CSA - Intra-state conflicts and effects

ULFA, INDO-BANGLADESH RELATIONS AND BEYOND[1]

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Fri, 29 Oct 2010 06:19:00 +0000

By Samir Kumar Das

This paper is an attempt at understanding the ULFA phenomenon - neither in complete isolation from its externalities also including the known framework of Indo-Bangladesh relations nor completely within that framework - but beyond either of them. It seeks to tell a story of those forces and processes which are not mediated by any bilateral or for that matter international relations and therefore remain relatively outside the control of any nation-state, and most importantly, how they affect and impinge on both ULFA and the course of Indo-Bangladesh relations. It also makes a call for accordingly reorienting and calibrating India’s external policy towards the militants and insurgents of the Northeast.

Much of the literature that has developed on insurgencies and bilateral relations in general and ULFA and Indo-Bangladesh relations in particular has a tendency of viewing insurgency more as a phenomenon mediated, if not determined, by bilateral or even international relations. Insurgencies and terrorism are seen as a foreign policy tool to promote what a state perceives as its national interest. According to this view, the order of nation-states is taken as given and insurgents are considered as too weak to throw their weight around in the fulcrum of international relations in South Asia and constitute a state for themselves. It is for example argued that with the solitary exception of Bangladesh, no state in times of Cold War could be successfully dismembered. Defence and strategic advocacies are accordingly made, taking the present order of nation-states as given and unalterable. As B. M. Jain observes:

“Given the current security environment in the region, India’s defence planners require to concentrate more on tackling the Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC) in the form of “sponsored terrorism” by Pakistan across borders. Though all the concerned government agencies are making endeavors both at operational and diplomatic levels to deal with LIC problem, no well integrated approach has yet adequately adopted to thwart Pakistan’s evil designs.”[2]

As a result, insurgency and terrorism are viewed as the unavoidable evil of international politics as long as there remain nations that are yet to form states and there remain states that contain more than one nation Insurgencies, for instance, continue to be attributed to the divergence between state and nation: “The fault lines between state and the nation is likely to be a basic feature of world politics for the foreseeable future since many states are never going to be able to eradicate the ethnic challenge to their legitimacy and not all nations are going to be able to obtain their own state”.[3] As a corollary to this argument, insurgents in the Northeast, in the words of a noted Indian journalist, are caught in ‘crossfire’ between rivaling nations and states.[4]

As one seeks to understand ULFA’s politics in the broader perspective of Indo-Bangladesh relations, one has to guard against this kind of fallacy: Bangladesh, as Taj Hashmi warns, has to guard against the ‘India factor’ and the main challenge for Bangladesh insofar as Indo-Bangladesh relations are concerned is to tackle the ‘India factor’ in Bangladesh’s foreign policy and relations. As he argues: “Viewing its long-term security interests, Bangladesh should not throw itself into the Indian orbit.” He accuses present Hasina-led government of having condoned India’s ‘push-back of so-called illegals’ (immigrants) into Bangladesh and cultivated the presence of anti-Bangladesh militants in India who demand the so-called ‘Swadhin Banga Bhumi’ (Independent Bengali Land) to be carved out of Bangladeshi territory for Hindu refugees/immigrants from East Pakistan, presently living in India.[5]

At another level, this approach seems to view insurgency independently of its local roots and any internal basis. As I have already pointed out, it is difficult to believe that insurgencies are planted by ‘foreign hands’ absolutely from without - although it is perfectly possible that the foreign powers are likely to fish in already troubled waters and take advantage of the turmoil once it sets in.[6]

On the other hand, insurgent organizations like ULFA are seen to be so strong as to be able to call the shots and influence, if not shape, the course of bilateral relations such as Indo-Bhutan or Indo-Bangladesh or even Indo-Pak relations. Bhutan is considered as too small and albeit powerless a country to crack down on the ‘terrorists’ taking shelter there. On the other hand, countries like Bangladesh or Pakistan are considered as – to borrow a phrase now made fashionable by the multilateral agencies – ‘failed states’. That these insurgents enjoy a free run in these countries, derive diplomatic and military support from the state agencies that deploy them as their foreign policy instruments are cited as sure signs of failure and their inability to exercise control over their own territory and people. Now that there has been a certain loosening of control of the states over the forces and processes (like cheap and unskilled labour, insurgents and terrorists, trafficked women and children, diseases, small arms and drugs so on and so forth) that travel across the state boundaries thanks to globalization unleashed in the region since the commencement of the 1990s, ‘state failure’ has become all too appalling and such multilateral agencies as UNDP, World Bank and IMF remain concerned about them. But, ‘failure’ of the neighbouring states cannot be the reason why it should take a toll on India.

In simple terms, the ULFA phenomenon cannot simply be reduced to the high and low of Indo-Bangladesh relations as much as the latter cannot simply be reduced to the ULFA phenomenon. This has some obvious lessons for us: First, while it is important to understand ULFA’s external dynamics, these dynamics in the age of globalization are seen to spill over the given template of nation-states. By all accounts, ULFA’s external links have become diversified and what started off as tacit or open support for the insurgents particularly by the neighbouring states is now being increasingly supplemented by transnational and global forces (like the radical Islamist forces) over which nation-states including those that extend support have little or virtually no control. Much of the externality, in other words, has become global. Our external policy towards the insurgents that continues to be directed to state actors will therefore have to be reoriented in recognition of this new reality. Besides, diversification of the external sources has provided ULFA with relative strategic freedom of operation in India. While Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan and lately China are named as potential or actual external base, such a wide base, one must understand, serves as a strategic asset especially at a time when the state and non-state actors in this wide base are not necessarily in unison and India has to invest disproportionately high amount of diplomatic and maybe other resources in order to contain it simply because it affects so many countries. The second section of the paper deals with this question.

Secondly, ULFA is accused of having changed its stand on undocumented immigration from Bangladesh allegedly at the instance of the Government of Bangladesh. It is believed to have reached a secret understanding with the Government of Bangladesh and this ideological dilution was the price that it was asked to pay in order to secure its camps and operations in Bangladesh. Perhaps there is more to it. ULFA’s shift in stand way back in 1992 may have exasperated a wide body of people in Assam; but seems to have been propelled by a clear and categorical understanding of the new global reality that migration especially of cheap and unskilled labour across the borders - however unwelcome it may be - proves unstoppable in the age of globalization. While there is demand for it in India, Bangladesh’s economy is never short of its supply. The economic logic of labour goes against the political logic of state formation and the sooner the states realize it, the better. The Indian state is yet to recognize what ULFA could in the early 1990s. It is one thing to deny this new global reality and hence to delude ourselves and completely another to initiate a new policy regime of ‘work permit’ by conferring recognition on it. We discuss the issue of migration in the third section of this paper.

Thirdly, India evidently looks upon the present regime in Bangladesh (along with Bhutan) as an unrecognized – indeed unrecognizable ally in the roadmap to peace with ULFA. Bangladesh plays a crucial role in getting the top ULFA leadership hitherto holed up there to ‘surrender’ to and work out peace with the Indian authorities. While the instrumentality of Bangladesh can hardly be recognized, India takes utmost caution – with of course varying degree of success - in ensuring that Bangladesh is not seen as playing only an instrumental role in India’s scheme of things. India’s twin policy of getting Bangladesh to act and forcing the ‘arrested’ ULFA leadership to enter into peace talks is fraught with danger at least on two counts: One, the policy is intended to split ULFA vertically into ‘arrested’ leaders who have reportedly expressed their consent to talks and that section of leadership that is still at large and unwilling to come to the negotiating table for whatever reasons. Past experiences show that this piecemeal approach to peace does not pay dividends and sometimes turns out to be counterproductive insofar as it sets off factional feuds, wreaks havoc and hamstrings enduring peace. Two, this approach looks upon peace as a game essentially confined to two otherwise conflicting parties. One has to remember that there are many more stakeholders of peace than are exhausted by the two-party module envisaged here. The ULFA too refuses to recognize these stakeholders beyond a point. As I have argued, the Peoples’ Consultative Group set up by it was seen to be too close to ULFA to represent the broader spectrum of the society. Paresh Baruah’s (its ‘Commander-in-Chief’) much-quoted reservations against the recent formation of Sanmilit Jatiya Abhibartan (SJA) and its activities are reflective of his staunch disapproval of any peace initiative that is organized independently outside its auspices. The other stakeholders – whom I broadly described as civil society – become a site of contest between the state on one hand and the insurgents on the other.[7] While the state has hardly any institutional alternative and redesigning to offer as a means of settling the conflict (both the Chief Minister and the Minister of DONER recently rejected any talk on the issue of sovereignty without giving any hint of what the Government is prepared to offer), a section of ULFA recognizes only that part of civil society that as it were agrees to serve as its front desk. Nowadays, there seems to have been a shift in ULFA’s media policy as well. Earlier it was keen on holding itself accountable to the public opinion articulated and crystallized through media by way of regularly responding to the readers’ queries and reflecting on its own policies and activities. Now the policy is to own at least a section of the influential media and thereby try to shape the public opinion. We discuss this troubled road to peace in the fourth section. But we propose to begin with the next section intended primarily to clear the methodological mess that most of the writings on conflict and peace in the Northeast are involved in.

The Methodological Mess

At one level, there has been a glut of publications on the Northeast particularly since the late-1990s for reasons not unknown to us.[8] But at another level, it is also true that very few merit closer attention. The sudden surge in publications could hardly contribute to any significant enrichment of our knowledge of Northeast Studies. Very few of these publications are, to say the least, methodologically informed. The problem is in a large measure methodological. Obviously the data and information we have to rely on while putting across our argument are of extremely delicate and sensitive nature. But in this paper we have depended on only those that are easily available in the public domain and we must confess that we have not been privy to any secret or classified information that are not otherwise shared by and accessible to others. Privileged access to any kind of information and data per se is no virtue of Social Science research, to my mind, even worse - could actually turn out to be more of a liability unless suitably rendered in a language replicable by others. Breaking news is the job the journalists are best meant for and certainly not the social scientists.

Besides, there is the problem of reliability of data and information that are in use. Thus to cite an example, Sengupta and Singh find evidences of ‘active support’ by state agencies of Bangladesh for insurgents of the Northeast as ‘incontrovertible’.[9] On the other hand, Bangladeshi journalists like Taj Hashmi and scholars like Shahedul Anam Khan find Indian involvement in Bangladesh’s internal affairs as much too apparent to require any further proof. Both could be true at the same time; but unfortunately there is very little that we as social scientists can do – to actually sift through the evidences invoked by them and independently check for ourselves whether they are either ‘incontrovertible’ or ‘apparent’ as being claimed by them. Social Science evidences are expected to be cast in potentially controvertible or verifiable terms. It is unfortunate to see that many social scientists working on the Northeast allow themselves to be fed by data and information that they cannot independently confirm or verify and not always unwillingly become party to the ‘psychological operations’ carried out by the conflicting parties. These data and information are far from being innocent and benign.

From International to Global Links

India’s relations with Bangladesh insofar as ULFA is concerned seem to have passed through three distinct – though not altogether unrelated – stages: In the first stage, ULFA reportedly started setting up its camps in that country by the end of the 1980s when it was on the run after being banned and the first military operation was launched against it in 1990. Initially it maintained a defensive posture and kept a low profile in a foreign country. It is difficult to believe that Bangladesh did not know anything about its presence; but it clearly decided not to take any notice of it by way of making public statements and thereby publicly acknowledging its presence. Quite the contrary – the Bangladeshi state was in a denial mode as long as ULFA had decided not to become visible.

The public surfacing of ULFA in Bangladesh seems to have begun in the second stage. Once officially banned and sought to be hounded out from India, the organization slowly allowed itself to be deployed as a foreign policy tool of our eastern neighbour. The role of Bangladesh in facilitating its linkage with Pakistan and with the world Islamist forces can hardly be denied. In the bargain, a certain ideological dilution particularly in relation to its stand on the ‘illegal’ immigration set in by the early 1990s. It will be difficult to conclude – as we will have occasion to see - that this ideological dilution was the only factor responsible for its rapid alienation from the people of Assam.

The third stage is marked by India’s policy of taking advantage of the friendly forces in power in the neighbouring countries including Bhutan, Bangladesh and getting them to act against ULFA and such militant organizations as National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO). But insofar as ULFA continues to harbour and maintain its links with the transnational, radical Islamist forces, its ties with Bangladesh are likely to survive the Bangladeshi State’s recent crackdown on ULFA leaders and cadres.

By all accounts, ULFA’s camps have been functioning in Bangladesh since 1989 and at that time the number of camps was estimated between 12 and 13. Established initially with the objective of using Bangladesh as a safe haven and training site, the Front gradually expanded its network to include operational control of activities and the receipt and shipment of arms in transit eventually entering India. The Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) and Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) are reported to be the chief suppliers of arms for the ULFA through Bangladesh.

It is now apparent that Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League Government during her first reign (1995-2000) had asked the insurgent groups to leave the country – much to the relief of New Delhi. Leading a coalition government with a wafer-thin majority that was being constantly held back by other radical Islamist forces and given the invisible rise of these forces in Bangladesh, this was the most that she could do at that time. In fact some outfits like the ULFA, and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) IM reportedly moved their camps to Myanmar. But it soon turned out to be only a relocation of their cadres and infrastructure to newer places within Bangladesh. In October 2001, the Islamists’ Party alliance led by Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won a landslide victory in the eighth parliamentary election. ULFA came back with a vengeance and reestablished its camps at Maijdi, Mymensingh, Rangpur, Mohangaon, Bhairab Bazaar and Pulchari. It also reopened its camps at Adampur, Banugashi, Jyantipur, Jayadevpur, Shrimangal and Cox’s Bazar. According to an estimate, by late 2003, 15 militant groups of the region had reportedly been running their 194 camps in Bangladesh.[10]

The BNP government led by Begum Khaleda Zia has been accused of nurturing Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) operatives active in the Northeast, and its help and assistance to insurgencies in the region have been described by some as ‘Bangladesh’s state policy dictated from Pakistan’. By all evidences, Bangladesh during this time has extended diplomatic support, facilitated their operation in other parts of South Asia and has allowed its territory to be used as conduit for arms supply to be used against India. In January 2010, Bangladesh's Minister of Local Government and Awami League General Secretary Syed Ashraful Islam claimed that there was 'clear evidence' of a meeting having taken place between Pervez Musharraf (former President of Pakistan) and Anup Chetia – the Chairman of ULFA - in 2002. According to him, the meeting, which lasted for about 90 minutes and took place in Musharraf's hotel room, was 'facilitated' by the then Khaleda Zia government.

The Pakistani High Commission in Bangladesh is reported to have arranged for the travel of ULFA leaders to Karachi, from where they were taken to the terrorist training centres by ISI and its affiliates (Diganta 2009). ULFA seemed to have paid Pakistan back with full gratitude by announcing its support for that country during the Kargil war. By asking Pakistan of all countries for Assam’s ‘liberation’ – bizarre though it may sound - ULFA seemed to have allowed this ideological dilution for military reasons. It again shows how military reason prevails over the political one in ULFA’s scheme of things. As Bertil Lintner points out:

ISI may not be have been particularly interested in the ULFA’s separatist cause, but if militancy increases in the northeast, India would be forced to withdraw troops from the battlefront in Kashmir and send them to Assam, which would suit Pakistan. At least, that was the strategy, as ULFA’s Commander-in-Chief Paresh Baruah told this correspondent in Bangkok in March 1992.[11]

On April 2 2004 Bangladesh Joint Forces seized 10 truckloads of submachine-guns, AK-47 assault rifles, other firearms and bullets reportedly destined for ULFA hideouts in Northeast India on a tip-off in the largest ever arms haul in an early morning swoop on the Karnaphuli coast in Chittagong. It is believed that at least ten to twenty 26/11-kind attacks could be launched using these arms and ammunition. To put it in another way, it can actually arm a small troop of a few thousand people.[12] Jane’s Intelligence Review in April 2004 pointed out that the shipment originated from Hong Kong and reached Sittwe in Burma, where the weaponry was transferred to some smaller vessels and shipped again to Chiattagong. The Review further stated that the shipment was worth an estimated USD 4.5 to 7 million.

Unlike our Himalayan neighbour Bhutan, Bangladesh has in the past denied the existence of camps inside her territory. The fomentation of insurgency and terrorism in Bangladesh, according to Jafa, is rooted in the very ‘logic and history’ of her state and society. As he argues:

While Bhutan watched helplessly as the militants’ camps were established on its territory …, the establishment of these camps in Bangladesh was the outcome of a different logic and history that goes back to the assassination of Mujibur Rahman … and the emergence of an Islamic anti-Indian leadership in Bangladesh. The Islamic anti-India hold on Bangladesh is so strong that during her two terms of prime ministership, Mujib’s pro-India daughter Sheikh Hasina could not demolish Indian insurgents’ camps which were working under the protection of the Bangladesh army and paramilitary forces.[13]

The caretaker government in 2007 has been, for the first time in the history of Indo-Bangladesh relations, at least willing to listen to Indian complaints in this regard.[14] But it did not do much in dismantling these camps. It was only with the ascension of Awami League to power with a thumping majority that Bangladesh’s regime change could trigger off a shift in its policy towards the insurgents of the Northeast. In the understated words of Bertil Lintner: “… a thaw came with the victory of Awami League in December 2008’[15] and over a year after this Bangladesh had detained several ULFA leaders and handed them over to the Indian authorities.

It is important to note that Bangladesh too accused India of having raised and sponsored Shanti Bahini – the Chakma insurgent outfit - against the Government and fomented the Chakma insurgency: “For Bangladesh, Chakma problem was essentially one of insurgency … led by the Shanti Bahini, which, according to Bangladesh foreign ministry, was aided by and trained in India, a charge denied resolutely by India”.[16]

We have already pointed out, as per the reports available in the public domain the radical Islamist organizations play a role in providing arms shipment to ULFA in Bangladesh. Paresh Baruah is reported to have met Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders through their operatives in Bangladesh. But the Islamist link too suffered a setback when in January 27, 2010 Bangladesh executed five ex-army officers who were convicted of the 1975 murder of the country’s independence leader and Sheikh Hasina’s father, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. Among those executed was Lt. Col. Syed Faruque Rahman, who in 1988 reportedly first met ULFA’s foreign affairs chief Munim Nobis. There is a distinct possibility that ULFA’s link with the transnational, radical Islamist forces might survive the impending severance of its link with the Bangladeshi State. Radical Islamist forces – by all accounts - do not take Sheikh Hasina’s moves so kindly.

Her maiden visit to India in early 2010, after she became the prime minister for the second time, was marked by an understanding that neither India nor Bangladesh would allow her territory to be used against the other. While Bangladesh’s intentions now can hardly be doubted, it is also important to find out how far Sheikh Hasina’s initiatives will be sustainable in the long run and whether it will be within the capacity of the present regime to continue with the same tempo in the foreseeable future. There has been an attempt on her life during her first reign reportedly with an ULFA hand behind it and there was uprising in the ranks of the Bangladesh Rifles and radical Islamist forces have reportedly penetrated deep into the armed forces. The triad of blind religiosity, a significant section of armed forces and a not-too-negligible section of radical political parties (including Jamaat and Khelafat-e-Majlis) and groups is likely to be a stumbling block to Bangladesh’s newfound economic progress and political stability. Immediately after her visit in January 2010, I pleaded to India’s policy circles for remaining circumspect and cautious in their approach to changes happening in Bangladesh. As I wrote:

It is important to see how Bangladesh proposes to sustain the tempo of Indo-Bangladesh cooperation that Prime Minster Sheikh Hasina’s recent visit seems to have inaugurated. Indo-Bangla relations still have to grapple with a few albeit formidable question marks in future.[17]

In simple terms, one has to take a more complex and nuanced approach to what was hitherto considered as a simple and linear connection between Bangladeshi and Pakistani States on one hand and the radical Islamist forces on the other. Moreover, if newspaper reports are to be believed, ULFA too is not sitting idle and is now reorienting its policy under the changed circumstances. A change seems to have occurred in respect of its treatment of the media. ULFA now understands the importance of influencing media and civil society according to its own terms. Its earlier approach of holding itself accountable to and respecting the established public opinion of the society by way of regularly responding to readers’ queries and comments in the columns of Budhbar and Sadin has changed to an approach of setting forth the public agenda itself and shaping the terms of public discourse.

ULFA and the Issue of Migration

Although Assam is a standing witness to alarming influx of population from across the borders particularly from Bangladesh, the issue does not form the core of public agenda, for, neither Bangladesh nor ULFA – nor even the Indian State is bothered about the problem. Migration from across the borders dates back to Assam’s hoary past. Although the land forms one of the ancient migratory routes cutting across a number of empires and geopolitical regions, it started being perceived as a problem only in the first half of the twentieth century, when the newly emergent Assamese middle class sensing the strain of the migrants on Assam’s resources mainly land and employment opportunities, articulated its voice in protest. Immigration of course continued unabated even during the time of East Pakistan (1947-1971) for a variety of reasons. Much against their wishes, the leaders of Assam’s anti-foreigners upsurge (1979-1985) agreed finally to accept the immigrants from East Pakistan till 25 March 1971 – a little before Bangladesh was born as an independent country – through a gradual process. The term ‘Bangladeshi’ is used currently in Assam to refer to anyone who has migrated from Bangladesh after the country was born and remains illegally settled in Assam.

Although Assam is a standing witness to alarming influx of population from across the borders, the issue does not form the core of public agenda, for, neither Bangladesh nor ULFA – nor even the Indian State is bothered about the problem. Bangladesh’s response to the question of illegal immigration has so far been two-fold: First, officially Bangladesh continues to follow the same policy of denying that anybody from that country enters or remains illegally in India and that its denial mode continues unabated. One has to recognize immigration as a problem if one were to solve it. Since it pays for Bangladesh to permanently remain in denial mode, it will not be easier on our part to make Bangladesh recognize it. In one of my earlier papers, I actually made a plea for making Bangladesh recognize illegal immigration as a problem.[18]

Secondly and more unofficially, a case is made particularly in scholarly and activist circles in justification of the immigration that has been taking place and some scholars even stretch the point further and claim migration as a ‘natural right’ for the Bangladeshis. For instance, it is argued that the submergence of the coastal areas of Bangladesh under the sea - thanks to such factors as global warming, environmental disasters and climate change - is responsible for their out-migration to the neighbouring areas of India. Since the factors responsible for this are transnational and global, Bangladesh cannot be asked to bear the entire burden of this and other countries too are obliged to share the burden. Environmental justice in this context is defined as burden sharing. Some even raise the demand for ‘lebensraum’ and Bangladeshis’ ‘natural right’ to migration.[19] Between these two extremes, there is also the recognition that the figures dished out by Indian agencies are highly exaggerated and many Bangladeshi scholars make fun of it. For example, Shahedul Anam Khan, who teaches at Dhaka University, argues:

“If we take the (figure of, SKD) 20 million illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in India to be accurate, accreting over a period of twenty years, the daily outflow from Bangladesh on the average comes to around 2,000, a staggering figure indeed!”[20]

On the contrary, Bangladesh accuses India of provoking and inciting Hindu refugees and secessionist forces. The Bangladesh Liberation Organization (previously calling itself the Nikhil Banga Nagarik Sangha) functions allegedly with the support of Hindu migrants. It demands the creation of a separate ‘homeland’ with about 20,000 sq. miles of Bangladeshi territory (comprising Kushtia, Jessore, Faridpur, Khulna, Barishal and Palnakhali) for the 15 million non-Muslim minorities in Bangladesh and also for the 15 million non-Muslim refugees who had been compelled to cross over to India up to 1980.

Although born out of the more militant stream of Assam’s anti-foreigners’ agitation (1979-1985) targeted mainly though not exclusively against the illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, ULFA gradually looked upon Bangladesh as its dreamland of refuge. ULFA – as we have already seen - has reasons to be grateful to Bangladesh and also to the Bangladeshi State. It returned its gratitude by way of shifting its stand on the Bangladeshi immigration in 1992 – indeed an ideological dilution. ULFA’s anti-immigrant stance underwent a complete turnaround by the middle of 1992 when it released an otherwise controversial pamphlet. The pamphlet gratefully remembers the contributions made by the immigrants to different sectors of social life in Assam. It was for instance mentioned that the immigrants have been responsible for rendering the embankments and shifting river islands (popularly known as ‘chars’) cultivable. It is also unfortunate that they became ‘pawns’ in the hands of the ‘wicked’ politicians and are used as ‘vote banks’. The document ‘considers the people of East Bengali ethnic group migrating from East Bengal to Assam as one of the main constituents of the public life of the people of Assam’ and redefines ‘the Assamese’ not merely as the ‘Assamese-speaking people’ but as ‘the veritable mixture of all ethnic groups living in Assam’.[21] The immigrants of the East Bengali origin so far held as potential candidates for expulsion were rechristened as Asombasi Purbabangeeya Jangoshthi (East Bengali ethnic community living in Assam). Much of ULFA’s subsequent political practice, as we know, harped on the historical and demographic continuities between Assam on one hand and East Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh on the other. If there is history of nation-states in South Asia and international borders that separate them, there is also the contra-history that always opens before us alternative possibilities of remaking and reenacting it. The contra-history thus interrupts the otherwise linear history of nation-states at every moment and imposes on the nation-states the onerous obligation of negotiating and coming to terms with it. All histories of nation-states in the region are closely shadowed and haunted by contra-histories of what could have happened but had never had happened.

Indian State does not seem to have read the writing on the wall excepting that the intelligence community paints a grim and alarmist picture:

The file dated March 13, 2002 (25.1.2002 – NEA – 982) states that infiltration from Bangladesh has altered the demographic pattern of the North-East. Bangladeshis constitute more than 35 percent of the population in Nowgong (sic), Sonitpur, Darrang, Dhubri, Dibrugarh, Goalpara, Cachar, Barpeta and Nalbari districts of Assam, says the report. They have apparently started to move towards the upper reaches of the North-East from Tripura and Assam resulting in 135 percent increase in the Bangladeshi Muslim population in Arunachal Pradesh.[22]

What Indian state has done post Assam Accord 1985 is an open book for everyone to see and illegal and undocumented immigration continues unabated although, according to some, the pace and tempo may have considerably slowed down in recent years. Immigration is a problem of the people of Assam – not of ULFA, nor of Bangladesh not even of India.

Bangladesh and Peace with ULFA

Indian State’s presently followed strategy of dealing with ULFA has been three-fold: (a) securing division-by-division or battalion-by-battalion surrender of ULFA and thereby driving a wedge in ULFA ranks; (b) getting Bangladesh to ‘detain’ the top ULFA leaders in a discreet manner and push them across the border so that they may be ‘arrested’ on the Indian soil and (c) promising to let them out of prison only on condition that they accept peace terms.

Barring ULFA's elusive Commander-in-Chief Paresh Baruah, the entire top brass of the outfit is now in jail. The imprisoned leaders include Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Raju Baruah, self-styled Foreign Secretary Sasha Choudhury, Finance Secretary Chitrabon Hazarika, Cultural Secretary Pranati Deka, and ULFA’s political ideologue Bhimkanta Buragohain. Two other leaders - ULFA Vice Chairman Pradip Gogoi and Publicity Chief Mithinga Daimary - are currently out on bail. Now that almost the entire top brass of ULFA is captured, there is much confusion about whether they have ‘surrendered’ themselves or have been ‘arrested’. Official sources, for instance, maintain that Arabinda Rajkhowa and Raju Baruah were arrested only after they had ‘surrendered’ to them, while they declared themselves in the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s (CJM) premises that they had not surrendered and they would never do so. They also asserted that there could not be any dialogue when they were in handcuff. Indian state’s strategy of bringing them to the negotiating table by way of exerting force and pressure and treating them as ordinary ‘criminals’ boomeranged on its face. According to Akhil Ranjan Dutt, this marks the ‘critical turn’ insofar as people’s growing disillusionment with ULFA is concerned. As he argues:

A good number of people gathered in the CJM premises and some of them openly shouted slogans in favour of ULFA. The incident in CJM premises suddenly changed the peoples’ attitude to ULFA as far as public utterances were concerned … People, who are aware of the facts that ULFA did not and do not really represent the genuine interest of the people in Assam as the notion of Independent Assam has not been comprehensively and openly debated; the map of Assam that ULFA claims to represent is too fragmented among different ethnic communities; ULFA has been under the grip of Islamic fundamentalism; and also the act of indiscriminate killing of common people by ULFA etc. will not, however, demand that ULFA be treated like very common criminals. It is for the single reason that ULFA was a product of specific historical circumstances of a marginalized nationality within the over-centralized federal polity of India. Common peoples’ opinion on ULFA is very delicate. Common people are not hardcore supporters of, may be not even sympathetic to ULFA’s violence, but at the same time they continue to perceive the ULFA cadres as their children ….[23]

In other words, ULFA’s ‘death’ and so-called complete erosion of its credibility in public eye have been pronounced by many a commentator so many times since 1992 that one loses count on it.[24] ULFA has died so many such deaths in the past that today on hindsight it is more accurate to say that it is like a cat that has nine lives.

Meanwhile, Pradip Gogoi and Mithinga Daimary who were out on bail met leading personalities of Assam and appealed for their help in furthering the deadlocked peace process. An 11-member forum called Sanmilit Jatiya Abhibartan (SJA) comprising academics, writers, retired police and army officers, rights leaders, and intellectuals, was formed in April 2010 and it claims the support of at least 100 civil society and other ethnic groups. In the same month, the Forum held a citizen's conclave and resolved to initiate peace between the government and the ULFA to put the curtains down to more than three decades of violent insurgency in Assam. It had sought the release of all jailed ULFA leaders to enable them to hold the outfit's Central Committee meeting to take a decision regarding holding of peace talks with the government. Bolstered by the assurances of the ULFA leaders, Prof. Hiren Gohain who heads the Forum had even claimed that if the government were sincere, then even Paresh Baruah would not object to negotiations. The civil society was also made to believe that the ULFA was ready to climb down from its demand for a sovereign homeland for a respectable settlement of issues. It was also decided that the final decision would be taken by the ULFA’s Central Committee. Prof. Gohain has made it crystal clear from the beginning that the Citizens’ Forum would not act as a mouthpiece of ULFA as the group decided to take the initiative as per the wishes of the people for peace. ULFA Vice Chairman Pradip Gogoi was quick in welcoming the move of the Citizens’ Forum.

The difference of approaches should not escape our notice. While the Forum wants ULFA to arrive at a considered decision on the issue of peace only after free and thorough discussion and deliberation in the Central Committee - their own body – thereby lending recognition to the decision-making process that ULFA has set for itself, the government seems only too willing to conduct negotiations with battalion commanders, division-level officers and leaders, in short, whoever is captured and could be brought for talks. While for the Forum, respect for the established norms and procedures is the surest gateway to democratic decisions and durable peace, the government is in a hurry to get them to begin talks – no matter whether talks eventually fail. In one of my papers, I argued that continuation of conflict sometimes is even better than failed talks. The history of peace in the Northeast is essentially the history of peace talks with very few of them culminating in peace and durable order.

Two issues, which prove critical for any peace talks to become successful, are – first, the representative character of those who come forward for talks and secondly, a wider debate on and the availability of institutional designs as possible alternatives for conflict settlement. The representative character of those who come forward for talks can only be ascertained through the Central Committee meeting, that is to say, through the same decision-making norms and procedures that ULFA has established for itself and the more these norms and procedures get short-circuited and bypassed, the more their representation is reduced to the vocal and ultimately the coercive power of their claims. The abortive Shillong Accord (1975) serves as a grim reminder as neither of the signing parties was prepared for taking any responsibility for its success or failure. The militants who signed it did it in their individual capacity and the Naga National Council never owned it up. It turned into what I described as ‘nobody’s communiqué’. [25]

The Centre decided on 17 June, 2010 to start talks with ULFA and formally endorsed the name of former Intelligence Bureau director P.C. Haldar as the interlocutor. “The majority of ULFA leaders favour talks and the government has appointed P.C. Haldar as interlocutor”, Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi had said after the talks with Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram.[26] Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met a 6-member delegation from the Citizen's Forum and said that New Delhi has no objection to releasing six top jailed leaders of the outlawed ULFA if that helped in opening peace talks. The government was ready to provide safe passage. The Chief Minister announced safe passage for all second-rung ULFA leaders who were spread outside the country and various parts of Assam. He said: "We want to include the ULFA battalion commanders in the peace process. Most of them have agreed for talks. I am ready to facilitate safe passage”. Not all of them are Central Committee members.

Also the government’s impatience in conducting negotiations without involving Paresh Baruah – its ‘commander-in-chief’ – is itself part of the problem. "Paresh Baruah would be marginalized if he remains adamant and fails to respect the voices of the people of Assam," the home secretary said.[27] On the other hand, Paresh Baruah’a appeal to Arabinda Rajkhowa and other leaders who had been detained or arrested by the Indian state to be mindful of the historic struggle of ULFA and not to commit any blunder created more confusion and reflected the schism between the two top leaders. Six of Baruah’s top guerrilla commanders are still at large: Antou Choudang, Bijoy Chinese, Jiban Moran, Drishti Rajkhowa, Subal Mahanta and Hira Sarania are still in Bngladesh or Myanmar commanding their deep jungle hideouts. Assam’s Inspector General of Police (IGP)-Law and Order Bhaskarjyoti Mahanta is candid about the post-crackdown scenario for ULFA: “True they suffered a huge setback but the ULFA killing machine is still largely intact. We need to have those field commanders in our net before we can truly relax”.[28]

The Government’s newly appointed interlocutor met Arabinda Rajkhowa inside the prison. While he described the meeting as the beginning of peace talks, Rajkhowa staunchly repudiated the claim saying that there were talks between them but certainly not ‘peace talks’.

It now appears that ULFA and the Government have been sending signals at cross purposes. While for ULFA as well the Citizens’ Forum, the real challenge is to arrive at a settlement – more than simple cessation of hostilities or what is strategic circles is known as ‘suspension of operations’, the Government is thinking in terms of getting ‘the majority of ULFA leaders’ to first ‘surrender’, agree to come forward and sit around the negotiating table. The distinction between peace as settlement and peace as simple cessation of hostilities is only too evident to be recalled here. Is the government thinking in terms of boldly inventing and experimenting with our political institutions as a means of settling the problem? Is any alternative institutional design of addressing the issue of ‘sovereignty’ on offer that might lead to the possible settlement of the problem? We have no clue but Bertil Lintner informs us after his recent visit to the Northeast: “The word here in Guwahati is that New Delhi may try to neutralize ULFA with money and promises of representation in local administrations – as it has done with other separatist movements in India’s north-eastern region”.[29] In the absence of any alternative institutional design, Assam is bracing for yet another abortive peace accord.

In the face of strong Bangladeshi crackdown, ULFA is likely to stage a homecoming of sorts. Although Paresh Baruah is reported to have hitherto been rather indifferent to the Indian Maoists, his rapprochement with “Indian proletariat” (read Hindi speaking poor people whom ULFA had been slaughtering at regular intervals since the early 1990s) is possible – like the Manipuri insurgents. At home or abroad, it is easier to force peace on ULFA, but difficult to address and resolve the nationality questions that it has raised. In a paper written not quite long ago, I argued that these questions are likely to survive any possible redundancy of ULFA insofar as it ceases to raise them .[30]

Albert and Brock in an interesting paper argue that the relevance of a ‘Westphalian State System’ as a ‘normative world order’ has been considerably eroded thanks to the forces and processes of globalization. But they plead for ‘retelling’ the ‘old stories’ centring around such foundational concepts as national identity, national borders and national sovereignty: “… globalization would not constitute a threat to national identity as such but to specific formulations or narratives of this identity. It can be looked at as a new condition under which the old stories about the meaning of belonging to a new nation have to be retold differently”.[31] But, ‘retelling’ the old stories in bold, new ways makes a demand on us for constantly innovating and experimenting with our existing social and political institutions. Institutional solutions can emerge only through an intense public debate. Where is that debate? Who will listen to it?

[Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from original non-English sources are mine – the author.]

[1] I thank Mr. Dileep Chandan and Prof. Veena Sikri for their comments on an earlier draft of the paper. Lapses, if any, are however mine - the author.

[2] Ramakant and P L Bhola eds., Post Cold War Developments in South Asia, (Jaipur Jaipur: RBSA Publishers, 1995), 35.

[3] Alan Ryan, ‘Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict’ in Brian White, Richard Little and Michael Smith eds., Issues in World Politics. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 152.

[4] Subir Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossfire: North East India. (New Delhi: Lancer, 1996), pls provide page number.

[5]Taj Hashmi, ‘The ‘India Factor’ in Indo-Bangladesh Relations’ in Bdnews24.com, January 22, 2010 http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2010/01/22/the-%E2%80%98india-factor%E2%80%99-in-indo-bangladesh-relations/ (accessed on 22 June 2010)

[6] Samir Kumar Das, “National Security in the Age of Globalization: A Study of State’s Responses to Ethnic Insurgencies in Northeastern India’ in Gurnam Singh ed., Ethno-Nationalism and the Emerging World (Dis)order. (New Delhi: Kanishka, 2002), 108-27

[7] Samir Kumar Das, Conflict and Peace in India’s Northeast: The Role of Civil Society, Policy Studies 42. (Washington DC: East-West Center, 2007)

[8] Samir Kumar Das, ‘Constructing the North-East as a Field: Some Observations’ in Punjab Journal of Politics, XXI (1&2), 1997, 13-33

[9] Sengupta, Dipankar & Sudhir Kumar Singh, ‘Introduction’ in Dipankar Sengupta & Sudhir Kumar Singh eds., Insurgency in North-East India: The Role of Bangladesh. (New Delhi: Authorpress/ (Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building) SPONDAN, 2004), 8.

[10] The Sentinel, 23 December 2003.

[11] Bertil Lintner,: ‘ULFA: Rudder-less Rebellions’ in Look East, May, 2010. 18

[12] Diganta, “Was ULFA helped by Bangladesh Officials in Chittagong”, The New Horizon, March 24, 2009, http://horizonspeaks.wordpress.com/2009/03/04/ulfa-truck-in-chittagong-helped-by-bangladesh-officials/ (accessed on 22 June 2010).

[13] Vijendra Singh Jafa, ‘Insurgencies in North-East India: Dimensions of Accord and Containment’ in S. D. Muni ed., Responding to Terrorism in South Asia. (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), 92.

[14] Anand Kumar, ‘Indo-Bangladesh Relations under the Caretaker Government’, South Asia Analysis Group, no. 2266 (June 11, 2007),http:// www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers23%5Cpaper2266.html

[15] Bertil Lintner,: ‘ULFA: Rudder-less Rebellions’ in Look East, May, 2010. 17

[16] Rekha Saha, Indo-Bangladesh Relations, (Calcutta: Minerva, 2000), 183. Also see Shahedul Anam Khan, ‘The State and Limits of Counter-Terrorism – II: The Experience of India and Bangladesh’ in Imtiaz Ahmed ed., Understanding Terrorism in South Asia: Beyond Statist Discourses. (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), 162

[17] Samir Kumar Das, ‘Wrestling with My Shadow: The State and the Immigrant Muslims of Contemporary West Bengal’ in Masahiko Togawa and Abhijit Dasgupta eds., Minorities of Bengal (tentatively titled). (New Delhi: Sage, 2010), 54

[18] Samir Kumar Das ‘Ethnicity and Security in Assam: A Plea for Greater Indo-Bangladesh Partnership’ in C. Joshua Thomas ed., Engagement and Development: India’s Northeast and Neighbouring Countries (New Delhi: Akansha/Shillong: Indian Council of Social Science Research, North East regional Centre, 2006), 134-163.

[19] Samir Kumar Das, ‘Wrestling with My Shadow: The State and the Immigrant Muslims of Contemporary West Bengal’ in Masahiko Togawa and Abhijit Dasgupta eds., Minorities of Bengal (tentatively titled).(New Delhi: Sage, 2010)

[20] Shahedul Anam Khan, ‘The State and Limits of Counter-Terrorism – II: The Experience of India and Bangladesh’ in Understanding Terrorism in South Asia: Beyond Statist Discourses. (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), 163

[21] ULFA, “Asomabasi Purbangeeya janagoshthiloi ULFA-r Ahvan” (in Assamese) [ULFA’s Call to the Groups of East Bengal Living in Assam], Budhbar (Guwahati), 24 June 1992, 5–6.

[22] Nirmal Jindal, ‘Insurgency in Bangladesh: The Role of Bangladesh’ in Dipankar Sengupta & Sudhir Kumar Singh eds., Insurgency in North-East India: The Role of Bangladesh. (New Delhi: Authorpress/ Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPONDAN), 2004), 211

[23] Akhil Ranjan Dutta, ‘ULFA Episode at the Crossroads’ 2010,

[24] Thus a commentator observes in 1998: “Today, Assamese insurgent groups find themselves rejected by their own people and enjoy diminishing external support for their cause” (Sawhny 1998:88).

[25] Samir Kumar Das, ‘Nobody’s Communique: Ethnic Accords in Northeastern India’ in Ranabir Samaddar & Helmut Reifeld eds., Peace As Process: Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution in South Asia. (New Delhi: Manohar, /New Delhi: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2001), 231-52

[26]“Emissary for ULFA talks” The Telegraph, Calcutta, 17 June 2010 http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100617/jsp/nation/story_12574913.jsp

[27]‘ULFA leaders to surrender shortly: Pillai’ http://www.zeenews.com/news631835.html updated on Sunday, June 06, 2010, 12:23 IST accessed on 22 June 2010

[28] Bertil Lintner,: ‘ULFA: Rudder-less Rebellions’ in Look East, May, 2010, 21

[29] Ibid. 19

[30] Samir Kumar Das, ‘Assam: Insurgency and the Disintegration of Civil Society’ in Faultlines: Writings on Conflict and Resolution, South Asian Portal for Terrorism, 13, November 2002, 95-116. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume13/Article5.htm.

[31] Mathias Albert & Lothar Brock, ‘What Keeps Westphalia Together? Normative Differentiation in the Modern System of States’ in Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, Yosef Lapid eds., Identities Borders Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 46

CHALLENGES TO PARA-MILITARY FORCES

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Sat, 09 Oct 2010 03:38:00 +0000

K S Sood, DIG (Retd) PMG, PMMS

On 6 April 2010, killing of 76 CRPF personnel in an ambush by Maoists in Dantewada has stunned the nation and raised a question whether the Indian Police and Central Para- military Forces (CPMFs) are prepared to take on the highly motivated and very well trained cadres of Maoists or the government’s policy is flawed. Attacks on the CPMFs, especially the CRPF deployed in the troubled Naxal-affected regions are getting frequent; the security forces have become a target for Naxal attacks in the ‘Red Corridor.

Recurring attacks on security personnel and innocent civilians is indeed a challenge to our democratic set up. Security forces have suffered 226 casualties in counter-insurgency operations; so far this year (2010), in the Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected States. In 2009, this number was 312 out of total 431 casualties. In 2008, more than 57% of total security forces casualties in insurgency-related violence were reported from the LWE states.

In a meeting of Politburo, CPI (Maoists) had decided to take on the Government head on and they have been able to bring about divisions in the Govt. Some UPA ministers and party members feel that Governments approach to tackle the issue is harsh and suggest dealing with them with ‘Development Approach”. These contradictions within the UPA have confused the public and diluted an effective and determined policy approach against the Maoists.

Due to structural and systematic deficiencies even after six decades of Counter Insurgency experience, we are still struggling in our efforts to contain Naxal violence. To deal with insurgencies and disorders, the Government has relied upon CPMFs, which are easily available and can be a rapidly deployed to tackle any crisis. But due to continuous expansion of the theatres of violence, CPMFs are under severe pressure and unable to co up with the situations. An analysis of the `threat` dimension would define the role of the paramilitary forces; the `capability` dimension defines the structures, manpower and resources needed to achieve the organisational objectives; and the time dimension defines the urgency of creating the required paramilitary capability. To deal effectively and proactively, to meet the existing and emerging challenges, tremendous efforts are required in building basic capability dimension of CPMFs. Are the troops in these areas, physically fit, well trained, mentally alert and logistically well-equipped to take on counter-insurgency operations in the tough terrains of LWE affected states?

The country’s internal security situation demands a robust policing and paramilitary framework. Capabilities at Police Station level and in CPMFs at Platoon and Company level have to be adequate and go hand in hand to meet the challenges. In rapidly changing internal security scenario, the role assigned to CPMFs has undergone substantial changes. Para-military forces today, are multi task forces dealing with security, counter insurgency, law and order, border management, election duty, disaster management to list a few.

In sub-conventional operations requirements are different from conventional operations. Sub-conventional operations are the most difficult because concept of enemy cannot be applied to own people as a result the role of CPMFs has become more challenging. Having served both in the Army and BSF, I would not hesitate to say that life in Para- military forces is very tough as day in and out they are facing numerous challenges without any respite.

CPMFs have been expanding for the last 10-15 years, new battalions are being raised at break neck speed and at the same time proper training of the men; their equipment and logistics have not gone alongside. In spite of expansion at a large scale the Para-military Forces face grave challenges and have no respite. Mere increase in number of battalions will not enhance their efficiency when one views the weaknesses in command and control, organizational structure and state of training. Para-military Forces have not been able to innovate at the tactical level, lack of vigor at the junior levels of command, and not learning from the past mistakes are some of the reasons for their set backs. The Dantewada tragedy in which 75 CRPF personnel were brutally killed in an ambush is a serious operational failure and shows the inability of the Police and Para-military Forces to contain the Naxal violence.

Despite simmering resentment within the rank and file, life goes on. A middle ranking CRPF officer says, “Those who understand the ground realities do not have the power to decide and those who have the power to decide, do not understand the ground realities.”

We must draw lessons from the actions of operationally deployed Platoons and Company’s which are the source of rich ground experience, instead of strategy being worked out by inexperienced officers who have never served in the field, thus are unaware of the ground realities.

On the other hand the militarization and lethal capabilities of Naxals are on the rise. Naxalites have attacked Para-military camps and fought pitched battle for hours and they have well-coordinated, trained and ideologically brainwashed cadres and units. LWE tactics is to “Lure Forces into Trap.” Armed Naxal cadres who have no fear of the presence of security forces can now gather in Bn / Brigade size groups at their time and place of choice. CPMFs have the obvious disadvantage of not knowing the local language, area, customs, traditions and it is here the role of well trained local Police comes to play.

Police is a strong arm of the Govt., its strength and efficiency is essential for the Govts credibility. Civil police have roots in the society; they belong to that area, have deep knowledge of the terrain, know the local language and have bonds with the people, which are the key to success in any counter insurgency operation. Punjab and Andhra Pradesh provide an outstanding example of success achieved by the local police and Para-military forces in successful counterinsurgency campaigns.

No counterinsurgency campaign can succeed without the cooperation of the local police. Analyzing a series of Naxal incidents as case studies, grey areas in police training are:

a) Lack of physical and mental robustness.

b) Lack of soldierly and disciplinary traits

c) Lack of knowledge of field craft and tactics.

d) Poor firing skills.

A well trained, professionally committed and motivated local police with CPMFs can tackle any type of internal disorder. But at present there is a mismatch in training capabilities and infrastructure in most of the States. However STF personnel in most of the Naxalism- affected States are generally performing better as they are better trained; however they completely need to switch over to the combat role.

Paramilitary forces can achieve outstanding results against the insurgents only when they work in close coordination with the local police forces. But Para-military forces at times, feel hesitant in having close liaison with the Police and don’t feel comfortable in taking orders or working under the directions of local Police.

Modernization of Police and Para-military forces should go hand in hand as their duties are complimentary to each other in counter insurgency operations. Modernize and strengthen the Police at the police station level instead of making it top heavy.

In order to enhance the capabilities of Police and Para-military Forces in Naxal affected States, the Centre and State Government’s have initiated numerous steps. Combat capability of Special Police Forces, like raising of special anti-Naxal forces, specialized training to SPFs in counter insurgency and jungle warfare, providing better arms, ammunition, equipment and BP vehicles.

What are the challenges which are being faced by Para-military forces? We need to examine as to why different organizations with same weapons and manpower and from the same background perform differently in anti-terrorist and anti-insurgency operations. Difference in performance is due to lack of leadership, chain of command, neglect of training, higher age profile, professional ethos, manner of employment, regimentation, and logistics and its responsiveness.

BSF and CRPF are the main Para-military forces fighting Terrorism, Insurgency and Naxalism. BSF was raised in 1965 with 25 Bns has now 159 Bns. Each Bn has got 7 Companies with strength of 137 personnel in each company. But the effective strength of a company when it moves out to an operational area comes to only 75 to 80 personnel. Imagine if the Company is deployed in any operational area it will have fighting strength of only 60 -65 personnel after taking out personnel for administration and other duties.

Britishers raised Crown Representative Police in 1939 to quell “dacoity” in States. After Independence it became Central Reserve Police. It was deployed on Indo-China and Indo-Pak borders along with Army and did very well. In 1974 it became CRPF with the basic role of striking reserve to assist States/UTs in police operations to maintain law and order and to contain Insurgency. Besides the word Force, it still has the word Police and is treated as Police. It has various roles – crowd control, election duty, law and order problem, CI, personnel security, protection of flora and fauna etc. CRPF has got 208 Bns and is the biggest Para-military force in the world.

The question arises why our CPMFs are not being able to meet the challenges. The following factors can be attributed:-

a) Organizational structure at Functional level needs a change.

b) Inadequacy in training imparted to Police and CPMFs.

c) Lack of coordination between Police and CPMFs.

d) Non availability of reserves.

e) Lack of effective leadership

f) Lack of actionable Intelligence

g) Prolonged deployments

h) Lack of regimentation

j) Morale and Motivation

k) Political interference in working of Police and CPMFS.

Organizational structure at Functional level needs a change

Para-military forces should work on doctrines based on latest strategic perceptions and by structuring the organization accordingly. Internal Security duties demand a manpower intensive establishment at the activity level that is at the Platoon and Company level. In a Company effective strength available is 75 – 80 out of 137 personnel. Seven Companies with small functional strength affects the operational capability of a Battalion. So the number of Companies should be reduced to four, but at the same time increase the strength of the Company from 137 to 190, so that minimum 150 men are available in each Company for the operations. A weak Platoon or Company in terms of manpower does not instill confidence in a junior commander. So changes at the basic structural level are the need of the hour.

Inadequacy in training imparted to Police and CPMFs

The fact that a sub unit of a well organized Para-military force was literally massacred raises some serious questions of training and adherence to basic tactics/field craft. Case studies of Naxal related incidents have revealed that one of the prime reasons for recurring security force casualties has been the inadequacy in training imparted to them. Training has to be realistic, dynamic, progressive and responsive to the changing environment. To remain responsive to emerging challenges, the curriculum both conceptually and contextually should be reviewed periodically. But there is no such Directorate in CPMFs which can function as a think-tank and generate ideas, concepts and eventually a doctrine responsive to the present day training needs.

With the passage of time and multifarious commitments, the culture of training has eroded in CPMFs. Senior commanders are unable to implement training programmes due to heavy commitments of the CPMFs in multifarious administrative and security duties. I can confidently say that after 1988 hardly any collective training has been carried out at Bn / Coy level in CPMFs due to heavy commitments. Even most of the training pamphlets have not been revised during the last 15 years.

Is it reasonable to expect a person trained like a policeman to perform like a commando after six / eight weeks of pre-induction training? What about his mindset and reflexes? Can you change the mind set and reflexes of a 50 years old person in six weeks?

CRPF has got five Recruit Training Centers, each capable of training 1200 recruits in a year. 69 CRPF Battalions have been raised during the last ten years mostly at Group Centers instead of Recruit Training Centers, without proper trainers, ranges, equipment and accommodation. CRPFs prestigious training centre at Neemuch has a Recruit Training Centre and Central Training College which conducts approx 48 Courses in a year. Only eight officers are authorized as Instructors and they perform other duties also. In the Army for example to run a single Junior Command course 1 Major General, 5 Brigadiers and 48 Colonels are available. So you can imagine their standard of training which is flawless and how professionally sound they are.

In the absence of effective evaluation system to monitor the training imparted no one is accountable for the final outcome. The focus at times shifts to maintenance of the area, parks, and officer’s mess, places that a VIP is likely to visit and appreciate.

There is tremendous pressure on the availability of training areas, firing ranges due to rapid urbanization. Therefore we need to improve our training infrastructure.

There are 215 State Police and 69 Central Training Institutes in the country. A large number of States Police training Institutes do not have proper team of Instructors. In State police, posting in a Police training centre is considered as a punishment posting. Such type of unwilling personnel cannot impart training in a real sense.

A survey has revealed the following:-

Very few training institutions have published training material for use by the trainees.
Quality of trainers is generally poor and posting in a police training centre is considered as a punishment posting.
23 Police training institutions were functioning without classrooms, 18 without blackboards, 16 without overhead projectors, 57 without conference rooms, 76 without seminar or assembly halls, 20 without library, 70 without auditorium, 93 without simulation facilities, 72 without computers.

Cobra Bns now called SAF (Special Action Force) Battalions of CRPF are doing a much better job in anti Naxal operations because they are a younger lot, better trained and highly motivated. Each SAF Battalion has 33 young officers compared to 14 officers in a regular Battalion. We certainly need more SAF Battalions to take on the Naxalites.

There is a need, for certain amount of structured training at training centers for Counter insurgency apart from re-orientation training before their deployment. Well trained CPMFs are in the national interest, as they are of great help to the Army in a hot war scenario.

Lack of coordination between Police and CPMFs

Lack of coordination between State and CPMF became public in July 2010, when Chhatisrgarh DGP, said, “We can’t teach the CRPF how to walk,” after the Centre called for "relocation and reconfiguration" of CPMF. Special DG (Naxal Operations) CRPF retaliated with an allegation of non-cooperation from state police. The problem of coordination persists at various levels which is hampering the performance of Para-military Forces. Most of the times it is an ego based issue.

Lack of coordination is also evident due to lack of understanding of operational ethos and gap in training. Police personnel train separately but work jointly with CPMFs in CI operations, which is a major handicap in ensuring coordination at all levels. Training of State police and Para-military forces is totally different. Newly raised India Reserve Battalions from some States are being sent to Border Security Force training centers for training, similar arrangements need to be done for State Armed Police and District Police personnel.

After the Dantewada incident of 6^th April 10, CRPF is caught in a bureaucratic red tape as junior leadership has to take permission from its HQs at New Delhi to launch any operation even on the information given by the local police. By the time permission is received by the field commanders, Maoists have already moved out. It is clear that something is amiss so far as the coordination is concerned at joint operational level.

Non availability of reserves

In Naxal areas deployment and operations are company based and a company covers approx a vast area of 18-20 Kms. There are no reserves / reinforcements available in case of any eventuality. While talking to some CPMFs officers deployed in Orissa, they showed serious concern about the non availability of reinforcements / reserves which can come to their rescue. Non availability of reserves is at the back of their mind which affects the performance of CPMFs as they hesitate to venture out of their camps in an unknown terrain which is mined.

Lack of effective Leadership

In CI operations where the stakes are very high, well trained and experienced officers, confer a sense of protection on their subordinates by virtue of their skills. In this harsh, dangerous and stressful environment, it is the effective leadership which will keep the high motivational levels.

The organizational process of identifying gaps in performance is important, and has to be an ongoing exercise. When the senior leadership has rarely stayed in tents or moved in jungles, it could be difficult to inspire cutting edge levels of command. The lessons have to be learnt, from the junior officers in the field who are engaged in actual combat.

Counter Insurgency operation is a small commander’s war, fought at Company / Platoon level. Effective Counter Insurgency operations cannot be controlled by centralized command. There is a requirement to have faith in the junior leadership and allow them to take decisions as they are the better judge to understand and know the ground realities. Make them more accountable and responsible in handling the situations

Lack of actionable Intelligence

There are a large number of State and Central Intelligence Agencies working in India but with little co-ordination among them. These agencies mainly work in urban and strategic areas, leaving vast rural area uncovered. Collection, collation and dissemination of Information take a long time. When the Para-military forces move in they feel handicapped due to non availability of actionable intelligence.It is also not easy to gather information about the Naxalites in these areas, as Naxals have a terrorizing influence over the locals.

Naxalites use traditional methods of communication which the security forces find difficult to decipher. Locals living in the interior areas avoid the Police and would not dare to provide any information to the Police because of the fear to their lives, if caught by Naxalites. The Para-military forces also find themselves handicapped as the Maoists are not using modern means of communications as it increases their chances of detection and neutralization. So there is no flow of technical intelligence.

Security Forces thus are more dependent on Human Intelligence, which is not forth coming. Urban sources do not hesitate, in reporting to the Police but in the case of Maoist insurgency, the villagers are reluctant to report against their co-villagers. Villages are thinly-populated in deep jungles, so Police informers get easily exposed where advantage of anonymity is weak and there is no protection for village sources against the backlash by the Maoists. The ability of the rural Police to collect information depends upon on its movement in the affected areas and its relationship with the village community. Fears caused by the frequent use of landmines and being ambushed with devastating effect have affected the movement of Police and CPMFs in patrolling in rural areas which has also resulted into lack of police-community relationship. Thus the Police and CPMFs are not able to remain in regular touch with the villagers, as a result cannot collect worth while intelligence about the Naxalites.

BSF and CRPF have got Intelligence branch as an integral part of each Coy/Bn. But they are unable to mix up with local tribes due to language problem, area not being familiar and they can be detected very easily. So lack of information is a big challenge to launch INT based anti-Naxal operations.

Prolonged deployments

Para-military forces especially CRPF personnel are deployed continuously on operational duties. There are very few static establishments, which accommodate less than 15 % of the strength of CRPF personnel. This continuous deployment from one theatre to another exhausts them physically, mentally and psychologically and erodes their capabilities. You cannot expect good results from depressed personnel who most of the times live in inhuman conditions without proper accommodation in some States.

In the Army field tenure is followed by a peace / hard peace posting in rotation. In peace posting they train hard. We, on the other hand, find ourselves in combat postings for a long time,” said a CRPF official. But in CPMFs there is no such opportunity when the troops are free. From Border duties they move to election duty, law and order duty, CI duties so there is no respite for them.

In 2009, 14,422 Para-military Jawans applied for voluntary retirement from service— up 85 percent from the previous year and 112 percent from 2007. But only 4,622 soldiers sought voluntary retirement from the Indian Army, which is much bigger, than all the paramilitary forces put together.

Lack of Regimentation

Para- military forces have no regimentation hence no sense of belonging. For example in army a recruit after joining an army unit retires from the same unit only. For a young officer there is no bigger honor than to command the unit in which he was commissioned. There have been numerous examples when an officer on promotion as a Commanding Officer opted to defer his promotion and wait for the present incumbent to finish his tenure, so that he can command the same unit which he joined on commission.

A soldier will sacrifice his life for the honor of his unit and not for the country. In response to a question to men that “What makes them to risk their life, 82% reported in favour of Units pride”. Regimentation is an essential ingredient of morale and motivation. This system should be adopted by CPMFs. The system now to some extent has started in BSF.

Morale and Motivation

CPI (Maoists) have been able to induce fear in the minds of CPMFs by successful attacks and this coupled with inadequate training, and equipment has adversely affected the morale of the troops.

CRPF attached to police stations is mainly deployed on Company/Platoon bases. CPMF units must operate as cohesive Unit, under the direct command of the commanding officer and not as independent companies, with the commanding officer responsible only for administration. A commanding officer, whose companies are deployed for anti-Maoist operations in Chhatisrgarh, Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh and is sitting in his battalion HQ in Chennai, cannot be effective in exercising operational control, ensuring high standards of training and boosting the morale of the men under his command who are deployed miles away. But Commanding Officers are still held responsible for any operational or administrative lapse under such circumstances?

The ever increasing requirement of Para-military forces in CI operations from one theatre to another has become a regular feature, resulting in their constant and prolonged deployments in inhospitable terrain, staying away from their families, frequent moves, not being able to attend functions in the family. Low intensity conflict operations and proxy wars have put tremendous professional and psychological pressures on Para-military Forces. CI operations are very tough but there is no rest and recreation for the troops.

A jawan joining BSF waits for approx 18 years to get his first promotion as a Head Constable. Rank of Lance Naik and Naik were done away with by the 6^th Pay Commission on the recommendations of BSF. Hence to wait for 18 years to get first promotion has adversely affected the morale of the troops. BSF has now taken up a case for reintroduction of rank of Lance Naik and Naik.

Therefore, the importance of sustaining the motivation level and morale of troops in these circumstances, assumes added significance. Troops are facing stress, tension, frustration, anger which has resulted into their low performance and a large number of suicide cases. Numerical superiority of manpower or weapons does not motivate a jawan but highly motivated leadership can bring the desired results.

Higher Age Profile on CPMFs

Personnel in CPMFs from class IV to commandant retire at the age of 57 and DIG and above retires at 60.The local promote officers are well past their middle age and cannot lead by example from front. Even lower ranks are in higher age group and to expect these men to trek 15 Kms a day or move in jungles in humid conditions is asking for too much. CRPF which has got 208 battalions may work out and have 100 battalions of personnel in higher age group for exclusively tackling law and order problems and the remaining 108 battalions must have younger lot to be deployed for CI operations.

Political Interference in working of Police and CPMFs

There is lot of interference in the working of Police by the leaders of political parties, especially those who are in power. For example in Bihar Special Auxiliary Police (SAP) with 4000 ex-army men was raised on a two-year contract, to fight Naxal outfits.

The SAP succeeded in some cases to push the Naxalites on the back foot, although in the process, it suffered some casualties. But today most of the elite force is now being utilized in providing protection to the VIPs of Bihar. Political leadership in some of the States is reluctant to join the war on Red Terror to remain in power. In some States Maoists are considered as a misled lot and should be dealt with sympathy and not by CPMFs. They have forgotten that Maoists one point agenda is armed over throw of the Indian State and finish democracy in this country.

Maoist terrorism is the gravest threat today to the national security. There is no unanimous stand in UPA how to fight the Maoists. Union Home Minister seems to have washed of his hands of the matter after he was given a limited mandate for the use of Armed Forces to fight against the Maoists. The Congress allies in UPA are playing a double role. Mamta Banerjee openly condemned the killing of Maoist leader Azad in a so called Police encounter. Bihar Chief minister has rejected the Union Government’s proposal for joint operations against Maoists in Bihar. Unless and until Political leadership is determined to deal sternly with Maoists State Police and CPMFs cannot succeed.

Following a large number of serious set backs suffered at the hands of Maoists and in the absence of clear directions at Political level in different States the morale of Police and CPMFs is low. There is an urgent need for the up gradation of state police force in terms of transformation in doctrine, manpower utilization, training and methods through which they would operate in these areas. Military operations are the only dimension of the totality of strategies the State needs to employ in such a serious internal conflict to save the country from disintegration.

CONFLICT IN NEPAL: IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENT AND ITS CROSS-BORDER IMPLICATIONS

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Tue, 05 Oct 2010 04:40:00 +0000

B.C. Upreti

Plural societies, authoritarian and dictatorial political systems and discriminatory and underdeveloped economies which are faced with several complex situations are prone to various types of horizontal and vertical conflicts. In countries where all these factors are combined together conflicts become more vibrant and intensive in nature. In such cases the settlement of conflicts and building peace on a sustained basis becomes a vital aspect of the process of nation-building. Social inequalities and social discriminations, authoritarianism, exclusive nature of the democratic political systems, failure of the governments in delivering goods and realizing basic needs of the people, inequalities, economic disparities and discriminatory development, etc. have been the major causes of conflicts in most of the cases. It is thus clear that conflict is the manifestation of differing situations, perceptions, attitudes and approaches of groups/communities within a society. It occurs due to different views, ideologies and beliefs about a particular situation.

It is not surprising that the south Asian states have faced many violent conflicts. In some instances these conflicts have led to the eventual disintegration of the state. Social complexities and backwardness, economic disparities and underdevelopment and absence of inclusive democratic governance have given rise to various conflicts in the region. However, what is important is that, due to geographical compactness and continuity and socio-cultural linkages, these conflicts have cross-country implications.

Although Nepal has faced several conflicts over time, they were contained by the authoritarian rulers through the use of coercive powers. The socio-economic and political discriminations and disparities were for long being pushed under the carpet of authoritarian rule.[1]. After the 1990 democratic change it was expected that an inclusive political system and equitable and just socio-economic order would help realizing needs and aspirations of the people. Unfortunately, the democratic governments of the day neither succeeded in giving way to an inclusive democracy and the transformation of the feudal-hierarchal socio-economic order nor in realizing the rising aspirations of the people. It was not merely the question of failure of the democratic governments in the post-1990 phase in delivering goods, but the continuation of the political dominance of the monarchy and the perpetuation of the feudal social order that had become a source of discontent. It annoyed the leftist forces particularly the hardcore communists who were against the continuation of the monarchic and feudal state.[2] It may be noted here that in the 1990 nationwide democratic movement, all the political forces including the communists had extended their full support to the movement but the hardcore communists were soon disillusioned by the nature and dynamics of democratic governance. They, however, utilized the democratic space for raising a war against the state that ultimately culminated into the Maoist insurgency beginning in early 1996.

The Maoist insurgency that continued for almost a decade proved to be a phase of deep structural crisis in Nepal affecting every dimension of the Nepalese society.[3] In the post 2006 period considerable efforts have been made towards creating conditions for peace, stability and democracy in the country. One has to take note of the fact that the restructuring of a post-conflict society requires a well founded strategy of peace building. To what extent the post-conflict Nepalese state has been able to do that is a different issue. However, a broad based strategy needs proper understanding of the implications of the conflict and the ways and means to overcome the damages done by the conflict.

Any conflict of the nature of a protracted war is bound to have wide ranging implications for the society, economy and polity. One vital aspect of the implications of a conflict in modern times is the impact on the environment. In fact, it is now being realized that the conflicts have highly devastating impacts on the environment. There is a closer nexus between conflict and environment and peace building needs to incorporate the diverse aspects of environmental regeneration. The shared nature of the eco-system and some of the natural resources in particular in a compact geographical region, result in cross border implications of a conflict within a state. This chapter outlines the impact of the Maoist conflict on the environment in Nepal.

Maoist Conflict in Nepal: An Overview

Nepal suffered the worst kind of conflict in the form of the Maoist insurgency that has no parallels in the recent political history of the country. The ‘people’s war,’ an armed uprising by the Maoist extremists began in February 1996 in four districts of western Nepal but by the end of 2001 it had expanded to most parts of the country thereby posing a major challenge to security and stability of the country. The Maoist insurgency was a reflection upon the complex nature of the Nepalese state and society and the deep rooted contradictions that it was faced with.[4] Several factors are behind the rise of the Maoist conflict in Nepal. These factors include a long list starting from variations in infra-structural development; poverty; un-employment; lack of fulfillment of basic needs; class, caste and region based disparities and discriminations; highly centralized power structure; exclusive political representation; development mismatch and failure to denial of access to and control over production resources; Nepal’s failed development; false impression of a monolithic society; social divides and political mishandlings; radical ideological orientation; operational contradictions within democratic political parties and power politics and opportunism.[5]The Maoist insurgency was basically targeted against the state and the institutions, parties, groups and individuals having an alliance with the feudalistic state in one form or the other. It should be noted that in most of the cases of prolonged insurgencies it is the common people, the youth, and the weaker sections of the society which become victims of the conflict. This has also been the case with Nepal in the last decade.

The Maoist Movement grew over the years in terms of its capabilities, strength, influence, strategies, and violent operations.[6] In fact, one may argue that the Maoist insurgency had reached a critical stage and succeeded in paralyzing the Nepalese economy, society and polity in a big way. The Maoist movement of Nepal took advantage of the prevailing socio-economic and political conditions in the country and grew into a strong movement, sustained itself, and reached a stage of challenging the state apparatus. It is true that the Maoists had linkages with a number of international revolutionary organizations. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the Maoist revolutionaries of Nepal cultivated strong constituencies, took possession of arms and finances by force, raised their army of young and committed revolutionaries, and in ten years time brought nearly one third of the country under their influence.[7] The Maoist movement flared up in Nepal at a time when the international communist movement was experiencing a low profile.

The demands of the Maoists could be understood at two levels: Firstly, the socio-economic agenda, which was related to the issues of socio-economic reforms, equality, and distributive justice. Secondly, the political agenda related to transformation of the Nepalese political system by converting it into a Republican State. It would have been possible for the Nepalese state to deal with the Maoists separately on these two types of agendas. A strong economic package would have diluted the propensity of the movement. It would have also minimized the social bases of the Maoists. It may also be argued here that movement or no movement; socio-economic transformation should have been the primary agenda of any government after the establishment of democracy in Nepal. The absence of good governance in the post 1990 period gave strength and justification to the movement. In fact, the issue of offering an economic package to the Maoists had come up in 2001, but the government did not agree to it. The question of the Constituent Assembly and a republican constitution has not been new to Nepal. These demands have been raised repeatedly since 1950. Why Nepal should the ruling elite and political parties feel shy about taking up these issues for a wider consideration? Is it not possible to initiate a public debate on these issues and create a national consensus over their implementation or rejection? It appears that the narrow political interest and divisive politics came in the way of discussing these issues. The Maoists took advantage of this divisiveness and raised a movement on that basis. The Maoists succeeded easily in tapping the discontent among the ethnic groups, Dalits, women, Madhesi’s and the youth in general. It was due to the support of these groups that Maoists could easily hit back at the state of Nepal which was considered to be largely responsible for discrimination and the elite who were regarded as exploiters and profiteers.

There was a stage when Maoists had acquired a lot of sympathy and support, mainly in the countryside, particularly due to their stand against social abuses. However, gradually the popularity of the Maoists was at stake. People were fed up with the continuous strikes, violence, threats, forced inclusion of young children in the Maoist army, and economic hardships. They feared being killed either by the army or the Maoists. The people in the countryside realized that even the Maoists had not been able to do anything better. The Maoists gradually lost the earlier earned popularity in the countryside. However, they did not lose control. Despite resentment among the people in rural areas, they continued to control vast areas.

Since the first ceasefire by the Maoists in August 2001 till the end of the last round of talks between the Maoists and the government in November, 2001, there was sufficient scope for a negotiated settlement to the problem. But neither the government, the Maoists, the democratic political parties and nor the civil society of Nepal could take initiative. While the two negotiating groups remained adamant on their respective positions, political parties and the civil society organizations were less concerned or had no solution to the problem. The situation changed drastically with the declaration of state emergency in November, 2001 and the subsequent deployment of the Royal Nepalese Army for the containment of the Maoists. The state of emergency not only resulted in more powers for the army but also resulted in the curtailment of press and political freedom. The conflict became more violent and intensive in the years following the government’s emphasis on finding a military solution.

The escalation of the protracted war also gave an opportunity to the monarchy after mid 2001, when a new King took over the thrown, to hit back at the government for its failure and incapability in handling the conflict situation. The elected government of Sher Bahadur Deuba was dismissed by King Gyanendra in October 2002, on the grounds of its failure to hold general elections on time and manage the Maoist conflict. It was clear that the monarchy was trying to consolidate its political powers and position by taking advantage of the conflict situation. The second round of peace talks in 2003 also failed, although the King himself had shown interest in initiating the peace negotiations.

The political ambitions of king Gyanendra became evident when he assumed all powers in early 2005.[8] The authoritarian rule of the monarch, abuse of power and authority, control over civic liberty, freedom and rights, use of state power to control unfavorable civil behavior, etc. made political parties realize that the monarchy was the main stumbling block for democracy. It led to the formation of a Seven Party Alliance to fight against authoritarianism and restore democracy. The Maoists developed an understanding with the democratic political parties and agreed to join the constitutional and democratic path for the realization of their goals. They declared a ceasefire and lent their support to the democratic parties in raising the second democratic movement in April 2006. The CPN (Maoist) and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) developed an understanding over the issues of republican state, Constituent Assembly and secular – federal state. The Maoists joined political mainstream in the post 2006 period. The interim constitution of early 2007 and the Maoist entry to the interim government, the emergence of the CPN (M) as the largest party in 2008 Constitutional Assembly elections, the formation of the Maoist government and then the fall of the Maoist government in late 2009 were all dramatic developments and of challenges.[9] Despite political understanding and peace process there was always a lingering fear of a return to the conflict situation. However, one may agree that the Maoist movement gave a new direction to Nepalese politics.

It may also be pointed out here that any conflict is bound to have adverse socio-economic and other implications. While the socio-economic impacts of a conflict can be much more devastating and wide-ranging, the impact of a conflict on the environment is equally important. This chapter outlines the impact of the Maoist conflict on the environment in Nepal.

Conflict and Environment: Some Issues

Human beings are an integral part of the eco-system. The activities of the human beings, constructive or destructive, are bound to affect the environment in either way. The human history is full of evidences of conflicts that have plundered the environment. There are three important aspects of the impact of conflict on environment. Firstly, the nature and intensity of environmental degeneration due to a conflict would depend upon the intensity and longevity of the conflict itself.[10] Secondly, the conflict may have direct as well as indirect implications for the environment. Thirdly, it is not necessary that the conflict would have negative consequences only, there can be certain positive impacts as well depending upon the goals and strategies of the conflict. However, it can be said that the positive consequences are minimal in comparison to the negative consequences of a violent conflicts.

Most of the theoretical propositions regarding the interlinkages between the conflict and the environment are concerned with the environment related conflicts.[11]In fact environment related conflicts have increased in our times and have acquired a place in the development agenda of nation states. Land grabbing or green conflict, illegal settlements, occupation of forest areas, dependence on forest based resources, resettlement and displacement, sharing and utilization of renewable natural resources, exploitation and control of mineral resources etc. are major issues in environmental conflicts.

Environmental conflicts may be caused due to a number of factors[12] such as:-

1. Scarcity of natural resources caused largely due to population pressure.

2. Uneven distribution of resources.

3. Control over natural resources.

4. Exploitation and sharing of natural resources.

5. Abundance of resources leading to their misuse.

Environmental hazards caused by a violent conflict provide an entirely different dimension of the linkages between conflict and environment. The impact of the conflict on environment can be multi-dimensional involving the following issues:

1. Destruction of natural resources due to a war like situation.

2. Excessive exploitation of natural resources and bio-diversity by the conflicting groups in order to raise funds.

3. Misuse of conflict situation by vested groups for smuggling and illicit trade in natural resources and bio-diversity.

4. Displacement and resettlement of people from conflict affected areas.

There are several examples where conflict has caused serious environmental hazards. Examples can be traced back to the Vietnam War where the US army had dropped chemicals that devastated vast areas of Vietnam’s countryside causing genetic disabilities. In the 1990’s, civil strife caused environmental hazards in many countries such as Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Liberia, etc.[13] In Afghanistan in 2002, people displaced by the conflict fled to remote areas where they began to over-exploit the natural resources. During the Kosovo conflict, 50 industrial sites were bombed in Serbia causing environmental problems. In South Asia also conflicts of various sorts have been causing environmental degeneration such as in Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan.

Keeping in view the widespread environmental consequences of conflicts, the UN has launched the UN Environment Programme and environmental regeneration is gradually becoming an important aspect of peace processes.

Impact of the Maoist Conflict on the Environment

Nepal has been an agrarian economy with over 80 percent of the people dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. The land distribution has been inequitable[14] and poor people live on lands that measure less than one hectare which can hardly support a family’s needs. There is intense and widespread competition for available natural resources, leading to conflict for space, ownership and control. At the same time fast depletion of resources, the rapidly increasing population, the faulty land distribution system, insecure tenancy rights, etc have caused problems particularly for the tenant farmers and agricultural laborers. It has resulted in increasing pressure on natural resources leading to the environmental conflict.[15]

It is true that the degree of human reliance on the environment differs from place to place. The situation is quite different in the Nepalese hills. The lives of people in the Nepalese hills depend on natural resources to a large extent. However, the region is quite inaccessible, fragile and diverse and their capacity to adapt to changes in the eco-system is poor. As such the environment carrying capacity of the hills is quite low. With repeated and high-intensity use of limited resources the chances of damage to the environment become quite high.[16] The utilization of mountain resources has resulted in deforestation, soil degradation, erosion, flooding, etc. The increased demand for food exerts high pressure on the available land. In the mountains, agriculture is almost non-existent, while the hills that occupy more than 60 percent of Nepal’s land area offer only 35 percent cultivated land.[17] This makes it clear that the opportunity for farming is far less in Nepal, except in Terai, due to inadequate precipitation, low temperature in mountains, infertile land and inadequate means of irrigation. The livelihood of rural people depends largely on forests and hence the forests of Nepal are one of the most exploited natural resources. According to one estimate, only 21 percent of the total land area of Nepal is under forest cover. The eco-system of Nepal is very fragile and people depend heavily on natural resources. Therefore, any conflict is bound to have wider consequences for the environment.

It can be said that the Maoist insurgency acquired the characteristics of a protracted war and it had wide ranging consequences for the environment in Nepal. However, in the garb of the conflict a number of vested interests, persons and groups also took advantage of the situation and exploited the environment for their own benefits and interests. Some of the areas where the impact of the Maoist movement was visible are as following:-

1. Impact on the Protected Areas

The development of national parks as protected forest areas and wildlife conservation began in Nepal in 1973. The use of resources from these protected areas is regulated to promote sustainability. Nearly 18.33 percent of the total land area of Nepal is under protected area status.[18] The Royal Nepalese Army was positioned in these areas to prevent poaching and illicit trade of wildlife species. These areas also became target of the Maoist attacks due to the presence of the army. The Maoists also began their assault on the infrastructure of protected areas by destroying and outlying guard posts and forest offices. These were in the remote areas and vulnerable hence the guards and other forest staff were constrained to leave these places. After November 2001 the army was withdrawn from these protected areas. Prior to the Maoist attacks there were 112 guards in protected forest areas. It was reduced to 34 by 2002.[19] In some of the protected forest areas like Makalu – Barun National Park and Dhorpatan Hunting Reserve, which were not properly guarded, the Maoists established their training camps.

The attacks on infrastructure in the protected forest areas, occupation of these forest areas by the Maoists training their cadres, and the withdrawal of forest guards due to the threat from the Maoists made these protected areas insecure. This resulted in the decline of tourists. Some of the reserve sanctuaries of Nepal have been of famous the world over and have attracted tourists from around the world. Tourism has been a major source of foreign currency earnings. After 2001, there was a decrease of 50 percent in tourism in national parks.

The Problems in National Parks

National Protracted Areas	Armed Check Posts Before 2001	Armed Check Post After 2001	Problem
Royal Chitwan National Park	42	7	Incidents of Poaching reported
Royal Bardia National Park	5	Nil	Encroachment & poaching incidents took place
Sagarmatha National Park			Destruction by army in search of Maoists
Shey Phoksundo National Park			Withdrawal of guards, poaching and encroachment
Makalu Barun National Park			Logging, poaching and smuggling activities
Shivapuri National Park	21	4	Logging and poaching
Royal Shuklaphanta Wildlife Reserve	One army unit	Nil	Destruction of Forests
Dhorpatan Hunting Reserve			Poaching, officials left after Maoist attacks
Annpurna Conservation Area	10	nil	Maoist ransomed in the protracted areas

Source: DHPWC Annual Report 2003 in Mark L Murphy et.el Conversation in Conflict, IISD< Manitoba, Canada, October 2005

2. Loss in Bio-diversity

The Maoists conflict also caused loss of biodiversity in the wildlife sanctuaries and other protracted forest areas primarily due to the withdrawal of security forces and officials from there due to the fear of the Maoists. It was reported that a large number of Asian one horned Rhinos were pouched between 2001-2004 in Royal Bardia National Park and Royal Chitwan National Park which are world famous for these species. Wildlife smuggling increased tremendously from 1998-2003.[20] A number of reports appeared during 2001-2005 indicating increase of smuggling of precious wildlife species.

3. Setback to Community Forests

In Nepal community forestry has emerged over the years as a highly successful strategy for the regeneration of the forests.[21]It involves handing over of user rights and management of the forests areas to local people who have been traditionally using the forests for various purposes. It incorporates localized control over forest resources, so that a proper balance is maintained between resource utilization and management. The conflict was a serious setback for this form of forest conservation. The breakdown of law and order threatened community forestry institutions. Some of them even stopped functioning due to the fear of the Maoists. The Maoist conflict adversely affected employment and funding in conservation and development sector and many poverty reduction programmes were affected.

In some areas the Maoists had forced the NGO’s working for community forestry and the Community Forestry User’s Groups (CFUG) to register with the people’s government so that they could keep a track of the flow of funds to these organizations and levy taxes on them. The government of Nepal imposed taxes on revenues earned by the CFUG. As a reaction to this the Maoists took over the Community Forestry Users Groups in some areas by expelling elected members and replacing them with their own men. According to a report, the Maoists had allegedly seized 210 of 255 community forests in Achham district alone.[22] Such incidents had been reported in other areas as well.

The State of Community Forests in Nepal

Year of Community Takeover	Number of User Groups	Hectares of Forest Handed Over	Number of Households Involved
1988	1	27	53
1989	10	567	35
1990	42	1973	1115
1991	87	5012	4492
1992	349	20845	12973
1993	737	52121	36214
1994	1225	88763	80944
1995	1655	120818	142839
1996	1763	156899	178670
1997	1588	133695	196614
1998	1442	135767	177366
1999	1156	100027	168770
2000	1067	90714	135406
2001	841	83600	121746
2002	592	50667	93827
2003	557	40833	62230
2004	430	32449	49109

Source: Department of Forestry, Nepal, 2004.

4. Problem of Pollution

There were also problems of pollution in many areas. Dead bodies of the people killed in the attacks in many areas like Pili, Beni, Solukhumbu, Dang, etc. were thrown away in rivers and forests and the decomposed bodies led to pollution around the deposed areas. Further, land mines laid by the Maoists also polluted these areas. Security forces would set the forests on fire in areas where the insurgents were suspected to be hiding. Such forest firing not only damaged flora and fauna but also polluted the environment.

5. Impact on Genetic Resources

The conflict had caused severe disruption of the faming system and seed flow mechanisms, besides disturbing forest management, encroaching on forest land and exploiting non timber forest products, rare species of flora and fauna. There was over exploitation of some high value medicinal plants (e.g., Yarsagumba, Kudki, Sugandhawal,etc.) by rebels for the economic benefits. It was reported that the Maoists were engaged in collecting these high value herbs in order to raise funds. It also gave opportunity to the smugglers to over exploit the bio-diversity for illicit trade.

6. Conflict over Land Resources

Land is considered to be a symbol of power, prestige and social status in the rural areas. It is because of this reason that there have always been instances of power brokers and local elites capturing valuable land resources by using their networks and connections in the government and the traditional power structures. In Nepal too land is one of the major means of exploitation and it was obvious that land became the most prominent target of the Maoists. They evicted all local landlords and village elites from their villages and captured their land. In the Maoist controlled areas, they distributed the lands of landlords to poor people but these poor were not able to utilize the situation for the fear of security forces. The local landlords were not able to cultivate their lands which led to the under utilization of the scarce resource. Commercial farming had been either controlled or disturbed by the Maoists and such control had ultimately forced the commercial farmers to leave the areas. Rich and medium commercial farmers were facing continuous pressure to pay to the Maoists huge amounts of money. Such extortion had greatly affected commercial farming such as tea gardens, fruit gardens, livestock farming, cardamom growing, broom grass and ginger growing, etc.

Investment in agriculture sector by the Agriculture Development Bank (ADB) and other financial institutions had decreased due to the uncertain conditions created by the Maoist conflict. It became extremely difficult for the ADB staff to visit fields, as the insurgents were against ADB loans and they had damaged several branches of the bank and destroyed their documents. Many farmers could not return bank loans due to loss of their business. Big farmers and entrepreneurs were not ready to take the risk of investing in agriculture due to insecurity.

7. Problem of Safety of Conservation Organizations

The escalation of the Maoist violence after 2001 caused the withdrawal of staff from many NGO’s and field organizations to district headquarters. Some organizations stopped their work temporarily. There were incidents of extortion, kidnapping and murders. The organizations that became victims of the conflict were CARE Nepal, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), DANIDA, SDC, CIDA, Peace Corps Nepal, DFID, etc. The withdrawal of these NGO’s or disruption of their activities had an indirect impact on the environment as many of them were involved in programmes supporting environmental protective measures.

Cross-border Implications

Environmental degeneration cannot remain confined within the boundaries of a state and the cross – country impacts are obvious where more countries are part of a compact ecological zone.

The impact of the Maoist conflict on the environment of Nepal also had its implications on Indo – Nepal relations. The two countries share the Himalayan river system. Nepal is rich in river water resources and it is next to Mexico in terms of hydro – power potential. India can cooperate with Nepal for the utilization of river water resources thereby benefiting both the countries in several ways. However, the sharing of the river water resources has been a complex issue between India and Nepal.[23]Maoists made this issue much more complex by strongly reacting against the Indo–Nepal cooperation for water resources development. The Maoists considered India as an imperialist power. They termed all the treaties concluded between India and Nepal unequal and hence demanded that these treaties be scraped. This adversely affected the water resources development cooperation between India and Nepal. Some of the ongoing projects got delayed due to the conflict.

The implementation of water resources development projects such as the Mahakali Treaty had become difficult due to the ongoing conflict in Nepal. Although, it is difficult to say that the Maoists insurgency alone was responsible, the Maoists had taken a strong position against it. The Karnali and Sapt Kosi projects also met the same fate. The floods from Kosi and Gandak rivers have been a perennial problem for the Indian plains in Bihar.[24] It is a fact that the floods in Bihar cause loss of human lives, loss of livestock, livelihood and homelessness. Further agricultural land is submerged and the sand-castings due to floods create problems for further cropping. These rivers also cause devastating floods in Nepal’s Tarai as well. India’s strategy of building embankments to prevent floods has been questioned by Nepal. It is not only India which has to face the sorrow of Kosi but the Nepal Terai is equally devastated by these floods. The Maoists blamed India for causing floods in Nepal Terai due to constructions of embankments on its side and tried to make it a hot political issue. The Maoists strongly condemned India’s flood preventive measures. The problem of floods is a complex issue. It needs proper management and active cooperation between the two countries. But the Maoists created such an atmosphere that nothing could be done to prevent floods from Kosi and other rivers. The Maoist continued with these postures over water issues even after 2006. It may also be noted here that India and Nepal share the great Himalayan ranges which are considered to be sensitive and fragile. Any sort of environmental degeneration is bound to adversely affect the ecology of the Indian plains. Hence the implications of a conflict on the environment in Nepal also have its implications for India.

To conclude, one may state that any conflict is bound to have an impact on the environment. The intensity of the environmental fallout of a conflict depends on the nature and dynamics of the conflict. The Maoists conflict in Nepal had wide ranging consequences on the environment as is discussed above. The conflict situation also provides the scope for individuals and groups to exploit natural resources and biodiversity for their benefits thereby causing great harm to flora, fauna and wildlife resources. It is necessary that the environmental linkages of an armed conflict be realized by the stakeholders of peace, stability and democracy.

The environmental fallouts of a violent conflict can have cross-border implications where the natural resources are shared by the concerned countries. It not only results in the loss of resources and adverse impacts due to their mismanagement but also creates rifts in the relations between countries. It is for this reason that the environmental linkages of a conflict become a much more sensitive issue. On the whole it is clear that the Maoist conflict had several direct and indirect implications for the environment in Nepal. These issues become much more important when natural resources, the bio diversity and the flora and fauna are a source of earning for a majority of the people. Hence the management and conservation of the eco-system is an important element in any post-conflict phase and should be considered vital to the search for sustainable peace.

[1]B.C. Upreti, “State and Society in Nepal: the Emerging Issues of their Restructuring and Transformation”, Indian Journal of Nepalese Studies, XIII(2007): 33- 40.

[2] B.C.Upreti, Nepal: Democracy at the Cross Roads: Post 1990 Dynamics, Issues and Challenges, (New Delhi: Kanishka, 2007), 15- 45.

[3] For a detailed discussion see, Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege, Nepal’s Maoists Insurgency, 1996- 2003,(Kathmandu: Printhouse, 2003).

[4] B. C. Upreti, “Dealing with Maoists: Nepal’s Experience with Peace Negotiations” in Manas Chatterji and B.M.Jain eds. Conflict and Peace in South Asia, (Bingley, UK: Emerald,2008), 213- 215

[5] See, Arjun Karki and David Seddon, The People’s War in Nepal, (Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2003); Bishnu Raj Upreti, Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal,(Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2006); Uddhav P. Pyakurel, Maoists Movement in Nepal: A Sociological Perspective, (Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2007); B.C. Upreti, Maoists in Nepal, From Insurgency to Political Mainstream, (Delhi: Kalpaz, 2008); B.C. Upreti, Nepal, Transition to Democratic-Republican State, (Delhi: Kalpaz, 2010).

[6] See Panch N. Maharjan, “The Maoists Insurgency and Crisis of Governability in Nepal”, in Dhrub Kurmar ed., Domestic Conflict and Crisis of Governability in Nepal, (Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 2000)

[7] B.C. Upreti, Maoists in Nepal, From Insurgency to Political Mainstream, ( Delhi: Kalpaz, 2008)

[8] B.C. Upreti, “Will the Monarchy Survive?”, Seminar, 548 (2005): 17- 20.

[9] See, B. C. Upreti, “Challenges in the Post Election Scenario in Nepal”, Economic and Political Weekly, March 14, 2009: 23- 25.

[10] Mark L. Murphy, Krishna P. Oli & Steve Gorzula, “Conservation in Conflict: the Impact of the Maoist- Government Conflict on Conservation and Biodiversity in Nepal”, IISD Publications, 2005, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/security_conservation_nepal.pdf

[11] See, Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity and Violence, (Princeton, Princeton University Press:1999)

[12] For detailed explanations see, Bishnu Raj Uprety, Nepal’s Armed Conflict: Security Implications for Development and Resource Governance, (Kathmandu: Swiss National Center of Competence in Research, 2006), 2-4. Also see, David Seddon & K. Hussein, The Consequences of Conflict: Livelihood and Development in Nepal, ODI Working Paper 185 (2002).

[13]For some case studies relating to the fallout of conflict see, Darry D’. Monte, “The Environmental Fallout of Conflict”, Infochange-environment, March 2010, http://infochangeindia.org/Environment/Eco-logic/The-environmental-fallout-of-conflict.html; Jeff Dorsey & Steven Opeitum, “The Net Economic Cost of the Conflict in the Acholiland Sub Region of Uganda”, Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU), Kampala September 2002, http//www.csopnu.net, accessed on May 13 2010; Amanuel Mehreteab, Wake Up Hanna! Reintegration and Reconstruction Challenges for Post War Eritrea, (Asmara, Eritrea: Red Sea Press, 2004).

[14] G.R. Aryal and G. Awasthi, “Agrarian Reform and Access to Land Resources in Nepal: Present Status and Future Perspective Action”, Philippines, Environment, Culture, Agriculture, Research and Development Society (ECARDS)—Nepal: 2003, http://www.cerai.es/fmra/archivo/nepal.pdf

[15] See, Jugal Bhurtel & Saleem H. Ali, “The Green Roots of Red Rebellion: Environmental Degradation and the Rise of the Maoists Movement in Nepal”, Vermont, University of Vermont: 2003, http://www.uvm.edu/~shali/Maoist.pdf

[16] See, Pitamber Sharma, Draft Sectoral Reports on Sustainable Development Agenda for Nepal:Mountain Development, Sustainable Community Development Programme, International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, ICIMOD Kathmandu, Nepal, 2002

[17] Pradyumna P. Karan and Hiroshi Ishii, Nepal: A Himalayan Kingdom in Transition, (Tokyo: UNU Press, 1996), 40-66

[18] Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation, Nepal Biodiversity Strategy, Government of Nepal, 2002.

[19] Pralad Yonzon, “The Wounds of Neglect”, Habitat Himalayan, IX, No. 1 (2002)

[20] See, Ek Raj Sigdel, “Poaching- How to Fight It”, The Kathmandu Post, March 6, 2003; K.C. Shandip , “Nepal Still a Hotspot for Illegal Wildlife Traders”, The Kathmandu Post , April 27, 2002.

[21] Mark, L. Murphy et.al, Conservation in Conflict, 2005

[22] Ibid.

[23] B.C. Upreti, Politics of Himalayan River Waters, ( Delhi: Nirala, 2003)

[24] See, Rameshwar R. Iyer, “Floods, Himalayan Rivers, Nepal: Some Heresies”, The Economic Political Weekly, November 15, 2008; Dinesh Kumar Mishra, “The Kosi and the Gandak Story”, Economic & Political Weekly, November 15, 2008; Rajiv Sinha, “Kosi: Rising Waters, Dynamic Channels and Human Disasters”, Economic & Political Weekly, November 15, 2008.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND INTRA-STATE CONFLICT: INVESTMENT FOR PEACE IN MYANMAR

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Mon, 04 Oct 2010 06:05:00 +0000

Anna Louise Strachan

Introduction

The Union of Myanmar occupies a strategic position in Southeast Asia, surrounded by China, India, Bangladesh, Thailand and Laos. It has the potential to serve as a gateway between Southeast Asia and the countries of the Indian subcontinent. Myanmar’s immediate neighbours have sought to gain influence in the country despite the fact that it is often seen as a pariah state, not only by the West, but by most of the world. They have sought to improve connectivity using Myanmar as a transit point. While many factors have rendered progress on this front slow and ineffectual, Myanmar’s continuing instability, in particular the ongoing ethnic conflicts which have plagued the country for decades, is frequently seen as the main impediment. Other regions have nonetheless succeeded in making significant progress towards integration despite ongoing conflicts. This paper will therefore argue that while intra-state conflict is one of the factors behind slow progress on regional economic integration, many other factors, some of which are arguably more important, have hindered progress on this front. This will be done by looking at the impact of intra-state conflict in Myanmar on regional integration in a general sense and then considering the same issue in the context of Bangladesh and India and the member countries of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). This will illustrate the extent to which regional integration is affected by intra-state conflict in all contexts.

The definition of conflict is broad and in the case of Myanmar what constitutes a conflict remains unclear. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) there were just two active armed conflicts in Myanmar in 2008. These were between the government and the Karen National Union (KNU) and the government and the Shan State Army – South Command (SSA-S). The UCDP places both conflicts in the “minor” category. According to the Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS), six active intra-state conflicts beleaguer Myanmar. These are between the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the SSA-S, the Chin National Front (CNF), the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) and the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) and the government. The 2009 Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, however, lists a plethora of conflicts. Many of the groups mentioned by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) signed ceasefire agreements with the military junta in the 1980s and 90s. HIIK also classifies the situation between Myanmar’s opposition parties and the ruling military junta as a conflict. While Myanmar’s military junta and the country’s ceasefire groups undoubtedly have an impact on progress towards integration and greater connectivity, it is not possible to discuss all these issues at sufficient length in this paper. ‘Intra-state conflict in Myanmar’ in this paper therefore refers to those conflicts which are current and which involve the actual use of violent force.

Violent force frequently involves damage to infrastructure and the disruption of transport as well as human suffering. Violent incidents therefore have the potential to hinder trade, a key element of regional integration. Karen and Shan states, are important transit points in terms of linking South Asia with Thailand. Shan state also has the potential to serve as a gateway to Laos and Vietnam. There is therefore reason to believe that the severe conflict situations in these areas can act as an impediment to regional integration as they cause instability and uncertainty in an area with great economic potential. Improved connectivity and economic integration could, however, provide the stability that is lacking in these areas and therefore greater commitment to these goals is required. This paper argues that the benefits of such a policy outweigh the costs as there is a possibility that rather than intra-state conflict hindering progress towards integration, greater integration may actually serve to resolve some of the tensions in Myanmar.

Acts of violence such as the bomb explosions in Yangon in April 2010 arguably serve as justification for slow progress towards economic integration and improvements in connectivity. While it is unclear who was responsible for the attacks, the junta have blamed previous attacks on minority ethnic groups. Regardless of who was responsible for the attacks, such acts of violence can reduce confidence in Myanmar’s ability to be a significant player in any efforts to foster regional economic integration. They also make Myanmar appear to be an unattractive target for foreign investment. It is nevertheless worth noting that a number of countries have played a significant role in regional organisations, despite ongoing conflicts and acts of terrorism within their borders. This paper will therefore argue that undue significance should not be attached to such incidents.

It is in the interests of both India and Bangladesh to foster greater economic integration with Myanmar. Transport links through Myanmar would open up Southeast Asia to the subcontinent and significantly increase trade and interaction between the two regions. It would seem sensible, therefore, that Bangladesh and India seek to develop a joint policy in order to facilitate the resolution of Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts. This paper will consider the policy options available to these countries in order to establish the means of intervention most likely to bring stability to Myanmar’s conflict stricken provinces. It will be argued that policy options for both countries are limited. Both countries must tread carefully in their dealings with Myanmar’s ruling junta in order to prevent Myanmar isolating itself completely. It will further be argued that the danger of pushing Myanmar towards China has been overplayed, notwithstanding China’s significant influence there and evidence will be provided in support of this view. This paper will go on to present the argument that fostering economic prosperity in conflict stricken areas is the only realistic policy option available to India and Bangladesh in terms of conflict mitigation. While this is a strategy that carries with it a lot of risk, it enables India and Bangladesh to meet their requirements in terms of connectivity while also facilitating progress towards regional economic integration by creating a more prosperous environment for Myanmar’s marginalised minorities and thus resolving some of the issues which have led to the continuation of armed conflict.

It is proposed that ASEAN would also benefit from the resolution of Myanmar’s internal conflicts. Progress towards economic integration in the region has been slow, hindered by instability and political infighting. Myanmar has been a particularly controversial issue as ASEAN’s longstanding policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member nations has meant that they have failed to address the many Myanmar related issues that face the organisation. This paper also argues that closer ties between ASEAN and India are the perfect platform for cooperation between India and ASEAN on the resolution of Myanmar’s intra-state conflicts. ASEAN also stands to benefit from prosperity in Myanmar’s minority areas and must join Bangladesh and India in investing in infrastructural projects. The importance of bringing expertise to Myanmar in order to enable the creation of soft infrastructure and to facilitate trade will also be discussed.

Regional integration

Attempts at regional integration have been made in both the developed and the developing world. Their recent financial problem notwithstanding, the EU (European Union) is arguably the most notable example of a regional integration success story. Regional integration efforts which include countries from the developing world include the Arab League, the AU (African Union), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and ASEAN, which will be discussed later in this paper. The initiatives mentioned involve various degrees of regional integration. ECOWAS, for example, has made significant progress on integration. To date,

“a free trade area has been established, intra-regional passenger transport has been facilitated, infrastructural measures have been realised, a mechanism for conflict resolution has been initiated, the question of the community’s income has been solved, and a functional court of justice has become a reality.”

Considerable progress on integration has thus been made, despite the conflicts afflicting a number of its member states. This suggests that regional integration in Asia should also be able to proceed, unhindered by the intra-state conflicts in Myanmar and in other parts of the continent.

At this stage it is important to note that there are numerous levels of economic integration. Schiff and Winters argue that RIAs (Regional Integration Agreements) do not generally aim for economic union but rather seek an increase in competition by eliminating policy interventions and reducing market segmentation. They go on to state that a number of recent RIAs, including APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), are considering an intermediate level of integration, which involves “close governmental cooperation to harmonize domestic regulations and policies, but no supranational authority.” It must be noted that plans for an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) to be created by 2015 go far beyond this. According to the blueprint for the AEC

“the AEC will establish ASEAN as a single market and production base making ASEAN more dynamic and competitive with new mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of its existing economic initiatives; accelerating regional integration in the priority sectors; facilitating movement of business persons, skilled labour and talents; and strengthening the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN.”

The question is; are such goals attainable in the foreseeable future?

Bhattacharyay states that “greater regional integration through enhanced physical connectivity supports trade and investment (including FDI) expansion, and financial market development.” This is especially important for developing countries. The members of BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Iniative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) are all categorised by the World Bank as falling into the low-income and lower-middle income categories. Moreover, there is great inequality in terms of the GDP of ASEAN members. SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) members also fall into the low-income and middle-income categories. Increasing investment and financial market development are therefore clear incentives for the countries of South and Southeast Asia to pursue greater regional integration.

Brooks and Stone, however, argue that “while regional integration can help less developed countries and regions to access new markets, suppliers, technologies and opportunities, and can help to internalize negative spillover effects and capitalize on economies of scale, progress has not been even across subregions.” They go on to say that East Asia and Southeast Asia are ahead of other sub-regions and in particular of South Asia. This can be taken to mean that progress in Southeast Asia has not been as slow as is generally believed. Alternatively, it could mean that progress towards integration in South Asia has been particularly slow. Regardless of the intended meaning, it is clear that there is much room for improvement in terms of progress towards regional integration and in terms of facilitating connectivity. The key task with regard to regional integration and connectivity in South and Southeast Asia is to “revive, renovate, and re-establish Asia’s transportation networks, which played a pivotal role in integrating the region in ancient times and to establish Asia-wide intermodal transport and transit in order to reduce the trade transportation costs across borders.” A regional transit agreement is also required, failing which all Asian countries should accede to existing international conventions. Brooks and Stone argue that soft infrastructure is as important as physical infrastructure when it comes to accelerating progress towards regional integration. They state that factors like the availability of credit, foreign exchange at reasonable rates, a reliable system of legal recourse and an effective competition policy play a significant role in achieving regional integration. Soft infrastructure is an area in which there is much room for improvement in South and Southeast Asia. Brooks and Stone also argue that once basic physical infrastructure is in place, investment in soft infrastructure and enhancing trade facilitation is more effective than building more physical infrastructure. This must be considered when looking at ways for India, Bangladesh and ASEAN to foster regional integration through investment in Myanmar. A multi-faceted investment and development programme, involving investment in physical infrastructure and the provision of expertise on issues relating to soft infrastructure and trade facilitation is likely to be the most successful approach to regional integration programmes which envisage Myanmar fulfilling the role of a major transport hub.

Economic integration and connectivity around the Bay of Bengal: obstacles and opportunities

There are numerous opportunities for improving connectivity and for increasing economic integration around the Bay of Bengal. For the purposes of this section Bangladesh and India will be considered as the key players with regard to regional integration. This section will outline the commitments made by the countries in question to promoting connectivity and economic integration before assessing the progress made and the obstacles that continue to exist. Ways, in which the countries in question can move forward, in terms of using Myanmar as a gateway between South and Southeast Asia, will then be considered.

Myanmar is already a member of a number of regional organisations. It has been a member of ASEAN since 1997 and as a consequence is also a member of the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and of the ACD (Asia Cooperation Dialogue). Myanmar is also a member of BIMSTEC and of the MGC (Mekong-Ganga Cooperation). Myanmar also applied for membership of SAARC in 2008, however the application is still under consideration and Myanmar currently holds observer status. Myanmar is a member of the Kunming Initiative (BCIM) alongside, Bangladesh, China and India. It is also a signatory to the Asian Highway Network (AH). This indicates a certain level of commitment to improved transport links and greater regional economic integration on Myanmar’s part. Thein lists a large number of infrastructural projects which the Government of Myanmar has recently completely or is currently undertaking. His paper is of interest as it looks at the issue of regional integration from what he terms the “Myanmar perspective.” Most writing on this issue pays very little attention to this angle so it provides a means of obtaining information which shows the situation from a different angle. It is, however, worth noting that it is difficult to verifyithe extent of the progress that has been made on these projects and that the list should therefore be viewed with some caution.

In recent years efforts to improve connectivity and to foster economic regional integration have increased. Chaturvedy and Malone argue that while “the Indian government has spoken a great deal about the importance, indeed the primacy, of greater economic cooperation with its neighbours ...results are meagre and unconvincing, as are the achievements of the SAARC.” This is a valid argument, however one has to look at the larger picture before judging India’s progress on this front. South Asia is a region fraught with instability and almost all of India’s neighbours are embroiled in some form of intra-state conflict. While intra-state conflict is just one of many factors hindering integration, it certainly plays a major part, especially as the issue is not one conflict but dozens of them. According to the HIIK, India alone has 11 conflicts categorised at severity level 3 or above. Referring to linkages between India, Bangladesh and Southeast Asia, Pattanayak states that “problems of connectivity can largely be attributed to the mistrust and suspicion that has been characteristic of Indo-Bangladesh relations since 1977.” Like intra-state conflict in the region, this is one of many factors hindering progress on connectivity and regional integration. Other factors include a lack of integrated and harmonised railway networks and a dearth of active overland official trade outlets as well as the absence of trade facilitation policy measures and transit trade.

Bilateral trade between India and Myanmar stood at US$995 million in the period 2007-2008. At present Myanmar’s exports to India far outweigh its imports from India. Swaminathan states that border trade between Myanmar and India is negligible. He cites sub-standard roads on the Indian side, a small list of tradable goods and excessive regulations and restrictions as the causes for this. He does state, however, that India and Myanmar are considering plans to upgrade border trade carried out at the Reedkhoda - Tamu-Moye border crossing to ‘normal trade.’ The reasoning behind India’s relative neglect of its border areas in terms of infrastructure is often cited as being the instability in those areas caused by insurgencies and cross-border tensions. It is possible that Myanmar has neglected its border areas for similar reasons. Such neglect could conceivably have exacerbated instability in these areas. In view of the fact that the current approach has been a failure, it is time to look at this issue from a new perspective. Increased trade and investment will significantly improve the economic conditions in both the conflict afflicted provinces of India’s North East and in the neighbouring provinces in Myanmar. Such an approach has the potential to stabilise these areas by bringing much needed development to marginalised communities.

Sikri argues for the benefits of greater connectivity with Myanmar, stating that there is a domestic dimension to India’s policy towards Myanmar. He argues that improved economic and communication ties with Myanmar would reduce India’s dependence on Bangladesh and could ultimately lead to greater development in India’s North-eastern states. While it is possible for India to focus on linkages with Southeast Asia using only its North-eastern corridor as a point of transit, it is advisable for India and Bangladesh to cooperate in order to bring about economic integration. Regional integration requires cooperation amongst all the countries of the region and Bangladesh can play an important role in facilitating connectivity between South and Southeast Asia.

To date Bangladesh’s attempts to improve connectivity with its neighbours have been limited. Nevertheless, it did sign a bilateral agreement with Myanmar in 2007 for a Bangladesh-Myanmar Friendship Highway. Bangladesh proposed to bear the full costs of this project. In June 2009, Bangladesh – Myanmar trade stood at US$140 million. The two countries aim for this figure to reach US$500 million by the end of 2010. This is a step in the right direction but does not go far enough. Numerous suggestions have been made by high-ranking officials in Bangladesh, including the Foreign Minister , regarding ways in which the two countries can cooperate to further connectivity and to boost trade. However, these projects largely remain pipe dreams, regularly discussed but rarely reaching fruition. This may be due to the fact that relations between Myanmar and Bangladesh have not always been amiable, becoming increasingly strained in 2009 over a maritime dispute between the two nations. A major military build up by Myanmar ensued in October of that year, and while there has been no question of an outbreak of a major conflict between the two countries, occasional border clashes do occur. Despite these disputes there is still room for cooperation between the two countries on other issues. In the short-term it is essential that the Myanmar question is addressed issue by issue as in totality it is otherwise too complex and too controversial for any headway to be made. In the long-run the resolution of all disputes between the two countries is desirable as greater stability would be beneficial to the entire region.

China is also an issue that is frequently raised when considering Myanmar’s potential role as a gateway between South and Southeast Asia. China is believed to exert significant influence in Myanmar. It is also perceived to be in competition with India for this influence. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the insular nature of Myanmar’s military junta does not provide foreign powers, including China, with as much scope for involvement in its internal affairs as is generally believed. Evidence of this is provided by the International Crisis Group (ICG), which details attempts by China in 2007 to improve Myanmar’s military government’s relationship with minority ethnic groups in an attempt to ease tensions and improve the domestic situation. These efforts did not bring about significant change in Myanmar, suggesting that China’s influence and Myanmar’s dependence on China are frequently overplayed.

Referring to Myanmar’s potential role as a connecting point between China and India and China and Bangladesh, Chaturvedy and Malone argue that Myanmar is “the pivot of many forms of actual and potential transit that India could find highly threatening in a part of the country far from its critical mass.” It remains necessary for India to maintain its focus on what can be gained from its own involvement in Myanmar, rather than becoming too preoccupied with China’s intentions. If the danger posed by China is real then India’s only option of combating it is by stepping up its own involvement in Myanmar. This must be done in such a way as to not threaten the military junta, as should it feel that India is trying to encroach upon its sovereignty it is likely to take steps to terminate India’s involvement in the country.

It is also worth noting Frost’s assertion that India’s influence is still far less than that of China as this too could serve as a hindrance where Indian efforts to resolve India’s internal conflicts are concerned. Lall, however, argues that the administration in Myanmar is open to greater Indian involvement as it hopes that India will balance China. Both arguments suggest that there is room for India to increase its influence in Myanmar. Doing so by improving connectivity through infrastructural investment is likely to improve India’s position in Myanmar, rather than damaging it in the way that condemning the current human rights situation and other aspects of the junta’s rule would do.

In terms of connectivity, the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) argues that the restoration of the Afghanistan-Pakistan-India-Bangladesh-Myanmar (APIBM) Corridor will go a long way in enabling South Asia to become a connection hub between Central and Southeast Asia. The RIS claims that such a move would benefit Bangladesh as it would become a transit hub for India’s trade with Myanmar and Myanmar itself would benefit as it would serve as a transit hub for India’s trade with other ASEAN countries. This is undoubtedly true but, given the security situation in the countries through which such a transport corridor would pass, it is not currently feasible. Afghanistan is currently beleaguered by war and the other countries involved are plagued by significant intra-state conflicts. While intra-state conflict does not have a major impact on regional integration, the level of severity is undoubtedly a factor, which requires careful consideration. Violent conflict frequently involves damage to infrastructure and the disruption of transport as well as human suffering. There is therefore a serious risk that the costs would outweigh the benefits of such an initiative unless these conflicts are resolved. Although some roads have been built in Afghanistan investing in the Afghanistan-Pakistan sector of this transport corridor carries with it a lot of risk and significant progress is unlikely to be made until the conflicts in these countries are resolved. The India-Bangladesh-Myanmar section, however, is viable due to the fact that the conflicts in the these countries are less severe than those in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In recent years India has become increasingly involved in neighbouring countries, contributing to peacekeeping efforts in Nepal and Afghanistan. In an address at IISS in London, India’s Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao, argued that the international community must work together to realise Afghanistan’s potential as a trade, transportation and energy hub. She stated that in the case of Aghanistan “growing economic interdependence would complement efforts to promote peace and prosperity in the region.” The same holds true for Myanmar. India has pledged US$1.2 billion to help rebuild Afghanistan’s infrastructure and has been involved in numerous projects from running medical missions to erecting power transmission lines and building roads. This has had the effect of bringing about significant increases in bilateral trade and has reportedly aimed at reaching every sector of Afghan society. However, India’s involvement in Afghanistan has not come without a price. Indian consulates have been the targets of explosions and grenade attacks and Indian nationals have been attacked. India also has significant commitments with regard to aid for countries in Africa. As mentioned earlier in this paper, India has already played a proactive role in Myanmar with the focus to date being on providing funding for infrastructural projects. Increasing its funding of infrastructural development in conflict afflicted areas is therefore just a step up from its current level of involvement. Furthermore, India has not shied away from financial investment in Myanmar to date, despite the continuing conflicts in many parts of the country. According to Lall the factors behind this are “the economic development of India’s North East, India’s increased interest in trade with ASEAN, India’s search for energy security and increased Chinese involvement in Myanmar.” India should increase its engagement in Myanmar in much the same way it has proceeded in Afghanistan. The risk of investing in conflict afflicted areas should not be a deterrent for India if it is serious about conflict mitigation and about increasing its influence in the region.

Currie argues that India’s benefits from its cooperation with the junta have been small on both the economic and security fronts. She claims that Myanmar plays India and China off each other, protecting its own interests above all. She adds that when forced to choose between its two neighbours, Myanmar invariably chooses China. Currie goes on to argue that India should “be more clever about using its own values and role within Asia to change the regional calculus on Burma.” She states further that this should be achieved by India collaborating with other democracies in the region to press for political reform and improvements in other areas, such as internal security, which have an effect on the entire region. Such a situation would be highly desirable but Currie fails to go into detail on this subject. While the principle is excellent, it is likely to prove difficult to achieve in reality. Pressure has been put on Myanmar in the past and it has failed to bring about significant change. The idea that India, even in collaboration with other democracies in the region, will succeed in bringing about change in Myanmar where others have failed is idealistic. Realistically, India has a better chance of increasing its influence through investment than via political pressure.

Prosperity and stability are inextricably linked and perhaps Myanmar’s neighbours need to make some risky investments in order to facilitate conflict resolution within the country. Tentative moves towards improving connectivity have already been made by India. Improved infrastructure and transport links may well have the effect of bringing about change in an indirect manner. Greater prosperity for Myanmar’s marginalised minorities could be an indirect way of bringing about peace. Such a policy would, however, depend on the junta’s acceptance of foreign resources being allocated in this way. To date it has been reluctant to afford these groups any form of assistance. It may be more amenable to supporting improved infrastructure in minority areas if funding for such projects is coming from external sources. Among key infrastructural projects would be improved transport facilities. It is, however, worth noting that assistance in terms of medical and educational facilities is unlikely to prove a viable option as the junta is not likely to take kindly to what could be viewed as the empowerment of minority groups, especially when this empowerment comes from the world’s largest democracy. Notwithstanding this, India must not confine itself to infrastructural projects in Myanmar’s conflict afflicted provinces alone. India must continue to invest in manufacturing and pharmaceuticals in Myanmar in a bid to create employment opportunities for those living in border areas. To date such projects have been limited. India must also use its increasing importance on the global stage to advocate a change of policy towards Myanmar in Europe and the United States. India must seek to persuade the world that empowering India’s ethnic minorities by providing them with the means to achieve prosperity is the optimal way of improving the situation in Myanmar. This policy is far from ideal as it is long-term and the changes brought about may not succeed in completely ending the bloodshed in Myanmar. However, it does provide a means of meeting India, Bangladesh and ASEAN’s needs in terms of connectivity and facilitating greater economic integration while having the potential to mitigate the circumstances which have led to intra-state conflict in Myanmar.

Progress towards an ASEAN Economic Community

While the member states of ASEAN have professed a desire to further economic integration in Southeast Asia to the extent of creating an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015, progress on this front has been slow. Instability in the region is partly to blame for this lack of progress. Myanmar is not the only country in the region to be suffering from intra-state conflict. Thailand is afflicted both by severe political unrest and by a long-running insurgency in its predominantly Muslim southern provinces. In the Philippines the New People’s Army (NPA) and rebel groups like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group have long been responsible for internal strife and in Indonesia separatists in Papua and ethnic clashes in other parts of the country have also contributed to regional instability. Increasing instability in Thailand could act as the most serious obstacle to greater regional integration. Should the situation escalate to conflict level, instability in Thailand is likely to outweigh intra-state conflict in Myanmar in terms of preventing progress on regional economic integration both ASEAN and BIMSTEC. Territorial disputes and non-traditional security threats such as natural disasters also have the potential to hinder progress on integration.

Bhattacharyay argues that “an improved and integrated transport and logistics system in ASEAN is an integral part of the regional integration initiative.” He goes on to outline a two track approach to infrastructure and development for ASEAN. He argues that ASEAN must cooperate in building and operating Cross-border Infrastructure (CBI) and in financing infrastructure development as enhancing ASEAN connectivity through CBI requires strong commitment and partnership among ASEAN governments. This is one of the key factors behind ASEAN’s slow progress towards regional integration. Strong commitment and partnership among ASEAN governments have not reached required levels to date. The reason behind this is not intra-state conflict, but rather disagreement between governments. The military junta’s policies are thus a much greater hindrance in terms of regional integration than internal conflict.

At this stage it is worth noting that an assessment of the economic impact of intra-state conflict in Southeast Asia highlights the fact that conflict has had little impact on growth in the region. It seems likely therefore that the same should hold true for regional integration. Conflict does not appear to have served as a significant deterrent for investors and thus should not prevent progress on the infrastructural improvements required to make greater economic integration possible. The resolution of intra-state conflicts in Myanmar and in other Southeast Asian countries is however of great importance as greater stability would have significant social and economic benefits for the region.

The India-ASEAN relationship has developed in recent years. The 2009 ASEAN-Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is just one example of closer ties between India and the nations of Southeast Asia. There has also been increased military cooperation between India and ASEAN. This is a step in the right direction in terms of regional integration yet the full potential of the relationship has yet to be fulfilled. Cooperation on the Myanmar issue would certainly represent progress. Both parties stand to benefit from improved connectivity through Myanmar and from increased stability in the region. In particular, ASEAN must seek to improve infrastructure in the areas bordering with Thailand in a bid to improve trade between Myanmar’s war-torn Karen State and Thailand’s northeastern provinces. It has recently been announced that a new border trade zone will be opened on the Thai-Myanmar border in Mae Hong Song Province. The aim of the zone is to facilitate land and air freight based trade between the two countries. The project will also involve the building of a new highway. While there has been some scepticism regarding the viability and the usefulness of the project, it seems clear that this is precisely the kind of investment required to bring stability to Myanmar’s conflict stricken areas.

Discussing US policy in Myanmar, Kurlantzick advocates the prevention of what he terms “the looming humanitarian disaster” arguing that such a move is both altruistically and strategically important as it would prevent the destabilisation of the entire region. He states that a new humanitarian assistance programme would build the institutional infrastructure required for the US to respond should the situation in Myanmar deteriorate. Significantly, Kurlantzick believes that such a programme should be carried out in collaboration with Myanmar’s neighbours. If ASEAN, India, Bangladesh and the U.S. could implement ‘investment for peace’ together then significant change could occur. The lives of those living in Myanmar’s border areas would improve significantly. ASEAN arguably stands to benefit the most from such a programme as the consequences of the situation in Myanmar are felt throughout its member nations. These consequences are serious and include large numbers of refugees, a flourishing trade in narcotics and the rapid spread of HIV.

Conclusions and policy recommendations

Intra-state conflict in Myanmar is not the key factor preventing progress on regional integration. A whole range of factors impede progress. Resolving the ongoing conflicts in Myanmar would, however, serve to smooth the path to increased connectivity and integration between South and Southeast Asia. It is therefore necessary for Myanmar’s neighbours to play a proactive role in resolving these conflicts without alienating the ruling military junta. It seems clear that international approaches to the Myanmar issue have to date been unsuccessful. Recently, there have been many scholars and professionals advocating an end to sanctions, which they argue should be replaced by financial aid. There is however a fear that such funds could be misused. Investment for peace is an option open to all of Myanmar’s neighbours and the larger international community and could bring about a significant improvement in the living conditions of the country’s ethnic minorities. That is because investment would take place in the border areas and where possible the funds would not be made available to the junta but rather to the communities in need of assistance. The logistics of providing aid and investing in this way would have to be looked into very carefully but the idea of transferring funds to communities along the Thai border via Thailand has already been put forward by several scholars. It must be noted that in view of the nature of the military junta in Myanmar, one should not be overly optimistic about what can be achieved. A realistic approach is essential. Even attempts to bring about an end to intra-state conflict in Myanmar through investment must be undertaken with care. Subtle infrastructural development and assistance is required in order to ensure that the junta does not become suspicious of its neighbours' motivations.

To date Bangladesh has had little experience of facilitating conflict resolution as a third party. However, as discussed earlier in this paper, it is in Bangladesh’s interests to actively pursue a timely resolution of Myanmar’s internal conflicts, in particular those which are being played out on Bangladesh’s borders. It is therefore vital that India and Bangladesh cooperate on this matter. Both will reap the benefits of stability in Myanmar and have much to gain from greater economic integration and connectivity. Instability in Central Asia renders efforts to improve connectivity with Europe fraught with difficulty. Moreover, resolving the conflict situations in Pakistan and Afghanistan is likely to prove even more difficult than resolving the intra-state conflicts in Myanmar. Both Bangladesh and India must therefore devote their energies to increasing their involvement in Myanmar and presenting a unified front rather than acting in competition with each other. Bangladesh must also seek to heal rifts with Myanmar to facilitate greater cooperation with regard to improving conditions in the areas along the border between the two countries.

India’s stance on Myanmar has earned it a great deal of criticism from the international community. Increased investment is likely to provoke strong reactions from some quarters. It is however important to remind those opposed to a more conciliatory approach to Myanmar, particularly one involving increased foreign investment, that a tough stance has to all intents and purposes been fruitless. Sanctions have failed to bring about change and have only increased the suffering of the people of Myanmar. India has stood apart from the international community on the Myanmar issue thus far and there is therefore no reason why it should be concerned about any additional adverse reaction to its policy decisions in the future. Moreover, India’s increasing prominence in global politics could even serve to provide it with an opportunity to alter international opinion on the appropriate policy towards Myanmar. India should seek to convince the international community that economic empowerment is the way to improve the lot of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities rather than adding to their woes by punishing them for their government’s actions with sanctions. This will however require increased investment in India’s North East as well. The ongoing conflicts in the region must be resolved and the Indian government must increase spending on infrastructure so that improvements are being made on both sides of the India-Myanmar border.

ASEAN also stands to benefit from increased investment in Myanmar’s conflict stricken border areas. Thailand is particularly affected by the ongoing conflict in Karen state and as a result steps must be taken by the organisation to improve conditions along the border between the two countries. Cooperation on the Myanmar issue also presents an opportunity for ASEAN to strengthen its ties with India and Bangladesh. Improved ties are essential if greater regional integration is to be achieved.

NEPAL: IMPACT OF INTERNAL CONFLICT ON SECURITY

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Thu, 30 Sep 2010 09:46:00 +0000

Yubaraj Ghimire

Internal conflict emerges from the unrealized rights, demands and aspirations of citizens within the institutional context of the state and society. Some times internal imbalances of power, unfulfilled basic needs, denial of rights, aggressive impulse of leaders and groups, sense of ideological supremacy, identity politics and absence of weak law-enforcing mechanism also contribute to internal conflict. Unaddressed aspirations, if endorsed by organized voice, do have a tendency to snowball into a political movement and agitation. Given the scale of illiteracy, poverty and corruption in the Nepalese society, these aspirations and frustrations can fuel any movement if there is an alternative leadership, with proven or even perceived credibility. Such a movement often may take radical or militant course and tie the leadership in an expectation trap. Pervasive poverty, inequality and discrimination provide a sound recipe to radicalize the society and generate conflict against incumbent political classes representing the state. Obviously, “extreme poverty exhausts governing institution, depletes resources, weakens leaders and crushes hope, fuelling a volatile mix of desperation and instability”.

After all, it is far easier to sell a radical dream to the people who want a quick and magical relief from poverty and corruption and increased risk of uncertain future. In a country penetrated by international regimes such as Nepal, transnational ideological movements also make a common cause with local movements—peaceful or violent— and erode the capacity of the state to maintain national security and authority as well as muster the loyalty of people to the nation-state. National security in the context of global anarchy requires the management of conflict of interests with the neighbors and the resolution of security dilemma through balanced foreign policy. The central point of security dilemma is that an increase in one state’s security decreases the security of others. In Nepal, severe internal strains viciously feed one set of conflict to another and even unfold cross border connections and networks thus undermining the sovereignty of national space. The uncertain strength of the political forces in Nepal and inter and intra-party struggles are standing in the way to vitiate national security issues. There are other unresolved Constitutional issues that also serve as the motors of conflict.

The reference point of this chapter is Nepal as it is facing intense security challenges incomparable to any other time in the nation’s history. The chapter will mainly delve into the political developments, from February 1996, the phase that witnessed the birth and rapid expansion of Maoist insurgency, up to April 2006 when it gave up violence and joined the political mainstream based on the 12-point agreement mediated by New Delhi. The Maoist conflict resulted in the loss of more than 15,000, leaving several people disabled, causing devastation of development infrastructures and private property worth billions of rupees, and leading to internal displacement of more than 60,000 people. The mass movement of April 2006 against the Royal takeover and the direct rule by King Gyanendra for 15 months since February 2005 brought unexpected political outcomes. National Day of Nepal was suspended and many national icons were contested. Nepal’s better known identity—Unitary Hindu Kingdom—changed into a Federal Democratic Republic (FDR) which will be institutionalized by a Constitution. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2006 has many national security components including normalization process, de-radicalization of politics, integration and rehabilitation of 19,600 UN verified Maoist combatants, democratization of Nepal Army and improved civil-military relations. This chapter discusses the issues of Constitutional crisis, embedded links in political uncertainty, mechanism of political stability, national security and economy.

Constitutional Crisis

The Constitutional system seeks to settle the issues of legitimate political order and internal security dilemma by reinforcing law-governed behavior. National interest and survival are best served by harmonizing the goals of the state, market, civil society and international community and capturing the synergy. “The appropriate state action is calculated according to the situation in which the state finds itself”.

In Nepal, when it was clear that the Constituent Assembly would miss the deadline of 28 May 2010 to draft a new Constitution, the polity extended its tenure by another year. The three big political parties—Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (UCPN-M), Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML)—which together form more than two-third majority in the House which is required to frame and deliver the new Constitution—reached an understanding to complete the assigned role within the new time frame. However, skepticism is growing as political parties are losing their credibility in achieving the urgent tasks. Are they serious and sincere about drafting and delivering the new Constitution? Will the constituent assembly dominated by the three parties, with UCPN-M, the largest one, be able to manage the major differences they have on at least 20 contentious issues that range from the model of governance to federalism to the independence of judiciary?

In all probability, the political conflict will be intensified. Until and unless Nepal has a properly drafted and adopted Constitution, uncertainties may continue to prevail in the country. Continued political instability, and lack of consensus among the key players on several issues, will cause deterioration in the situation of the country. In addition non-political factors of insecurity are also becoming stronger. Nepal today is facing “shortages of the four basic agricultural sources—land, water, energy and fertilizer. No nation can isolate itself from these scarcities or their economic and political consequences”. Climate change has also led to scarcity of water. Issues like terrorism, globalization and transnational social movement are weakening the capacity of state to create public order, provide service delivery and settle problems and conflicts. “As political survival and internal peace are more often defined in economic terms, states have become responsible for economic transformation”

Embedded Links in Political Uncertainty

On May 28, the three mainstream parties penned an accord in which Prime Minister Madhav UCPN-M as it is the single largest party in the Constituent Assembly that was elected in April 2008. The accord also stated that the Maoists will agree to honor the past commitments like returning the property the party had confiscated from political opponents and ordinary people during the decade long insurgency. In addition, they also agreed to transform the Young Communist League (YCL) into a civilian outfit and work earnestly for rehabilitation and integration of the Maoist combatants in the society and security agencies of the

state.

But within hours, they began squabbling over whether the resignation offer was unconditional or linked to the Maoists implementing the past accords. The state and politics of Nepal are guided and dictated by this confusion and uncertainty because each top political leader wants to become Prime Minister and, therefore, each uses his leverage in other parties to bargain and weaken the opponents within the same party. Yet, the three parties agreed to extend the tenure of the constituent assembly for various reasons. One, they preferred collective survival than joint death. Second, people were feeling betrayed by the inability of the House to deliver the Constitution and there was tremendous international pressure, from the United Nations, United States and the European Union to have the term extended so that a legitimate institution of the people does not disappear suddenly. Its absence, they feel, will aggravate the existing political authority vacuum. But there was neither an apology offered, nor a guarantee assured by the government as well as the signatories to the May 28 accord that they would address major contentious points that have come in the way of writing the Constitution. In brief, the post conflict situation continues to keep the political spectrum divided sharply and, therefore, muddling around than marching ahead.

Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal complied with the accord in July 2010, but the promised politics of consensus could not be restored. The House could not elect its successor by consensus within the 12-day deadline that President Rambaran Yadav had set. The UCPN-M, through a Position Paper released on July 11, said the party was in no possession of land confiscated during the years of conflict, and that YCL was not a para-military outfit. Politics of ‘understanding’ is increasingly getting displaced by politics of deceit and history of betrayal of each other prevents the possibility for long–term cooperation on national issues. What went wrong in Nepal in the past four years when there was so much euphoria and hope that peace, democracy and development would be firmly consolidated and take deep roots in the country? How safe and secure do the people feel now? This issue needs to be dissected and viewed from different dimensions as security presupposes not only freedom from fear but also from basic needs deficit.

Mechanism for Political Stability

Political stability and consensus factors need to be taken into account. The credibility of the political actors in the eyes of the people and the international community needs to be analyzed. The 12-point agreement that united the parties for the removal of monarchy is unraveling due to change in the internal political equation and political change in India. The conflict, of course, has left a deep impact on the security instruments of the state, and the post conflict scenario as well as the ongoing peace process—with a heavy dose of uncertainty—has visibly enhanced the role of external players. It will be too early to predict where Nepal goes from here, but the current developments do not make people optimistic as they were four years ago. The promised politics of consensus—that forms part of the interim Constitution which is still in vogue—has already fragmented thus undermining the constitutional and institutional mechanism of stability. In April 2006 under pressure of the mass movement, King Gyanendra not only handed over power to a conglomeration of the political parties led by G P Koirala, he also revived the parliament that was not only dissolved three years ago—and subsequently (that dissolution) upheld by the Supreme court—but it had also outlived its normal five year tenure by then. Political necessity dictated the situation rather than democratic choice. The political parties probably realized that not having an elected body would give any ‘dictator’ an ideal platform to take over power.. Perhaps the parties were guided by the same logic and fear when they decided to extend the tenure of the constituent assembly on May 28, 2010.

The politics of consensus is almost dead already. G P Koirala who worked as interim Prime Minister heading a coalition government, made no attempt to relinquish the post for almost three months even after his party, the Nepali Congress, lost to the UCPN-M in the CA elections which secured 28.1 per cent votes with 238 members in a House of 601. Instead, the government headed by Koirala transacted major bills and decisions with larger political implications without even taking oath as the Prime Minister after the elections to the CA. Once Prachanda managed to get other parties support crossing the majority mark in the House, Koirala and the Nepali Congress, the main architect of the politics of consensus—refused to join the coalition giving almost an irreversible jolt to that process. The prevailing confusion and CA’s failure to have Constitution delivered on time has its root in the collapse of the politics of consensus and the ability to attain collective action. This trend continued even after the change of government subsequent to the resignation by UCPN-M Chief Prachanda as the Prime Minister in May 2009 and takeover by UML’s Madhav Nepal as the Maoists refused to join the government. The exercise to have the National Unity government sounds good in principle but there are doubts if at all it can be translated into action.

The collapse of political consensus also witnessed a parallel and equally damaging as well as negative trend of politics and politicians being discredited. Hopes had died, and leaders were fast turning into a breed that could not be and should not be trusted. Moreover, they failed to come to an understanding on what should a Federal Republic and Secular Nepal look like? Maoists want Nepal split into 12 provinces—mostly on the basis of ethnicity—with the right to self-determination while the two other parties fearing its consequences on national unity are still not clear about the basis of federalism. Similarly, Maoists want a judiciary accountable and servile to the legislature with the provision that judges could be hand-picked by the people’s representative body. They also want an executive President while UML wants a directly elected Prime Minister. The Nepali Congress continues to harp on parliamentary democracy, something Maoists are rigidly against. Maoists have been insisting that they would want ‘people’s republic’ in Nepal in which the competing parties would need the endorsement of only one national party i.e. the UCPN-M to operate legally. Their intermittent cry that they would capture state power only makes politics and future of Nepal uncertain as a democracy besides forcing pro-democracy parties to rely more on the security agencies of the state—mainly the Nepal army—to defeat such a move if and when it comes. That is why there are doubts and skepticism about the implementation of the May 28 accord and the politics of consensus being revived.

National Security and Economy

The 12-point agreement—initiated and mediated by India—way back in November 2005, ten months after the Royal takeover brought the pro-republic Maoists and the pro-Constitutional monarchy forces like the Nepali Congress and the UML together. “We decided to give up monarchy in lieu of Maoists agreeing to join peace and democracy”, K P Situala, a prominent Congress leader and key negotiator in the process said publicly. The agreement subsequently led to the removal of the monarchy and Nepal being declared a federal and secular state. However, political compromise took precedence over the Constitution and due process of changes. Political accountability was rarely enforced in the post April 2006 period. The United Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN) was invited for a limited role in the peace process. With UNMIN’s arrival in June 2006, Nepal army was forced to confine itself in the barracks and this may continue until the Maoist combatants are integrated and rehabilitated. There is discomfiture in the army which feels humiliated in being ‘equated with rebels’. UNMIN’s initial one year term is being extended continuously after for an additional six months and quite often it is branded as carrying a ”pro-Maoist bias” by the Non-Maoist parties as well as the Nepal Army. In March, Army Chief Chhatraman Singh Gurung told Lynn B Pascoe, Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations as well as its political head that Nepal Army is not going to be confined in the barrack indefinitely. He also said that Maoist combatants cannot be admitted to the army as a group, but he was willing to consider their entry on individual basis provided they fulfill other qualifications. The issue of integrating the Maoist combatants in the security agencies is the single most significant that issue has the potential to spoil the ongoing peace process. The fact that two rivals who fought for almost half a decade do not trust each other yet is understandable.

There is little that the political parties have done to bring them together to convince them that peace cannot be achieved and consolidated in a durable way without their cooperation. While the Maoist combatants enjoy firm patronage in the form of its parent party, the UCPN-M, the Nepal Army has only now begun getting the backing of non-Maoist parties and that too after Maoists began threatening repeatedly that they would capture the state powers. Soon after the hand-over of the power by the King, the UCPN-M, the only party that had pro-republic, federal and secular agenda, obviously was seen as the face and key agent of the desired change. Nepali Congress and the UML blindly followed their agenda for the sake of their interest in power-sharing. The Maoists tactfully put the army, the King and his unpopularity on the same platform. The two other parties did not adopt such an aggressive stand against the Nepal Army. The Maoists insisted right from the beginning that the Nepal army must be downsized. “Why would we need this army that is full of rapists and corrupted officers”, Prachanda asked during his maiden press conference that marked the end of his underground politics at the official residence of the Prime Minister (G P Koirala then) on June 2, 2006. Nepal Army continued to be his target after he became the Prime Minister in July 2008. He stopped recruitment in the army against regular vacancies, and sacked Gen Rookmangud Katawal, as Army Chief on May 3, 2009 only to be vetoed by President Rambaran Yadav under pressure from 18 major political parties. These political parties were of the opinion that Prachanda wanted to divide and destroy the Nepal Army and spread a psychological message that once the army was weak “the state can be captured’. The competition for security between rival parties made it difficult for cooperation. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on November 21, 2006—that forms the basis of the peace process—talks about democratizing the Nepal Army, but does not quite mention the model of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) to be followed. The European Union, mainly the United Kingdom is in favor of SSR, a model that Maoists have lent their weight behind. The EU is heavily involved, for the first time, in the two crucial areas of formulating Nepal’s defense policy and

restructuring its Army. It is openly asserting that the secular Nepal must guarantee in its future Constitution the right to (religious) conversion. The issue has far serious connotation and is now being objected to by huge groups of Hindus—both moderate and hardliners—who together constitute more than 80 per cent of the total population. Hence, the issue of security and faith are getting linked closely and this development may lead to serious consequences.

The Hindus in Tarai are seething with discontent and demanding the restoration of Hindu identity of Nepal. The EU is also against arms supply being resumed as it feels it goes against the spirit of the peace process while India is keen to lift the embargo it had placed during the Royal takeover. This some say is in violation of the 1950 treaty of Peace and Friendship and subsequent exchange of letters (1965) on arms supply. It is not only India and the EU that are being debated and more visible in Nepal, China—Nepal’s northern neighbor which rarely spoke on issues beyond Tibet—is showing diverse and magnified interest. With monarchy the gone, an institution that it worked in trust for more than four decades, China is looking for a trusted ally with whom it can work on short-term and long-term basis. As political parties and political process seem in disarray, it is also simultaneously trying to have a peace and friendship treaty signed with Nepal so that its role in future—especially when there is chaos and uncertainty—could be defined and legitimized. In a way, it is competing and cooperating with India vis a vis Nepal on an issue by issue basis. China’s increased interest in Nepal can be gauged by the increasing number of high level official visits. The conflict and post-conflict scenario have also witnessed other crises, mainly related with climate change and food scarcity. Around 3.5 million people are officially declared as hit by food scarcity. Around 35 glaciers, out of 2000 in the country, are listed as being close to danger point of bursting. This could have disastrous consequences with its effect spilled beyond the border of the country. All these without clearly defined consensus based politics, threatened by breach of peace process and resumption of violence, do not augur well for a country known in the past for its social and religious amity as well as land of peace. “Security agenda should respond to real requirements and needs. National interest must also be considered, as when domestic crises are ignored, disastrous consequences are seen” Moreover, both giant neighbors—India and China –see or perceive Nepal’s territory as potential foot-hold or swelling ground for forces hostile to their national and security interest.

Conclusion

An internal conflict, if allowed to linger, leaves impact that does not necessarily remain internal as transnational forces blur the boundaries between national sovereignty and international security. The soft power of ideas and communication has fused the national horizon and workers are integrating themselves with the international system. Out of 400,000 workers who enter into the labor market 300,000 migrate aboard in search of jobs and their remittance has contributed more than anything else to the nation’s survival and well being. De-linking from the international system is not a realistic option but, there is a need to minimize the negative effects of harmful linkages between politics and policies. The possible nexus between the Maoists in Nepal and India and the consolidation of ultra left groups from across South Asia into the Confederation of the Committee of Maoist Parties in South Asia (CCOMPOSA) has made militancy

based politics a core regional concern. The Bhutan Maoist Party has already given notice to the Druk Government that it is going to launch a movement for Republican Bhutan in the near future. The obvious role model is Nepal’s Maoist Party, the strength it gathered as an insurgent group, and the legitimacy it secured through election.

As a result of the conflict, the Nepal police was extensively armed and expanded, a paramilitary force named the Armed Police Force was created to combat ‘terrorism’, and Nepal Army grew in strength from 55,000 in 1996 to 90,000 in 2002. The number of Maoist combatants also grew at an alarming rate. According to reports from the Home Ministry, 109 armed outfits operate in parts of the country, mainly in Terai. Other political parties and ethnic groups are also creating militant wings and militarizing the society. This means that the country would spend more on defense and internal security at the cost of basic needs like food, education, health, jobs and social mobility. Such a situation can also invite the involvement of international actors as is evident in the case of Nepal. It is however, important to note in conclusion that what legitimizes the militants is ultimately the people’s mandate and they can be discredited if they chose to use the democratic process as a tactic rather than a legitimate political means. Democratic ends require democratic means and this is the reason for the creation of civilization and security with the minimization of the instruments of violence and insecurity in society.

Conflict in Sri Lanka: Roundtable meeting with Amb Jon Westborg

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Wed, 29 Sep 2010 06:13:00 +0000

As a part of the ongoing research project “Internal Conflicts and Transnational Consequences”, CSA organized a round table meeting with Amb Jon Westborg, Special Envoy, South Asia, Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the conflict in Sri Lanka. Amb Westborg was Ambassador to Sri Lanka (1996-2003) and India (2003-2007).

To begin with, he briefly covered the role of Norway to resolve the internal conflict in Sri Lanka and also gave out his observations on the post war developments.

In the last two decades or so, Norway has been involved in various ways and degrees in peace and reconciliation process across the world. Norway played various roles as official facilitator for negotiated peace in Sri Lanka to provider of humanitarian assistance in Burma. Norway has actively involved in the following conflict riddled regions-

• Asia- Sri Lanka, Aceh, Philippines

• Africa- Ethiopia, Sudan

• Latin America- Guatemala, Colombia, Haiti

• Middle East- Israel and Palestine

This peacemaking diplomacy has given the country much credibility as a sincere stakeholder in the peaceful world order.

The willingness to talk to the all parties in the conflict, steady and consistent policy on development assistance through extensive network of non governmental organisations and dedicated work of humanitarian assistance enabled Norway to be a part of Sri Lankan peace and reconciliations process from 1997-2005. While Norway could not influence the subsequent course of events, its impartial facilitation was widely acknowledged as useful, raising demands for Norwegian facilitation in other parts of the world.

On the present political situation in island nation, Amb Westborg emphasized that political solutions based on recognition of the rights and identities of Tamil speaking people and a process of development which is more inclusive and equitable could only bring peace in the island nation. He explained that the deep rooted causes of the issue must be tackled first. He greatly appreciated the rehabilitation and resettlement measures taken by the present government and said that it showed a marked shift in the mindset of the political leadership. Though the rehabilitation and resettlement work in the northern and eastern part of Sri Lanka are progressing well, he observed that much more needed to be done and this could be accomplished with the help of international and non governmental organisations which are more experienced in the softer side of development like reintegration of the displaced and preparing them for a life after war. But for reasons best known to the Sri Lankan government, International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and other international organisations have been denied access to work in these areas. He also mentioned of lack of efforts by the present government to strengthen local governance structure and the local Tamil organisations as a part of rebuilding effort.

Turning to the issue of the ex LTTE combatants and child soldiers, he mentioned that many were released and are in various rehabilitation agencies run by the Sinhalese NGOs and Sri Lankan Government. There has been much criticism and dissatisfaction within Sri Lanka and among international community in the manner in which whole process is carried out. He pointed out the government could enlist the services of external agencies to assist in dealing with the ex-combatants. But, previous experience had made the government wary of NGOs and international agencies. Despite all this, some progress has been made on this front.

Speaking on the economy, he said Sri Lanka has come a long way. Sri Lanka is wooing foreign investment in all sectors with positive results. He was of the opinion that reviving agriculture and fisheries in northern and eastern part of Sri Lanka is one possible way to kick start the war ravaged economy. And if income generation opportunities do not increase in these former conflict zones, frustrations are likely to intensify and build “pressure in the pressure cooker” triggering another conflict.

Talking on the allegations of the human right violations during the conflict, he welcomed the decision of the Sri Lankan Government to set up a separate commission “Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission” to report on the lessons to be learnt from the events in the period— Feb 2002 to May 2009. He hoped that the commission would prove to be a credible, independent and impartial mechanism as such arrangements had played an important role in advancing accountability and redressing wrongs in other countries emerging from civil war.

About the role of the Diaspora in the rebuilding efforts, he said that Tamil diaspora in Norway was very keen on helping in rebuilding and development of northern and eastern part of the state but have not yet done anything concrete so far. They seem to be waiting for safer climate and well defined procedures/ channels for their investment. He has urged the Tamil diaspora across the world to stop prioritizing politics and actively engage in rehabilitation and development work.

The project “Internal Conflicts and Trans –Border Consequences in South Asia” is progressing well.

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Tue, 03 Aug 2010 07:03:00 +0000

CSA has undertaken a three year project “Internal Conflicts and Trans- Border Consequences in South Asia” funded by Mac Arthur Foundation. The project is carried out in three phases under the direction of Lt Gen (Retd) VR Raghavan, President CSA as under:-

The conflicts covered are Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and India. The conflicts covered in India are -Naxalism, Jammu and Kashmir and Northeastern India. To conduct the study a number of scholars, researchers and experts are identified and after detailed interaction, engaged in writing research papers. Also, a number of prominent research institutions and think tanks are associated to organize collaborative study on the above mentioned subjects.

A two day Seminar on “Internal Conflict in Myanmar and trans border consequences” was organized in Singapore on 26th and 27th May 2010 in collaboration with Institute of South East Asian Studies (ISEAS) Singapore. Nine researchers addressed different facets of the conflict in Myanmar and made their presentation at the Seminar. The various issues covered during the seminar are as under:

• Dr Tin Maung Maung Than, Senior Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore: Tatmadaw and Internal Conflict in the context of political transition;

• Ms Kerstin Duell, Graduate Student, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore: The Trans-nationalization of contentious politics: Security concerns, Donor agenda, Diasporic networks;

• Dr. Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), Singapore : Effects of Conflicts in Myanmar on Bangladesh;

• Prof. LI Chenyang, Director, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Yunnan University, China : Effects of Conflict between Ceasefire groups and Myanmar Military Government in Northern Myanmar on China since 2009;

• Dr. BP Routray, Independent Security Analyst, Singapore: Conflict in Myanmar- Effect on Northeastern India;

• Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Fellow ISEAS, Singapore : Conflict in Myanmar Effects on Thailand;

• Ms. Anna Louise Strachan, Freelance Journalist and Researcher, Singapore: Regional Integration and intra-state conflict- Investment for peace in Myanmar;

• Mr. Larry Jagan, Freelance Journalist, Bangkok: International responses to Internal Conflict in Myanmar;

• Dr. Ramu Manivannan, Reader, Madras University, Chennai: Conflict resolution In Myanmar: An evaluation of opportunities and challenges for dialogue and reconciliation.

Second in the series of conferences, was the two day Seminar on “Internal Conflict in Nepal and Transnational Consequences” on 3rd and 4th June 2010 at Varnasi, in collaboration with Malaviya Centre for Peace Research and the Centre for the Study of Nepal, Banaras Hindu University.

Nine researchers from India and Nepal presented papers on different dimensions of the conflict. The following are the papers presented at the seminar:

• Mr. Yubaraj Ghimere, Senior Journalist, Nepal : Conflict in Nepal: An overview;

• Dr (Ms) Padmaja Murthy, Former Fellow, Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies(IDSA) , New Delhi : Internal Conflict In Nepal & Its Cross Border Consequences;

• Prof. Anjoo Sharan Upadhyaya, Professor of Political Science, Banaras Hindu University: Conflict in Nepal and its impact on the Terai region;

• Dr. Nihar Nayak, Associate Fellow, IDSA, New Delhi: International impact of conflict in Nepal;

• Prof. B.C Upreti, Director, South Asia Study Centre, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur: Conflict in Nepal- Impact on Environment and its cross country ramifications;

• Prof. Rajendra Prasad, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Gorakhpur University: Internal Conflict in Nepal and its Security Implications for India;

• Mr. Uddhab Pyakurel, Political Analyst, Nepal: Conflict in Nepal after the Peace Accord: A View from Nepal;

• Brig.(Retd) Keshar Bahadur Bhandari, Nepal Army: Impact of Internal Conflict on Nepalese Army;

• Mr. Chiran J Thapa Freelance Writer, Nepal : Effect of Counter-insurgency operation on civil- military relations in Nepal;

This was followed by the third conference, a two day workshop on “Conflicts in the North- East: Internal and External Effects” organized in collaboration with the Centre for North East Studies and Policy Research and Delhi Policy Group on 26- 27th July 2010 at New Delhi.

The following papers were presented at the workshop:

• Mr. E.N Ram Mohan IPS (Retd), Former Director General, Border Security Force : Overall perspectives;

• Dr. Mohendro Singh, Retired Professor of Economics, Manipur University: Economic Impact of conflict in North East;

• Prof. Udayon Misra, Fellow, Indian Council for Social Science Research: Internal Strife and External Impacts in the North-east – the issues of Nagaland and the Nagas;

• Dr. Vijayalakshmi Brara, Reader, Centre for Manipur Studies, Manipur University: Nongpok Thong Hangba – Towards Cultural Collectives;

• Mr. Jayanta Bhattacharya, Chief of Bureau, Press Trust of India, Agartala: Ramifications of Conflicts in Tripura and Mizoram;

• Dr. Samir Das, Professor of Political Science, University of Calcutta and Research Coordinator, Calcutta Research Group: ULFA and its impact on Bangla-India relations;

• Dr. Sanjeeb Kakoty, Faculty Member on Sustainable Development, Rajiv Gandhi Indian Institute of Management, Shillong: Migration mantra and the Bangladesh-North-east conundrum.

All these presentations were followed by a lively and informed discussion which helped the paper presenters to review their papers and improve upon it. These revised papers will be published as edited volumes.

As a part of the ongoing project on Internal Conflicts, CSA organized a one day workshop on “The Naxal Threat: Causes, State Responses and Consequences” in Chennai on 27th August 2010. Lt Gen (Retd) VR Raghavan, President CSA briefly outlined the workshop concept.

Six researchers with wide-range of experience and expertise addressed the different facets of the Naxal issue. Presentations were followed by intense discussion and question & answer session. The various issues covered during the workshop are as under:-

Dr P.V. Ramana, Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi- Overview of Centre and State Responses to Naxal Threat;

Ms Sharanya Nayak and Ms Malini Subramanian Tribal Researchers and Social Workers - Impact on Tribal Communities of Orissa and Chattisgarh;

Mr E.N. Ram Mohan, IPS (Retd), Former Director General, Border Security Force- States’ Responses to Leftwing Extremism;

Dr Sudha Ramachandran, Independent Researcher/ Journalist- Naxal Threat: A Perspective;

Mr K. S. Sood, Former DIG, Border Security Force- Challenges to Para Military Forces;

A two day National Seminar on “Conflict in Jammu and Kashmir: Impact on the Society, Polity and Economy” was organized in collaboration with the Department of Strategic and Regional Studies (DSRS), University of Jammu on 21-22 September 2010 at University of Jammu.

The following papers were presented at the seminar:

Dr S S Bloeria, IAS (Retd), Former Chief Secretary, Government of Jammu and Kashmir: “Conflict Overview”;

Mr Balraj Puri, Expert on Jammu and Kashmir and Human Rights Activist: “Impact of Inter- Regional Relations on Politics of Jammu & Kashmir state and vice versa”;

Prof Navnita Chaddha Behera, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Delhi: “Impact on Inter- Provincial Relations”;

Prof. Noor Ahmed Baba, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Kashmir: “Impact on Inter-Communal /Religious Relationship”;

Dr. Arun Joshi, Bureau Chief, Hindustan Times: “Impact on Inter-Religious/ Communal Relations”;

Prof. R. L Bhat, Professor, Department Economics, Jammu University: “Impact on Economy”;

Mr Vikrant Kuthiala, Chairman, J&K Committee of PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi: “Impact on Commerce and Industry”;

Dr Ashish Saxena, Department of Sociology, University of Allahabad: “Impact on Governance”;

Dr. Baljit Singh, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Jammu University: “Kashmir Conflict - A Reflection on competing nationalisms of India and Pakistan”;

Dr. Mohammad Monir Alam, Director in Charge, Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, Jammu University: “Pakistan’s policy towards the conflict”;

Ms Roopali Sharma, Research Scholar, Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, Jammu University: “ Gender dimensions of the conflict”;

Dr. Javaid Rahi, Gujjar Activist: “Impact of the conflict on Gujjars and Bakerwals”;

Mr Pradeep Dutta, Chief Correspondent, Times New TV, Jammu: “Politics of Displacement & Trust Deficit”.

India's Naxalite Insurgency – Challenges and Responses*

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Tue, 15 Jun 2010 04:33:00 +0000

Geeta Madhavan^

NAXALISM AND MAOIST INSURGENCY

The earliest perpetrators of terrorist activity in India were the left wing groups in the state of West Bengal. Informally termed as Naxalism, it was a violent uprising and opposing movement which started in a village called Naxalbari in 1967 in West Bengal as a response to killing of peasants by the landlords. The Naxal movement was part of the larger issue of rural violence and it spread to other states in the country. Though it fragmented in the period following 1970, the movement revived and it was estimated that by 1980, there were 30 odd groups sharing similar ideologies and having a membership of almost 30,000. Although different groups operated in various areas, they have been loosely united since September 2004 as the Communist Party of India (Maoist) with an estimated 10,000 members who use regular weapons, home-made arms and explosive devices, including landmines and the membership is presently suspected to have swelled to an alarming 50,000.

In 2003, the Maoists had influence over 55 districts in 9 states; it is now estimated that they have established their writ over 223 districts in 20 states in India with large areas under their influence, where the guerrillas have control and run quasi-government structures. Large parts of these states are afflicted by rural poverty and have a larger proportion of tribal populace. Several groups with similar ideologies control nearly 19 per cent of India's forest areas where these large tribal population exist. Running through the heartland of India is their ideological territory, the Compact Revolutionary Zone or the Red Corridor. The Maoists have killed civilians, tortured and mutilated those they believe to be enemies, and engaged in extortion and forced recruitment.

This growing insurgency is a major problem for the Indian government and the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh described it as the “single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country...the movement has gained in strength ....the extremists are trying to establish ‘liberation zones’ in core areas where they are dispensing basic state functions of administration, policing and justice,”

In 2009, West Bengal police started Operation Lalgarh, a massive ongoing operation to flush out the Naxalites by deploying the anti Naxal COBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) Force. In June 2009, Operation Green Hunt, an assault operation was launched in three states that formed the tri junction of Maoist dominated area of central India. The action came in for severe criticism as the tribal populations were relocated and they lost their homes and livelihood and were often caught between the police forces and the Maoists. Both the operations were criticized for their disregard for civil and human rights. The Maoists dealt with swift justice for informers and those they suspected as not being on their side. The police on the other hand, often picked up the tribal youths as suspected Maoists and dealt with them harshly sometimes even killing them in fake encounters. The retaliation from the Maoists for these operation against them was swift and deadly and ever since the violence has escalated.

In the biggest attack ever on government forces, on 6th April this year, 73 personnel of the Central Reserve Police Force were killed in a meticulously planned ambush by the Maoists in Dantewada district of Chattisgarh, a Maoists stronghold. Several such attacks against police forces and civilians have been taking place regularly in the regions where the Maoists have control. In the state of Jharkand, another Maoist stronghold, a train was derailed by the Maoists on 28th May in which 100 people were killed and more than hundred persons were critically injured. Although the Naxalite movement was once considered to be in organizational disintegration, ideological disarray and confusion; it is now considered a serious threat to the national integrity of India.

CHALLENGES and RESPONSES

1. The fundamental challenge is the structural impediments in launching national counter insurgency operations. Initially, the Maoist insurgency was considered to be law and order problem which was to be dealt by the police of the affected states. As the area under the control of the Maoists enlarged and their influence expanded and their violence increased, the central government was forced to raise the threat from a state level concern to a national security threat. However, the federal structure of the government makes it incumbent on the central government to coordinate with the state forces. The role of the security apparatus of the state is vital as the forces deployed by the central government are under the command of the state structures. The Home Minister, P. Chidambaram, reiterated this fact when he articulated his concerns of the ability and will of the states to pursue the counter insurgency operations.

The response that is envisaged is a coordinated joint effort by all states with Maoist presence under a central command. The operations against the Maoists in the state of Andhra are often proclaimed as a success by the state. However, the crackdown by the elite commando forces has resulted in the tactical withdrawal to other states. Moving swiftly form one jurisdiction to another the Maoists have been able to evade the security forces .Therefore, only a swift and simultaneous joint action by all the affected states can result in flushing them out. Also it is important that zones designated as “liberated” zones by the Maoists are regained and the government authority established before any other organization can be set up in the area. The state has to recover its image as the protector of the people especially of the tribals who have been driven out by both the government forces and the Maoists and see both of them as their enemy.

2. The indications that the Maoist violence has crossed the threshold of insurgency and has been termed by them as a revolutionary war have raised deep concerns. After the defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lankan, Maoists have sought to apply the lessons learnt from the defeat indicating that the mistake of the LTTE lay in the lack of study of the changes in enemy tactics and capabilities, underestimating of the enemy and overestimation of its own forces and capabilities. A circular of the insurgency forces sets out general strategic plans to counter government’s expected Anti Naxal plans; it sets out that (i) attack should be organized with meticulous planning, targeting police, informers and other enemies; (ii) carried out in close co ordination with and in support of armed resistance of the people and (iii) linked to seizure of political power and establishment of base areas and (iv) rouse the masses.

Since the Dantewada ambush by the Maoists in which central police personnel were killed, there has been strong support for the deployment of the Army in the area. The Home Minister also indicated the request of the states for the use of air support, as against air power, in these areas. The Defence Minister has indicated that there has been serious consideration for the role of the Army and that the government is examining the pros and cons of Army involvement. So far the Army has provided training to 47,000 police personnel at the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School and other Counter Insurgency Training Schools as well as several police academies.

3. Successful campaigns by the counter insurgency forces have left a vacuum in those areas as the civilian government agencies have not been able to move swiftly to occupy the space immediately and resume administration. This has allowed resumption of the writ of the insurgents who have been quick to fill the gap. The preoccupation with the peace and order has proved very costly because the socio- economic conditions have been ignored. The focus on law and order situation by the intelligence agencies has not given a realistic appraisal of the situation. There is no accountability for the violations by the security forces and this has caused deep anger among the civilian and tribal population in these areas. The establishment of the government supported armed vigilantes groups (Salwa Judum) in the areas have led to gross violation of civil rights and the claimed success of the movement has come at the cost of the rule of law.

This situation has underlined two major requirements. The first, that it is necessary to involve the civilian government agencies. Redressal systems have to be set in place to deal with violations of human rights and civil rights. The weakest link in counter insurgency programs is the reestablishment of governance. The middle level government agents therefore, have to be moved in swiftly to re establish mechanisms for legitimate redressals pertaining to social dignity, civil rights and legitimate concerns. The second, is to create a parallel source of information (as against those of the intelligence agencies), to plan inter disciplinary study and form action groups. Socio economic counter insurgency campaigns have to run parallel to tactical operations. Resisting the arming of the vigilante groups, the government has to empower the non violent grievance mechanism and isolate the legitimate demands of the local population and address them.

4. Dr Manmohan Singh stated: exploitation, artificially depressed wages, iniquitous socio-political circumstances, inadequate employment opportunities, lack of access to resources, under developed agriculture, geographical isolation, lack of land reforms, all contribute significantly to the growth of the Naxalite movement”. He further clarified on “In dealing with Naxalism, we will pursue a policy that genuinely seeks to address developmental concerns at the grassroots, while firmly enforcing the writ of the state government would not flinch from frontally battling Maoist violence, communalism and terrorism. Social development of the regained areas is imperative. On May 14, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi stated: while we must address acts of terror decisively and forcefully, we have to address the root cause of Naxalism.” “…. A reflection of the need for our development initiatives to reach the grassroots……our government is putting in place more targeted development schemes for our most backward districts”. Prime Minister has announced INR 7,300 crores development package and withdrawal of 1, 00,000 petty ceases against the tribals.

Conclusions:

1. Time frames for counter insurgency and development programs cannot be reconciled, therefore there has to be emphasis on immediate and swift counter insurgency operations and long term development programs.

2. Clear policy of two pronged approach: Counter insurgency operations and sustained and inclusive development: investment of political and fiscal capital. Development can only take place with effective and clear control over areas cleared of insurgent control.

3. Emphasis on economic counter insurgency campaign and transparency in the implementation of development programs .Development should take into account limitations of demography, available human resources, and means for optimum use of financial resources, structural infirmities and natural surroundings.

4.Perceptible indication of development in areas that have none or minimum significant manifestation of insurgency and in areas adjoining those areas under the direct control of insurgents as a means of establishing faith in the developmental programs reaching those areas subsequent to the counter insurgency operations.

5. Involvement of civilian government agencies to re establish governance. The manpower deficit at mid level of the governmental agencies have to be addressed. Strategies have to cross reference with capabilities, resources available, capacities and factual assessment of ground situations.

6. Corruption and criminalization of government agencies which has placed obstacles in the progress of these agencies evolving and growing to meet the new requirements and the actual needs of the people of these areas.

7. The creation of civil rights cells for redresses and legitimate demands for restoration of civil rights.

^ Dr Geeta Madhavan is the founding member of Centre for Secuirty Analysis.

* Paper presented at the Regional Network of Strategic Studies Centre's Working Group Meeting held at Istanbul on June 9-11, 2010

Constitutional crisis: A tug of war

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Tue, 01 Jun 2010 04:04:00 +0000

By Ancy Joseph

A major constitutional crisis was averted in Nepal. The opposition, Unified Nepal Communist Party-Maoist (UCPN-M) agreed to extend the present parliament for a year. In return, Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal is to step down. As per the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2006 between the Maoist group and the Seven Party Alliance, Nepal was to get a new constitution on 28th May 2010. However, due to prolonged disputes between the ruling parties and UCPN-M for over a year the deadline could not be kept.

Without the support of the Maoists, who control the largest parliamentary bloc, the government lacked the necessary two-thirds majority to extend the life of the parliament. The only option was the declaration of a state of emergency by the president. This would have led to the suspension of the government, unleashing an unprecedented crisis and political vacuum.
The eleventh hour discussions resulted in the extension of the term for another year. The new constitution will have to be tabled within that. The new constitution is expected to restructure the government radically, create, for the first time, a federalist system of states, codify the relationship between the branches of government and expand the list of official languages.

A three-point agreement gave a new life to the Constituent Assembly (CA). The CA will be extended by one year, past agreements will be implemented and Prime Minister will resign within a few days to pave way for a unity government. Both sides claim the last minute negotiations as ‘positive development’ and ‘historic’ that resulted in opening the door to end the current political deadlock.

The crux of the whole issue is the integration of the members of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into Nepal Army (NA). Thousands of former Maoist fighters remain in UN-supervised cantonments after the military chiefs refused to integrate them into the army as required under the peace process. The government still claims that there are only 3,000 of them while the Maoists insist that there are 19,000 to be integrated. The ruling coalition is also pressing for the disbanding of the Maoist youth wing—the Young Communist League.

The integration process did not gain momentum even when the Maoists were in government, which was a failure on their part, despite their blaming the non-cooperation of the other political parties. There are 19,600 UNMIN-verified PLA fighters in the cantonments, on whom the state has spent Rs 60 billion in three years. The peace process is caught in the blame games. Technical and high level committees have failed to decide on the issue. The High Level Political Mechanism has been passive and proposed integration schemes have been ineffective. Ruling coalition believes it is the Maoists alone who benefit from keeping PLA soldiers in the cantonments.

There is no dispute that integration, management and rehabilitation of the PLA are an integral part of the peace process. The integration and rehabilitation of PLA soldiers are very sensitive issues and require a consensus for resolution. But the leaders of the political parties do not have a specific plan to achieve this. So far the discussions have only focused on numbers, rather than how and where in the security forces they will be integrated, and what designations they will receive. Even with integration of PLA into Nepal Army only fundamental transformation of the organization, structure and political behavior of the political parties can bring peace to Nepal.

Another issue of the immediate nature that can cause further political tensions is the resignation of the present Prime Minister to pave way for the formation of a new government. The Maoists had been demanding that Prime Minister Madhav Kumar, from the Nepal Communist Party-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), resign immediately to make way for a “national unity government” led by them. Kumar had flatly refused to step down until the parties arrive at consensus on all contentious issues related to peace process, constitution drafting and the name of the next prime minister to lead a proposed national consensus government. Differences between the government and opposition have already emerged. A meeting yesterday between the ruling CPN-UML and Nepali Congress with the opposition UCPN-M broke down with no agreement on the implementation of the arrangements. The UCPN-M pushed for the prime minister’s resignation while the ruling parties insisted that the issues of the Maoist ex-fighters and youth wing be resolved. UN chief Ban Ki-moon urged the leaders to work out their differences, while political analysts have warned that failure to find a solution could mean a return to civil war.

The Maoists have been agitating for a return to government ever since Prachanda's resignation a year ago, and earlier this month brought the country to a standstill by holding a nationwide general strike to press their demands. The strike was called off after six days following intense international pressure and a mass rally in the capital Kathmandu protesting against the disruption of public life.

There is a trust deficit between the Maoist Party and the ruling coalition parties. The latter suspect that the Maoists are not committed to multiparty democracy. On the other hand Maoist have serious apprehensions about the commitment of the older parties to any kind of progressive change and suspect there is a deep conspiracy to dissolve the CA.

With the government and opposition already debating the implementation of last Friday’s three-point agreement, further political turmoil is likely soon.

WINNING PEACE IN WAR-TORN SRI LANKA

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Sat, 22 May 2010 07:20:00 +0000

CSA organized a seminar "From Winning the War to Winning Peace: Post-war rebuilding of Society in Sri Lanka" in Colombo in August 2009. A talk by Mr. Tissa Vitharana, Minister for Science and Technology, Government of Sri Lanka at this seminar is reproduced below.

As the dust of battle settles, the visions of the past have to be cleared with an understanding of the current situation and what we need to do. In an emotionally charged atmosphere wrong assessments can be made and wrong conclusions can be drawn. Such an environment can adversely affect the peace process. The part of Sri Lanka that was occupied by the LTTE has been liberated and the country is now looking at establishing a united nation with united people. This however is not an easy task, as there are forces operating within our country, which would like to see conflict again. In this context, we must properly evaluate the state of affairs and ensure that the peace process continues and we reach a political solution that can ensure lasting peace.
It is important that our expectations are realistic in this post war scenario. One must be mindful of the fact that the country has fought not just a conventional war, but also a terrorist war. People in the war zones have to regain their livelihoods. It is a situation where the country not only faces deep divides within the Sri Lankan society but also deeply divisive forces from abroad that have an interest in fuelling the conflict. We must remember that the world is facing an economic crisis and it could perhaps be worse than the great depression of 1933 when the private sector collapsed and government spending became essential to partially recover from the Great Depression. The real recovery came with the Second World War. After the war, there was a post-war economic boom, which continued until the 1970’s. This is why we must remember that there are countries whose economies depend, to a considerable extent, on arms production. The sale of arms depends on continuing conflicts. Without conflicts, the arms will not be sold. We must therefore remember that perhaps in the nuclear era, a world war cannot be contemplated. However, localised wars and conflicts are on the cards.
The war has come to an end but these forces have not disappeared. However, with the cooperation of well-meaning and thinking people, Sri Lanka is trying to forge a solution, which would take us through the stormy waters. In his election manifesto, President Mahinda Rajapakse made two important announcements. One was his readiness to hold talks with LTTE supremo Prabhakaran. He said he was even prepared to go to Vanni to do that. The other was that he would set up an All-Party Representative Conference (APRC). The representatives and leaders of the political parties in the parliament will be mandated to come out with a political solution to the national question. The President firmly believed that this was a political problem and needed a political solution. It is out of this, that the APRC process emerged.
One must recognise that the APRC process is very different from the processes that have resulted in the special 1978 constitution and the 13th Amendment. The J R Jayewardene constitution was known only to him and a small circle around him. It was not even revealed to the cabinet ministers of his own government. There was no public debate in the country. I would call that constitution as having been one which was designed explicitly to get the process of globalisation rapidly into the country. It ensured that we would have a completely open economy, which would enable foreign investment, utilisation, and exploitation of our resources: human, material, natural and agricultural in a way the multinationals wanted. This was against the interests of the majority of the people of the country. It was therefore necessary that in a democratic society where we have been used to change in governments periodically, the voice of the people be silenced and distanced from those who take decisions.

The constitution made it extremely difficult for people who do not have massive financial and other resources to contest and win positions in the Parliament and the government. As a result, people did not have a representative either in parliament or in the provincial councils and did not have anyone to turn to when they have a problem. This type of alienation of people and distancing them from the process of governance has led to the selective breakdown of governance in the Sri Lankan society.
I call for a complete change in the constitution. A few changes here and there are not going to be helpful. The 13th Amendment was again a part of the Indo- Lanka Accord that set the process of devolution. The fact that devolution was initiated was good thing, but the 13th Amendment did not emerge out of a national debate or discussion. The APRC process offered an opportunity for discussing the Constitution and freely exchange views to formulate a solution that will be appropriate to our needs.

I acknowledge the contribution made by the expert panel, which was set up by the President to provide the constitutional support to the APRC. All those who have been following the process are aware of the fate of the proposal made by panel. Nevertheless, we must accept that no one is a pundit and no one has the perfect solution. It is a dynamic process and we know that even well considered and formulated Constitutions have undergone changes through a process of consensus. throughout history.

Initially the Tamil National Alliance was not included, in the peace process. It was not because they were not inclined to come but because they had not been invited. Half way through the process when the President approached me on this issue I suggested that the TNA should be included. Irrespective of the view that they are proxies of the LTTE would play a destructive role it was my view that once individual issues come up for discussion, they would make a constructive contribution. When I spoke to the leader of the Tamil National Alliance, Mr. R. Sambandan, he said that they were not prepared to participate at that point in time. He affirmed that he would be willing to participate once talks with the LTTE commenced. Today four political parties have opted out of the process. First, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front -JVP) participated in 21 meetings stating that they were for devolution. By this, I mean that their representative accepted devolution within a unitary framework and this is on record. Later, they reversed that decision and withdrew. They have since then been critical of the APRC process. At a summit relating to the APRC a group of United National Party (UNP) leaders crossed over to the Government. The UNP subsequently cited this as a reason for withdrawing from the process but stated that once the process arrives at an agreement they will be prepared to rejoin discussions. The Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (People’s United Front-MEP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (National Heritage Party- JHU) which participated in the process for almost 2 years withdrew in 2008. First, on the grounds that the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (Tamil People's Liberation Tigers –TMVP) was not included and later they stayed away from process without specifying any genuine reason. Today there are thirteen parties including the TMVP in the process, eleven from within the government and two from the opposition namely- The Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and the Democratic Peoples’ Front, which was formerly the Western Peoples’ Front led by Mano Ganesan.

The process has arrived at a consensus and I have given a summary of the progress to the President. We discussed the proposals and exchanged views and the President has decided to study the document further and revert with his suggestions. Therefore, we have suspended the APRC discussions that consisted of 128 discussions averaging three hours each. Once we have the President’s feedback, we will reconvene the APRC and get the reactions of its members. If modifications are indicated, we will make them after obtaining the approval of the APRC and then we will have to get signatures from the representatives of each of the political parties concerned. It is at this point that I hope the UNP will join the process. I must note that I disagree with the President’s opinion that the UNP will never join the process. I think it is possible to draw them into the process as the conditions have changed and those within the party, who were opposed to its participation, are now in a much weaker position. There is a new thinking and a new situation in the country and I am sure wiser counsel will prevail.

On the question of drawing the other parties into the process, we need to get their opinions. This does not mean we go through the whole discussion with them but means that we accept ideas. As far as the TNA is concerned, it is very important that they be an active participant of the APRC. We need to have long discussions with them and my hope is that they will participate in the process. I have been in touch with the leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) Mr. Anandasangaree, the People’s Liberation Organisation of the Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF- Padmanabha wing) and I have been able to transmit their views at various points in the discussions. My hope is that all these parties can be involved in the preparation of the final document. As is evident, this process will take time and we will have to follow Presidential and General Elections. In the meantime, we need to send the right signals to the Tamil people. The government is working on meeting their needs through social and economic measures. It is also interested in working out a political solution to the problem. I think the proper implementation of the 13th Amendment has a pivotal role to play.
It is common knowledge that the APRC process is proposing a return to the Westminster model of government and a move away from the Executive Presidential System. The question of when this would come into effect needs to be decided. However, a growing public opinion is that the current system must be maintained keeping in view the present people in office and the military victory just achieved. These matters will evolve with time. Another important aspect of the proposal is the definition of the nature of state. We defined the nature of the state as is done in the Indian Constitution, using neither of the words unitary or federal. Unfortunately, parties like the SLFP, JHU and JVP and MEP from outside the process and the breakaway JVP insist on a unitary model fearing separation. These fears are insurmountable and therefore we must work out a solution within a unitary framework. We visited Great Britain and were able to get a lot of information on the Northern Ireland peace process that was settled within a unitary framework. In Great Britain, the Good Friday Agreement is embodied in the Northern Ireland Act and this Act can be revoked or changed with a simple majority at Westminster. Despite this, the process has gone forward thanks to an adequate devolution of powers. I am glad that all the members of the APRC had an opportunity to witness that the devolution takes place not only in Northern Ireland, but also in Scotland and Wales. The APRC came around to accepting that within a unitary framework, devolution of power is possible, and that this can bring us a new solution.
On visiting India, the APRC found that the concurrent list was causing problems. There were litigations between the Central and State governments regarding the same. The advice we received was to try and minimise the number of subjects on the concurrent list. We first started with 14 subjects when the JHU and the MEP were still participating and were eventually able to eliminate it altogether with their withdrawal. The President felt that there should be a Concurrent List with regard to certain powers, where the Centre would be able to intervene if required. These included issues like the Police and Land. I mentioned that the proposal had empowered the Centre to set up a regulatory framework within which the State would operate and the President has promised to consider this option. Similarly, from the Panchayati Raj system in India we learnt the importance of strengthening local government. APRC has proposed the Grama Sabha system that was prevalent earlier and is applying it as far as possible to empower the villages. The village will have the necessary institutionally defined powers, the administrative backup and the financial support, for it to act with regard to its infrastructure and economic development needs. Rather than having direct elections to local bodies, we have suggested that those representatives come up from the village committee and the ward committee system. In this way people from poorer backgrounds can be elected to the democratic offices. With regard to police powers, there is a provision for a Provincial Police Commission under the direction of the Chief Minister in the 13th Amendment and it can be established if the amendment is properly implemented. The APRC has recommended that there should be only one police commission, a National Police Commission that would deal with recruitment, promotions, transfers, and disciplinary action within the police both at the central and the provincial level.

In conclusion it is important to note that the process cannot accommodate extremists. It is important that we have the consent of a majority of our people. The challenge ahead of the APRC process is to arrive at a final consensus, acceptable to a majority of the Sinhalese, a majority of the Tamils, a majority of the Muslims and a majority of other sections in our community.

RECOVERY AND RECONCILIATION IN POST WAR SRILANKA

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Sat, 22 May 2010 07:17:00 +0000

CSA organized a seminar "From Winning the War to Winning Peace: Post-war rebuilding of Society in Sri Lanka" in Colombo in August 2009. A talk by Mr. Mahinda Samarasinghe, Minister for Disaster Management and Human Rights, Government of Sri Lanka at this seminar is reproduced below.

The word “peace” and the phrase “rebuilding of society” are to my mind, fundamental conceptual paradigms that we must gain a common understanding of and evolve consensus on.
What then is this “peace” that we aim to win? In the words of words of Spinoza, peace is not the mere absence of open violent conflict but an innate predisposition towards benevolence, confidence and justice. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, also perhaps inspired by the sentiments expressed by Spinoza, put it thus: “Peace is not a relationship of nations. It is a condition of mind brought about by a serenity of soul. Peace is not merely the absence of war. It is also a state of mind. Lasting peace can come only to peaceful people.”

Values of Peace

It is important to internalize the core values of peace if we are to achieve the societal goal of ‘winning the peace’. To do this, we must be committed to demonstrating benevolence through tolerance and accommodation of our fellows, confidence and trust in one another and justice predicated on principles of equity and equality. This leads us to the next concept of the rebuilding of society. To my mind, there are four closely interconnected and interrelated steps for rebuilding a society. They are:

Reconstruction, Resettlement, Reintegration including Rehabilitation and Reconciliation including democratic political accommodation.

All these facets must be supportive of the generation of and spread of peace, in the terms outlined above within Sri Lanka. Allied with these main facets are the provision of safety and security as a condition precedent and democratization to maintain long-term stability.

Preventive Measures

We also have to put in place preventive measures which will forestall a resurgence of violence and conflict. The debilitating and corrosive influence of nearly three decades of conflict, on the entirety of society and its institutional structures, needs to be gradually and carefully redressed.

The three sub-themes of this book amply cover the scope and ambit of the interlinked aspects of rebuilding society. The cardinal rule that must govern all our actions is that the new society that we build for ourselves must be better than any we have known, learning from our past mistakes and building on our successes. Prior to all of this we must take measures to care for those who are the immediate victims of the conflict. Much is spoken of the situation of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) rescued during the humanitarian operation in the northern theatre of conflict. Less is spoken of the casualties of war in the South - the dead, wounded and disabled amongst the Security Forces and the police and also their families. We need to care for all these persons and see to their welfare. There are also older categories of IDPs - among these are Muslims who were evicted from the North by the LTTE nearly 20 years ago - that we have undertaken to resettle in a durable and sustainable manner.

Resettling

In talking about the approximately 270,000 IDPs in several districts - mainly the welfare centres and relief villages in Vavuniya District, in 2009, over 15,000 displaced persons have been resettled in Jaffna, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara and Mannar Districts. We have screened and readied for release over 10,000 persons from welfare centres and relief villages who are elderly, are pregnant or lactating mothers or children. We have a population of 10,000 persons (including child recruits) who have been members of the LTTE or affiliated with the organization in some way, in centres that are subject to rehabilitation programs. All these persons are deserving of our care and attention. We are in the process of registering them, with well over 50 percent having been registered to date.

The issue of their freedom of movement has been canvassed before the Supreme Court and the Government bears a responsibility to the rest of the people of Sri Lanka to care for their safety. We have reliable information that LTTE cadres have infiltrated the ranks of the IDPs.

Screening Process

Until the screening process is complete and these elements are identified and apprehended we have to take utmost care in permitting even limited freedom of movement as the risk exists of LTTE cadres posing as civilian IDPs and entering the general population. This is a chance we cannot afford to take. The decision was not taken lightly but rather by a careful balancing of the rights of the IDPs against those of the rest of the population, especially given the LTTE’s propensity to cause maximum carnage among the civilian population by launching terrorist acts.

International Dimension

There is also an international dimension created by the intense pressure brought to bear on the political leadership in countries that are host to the widespread Tamil Diaspora. We need to engage with those nations and with the Diaspora itself to convince them that we are working to rebuild a new Sri Lanka; one in which the diversity that has characterized our polity is cherished, celebrated and nurtured. Our multi-lingual, multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural social structure must be safeguarded and given space to express itself. It is only then that confidence in an overarching, cohesive and common Sri Lankan identity can be fostered that will enable us to move forward as one nation and one Sri Lankan people. It is only then that we can collectively overcome all the post-conflict challenges in our way as well as other new challenges that any modern nation state is called upon to face.

Attracting Expatriate

We must seek to attract the vast pool of expatriate Sri Lankan talent - a resource which is vital to the rebuilding of the conflict affected North and East. We must encourage the Tamil Diaspora to invest in these areas and let their brethren enjoy the benefits of their expertise and entrepreneurship. At the same time we need to be on our guard against those, particularly Western, media outlets which, by disseminating disinformation spread by the LTTE network’s remnants and their proxies, constantly seek to besmirch the name of Sri Lanka. Here have been instances where respected UK newspapers have reported of tremendously exaggerated numbers of supposed mortalities in the IDP welfare centres and relief villages in Vavuniya.

Overstated Number

When we did check on this reportage, we found that the number was grossly overstated. In August 2009 a horrifying video of supposed executions of Tamil persons in January was played on a Western television channel’s news program and the canard was immediately picked up by many news organs and given wide publicity. On both these occasions, we were able to ascertain the truth and promptly denounce the distortions and untruths for what they were. The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, a proscribed LTTE “front” organization, continues to spew out the most outrageous falsehoods regarding the situation of the IDPs.

These are attempts to generate ill-will against Sri Lanka and distance her from her many friends and we must be alert to such machinations. These efforts were at their height during the final phases of the conflict when pressure was brought to bear at several international forums. Sri Lanka faced those pressures and emerged victorious. To enable us to continue to hold our heads high on the international stage, our foreign policy must be geared towards portraying the truth about Sri Lanka overseas and must be aimed at constructively engaging and cooperating with our international friends and partners while at the same time preserving national sovereignty. There also others who, for reasons best known to themselves, are domestically spreading false reports about the situation in the relief villages and welfare centres.

I have been able to inform the Parliament of the steps taken to mitigate the risks of flooding and of diseases spreading due to the pre-monsoonal rains experienced in the North. Exaggerated stories of deteriorating conditions and catastrophic outcomes raised alarms and the national legislature decided to conduct an adjournment debate on the issue. The Government was able to respond fully to all queries and explain the many preventive and mitigatory measures it had taken.

Rehabilitation and Resettlement

There are four main planks of our recovery efforts. We are now in the late-response and early-recovery phase where we are now over the immediate impact of the disaster, i.e. armed conflict and terrorism. We are now dealing with the fallout of the disaster those who were harmed and displaced. In humanitarian terms, we are currently in a care and maintenance stage. We are, contemporaneously, moving over to early recovery phase involving what you have identified in your sub-theme as “economic reconstruction” and from there to achieving longer term development objectives. Our ultimate goal is the return of IDPs to the areas in which they originally resided.

The process requires ensuring that these areas must be rendered safe, free of mines and other unexploded ordnance. The areas of return must be cleared of the vast caches of weapons that our Forces are recovering on a day-to-day basis. To facilitate this process, basic infrastructure must be put in place which will sustain the restored communities. Economic life must be restarted.

Resettlement

A return to traditional livelihoods must be enabled. Income generating activities from small and medium industry, services, agriculture and fisheries must be recommenced. If people in the conflict affected areas are to face the future with any degree of confidence, the public facilities and institutional edifices providing essential services must be available and on par with those in the rest of Sri Lanka. It is also necessary to enable and empower them to take charge of their own lives and not be continuously dependent on humanitarian assistance and relief. These are challenges that the Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa has taken on and is determined to meet and overcome.

The next step is the housing and urban renewal of metropolitan centres. This will enable the second phase of recovery - resettlement. This process itself must be open and transparent. People must be informed of the plans for their eventual return and their movement must be voluntary. To ensure this voluntariness, “go and see” visits by representative groups of IDPs are facilitated to view conditions in the areas of resettlement/return and report to their fellow IDPs.

The Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights has with the assistance of the Sri Lankan representation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) put in place a strategy of Confidence Building and Stabilization Measures which will sustain and help the resettlement process by building capacities and confidence between and among key actors in the resettlement process - IDPs themselves, Government officials, Security Forces and host communites in locations of displacement and also in areas of return.

The first two limbs of this recovery effort are being coordinated and implemented in consonance with the overarching Wadakkin Vasantham (Northern Spring) program under the purview of the Basil Rajapakse, Chairman of the Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province. He is assisted by Resettlement and Disaster Relief Services Minister Rishad Bathiudeen.

The Wadakkin Vasantham program will bring together all focal points and agencies that have a role to play in ensuring the success of the resettlement process and creating the conditions for the rapid economic development of conflict affected areas in the medium to longer term. Another major post-conflict challenge is the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life. In support of the Wadakkin Vasantham initiative and the attempts at normalization and reconciliation launched by the President, my Ministry has, after wide consultation, recently completed a national framework proposal on the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life. We laid the conceptual underpinnings of this exercise in 2006 within the ambit of the disaster recovery mandate of the Ministry and began work in October 2008, long before the conflict was successfully concluded.

Reintegration

The proposal takes a holistic view of reintegration which includes not only disarmament and demobilization followed by rehabilitation but also transitional justice, reinsertion and socio-economic integration. The integration process will enable those who took part in the conflict to rebuild their lives and become productive members of society. We are in the process of formulating an action plan in keeping with the national framework in close consultation and coordination with the various Government focal points.
We expect the action plan to be finalized shortly with the active cooperation of all key Government actors, civil society and our international partners. Here again, inter-agency coordination and a commonality of approach are the hallmarks of this initiative. This outlook will, we believe, prove effective, prevent duplication and ensure that all agencies are working towards a common goal and are striving to move in one direction.
It will help build synergies among the various operational agencies who are working on disparate components of an integrated strategy.

The following part briefly covers the efforts at reconciliation in conjunction with re-democratization and the search for a political solution within a democratic framework that guarantees equality of status, treatment and opportunity to each and every Sri Lankan irrespective of differences based on culture, language, religion or ethnicity.

Reconciliation

The President has given leadership to this process of national reconciliation with the involvement of all political parties and this is an initiative which, eventually, will bring us closer to achieving a durable peace. I would like to point out that the Government of the President has consistently taken the position that political problems would be met with a political response. As far back as October 27, 2008, President Rajapaksa told an Indian Newspaper:

“I am absolutely clear that there is, and can be, no military solution to political questions. I have always maintained this. A military solution is for the terrorists; a political solution is for the people living in this country.”

In this context I would also like to recall the historic words of the President when he addressed the national legislature and the entire country soon after the triumph over the forces of terror on May 19, 2009, re-emphasizing his Government’s commitment to a locally created political solution. He said:
“At this victorious moment, it is necessary for us to state with great responsibility that we do not accept a military solution as the final solution...the responsibility that we accept after freeing the Tamil people from the LTTE is a responsibility that no Government in the history of Sri Lanka has accepted”
It is necessary that we give these [Tamil] people the freedoms that are the right of people in all other parts of the country. Similarly, it is necessary that the political solutions they need should be brought closer to them faster than any country or Government in the world would bring. However, it cannot be an imported solution. It is necessary that we find a solution that is our very own. It should be a solution acceptable to all sections of the people, he said.

Having defeated the most ruthless terrorists of the world, we now have another powerful challenge, the President said. It is the task of restoring the rights and dignity of the Tamil people destroyed by the LTTE.”
This then, is the pith and substance of the Government’s vision when it comes to the political solution that is necessary if we are to finally win the peace. The North saw the recent establishment of two democratically elected institutions which are a bellwether for the re-enthronement of democracy in the entirety of Sri Lanka. We successfully met this challenge in the Eastern Province after the military victory in 2007. In a similar manner, the Government has committed itself to the re-establishment of democracy in the North.

Good Governance

In the recent past, the people of conflict affected areas were subject to a separate system of police, courts and administrative structures imposed on them by the LTTE. They had to endure and survive enormous hardships during this era. It is vital that, in the future, we engender trust in a democratic framework and amongst the people and familiarize them with modes of popular and good governance. Elected political representatives should be entrusted with the responsibilities of working for the people and running an administration in the Northern Province. Additionally, trust in the rule of law and structures to ensure good governance must be encouraged. Administrative agencies must be strengthened in order that the people of the North are able to attend to their needs in a manner similar to others in the rest of the country.

A functioning democratic system itself can prove a cohesive force and greatly aid reconciliation efforts. Each community will, in the course of democratic give and take, have to eschew narrow parochial thinking and make some sacrifices for the common good. This is how the military victory gained during the humanitarian operation will be made more productive and meaningful and will be of eventual benefit to us and to future generations. It is in this manner that a stable peace in a new, unified Sri Lankan society can be won and sustained.

Naxalism:Threat to Internal Security

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Fri, 21 May 2010 02:02:00 +0000

The Government of India has taken serious note of the Naxal problem in the recent past. The recent attacks by the Naxalites on State and Central Police Forces in Dantewada are very serious events wherein large number of lives have been lost and the Nation sits up to see as to what would happen and what should happen.

The CSA has been concerned about the developing Naxal problem for quite some time. The CSA organised a lecture on 21st November 2008 by Lt. Gen. (Retd) K.M. Seth, Former Governor of Chattisgarh on the subject at Chennai. His talk is summarised here.

Naxalism is a very important subject for India in so far as its internal security is concerned. The national mind set that existed earlier and continues to exist today is that Naxalism is a socio-economic problem. The nation continues to believe that it is a law and order problem of the State. Hence the Constitution prevails and prohibits the Central Government from getting involved in it. The result is that the problem has remained unattended and has grown to the extent that we are witnessing today. In March 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while addressing Chief Ministers of Nine naxal affected States, mentioned that Naxalism constitutes the biggest internal security threat to India. This was the first official recognition of the problem. This was followed by the Prime Minister’s address on 15th August in the same year where he mentioned that the country is facing serious challenges from terrorism and Naxalism. Thereafter the problem that Naxalism poses to India has been acknowledged on several forums. However, it is saddening to note that there has been no serious effort to quell the menace of Naxalism.

The Internal Security Environment

India has been facing an insurgency in the Northeastern States since 1950s and in Jammu and Kashmir since 1989. The Naxalite left wing extremism raised its head in 1967 and during the last few years has extended with phenomenal speed engulfing almost 16 States of India with varying degrees of violence and areas of operation. Over and above, this growing menace is the existence of terrorist sleeper cells within India. Often Indian authorities have blamed intelligence agencies from foreign countries for terrorist attacks and maintaining sleeper cells within India but the time has come that the authorities tackle with these sleeper cells more effectively than has been done earlier.

Having outlined the general internal security environment, I would like to emphasize the growth of left-wing extremism. Left wing extremism commenced in 1967 from a very small village of Naxalbari in the Silliguri district of the West Bengal. It spread very fast but was taken care of in an equally swift manner. Charu Majumdar, who was the leader of the movement in the ‘60s is considered the father of Naxalism. Around the same time in 1966-67, in Srikakulam, in Andhra Pradesh a farmer’s agitation raised its head which led to what is today the Naxalite movement in Andhra Pradesh. It is now led by young dedicated and educated men and women who are fully indoctrinated with Marxism and its ideology. The movement in West Bengal as mentioned earlier was quickly tackled by all available means but the most important aspect of government response was land reforms, which went all the way to put the whole problem in place.

India’s Internal Security Environment Map

Over the last 3 to 5 years Naxalism has regained its strength and has grown to encompass 16 states and 170 districts. Of the 170 districts, 76 are severely affected. The speed with which Naxalism has spread across this vast area speaks volumes of the states’ inability to deliver basic services, drinking water, electricity, road and educational needs to the rural inhabitants of the tribal areas. This state of inability provides space for left wing extremism to step in and fill up the vacuum. Another failure on the part of the States is that the rural masses are not included in the developmental process and the interior forested areas are completely neglected. This has again given an opportunity to the naxalites to convince the local masses that the democratic process is incapable of removing their problems. The Naxalites started holding Jan Adalats, petty developmental activities, small agricultural activities and cultural activities in the interiors.

Who are the Naxalites?

Naxalites do not belong to any particular religion or caste. They are the Dalit people who are marginalized and have hardly anything to live with except that they used to have land. They are led by indoctrinated people and are organized into a very classical communistic pattern. They have a central committee of 21 members. Then they have a Polit Bureau with seven members. Then, there are regional bureaus which have divisions under them, just like the Armed Forces or Police. These divisions have ‘Dalams’ i.e. platoons that have 20/30 people with Arms. The villages have ‘Sangams’ which is comprised of highly indoctrinated people supporting them ideologically but not armed. Recently, Eastern Bureau has been established about which very little is known.

Till as late as October 2004 there were 39 major organizations, two of them are well known namely the PWG and the MCC. These two accounted for 85% of the violence in the country. On 14th October 2004 these two organizations decided to merge into a single entity called the CPI Maoists, in short CPI (M). These people have set an aim to build a powerful revolutionary movement and continue its fight against social repression and inequalities in South Asia and spread the news in the entire world.

The Naxalite Vision

If one wants to know what is their ideological base, what their aim is and where their vision lies, we will have to go back again to the ‘60s. There were two very distinct resolutions made, one in 1970 and another in 1980. In 1970 resolution read “…..the axis and content of agrarian revolution rejects the parliamentary path of participation in elections and pursues the main objectives to liberate the rural areas first, and then, having expanded the base areas, the centre of democratic power in rural areas advance towards country side and seek victory through encircling and capturing the cities”

The Naxalite movement still holds on to this aim and there is no change in philosophy. The 1970 resolution was only modified in 1980 to define their area of operation. The resolution read “homogenous contiguous forested area around Bastar division (since divided into Bastar, Dantewada and kanker districts of Chhattisgarh) and adjoining area of Adilabad, Karim nagar, Khammam, east Godavari districts of Andhra Pradesh, Chandrapur and Garchiroli districts of Maharashtra, Balaghat of Madhya Pradesh, Malkangiri and Koraput districts of Orissa would comprise the area of Dandakarnya, which would be liberated and used as base for spreading peoples democratic revolution” The region called Dandakaranya refers to the liberated areas mentioned in the 1970 resolution.

Map Showing Area referred to as Dandakaranya (outlined in red) by Naxalites

The centre of this Dandakaranya region is Abujmad which is an area of 10,000 sq.km. This is more than the geographical area covered by the State of Tripura. Abujmad is a totally unsurveyed area. Even the British had not surveyed it and the only place it has ever been mentioned is in a Gazette of 1908 where it is referred to as an area reserved for refugees. One has to wonder what refugees the British were referring to in 1908. The area has no roads, no tracks and nothing else except about 20,000 people spread over small villages numbering about 237. This area is the nerve centre for all the planning meetings of CPI(M) Central Committees, and Polit Bureaus. The bulk of Abujmad lies in the State of Chattisgarh and when I was the Governor, the Chief Minister and myself made an effort to open up the region. The State Government spent 170 Crores to get ISRO to map the region. However when the time came to carry out a land survey, the surveyors could not move even 2-3 Kms inside the region because it was mined extensively in eccentric circles and remains to be that way even today.

Dandakaranya – Perspective from Map of India

The region has training and logistics camps but not a single police station or any other administrative machinery for that matter. There are police stations at the periphery but none inside the region. Thus, Abujmad has become a truly liberated area right at the heart of the country. In January 2007, the CPI (M) held their Ninth conference in this area where crucial decisions were taken. These decisions continue to impact the security of the nation. The following were the objectives outlined at the conference:-

Strengthen Peoples Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA)
Expand struggle from guerilla to urban/ mobile warfare.
Organize jail breaks to free detained cadres.
Target police stations.
Target economically important objectives and major installations.
Unconditional support to minorities.
Launch strategic counter offensives

The objective of unconditional support to minorities has been drawn from Nepal. Probably, the Naxalites aim at capitalizing on the discontent of the minorities as a result of the neglect by government authorities.
The problem of Naxalism today has reached dangerous levels. The capability to launch well organized attacks on jails since 2007 is well known. In 2007, naxal activities resulted in 1665 violent incidents in which 460 civilians and 236 security forces personnel were killed. Until October 2008 there were 2 violent incidents in which 477 civilians and 175 security forces were killed.

Inspiration from Nepal

As mentioned earlier, in the 2007 conference the naxalites drew some objectives from Nepal. In this context, let me describe my one on one meeting with a Naxal Area Commander in a Jail in Dantewada District during the year 2005. After the initial hesitancy, the commander told me that- “look at what Nepal has achieved in such a short span of time (this was the period when Nepal was still a Kingdom) and look at us. We have been at revolution since 1967 but have not achieved anything. That is why we want to take that model”. The reason I am referring to this meeting is to bring out the fact that the Naxals have no direct links with the Nepal Maoists but they only draw their inspiration from what they have achieved. This inspiration has given rise to the term ‘Revolutionary Corridor’. The Revolutionary Corridor exists from Nepal to Tirupati and Chattisgarh is right at the centre. If this corridor materializes then the problem will be tremendous. I have tried to convince the authorities that one way of solving this problem is to strike it at the centre i.e. Abujmad. The Government is concerned about the collateral damage which is a very legitimate reason but the problem is being allowed to fester due to the fear of collateral damages.

Peace Initiatives

There are certain peace initiatives that had been taken place in the last few years. In 2004, peace talks were initiated in Andhra Pradesh. But the fate of the Peace talks is known to all, especially those who have been studying the issue. While the organization has operations that span several States, action or initiative by one single State could not have solved the entire problem. Another important aspect is the mindset of the Naxalites in agreeing to talk to the Government. The representative of the People’s War Group, Ramakrishna noted before the talks that “Talks are with a purpose to force the Government to address the pressing problems of the people; we do not believe that suffering masses can be liberated through negotiations”, and “capturing power and liberating people from the clutches of exploitative capitalists ruling classes-------using the Dandakaranya region (declared by naxalites as liberated zone) as a lever, we will liberate the people of this country to establish peoples rule”. This was just before the commencement of the talks on 15th of October 2004 and with this mind set, the talks continued for a year. The naxalites were weak during the period before the talks were initiated and in the one year of the talks they had reconsolidated themselves. In 2005 the peace talks failed.

Another initiative was with an organization called ‘Salwa Judam’ which in Gonv means Mission for Peace. On 5th June in a small village in Bijapur, the villagers took it upon themselves to put an end to the naxal injustice. They had to face:

Relentless maoist oppression.
Atrocities on women.
Assault on culture and religion
Prevented picking tendu patta, which was their main source of livelihood
No minor forest produce picking.

These interferences in their lives led 50 to 60 villagers to get together and asked the Sangam to help them. In no time this movement spread to one village to another and finally the entire Dantewada area was engulfed by this movement. The naxalites started killing these people making sure that this movement is arrested. As a result villagers moved out of their villages to camps, police was deployed to secure them and nearly 46,000-50,000 people lived in 22-23 disorganized camps. The Government role in the movement began when in October 2008, the leader of the movement, Mahendra Sharma, who is also a Congress leader from the region, faced a threat to his life from the Naxals. The government provided security to Salwa Judam camps through police forces. It was not effective because about 5,000 people were living in a perimeter of 5 to 6 Kms and many such places were to be guarded and therefore the police protection was insufficient.
It was around this time that I personally suggested that the State Government employ Special Police Officers known as the SPOs under the Police Act of 1861 for protection. The government in all its sincerity accepted the proposal and went ahead recruiting and training people for two weeks and equipped them with 303 rifles. Most of these SPOs were from the surrendered Sangams and there were nearly 4,000 SPOs on ground. However there was a huge community of motivated human rights organizations, journalists and other individuals who filed 2 PILs in the Supreme Court in April 2008. This led the Supreme Court to order the NHRC to carry out an independent inquiry into the matter and submit a report within eight weeks. National newspapers around this time were flashed news like ‘Chhattisgarh Government cannot arm its citizens’, ‘It is an Unconstitutional act’ and that it was wrong for a government to encourage arming its people under the guise of protection.

The NHRC report was submitted in July 2008. The main criticisms of State’s action with regard to Salwa Judam were:-

Mobilization by state un-ethical.
High handedness of SPOs- Rape, Murder Etc.
Pathetic living conditions in camps
Villagers uprooted from their villages

The report stated that the events that led to Salwa Judam were the naxalites interference in day to day life of tribals including:-

family matters
education
marriages
religious beliefs
one child per house as Sangam members
exploitation of girls
extortion and torture.

For long the journalists and several other organizations blamed the state government for setting up the movement of Salwa Judam to tackle with the naxalites. It was put out in the media as a plan by the state to segregate the villagers so that the State could then handle the Naxals. What would any government do in such a position where there are so many internally displaced people, because people moved out of their villages for the sake of protection? Would the Government deny them protection or provide them the required protection which is actually the right of the citizen and the duty of the Government? The NHRC report also stated that police officers were grossly insufficient and therefore Special Police Officers, under Sec.17 of Police Act 1861 had to be appointed. Lastly and perhaps the most important conclusion of the report was that Salwa Judam and the SPOs are two distinct identities. Regarding the role of the State Government, the report stated that “The State Government cannot be said to have sponsored Salwa Judum but extended support by providing security to processions & meetings of Salwa Judum and to inmates of relief camps”.

Several human rights activists had also raised a big hue and cry about killings by Salwa Judam/SPOs. Even in this regard the NHRC report stated that:

Allegations were based on hearsay
Many of the villagers were killed by naxalites and not by Salwa Judum activists/SPOs
One tribal was killed by Salwa Judum activists in which case an FIR was lodged.

One criticism in the PIL which cannot be denied is the pathetic conditions of the camps. Lot of things had to be done regarding hygiene, child care, medical care Etc. In fact this is the situation that exists not only in the camps but also in the whole district and the whole of Abujmad. Educational and employment facilities do not exist in these regions and there is no denying this fact.

Today, Salwa Judam as a movement has ceased to exist. Around 20,000 people have gone back to their villages and 30,000 continue to remain in the 23 camps. They are scared for their lives and livelihood even though the Naxals had declared that they will not attack anyone except those who had become SPOs.

Recommendations

There are three essential steps that must be taken to tackle the Naxalism:

The Naxal problem is a national problem and piecemeal talks will not be useful. Hence, talks have to be initiated at a national level.
We must resort to land reforms in a big way.
Application of adequate force and development should be done simultaneously. No longer can we say that lack of development breeds insurgency and insurgency prevents development. The areas must be opened up simultaneously with adequate application of force.

Coming to the land reforms, tribals in these areas are not a migratory population but have been living on these lands for thousands of years. Their forefathers owned the lands and today they are the original owners of the lands. What Forest Conservation Act 1980 did was to deprive them of their land. Their source of livelihood was taken away and this is the biggest heart burn in the whole issue. We have to find a way to redistribute land to the historic owners to let them make use of it and make their livelihood.

To put the situation in perspective, in China 43% of the cultivable land has been redistributed; South Korea-32% and in Japan-33%. In comparison, India has distributed only 1.25% of land. It is a pathetic situation. The deprived population of the country has to be made the owners of their land through legislative measures. If we act on land reforms, the naxalites will be deprived of one of the main cause they have been capitalizing on for years.

In addition to land reforms, an empowered Joint Task Force should be established for the States of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Maharashtra with members from all concerned departments like electricity, education, defense, PWD Etc. There should be in addition, a central database about the region marked as Dandakaranya. The districts affected by Naxalism have to be opened up and Abujmad should be sanitized.

With the naxalite carnage spreading in 1/3rd of Indian Territory, swift action on all the above recommendations will prove to be useful and timely.

Ethno-Political situation in India's Northeast

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Wed, 19 May 2010 06:11:00 +0000

All the South Asian countries suffer from intra-state conflicts which sap their energy and eat into the vitals. Democratic and social institutions get affected, developmental activities suffer and effectiveness of the governance gets eroded. The problem in Jammu & Kashmir, Naxalism and the situation in Northeast India are some of the more prominent internal conflicts which need to be addressed seriously. In this context, the CSA had organised a lecture on 16th January 2009 by Mr Ved Marwah, Former Governor, Manipur and Jharkhand. His talk is reproduced here.

From every point of view, from economic to strategic, the Northeast is the most important region of the country. And yet, in national consciousness, the region figures more as the periphery of the country – an area that is both territorially and emotionally remote. This reality is sadly reflected also in the corridors of power in New Delhi. Therefore, not surprisingly, it remains as the most neglected part of the country. Over-burdened with all sorts of political, economic and security problems, the policy-makers have found little time for the Northeast. They refuse to learn any lesson from their past mistakes; and, in fact, continue making the same mistakes again and again. It is no secret that the allocated funds go into the pockets of unscrupulous politicians and bureaucrats and not to the target group; and yet every successive Prime Minister continues to announce an economic package for the region in the (unrealistic) hope that more funds is the answer to all the problems of the people. No thought is given to what happened to the previous such announcements?

Blessed by bountiful nature, the region is potentially the richest part of the country. And yet, it has remained poor and backward. It has huge natural resources. One-third of the country’s water resources are in the Northeast; it has the potential of generating thousand of megawatts of hydro-power. It has coal, oil and gas and one of the biggest unexploited sources of uranium in Meghalaya. It is also one of the most attractive regions of the country with so much pristine forest and bio-diversity. It has huge potential in horticulture and floriculture. Tea came to India through Assam. Its markets were, unlike now, well-connected to rest of the country and the world at large by rail, river and sea through Calcutta and Chittagong. The Northeast was a land of opportunity. That is why, people from various parts of the country flocked to the region to earn a better living. There was no dearth of investments; they flowed into the region from home and abroad. All this changed in 1947.

The many insurgencies and separatist movements flourishing in the area, pose the biggest challenge to the security establishment. The area is too large and the terrain too difficult to be pacified by force alone. A glance at the map would show how vulnerable this region is to both external and internal subversion. Ninety-nine percent of its borders are international borders; only one per cent are linked to the rest of the country through a narrow strip of land in Siliguri in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal, rightly called, the “Chicken Neck”. Hostile forces will always be tempted to squeeze India through the Siliguri Corridor, an area plagued with militancy and separatism. The adjacent countries have been less than friendly to India. The countries in the neighbourhood do not miss any opportunity to destabilize the situation to further their own agenda. Many insurgent groups operating in the Northeast have sanctuaries in Bangladesh and Myanmar. The big brother China is known to have supported the insurgent groups from Mizoram, Nagaland and Manipur. It has huge presence in Bangladesh and Myanmar. The recent developments in Tibet and a visible change in China’s attitude towards Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim should be matter of serious concern. With the Maoists in the dominant role in the power structure in the new Nepal, we should not be surprised if they too become a player in this game, like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. China will not have to send an invading army, as they did in 1962, to create trouble in this region. They can do so at the time of their choosing with more effect and least cost to itself through these “friendly countries”. Pakistan has been from the very beginning after independence active in this region in pursuit of its national agenda: the break-up of the Indian Union. Pakistan’s ISI is actively involved in supporting the insurgent groups. It has not given up hope of separating the Northeast from India. The spread of the “jehadi” ideology poses a new danger in the region. Bhutan cannot remain completely insulated from these revolutionary changes in Nepal. A change in the attitude of Bhutan towards this region to the disadvantage of India in the near future cannot be completely ruled out. But unfortunately, its strategic location has only created more problems for the people instead of rapid economic development. The dispersal of some ethnic groups to the neighbouring countries has created additional problems.

But the problem is basically political. A number of armed conflicts have been smouldering in the region since Independence. Reports of frequent killings do occasionally appear in the media, but seldom captures national attention for long enough time to make the people or the government in New Delhi to give serious thought to many problems of the region. The façade of democracy successfully hides the serious ills the region has been suffering for long. On the other hand militancy and endemic violence provide a convenient cover for what amounts to virtual loot of the public funds and the withdrawal of the state from even the most essential functions. The vacuum is being filled by the various insurgent groups. It is they who collect “taxes” in the form of extortion and provide security to their own ethnic group through their armed militias. The institutions of the state can neither guarantee security nor provide essential service. The sheer number of the many insurgencies thriving in the Northeast is staggering. Manipur tops the list with 36. Assam and Tripura are close second and third with 34 and 30 respectively. As ethnic loyalties get stronger and the armed militias tighten their stranglehold, the space for cooperation and obedience to the state institutions becomes more constricted. Since the state is no longer seen as a reliable instrument for providing security, the job is handed over to their own armed militia. The ground reality, that the Indian state is alien, remote and of little relevance to most inhabitants of this region, cannot be denied. It commands little loyalty among the people.

Unique Features of the Region

The region is so different from the rest of the country that it cannot be compared with any other part of the country. The people are different in every way - racially, ethnically and culturally. But they take great pride in their village, tribe and ethnic identity. The ethnic aspirations cannot be dismissed summarily as an outburst of emotive and irrational sentiments. The unending conflicts are reflected in breakdown of public order and the deterioration of inter-community relationships.

Far from being a homogeneous society, as commonly believed, it is a very diverse society with many races, religions and languages. The inhabitants of this region speak close to 160 languages. There are more than three hundred culturally distinct ethnic groups inhabiting the region. Whether it is linguistic practices, dress, rituals or food habits, there are vast differences among the various ethnic communities. They do not always share the same customs and traditions. Moreover, the cultural distance between the landowners in the plains and the hill people has produced wide cultural difference over the years, more so after independence. The land-owning plains people and the hill-tribes cannot be treated in the same way. Even though there are no clear-cut divisions, the erstwhile colonial rulers recognized this complex relationship. The hill-areas were much less administered than the plains area through much of colonial rule. Christian missionaries concentrated mainly in the hill-areas. Overwhelming majority- almost 90% - of the people in Mizoram, Nagaland, Mehalaya and the hills areas of Manipur are Christians.

History and geography have combined to make the people feel isolated and alienated from rest of the country. Deprived of even the most essential public services, they feel disgruntled and dissatisfied with the functioning of the government. Disgruntlement of the people may not be a unique feature of the Northeast, but there is a big difference. When people in rest of the country feel aggrieved and disgruntled, they vote out the incumbent government, but in the Northeast they blame the central government and start demanding separation from the Indian Union. The demand might not have been raised too seriously in the beginning, but falling prey to the separatist propaganda it soon becomes serious enough to give birth to militancy and insurgency.

Instead of giving special attention to economic and social development of the region, the central government followed the more convenient route since Independence of politically empowering the dominant ethnic group by creating tiny states on ethnic lines. The policy has increased and not lessened alienation. Political and economic empowerment must go hand in hand. One without the other has little meaning. The short-sighted policy made the minority ethnic groups more insecure and alienated than before. The unintended effect of this policy has been to give rise to many more demands for the division of even these tiny states and the creation of more states on ethnic lines. Division and sub-division along ethnic lines is no solution to the problem of alienation of the people. Prime Minister Nehru rightly understood the sensitivity of the region and its people but failed to appreciate the complexity of its social structure. The various arrangements devised in an ad hoc and short-sighted manner have failed to achieve the desired objective. They have, in fact, created new conflicts and demands for more division and fragmentation on ethnic lines.

A Society in Transition

Many important economic, political and social changes are taking place in the tribal society. The tribal communities are going through a process of transition from shifting cultivation to settled agriculture, from village control of land to private ownership. Changes in agrarian practices, urbanization and cultural transformation that are taking place due to the arrival of the electronic media have in their wake brought their own problems. One has also to recognize the numerous informal arrangements that have emerged in the ownership of land and business practices because of legal restrictions enforced in the region intended to safeguard the interests of the local people. The migrants who have gained considerable amount of economic and political power through informal means are now demanding formal change in the status of the land in their possession by giving them formal titles. The loss of land by the tribals to the migrants is one of the important causes in places like Karbi Anglong for ethnic conflicts and rise of insurgency. Problems of economic and social justice in the Northeast are more complex than what the ‘regime of protection’ designed by the colonial rulers was expected to accomplish.

The process of modernization has changed the way the younger generation thinks and acts. One consequence of this change has been that the elders no longer enjoy the status they used to enjoy earlier. The tribal society appears to be moving away from traditional values of egalitarianism for each and every member of the tribe to a no-hold-bar vicious form of feudal exploitation of the poor. Militancy, drug-trafficking, and large scale leakages from public funds have combined to create new oligarchy of politicians, government servants and government contractors who indulge in blatant corruption. They are flagrantly violating the most cherished values and work ethics of the tribal society. Exposure of the remote and isolated societies to greed and availability of easy money has brought out the worst among some of them. They have no shame or fear in openly manipulating and exploiting the situation for personal gain. The newly rich, expert in double-speak, are also in the forefront of campaigns of anti-India propaganda. They are primarily responsible for fueling the separatist fires in the region. Innocent tribal-people are generally uncomfortable with ‘outsiders’. They become easy prey to the vicious propaganda against them. Widespread corruption and dislike for manual labour are the direct consequences of this state of instability.

Militancy and Insurgency

In 2008, 1057 persons were killed, almost double as compared to 539 in J&K, in the terrorist related violence in the seven states in the north-east. The region has registered a sharp rise in the terrorist violence in the last few years. The number of deaths has increased from 640 in 2006 to 1057 in 2008.The two worst-affected states are Manipur and Assam. 500 persons were killed in Manipur and 372 in Assam in 2008. An estimated two lakh persons are reported to be internally displaced due to ethnic strife.

The Naga insurgency was the first armed conflict in this region. It started soon after India’s independence in 1947 when the Naga leadership under Z.A.Phizo raised its banner of revolt. Since then the number of armed conflicts has multiplied. From one Naga insurgency at the time of independence in 1947, the number of insurgencies has multiplied to over hundred spread all over the region. There are reports of insurgents regrouping, forging national and international alliances, taking direct help from intelligence agencies of countries hostile to India, extorting huge funds, buying of sophisticated arms and explosives in the international arms market, including weapons like rocket launchers and remote control electronic devices.

The Nagas were the first to raise the separatist flag. The British did not discourage their ambition for a separate state. In fact, there is enough evidence to show that they actively encouraged it, because they did not trust new rulers in India, who had fought a long struggle for independence against the British. According to their assessment then, the British interests would be safer in the hands of the Naga leaders. Aware of danger to India’s integrity and security, Prime Minister Nehru took a number of steps to win their loyalty and meet their aspirations for separate identity. The division of Assam into tiny states on ethnic lines became the main plank of his policy. With hind sight one can say that this was the beginning of trouble in the region. Once the central leadership allowed identity politics to play a free role, it was only a matter of time before the other ethnic groups started demanding their own separate states. Having started the process, the central government could not reverse it. It is still going on! Militancy and insurgency confined to the Naga area soon spread to other parts of the region.

The pattern of insurgency has followed the conventional guerilla warfare pattern by committing acts like ambushes, target killings and selective hitting of soft targets, like alleged police informers, contractors, and political collaborators to create fear and panic. Till the end of 1970’s, as insurgency was confined to a limited area, only two or three ethnic groups were involved. This number has proliferated since then, and today the region is afflicted by over hundred insurgencies. The many insurgencies that are flourishing in the region include the insurgencies by the Nagas, Mizos, Tripura tribes, Meities, ULFA, Karbis, Khasis, Garos in the hills, and the Bodos, Kacharis, Tiwas, Rabhas, Misings, Ahoms, Chautias, Deuries, Kosch, Rajanshis, Moran, Matak and by the Meiteis in the plains.

Many of them are the result of inter-ethnic conflicts. They include, Bodos and Santhals, the Kouch Rajbonshi and Bodos, Karbi and Kukis, Kukis and Nagas, Khasis and Jaintias and Garos, Dimsas and Hmars in Barak Valley, Tripuris and Bengalis, Mizos and Reangs, Chakmas and Aruncahalis, Khamti and Mishimees. These are some of the more serious conflicts raging in the region. One factor that is fueling insurgencies in the region is that most political and economic benefits are being cornered by the dominant ethnic group. This is creating insecurity and tensions among the minority groups in a region afflicted by scarcity of opportunities and resources. These insecurities and tensions have led to demands for secession, separate homeland, and ethnic cleansing. The smaller communities not being in a position to influence the outcome of political verdict are pushed to the background. They find themselves pushed to the margins of the political and economic system. The local elite exploit the situation for their own selfish ends. They assume the leadership to mobilize the people against the state and the rival ethnic groups and push them towards militancy. The insurgent groups have close links with mainstream politicians of their own ethnic group. Ethnic politics could well be the other side of the incapacity of the state to guarantee security of life and property. Security is provided by their ethnic armed militias.

Whatever the genesis of insurgency, the dynamics of its persistence has acquired a momentum of its own. The collusive arrangement between different militant factions and the various political parties and civil servants are more the norm than the exception. The nexus has helped in building a massive network of extortion and intimidation. The extremist politics have more than one component. Their demand for separate political identity and ethno-centric demands are an integral part of their political agenda. The obvious conflict of interest over land, government jobs, and cultural and ethnic identity have only further complicated and aggravated the situation. The ambitious political and economic elite manipulate these conflicts to mobilize mass movements.

Many of the ethnic communities demand separation from the Indian union; they demand a separate sovereign state for their own ethnic community. They have crossed the stage of ethnicity into the stage of nation formation. The communities that are making secessionist demands include, the Asomiyas, Khasis, Bodos, Mizos, Nagas and even Karbis. It is also true that the demand for secession in the initial stages of these movements is more a bargaining tactic than a genuine demand by the insurgents. History of ethnic assertion is closely linked to the history of political evolution and the emergence of new social forces. Without the numbers and political clout, ambitious politicians, not unlike in the other parts of the country, use emotive issues and slogans to whip up public support.

The movements for secession, statehood, and autonomy can be divided into various categories: discrimination by the dominant communities; concern with issues of culture and language – attempts at assimilation or ethnic cleansing through the imposition of the language of the dominating community- like the Bodos and Bengalis in Assam; against outsiders, like in Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh; against other indigenous people like in Karbi-Kuki, Dimasa-Hmar, Naga-Kuki, Kuki-Paite, Reang-Mizo and Hmar Mizo conflict.

Lack of development is, no doubt, a serious problem, but the root cause of insurgency and the growing strength of secessionist sentiments lie in the deeply-rooted grievances relating to how states like Manipur and Nagaland were deprived of their political rights during the post-independence period. The insurgent groups, political parties, and public at large do complain about lack of development, but they put the entire blame for these conditions on the Union government. No solution can emerge and the situation would continue to deteriorate unless this hard reality is squarely faced.

But as insurgency is forced to confront the state, it is compelled out of necessity to seek sanctuaries and material support from the external sources, especially the neighbouring states hostile to India. And once they become dependent on the foreign governments for survival, it does not take long before the movements makes a strategic shift from the issues and demands that had made them relevant in the first place. While the core issues remain unresolved, the conflict continues to escalate. At times, the issues that had given birth to the movement and the later issues all get so mixed up and complicated that neither the movement leaders nor the representatives of the state are in a position to talk to each other to reach a compromise for fear of annoying and losing the support of one constituent of their support base or the other. The negotiations are then mainly conducted through the media and the intelligence agencies. The two are not the best interlocutors, because many a times they have their own agendas to pursue.

While the factors that are responsible for the rise of armed conflicts in various states in the north-east are not the same; the region shares some common problems.

Lack of Development

The region is the most underdeveloped part of the country. The partition of India in 1947 has played havoc with the economy of the region. It virtually made the region land-locked. It cut off its old routes of communication - land, rail and river - with the rest of the country, as they all pass through the then East Pakistan and now Bangladesh. One direct effect of this physical isolation is that the prices of even essential commodities are very high in the Northeast. The region produces relatively little even to meet its basic needs. The prices of goods and services are well above the rest of the country because of high cost of transportation.

Many items of fruits like oranges which grow in abundance in some parts of the region rot because there are no cold storages or warehouses. Banking services continue to be of primitive standards. Lack of development is one of the major reasons for alienation of the people. Alienation has led to conflict and violence, which in turn has become the biggest stumbling block in the path of development.

Poorly-educated, young men and women in the region have a dislike for manual labour; they want white collar jobs in government service as there are no jobs in the private sector. In the prevailing environment of insecurity, very little private investments are coming into Northeast. The huge expansion of civil services that has taken place in recent years has resulted in corruption, nepotism and incurrence of large unproductive public expenditure. Lack of infrastructure, like roads, transport and power, has discouraged industrial development in the region.

Unemployment

Government service or becoming a government contractor is the two main options for earning easy money. It is, therefore, not surprising that there is ever increasing demand for more central government funds and government jobs in these financially non-viable tiny states. Ever-increasing government machinery has become a white elephant for the state economy.

Financially Unviable ‘Tiny Sates”

At the time of independence the north-east region comprised of Assam and two princely states of Manipur and Tripura. But in common parlance the whole region was known as Assam. The name Northeast gained currency only after the reorganization of the region and liberation of Bangladesh. Till then the whole area, except the area that constituted the then Naga Hills, was peaceful. Prior to 1947 no ethnic group, except the Naga National Council (NNC) demanded secession from the Indian Union. The situation has undergone a dramatic change for worse since then.

The reasons for the division of Assam and the creation of new states were entirely political. Political expediency rather than in-depth thinking decided a very complex issue in a simplistic manner in the hope that the creation of new states will put an end to turmoil and secessionist demands. But instead of bringing peace and development to the region, this one step is responsible for creating more problems than any other. It has fueled more militant demands for the creation of more autonomous units or separate states on the basis of ethnic numbers or secession from the Indian Union.

With the exception of Assam, all other states are too small and lack resources to become financially self-reliant. Their dependence on the central government even to run the state administrative machinery is total. Pumping in more funds for development, instead of leading to faster development has only bolstered “patronage politics”. Securing maximum funds from the central government becomes the main task of the elected government. For this obvious reason, the ruling party at the Center finds it easier to manipulate politics in the states to foist its own party government on the people in the state. It is not a coincidence that more often than not, each time there is a change in the party ruling at the centre, there is a corresponding change in the party ruling in most states of the region. Voting pattern suggests a bias in favour of the party ruling at the centre.

Poor Governance

The erstwhile colonial rulers recognized the complex relationship between the hills and the plains-people. The hill-area was much less administered than the plains area. The British had realized the difficulties of directly ruling this region. Isolated by geography, rugged terrain and forests, the policy of colonial neglect continued by the post-independence Indian rulers have all combined to keep the region backward. It continues to remain an isolated and neglected part of the country. The British had by design segregated the area into various categories: regulated areas, scheduled districts, backward tracts and partially or excluded areas. Ostensibly for security reasons, an Inner Line was drawn to prevent tribal raids into the plains, though later it was maintained with the objective of protecting the hill people from exploitation of the plainsmen. The irony is that it is the plains people, in states like Manipur, who today demand its introduction in their states to keep the hated “outsider” – the people from the rest of the country. The Mizos are today agitating for the retention of the “Inner Line”, so are the Nagas. The British had left the area mostly un-administered except where they had their own economic interests. They had drawn an Inner Line in 1873, ostensibly to protect the tribal interests, but kept pushing it out to accommodate their own interests in the newer tea gardens. They also created Kuki settlements in the Naga dominated areas for protection against raids by the Naga predators. But they generally treated these areas as un-administered.

After independence, the Indian government took a more direct interest in the region. The Indian Frontier Administrative Service was created in 1956 for better administration of this border region by a specially selected cadre of officers drawn from various streams. The service, however, was merged with the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) in 1970 for no valid reasons. The north-eastern states were divided into more than one cadre. The ill-conceived step has made the task of improving the administration even more difficult. The All India Service officers from outside the region are reluctant to get posted to the Northeast. No matter how much security and financial incentives are provided to the officials from outside, they treat assignments here as punishment and hardship postings. They can hardly be expected to build a sort of rapport with the people that can be foundation of a normal legitimate state. The officers from outside the region are unable to adjust to tribal life and have become social and psychological misfits.

The newly created Department of Northeast Economic Development has failed to take off, because lack of coordination between the Union Home ministry and the department. It is functioning more like a branch of the Planning Commission distributing funds and approving development projects. Not surprisingly, the department has inherited all the shortcomings of the planning Commission. A former DONED Minister was accused of being India’s Mr. “Ten Percent”. 10% of the total cost for the projects cleared by the DONED had to be paid to the son of the minister, it was alleged. It must be recognized that it is not possible to separate politics, security and economic development in the region. The so-called “Look East Policy” too has failed to take off. The policy has little relevance to the states in the Northeast till the problems of infrastructure and security can be solved. The sad reality is that writ of the governments in the insurgency-affected states simply does not run. Despite all this talk about rapidly improving the infrastructure, the situation on the ground is pathetic even after over sixty years of independence. Even some national highways are becoming increasingly non-functional. The region having the largest resources of water and power is abysmally short of power and water. Health services and the education system are in shambles. Most schools exist only on paper, and the higher educational institutions are a disgrace. Even the so-called central universities are centres for distribution of patronage and not for imparting quality education. Despite pumping in the highest per capita development funds, the gap between the region and the rest of the country is actually widening and not narrowing.

The three main wings of the Union Government who deal with the Northeast– Planning Commission, the Union Home Ministry and the newly created Department for the Northeast under a separate Minister- all suffer from the same misconception. The North East Council too is no longer the institution it used to be. It has been functioning more like the Planning Commission in New Delhi as a funding agency. It suffers from all the shortcomings that such institutions suffer from. It is being manipulated by corrupt politicians and bureaucrats to serve their own ends. The institution was supposed to look at the development of the region, comprising tiny states, as a whole. Though based in the region it is too bereft of any vision for the development of this troubled region. It is being pulled in different directions for allocation of funds by greedy and corrupt local political leaders. Central funds instead of making any significant contribution to economic and social development have added to nepotism and corruption. Simplistic view of the many complex issues has only made the situation more difficult.

Corruption and Extortion

A fixed percentage of government employees salaries are deducted, generally at source, by the insurgent groups. Similarly, no contract for construction or supply of goods and services can be signed without the approval from the insurgent group. They have their own list of favourite contractors, who pay a percentage of payment received from the government to them. There have been many instances, where the civil servant unwilling to meet the extortionist demands, were forced to sign on the dotted line at gun- point. In a number of reported cases, the reluctant officers have been punished. Some of them were shot in the leg and even killed in their own office if still not complying with their instructions. Politicians and bureaucrats are expected to share part of the ill-gotten money acquired by them by virtue of their official position with the insurgents and their supporters. Line separating militants from non-militants is often blurred. This ground reality explains the so-called nexus between armed militias, mainstream politicians and bureaucrats.

There are hardly any checks on misappropriating government funds. The audit department exists only in name. The officers posted in the department are too scared to make even pretence of audit.

Corruption has also distorted the political system. The story of Samata Party forming the government in Manipur in 2001 illustrates the state of politics in the state. In the 2000 assembly elections, the Samata Party was able to get only one of their candidates elected. Unfortunately, even he died within few months of his election and the Party had no presence in the State Assembly. And yet in 2001, it managed to form the government. Political leadership in Delhi is no less responsible for the mess in the Northeast as amoral and corrupt leadership in these states. The mainstream national political parties vie with each other to install their own party government in these states. For obvious reasons, the ruling party at the centre has an advantage over the other parties. It controls the purse strings! The question is why are the central leaders so keen on foisting their own party government on the hapless people of the state, when they are fully aware that their party has little grass-root support and has a very narrow base to grow. I was told by more than one state leader that adding another state to their tally of state governments ruled by their state is not the only reason. They make open allegations about the payment “levy” to their high commands in Delhi. True or not, it explains the nastiness in the state of politics in the Northeast.

The militants and other anti-national forces take full advantage of this state of affairs and subvert the security system. In some states like Manipur the militants exercise such strong control over the administration that not many dare to disobey their commands. The system of extortion is well-orgnaised. Trouble arises only when more than one militant organization is involved in the extortion racket. There have been cases where the militants have entered into the so-called well-protected government office of the government servants unable to meet their demands and shoot them.

Politics in the Northeast are not based on democratic norms as understood in the western-model democratic system. The democratic system which they practice is very different from this model. Though in one sense the tribal societies are truly democratic; they have characteristics of a strong cohesive community in which every member of the tribe lives and works for the entire tribe. The rise of corrupt, greedy and power-hungry elite is more the product of the distortion of the Indian democratic system as practiced here. Concept of private property is relatively new in these areas. The economic structure was relatively simple. Every one in the tribe and the village contributed one’s bit in fighting the tough battle of survival. The village was a self-sufficient unit. The traditional system of ‘gaon bara’ tells its own story. This traditional system exists even today in Nagaland and some other areas. However, it has lost much of its shine. There has been steady erosion of this once strong institution due to many factors; the most important being its virtual replacement with the so-called modern democratic institutions.

The duality in the administrative and political system has also created serious problems. The formal structure has all the trappings of the modern system, but lacks substance. The concept of rule of law on which all the democratic institutions rest is very different in the tribal societies. All functionaries of the government are expected to favour their own tribe members and not members of other tribes even in doing so they violate the “rule of law”. The members of their own tribe are more equal than the others. Every one is not equal before the law as understood in these societies. Outsiders will remain as outsiders even if they have lived in the area for centuries. Political leaders and civil servant are expected to discriminate in favour of the tribe. It is in this context one has to understand the misappropriation of public funds. In fact, looting ‘Indian money’ is considered as the right thing to do. Corruption if practiced to benefit their tribe is not looked down upon. It has social sanction as long as the loot is shared with the tribe.

Politician-Insurgent Nexus

Political party is a key institution in a parliamentary democracy. In the Northeast this institution is very weak. Political party label means very little in this region, except in Assam and Tripura, as compared to the rest of country. Most political parties do not have any organized structure. They have no ideology, and political leaders shamelessly manipulate the system for personal gain. They hop from one party to the other without any compunction or fear of criticism from the people. They are able to retain their support, and even increase it, if they can distribute loaves and fishes to them.

As money is the name of the game, most political leaders find it convenient to develop close associations with one insurgent group or the other. During elections political leaders seek support of the insurgents in the form of muscle power. They also depend on them for emotional appeal to the electorate on ethnic lines. In lieu of their support, they share part of the loot from public funds with them and intervene with the state police in their favour. The growing nexus between the undergrounds and the over ground political leaders and the civil servants is directly related to the lure for easy money. As the people do not trust the state police to protect them, the different ethnic groups have organized their own armed militias. They need funds to maintain these armed, which they secure by extortion and pilferage of government funds practiced on large scale. This in turn has led to a breed of greedy political leaders whose main interest in politics is to make money and not serve the people. The entire political system in the region has grown around these unscrupulous politicians. The system enriches the corrupt leaders and civil servants.

With the politician-contractor- insurgent nexus getting stronger with passage of time, the state governments in insurgency-affected areas are virtually non-functional. They rule the small area in the capital and, may be, the district headquarters. The various insurgent groups have filled this vacuum without much difficulty and resistance. Many of the contractors turned politicians are simply not interested in development to provide even the most basic essential services to the people.

Another factor with strong negative influence on the electorate is small size of the constituencies. As the number of electorate in most constituencies in the region is small and the number of candidates seeking elections large, it is possible to win elections by getting support from a small section of the electorate; sometimes as low as 10% of the total votes in that constituency. Therefore, to win election, the candidates do not have to woo the entire electorate; they concentrate on a small core support group, mostly from their own ethnic group. Distribution of cash to win support is not looked down upon. Because the size of the legislature is small, the support of even one MLA assumes great importance in the formation of the government. One or two member parties do brisk business during the period of government formation. They negotiate hard for their support; it is given to the highest bidder.

The region sends very few members of Parliament, only eight for the Lok Sabha. Without political and economic weight it finds it difficult to get national attention except when there is a crisis situation like large scale violence. Militancy, insurgency and sensational incidents of violence have become integrated part of political strategy to grab national attention and to put pressure on the central government to attend to their many grievances, real and imaginary. All these constraints make political management of this sensitive region difficult and complicated.

Immigration

Demographic change in Assam took place due to deliberate policy of the British to bring in Bengalis as civil servants and Santhalis as tea-plantation workers, and Nepalis in the police and paramilitary forces. The problem of migration dates back to the colonial period. Causes for migration are complex. During the colonial period, large-scale migration from other parts of the country took place because of economic reasons and administrative preferences. After partition, in addition to economic factors, large-scale migration took place also because of security and political reasons. The policy-makers have not always been sensitive to this complexity. Large scale influx of the Bengalis from East Pakistan was strongly resented by the local tribal people, as the migrants had converted them into a minority in their own land. Violent tribal-non tribal conflict and insurgency in Tripura were the direct consequence of this unchecked and later legalized immigration.

Internal conflict-induced displacements in the region have further complicated the problem. Among the recent conflict-induced displacements in the Northeast are Paites, Kukis and Nagas in Manipur; Reangs in Mizoram, Bengalis and various Tripuri tribes in Tripura; and Chakmas in Arunachal Pradesh. Kukis in Manipur demand the creation of a separate Sadar Hill District (Kangpokpi). Mounting tensions between the historically ethnic area and the contemporary demographic reality of overlapping ethnicity has fueled many conflicts. The influx into the Northeast has created communal, linguistic, and even tribal-non tribal conflicts. These have been exploited by vested interests for petty partisan political ends, unmindful of larger consequences for national security. They have given rise to suspicion, violence and even ethnic-cleansing.

Drug Traffic

Proximity to the “Golden Triangle”, notorious for drug trafficking, has led to growth of organized crime in the region. Drug-traffickers have close links with political leaders and bureaucrats. Drug traffickers are using Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland as a transhipment point as well as a market. The number of drug addicts is growing rapidly in these states. The incidence of drug abuse and AIDS in Manipur is one of the highest in the country.

Changing Situation

As the ULFA came under pressure from the security forces, it made a dramatic turn around and instead of demanding the ouster of illegal migrants from Bangladesh its top leaders have sought shelter in Bangladesh. They depend on the aid from the Bangladesh and Pakistan intelligence agencies for the very survival of their separatist movement. Today, they are running training camps in Bangladesh, the country from where the illegal immigrants in large numbers had come. Their top leaders have been provided sanctuary in Bangladesh by the Bangladesh government. It is, therefore, not surprising that they almost have given up their earlier demand of throwing out the Bangladesh immigrants and are today pursuing the Bangladesh Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) agenda of targeting the migrants from other parts of India. It is today advocating recognition of the contribution of the illegal immigrants from Bangladesh to Assam’s economy. The outfit has also maintained some camps in Myanmar. It had earlier camps also in the forests of Bhutan, but they were ousted from there by the Bhutanese army in a military operation. Assam has 265 km of border with Bhutan.

The demand by a section of the Muslims which has sought OBC status in Assam has created further complication. All these trends show how far the Assamese society has fragmented since the beginning of the fragmentation process. They have fueled discontent and a sense of deprivation that has led to demand for distinct classification in order to secure reservation benefits in jobs and other entitlements, autonomy, separate statehood and even secession. Its initial demand was for an autonomous district, but ABSU has now pitched for a Union Territory status. The very notion of one Assamese people is being seriously challenged by the Bodos, Karbis and other tribal groups. They feel oppressed and discriminated against and demand separation from Assam and not from the Indian Union, though lately secessionist demands are also being articulated by the hardliners among them.

Inter-Ethnic conflicts

Hmar-Dimasa and Kuki-Karbi clashes in Karbi Anglong and consequent exodus of Khasi-Pnars from Karbi-Anglong led to further conflict and violence. Many of the insurgencies grew out of inter-ethnic conflicts. They have spread to the neighbouring states where their ethnic groups are in sizable numbers, for example, Naga groups presence in Changlang and Tirap districts in Arunachal Pradesh. Ethnic groups based in Tripura and Manipur such as Reangs, Brus and Hmars and have both physical and political presence in Mizoram. A large number of these groups have been militarized as well as politicized. Ethnic militias have become part of the civil societies because of feeling of insecurity vis-a-vis other ethnic groups. They are fighting battles on two fronts, one against the other hostile ethnic group and the other against the Indian state, though not all demand secession from the Indian Union.

The demand for a separate homeland for the Bodos has generated strong opposition from the non-Bodo groups, many of whom are no less disadvantaged than the Bodos. In this complex ethnic scenario, some disadvantaged groups are demanding schedule tribe status for their community as they feel doubly deprived and disadvantaged in order to be able to enjoy the basic citizenship rights. Some of these groups have been living here for centuries and have no other home to go to if forced to leave from here. The ULFA have started a violent campaign for the ouster of these communities from Assam. The proliferation of ethnic agendas, ethnic militias and ethnic violence are the result of misconceived short term solutions to complex issues which demand an integrated approach for solving the problems on long term basis. The farce of dialogue with the ULFA leaders through the interlocutors from the civil society has only strengthened the ULFA, who after their ouster from the sanctuaries in Bhutan had been considerably weakened. It is unfortunate that narrow political interests and not national interest continue to dictate government policies.

Another illustration of how sensitive various ethnic groups are about their ethnic identity is the Zomi-Kuki conflict. Their conflict is over the trivial issue of nomenclature. But it was not less bloody! The Paite-Zomis and Thadeu-Kukis conflicts took as many 562 lives (342 Zomis and 22 Kukis) in 1997. The situation, however, has not remained static. They keep on changing their demands and allies. The ULFA and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) seek protection and sanctuary in Bangladesh, a country whose people they had earlier sought to kill and deport from Assam.

Religious tensions in Assam are also on the increase. The rise of the communal forces in the state does not augur well for peace and stability in the state. The attempt to mobilize the Muslims in favour of the Congress party has not worked according to the plan. Distrustful of the Congress party’s motives, they have formed their own party in the hope of playing the balancing role in the tussle of power between the main contenders.

External Dimension

Situated in a troubled neighbourhood that is afflicted with all sorts of serious political conflicts, the Northeast cannot remain insulated from the repercussion of these conflicts. Dispersal of some ethnic groups across the international borders in the neighbouring countries like Nagas into Myanmar, and Chakmas into Bangladesh has created further complications that have serious implications for India’s national security. Some of the insurgent groups operating in this region like NSCN (K), UNLF and ULFA have sanctuaries in Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Proximity to international borders is a crucial factor helping the growth of militancy and insurgency in the region. Many insurgent movements are being supported by external intelligence agencies. The external threat is not something new and is manifest in the continuous cycle of violence and terror in the north-eastern states over the past several years. The presence of the ‘jihadi’ groups in the region is of recent origin. Islamic outfits, aided and abetted by Pakistan and Bangladesh are active in parts where there is sizable Muslim population, for example in parts of lower Assam where large number of illegal Bangladeshi migrants are living. The Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) of Bangladesh and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan are active in fomenting trouble. Many of the insurgent groups in the Northeast are operating from their bases in Bangladesh. Several of their top leaders are openly living in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has all along denied the presence of Indian insurgents or their camps on its soil at the official level.

The Indian government is in possession of hard evidence about the role of Pakistan’s ISI and Bangladesh DGFI in the region. While Pakistan is driven by its obsession to avenge the separation of Bangladesh, the DGFI is furthering national agenda of ‘Greater Bangladesh”. They are making determined efforts to radicalize the Muslims population in the region. The simmering discontent in the region for one reason or the other provides them with the opportunity to do so. Though at one time China was providing training and arms to some of the major groups like the UNLF from Manipur and the Nagas, but since the late seventies there are no reports of its direct support. However, this could change with India-China relations taking a turn for the worse. In any case with its close allies Pakistan, Bangladesh becoming much more active in the region, it can outsource the task to these countries.

The top leadership of the ULFA has been given sanctuaries in Bangladesh. Some of them are living in the capital Dacca and allowed to carry on their activities with the help of the Bangladesh military and intelligence. The help to the insurgent groups did not stop even during the friendly regimes of Sheikh Mujib and his daughter Sheikh Hasina. Bangladeshi leadership cutting across party lines harbour the same ambition of separating the Northeast from the Indian Union. The sentiments are not very different in Nepal. All players in the political game, the former King, political parties and the Maoists are one in their opposition to India on many issues.

Political instability in the neighbourhood and the growth of the jehadi terrorist groups has a direct bearing on the situation in the Northeast. The recent spurt in acts of terrorism, including suicide bombings, something that was not witnessed earlier, is attributed to this phenomenon in our neighbourhood. Increasing involvement of Pakistan’s ISI and strengthening of the fundamentalist Islamic forces in this region should be matters of serious concern for national security. Leaders like ULFA’s Paresh Brua continue to enjoy the hospitality of Bangladesh even under the new military dispensation. There are recent reports about the closer working relationship between the ISI and the Bangladesh Intelligence agencies to strengthen these insurgent groups through greater financial help and bringing about closer working relationship between them and the new jehadi forces now getting stronger with help from Bangladesh in Pakistan. The first ever suicide bombing in Assam took place on 9 April 2007, which clearly points to the success of the Pakistani and Bangladesh intelligence agencies in the Northeast. It is reported that the number of training camps to train insurgent groups operating from this safe haven has gone up to 176. The ULFA leads the list with the highest number of training camps-38 within this terror belt which stretches form Sherpur district in the north, bordering the West Garo Hills in Meghalaya to Cox’s Bazaar in the south near Myanmar. Similarly, the National Liberation Front of Tripura (Biswamohan) has reportedly 34 camps spread along the Bangladesh-Tripura border in the three districts of Rangamati, Maulvi Bazar and Khagrachari and one at Dhanmandi in Dhaka. The All Tripura Tiger Force also has 15 camps in the same belt. Also listed in the report are the location of camps of Borok National Council of Tripura and Bru National Liberation Front in the Rangamati district. The National Democratic Front of Bodoland has 14 camps, Dima Hlam Daogarh of NC Hills district of Assam has one camp in Maulvi Bazar, Meghalaya’s Hyniewtrep National Liberation Council has two, the People’s Liberation Army of Manipur has sixteen, Kongeiyawal Kamba Lup has three, the United National Liberation Front has one, People’s Revolutionary Front of Kangliepak one, all from Manipur, Kamatapur Liberation Organisation eight, Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam 11 and Islamic United Reformation Protest of India has three camps reportedly located in the madrassas in Kurigram district.

Cachar, North Cachar Hills, Karbi Anglong and Meghalaya have seen a spurt in insurgency in the last few years, as the area straddles the transit route to Bangladesh. Pakistan’s active role in stoking the secessionist fires by providing material and financial help and ideological motivation. The ISI has been pursuing their agenda through the Islamic religious institutions in Bangladesh, Nepal. Bangladesh has been actively helping the insurgent groups by providing sanctuaries, training, funds, arms and explosives. The anti-India rhetoric also helps in shifting the focus of public wrath against the government for its failures to the bigger neighbour. The failure of the Indian government in solving the boundary disputes for the last thirty-six years has added to the problem.

Nothing hurts the people more than the belief that New Delhi is simply not bothered about what happens in the Northeast. How can total indifference of the central government be explained to the people in Manipur when the All Naga Students Association forced an economic blockade in 2006 that cut off all essential supplies to the state for fifty-two days? New Delhi did not intervene to end the blockade. Could it have allowed such a blockade even for one day say from Haryana to Delhi? The national media was as indifferent as the central government. Such instances only confirm their belief about the indifference of mainland India. Should we then be surprised if the secessionist forces are gaining strength?

Counterinsurgency Strategy

Unfortunately, government response has been piecemeal and ad hoc. It has not been able to formulate a long term and comprehensive strategy to deal with the problem. This is the main reason why neither military means, nor peace talks or ceasefire agreements have succeeded in bringing peace in the Northeast. Ad hoc policies have only exacerbated the problem. The fact that so far the only peace accord that has succeeded is the Mizoram accord with Ladenga in 1986 is because the sporadic negotiations with the militants were more an ad hoc response than an essential component of a long term comprehensive strategy. An essential requirement of a successful peace dialogue is that it manages to bring the major parties to the dispute, if not all groups, on board. This, the government failed to do in most such dialogues, including the protracted ceasefire and peace dialogue with the NSCN (IM). The ceasefire has not brought peace, also because its terms have been allowed to be blatantly violated by the NSCN (IM) cadres.

The government has also made efforts to accelerate the pace of development by allocating large funds to all the states in the northeast. The strategy has failed because development and security cannot be separated. Security and development are closely inter-twined. They are two faces of the same coin and one cannot be separated from the other. When in large parts of the Northeast the state is unable to perform its most basic functions, like maintenance of law and order, delivery of essential services and collect taxes, it would be unreal to expect any meaningful development. To plan development policies without taking into consideration the security situation on the ground would be unrealistic. It is not possible to get results unless the instruments of planning and implementing economic, political and security policies are combined in one institution of the state. The three cannot be separated; each has both short term and long term impact on the others. The North East Council which started with much fanfare in the seventies has not achieved much success because of this impractical division between economic, political and security policies. It has not made much impact even on the extremely slow pace of development of the region, as no development project can take off without creating a reasonable security environment.

The so-called “Look East Policy” announced with much fanfare has made no headway. There is very little trade with the neighbouring countries though the land route primarily because of conditions of insecurity on the Indian side. It also must be recognized that land routes are much more difficult and expensive than sea-routes. Most of the international trade in this region continues to be conducted through the sea-route.

The situation can still be managed if there is consensus among the main political parties about how to deal with it. Further illegal migration can be stopped and a solution found for the migrants who are already in the state for economic reasons. Granting work permits to them that will give them permission to work but no political rights, is one such solution. Creating one or more non-territorial constituencies for all non-locals could be another solution for granting them political rights. Article 171 of the Indian Constitution provides for doing this. Granting them legal status will not only foster regional and national solidarity but also improve the security situation. The suggestion that immigration due to economic and social distress, aggravated by natural disasters, can be countered by regulating legitimate labour movements through work-permits needs serious consideration.

A series of inter-related initiatives could point the way to understanding the requirements for peace and development. Any further drift and pouring funds into bottomless pit that do not reach the target group will only lead to further deterioration in the situation. The many serious issues need to be squarely faced and not evaded and swept under the carpet. The feeling of deprivation, real or imaginary, will only lead to further alienation and assertion of identity. Pandering to unreasonable demands will also worsen the situation. The policy-makers have still not learnt the lesson from the past experience. Giving in to demands for separation and autonomy on ethnic lines, and thus causing further fragmentation, are remedies worse than the disease. And yet the unending process of fragmentation is still on because of narrow political consideration.

The state police in the Northeast needs immediate attention from the central government if they are to perform effectively their role of enforcing the rule of law and providing protection of life and property. Postings in the Northeast should not be treated as punishment postings.

Deals negotiated in secrecy with one insurgent group or the other, however strong, like negotiations with the NSCN (IM), are unlikely to bring peace to this troubled region. The demands like Nagalim (greater Nagaland) are best addressed by creating a space in which all the stakeholders in these conflicts can express their views and meet their aspirations. The people of the region must be taken into confidence, if lasting solution to the divergent claims of various ethnic communities is to be resolved peacefully. Sixty years is a long enough a period for honest stock-taking and reassessment of the strategies and policies pursued so far. The fact that we have so far failed in achieving the aims and objectives cannot be denied.

In conclusion, it is suggested that a holistic view is taken of all the security, political, economic, social, and ethnic problems of the region and their linkages with the neighbouring countries. Otherwise, it will not be possible to tackle the serious situation that is developing in the Northeast. The strategy to solve the many issues should include: appropriate reforms in the constitution, political and legal institutions to accommodate the aspirations of the people. It should think in terms of cooperative federalism, decentralization and regional autonomy.

noreply@blogger.com (CSA) — Wed, 28 Apr 2010 08:41:00 +0000