicológico es más pronunciado cuando el consumo de noticias en redes sociales es alto. El estudio interpreta, desde una perspectiva de sociología crítica de los medios, cómo la construcción de las diferentes dimensiones del bienestar subjetivo de las audiencias a través de la confianza en las noticias puede verse condicionada por la confianza en el gobierno y el consumo de noticias en redes sociales.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Citizens' trust in the news and the government can affect the success of governments' strategic intervention in the news media to advance their positions. To sustain healthy trust levels in both sources, it is important to ensure that they can enhance their subjective well-being. Through a survey, this study puts forth a trust-nexus framework examining how the interplay of government and media trust impacts well-being in a liberal-authoritarian media system. The marginal effects of news trust on audiences' emotional and social well-being are greater at high levels of government trust than at low levels. This interaction effect impacting psychological well-being is more pronounced when there is high than low social media news consumption. The study interprets, via a critical media sociology perspective, how the building of the different dimensions of news audiences' subjective well-being via news trust can be conditioned by government trust and social media news consumption.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;摘要&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;公民对新闻和政府的信任会影响“政府通过战略性干预新闻媒体以巩固自身地位”一事的成效。为了维持民众对新闻和政府的健康信任度, 确保其能够提升民众的主观幸福感至关重要。本研究通过一项调查, 提出了一个信任关系框架, 探讨在自由威权媒体体系中, 政府信任与媒体信任的互动如何影响民众的幸福感。研究发现, 在政府信任度较高的情况下, 新闻信任对受众情感和社会幸福感的边际效应大于政府信任度较低的情况。这种影响心理健康的交互作用在社交媒体新闻消费量较高的情况下更为显著。本研究从批判性媒体社会学的视角出发, 阐释了政府信任和社交媒体新闻消费如何制约新闻受众主观幸福感的不同维度。&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Resumen&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;La confianza ciudadana en las noticias y el gobierno puede afectar el éxito de la intervención estratégica de los gobiernos en los medios informativos para impulsar sus posiciones. Para mantener niveles saludables de confianza en ambas fuentes, es importante garantizar que puedan mejorar su bienestar subjetivo. A través de una encuesta, este estudio presenta un marco de nexo de confianza que examina cómo la interacción entre la confianza en el gobierno y los medios impacta el bienestar en un sistema mediático liberal-autoritario. Los efectos marginales de la confianza en las noticias sobre el bienestar emocional y social de las audiencias son mayores con niveles altos de confianza en el gobierno que con niveles bajos. Este efecto de interacción que impacta el bienestar psicológico es más pronunciado cuando el consumo de noticias en redes sociales es alto. El estudio interpreta, desde una perspectiva de sociología crítica de los medios, cómo la construcción de las diferentes dimensiones del bienestar subjetivo de las audiencias a través de la confianza en las noticias puede verse condicionada por la confianza en el gobierno y el consumo de noticias en redes sociales.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Zhang Hao Goh, 
Edmund W. J. Lee
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Living in the Trust Nexus: Investigating the Interplay of News and Government Trust on Individuals' Subjective Well‐Being in Singapore</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.70066</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.70066</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.70066?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.12747?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2026 00:00:00 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-11T12:00:00-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19430787?af=R">Wiley: Asian Politics &amp; Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/aspp.12747</guid>
         <title>Issue Information</title>
         <description>Asian Politics &amp;amp;Policy, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator/>
         <category>ISSUE INFORMATION</category>
         <dc:title>Issue Information</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/aspp.12747</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Asian Politics &amp; Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/aspp.12747</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.12747?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ISSUE INFORMATION</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
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