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<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="/static/theatlantic/syndication/feeds/atom-to-html.e8fb83e50eaf.xsl" ?><feed xml:lang="en-us" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/"><title>Global | The Atlantic</title><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/" rel="alternate"></link><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/feed/channel/international/" rel="self"></link><id>https://www.theatlantic.com/international/</id><updated>2026-11-20T10:04:01-05:00</updated><rights>Copyright 2026 by The Atlantic Monthly Group. All Rights Reserved.</rights><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689510</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nine months into the United States and Israel’s war on Iran, the Islamic Republic rules over a shattered economy and a society weary of the limbo between war and peace. The Iranian regime is deeply unpopular, but the opposition, divided over the war and faced with brutal repression, has no strategic path forward.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The regime has executed 74 political prisoners since the war broke out, and more than 100 others remain on death row, according to the Oslo-based organization Iran Human Rights. Small acts of nonconformity, even when they are not explicitly political, can incur harsh punishment. Several café &lt;a href="https://farsnews.ir/azizim49/1793469981332970881"&gt;owners&lt;/a&gt; in Tehran are being prosecuted for celebrating Halloween. At least 118 Baha’is have been arrested or summoned to court in recent months for the crime of following a faith unrecognized by the regime. On Tuesday, security forces raided the home of the women’s-rights activist Sepideh Qolian, in the southwestern city of Dezful. She wasn’t there—so they beat her father and teenage niece and arrested them, along with her brother, instead.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“A lot of us were happy when the dictator was killed,” a 40-year-old teacher in Tehran told me, referring to the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. “But the war has turned a religious dictatorship into a military dictatorship. Even our teachers’ union can’t do its basic work anymore.” (He and others who spoke with me from Iran asked for their names to be withheld for their safety.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Many of the Iranians I spoke with linked the ferocity of the current repression to the conflict. “After the war, we can’t even stage civic protests anymore,” a Karaj-based left-leaning journalist in his 30s told me. “The war was supposed to bring freedom, but it has suffocated it. We now have so little hope for advancing progressive and democratic demands.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Precisely because the war raised so many hopes, the disappointment with current conditions is particularly bitter. And that disappointment extends to the person who perhaps most embodied the notion that outside intervention could bring freedom: the opposition leader and former crown prince Reza Pahlavi. Last winter he promoted the conflict as a vehicle for popular Iranian aspirations. Even he has now recalibrated, if subtly: “We needed this humanitarian intervention and we do not apologize for it,” Pahlavi &lt;a href="https://www.freiheit.org/germany/acceptance-remarks-reza-pahlavi"&gt;said&lt;/a&gt; earlier this month, while accepting the Freedom Prize in Frankfurt on behalf of the Iranian people. But he added that he grieved “every innocent Iranian lost in this war” and that Iranians didn’t want to see their country bombed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Pahlavi’s alignment with the Israeli-American attacks on Iran has posed problems for some of his supporters, two people close to his group told me. At least two of his former staffers became critics over the issue. One of these is Mehrdad Marty Youssefiani, his former chief of staff, who told me that he considered Pahlavi’s camp to be “in violation of fundamental national values.” Pahlavi’s mother, Iran’s former queen, Farah Pahlavi, &lt;a href="https://farahpahlavi.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Point-de-Vue-4076-SM-Farah-Pahlavi.pdf"&gt;came out&lt;/a&gt; against the war, in what may have been an indirect rebuke to her son. A well-known pro-Pahlavi documentary filmmaker last month also &lt;a href="https://x.com/AliHamid27/status/2114794762452472157?a=sch22UMq7w0E2bYSEQk&amp;amp;s=20"&gt;condemned&lt;/a&gt; the war and those who supported it—implicitly including Pahlavi.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Esmail Abdi, a former trade unionist who now heads the exile-based Iran Freedom Congress, suggested to me that Pahlavi’s support for the war left him with a lot to answer for. “We must ask him: How does foreign intervention help with Iran’s political independence, sovereignty, and democracy? We’ve seen that war doesn’t bring freedom.” The Karaj-based journalist told me of Pahlavi, “When Iranians were dying under air strikes, he sent condolences messages for American soldiers but not for thousands of killed Iranian civilians. This has definitely cost him some support. It was a big mistake by him.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/04/iranian-opposition-united/686679/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: The Iranian opposition’s urgent task&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Many of Pahlavi’s supporters also criticize the role he played in the demonstrations last winter. Pahlavi called Iranians to the streets on January 8, having previously assured them that he had &lt;a href="https://www.iranintl.com/202507262852"&gt;secured&lt;/a&gt; the defections of more than 50,000 of the regime’s security forces and civil servants. The regime massacred thousands of protesters, and no defectors materialized. Nor did a follow-up plan from the former crown prince.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“I am upset at him because he lied to us,” a young woman in Tehran who took part in pro-Pahlavi protests in January told me. “We thought he was ready to come back to the homeland. We believed him when he said he had the support of thousands of defectors. Our trust is now tarnished.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Nonetheless, Pahlavi retains a significant social base inside Iran. On Tuesday, demonstrators in the small city of Abdanan in western Iran, which had been the site of major demonstrations back in January, chanted his name. Ali, an artist who left Iran for Europe a few months ago and doesn’t support the crown prince, conceded to me that he thought Pahlavi would win a free election if one were held tomorrow.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And Pahlavi has not given up. Writing in a Belgian newspaper earlier this month, he unveiled a &lt;a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/opinion/2388691/europe-must-stand-with-the-iranian-people"&gt;plan&lt;/a&gt; that includes building a movement inside the country, securing defections from the regime’s security forces, uniting the Iranian diaspora, and winning support from the West. The trouble is that little in his past shows him capable of carrying out that strategy. Last month, he started a new initiative asking “not just military and government personnel” but “Iranians from every walk of life” to join his camp by communicating with an AI-powered bot on the messaging app Telegram.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Not a single prominent political official or diplomat of the Islamic Republic has publicly joined Pahlavi. He recently said that he would hesitate before calling for another street uprising, because he wouldn’t want more people to be killed. Yet in September, Pahlavi &lt;a href="https://www.foxnews.com/video/6405444851112"&gt;advocated&lt;/a&gt; arming anti-regime Iranians—an inflammatory step that one Iranian journalist &lt;a href="https://x.com/matin25388/status/2102753805423022497?a=IKlnEpjbMghI4lg4HJ0&amp;amp;s=20"&gt;decried&lt;/a&gt; as “promoting civil war” and “a new level of vileness.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Further complicating his efforts, Pahlavi’s movement, which once promised to be unifying, has turned exclusionary in recent years. His close advisers have &lt;a href="https://www.iran-emrooz.net/index.php/politic/more/110046/"&gt;derisively&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="https://x.com/alirezakiani2/status/2059450806550552685?a=nrtocaKqPizdOa0gvMs&amp;amp;s=20"&gt;referred&lt;/a&gt; to other opponents of the regime as “79ers,” identifying them with the revolutionary coalition that brought down the shah in 1979, and which encompassed liberal nationalists, Marxists, and Islamists, among others. Last year, Pahlavi’s supporters in Iran threw stones at the Nobel peace laureate Narges Mohammadi, a human-rights activist, at a &lt;a href="https://andisheh-nou.org/?p=72678"&gt;speech&lt;/a&gt; she gave. Earlier this month, the actor Taraneh Alidoosti met with broad public sympathy when she appeared without hijab at the funeral of her father, Hamid, a well-known footballer. Yet &lt;a href="https://x.com/weiblicheloewe/status/2117539298887266426?s=20"&gt;Pahlavi&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="https://x.com/HAMEDilamy/status/2117885124142387466?s=20"&gt;supporters&lt;/a&gt; attacked her online. When Pahlavi issued condolences for the footballer, he didn’t mention &lt;a href="https://x.com/PahlaviComms/status/2118845994762703237?a=fmzs9VvxQZ820q2dHfQ&amp;amp;s=20"&gt;Taraneh&lt;/a&gt; by name. Mohammadi and Alidoosti represent a liberal and feminist section of the opposition.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/05/iran-exile-reza-pahlavi/687088/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Robert Worth: The Iranian royalists’ thuggish edge&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Such attitudes make Pahlavi at best a factional leader, not the unifying transitional figure he claims, and once appeared, to be. But other sections of the opposition don’t have a clear path forward, either. The Mojahedin-e-Khalq, with its eclectic mix of Maoist and Islamist convictions, remains enormously unpopular. The Kurdish and Balochi ethnic groups have occasionally mounted armed uprisings, but these have been limited to small areas in Iran’s remote southwest and southeastern regions. The Iranian Freedom Congress has brought together an impressive array of pro-democracy voices but hasn’t taken much political initiative since it was founded earlier this year.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;These groups are all headquartered in exile. Inside Iran, any oppositional act is punished harshly, as the treatment meted out to Qolian shows. Pro-democracy advocates include former regime officials (such as the former prime minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, and the former deputy interior minister, Mostafa Tajzadeh), as well as nationalists, feminists, socialists, and liberals. But the regime has imprisoned most of the best-known figures from these groups and effectively stopped them from so much as holding meetings. Even Pahlavi’s latest strategy starts with a movement inside the country with room enough to breathe.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Arash Azizi</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/arash-azizi/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/HFUgh8COL65RJ1oWIg0LU6O-rdw=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_06_Reza_Pahlavi/original.jpg"><media:credit>Steffen Boettcher / laif / Redux</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">What War Has Brought Iran’s Opposition</title><published>2026-11-20T07:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-20T10:04:01-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Domestic repression and exile infighting leave few strategic options.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/11/iran-opposition-strategic-options/689510/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:39-689407</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;O&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;n the eighth day&lt;/span&gt; of violent protests in Tirana, I followed a column of some 3,000 people marching through the Albanian capital. For months, Albanians had held anti-government demonstrations as peaceful as the pink bird that had lent their movement its name—the Flamingo Revolution. But the protests had recently entered a new, volatile phase. Some had begun calling it the Eagle Revolution, after the fiercer bird on the national flag.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It was 1 p.m. on a Tuesday in October, and demonstrators filled the downtown boulevards. We walked past shattered bus shelters, broken shop windows, and government buildings blackened by fire.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“Down with the&lt;i&gt; patronazhistët&lt;/i&gt;,” people shouted, referring to the entrenched patronage networks that reward party loyalty over merit in nearly every sphere of life. When another group chanted a World War II slogan—“Albania for the Albanians, death to the traitors”—my fixer said, “This one is for you.” He meant Americans. What had first sparked the protests, in May, were plans by Jared Kushner, the son-in-law of the American president, to build an ultra-luxury resort in a fragile nature preserve in the country’s south, where flamingos gather.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The marchers stopped outside the education ministry. I moved to the front, where the most aggressive protesters were. The “fire team,” some called them: lanky youths in masks and reflective ski goggles. Several of them wrenched paving stones from the sidewalk, smashed them against the curb, and launched the pieces at the ministry’s windows by hand and slingshot.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;State police officers, leaning on riot shields, watched impassively for about 15 minutes. Then a heavy police truck with rooftop water cannons maneuvered onto the street. My fixer pushed me through the crowd as jets of water raked our backs. That evening, after dark, the streets outside the prime minister’s office boomed with small explosions. Police in riot gear rolled through with tear-gas launchers. Protesters tossed Molotov cocktails that broke in flames at officers’ feet.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;Albania is one &lt;/span&gt;of Europe’s poorest countries. From a nation of 2.3 million, some 40,000 citizens leave each year. The list of prominent politicians recently charged with corruption—by a special prosecutor’s office, created under pressure from the European Union and the United States—includes a former prime minister, a deputy prime minister, a former president, and the mayor of Tirana, who presides from his jail cell. A Miami businessman who sold Kushner and his partners land for the resort is being investigated by Albanian prosecutors for allegedly forging the deeds and laundering money for drug gangs. (All of them maintain their innocence. Kushner has not been accused of wrongdoing.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I wanted to speak with college students at the forefront of these new protests—young people so furious about government corruption that they’d spent months in the streets. Almost nothing like it has occurred in our own country, despite nearly 90 percent of Americans—a 20-year high, according to Gallup—&lt;a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/09/02/americans-government-corruption-poll"&gt;seeing corruption as widespread&lt;/a&gt;. In an &lt;a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/10/23/corruption-midterm-election-cnbc-poll-trump.html"&gt;October CNBC survey&lt;/a&gt;, voters ranked corruption as their top issue, ahead of food costs. But for many Americans, the issue seems remote—a problem that troubles them intellectually yet doesn’t touch their lives in the intimate ways that it does Albanians’.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Prime Minister Edi Rama and his center-left Socialist Party have held power for 13 years. Party leaders, protesters told me, influence who gets jobs, contracts, and government services. Graft abounds. In a 2025 survey, nearly 10 percent of public-university students admitted that they’d offered bribes for better grades.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I met Megi Ibrahimi, a 20-year-old student at the Polytechnic University of Tirana, in late October, not long after I arrived in the capital. She told me that she had been studying with friends in a café in May when she saw a video filling social media across Albania. Razor-wire fencing had gone up around an idyllic strip of beach between the Adriatic Sea and a lagoon. The area had been a legally protected landscape since 2004. Loggerhead turtles lay eggs in the dunes. Mediterranean monk seals, some of the world’s rarest mammals, hunt in the waters.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But in February 2024, Albania’s Parliament, in Rama’s grip, passed a law allowing resorts of five stars or more to be built in nature sanctuaries. Three weeks later, Kushner posted renderings of his project on Instagram—a 657-acre resort with a yacht club, casino, and beachfront housing that a leaked project document calls “Billionaire Villas.” (The average annual salary in Albania is roughly $14,000.) Later that year, a government committee led by Rama gave Kushner and his partners “strategic investor” status to build another resort on a nearby island, qualifying them for fast-track permitting and state-sponsored perks, including a cleanup of unexploded ordnance. (The island was once a Soviet submarine base.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In the video on Ibrahimi’s phone, a protester at Kushner’s lagoon site—a fisherman with ancestral ties to the land—is beaten, then dragged away by the developers’ private security guards. The man later claimed that the guards put guns to his head. State police officers stood doing nothing, until protesters, galled by the abduction, were on the verge of a riot.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;To Ibrahimi, and to many other Albanians I spoke with, the episode was a metaphor for their own feelings of powerlessness. The country’s leaders lavish favors on foreign investors, oligarchs, and party hacks, while everyone else struggles to stand. Ibrahimi, the daughter of a teacher and a retired municipal worker, graduated second in her high-school class, in the small inland town of Përmet. She could easily join the emigrants seeking better schools and jobs abroad. But she wants to stay. “I’m Albanian, and I want to live in my country,” she said. Yet the video she watched at the café that day sickened her: “It felt like our dignity was being dragged through the dunes.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;She wasn’t alone. The protests at the resort site spread overnight to the capital, two hours’ drive to the north. Demonstrators carried signs that said &lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;Albania is not for sale&lt;/span&gt; and held daily protests through the summer. At their peak, in mid-June, the crowds had grown to an estimated 100,000 people.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Ibrahimi spent much of the summer among them. She made friends and Instagram videos. She worked with other students on creative displays that she hoped would energize her fellow citizens, including a poker table that students sat around wearing masks with the faces of Albanian politicians, wagering chips that represented the country’s wildlife preserves.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Outrage toward Kushner’s project mushroomed into a broad set of anti-government grievances, including corruption, school conditions, and living costs. Ibrahimi reveled in a sense of possibility. With so many people protesting—mothers pushing strollers, children making paintings, pensioners sharing memories of the country’s repressive past—she believed that Rama would accede to at least some of their requests. The protests were shaping up to be the most significant civic movement in Albania since pro-democracy students had toppled the statue of the late dictator Enver Hoxha, and with it nearly &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/12/victims-of-albanian-communism-struggle-for-closure/265956/?utm_source=feed"&gt;five decades of communism&lt;/a&gt;, in 1991.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But Rama has dug in. A charismatic former professional basketball player and an accomplished painter, he has been elected to four consecutive terms and has zealously marketed Albania to the outside world, seeking tourists and private investors. He has made admission to the European Union his government’s highest priority. “There is absolutely no chance that the investment will stop as long as I am here,” he told Reuters in early June.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As summer ended and the days shortened, people with kids and careers started to attend the protests less often. Ibrahimi and her friends came to believe that the responsibility for change in Albania lay with their generation. Her grandparents had suffered through the worst years of communism, when dissent got people jailed or killed. Her parents worry about what could happen to her at the protests, where students have been maimed, surveilled, and arrested. “My mom begs me every day to stay home, to not go outside,” she said. “But we still have dreams, and the time to fight for our dreams.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Flamingo protesters initially had five demands, including term limits for the prime minister and the repeal of laws that benefited Kushner’s projects. In the face of Rama’s intransigence, student activists narrowed their demands to one: Rama’s resignation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;They set October 13, a week after school resumed, as the start of a new, student-led wave of demonstrations. They called on protesters to meet in a new location, the Ministry of Education, at a time when many classes let out. Ibrahimi spray-painted the date around Tirana and promoted it on a local TV show. “We will leave the public square,” she told her interviewer, “the moment the main demand of this protest is met, which has been there since day one: the removal of this outdated political caste.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;By the end of October 13, Tirana had descended into chaos. Protesters in masks threw stones, fireworks, and petrol bombs at government buildings and the police. They tore down streetlights, snarling traffic, and used signposts to batter windows and doors. In the days that followed, they set fire to banks, government ministries, a police station, and the supreme court.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Ibrahimi brought eggs and water balloons filled with paint. For a time, she was on the front lines, face-to-face with the police, some of whom shot protesters with rubber bullets. But she soon found a role that felt more useful. She put on her gas mask and looked for protesters who were struggling to breathe. She led them out of the clouds of tear gas and flushed their eyes with the saline solution she kept in bottles in her backpack.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;In my conversations &lt;/span&gt;with Albanian political analysts, officials from minority parties, and others, I heard little condemnation of the violence. “It was unavoidable,” Arlind Qori, a political scientist who chairs the Together Movement, a party with one seat in Parliament, said when we met in his office. A sticker on the table between us depicted Rama behind bars, with dollar and euro symbols in his eyes. “Peaceful protests didn’t move him a bit.” As of late October, 107 protesters and 201 state police officers had been injured, according to official figures.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Protesters have demanded a new, transitional government, but Rama—who has nearly three years left in his term—has no plans to step down. Rama told me that “the whole outrage against the project has been a big bullshit”—driven, he claimed, by journalists’ animus toward Kushner and President Trump. “Yes, corruption has been a big problem for Albania, and it would be a lie to say they”—the protesters—“do not have a point.” But independent prosecutors were rooting it out, “including within our own ranks,” he said. He blamed the recent violence on antifa, organized crime, and his political foes. “The opposition wants me to leave through street pressure, because it cannot defeat me at the ballot box.” Kushner’s projects are under review and have received no final approvals. In a recent &lt;a href="https://jaredkushner.com/posts/new-yorker-response/"&gt;statement on his website&lt;/a&gt;, Kushner acknowledged that locals have “legitimate questions and concerns.” He added, “Ultimately, Albania will decide whether the project proceeds.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Students describe their movement as leaderless. They fear that anyone they choose as a representative will be corrupted by the ruling party—or singled out for attack. Just 2.8 percent of Albanians polled in 2018 agreed that “most people can be trusted,” the second-lowest of nearly 90 countries in an international survey and the lowest in Europe.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Still, Ibrahimi and her friends closely watched the recent elections in nearby Serbia. There, a student-led opposition defeated the populist strongman Aleksandar Vučić, who, like Rama, had dominated the country’s institutions for more than a decade. Also like Rama, Vučić had championed a Kushner-backed luxury real-estate development in his country. Kushner &lt;a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-hotel-russia-serbia-jared-kushner-9a7189f5"&gt;abandoned it in 2025&lt;/a&gt;, after Serbian prosecutors charged officials with corruption in connection with the project. “There are things we could learn from them,” Ibrahimi said of Serbia’s student movement.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;An hour after our first interview, I found her again, outside the education ministry. Protesters had set fire to a few dumpsters, but the crowd was small, and people seemed tired. Ibrahimi flitted among groups of friends, some of whom wondered whether the time had come for yet another shift in strategy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As smoke poured through the afternoon light, an old woman arrived, pushing a wire shopping cart. She pulled faded winter jackets from a plastic bag and held them up to see which of the young people they might fit. She told Ibrahimi’s friends that the jackets had belonged to her children, who now lived abroad. It was getting chilly. Her children, she said, would have wanted this new generation to have them.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p data-flatplan-paragraph="true"&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt;This article appears in the &lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;a data-event-element="inline link" data-gtm-vis-first-on-screen31117857_899="77188" data-gtm-vis-has-fired31117857_899="1" data-gtm-vis-total-visible-time31117857_899="100" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/toc/2027/01/?utm_source=feed" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" target="_blank"&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt;January 2027&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt; print edition with the headline “The Albanians Have Had Enough.” &lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Ariel Sabar</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/ariel-sabar/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/ZpYHotxwWZWdELNZU2vjusk8QFk=/0x52:2041x1200/media/img/2026/11/Sabar_Albania/original.png"><media:credit>Armend Nimani / AFP / Getty</media:credit><media:description>Grievances over corruption, school conditions, and living costs are fueling a newly violent phase of protest.</media:description></media:content><title type="html">How Jared Kushner Sparked a Revolution in the Balkans</title><published>2026-11-18T10:30:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-18T11:00:52-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Protests over his luxury development on the Mediterranean coast have morphed into a revolt against Albania’s political elite.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/2027/01/albania-kushner-flamingo-revolution/689407/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689462</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;Asian countries hoping&lt;/span&gt; to resist China’s ambitions for regional supremacy might look to a recent art festival in South Korea for inspiration. The Gwangju Biennale, founded in 1994 to celebrate Asian culture and South Korea’s democracy, erupted in controversy in September over the organizers’ decision to grant Taiwan its own self-named pavilion—in defiance of Beijing’s purported claims to the island. But despite the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s demands that the South Korean authorities rectify this “&lt;a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202609/t20260903_12015816.html"&gt;grave violation&lt;/a&gt;,” the Biennale’s organizers refused to budge. China’s unappeased delegation pulled out of the festival in a huff. The incident offered the other attendees a valuable lesson: China needn’t always get its way.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;China’s neighbors would do well to keep this in mind during this week’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. On its surface, the annual gathering of leaders of countries throughout the Pacific region, including the United States, will be a showcase of China’s growing power. As the summit’s host, Chinese President Xi Jinping has savvily invited his guests to the tech hub Shenzhen, home to leading robotics manufacturers, the telecommunications firm Huawei, top drone makers, and roving robotaxis. Meanwhile, President Trump, Xi’s main counterweight in the region, will arrive tomorrow as a diminished figure—unpopular at home, entangled in a costly and controversial war abroad, and presiding over a party that voters just cast out of Congress. Washington’s traditional allies in the region have already been rattled by Trump’s &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/09/xi-trump-summit/688743/?utm_source=feed"&gt;unexpected turn&lt;/a&gt; toward China in his second term. Countries such as Australia are now working to figure out how to protect themselves against China’s encroaching power without the assurance of American support.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“If the U.S. isn’t there, we are going to be a little bit more circumspect about how we stand up to China,” Gordon Flake, the chief executive of the Perth USAsia Centre at the University of Western Australia, told me. “But it doesn’t mean we won’t do it.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Unlike European leaders, who are similarly trying to defend their interests against China amid a breakdown in the Atlantic alliance, the countries of Asia lack a unifying body to coordinate policy or assert collective power. The European Union can press Beijing for concessions on trade with Europe’s common market, but the Pacific region’s various governments must negotiate deals on their own. Compared with EU members, these countries are also more politically and economically diverse—some are wealthy and some are poor; some are democracies and some are not. This makes delivering a single unified message more challenging. More than 70 percent of people in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia view China favorably, compared with less than 30 percent in South Korea and India, and 11 percent in Japan, according to &lt;a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/07/15/views-of-china-and-xi-are-improving-globally/pg_2026-06-15_global-views-china-2026_00_02/"&gt;survey data&lt;/a&gt; from the Pew Research Center.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/11/jensen-huang-chinese-intelligence-nvidia/689430/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: China’s intelligence coup in the AI war&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yet the stakes for countering China’s rise are higher in Asia than anywhere else. China’s economy is far and away the most dominant in the region—more than four times that of Japan, Asia’s second-biggest economy. Xi has worked to project China’s power throughout the world, but he is most interested in ruling over his own neighborhood. As he &lt;a href="https://id.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/201405/t20140530_2048472.htm"&gt;declared&lt;/a&gt; in a pivotal 2014 speech that marked the country’s turn toward a more assertive regional policy, “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia,” in clear opposition to foreign interference in the region. “The Chinese people, in their pursuit of the Chinese dream of great national renewal, stand ready to support and help other peoples in Asia to realize their own great dreams.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Most countries in the region would prefer to realize their own dreams without China’s “support.” Despite Trump’s inconsistent approach to maintaining ties with long-standing allies, countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia are wary of partnering with Xi’s new imperial order instead. Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, having &lt;a href="https://eoimanila.gov.in/speeches-details/keynote-address-by-external-affairs-minister-at-the-13th-all-india-conference-of-china-studies"&gt;touted&lt;/a&gt; the importance of “a multipolar Asia,” &lt;a href="https://thewire.in/diplomacy/criticising-asia-for-asians-jaishankar-says-narrow-asian-chauvinism-against-regional-interests"&gt;dismissed&lt;/a&gt; the Asia-for-Asians idea as unrealistic in 2022: “A narrow Asian chauvinism is actually against the continent’s own interest.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;India’s leaders have good reason to resist China’s ambitions, which have involved expanding its economic and military influence into South Asia, &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj3vq7nkzr0qo"&gt;testing&lt;/a&gt; New Delhi’s resolve along their shared Himalayan border, and supporting Pakistan, India’s bitter rival. Beijing “thinks that India needs to accept subordinate status to China,” Manoj Joshi, a fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, told me. But “India is not willing to accept that in any way it is second to China.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Beijing’s contentious territorial claims have other neighbors on edge as well. Xi’s extensive military drills around Taiwan have raised fears of a devastating regional war. His insistent claim to nearly all of the South China Sea keeps China in almost-constant conflict with the Philippines. In July, the Philippine government accused China’s coast guard of allegedly injuring a Filipino sailor in the South China Sea, lamenting in a &lt;a href="https://www.dnd.gov.ph/Release/2026-07-20/2711/Statement-on-the%C2%A0Latest-Act-of-Violence-and-Harassment-Committed-by-the-China-Coast-Guard-against-the-Philippine-Navy"&gt;statement&lt;/a&gt;: “We simply cannot trust this belligerent neighbor.” Last month, the Chinese ambassador in Manila drew sharp criticism for provocatively &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/philippines-summons-chinas-envoy-over-remarks-conveying-threat-2026-10-19/"&gt;claiming that China&lt;/a&gt; “may easily win” a war against the Philippines—though he denied that he was making a threat.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Xi has attempted to soften these political conflicts with promises of economic cooperation, but any hope that China’s rise would lift other countries has faded. The same &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/chinese-companies-profit-problem/689088/?utm_source=feed"&gt;state-subsidized Chinese exports&lt;/a&gt; that have threatened industries in the United States and Europe have undercut various sectors throughout Asia as well. Trade with Southeast Asian countries accounts for &lt;a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/china-squeezing-southeast-asia"&gt;nearly a quarter&lt;/a&gt; of China’s global trade surplus. Chinese companies are expanding their market share in manufacturing industries that are central to South Korea’s economy, such as shipbuilding, batteries, and petrochemicals. Xi has sought to use China’s growing economic might to coerce neighbors to concede to his political demands. Beijing &lt;a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/china-deprives-japan-of-rare-earths-supply-escalating-dispute-41e7750c"&gt;halted supplies&lt;/a&gt; of rare earth elements to Japan in January after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi warned that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could trigger a military response. (Despite this pressure, Japan has not withdrawn its comment.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;Even as Trump has &lt;/span&gt;cozied up to Xi over the past year, his administration has tried to reassure Asian allies of its continued support. The U.S. &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-japan-join-philippines-south-china-sea-drills-2026-07-26/"&gt;conducted naval drills&lt;/a&gt; with the Philippines and Japan in the South China Sea in July. Just before this year’s APEC summit, Trump met with his fellow leaders from Australia, India, and Japan for talks about enhanced cooperation on AI, critical minerals, and maritime security, with new plans for joint military exercises to counter China’s power. But other moves add to traditional U.S. allies’ unease. Trump has delayed approval of a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, presumably to stay on better terms with Xi. Last year Trump flew all the way to South Korea to &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/10/xi-trump-trade-deal/684762/?utm_source=feed"&gt;meet with Xi&lt;/a&gt; on the sidelines of the APEC summit, but skipped the summit itself.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In the absence of clear signals from Washington, Asian leaders have tightened ties with one another. In 2017, when Trump &lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/01/trump-tpp-dead/514154/?utm_source=feed"&gt;withdrew&lt;/a&gt; from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a regional trade pact designed to isolate China, the other 11 members moved forward without the United States. Japan has expanded its relationships in the region, in part by &lt;a href="https://www.dw.com/en/japan-military-aid-expands-southeast-asia-footprint/a-67521664"&gt;offering aid&lt;/a&gt; to strengthen the defense capabilities of other Asian countries. Australia and India have &lt;a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/newsroom/china-s-assertiveness-and-us-uncertainty-are-pushing-india-and-australia-closer-on-defence"&gt;deepened&lt;/a&gt; their collaboration through expanded intelligence-sharing and joint military exercises.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/11/ai-race-china-us/689439/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: The future of AI is not China&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But leaders in the region must tread carefully. They all have close trade links to China and can’t risk alienating their vindictive neighbor. Akio Takahara, an expert on diplomacy at Tokyo Woman’s Christian University, told me that Chinese leaders actively “try to disturb any attempt by other countries to link up.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Ironically, the more powerful China becomes, the more necessary the U.S. is as a counterweight. Flake told me that although there is “acute concern about the reliability of the United States,” policy makers in Australia still view this alliance as crucial to the country’s security—and “there is no clear Plan B.” Instead, they are “striving to get the United States back to where the United States has been.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The fact that the U.S. is still indispensable in Asia indicates the extent of Xi’s failure to dominate the region. Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy has delivered Xi a chance to expand Chinese influence at America’s expense, but the Chinese leader’s heavy-handed pursuit of power has ultimately left the door open for a U.S. revival in his own backyard. Instead of treating his neighbors like imperial subjects, Xi might consider letting Chinese artists participate in the Gwangju Biennale next time and enjoy the party.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Michael Schuman</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/michael-schuman/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/OlQKNxcRD57AlD33cRxI69V_U_s=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_17_APEC_Curtain_Raiser/original.jpg"><media:credit>Maxim Shemetov / AFP / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">‘We Simply Cannot Trust This Belligerent Neighbor’</title><published>2026-11-17T09:51:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-17T11:55:47-05:00</updated><summary type="html">China’s ruthless pursuit of regional power may be backfiring.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/11/apec-china-us-xi-jinping/689462/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689113</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Introduction by Sophia Grace Carter&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;I&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;n September&lt;/span&gt;, the photojournalist Lynsey Addario traveled to Venezuela with &lt;em&gt;Atlantic &lt;/em&gt;staff writer Anne Applebaum. They arrived in a country devastated by back-to-back earthquakes in June and still reeling from the U.S. military operation that had toppled its president, Nicolás Maduro, in January. Drawing on her reporting there, Applebaum argues in &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;’s&lt;em&gt; &lt;/em&gt;December issue that the Trump administration has revived a familiar form of Yankee imperialism, laying claim to Venezuela’s oil troves with little regard for the interests of its people. Addario’s images capture the head-spinning transformations under way—and how some citizens are chafing against the new political order and others are attempting to preserve some semblance of normalcy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/2026/12/trump-oil-venezuela-exploitation/689033/?utm_source=feed"&gt;From the December 2026 issue: Anne Applebaum on what the U.S. is really doing in Venezuela&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Addario has covered nearly every major global conflict of the past two decades—the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the genocide in Darfur, the civil wars in Libya and Syria, Russia’s incursion into Ukraine. But she began her career in Latin America at 21, traveling through the region with her camera. In 2002, she documented the aftermath of a failed coup attempt against the regime of Hugo Chávez, Maduro’s predecessor,&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;and,&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;in 2024, for this magazine, she photographed a group of &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2024/09/darien-gap-route-migrants-panama/679156/?utm_source=feed"&gt;migrants crossing the Darién Gap&lt;/a&gt;, many of them Venezuelan. Nearly 8 million Venezuelans—about &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://unric.org/en/far-from-the-headlines-one-in-four-venezuelans-have-left-the-country/"&gt;25 percent of the population&lt;/a&gt;—have fled the country over the past decade. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On this year’s trip, she witnessed the circumstances that have driven that exodus. Once the richest country in South America, Venezuela now suffers from the world’s highest inflation rate, driven by a quarter century of political fracturing, corruption, economic mismanagement, and U.S. sanctions. Though the country possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves—more than 300 billion barrels—electricity shortages are a fact of life, and many Venezuelans live in poverty amid crumbling infrastructure. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;When the earthquakes struck in June, the government’s ineffectual response left citizens to fend for themselves. The tremors killed at least 6,500 people; injured more than 16,800; and left about 17,000 homeless. In La Guaira, the city hardest hit, government rescue workers didn’t show up for days, so residents and volunteers mobilized to deliver aid on their own, turning schools into makeshift shelters and opening soup kitchens.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Heeding the war photographer Robert Capa’s dictum that “If your pictures aren’t good enough, you’re not close enough,” Addario often spends time talking with her subjects before photographing them, trying to understand their life and circumstances. These conversations can be fraught, and Addario told me that she sometimes becomes the target of her subjects’ anger and frustration. But she can also serve as an outlet for them. In La Guaira, where she encountered people digging through the wreckage with their bare hands in search of the bodies of the missing, she sensed that some were grateful to have their loss memorialized. Months had passed, and they were still there searching. By photographing them, Addario hoped she might help ensure that “they don’t feel like it’s all been forgotten.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;— &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/author/sophia-grace-carter/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Sophia Grace Carter&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-bleed"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/H6jQbrnk-tSJiR-WgJukeqd6Knw=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/a202609010_15822_KBG/original.jpg" width="1600" height="1067" alt="a202609010_15822_KBG.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/a202609010_15822_KBG/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405433" data-image-id="1867649" data-orig-w="8256" data-orig-h="5504"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Jeanpier Bolívar, 34, and Juan José Meléndez, 27, pull in a nearly empty fishing net on Lake Maracaibo, a brackish estuary where oil extraction began more than a century ago. The lake is South America’s largest body of water—and its largest environmental disaster. Local fishermen say their catches have dwindled as pollution has worsened, and some resort to rinsing their crabs and shrimp with gasoline to remove the crude oil. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/JlSefdrKY3JBckbHSnI3K_YAQaE=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/a202609010_16178_KBG/original.jpg" width="665" height="443" alt="a202609010_16178_KBG.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/a202609010_16178_KBG/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405434" data-image-id="1867650" data-orig-w="7846" data-orig-h="5231"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;A thick sheen of petroleum coats the lake’s surface. More than two decades of neglect have left its waters poisoned by leaks and spills, and dotted with ghostly drilling platforms.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/QqCuw7h8HMXDYRS_BtnzfkEp3h8=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/a20260909_04299_KBG/original.jpg" width="982" height="655" alt="a20260909_04299_KBG.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/a20260909_04299_KBG/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405432" data-image-id="1867648" data-orig-w="8256" data-orig-h="5504"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;The oil industry has generated enormous wealth, even as many of the people living in the shadow of its pumps and refineries remain mired in poverty. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure class="full-bleed"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/w5sEpBM9C0sEWC8BmuiYoDEVrc8=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/a20260909_10724_KBG/original.jpg" width="1600" height="1067" alt="a20260909_10724_KBG.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/a20260909_10724_KBG/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405428" data-image-id="1867644" data-orig-w="8256" data-orig-h="5504"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Residents gather on a street in the city of Maracaibo during a rolling blackout. Though Venezuela has the world’s largest proven oil reserves, the country’s deteriorating electrical grid causes regular power outages lasting six to eight hours.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure role="group" class="full-bleed"&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/fk9GIqD9n_qiE-Da0O4BDC5uhX0=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/a202609010_16649_KBG/original.jpg" width="665" height="443" alt="a202609010_16649_KBG.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/a202609010_16649_KBG/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405426" data-image-id="1867642" data-orig-w="8256" data-orig-h="5504"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/x7jWwQ-XyIbSmBSv9ozXmEBmvmQ=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/a202609010_16627_KBG/original.jpg" width="665" height="443" alt="a202609010_16627_KBG.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/a202609010_16627_KBG/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405427" data-image-id="1867643" data-orig-w="8256" data-orig-h="5504"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;A street market in Maracaibo in September. Skyrocketing inflation has driven up the cost of basic goods; prices sometimes change from one day to the next.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/0x7LCkTox4djc7Zc_6hU-Awttyg=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/11/20260908_03326_KBG_1/original.jpg" width="665" height="443" alt="20260908_03326_KBG (1).jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/11/20260908_03326_KBG_1/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14442341" data-image-id="1871845" data-orig-w="8256" data-orig-h="5504"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Venezuelans ride on public transportation in La Vega. The neighborhood was once a stronghold of Hugo Chávez, who ruled Venezuela from 1999 until his death in 2013. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/2b7yzx3jTpNLSv15pEyssoi3NEA=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/a20260908_03779_KBG/original.jpg" width="982" height="655" alt="a20260908_03779_KBG.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/a20260908_03779_KBG/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405431" data-image-id="1867647" data-orig-w="8256" data-orig-h="5504"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;A boy plays in an alley in La Vega. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure class="full-bleed"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/MnC3QbAlITI21EhSowPBpdQGv9c=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/a20260907_01388_KBG/original.jpg" width="1600" height="1067" alt="a20260907_01388_KBG.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/a20260907_01388_KBG/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405438" data-image-id="1867654" data-orig-w="8256" data-orig-h="5504"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Venezuelans were still searching for the bodies of loved ones amid mountains of brick and concrete in La Guaira in September, more than two months after back-to-back earthquakes devastated the region.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/LO0KLau4UrKKmnw3u-B-q6D5ijA=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/a202609013_22397_KBG/original.jpg" width="982" height="655" alt="a202609013_22397_KBG.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/a202609013_22397_KBG/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405436" data-image-id="1867652" data-orig-w="8256" data-orig-h="5504"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Women pray during an open-air Mass at the Basílica de Santa Teresa in Caracas. The church was damaged by the June earthquakes and declared unsafe to enter. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure class="full-bleed"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/azFW9w-AoQLWdwKvbfnaaw9wZBc=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/a202609011_19477_KBG_1/original.jpg" width="1600" height="1023" alt="a202609011_19477_KBG (1).jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/a202609011_19477_KBG_1/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405429" data-image-id="1867645" data-orig-w="7937" data-orig-h="5075"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Venezuelan security forces barricade streets leading to Miraflores, the presidential palace in Caracas, as protesters demand the release of political prisoners. More than 320 remained incarcerated as of late October.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/c3ppPwQOHGdU1vukGUeYou5sopk=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/a202609011_18540_KBG/original.jpg" width="665" height="449" alt="a202609011_18540_KBG.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/a202609011_18540_KBG/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405430" data-image-id="1867646" data-orig-w="7894" data-orig-h="5335"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;A woman dressed as the Statue of Liberty bound in chains faces a line of Venezuelan security forces during a demonstration in Caracas.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/8Omj1rKgrF63iXpNL4U9_gPoOcE=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/a20260908_03986_KBG/original.jpg" width="665" height="443" alt="a20260908_03986_KBG.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/a20260908_03986_KBG/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405435" data-image-id="1867651" data-orig-w="7500" data-orig-h="5000"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Anti-American graffiti in Caracas evokes decades of tension between Venezuela and the United States, even as Washington exerts growing influence over the country’s pliant interim government.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;</content><author><name>Lynsey Addario</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/lynsey-addario/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/SBRIZcK4ZTGb0BgGQ2h1bg84U3w=/0x656:8071x5196/media/img/mt/2026/10/a20260908_03583_KBG/original.jpg"><media:credit>Lynsey Addario for The Atlantic</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The Hollowing of the Venezuelan State</title><published>2026-11-17T09:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-17T17:52:50-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Photographs of a collapsing economy, a decaying oil industry, and citizens left to fend for themselves</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/11/venezuela-maduro-oil-earthquake-intervention/689113/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689439</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;Nathan Chen, a teenage&lt;/span&gt; tech prodigy, was a leading innovator at Moonshot AI, one of several top Chinese labs that have sparked fears in Silicon Valley that China is gaining ground in the race for AI supremacy. But last month, Chen posted on X that he had left the Beijing-based company. He is now at Discovery Loop, a new Palo Alto–based AI start-up with a growing stable of high-profile talent.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Perhaps Chen sensed that the most exciting advances in AI were not happening in China—despite the fact that the technology’s rollout in the United States has lately looked more troubled than ever. Newly empowered Democrats, ushered to midterm victories thanks in part to public opposition to data centers, are calling to rein in construction plans. A sex scandal, possibly also a spy scandal, at Nvidia—a U.S. chipmaker that has almost single-handedly enabled the AI boom—has cost Jensen Huang, its former chief executive, his job; fomented turmoil in U.S. financial markets; and plunged the entire AI economy into crisis.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But China still appears to be falling behind. Chinese AI firms are short of chips they need—a problem that Huang’s downfall might well make worse—and they can’t raise enough capital to compete with their wealthy American rivals. Public resistance to the potentially job-killing technology seems to be growing, and the security-obsessed Communist Party, which has been bullish on the potential for AI to fix China’s mounting economic challenges, has lately appeared wary of the threats it might pose to the party’s grip on power. This attitude shift could further hamper AI’s progress in the country.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Proponents of the emerging technology argue that AI will bring societal benefits—boosting economic productivity, fast-tracking scientific advances, and strengthening military capabilities. China’s leaders have touted the technology as crucial to the country’s continued rise, and tech executives and national-security experts in the United States have framed the pursuit of AI as an existential race for technological dominance, a winner-takes-all competition between the two countries that will determine the global balance of power. Some analysts question whether the geopolitics of AI are so neatly zero-sum, but if advances do end up conferring a decisive strategic advantage to the country that best harnesses these tools, then China’s leaders should be worried.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;Anthropic’s initial public&lt;/span&gt; offering, scheduled for this week, demonstrates the kind of access to capital that American firms enjoy and their Chinese competitors can only dream of. Anthropic is expected to raise more than $90 billion from its Nasdaq debut and direct sale of stock to investors, including Google and Microsoft. By comparison, a Chinese start-up known as &lt;a href="http://z.ai/"&gt;Z.ai&lt;/a&gt; raised &lt;a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-07/china-s-openai-rival-zhipu-debuts-in-hk-after-558-million-ipo"&gt;$558 million&lt;/a&gt; as the country’s first generative-AI firm on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, in January, and an additional &lt;a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-14/z-ai-s-cash-burn-drives-alibaba-like-hong-kong-fundraising-spree"&gt;$9 billion&lt;/a&gt; in two subsequent share offerings. The story is the same when it comes to paying customers. Anthropic posted revenues of more than $16 billion in the first half of 2026, compared with &lt;a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-31/z-ai-sales-miss-estimates-after-china-s-ai-price-war-weighs"&gt;Z.ai’s $142 million&lt;/a&gt;. The business model preferred by Chinese firms will make it hard to close this gap. Most offer their standard models open-source, which means the tech is free to use and update, and sell access to their most advanced models. But in China’s crowded AI sector, fierce competition for customers is driving down fees. Earlier this month, the Chinese tech giant Alibaba tapped Li Jiaqi, a livestreamer and beauty influencer known as the “Lipstick King,” to pitch &lt;a href="https://www.citynewsservice.cn/articles/shanghaidaily/news/chinas-lipstick-king-sells-ai-for-one-cent-this-double-11-pk8veran"&gt;a temporary promotion&lt;/a&gt; in monthly membership fees for the company’s AI productivity platform, from 28 yuan down to .01 yuan—or .0015 cents.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/2026/11/jensen-huangs-icarus-complex/689393/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Matteo Wong: A $5.7 trillion face-plant&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Chinese firms are also at a serious disadvantage in computing power. Washington has imposed export restrictions on Nvidia’s most advanced chips to China, and China’s own chipmakers have yet to make a product that matches their power. Chinese companies have tried to evade these controls by tapping cloud services and data centers outside the country and smuggling in banned Nvidia chips. But Huang’s extramarital affair with an alleged Chinese spy will likely lead to the closure of at least some of these loopholes. Alice Huang, the woman at the center of the Nvidia scandal (no relation), was a top executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore-based cloud-computing firm that has been under investigation by the U.S. federal government for illegally funneling Nvidia chips to China. Lawmakers from both parties have &lt;a href="https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/jensen-huang-affair-revives-push-for-chip-restrictions-on-capitol-hill-b0500089"&gt;announced plans&lt;/a&gt; in recent days to add measures tightening restrictions on chip exports to the defense package currently stalled in Congress.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Chinese labs have demonstrated that they are able to build competitive AI models with less money and computing power than their U.S. rivals. But the advantages that America’s AI sector has in funds, infrastructure, and chips promise to compound over time. Chinese companies appear to have responded to this resource gap by devoting their energies to building lower-cost products for a wider user base, rather than trying to make the most intelligent cutting-edge models. “I don’t actually think at any point over the past two years that Chinese companies have been trying to beat the U.S. on intelligence,” Kendra Schaefer, a partner at the research firm Trivium China who specializes in Chinese AI, told me. “It has not been part of the strategy at all, because they know they can’t win.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Chinese AI engineers have instead set their sights on where they can aggressively compete. For example, China’s massive manufacturing base would seem to grant an advantage in developing embodied AI for operating robots and other hardware. But here, too, technology from America is leading the way. Last month, Wang Xingxing, the CEO of Unitree, a top Chinese developer of humanoid robots, &lt;a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-23/unitree-founder-now-expects-robots-breakthrough-as-soon-as-2028"&gt;gushed about&lt;/a&gt; the capabilities of OpenAI’s newly released ChatGPT-6 Astra model for advancing the movements and actions of intelligent machines.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;China might also seem to have an edge over the U.S. when it comes to the speed with which individuals and companies are adopting the technology. The Chinese government has an ambitious plan to spread AI through every aspect of its economy and society by 2035, and surveys find that Chinese people are far more optimistic than Americans about AI. This has raised concerns in the U.S. that China is doing a better job of realizing gains from the new technology. But Martin Chorzempa, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, has found that in practice, American companies are integrating AI into their operations more extensively than Chinese companies, which means they “are able to get a lot more out of it,” he told me. He added that there is “zero” evidence that AI is spreading faster and deeper in China.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;China’s leaders seem to have also grown warier of AI and the risks it could pose to the country’s political and economic stability. Beijing’s spy chief, Chen Yixin, &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/14/world/asia/china-ai-security-risks-anthropic.html"&gt;recently called&lt;/a&gt; for greater regulation of AI to prevent China’s adversaries from using the technology to spread misinformation or to launch cyberattacks on critical Chinese infrastructure. But Chinese authorities appear just as nervous about more prosaic uses of the technology.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A recent editorial in the &lt;i&gt;People’s Daily&lt;/i&gt;, the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, criticized some popular AI-generated videos that imagined a romance between two beloved characters from classic Chinese literature as “malicious alterations that ridicule heroes.” Chinese social-media companies &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/29/world/asia/china-ai-videos-sun-wukong-lin-daiyu.html"&gt;duly scrubbed&lt;/a&gt; the short films from their platforms—in keeping with a wider government ban on AI-generated content that, in the eyes of the state, distorts Chinese history and culture and threatens to manipulate public opinion. In a country where the government seeks to control the national story, even the most innocuous AI creations can seem ominously subversive and worth suppressing.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Public anxiety about AI’s effect on jobs is also spreading, which may pose some obstacles on Chinese companies that hope to use the technology to increase productivity and cut costs. One of the country’s most popular chili-sauce brands, Lao Gan Ma, &lt;a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202610/27/WS6ae05098e4b06d4aa0565043.html"&gt;came under fire&lt;/a&gt; last month after the company’s chief quality officer credited AI with reducing product-defect rates and increasing revenues. These comments &lt;a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/lao-gan-ma-faces-backlash-over-ai-automation-claims-company-denies-mass-layoffs"&gt;quickly circulated&lt;/a&gt; online, along with reports that the technology had allowed Lao Gan Ma to lay off hundreds of workers—a claim that the company has denied. Some consumers have responded by calling for a boycott of the sauce. As one commenter wrote: “Their layoff is our future.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/2026/09/china-ai-panic-doomerism/688761/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Liza Lin: China has no use for AI doomerism&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Despite efforts to encourage companies to adopt the technology, China’s leaders are also clearly worried about related job losses. The government released new guidelines last month for beefing up job training and support for workers displaced by AI. These new provisions also allow regulators to weigh the potential job losses from AI-related ventures that require state approval, such as an expansion of robotaxis, suggesting that the government may intervene to prevent large-scale layoffs. AI is meant to help companies become more productive by allowing them to cut staff, yet China appears willing to sacrifice some of these benefits if it means preserving the social order. In the U.S., the fragmented regulatory landscape for AI gives companies, developers, and employers a great deal of latitude for exploiting the technology’s benefits.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;Perhaps the very idea &lt;/span&gt;that China and the United States are engaged in a high-stakes race for AI dominance misunderstands the situation. China might simply be claiming a role in AI that the country has taken in so many other industries: as a low-cost producer, offering sufficiently capable services at cheap prices that complement rather than rival the superior products sold for higher fees in the U.S. As in other industries, the demand for AI products at both the high and low end should be strong.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But if China’s government continues to block American AI models from operating in the country, these seemingly symbiotic market niches won’t end up serving the Chinese people, who will be largely doomed to the exclusive use of their country’s inferior products. If the Communist Party seeks to control what Chinese AI companies get to use and how they get to use it, then the United States will enjoy a monopoly not only on superior AI but also on the freedom to make the most of it.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Michael Schuman</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/michael-schuman/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/08bXX4Frch43xQ5GXs07AblLCvg=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_11_China_mpg/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by Matteo Giuseppe Pani / The Atlantic. Source: Getty.</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The Future of AI Is Not China</title><published>2026-11-16T08:37:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-16T10:57:16-05:00</updated><summary type="html">The Nvidia scandal will create only more hurdles for Chinese labs.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/11/ai-race-china-us/689439/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689417</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;Jensen Huang’s abrupt departure from Nvidia, following revelations of an affair with a woman, Alice Huang, whom U.S. intelligence officials believe to be a Chinese-intelligence asset, should force a fundamental rethinking of America’s AI strategy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Jensen Huang was not just the CEO of the world’s most important semiconductor company. He was also one of Donald Trump’s closest and most influential advisers on AI. Huang persuaded Trump to abandon his initial embrace of export controls, arguing that U.S. technology firms should compete in China. He persistently argued that AI is more akin to electricity than a weapon and that warnings about AI safety were wildly overblown—a view that Trump fully internalized.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In the coming months, Congress will scrutinize every aspect of the scandal. Among these are the Commerce Department’s suspension of its investigation into Megaspeed, the Singaporean company that Alice Huang was a director of; the failure to crack down on China’s extensive chip-smuggling operation in Southeast Asia; Nvidia’s financial contributions to Trump’s pet projects, such as the White House ballroom; and China’s possible illicit influence over other business leaders in America.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/2026/11/jensen-huangs-icarus-complex/689393/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: A $5.7 trillion face-plant&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The scandal comes at a moment of deep national dissatisfaction and anxiety about AI, and it is likely to reinforce public concerns that the companies developing this technology are given too much influence over how it is governed. In the recent midterm elections, candidates promising restrictions on data-center construction made significant gains. &lt;a href="https://darioamodei.com/post/we-must-pace-the-frontier"&gt;Dario Amodei&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="https://x.com/sama/status/2098811563415150910?lang=en"&gt;Sam Altman&lt;/a&gt;, the heads of Anthropic and OpenAI, respectively, have warned that new models could come with tremendous risk and suggested that the companies should “pace the frontier.” Hardly a week passes without news of unprecedented cyberattacks, some of which are powered by AI. In July, for example, autonomous agents undergoing safety testing at OpenAI escaped their sandbox and hacked into the systems of Hugging Face, another AI company.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;America’s conundrum is this: The United States must stay ahead of China, but it also has to take safety seriously. The answer is not to accelerate development or to seek a grand bargain with Beijing, but to strengthen export controls. Stronger controls will help preserve America’s lead, creating the room to slow down development and ensure that new models are rigorously tested before they are released.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Winning the race with China has become a one-size-fits-all excuse for business executives to advance their company’s interests and reject calls for regulation of any kind. Politicians have also fallen into this trap. In September, Senator Ted Cruz &lt;a href="https://x.com/politico/status/2098117210296156663"&gt;told&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;Politico&lt;/em&gt;, “If they’re going to be killer robots, I’d rather they be American killer robots and not Chinese killer robots.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Geopolitics are a poor excuse for doing something irrational. But to &lt;a href="https://www.asiafinancial.com/nvidias-huang-says-chinas-military-cant-rely-on-us-tech"&gt;say&lt;/a&gt;, as Huang did, that who wins the race doesn’t really matter is equally wrong. In April, Anthropic announced that it had developed a model called Mythos, which gave users extremely advanced cyberattack capabilities. Rather than releasing Mythos to the public, Anthropic worked with the Trump administration to set up Project Glasswing, which gave the top U.S. companies access to the model for cyberdefense, so that they could plug their gaps as quickly as possible. If China or any other state had developed Mythos-like capabilities first, it would not likely have shared the model with U.S. companies, which would have been left exposed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Several senators have proposed a tempting solution: The United States should negotiate a comprehensive arms control with China to pause or slow down AI development. Altman has &lt;a href="https://fortune.com/2026/09/12/trump-xi-jinping-nobel-peace-prize-us-china-treaty-ai-development-openai-sam-altman/"&gt;said&lt;/a&gt; that such a deal would be easy for Trump and Xi Jinping to agree to. But this is a fantasy. Verification would be extremely difficult. China would likely see the pursuit of such an agreement as a U.S. attempt to lock in a lead. In a recent &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/14/world/asia/china-ai-security-risks-anthropic.html"&gt;statement&lt;/a&gt;, the head of the Ministry for State Security, China’s intelligence services, made clear that China sees AI competition with the United States in adversarial terms. That doesn’t rule out talks and coordinated actions to address specific safety risks, but it does mean that a grand bargain is extremely unlikely.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Taking safety seriously is impossible if the AI developers continue at full throttle. The models are close to being able to improve themselves, a capacity that could dramatically accelerate technological progress beyond the ability of humans to evaluate and control it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That’s why the United States needs to strengthen its export controls and double down on safety in the lead time that gives it over China. Although China is working hard to develop its indigenous chip-manufacturing capability, it is still struggling. In June 2025, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick &lt;a href="https://www.rev.com/transcripts/lutnick-testifies-on-budget-request"&gt;testified&lt;/a&gt; to Congress that China produces only about 200,000 advanced chips annually, a tiny number compared with what it needs. Chips are the one advantage that the United States has over China, and Washington needs to capitalize on this.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Much of China’s progress appears to have depended on access to American AI models. Chinese companies have used distillation, a technique whereby a less capable model is trained by a more powerful one, allowing it to duplicate some of those capabilities quickly. In February, Anthropic &lt;a href="https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-preventing-distillation-attacks"&gt;revealed&lt;/a&gt; that DeepSeek, Moonshot, and MiniMax had generated more than 16 million exchanges with Claude through approximately 24,000 fraudulent accounts to extract its capabilities. The company later &lt;a href="https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026"&gt;uncovered&lt;/a&gt; an even larger operation by Alibaba, involving more than 150 million exchanges designed to improve its Qwen models. In September, the FBI and the NSA &lt;a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-251a"&gt;warned&lt;/a&gt; that Chinese laboratories were using large-scale distillation to acquire American AI capabilities at a fraction of the cost of developing them independently.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As we now know from the Nvidia scandal, espionage also likely plays a role. Huang knew more than any other individual about who was getting advanced chips. Access to that information could have proved invaluable to a foreign actor. The AI labs are also very vulnerable to spying. Last month, federal prosecutors &lt;a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/saudi-national-arrested-installing-surreptitious-audio-recording-device-openai"&gt;charged&lt;/a&gt; a Saudi national employed at OpenAI with installing a covert recording device. The labs’ crown jewels are model weights—the mathematical parameters that encode what the models have learned. If a foreign intelligence service steals those weights, it could acquire capabilities that the labs spent years developing. The U.S. government needs to significantly increase counterintelligence cooperation with the labs and other companies doing work that pertains to U.S. national security.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/11/nvidia-china-ai-regulation/689387/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: The scandal is bigger than Jensen Huang&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Ensuring adequate safety of new AI models depends on slowing the race, not just between the U.S. and China, but also among the American labs. AI engineers and experts have been discussing how to do this. One of the leading &lt;a href="https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/dBrGqjYxmidRaLLCr/how-to-pace-the-us-frontier"&gt;ideas&lt;/a&gt; is to require the labs to reallocate their computing power, devoting far less of it to research and development and far more to customer service and safety. This would slow the pace of development—and it could be done within parameters that allow the United States to stay ahead of China, and the AI companies to maintain their profitability.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;President Trump has spent much of the past two years bullying some of America’s closest and oldest allies, and his posture has hardly generated confidence in Washington’s stewardship of AI. America’s Five Eyes allies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) had to wait months before gaining access to Mythos to improve their private-sector cyberdefenses. These and other traditional allies will surely worry that an American president may use powerful AI against them. Trump is unlikely to assuage these fears, but the new Congress can begin to lay the foundation for a new AI alliance that lays down criteria for access to chips, computing infrastructure, and frontier models, and proposes restraints and assurances for how the United States will use powerful AI.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;One lesson of the Jensen Huang scandal is that policy makers gave extraordinary influence to technology executives whose commercial interests did not always align with American interests. His departure offers a rare opportunity to rethink the assumptions that have underpinned AI strategy for the past two years, address mounting concerns about the technology, and establish a new approach that protects both American AI leadership and public safety.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Thomas Wright</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/thomas-wright/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/bmQZbLk1ZBaLgP2Od7lpdG3B-sg=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_12_america_needs_to_rethink_ai_race_2266450939/original.jpg"><media:credit>Benjamin Fanjoy / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The Jensen Huang Scandal Should Change Everything</title><published>2026-11-12T16:35:14-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-12T17:10:33-05:00</updated><summary type="html">America needs a new approach to AI.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/11/nvidia-affair-chips-china/689417/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689387</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;Although the full Nvidia story is still emerging, the most alarming revelation may not be that Jensen Huang, America’s most influential AI executive, was involved with a suspected Chinese spy. It may be that senior administration officials were warned about the danger and nevertheless continued relying on him to guide the United States’ technological future. American strategy has come to depend, to an extraordinary degree, on powerful private-sector actors whose incentives the government cannot simply assume will align with the national interest.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In May 2025, Huang was &lt;a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/a-timeline-of-nvidia-ceo-jensen-huangs-suspected-spy-drama-05cbebf3"&gt;photographed&lt;/a&gt; dining in Taipei with Alice Huang, the alleged Chinese Ministry of State Security asset with whom he had a romantic relationship. This past May, President Trump flew to Beijing to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping. In flight, Secretary of State Marco Rubio &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/10/us/politics/trump-china-trip-nvidia.html"&gt;reportedly&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/11/09/politics/trump-jensen-huang-spy"&gt;briefed&lt;/a&gt; Trump on the intelligence. But that shocking information did not stop Trump from bringing Jensen Huang on the trip or treating him as a key adviser.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At a refueling stop in Alaska, Huang rendezvoused with the delegation. He chatted with Elon Musk in a cabin usually occupied by the president’s senior aides. On the table in front of Huang sat the White House–branded chocolates given out to guests: &lt;a href="https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0278/3841/4901/files/tweet-2055139121216053360.png?v=1778821838"&gt;Hershey’s Kisses&lt;/a&gt;. When the group arrived in Beijing, Huang &lt;a href="https://static01.nyt.com/images/2026/11/10/multimedia/10dc-trump-huang2-qjgf/10dc-trump-huang2-qjgf-superJumbo.jpg?quality=75&amp;amp;auto=avif"&gt;emerged&lt;/a&gt; from the plane to walk the red carpet alongside Trump, Rubio, and other top officials, a powerful symbol of Huang’s closeness to the president and his influence on the administration’s China and AI policy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/2026/11/jensen-huang-chinese-spy/689357/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: A scandal at the center of the economy&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p dir="ltr"&gt;Trump’s instinct was to stand by his man. The revelations did not shake the president’s apparent conviction that Nvidia’s leader was indispensable. But as of this writing, &lt;em&gt;The Wall Street Journal&lt;/em&gt; has &lt;a href="https://www.wsj.com/business/nvidia-is-preparing-to-oust-nvidia-ceo-jensen-huang-30f421ad?mod=hp_twoviz_pos_1"&gt;reported&lt;/a&gt; that the Nvidia board may be preparing to oust Huang. The administration is facing major questions about its handling of the issue: &lt;a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-11-09/nvidia-intervened-in-us-probe-of-megaspeed-chip-smuggling"&gt;Bloomberg&lt;/a&gt; has reported that in late summer 2025, Nvidia’s general counsel contacted senior Commerce Department officials about the company’s investigation into Megaspeed, and lower-level Commerce employees faced unusual restrictions on how they could pursue inquiries involving Nvidia. Asked on Sunday whether he should have acted on the warning, Trump replied, “No, I don’t think so.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Huang is what we might call a “double dove.” He famously &lt;a href="https://www.wsj.com/opinion/jensen-huang-is-wrong-about-china-f58c1a5b"&gt;said&lt;/a&gt; the “China hawk” label was a “badge of shame.” When the CNN anchor Fareed Zakaria asked Huang if it matters whether the United States or China wins the AI race, he said, “I don’t think it does.” Similarly, Huang dismisses warnings about catastrophic AI risks. These views contrast with those of Anthropic’s Dario Amodei, who is a “double hawk,” seeing China as a crucial national-security threat and warning that AI could pose an existential risk to humanity.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Both men insist that their positions reflect their understanding of American national interests and AI’s future. But their disagreements also align with their commercial interests. Nvidia profits from selling chips to as many customers globally as it can, and Huang has lobbied against American restrictions on the sale of advanced AI chips to China. By contrast, Anthropic benefits from keeping Chinese firms as far behind the frontier as possible. Ironically, the two men’s businesses are intertwined. Anthropic, like many other leading AI developers, uses Nvidia chips.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The AI race is generally understood as a competition among firms and between nations, but it is also a battle of ideas. At its center is what I have called the dream of “&lt;a href="https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2026/11/05/the-dream-of-ai-primacy/"&gt;AI primacy&lt;/a&gt;”: the conviction that advanced AI could give the United States a permanent advantage over its rivals, restoring an era of unchallengeable American dominance. But that vision depends on the questionable assumption that technological power accumulated by American companies can be reliably converted into power exercised by the American government.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;American and Chinese leaders speak of two rival technological systems, but those systems are in fact not entirely separate. They are interdependent, entangled through the movement of technology, capital, information, and people. Beijing has officially refused to import the large quantities of Nvidia chips that the Trump administration has approved for sale—but Megaspeed and similar companies operate on a business model that demonstrates how reliant Chinese AI firms remain on computing power from abroad. Some use data centers in Southeast Asia to get around U.S. restrictions. Silicon Valley executives, for their part, talk of a zero-sum race between America and China even as American AI companies &lt;a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/features/whos-ahead-in-the-global-ai-talent-race"&gt;rely&lt;/a&gt; on talent from China. These interdependencies create economic opportunities but also avenues for espionage, coercion, and manipulation. And the more the AI race depends on sprawling networks of companies, customers, and governments, the more influence accrues to the handful of individuals who sit at their intersection.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/democrats-ai-midterms-regulation/689320/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Rogé Karma: Democrats have no coherent plan for AI&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Technological supremacy and national power do not always pull in the same direction. A remarkably small circle of executives and officials make the decisions that will shape AI’s future and the geopolitical competition around it. The power of these individuals is fast escaping the reach of the institutions responsible for guarding against technological and geopolitical risks. &lt;a href="https://www.theinformation.com/articles/jensen-huangs-yearslong-ties-alice-huang-enabled-nvidia-chip-sales-china"&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Information&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; suggests that Alice Huang exploited her access to Jensen Huang to help Chinese companies obtain billions of dollars’ worth of Nvidia chips. Meanwhile, the Commerce Department &lt;a href="https://www.ft.com/content/afb6c960-a910-4d67-9588-73ba3bea5b06?syn-25a6b1a6=1"&gt;reportedly&lt;/a&gt; delayed action against Megaspeed, even as other agencies pressed for restrictions. &lt;em&gt;Axios&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.axios.com/2026/11/11/bessent-lutnick-megaspeed-nvidia-china-chips"&gt;reported&lt;/a&gt; that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent confronted Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick last week about why Megaspeed had not been added to a government list of restricted entities, following months of interagency warnings about the company.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The unanswered questions now extend well beyond the affair itself: Did the relationship influence Nvidia’s commercial decisions, causing the company to allocate products to Megaspeed rather than American firms? Did Nvidia’s political influence compromise the government’s ability to enforce its own rules?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some leaders of the AI race speak as though their inventions will allow humanity to transcend its limitations—and perhaps give one country power over all others. Yet the people guiding this transformation remain vulnerable to the oldest weaknesses of human nature: ambition, vanity, fear, greed, desire. The era they are making is defined by the collision between superhuman ambitions and human frailty.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The lesson of this scandal is not simply that these people are fallible. It is that we need institutions capable of checking their influence and managing the consequences of their mistakes before these individuals become too powerful to be held accountable.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;em&gt;*Illustration image sources: Joel Saget / AFP / Getty; Feng Li / Getty; Finn Gomez / Getty; Sean Gallup/Getty. &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Julian Gewirtz</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/julian-gewirtz/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/bbIaoDRADTATew0ltY9cP4Mq8BA=/media/img/mt/2026/11/Jensen1/original.png"><media:credit>Illustration by Paul Spella / The Atlantic*</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The Scandal Is Bigger Than Jensen Huang</title><published>2026-11-12T07:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-12T11:56:13-05:00</updated><summary type="html">No business executive should have so much political power that they can’t be held to account.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/11/nvidia-china-ai-regulation/689387/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689386</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;No one can mistake me for a supporter of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, or an apologist on his behalf. Over the years, I’ve published hundreds of articles criticizing him and warning of the great damage he has caused to Israel. My criticism only grew stronger after October 7, 2023, when my entire family was almost murdered under his watch.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Still, in conversations with American friends who share my dislike for Netanyahu, I often find myself rejecting and correcting one line of criticism: “Netanyahu is just like Trump.” The two populist leaders are close in age and share a similar style of politics, but until recently, they were also separated by a major difference, one that Netanyahu, to my mind, deserved credit for: Unlike Donald Trump, he was not an election denier. When he won—and he did, most of the time—he took the win. But when he lost, he didn’t try to throw out the votes of the Israeli people in order to remain in power.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Sadly, this distinction between Trump and Netanyahu no longer holds. Over the past two weeks, Trump has more or less accepted his party’s crushing defeat in the U.S. midterm elections (apart from one social-media post, which I’ll touch on in a moment), while Netanyahu has refused to respect the results of Israel’s election last month and has tried to overturn them in ways that resemble the U.S. president’s role in stoking the events of January 6, 2021.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This is something new. When Netanyahu lost reelection in 1999, after his first term as prime minister, he accepted defeat without challenging the foundations of Israeli democracy. He did the same when he led the Likud party to its worst-ever result, in 2006. After his return to power in 2009, he won two more elections, but in 2019 and 2020, he failed three times to win a majority in a series of deadlocked elections. In none of these elections did he try to dispute the results, even though they were uncomfortable for him.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The gap that once existed between Netanyahu and Trump was most obvious in 2021. In the first week of that year, Trump’s refusal to accept Joe Biden’s victory, and his cries of a stolen election, paved the way for an armed insurrection. Netanyahu lost power six months later, when Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid succeeded in creating Israel’s short-lived “government of change.” Unlike Trump, he didn’t deny the results or incite his supporters to question the legitimacy of the election. Instead, he moved to the opposition benches of the Knesset and staged a comeback the following year, when the Bennett-Lapid government collapsed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some fellow Netanyahu critics would point out, correctly, that when Netanyahu lost power in 2021, Biden was in the White House, and therefore any attempt to stage an illegal power grab would have run into strong headwinds from Washington. This is true, but until recently, I believed that even without the threat of a harsh American rebuke, Netanyahu still would have done the right thing and allowed for a peaceful transition of power. The events of the past weeks have convinced me otherwise.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On Monday, Trump put up a social-media post in which he questioned for the first time the validity of the midterm results. America mostly shrugged. For now, the president has shown no sign of the dangerous urgency with which he disputed Biden’s victory in 2020. Trump’s original response to the Republican Party’s collapse—he distanced himself from the results (“I wasn’t on the ballot”), blamed specific lawmakers for their losses, and said that the Iran war was worth the electoral shellacking—seems more authentic than his rant about how wrong the polls turned out to be.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Israel, however, faces a real crisis that has received relatively little coverage by American media, which has been singularly focused on the midterms.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This crisis began in the days leading up to the October 27 election, when public-opinion polls predicted that Israel’s Arab citizens, who make up approximately 20 percent of the country’s population, would be voting in historically high numbers. In the previous election, in 2022, just over half of Arab Israeli voters cast a ballot, while just over 70 percent of the overall voting population did. The parties representing the Arab population won only 10 seats out of the Knesset’s total of 120.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Before this year’s election, Yousef Makladeh, the top pollster surveying Israel’s Arab population, estimated that approximately 70 percent of Arab Israelis would vote this time, and that the parties representing them would receive at least 17 seats. Because the seats in the Knesset are allocated to parties based on their proportion of the vote, Makladeh’s prediction (which ended up being too cautious) meant that the bloc of parties supporting Netanyahu—his own Likud party, the ultra-Orthodox parties, and the far right—had no chance of winning a majority as it did in 2022.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/tel-aviv-israel-democracy-liberal/689229/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Gal Beckerman: The bursting of the Tel Aviv bubble&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On Friday, October 23, four days before the election, Israel’s Channel 12 aired a news report stating that Likud was preparing to dispute the results of the election with unfounded claims of widespread irregularities in Arab cities and villages. Israel doesn’t allow early voting of any kind, except for diplomats stationed abroad and soldiers serving on remote bases—which means that this news item was broadcast before a single vote had been cast in any Arab polling station anywhere in the country.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Netanyahu’s party “is examining a list of possible complaints regarding irregularities in the Arab vote, ahead of election day and afterwards,” the report said. “These include women voting with veils, voting hours in Bedouin communities, and the ages of election workers at the polls.” The same report also noted that Likud and Religious Zionism—a far-right party in the pro-Netanyahu bloc—“will dispatch 2,000 election-integrity overseers to polling stations in the Arab sector.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Just as Trump’s claims of fraud in 2020 began appearing before the election and intensified once it became clear that he had lost, Netanyahu was laying the groundwork for a similar scenario. But unlike Trump, he found willing accomplices within the very institutions tasked with protecting the integrity of the election.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On the morning of the election, hours before the polls opened, the Israeli police announced that it had arrested three activists affiliated with the United Arab List, one of the two main parties representing Arab voters, on suspicion of “election bribery.” The statement included grainy photos of envelopes that were found in the activists’ homes, supposedly containing thousands of shekels that were meant to be distributed to citizens in Arab towns in return for their votes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Netanyahu’s campaign pounced on the news, bombarding the airwaves and social media with angry and apocalyptic statements about an attempt to steal the election. My &lt;em&gt;Haaretz &lt;/em&gt;colleagues Bar Peleg and Omer Benjakob calculated that Netanyahu published or shared more than 70 posts on election day warning of the high Arab turnout and the threat of the election being stolen.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Eleven years ago, during Israel’s 2015 election, Netanyahu tried to energize his base by publishing a panicky video statement in the middle of election day, warning that “Arab voters are heading to the polling stations in droves.” That video was strongly criticized at the time by the Obama administration, Democrats in Congress, and parts of the American Jewish community, leading Netanyahu to issue a rare apology after the election and host several Arab lawmakers in his office for a lengthy conversation on the needs of their constituents.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Compared with the bluntly racist content that he shared on this year’s election day, the 2015 video looks like a polite infomercial. “Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood are storming the polling stations and stealing the election,” he wrote in one post. “You have to watch this,” he wrote in another, sharing a video showing Muslim women with their faces covered outside a polling station in southern Israel. Three hours before voting ended, a journalist thought to be close to Netanyahu reported that Likud had filed more than 700 complaints about “irregularities” in the Arab sector with Israel’s Central Elections Committee.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/10/israeli-election-benjamin-netanyahu/689143/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Graeme Wood: Netanyahu goes into full panic mode&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;When the dust cleared on the morning of October 28, two things became obvious. First, that the Arabs had indeed arrived “in droves” this time, breaking every previous record and securing an unprecedented 19 seats for their political parties. Second, that Netanyahu’s campaign had been effective, to a point: His scaremongering drove up turnout in Likud strongholds, bringing the party to a surprisingly positive result of 27 seats.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Even so, Netanyahu has no path to forming a government. The Zionist parties that oppose him won 48 seats (one is held by my father, who ran as part of Naftali Bennett’s “Together” list). Combined with the 19 seats that the Arab parties won, this would be more than enough to keep Netanyahu very far from any possibility of assembling a coalition.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But instead of recognizing the results and accepting the fact that his bloc of parties had shrunk from 68 seats in the outgoing Knesset to only 53 in the new one, Netanyahu doubled and then tripled down on the stolen-election narrative, just as the Channel 12 report before the election had predicted he would do.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The place to watch this campaign of lies take hold in real time was Channel 14, the country’s most pro-Netanyahu television outlet. When Trump denied the results of the 2020 election, Fox News largely cooperated with his unfounded claims, specifically the conspiracy theory involving voting machines (which ended up &lt;a href="https://apnews.com/article/fox-news-dominion-lawsuit-trial-trump-2020-0ac71f75acfacc52ea80b3e747fb0afe"&gt;costing&lt;/a&gt; the network hundreds of millions of dollars). Channel 14 played a similar role for Netanyahu, with endless broadcasts about the “stolen election” and the use of the term &lt;em&gt;polling-sites terrorism&lt;/em&gt; to describe the Arab public’s participation in Israeli democracy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In some ways, Channel 14 went even further than Fox. After all, in 2020, the Fox News Decision Desk, led by the analyst Arnon Mishkin, first placed Arizona in Biden’s column, ruining Trump’s plan to declare victory on Election Night before most votes had been counted. Channel 14’s pollster, by contrast, continued to show the pro-Netanyahu bloc winning a majority for long hours on election night, even when all other Israeli channels were predicting the exact opposite. When the final results resembled those channels’ exit polls and not Channel 14’s prediction, a useful explanation emerged: The Arabs had cheated and stolen the election.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A dramatic headline came out two days after the election: Israel’s Shin Bet, the intelligence agency responsible for, among other things, protecting Israeli democracy, was investigating an alleged attempt by a foreign country to influence the election by bolstering the Arab parties. The investigation began before election day but was made public only after the results had been published.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The current head of the Shin Bet is David Zini, a former general with close ties to those in Netanyahu’s orbit. He was handpicked for the job by the prime minister despite having no prior intelligence background, and despite being opposed by almost every living former chief of the organization. Zini has faced public criticism over the fact that one of his brothers has been charged with smuggling goods worth hundreds of thousands of shekels into Hamas-controlled areas of Gaza.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On election day, Zini gave a short statement at the headquarters of the Central Elections Committee, alongside Noam Sohlberg, a conservative supreme court justice who serves as the head of the committee. Zini said that the election had been “safe, proper, and supervised,” seemingly contradicting Likud’s claims of widespread irregularities. But a day later, he met Netanyahu and presented to him raw intelligence pointing to the possibility of foreign intervention on behalf of the Arab parties. According to &lt;a href="https://www.mako.co.il/news-israel-elections/2026/Article-f20924b38b881a1027.htm#main_article=1"&gt;reports&lt;/a&gt; in the Israeli media, only after sharing the information with Netanyahu did Zini update Sohlberg on his explosive suspicion.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Sohlberg gave Zini a formal letter permitting the Shin Bet to broaden its investigation into the allegations. Shortly afterward, that letter was leaked to the media, and was immediately followed by a bombastic Likud statement that the elections had been “stolen by Arab parties that support terrorism.” Netanyahu’s party accused the Arab parties of using “bribery, violence, threats, and cheating” to alter the election results. Never before in Israel’s history had a political party—certainly not the ruling one—issued such severe allegations against its political rivals.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Likud ministers and members of the Knesset quickly began demanding that the election be nullified altogether. Netanyahu stopped short of this but shared several videos on social media calling to annul the results and hold a new election instead. This message was then repeated endlessly by Channel 14 and other pro-Netanyahu media outlets. Netanyahu’s far-right allies, such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, also joined the call.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On January 6, 2021, the U.S. Capitol Police stopped an insurrectionist mob from taking over Congress and derailing the election-certification process. Federal and state judges played key roles in blocking Trump’s attempts to overturn the election with fake electors and other schemes. Last but not least, Trump’s vice president at the time, Mike Pence, refused to go along with the real-life plot against America.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/2026/11/biden-trump-democracy-elections/689343/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Joe Biden: What Trump did on January 6 ‘should follow him to his grave’&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In Israel, the plot fell apart once the courts and the attorney general got involved. The case against the three activists who were arrested on election day, supposedly on their way to deliver envelopes full of cash to potential voters, collapsed within days, when a judge pressed the police for evidence and discovered that little to none existed. The activists were released to house arrest and later had all restrictions removed. Multiple Israeli news outlets reported that the tip that had led to their arrest came directly from Netanyahu’s chief of staff, bypassing the chain of command in order to manufacture dramatic headlines just before the polls opened.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Shin Bet investigation has also run into a dead end. Zini’s original suspicion, as presented to Justice Sohlberg, involved tens of millions of shekels that had supposedly been funneled to Israel’s Arab parties illegally. However, he has been able to show only one suspicious transfer of funds, to a retiring lawmaker, worth several hundred thousand shekels. The allegation is notable and must be investigated, but it is a far cry from the headlines that conquered the national agenda two weeks ago, when Sohlberg’s letter authorizing an investigation was published.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Israel’s attorney general and a senior police team that has been tasked to work with the Shin Bet on this investigation remain highly skeptical of Zini’s claims and, more crucial, of his motives. After igniting a public firestorm, Zini has so far failed to present any evidence to back up his accusations. Sohlberg, a religious justice who lives in a West Bank settlement and is respected by both liberals and conservatives in Israel, announced last week that the investigation will have no impact on the election results—and indeed, last week the Central Elections Committee officially ratified them. On Tuesday, a new Knesset was sworn in, including the 19 lawmakers from the Arab parties.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Netanyahu failed, but his fight is not over. He still hopes to remain in power and force another election on Israel. He’s likely counting on internal conflicts to sink the so-called change bloc, which now has a clear majority in the Knesset, but is divided over ideological questions. By peddling lies about a stolen election, the prime minister is trying to erode the legitimacy of any political cooperation between the Zionist opposition and the Arab parties. That way, he can discredit the results, even without having them overturned.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Amir Tibon</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/amir-tibon/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/baCRccUtm7axtrfaeiq9aRLFbkQ=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_11_12_Israels_January_6_Moment_Amir_Tibon/original.jpg"><media:credit>Erik Marmor / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Netanyahu’s January 6 Moment</title><published>2026-11-12T07:00:00-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-12T07:01:57-05:00</updated><summary type="html">Disputing the results of an election is a new low for the Israeli prime minister.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/11/netanyahu-election-denial-israel/689386/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689370</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;F&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;or more than a decade,&lt;/span&gt; Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has relied on fear to throttle dissent in India. It has jailed protesters, deployed a &lt;a href="https://www.thenewsminute.com/news/how-indias-media-lost-its-nerve-and-its-money-under-pm-modi"&gt;pliant media&lt;/a&gt; to vilify critics, and fanned the flames of &lt;a href="https://caravanmagazine.in/politics/the-bjp-and-delhi-police-hand-in-the-delhi-violence"&gt;communal violence&lt;/a&gt;. This year, that playbook appears to have lost its efficacy. Discontent has grown, and Modi’s power no longer seems unassailable.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The first signs of this change emerged over the summer. Tens of thousands of young people thronged Delhi to demand that India’s education minister resign. They had come of age in a country where public education was &lt;a href="https://caravanmagazine.in/education/nep-2020-higher-education-student-protest-pradhan"&gt;crumbling, &lt;/a&gt;economic growth &lt;a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/why-indias-rapid-economic-growth-is-not-translating-into-prosperity-for-all-4197625"&gt;favored&lt;/a&gt; the rich, and jobs were &lt;a href="https://thediplomat.com/2026/08/india-has-a-complex-youth-unemployment-problem-and-there-isnt-a-quick-fix/"&gt;scarce&lt;/a&gt;. They had little patience for news channels perceived to be government mouthpieces—they even &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/lapdog-media-indian-reporters-caught-youth-protest-anger-2026-07-24/"&gt;heckled&lt;/a&gt; several reporters out of their demonstrations.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The summer’s young demonstrators mounted &lt;a href="https://thewire.in/rights/posters-delhi-youth-protests-cockroach-janata-party-jantar-mantar"&gt;posters&lt;/a&gt; and circulated cheeky &lt;a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/25/indias-youth-protesters-are-fighting-modi-with-irreverent-humour-and-memes"&gt;memes&lt;/a&gt; and slogans that took direct aim at the prime minister. When police &lt;a href="https://caravanmagazine.in/politics/defiance-chaos-repression-cjp-sansad-march"&gt;attacked&lt;/a&gt; one of their marches with&lt;a href="https://caravanmagazine.in/politics/defiance-chaos-repression-cjp-sansad-march"&gt; pellet guns, tear gas, and shock batons&lt;/a&gt;, the violence stoked public indignation that swelled the movement’s ranks. Modi then tried to endear himself with the digital-age protesters: He implored them to stand down in an &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-modi-turns-instagram-woo-young-voters-after-gen-z-protest-2026-08-06/"&gt;Instagram selfie video, and his colleagues from the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party &lt;/a&gt;delivered &lt;a href="https://www.newindianexpress.com/india/2026/Jul/28/fomo-delulu-nda-mps-use-gen-z-phrases-during-lok-sabha-debate-on-anti-paper-leak-bill"&gt;speeches&lt;/a&gt; peppered with youthful slang, such as &lt;em&gt;delulu&lt;/em&gt; and &lt;em&gt;clock it&lt;/em&gt;. These efforts just earned the BJP more &lt;a href="https://theprint.in/opinion/viral-spiral/bjps-gen-z-instagram-outreach-has-flopped-friends-are-cringing/3002918/"&gt;mockery&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The police have used force against protesters before, but the effects were very different. In 2019, the BJP championed a discriminatory citizenship law; demonstrations erupted, and the police used brutal means to crush them, including abetting and even participating in &lt;a href="https://caravanmagazine.in/politics/the-bjp-and-delhi-police-hand-in-the-delhi-violence"&gt;communal violence&lt;/a&gt;. The following year, the government announced sweeping agricultural reforms. Farmers who protested that these favored giant corporations faced a violent crackdown. In neither case was the popular outrage as widespread as it was this summer. That is likely because those past protests were associated with the Sikh and Muslim communities, which the BJP and its supporters had effectively maligned, playing into and deepening long-standing prejudices.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/india-modi-cockroach-janta-party/689183/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Why India is erupting&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;By contrast, this summer, many of those demanding the education minister’s resignation came from privileged Hindu families—the very constituents that the prime minister and his party count on for support. The government therefore couldn’t target them with as heavy a hand. The movement culminated in the education minister’s ouster. Right-wing provocateurs and media outlets—aided, in several instances, by police officials and BJP supporters and politicians—singled out &lt;a href="https://newlinesmag.com/argument/the-cockroach-movements-careful-silence-over-hindutva/"&gt;Muslim&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g43l251vyo"&gt;female&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href="https://www.queerbeat.org/stories/200-complaints-across-14-districts-in-keralam-bjp-mahila-morcha-targets-trans-woman-over-modi-comments/"&gt;queer&lt;/a&gt; protesters for retaliation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This fall saw the development of a new protest movement in the capital, centering on the denial of a fundamental democratic promise: the right to vote. Since 2025, millions of names have been struck from India’s voter rolls in a revision process that has raised many questions. At stake, Anjali Bhardwaj, an activist, told me, “is the very soul of India’s electoral democracy.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Those agitating against the assault on the franchise repurposed some of the same &lt;a href="https://www.instagram.com/reels/DbAl3q9TvAu/"&gt;rallying cries&lt;/a&gt; from the summer protests—for instance, “&lt;em&gt;Jab Jab Modi darta hai, police ko aage karta hai&lt;/em&gt;,” or, “Whenever Modi feels the heat, he sends the police onto the streets.” And the government again turned to repression. Security forces detained thousands of people carrying out flash protests, beating many and confronting others with legal charges. But many citizens now see these tactics less as a show of strength than as an admission of fear. The new movement has not been extinguished, and opposition political parties have come out to show their support.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At the same time, other, mostly unrelated protests have erupted or continued in different parts of the country. Since January, workers in at least 10 states have staged a &lt;a href="https://caravanmagazine.in/labour/workers-strike-wave-india"&gt;reported&lt;/a&gt; 275 strikes. In October alone, tribal residents from a village in Madhya Pradesh &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/rising-waters-flood-homes-temples-villagers-protest-indias-87-billion-river-2026-10-12/"&gt;lay&lt;/a&gt; on mock funeral pyres to protest an $87 billion river-linking project that has displaced them; scores of protesters in Mumbai demanded accountability from a public university over &lt;a href="https://thewire.in/education/harsh-punishments-humiliation-berating-parents-the-tyranny-of-professor-doolla-at-the-heart-of-iit-bombay-student-suicide"&gt;allegations&lt;/a&gt; that a student who died by suicide faced caste discrimination there; and students at another public university, in Delhi, successfully &lt;a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/jamia-18-day-protest-women-organised-mobilised-hunger-strike-10943278/"&gt;agitated for&lt;/a&gt; the restoration of a long-defunct students’ union. In Arunachal Pradesh, &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/india-deploys-extra-forces-after-protests-over-dam-chinese-border-escalate-2026-10-27/"&gt;protesters&lt;/a&gt; are resisting a mega-dam project that they say will submerge more than two dozen villages. All of these demonstrations have been met with major police pressure, much of it violent, and persisted in spite of it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“A million mutinies are now finally coming to the fore,” Praveen Donthi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, told me. Intimidating opposition members—“labeling people anti-national, anti-development, all that”—once worked to undermine such movements’ confidence, Donthi said. “That is not working now.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The government has yet to recover from the blow that the summer protests dealt its image, according to Neha, the national president of the left-affiliated All India Students’ Association. (Neha goes by only their first name and uses &lt;em&gt;they/them&lt;/em&gt; pronouns.) “The young people who have been part of these protests don’t really believe in the invincible aura of the prime minister at all,” Neha told me. “If anything, he has been acting as a wonderful source of memes and jokes and satire, and that has been the extent of his contribution to the young generation.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;T&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;his fall’s protest movement has its roots&lt;/span&gt; in an administrative process that began more than a year ago. In June 2025, just before contentious assembly elections in several states, India’s election commission announced that it would revise the country’s voter rolls. India has a process for this, called an Intensive Revision, and it has been done eight times in the past. But this Special Intensive Revision (as it was called) was different. The process was hurried and lacked transparency. Unlike past &lt;a href="https://theprint.in/india/governance/all-of-the-eight-past-sirs-upped-the-electorate-why-this-is-the-only-time-voter-numbers-shrank/3071676/"&gt;revisions&lt;/a&gt;, the SIR shrank the electorate, and not by a little: It struck 130 million names from the rolls.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Many of those deleted had died, moved to another constituency, were registered to multiple polling stations, or could not be found by enumerators. But the effects of the revision could not be explained solely by such cases. For example, the Sabar Institute, a public-policy-research organization, &lt;a href="https://x.com/SabarInstitute_/status/2076906556713816212"&gt;reports&lt;/a&gt; that about 70 percent of the 2.7 million voters deleted from electoral rolls in West Bengal after their cases were flagged for adjudication were Muslim, and more than half were women. In one constituency where Muslims made up 20 percent of the population, they accounted for 95 percent of the deletions, Sabir Ahamed, who co-leads the Sabar Institute, told me. A category called “logical discrepancies” excluded voters for inconsistencies in their names across different documents, or for arbitrary criteria such as an insufficient age gap between them and their parents.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“What followed was the greatest disruption of the electoral process India has ever seen—barring election boycotts and a rigged election in Kashmir in 1987,” the political scientist Gilles Verniers &lt;a href="https://caravanmagazine.in/politics/manipulating-voter-rolls-democracy"&gt;wrote&lt;/a&gt; in June. West Bengal held its state election shortly after the SIR concluded, and the BJP &lt;a href="https://www.reporters-collective.in/trc/wb-chief-minister-lied"&gt;campaigned&lt;/a&gt; on the specter of so-called illegal infiltrators from Bangladesh. It won in a landslide.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;People cut from the electoral rolls have not been disenfranchised only from voting. In West Bengal, the government also denied welfare entitlements to deleted voters, even though the supreme court had earlier clarified that the SIR was not a test of citizenship. And although a process for redress does exist, access to it is inequitable. In at least a few regions, a two-tier system allows enumerators to mark certain people as “VIPs” who can then sidestep the cumbersome process that those from less privileged backgrounds are forced to undergo to restore their name to the rolls.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Activists and journalists have raised questions about who decided to undertake this SIR with such haste and why. In the summer of 2025, Bhardwaj, the activist, filed a request for documents that could furnish these details under India’s Right to Information Act. In September, she received a note from the election commission &lt;a href="https://www.thenewsminute.com/news/who-decided-on-nationwide-sir-ecs-rti-response-raises-questions"&gt;indicating&lt;/a&gt; that it had not made the decision to undertake the SIR. But as far as she knew, the commission was the only body constitutionally empowered to do so. If it hadn’t chosen to revise the voter lists, then who had? “This raises a huge question on the constitutionality of the exercise and on the independence of the election commission itself,” she told me.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The SIR brought renewed scrutiny to a commission already dogged by &lt;a href="https://caravanmagazine.in/government/taming-election-commission"&gt;allegations&lt;/a&gt; of partisanship in favor of the ruling BJP. Then, in a series of &lt;a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/express-exclusive/election-commission-sir-14-objections-gyanesh-kumar-sukhbir-singh-sandhu-vivek-joshi-10889737/"&gt;investigations&lt;/a&gt; published this fall, &lt;em&gt;The Indian Express&lt;/em&gt; found that Gyanesh Kumar, the chief election commissioner, had made several SIR decisions unilaterally, in contravention of a requirement that the three-member body make all decisions by consensus. “Gyanesh, it’s done, bro,” became a &lt;a href="https://www.thestatesman.com/entertainment/bollywood/its-done-bro-how-salman-khan-became-the-unlikely-author-of-indias-most-popular-protest-slogan-1503647593.html"&gt;popular refrain&lt;/a&gt; on social media, riffing on a viral &lt;a href="https://x.com/BeingSalmanKhan/status/2080294472773259296"&gt;tweet&lt;/a&gt; from a Bollywood star who had called on protesters to stand down over the summer. A loose coalition began to mobilize, including the Cockroach Janata Party—the pressure group that led the demonstrations in July—together with several left-wing student organizations, the Indian National Congress, and other opposition parties.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;B&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;y early October, multiple organizations&lt;/span&gt; were calling for mass demonstrations to demand Kumar’s resignation and the withdrawal of the SIR. On October 10, when one such protest was to be held, central Delhi became a fortress, its streets lined with police barricades and patrolled by more than &lt;a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/delhi-news/delhi-turns-into-fortress-ahead-of-cjp-protest-jantar-mantar-40-000-security-personnel-deployed-no-internet-eci-cec-gyanesh-kumar-101791571036535.html"&gt;40,000&lt;/a&gt; police officers and paramilitaries. Hotels and guesthouses were &lt;a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/cec-resignation-delhi-gears-up-for-cjp-protest-10913242/"&gt;directed&lt;/a&gt; to not take any fresh bookings; liquor stores were ordered shut. About 50 metro stations were &lt;a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/cjp-jantar-mantar-protest-full-list-of-45-stations-shut/articleshow/134846958.cms"&gt;closed&lt;/a&gt; and more than &lt;a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/all-trains-to-new-delhi-nizamuddin-stations-cancelled-on-oct-10-4-am-2-pm-cjp-protest/article71562934.ece"&gt;200 trains&lt;/a&gt; were canceled, and internet service was &lt;a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/mobile-internet-blackout-4-km-radius-central-delhi-10-pm-tonight-10914440/"&gt;suspended&lt;/a&gt; around Jantar Mantar, Delhi’s most famous protest site.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I walked around the area with a colleague that morning. The quiet was eerie. Loudspeakers on street corners played prerecorded announcements about the orders in place &lt;a href="https://x.com/DCPNewDelhi/status/2106287957649080789"&gt;barring&lt;/a&gt; “unauthorized gatherings, public speeches, shouting of slogans.” The only people listening were journalists and security personnel.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We realized soon after that protesters trying to reach the site were being detained. At one point, we recorded the Delhi police dragging a young man into custody. A flank of officials obstructed our movement and insisted that we needed accreditation from the government press office, although our press cards were prominently displayed. Later that day, another police official in another part of central Delhi directed a group of his female colleagues to push me away when I asked him a question. He called journalists “reel makers” who were “only there to disrupt police work.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The state had learned from its missteps in July. And so the police opted for a quieter strategy this time, picking up protesters before they could congregate and dragging them onto buses. My colleagues and I met several detainees who &lt;a href="https://caravanmagazine.in/government/delhi-police-violence-sir-protests"&gt;recounted&lt;/a&gt; being assaulted away from the public gaze, often in the vehicles that ferried them to distant holding centers, where they were kept for hours. More than 7,000 people were reportedly &lt;a href="https://x.com/PTI_News/status/2108918425242497389?s=20"&gt;detained&lt;/a&gt; on October 10 alone. About two dozen journalists were detained that day; the number had &lt;a href="https://cpj.org/2026/10/at-least-43-journalists-detained-several-assaulted-while-covering-protests-against-indias-election-chief/"&gt;nearly doubled&lt;/a&gt; by October 11. The pattern continued in the days that followed, as flash protests broke out across the city. Meanwhile authorities forbade the use of Jantar Mantar as a designated protest site. Leaders from the movement, including Neha, were kept in custody for periods ranging from one night to several days. Some were asked to sign &lt;a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/neha-bora-refuses-to-sign-peace-bond-questions-curbs-on-dissent/article71619599.ece"&gt;documents&lt;/a&gt; that would effectively bar them from joining protests.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And yet, many citizens continued to show up daily. “I would not even, for a second, count this as the victory of a state. If anything, I would count it as the victory of the people outsmarting the police and the entire system,” Neha told me.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I talked with Naureen Sabba, a 26-year-old activist with the Revolutionary Workers’ Party of India who has participated in several protests since she moved to Delhi in 2023. The current movement, she acknowledged, was struggling to expand beyond committed activists and political workers. She pointed to two limiting factors: police dispersal and the loss of Jantar Mantar as a gathering place. “Common people, ordinary students, they are coming,” Sabba insisted. “However, they are coming in scattered groups, because the surveillance and repression of the state are so much that they are not even able to stand together in one place.”  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2025/02/modi-nationalism-demagoguery-limitations/681094/?utm_source=feed"&gt;From the February 2025 issue: Narendra Modi’s populist facade is cracking&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Sabba conjectured that the state’s repression would ultimately backfire. “Think of a spring,” she said. “You can keep pressing it down, pushing it further and further. But there comes a point when, the moment you let go, it recoils with tremendous force. The harder you push it down, the stronger it bounces back.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Donthi, of the International Crisis Group, told me that the protests have had an effect on the Modi government. “The SIR, the process, there is no doubt that it’s problematic, even in the minds of BJP supporters, which has led to a crisis of credibility for Indian democracy itself,” he said.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;For the moment, however, the movement remains somewhat inchoate and largely confined to the capital. Ajay Gudavarthy, an associate professor of political science at Jawaharlal Nehru University, told me that he had recently traveled to the southern states of Telangana and Tamil Nadu and was struck by the lack of widespread outrage against the SIR. “Those who are in, they are not bothered; and those who are deleted—it’s become an administrative issue,” he said. The demonstrations risk being perceived as a conflict among political forces seeking power, Gudavarthy noted, unless opposition parties can link the SIR deletions to matters of social welfare.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I asked Ahamed, from the Sabar Institute, why West Bengal hadn’t seen widespread protests despite the scale of disenfranchisement there. Since the BJP came to power in that state, Islamophobic attacks have risen and the party’s critics have been intimidated into silence, he said. “Even I, after the SIR, couldn’t speak here. Whatever talks and speeches I am giving are outside Bengal. I have started censoring myself, despite being an educated, well-connected researcher.” Ahamed said this was because of his Muslim identity and the fact that the BJP was accusing deleted voters of being infiltrators who should be deported.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The issues at hand, Ahamed cautioned, are urgent. If the SIR is not reversed, the next general election, in 2029, might be a foregone conclusion: “We can say who will win.”&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Nikita Saxena</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/nikita-saxena/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/BoQkevrCcRZLUDzSN0WNdUQEoaQ=/media/img/mt/2026/11/2026_10_24_India_Protests_Dispatch_Nikita_Saxena/original.jpg"><media:credit>Manish Swarup / AP</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Modi Is Facing ‘A Million Mutinies’</title><published>2026-11-11T10:26:36-05:00</published><updated>2026-11-11T12:37:35-05:00</updated><summary type="html">The crackdown on India’s protests has looked less like a show of force than an admission of fear.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/11/modi-india-cockroach-party/689370/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689229</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;N&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;o one talks about the left in Israel &lt;/span&gt;anymore. The label itself is essentially a curse word, something spat out by an angry taxi driver after he’s swerved around a guy on a scooter. A measly 12 to 15 percent of Israelis identify as such. But democracy has a much better reputation, at least in cosmopolitan, beachy Tel Aviv, which is maybe why the leftmost party running for parliament in this week’s election gave itself the name the Democrats.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A liberal ethos lives here, alongside excellent coffee, delicious salads, and fashion boutiques. The city has been the epicenter of protest against Benjamin Netanyahu’s government over the past four years. Itamar Ben-Gvir, Netanyahu’s far-right interior minister, has taken to calling it “the state of Tel Aviv,” and its population of tech workers, baristas, and academics “anarchists”—enemies whose openness threatens the purer Jewish state he dreams about.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The state of Tel Aviv, not exactly an inaccurate sobriquet, girded itself for the election this week and then got battered. The results can’t be called anything other than inconclusive. Cobbling together a new governing coalition, for either Netanyahu or his main opponent, Gadi Eisenkot, looks near-impossible. But Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc got 53 seats to the 48 for Eisenkot’s “change” bloc, and this was far from the win much of Tel Aviv expected and badly needed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I’ve heard the same refrain over and over this week. How could voters possibly elect Netanyahu again? After October 7. After the abandonment of the hostages. After the corruption. After his naked pursuit of power at all costs. The lies. The racism. And, in the days before the election, the proud embrace of the country’s increasing isolation. &lt;em&gt;The world economy wants to boycott us? Fine&lt;/em&gt;, he said. &lt;em&gt;We’ll shift to crypto&lt;/em&gt;. After all that. But there is also all the energy the city has put into rejecting Bibism (a shorthand as useful and yet nondescript as &lt;em&gt;Trumpism&lt;/em&gt;). Starting with the protests against the proposed changes to the judicial system after Netanyahu took power in 2022 and then the struggle to free the hostages in Gaza, Tel Avivians are so accustomed to protest that most have a kit ready with all they need (flag, water bottle, running shoes) for the Saturday-night gatherings that have become a ritual. Many of them are exhausted, and they expected this election to be a vindication.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/israel-netanyahu-eisenkot-election/689223/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Israel’s latest last chance to save itself&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I’ve spent the past week in Israel, speaking with people in Tel Aviv. The shock they are experiencing is twofold. First is the confirmation of their minority status in the country. Despite being the center of Israel’s economy and its cultural life, Tel Aviv seems even more isolated after this election, even more an exception, more set apart in its values and dreams—and getting ever smaller. “This is a blow, and it will be hard to pick up from this point and understand what the next steps are,” Oded Leshem, a political psychologist at Hebrew University and the author of &lt;em&gt;Hope Amidst Conflict&lt;/em&gt;, told me. Others spoke of a moral disappointment in the country. “It should have been a landslide,” one distraught tattooed waiter said at a wine bar near Rabin Square.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But another realization is quickly dawning. Perhaps the biggest story of the election was the success of the Arab parties. They managed to win 19 seats by bringing out voters in numbers never seen before. I experienced the enthusiasm personally the day before the election, standing on the outskirts of Abu Ghosh, an Arab Israeli village near Jerusalem, as people commuted to work. I was with canvassers trying to get out the vote, and for two hours, women in hijabs and large sunglasses and men in pickup trucks rolled down their windows to yell out that everyone they knew was going to vote—their brothers, mothers, grandfathers—and that something had to change. The village ended up having a 78 percent turnout, up from 55 percent in 2022. The anti-Arab policies of Netanyahu’s government had triggered a backlash. One Arab Israeli man in Jaffa told me that a Palestinian friend in the West Bank from Jenin, a man who can’t vote, had called him to make sure he cast a ballot, if only to help stop the settler violence. Every other election had only elicited cynicism from his Palestinian friends.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Looking at the numbers, Eisenkot does have a path to leading a government, but only if he includes the Arab parties in his coalition. Their 19 seats and his 48 add up to a robust 67. This will not be an easy marriage, because most of the Jewish parties in his bloc have vowed to never join a government with Arab parties. This resistance is not based in racism, or not &lt;em&gt;only&lt;/em&gt; in racism: Some of the Arab parties are openly anti-Zionist; they include a Palestinian right of return in their platforms; and even the most acceptable and pragmatic of Arab Israeli leaders, Mansour Abbas of Ra’am, is unwilling to explicitly &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://worldisraelnews.com/watch-mansour-abbas-still-refuses-to-condemn-hamas-as-a-terror-organization/"&gt;renounce&lt;/a&gt; Hamas as a terrorist organization. That said, I’ve seen commentator after commentator laugh at the idea that the preelection vows of any political party, Jewish or Arab, are rock-solid—Netanyahu, the grand strategist, it’s often pointed out, once flirted with the idea of adding Ra’am to his coalition.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The bigger shift will be a mental one. Israelis who want a liberal democracy can no longer afford to sideline the Arab parties. That was the message Arab Israeli communities sent: If liberal Tel Aviv has any hope of bringing its values to bear on the future of the country, it’s going to need those voters in Abu Ghosh. It’s going to need to see their significant inclusion as part of the democracy they are fighting for, even if this also means reopening arguments about the nature of the Jewish state, Palestinian rights, and the occupation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“You can’t be liberal and deny the Arab Israeli voters,” the screenwriter Avner Bernheimer told me. His film &lt;em&gt;Yossi and Jagger&lt;/em&gt; was a breakthrough in the depiction of gay life in Israel, and he has been one of the leaders of the country’s LGBTQ movement. “Most of them feel a part of Israel. They are Israelis. They work; they are doctors and engineers and architects and business owners. We have to accept the fact that they are not our enemy. They want to be a part of the Israeli project. If liberals keep boycotting them, we will lose to the extreme religious right, the most violent groups, and the cult of Netanyahu.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;T&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;he next few weeks will determine&lt;/span&gt; the shape of Israel’s government. But what may not change is the sense of alienation within the Tel Aviv bubble, the feeling among these Israelis that they might not have a home here anymore.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The stakes are not small. Putting the state of democracy and the worsening situation in the West Bank aside, Israel’s economy largely depends on this demographic. As much as 93 percent of all income-tax revenue comes from just 20 percent of Israel’s workers. And many are already leaving. From 2022 to 2024, according to a government report, Israel experienced a net loss of 140,000 citizens. If highly educated people leave—if they can’t see a future for themselves in a country where they are supporting a mostly unemployed ultra-Orthodox population and sending their children to the army when these religious families are not—then Israel may be headed the way of an impoverished theocracy, forever at war (a “Jewish Iran” is how one commenter put it on election night).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;My cousin Gideon, who fits the profile of Tel Aviv’s professional class (he’s a tech executive who likes good wine), put it bluntly to me: “If Bibi is elected, I’m not sure I’m going to stay here. And it’s enough that 100,000 people like me are leaving, and this country is toast.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The question of staying or going was particularly acute this week in Tel Aviv because about 70,000 Israelis who live abroad had come back to vote. People bumped into friends from Brooklyn or Berlin on Dizengoff Street. On the Sunday before the election, I went to a storytelling evening called Moadon Ktav—think &lt;em&gt;Moth Radio Hour&lt;/em&gt;. It’s a regular event where creative types compete with one another in delivering seven-minute monologues responding to a pair of word prompts. For this particular evening, which drew an audience of 400 young hipsters, the chosen monologuists were Israelis who live abroad, and the chosen words—&lt;em&gt;original&lt;/em&gt; versus &lt;em&gt;translation&lt;/em&gt;, &lt;em&gt;connect&lt;/em&gt; versus &lt;em&gt;disengage&lt;/em&gt;—seemed designed to elicit their most emotional feelings about exile.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The host, who wore aviator glasses and a gold chain, began the evening by asking the audience, “Why so stressed? What’s on the line? Only a country.” Heartbreak was a consistent theme: being caught between two existences, not fully comfortable anywhere. One woman living in Germany lamented that she would never be able to help her daughter with her homework. Another talked about leaving Israel to save his young son from being drafted in the future, only to realize that his child would now be a foreigner to him.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/israel-iran-palestine-khamenei/688959/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Fighting Israel to the last Palestinian&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Liad Mudrik, a professor of neuroscience and psychology at Tel Aviv University, was part of a group of researchers who saw an opportunity in the influx of expat Israeli academics arriving to “save the country,” as she put it. They suggested a mega-conference to take place just before the election, Mind IL—59 simultaneous conferences in different fields, including physics, philosophy, and art, with 5,500 participants, including 2,000 academics living abroad. Mudrik told me that many of these Israelis shared a common experience of feeling both ostracized abroad and ill at ease in Israel. She’s seen colleagues extend a sabbatical year or actively choose to look for work elsewhere. “What worries me is that if Israel doesn’t change its course, many more academics and professionals will decide to leave the country,” she said. “It would have a huge effect on Israel.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The ones who came back to vote did so because they could never &lt;em&gt;not &lt;/em&gt;be Israeli, for better or worse. “I’ve been the Iron Dome of Israel in San Francisco over the past three years,” Hadar Aviram, a law professor at the UC Law San Francisco told me. Students had dropped her classes, and the animal-rights organization where she was doing pro bono work stopped using her as a lawyer. She had no ethical qualms about voting even though she no longer lived in Israel. “My conscience is clear.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;T&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;he intellectual who perhaps most&lt;/span&gt; symbolized this liberal, democratic Israel—who could be deemed the creator of its source text, in a way—was Amos Oz, the novelist, who died in 2018. He expressed the self-effacing values of the kibbutz, took a consistent moral stand against the occupation after 1967, and deeply loved and exalted the secular Hebrew culture that took shape in the cafés of Tel Aviv. His daughter Fania Oz-Salzberger, a historian, continues to promote these ideas, including the necessity of full Arab participation in Israeli political life. That her main method of communication is posting on X, where she regularly tangles with trolls, says something about today’s world.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I met Oz-Salzberger, who has her father’s crystal-blue eyes, at a café on Allenby Street the day before the election. She was nervous. Even a “dead heat,” she said, would indicate “a terrible failure,” because, as she saw it, “the liberal-democratic muscle is being pushed to the max.” She expressed worries I’d been hearing in many of my conversations—about violence, about the degradation of the country over the past four years, about whether her two sons, both studying at Oxford, would choose to come back. But her response was also more combative than I expected.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Oz-Salzberger was done with compromises with the Orthodox and extreme-right parts of Israeli society. After decades of taking part in cross-cultural conversations—including those her father started—she no longer wanted to make nice, she said. “We’re saying to the settlers, we’re saying to the ultra-Orthodox: ‘We’ve played the game long enough. And there is no longer a common denominator between us.’” She told me she had even contemplated the need for a militia to counter the armed settlers on the right. To hear this from the daughter of Amos Oz, in defense of the “humanist Zionism” she still believes is possible, made clear just how much she feels she has already lost.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yishai Sarid, a lawyer and novelist, offered even darker prognostications. Sarid is another scion of what he calls “good old Israel”; his father was Yossi Sarid, a leading figure of the left. “I’ve lived with a feeling of being in a minority since a very young age,” Yishai told me.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In 1974, when Yishai was 9, his father, newly elected to the Knesset, moved the family to the northern border town of Kiryat Shmona and began teaching civics at the local high school. He wanted to express solidarity with the town, where 18 people had just been killed in a terrorist attack, and also to try to “heal the rifts” between the center and the periphery by moving his family to a place where Tel Aviv elites of his sort don’t usually live. (Hezbollah still regularly attacks the town with missiles, but its population just &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/netanyahus-likud-holds-kiryat-shmona-sderot-and-other-communities-hardest-hit-by-war/"&gt;voted&lt;/a&gt; for Netanyahu by nearly 50 percent, an astounding figure given how much it has suffered under him.) The time in Kiryat Shmona was lonely and difficult for Yishai. His father’s politics—especially his early and definite stance on the necessity of making peace with the Palestinians—always made him feel marginal.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The big turning point in Yishai Sarid’s life came in 1995, when Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin was assassinated shortly after negotiating the Oslo Accords. He understood right away that the country would never be the same. For years, he could not bear to walk by what is now known as Rabin Square, where the prime minister was killed. Many of the novels he’s written since explore the darkness that was let loose that day and has come to dominate Israel, as he sees it. &lt;em&gt;The Third Temple&lt;/em&gt;, published in 2015, imagines that the dreams of the religious fanatics have been fulfilled and the Jewish temple in Jerusalem has been restored, along with ritual sacrifice. He laughed when his agent told him that it had been nominated for a science-fiction award.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I asked Sarid whether he thought the country’s religious extremists actually wanted to bring back sacrifice. “Of course they do,” he said. “They’re training for it.” In Jerusalem, he said, religious groups have taken to wearing ancient priestly garments and every Passover rehearsing the ritual slaughter of sheep. He has no doubt that this is where Israel is headed. “The temple,” he said. “Everything leads there.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;F&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;undamentalism and sectarianism have&lt;/span&gt; become the baseline in Israeli society for the past three decades, the reality that the liberal democrats of Israel find themselves pushing back against. The only way to change this dynamic, Itamar Weizman told me, is to change the culture of the left from one of reaction to something “fun, cool, and sexy.” Answer the temple, in other words, with the allure of the Tel Aviv beach.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Weizman is a political activist wunderkind who, at only 34, has had a few careers already—in politics working for various politicians on the left, including Ehud Barak; in business as a venture capitalist and with a start-up focused on climate tech. Five years ago he started a nonprofit called Beit Radical (“Radical House”), a book publisher and an all-purpose community center in an abandoned fish market in an industrial section of south Tel Aviv. The design is brutalist chic: lots of concrete and native plants. There’s a café outside and a nightclub in the basement. A rooftop garden is in the works. Weizman sees his role as making engagement in Israeli society attractive for those who would leave. “I want them not to go to Berlin,” he said. “I want Berlin to come to them.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Weizman showed me around Beit Radical before the election. He moved and talked quickly, emptying ashtrays and picking up dirty coffee cups as we went along. Back in 2015, when he was 21, Weizmen headed a grassroots initiative called V15, through which he attempted to bring community organizing to Israel. Netanyahu tried to ban the group because it was funded in part by foreign nonprofits. Weizman said he shifted his focus to culture. The center hosts multiple events and activities every week, including lectures and concerts.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“I missed the future,” Weizman said. What brings young people to the center—multiple teenagers and 20-somethings told me that Beit Radical was their place—is a desire to feel confident again, to not always be reacting to the right, to begin to think ahead. And, crucially, to smile while doing it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This all sounded great, but I was struck by how homogeneous the young people hanging out at the café smoking cigarettes seemed, and I wondered out loud how Weizman planned to expand beyond the circle of upper-middle-class Ashkenazi Jews who frequent the center. He told me about plans to open up new Beit Radicals in places such as Haifa, which has a large Arab population, and Beer Sheva, a poorer town in the south. This seems a step beyond the bubble, which, given Israel’s demographics, will be necessary if Weizman hopes to move these young people past talking to themselves.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/4ZwqbJSkPZpv8rgpQQTx_HX0okA=/665x434/media/img/posts/2026/10/003A1487/original.jpg" srcset="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/4ZwqbJSkPZpv8rgpQQTx_HX0okA=/665x434/media/img/posts/2026/10/003A1487/original.jpg, https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/2uyv9EUO18eaoZNQy-3G7TwMFzc=/1330x868/media/img/posts/2026/10/003A1487/original.jpg 2x" width="665" height="434" alt="a black and white image of a ban and woman speaking" data-orig-w="4000" data-orig-h="2612"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Vered Adir&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Mili Eshet and Or Schraiber in Asaph Polonsky’s forthcoming film, &lt;em&gt;In Person.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;I chose to watch the election returns at Beit Radical, and, as Weizman promised, the night was indeed joyous—until 10 o’clock. The center’s courtyard was full: A crowd of about 2,000 was loudly singing, jumping up and down, under a glowing sign with a lyric from an old peace anthem, “Bring on the Day.” Rami Fortis, a Billy Idol–ish punk rocker famous since the 1970s, now 72, bald, and wearing glasses, was growling from the stage.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But at 10 o’clock, the election-night broadcast was projected on a stuccoed wall of a neighboring building, and it was as if someone had pressed a mute button on the party.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Unlike in American elections, with their slow drip of state-by-state results, in Israel, exit polls projecting how the votes have been apportioned to the various parties are released all at once. These numbers can turn out to be wrong, but they provide a rough immediate snapshot and begin a battle over the narrative. The first piece of information was that Netanyahu’s Likud party was projected to win 25 seats, which would give him the most votes in the next Parliament (the final number would be 27); no one quite seemed to notice just then how well the Arab parties had done. Within five minutes, the courtyard cleared out. People made for the exit with their heads bowed or glancing back painfully at the screen. In no time at all—only enough to take a few breaths—cautious hope had disintegrated into disappointment.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“It can’t be. It can’t be,” one woman with a pixie haircut was crying into her phone. A shaggy-haired young guy with a mustache, a stranger, put his hand on her shoulder and said quietly, “It happened.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;M&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;any of the Arab Israelis I spoke&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;with&lt;/span&gt; expressed pride in the numbers that came out to vote. And in the current limbo a few days past the vote, as backroom deals are being struck between various parties, they are waiting to see what happens, maybe more than any other demographic in Israel. The 19 seats the Arab parties won has forced a question that the mainstream Israeli political establishment has sought to ignore: How serious is it about Arab integration and shared political power? It’s one thing to point with pride at Israeli democracy (“the only democracy in the Middle East,” detractors are often reminded); it’s another thing to actually hand out ministerial portfolios to Arab citizens. The Arabs I talked with said they have always felt a little gaslit by this democracy talk. Now comes a moment of truth.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This wasn’t entirely expected, and the change bloc still seems to be reeling from the understanding that its only path to power will be doing something dramatic and brave on this particular front. The fight it expected, and the issue largely responsible for getting more people involved in the liberal-democratic cause, was over the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men into the army. Polling data show that 72 percent of Israelis support the idea. (The Arab parties also oppose mandatory conscription to the army, but some, like Ra’am, are open to the idea of a national service program.) The debate over this matter always points back to citizenship, to what an individual owes to society. Now a different but related citizenship question is going to dominate: What does a society owe to its citizens?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/09/israel-secular-religious-divide/688649/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Graeme Wood: Israel can’t postpone its reckoning forever&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The language for talking about Arab Israeli citizenship is already there. You could hear it in the way that Yoav Segalovich, a Jewish former police commissioner, explained his decision to join Ra’am. In an X post, he conjured the image of a hospital. “There, one sheds narratives and identities; there, first and foremost, people meet. Patients, doctors, nurses, administrative staff, families—everyone is equal. That is the place where we are all human beings, and that is where we will begin.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Segalovich is trying to normalize the sharing of political power with Arabs, to bring them into full partnership as citizens, something Israel’s Declaration of Independence demands. In the hours after the results showed a significant majority for the change bloc plus the Arab parties—in other words, a 67–53 majority for ousting Netanyahu—Segalovich declared victory, countering the glumness. “My intention is to break the lines between Arabs and Jews,” he said in an interview just after the results were reported.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Whether the politicians he hopes to share a coalition with feel likewise, and whether Eisenkot is capable of making the case for Arab inclusion, may not depend on idealism— a desire for coexistence, or an appreciation of Arab citizenship. It may demand that Israeli Jews to set aside some of their most deeply held convictions about the Jewish character of the state in favor of realpolitik. Simply put, if Eisenkot and his partners want to lead Israel and oust Netanyahu, then for their own sake, they must join with the Arabs.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I heard this self-interested approach in something that Raef Zreik, the Arab Israeli jurist and scholar, told me in the days before the election. He was generally skeptical that the results would change the lives of Palestinians in Israel or the West Bank, but he did see the possibility of improvement by focusing on pragmatism. Only a priest can look into the inner state of mind of a political actor, he told me. As a Palestinian, he was not going to wait for the hearts of Jewish Israelis to change. More important was whether they could be convinced that change served their own interests. “Sometimes it doesn’t matter what you think; what matters more is the way you act,” Zreik said. If you’re a member of the Ashkenazi Tel Aviv elite and pursuing your own interests, you might feel threatened by extreme-right forces in your own society, he said, and “in order to save yourself, as a side effect, you might want to enlarge the space for liberal individual democratic freedoms along the way.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At least some Israeli Jews are seeing this as an opportunity. President Isaac Herzog will soon have the task of deciding whom to appoint to form a new government: the candidate whose party got the most votes (Netanyahu) or the one who has the greatest potential of forming a coalition (arguably Eisenkot, if he includes the Arab parties). A long list of prominent Israeli legal scholars, former judges, academics, and public intellectuals have signed a petition asking that the president consider what Israel’s Arab citizens have expressed through their vote: a desire to play a full and equal role in the political process. Affirming this desire, they write, could be essential “to the future of democracy and the fabric of Israeli society.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;O&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;n election day, I wandered the shady boulevards&lt;/span&gt; of Tel Aviv, past the kiosks selling espressos and fresh juice. Occasionally, I would check in on Asaph Polonsky, a filmmaker whose movies have been in competition in Cannes. He lives in Los Angeles and had come to Israel to vote, but also to make a feature film called &lt;em&gt;In Person&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/10/israel-election-outcome-possibilities/689184/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Graeme Wood: Israeli election results hazy, try again&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The concept reminded me of &lt;em&gt;Before Sunrise&lt;/em&gt;, the Richard Linklater movie. In Polonsky’s story, Mili and Or, two Israelis, are exes who no longer live in Israel but have returned to vote. They run into each other on the street and begin a conversation that will last throughout the day as they walk the city and end up in Jaffa, where they will watch the election returns together.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Polonsky was filming in Dizengoff Square, at the center of the city’s shopping district, when I caught up with him. The giant fountain there is ringed by photos of hostages and memorials to dead soldiers. Photos of these young people also dangle from the branches of trees bordering the square. Mili and Or sat on a bench arguing. She was worried about raising a child in Israel and was glad to be gone. He has a child and told her that parenting is a worrisome business wherever you are. Polonsky stood behind the camera’s monitor with headphones on. Around him swirled the chaos of Tel Aviv, which seems so vibrant that it’s hard to imagine it ever ending—groups of teenagers taking selfies, canvassers dressed all in pink and yelling at people through megaphones to go vote, strangers petting one another’s dogs. Polonsky told me that all of this noise would be part of the film and that it was only roughly scripted. How it concluded would depend largely on what actually happened with the vote.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;He didn’t want to give too much away, understandably, and wasn’t looking for easy analogies, but it wasn’t hard to picture a will-they-won’t-they storyline being as much about this couple as about the relationship with a country. Polonsky said he had been hoping for the sake of his plot that the change bloc would win. “It would make for a happy ending,” he said. But instead something much harder to film happened: a continuation of unresolved tension, deadlock.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Maybe this was good for the story, Polonsky said. The film was ultimately about what can be changed and what cannot be changed. Could these old lovers rekindle a flame, or had too much happened? At that moment in Jaffa, though, the cameras trained on Mila’s and Or’s faces as they watched the news revealed no ambiguity, at least as Polonsky saw it. “Their eyes looked the way you do when you don’t get what you want,” he said. “Which happens a lot.”&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Gal Beckerman</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/gal-beckerman/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/5rh2MCHbrY31sL1sq0h748_R3jU=/media/img/mt/2026/10/2026_10_30_Tel_Avis_Last_Stand/original.jpg"><media:credit>Erik Marmor / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The Bursting of the Tel Aviv Bubble</title><published>2026-10-31T07:00:00-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-31T12:13:29-04:00</updated><summary type="html">The liberal, cosmopolitan side of Israel is facing a moment of truth.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/tel-aviv-israel-democracy-liberal/689229/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689223</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;I live on the same street in north Tel Aviv as Gali Baharav-Miara, Israel’s attorney general. Occasionally I see her walking through the neighborhood, a bodyguard following 20 feet behind. Her home is guarded around the clock. To the government and its supporters, she is an unelected official obstructing the elected right’s ability to govern. To liberal Israelis, she is one of the last institutional barriers between democracy and unchecked political power.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The national argument plays itself out beneath my window. On Saturday nights, right-wing protesters gather outside her home, shouting, honking their horns, and demanding her dismissal. I’ve seen Mordechai David here, a right-wing activist who has become notorious for confronting prominent government opponents while filming them on his phone. On Friday afternoons, Baharav-Miara’s supporters take their place, wearing &lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;Gali, Guardian of Israel&lt;/span&gt; T-shirts and holding signs urging her to stay strong. Then everyone goes home. The street becomes quiet. The cafés open in the morning and we drink our coffee.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Israelis have been predicting the end of Israel for as long as I can remember. In my liberal, secular circles, almost every election has been described as the decisive one, the last opportunity to save the country. If Menachem Begin wins, Israel is finished. If Ariel Sharon wins, Israel is finished. If Benjamin Netanyahu returns—again—Israel is finished. Friends announce that this time they really will leave. Yet when the results arrive, and despair descends, the following morning most wake up, drink their coffee, and go to work. After voting on Tuesday, that’s what millions did on Wednesday.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/10/israel-election-outcome-possibilities/689184/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Graeme Wood: Israeli election results hazy, try again&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;All of this is partly because Israelis are dramatic people, and Jewish history has given us good reason to be alert to impending disaster. It is also because leaving is harder than declaring an intention to leave. People have parents, children, jobs, homes, friends, and a language in which they know how to quarrel and make jokes. Besides, even extreme political change doesn’t immediately alter the texture of everyday life. As another election fades into history, school drop-off remains the same, as does the taste of that first cup of coffee.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;After the Yom Kippur War of 1973—the first war in which Israel seemed vulnerable and its victory uncertain—a wave of Israelis emigrated, shaken by the discovery that the Jewish state could not guarantee their safety. Ever since, departure has been both a real phenomenon and a national threat, uttered whenever the country disappoints us. We are forever leaving, and forever still here.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The liberal panic about Begin in 1977 was not invented. He came from a political tradition that the Labor establishment had treated as dangerous and illegitimate, and his victory ended three decades of rule by the elites who had founded the state. Many secular Ashkenazi Israelis felt as if their country had been seized by strangers: nationalists, religious Jews, and Mizrahi voters whose families had come from Morocco, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Arab world. For decades, the Labor establishment had treated these immigrants as cultural inferiors, housing them first in impoverished transit camps and later in remote development towns, far from the country’s centers of power. Begin treated them not as backward newcomers requiring instruction, but as fellow Jews entitled to dignity and influence. Along the way, Begin changed Israel profoundly, not always for the better. He accelerated the West Bank settlements and helped push inflation into triple digits. Even worse, he led Israel into the disastrous 1982 Lebanon War, which drove the Palestine Liberation Organization from Beirut but left Israel trapped in a bloody and protracted occupation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yet Begin also respected the democratic transfer of power that brought him to office. He also did not attempt to neutralize every institution capable of restraining him. Most important, in 1979 this lifelong nationalist signed a peace treaty with Egypt, agreeing to return the entire Sinai Peninsula; the withdrawal was completed three years later. In short, Begin recognized that holding power did not mean that every ideological dream had to be realized, or that compromise was treason. As Begin is often quoted as saying, the difficulties of peace are better than the agonies of war.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Two decades after Begin, Sharon frightened the Israeli left for even more concrete reasons. He was a leading architect of the settlement project, and a ruthless army officer as far back as the 1950s. As Begin’s defense minister, Sharon was also found indirectly responsible for failing to prevent the Sabra and Shatila massacre, when a Lebanese Christian militia supported by Israel killed at least 1,300 people in Beirut.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;When Sharon was elected prime minister in 2001, many liberals again spoke as if the state had reached its final chapter. I captured that reflex in my novel &lt;em&gt;Don’t You Want Me&lt;/em&gt;. At a dinner party in a New York apartment in the early 2000s, Israelis argue about whether to return home. One declares that if Sharon is elected, it will be the end of Israel, and he will not go back. It was the kind of sentence Israelis said so often that it barely required invention.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Sharon did not become a man of peace. Yet in 2005 he evacuated every Israeli settlement from Gaza, sending soldiers to remove settlers from their homes. The wisdom of the disengagement, the manner in which it was carried out, and its longer-term consequences all remain fiercely disputed, particularly after October 7. But the political fact is extraordinary from today’s perspective: The great patron of the settlers concluded that the state’s interests required a limit to their plans, a limit Sharon himself imposed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The point is not that Begin and Sharon were liberals in disguise. They were not. Nor were the warnings about them foolish. Each helped move Israel further from the country its old liberal elite imagined it to be—a secular, social-democratic, and egalitarian Jewish state, embodied by the kibbutz and the citizen army and governed by the institutions that Labor had built. But both men operated within a political world in which power encountered boundaries. Institutions mattered. The opposition was an opponent, not an internal enemy. Territory could be relinquished, and reality could defeat ideology.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This is what makes the right today different. Its most influential forces regard restraint itself as illegitimate. Courts, legal advisers, journalists, demonstrators, bereaved families, and even parts of the security establishment are described not as checks on the government but as a “deep state” preventing the “authentic” people from ruling. The phrases are imported, but the resentment is homegrown: an old belief that Labor’s heirs continue to control Israel’s institutions long after losing power. It is hardly surprising, then, that even before the count was complete, Likud claimed that the election had been “stolen” by the Arab parties, whose projected representation surged from 10 seats to a record 19, and demanded an investigation into alleged fraud.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The settler movement, which I wrote about in&lt;em&gt; The Hilltop&lt;/em&gt; as a subculture both absurd and dangerous, is no longer pushing at the margins of Israeli politics. Its worldview sits inside the government, while settler violence against Palestinians has become routine. Only last week, masked settlers attacking Palestinians during the olive harvest seriously injured Heidi Levine, a photojournalist for &lt;em&gt;The Washington Post&lt;/em&gt;. Meanwhile, far-right ministers openly advocate for the mass removal of Palestinians from Gaza under the euphemism of “voluntary emigration.” What was once regarded as extremist fantasy has become both daily practice and government policy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That worldview can promise land, revenge, and Jewish supremacy—but no destination. It offers no plausible picture of life with the Palestinians except permanent domination, recurring violence, and eventual expulsion. It presents eternal war not as a failure of politics but almost as a religious condition. As Netanyahu reportedly told fellow Knesset members in 2015, Israel would “forever live by the sword.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The irony, of course, is that Netanyahu’s government presided over the deadliest day in Israel’s history. On October 7, the security system in which citizens had placed almost-mystical faith collapsed. The war that followed inflicted a catastrophe on Gaza, killed and displaced enormous numbers of our Palestinian neighbors, and left Israel more isolated and morally damaged than ever.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Six months ago, during the conflict with Iran, a missile struck the street where my ex-wife lives, damaging our apartment. In Israel, the phrase &lt;em&gt;existential threat&lt;/em&gt; is used so frequently that it can begin to sound theatrical, until the explosion occurs outside a home in which your family lives. Yet if the volcano does erupt here, we count the dead, inspect the damage, argue about responsibility—then make another cup of coffee.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The coffee is not evidence that nothing happened. It is, rather, how we live with what did. This is why I hesitate before repeating the familiar claim that this week’s vote was Israel’s last. Since Tuesday night, I have again heard friends threaten that now they will leave. But countries rarely end on election night. Ballots are counted and coalitions are negotiated, and voters, this week like any other week, wake up late and complain about the result.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/israeli-expat-vote/689172/?utm_source=feed"&gt;View: Flying across the world to vote&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yet for too long, Israelis have confused survival with continuity. And whatever happens in the Knesset over the next few days and weeks, the country’s continued existence does not mean it remains the same country. Rather, its transformation will come step by step: another loyalist appointed, another illegal outpost recognized, another Palestinian farmer dispossessed, another generation of reservists called to fight a war without end. Elections may endure, but they risk offering diminishing choices. The flag will still fly, the cafés will still be full, yet what does that matter when the country beneath becomes more authoritarian, more violent, more isolated?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;There is therefore a broader question underpinning this election for Israelis: not only where Jews can live, but where they want to live. I began writing my forthcoming novel, &lt;em&gt;The Gavronski Brothers&lt;/em&gt;, after October 7 because I wanted to escape the present. It is a comic adventure about five Jewish siblings—my ancestors—fleeing Lithuania at the end of the 19th century to escape conscription into the tsar’s army. I thought that by going back 130 years I could avoid Israeli current affairs. Instead, I found the same questions waiting for me. Where can Jews be safe? Where can they be accepted? What must they surrender to belong?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Those questions are adopting a cruel new shape. Rising anti-Semitism makes parts of the diaspora feel less secure. But an ever more religious, nationalist, and authoritarian Israel is becoming a place that many liberal Jews may be able to inhabit physically, but no longer wish to inhabit politically or morally, especially if living there also means accepting the constant threat of war. To be clear: I will not leave. At 57, I am too old to begin again elsewhere, and this is my language, my landscape, my home. But I do not expect my two teenage daughters to build their futures here—and I cannot honestly tell them that they should.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Assaf Gavron</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/assaf-gavron/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/6YO6vM8dcCahhP2HuCwri1zOKwg=/media/img/mt/2026/10/2026_10_30_Another_Deadlock_In_Israel/original.jpg"><media:credit>Dana Golan</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Israel’s Latest Last Chance to Save Itself</title><published>2026-10-30T12:24:11-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-30T13:23:33-04:00</updated><summary type="html">This vote will not be the end of Israel. It also won’t answer the question of what kind of country Israelis want it to be.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/israel-netanyahu-eisenkot-election/689223/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689183</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;India has been convulsed with protests that challenge Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s authoritarian vision. The most recent of them are defending the franchise from an administrative action that struck millions of voters from the rolls. But the challenge to Modi’s Hindu nationalism really began over the summer, after India’s chief justice dismissed the country’s unemployed youth as “cockroaches” and “parasites.” Flipping the insult into a badge of honor, an Indian graduate student at Boston University, Abhijeet Dipke, began accounts across social media under the name “Cockroach Janta Party,” a play on Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Modi has been in power for more than a dozen years. In that time, he has faced nothing like the current level of unrest. The protests roiling the country suggest that he is vulnerable. They are also a consequence of his subversion of India’s democratic institutions: Street action has become the most potent means of contesting the Hindu-nationalist movement he leads.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The CJP held its first offline protest in June at Jantar Mantar, an 18th-century observatory in central Delhi. By that time, its Instagram account had amassed more than 20 million followers—more than the account for the BJP itself. The CJP demanded the resignation of Dharmendra Pradhan, India’s education minister, on the grounds that he had sabotaged the country’s high-stakes exam system and created uncertainty for millions of students. The demand was hardly a radical one to make in a democracy. But as part of his strongman persona, the prime minister has long made a habit of refusing to concede to public pressure.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2025/02/modi-nationalism-demagoguery-limitations/681094/?utm_source=feed"&gt;From the February 2025 issue: Narendra Modi’s populist facade is cracking&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The CJP enlisted the support of some prominent figures, including Sonam Wangchuk, an educator and activist from Ladakh, a Buddhist region bordering Kashmir. In late June, Wangchuk embarked on a hunger strike, a classical Gandhian form of protest that has deep emotional resonance in India. By its third week, the crowds at Jantar Mantar had surged, and the activist had lost more than 20 pounds, shrinking his body mass by 20 percent. Public clamor about Wangchuk’s deteriorating condition mounted, and the authorities forcibly removed him from Jantar Mantar.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Far from quieting the movement, this gambit transformed it into a mass uprising. On July 20, more than 100,000 protesters turned up for the CJP’s planned march to Parliament. The epicenter of New Delhi soon resembled a war zone; paramilitary forces lobbed tear-gas shells at protesters, while the cops pummeled the crowd indiscriminately with lathis, wooden clubs used by the Indian police. A paramilitary officer fired seven rounds of a pellet gun, injuring at least 10 protesters.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The violence provoked a countrywide backlash that went well beyond the education minister: The demonstrators began targeting Modi himself with expletive-laden chants. No previous Indian prime minister in living memory had faced this kind of public vitriol. The protests spread to more than a dozen cities across the country. And on July 25, Pradhan resigned.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Where established political parties and well-known civil-society organizations had failed, the CJP had achieved something extraordinary: A weeks-old youth movement blasted through the authoritarian firewall of Modi’s India, dispelled the climate of intimidation fostered by the Hindu right, and created a new democratic opening.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The columnist Tavleen Singh, once a Modi supporter, &lt;a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/tavleen-singh-writes-signs-of-political-change-10864981/"&gt;noted&lt;/a&gt; that “something fundamental had changed in recent weeks” and that “people seemed no longer scared.” Jawhar Sircar, a former opposition politician, &lt;a href="https://thewire.in/politics/recalling-twelve-unforgettable-years"&gt;wrote&lt;/a&gt; that the protests had “shattered the dome of fear and re-awakened India.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Since the Cockroach movement’s victory in late July, protests have been erupting across the country—on city streets and university campuses, outside government buildings and police stations—against the rise in crimes against women, the poor quality of government schools, and a range of other ills. On October 7, a Mumbai newspaper reported that 88 protests had taken place over the previous 10 days in the western state of Maharashtra alone.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The latest round of demonstrations concerns the election commission’s review of voter rolls, which began last year and has so far purged more than 130 million citizens. In a country whose adult population is growing, the number of eligible voters shrank by more than 10 percent; those voters expunged were disproportionately Muslim. A September 23 report in the newspaper &lt;i&gt;Indian Express&lt;/i&gt; revealed allegations from two election commissioners that Gyanesh Kumar, India’s chief election commissioner, had taken “unauthorized and illegal” actions in relation to the revision.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Kumar is widely seen as an acolyte of India’s ruling establishment. In 2023, shortly before he was appointed, the Modi government pushed a law through Parliament giving election commissioners lifelong immunity from prosecution. This sweeping immunity does not exist for any other government official in India—not even the president or prime minister.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/05/modi-india-escalation-trap/682870/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Modi’s escalation trap&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Cockroach protests during the summer were primarily a youth phenomenon, but the subject of voting rights, in a country with a proud democratic history, has universal resonance. Despite being largely poor and illiterate at the time, India enshrined the universal adult franchise shortly after its independence in 1947, inaugurating one of the world’s most audacious democratic experiments. Since then, elections and voting have become something akin to a sacred rite, emanating from the founding ethos of modern India.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A large portion of the Indian public views Kumar’s actions as equivalent to treason. The protesters are demanding that he be removed, that the revision to the voter rolls be reversed, and that the law bestowing lifelong immunity on Kumar be scrapped so that he can be prosecuted.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Earlier this month, episodic mayhem took over New Delhi as protesters blocked streets, detainees on police buses smashed the windows and escaped, and demonstrators perched on the roofs of government vehicles in acts of defiance. I met Indians of varying ages, backgrounds, and political convictions at those protests: construction workers, upper-class designers, Communist foot soldiers.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But the Modi government seems to fear nothing more than the Cockroach movement. The youth group, which threatened to instigate nationwide demonstrations if Kumar did not resign, announced a protest in New Delhi on October 10, and the government panicked.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The authorities transformed New Delhi into a fortress, flying in tens of thousands of paramilitaries from the hostile borderlands where they are usually deployed. Much of the city’s subway network was shut down. Trains scheduled to arrive from all over India were canceled at the last minute, to prevent protesters from swarming the capital.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Security forces detained thousands of protesters and dozens of journalists. Right-wing militias threatened demonstrators unhindered by the police. The Cockroach leaders, who’d flown in from Mumbai that morning, were arrested aboard their airplane. Central Delhi was a militarized web of barricades and armed enforcers.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Ishrat Ansari, a 49-year-old schoolteacher, had walked two miles from her home to the barricades near Jantar Mantar. She had been detained on a police bus, where she saw a reporter beaten and was so disturbed that she vomited. The heavy-handed measures, she felt sure, were a sign of the regime’s growing fear. “They are taking away our voting rights,” she told me. “When we elected you with our vote, how can you cancel us?”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A government once confident in its ability to set the terms of the public conversation had resorted to lockdown and repression. Surely this was an admission of the failure of the Hindu right’s formidable propaganda machine to steer the narrative.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The protests have not relented. A march on October 12 from New Delhi’s commercial center to the supreme court a mile away was one of the largest protests the city has ever seen. Rahul Gandhi, the leader of India’s opposition, announced it and called on ordinary citizens to participate. That tens of thousands did suggests that the clampdown over the previous two days resolved nothing in the government’s favor—on the contrary, the apparent subversion of India’s democratic tradition was having a galvanizing effect on those determined to resist it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The previous week, Gandhi had led more than 300 members of Parliament in a march toward the office of the election commission. At that time, he was stopped by the police. Now, a week later, he was leading a gargantuan crowd toward the supreme court. These two constitutional bodies were once fiercely autonomous. Under Modi, they have turned servile. Challenges to the revision of the voter rolls came before the supreme court earlier this year, and the court sided with the election commission, despite strong evidence of disenfranchisement. In an election in West Bengal, for example, Modi’s BJP won many seats by a margin smaller than the number of deleted voters.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2024/06/modi-india-2024-election/678664/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: The humbling of Narendra Modi&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As the march neared the supreme court, I stood roughly 20 feet away from an open-top truck painted in the colors of the Indian flag, where Gandhi was surrounded by leaders of opposition parties and civil society. The alliance recalled the diverse, umbrella coalition that had defeated Prime Minister Indira Gandhi after the Emergency, India’s previous spell under authoritarian rule in the 1970s.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saraswati Sharma, a 60-year-old homemaker, had made the 90-minute trip from the adjacent city of Gurugram. Her name had recently been struck off the voter rolls, after she had moved from Delhi, where she had been a registered voter for decades.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The revision deleted the names of not only Muslims, but also a variety of other inconvenient populations: the residents of neighborhoods associated with the opposition, members of low-income groups that were not considered reliable supporters of Modi’s party. Any small, seemingly insignificant detail—a spelling error, having a suspiciously high number of children—could be used to question a voter’s validity and strike them from the rolls.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“We have never seen such a compromised situation,” Sharma said, lamenting the loss of legitimacy of the supreme court and the election commission. Slogans denouncing Kumar as a traitor rang out in the background, and Sharma told me the march was the first time she had felt compelled to show up at a protest in the Modi years. “This is like a freedom struggle.”&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Vaibhav Vats</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/vaibhav-vats/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/LXEkIkHX6lruWq6gpESToAWJcNU=/media/img/mt/2026/10/2026_10_28_Modi_Student_Protests/original.jpg"><media:credit>Arvind Yadav / Hindustan Times / Reuters</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Why India Is Erupting</title><published>2026-10-28T11:54:01-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-28T13:26:22-04:00</updated><summary type="html">Protests are challenging India’s Hindu-nationalist government like never before.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/india-modi-cockroach-janta-party/689183/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689179</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;T&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;his week, Russia will permit&lt;/span&gt; handpicked American journalists and influencers friendly to the Trump administration to tour Oleshky, a Russian-occupied Ukrainian town on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River. There, fewer than 2,000 civilians, from a prewar population of 24,000, are trapped in a city that has been effectively under siege since December 2025—a place where they are terrorized by Russian forces, hunted by drones, and lacking reliable access to food, water, or medicine.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Now Oleshky is the site of a humanitarian cease-fire reportedly brokered by U.S. First Lady Melania Trump. Ukraine has long pressed for access to Oleshky’s civilians in order to bring them aid or help them escape to safety. Russia is allowing this only now. At the same time, Oleshky will host a propaganda tour for media visitors under Russian military escort. Whatever these journalists learn about life here almost certainly won’t be the truth.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Oleshky lies just across the Dnipro from Ukrainian-controlled Kherson, a strategically important city in the south of Ukraine. This location makes the town a useful military foothold for the Russians, who launch attacks on Kherson from it while using the presence of its civilian population to shield their positions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I am the only foreign journalist permanently based in Kherson, where I have been reporting since 2023. Since February, I have been investigating the humanitarian catastrophe in Oleshky and the neighboring settlements. My work has drawn on evacuee testimonies, contacts inside occupied territory, official data, and verified military footage.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;A&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;ccording to &lt;a href="https://x.com/thestudyofwar/status/2114109100443258932?s=46"&gt;the Institute for the Study of War&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;Russian occupation authorities have repeatedly obstructed efforts to evacuate the town or provide humanitarian access. Regular supply deliveries stopped at the end of last year, and food and medicine have not reached Oleshky through conventional channels since May. The city is under what has come to be called a &lt;a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidkirichenko/2026/07/02/russias-drone-siege-is-emptying-ukraines-frontline-cities/"&gt;drone siege&lt;/a&gt;: Drones monitor all access roads, streets, and civilian movement, remotely mining them to restrict logistics. With conventional access blocked, Ukrainian forces have resorted to delivering food by drone.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“Oleshky is an artificially created hell in the midst of the civilized world,” a woman named Liudmila wrote to me. She asked that I refer to her by only her first name, out of concern for the safety of her loved ones left behind. She prefers to write, rather than speak, about the four years she endured under Russian occupation, even though her eyesight is foggy from months spent sheltering in basements.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;When Russian forces entered Oleshky in February 2022, Liudmila and her husband, Andriy, decided to stay. They wanted to protect their family home on the banks of the Dnipro, and they imagined that the occupation would soon end.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Within days, Russian soldiers poisoned their dog, an Alabai, along with all the other large dogs in Oleshky. They killed Liudmila’s next-door neighbor and raped his wife. A local butcher disappeared; no one knew whether he was also killed. Some neighbors were detained and beaten. Armed, masked soldiers searched Liudmila’s home three times, confiscating the couple’s Ukrainian passports and leaving them with no documents. And yet, Liudmila and Andriy stayed. They got a new puppy, also an Alabai. Russian troops started to move into civilian houses, parking tanks in what once were gardens.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/10/ukraine-war-gas-pipelines-russia/689105/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: The new subterranean front&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In June 2023, the Russians blew up the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant dam, and Oleshky was swept by floods. Homes and corpses floated down the river; bodies washed up onto fences and were left in the sun—no one knew how many. Without access to municipal water or other utilities, the couple collected rainwater in summer and melted ice in winter. During one nighttime battle, Liudmila and Andriy woke to find their roof in flames. Andriy climbed up, and Liudmila handed him containers of water to extinguish the fire. After that, their water supply was gone, and the house was unlivable.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;They moved to an abandoned home nearby. Russian soldiers killed their young dog with grenades. Andriy fell ill, and Liudmila prayed next to him at night as the windows trembled from explosions. Ambulances no longer came to their neighborhood, so one morning, she put Andriy in a wheelbarrow and pushed him to the hospital. But there was no medicine there, or fuel to run a generator, and the hospital couldn’t carry out an operation. Andriy died in 2025.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;By then, Russian drones had started attacking civilians. Liudmila was afraid to turn on the lights at night, lest they attract drones. Sometimes drones would hover at window level for hours, seemingly spying on people inside.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Winter came, and water froze in buckets inside the house. Some neighbors froze to death. Liudmila, who was caring for her elderly mother-in-law, would push her wheelbarrow along heavily mined streets to look for food in abandoned houses. She’d wait for hours at the market for vehicles to bring supplies while drones circled over. Often, she saw dead bodies in the streets and dogs carrying human bones. When her mother-in-law died of untreated wounds, the Russian occupation authorities took her body to another town for a forensic examination. Liudmila was allowed to pick her up only a month later—from a pile of severely decomposed corpses at the morgue.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Liudmila escaped Oleshky at last this spring. From those left behind, she hears that scrounging for supplies is no longer possible. “Mines lie below; drones hover above. Death is everywhere: beneath your feet and over your head,” she wrote to me. “As you walk, you must watch every step, scan your surroundings, and keep your eyes on the sky.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;U&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;kraine has long sought to help&lt;/span&gt; Oleshky’s inhabitants either survive or escape. The country’s ombudsman, Dmytro Lubinets, proposed localized humanitarian cease-fires in May, July, and September of this year, but the Kremlin rejected all of them.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Now the White House has announced one that started yesterday and is credited to the first lady. The Trump administration has needed a success story on the eve of the midterm elections, and Moscow appears to have provided press access to exactly the sorts of tribunes that will give the American administration—and the Kremlin—a boost.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The right-wing television network Newsmax has said that it has been &lt;a href="https://kvia.com/politics/cnn-us-politics/2026/10/23/melania-trump-says-she-secured-a-one-city-ceasefire-between-russia-and-ukraine-for-humanitarian-aid/"&gt;granted&lt;/a&gt; “exclusive television access” to accompany a delegation of Russian and Ukrainian representatives entering Oleshky this week. According to sources familiar with the arrangements, but who asked for their names to be withheld because they were not authorized to speak with the press, Fox News will also be permitted on the scene. A Russian Telegram channel &lt;a href="https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/38721"&gt;suggested&lt;/a&gt; that Tucker Carlson plans to visit Oleshky too. Most Ukrainian and independent international journalists have been denied access.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/10/trump-ukraine-putin-fuel/688974/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Anne Applebaum: Trump’s message to Ukraine is now crystal clear&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;What will happen is predictable. Journalists and influencers loyal to the Trump administration and sympathetic toward the Kremlin will likely spend a couple of hours filming Russian soldiers distributing food, assisting the elderly, and facilitating evacuations. They will be permitted only supervised interviews with preselected civilians. Dependent on the Russian occupying authorities for food, health care, and permission to leave, these people will not express themselves freely in the presence of the Russian military. And even if they try, their testimonies will be filtered through the Kremlin-supplied interpreters accompanying the Western press.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The besieged population will appear to be wholly grateful to the Russian authorities for another reason too. After months of deprivation, people perceive even basic assistance as an act of generosity. By suddenly offering food and evacuation, the Russian authorities will present themselves as rescuers rather than as perpetrators, exploiting this psychological dependency to manipulate Ukrainian civilians and international public opinion.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Ukraine is accepting the conditions of this evacuation in order to save lives, and it will maintain an operational silence also to that end. By accrediting only Newsmax and other ideologically aligned outlets, Russia has signaled that it plans to seize the opportunity to control how Oleshky is presented to the world. The participation of a few approved media outlets will be touted as real press coverage, making those American journalists tools for the legitimization of a Kremlin whitewashing operation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That’s if Newsmax allows it. Its representatives could choose not to. They could instead make their visit to Oleshky an opportunity to practice independent journalism, challenge the Kremlin’s narrative, and expose the reality behind the humanitarian spectacle, rather than becoming a part of it.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Zarina Zabrisky</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/zarina-zabrisky/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/FNyB0za6P8L--j7ejWKp6z7VxBQ=/media/img/mt/2026/10/2026_10_28_Melanias_Potemkin_Ceasefire_1-2/original.jpg"><media:credit>Volodymyr Obertas</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">What You Are About to See From Oleshky, Ukraine, Is a Lie</title><published>2026-10-28T08:47:46-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-28T13:22:19-04:00</updated><summary type="html">The Kremlin is staging whitewashed tours of a city it has terrorized.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/oleshky-ceasefire-ukraine-press/689179/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689172</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Photographs and videos by Dana Golan&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;Since the beginning of the Gaza war, a record number of Israelis have left the country. More than 10 percent of the electorate now lives abroad, and the country generally does not allow absentee ballots: Those who want to vote in today’s election, the first since October 7, need to be there in person.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;An estimated 67,000 Israeli expats have traveled thousands of miles—and spent thousands of dollars—to return home. Within Israel, the polls suggest a fairly even split between the parties that favor Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and those that oppose him. But most of the expats &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/20/us/israel-election-netanyahu-voters.html"&gt;&lt;u&gt;are expected&lt;/u&gt;&lt;/a&gt; to support the opposition. The prime minister’s allies &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/2026-07-15/ty-article/.premium/sources-netanyahu-govt-seeks-to-limit-expats-from-flying-into-israel-to-vote/0000019f-66aa-de8e-afff-f7fa0d170000"&gt;&lt;u&gt;reportedly considered&lt;/u&gt;&lt;/a&gt; restricting airport capacity to limit the number of arrivals. But the flights still came.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Israelis returning from abroad expressed feelings of deep investment in this election and a belief that the outcome will affect them no matter where they live. Many are willing to travel a long way to vote for what they believe will be a better future.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/B-Qy5fj0Ul2RVKfuOvIM8a0pQcc=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/TheAtlantic_IsraeliExpats_007/original.jpg" width="982" height="655" alt="TheAtlantic_IsraeliExpats_007.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/TheAtlantic_IsraeliExpats_007/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405112" data-image-id="1867597" data-orig-w="3000" data-orig-h="2001"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Dana Golan for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Maya Mor Mitrani, a college student and opera singer in Philadelphia, spoke about concern for her father, who has served in the military reserves since October 7. “I just think the situation is really bad,” she said, “and I want to have at least some influence over how the government tries to solve the problems we’re facing right now. So if my influence amounts to just one ballot in the box, that’s what I’ll do.”&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/ok8PkUbdIib5umnW2nbXxxaIGGQ=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/TheAtlantic_IsraeliExpats_036/original.jpg" width="982" height="655" alt="TheAtlantic_IsraeliExpats_036.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/TheAtlantic_IsraeliExpats_036/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405114" data-image-id="1867599" data-orig-w="3000" data-orig-h="2001"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Dana Golan for&lt;em&gt; The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Jonathan Matkowsky was born in America, but he moved to Israel in 2012. On October 7, he barricaded his children indoors and drove south to help however he could, working as a volunteer driver for off-duty soldiers and civilians for the next four months. He later moved back to the United States. Now he has returned for the election: “It’s a meaningful vote for me because of how much trauma we’ve been through,” he said. Although he considered voting for Gadi Eisenkot because of his support for extending the draft to the ultra-Orthodox, he ultimately decided to vote for Netanyahu. He trusts the prime minister’s wisdom and experience and credits him with keeping Israel safe: “I’m proud of him. I believe in him. I think he’s a hero,” he said.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure class="full-bleed"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/dhQz5-YAgEC4kfBfkwHuI5cUlO0=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/101126_Elections_568/original.jpg" width="1600" height="1067" alt="101126_Elections_568.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/101126_Elections_568/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405111" data-image-id="1867596" data-orig-w="2500" data-orig-h="1667"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Dana Golan for&lt;em&gt; The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport on October 25, 2026&lt;br&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width" data-video-upload-id="8519"&gt;&lt;video src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/video/2026/10/27/Atlantic_Eisenkot.mp4" width="982" height="552" data-orig-w="3840" data-orig-h="2160"&gt;&lt;/video&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Dana Golan for&lt;em&gt; The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;A banner that reads “This time, Eisenkot” hangs in Jaffa, Tel Aviv.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/BMF2G2ANyn3oNbc3xozNHmVgPhc=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/101126_Elections_688/original.jpg" width="982" height="655" alt="101126_Elections_688.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/101126_Elections_688/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405138" data-image-id="1867604" data-orig-w="2500" data-orig-h="1667"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Dana Golan for&lt;em&gt; The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;An organization called Fly&amp;amp;Vote organized expats to fly from New York to Tel Aviv on October 25.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure role="group" class="full-bleed"&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/pLPVbWCsjODVw81xAAj5svNsGuA=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/101126_Elections_867/original.jpg" width="665" height="997" alt="101126_Elections_867.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/101126_Elections_867/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405115" data-image-id="1867600" data-orig-w="1667" data-orig-h="2500"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Dana Golan for&lt;em&gt; The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Shirily Bar-Or spent years protesting in Israel before moving to Athens last year. “I didn’t give up, exactly. I just needed to breathe. I was running out of air. I hope I’ll be able to breathe again tomorrow.” What she wants, she said, is for “the country to be sane again. I want a government that works for the public good. I want democracy.” To her, this election is pivotal because, she said, what Netanyahu wants “is to destroy us just to save his own skin.”&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/I7mEaaLqUtBjCG2uTNk1Q1iprLY=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/101126_Elections_729/original.jpg" width="665" height="997" alt="101126_Elections_729.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/101126_Elections_729/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405116" data-image-id="1867601" data-orig-w="1667" data-orig-h="2500"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Dana Golan for&lt;em&gt; The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Dan Galezer lives in New York and already had a trip to Israel planned, but he changed his flight to be there on election day. He said that he didn’t know which opposition party to support, but that “I’m just at the stage of saying: Get Bibi out of the seat already. His time is up.” Galezer’s family’s kibbutz was the site of one of the worst massacres on October 7. “Today, even after everything that’s happened,” he said, “I don’t rule out returning.” But whether that will even be possible, he said, may depend on the outcome of the election: “This feels like a breaking point.”&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/_I6VYt4gg3y9AjdYGMhzosPp40s=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/101126_Elections_832/original.jpg" width="665" height="997" alt="101126_Elections_832.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/101126_Elections_832/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405137" data-image-id="1867603" data-orig-w="1667" data-orig-h="2500"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Dana Golan for&lt;em&gt; The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Arie Deizer has lived in Bucharest for 30 years and compared Netanyahu to the Hungarian strongman Viktor Orbán. Netanyahu, he said, has “destroyed the country—he’s completely lost it now,” and Deizer hopes he’ll be “thrown out, just like Orbán.” Deizer is voting for the Democrats, in part because unlike many other opposition parties, they have not ruled out working with Arab parties, should they win. “I hope we’ll have an overwhelming majority here—70 seats—so that the Arab parties can’t be ignored.”&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width" data-video-upload-id="8520"&gt;&lt;video src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/video/2026/10/27/Atlantic_JewsArabs.mp4" width="982" height="552" data-orig-w="3840" data-orig-h="2160"&gt;&lt;/video&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Dana Golan for&lt;em&gt; The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;A sign on the entrance to a shop in Jaffa, Tel Aviv, reads “Jews and Arabs refuse to be enemies.”&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/-cNuwrcxRzzbhyMh3JflsI-w54A=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/TheAtlantic_IsraeliExpats_020/original.jpg" width="982" height="655" alt="TheAtlantic_IsraeliExpats_020.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/TheAtlantic_IsraeliExpats_020/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405363" data-image-id="1867632" data-orig-w="3000" data-orig-h="2001"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Dana Golan for&lt;em&gt; The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Shai Sinai hasn’t lived in Israel for 40 years, but he’s come back from Hamburg to vote in every election since Netanyahu came to power. “I was born here, I grew up here, I was educated here, I served in the army here, and my whole family—the family members who are still alive—basically lives here.” Volunteers from Fly&amp;amp;Vote, a nonprofit dedicated to helping expats return for the election, met him and other voters at the airport. So did members of the Democrats, a party Sinai said he will support. He hopes that the government will be replaced, he said, but “to say that I’m expecting it would be too optimistic.”&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/jhf3hCLTSXiyqE86Vghug8B5_L0=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/101126_Elections_768/original.jpg" width="982" height="655" alt="101126_Elections_768.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/101126_Elections_768/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14405362" data-image-id="1867631" data-orig-w="2500" data-orig-h="1667"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Dana Golan for&lt;em&gt; The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Volunteers and candidates from the Democrats Party came to greet Israelis as they landed in Israel to vote.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure class="full-bleed" data-video-upload-id="8526"&gt;&lt;video src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/video/2026/10/27/Atlantic_Bennett2-crf18.mp4" width="1600" height="900" data-orig-w="3840" data-orig-h="2160"&gt;&lt;/video&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Dana Golan for&lt;em&gt; The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Election posters at the entrance to a polling station in Tel Aviv include one from Naftali Bennett’s B’Yachad party that reads, “We will only fix this together.”&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;</content><author><name>Elias Wachtel</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/elias-wachtel/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/ZoKUWu4qfy4M8SlBLduZ9aLi5sY=/0x144:3000x1832/media/img/mt/2026/10/TheAtlantic_IsraeliExpats_010/original.jpg"><media:credit>Dana Golan for The Atlantic</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Flying Across the World to Vote</title><published>2026-10-27T17:21:12-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-28T09:39:29-04:00</updated><summary type="html">Israeli expats traveled thousands of miles to make their voices heard.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/israeli-expat-vote/689172/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:39-689018</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Photographs by Moises Saman&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt;This article was featured in the One Story to Read Today newsletter. &lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/one-story-to-read-today/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;u&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt;Sign up for it here.&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/u&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;A priest led&lt;/span&gt; me up battered stairs to a tiny room at the top of a church. From the window, we gazed down at the decayed colonial villas and scattered trash fires of eastern Havana. He pointed to the yellow wall behind us, where someone had sketched a meticulous map of the local street grid.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“They posted armed guards here, to watch over us,” he said.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;aside data-source="magazine-issue" class="callout-placeholder"&gt;&lt;/aside&gt;&lt;p&gt;Cuba’s Communist government, the priest said, took over the convent, cloister, and school of Los Escolapios after the revolution of 1959, expelling the nuns and setting up a guard post—one part of the regime’s sprawling apparatus of surveillance and control. The church downstairs was virtually closed, the congregation mostly exiled or jailed in accordance with Communist Cuba’s atheist principles.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The guards are gone now, along with the portraits of Fidel Castro and the secular schoolteachers who commandeered the convent’s lower floors after the revolution. The church is in the process of reclaiming the magnificent 18th-century cloister from the state, which left it in ruins. The priest, Iván Guerra Álvarez, made clear he believes that history is approaching another turning point, and that the Communist regime will soon be gone. “The Church will play a big role in the transition,” he told me. “We are the biggest institution in Cuba outside the government.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;No one can say when or how that transition will happen. Donald Trump may or may not have “the honor of taking Cuba,” as &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/17/donald-trump-can-take-cuba-oil"&gt;he boasted after imposing an oil blockade&lt;/a&gt; on the island earlier this year. The Cuban regime has stifled any viable domestic opposition. But the withering of the state—a process that has been under way for decades—has accelerated, and is shocking to see up close. The ration cards that used to guarantee basic foodstuffs for every Cuban had been blank for weeks when I visited in August. Police and soldiers were once ubiquitous throughout the country, but I saw hardly any.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In far-eastern Cuba, I met a fisherman who told me that he and others like him, who lacked electricity for refrigeration, have gone back to traditional methods of drying and salting fish. The average monthly salary for public-sector employees in Cuba—including doctors and teachers—is about 6,500 pesos, which is less than $10 and far below the cost of a subsistence diet (a single carton of eggs can cost up to 4,700 pesos). Even getting small amounts of cash can be a trial: Banks sometimes limit withdrawals to 1,000 pesos (less than $1.50) per person per day.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/S5UJ3krVL0cGFhAuioaTf6K6e7g=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_9/original.jpg" width="982" height="654" alt="a dog walks in an empty apartment complex" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_9/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14401095" data-image-id="1867121" data-orig-w="2880" data-orig-h="1920"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Moises Saman / Magnum for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;A former boarding school in Cienfuegos, established after the 1959 revolution, where students combined classroom education with agricultural labor&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;The government still purports—on faded billboards, in party speeches—to meet all of the material and spiritual needs of its citizens, but &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/09/cuba-america-diplomat-economy-coercion/688627/?utm_source=feed"&gt;it is now bankrupt in every sense&lt;/a&gt;. Almost &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/09/fidel-cuban-model-doesnt-even-work-for-us-anymore/62602/?utm_source=feed"&gt;no one believes in the system&lt;/a&gt; anymore, and many, especially outside Havana, behave as if the government simply does not exist. As in the Soviet-dominated Eastern bloc during its final years, destitution is leading people back to older faiths. Afro Cuban Santeria and Catholicism have flourished, and “house churches” have proliferated, often evangelical and sometimes consisting of nothing more than a dozen folding chairs in someone’s living room.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Guerra Álvarez led me down from the church tower to the main sanctuary of Los Escolapios, an atmospheric shift he half-jokingly likened to a trip from North to South Korea. We found ourselves in a noisy crowd of more than 100 schoolchildren and worshippers. A teacher dressed as an angel, with a white beard, wig, and gown, was giving Bible lessons in the dimly lit nave. Afterward, volunteers handed out lunches of rice and beans. To see so many people looking so cheerful was striking; Cuba is now a country full of empty streets and abandoned buildings, having lost as much as a quarter of its population to migration in the past few years.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The expanded role of the churches is partly an outcome of American policy: The U.S. government has long favored the Catholic Church as an intermediary. When the Trump administration approved a $100 million aid package for Cuba in May, it was on the condition that the funds be distributed by faith-based groups and humanitarian organizations. But the rise of religion in Cuba is also a measure of the state’s withdrawal—and perhaps a hint at the island’s future direction.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/SUh_Ds-dxc0ielUy-pmrvuUhFaA=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/SAM2026006G0808_1940461_1/original.png" width="982" height="655" alt="people give out food to others on the ground at a church" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/SAM2026006G0808_1940461_1/original.png" data-thumb-id="14401141" data-image-id="1867126" data-orig-w="2000" data-orig-h="1335"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Moises Saman / Magnum for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Teens receive bread and drinks at a Catholic church in Havana.&lt;br&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;I came to Cuba &lt;/span&gt;expecting to see suffering. What I did not anticipate was the &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/2026/06/david-frum-show-patrick-oppmann-cuba/687574/?utm_source=feed"&gt;near-total collapse&lt;/a&gt; of the state. This was evident even in Havana, where all-day blackouts are routine, but things are much worse in the eastern half of the island, which has long been poorer and less developed. Cuba’s religious revival has burned brightest there, especially among Pentecostal churches, whose traditions include faith healing and miracles.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/2026/06/david-frum-show-patrick-oppmann-cuba/687574/?utm_source=feed"&gt;The David Frum Show: Cuba is collapsing. Will Trump invade?&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I drove to the east with the photographer Moises Saman, an 18-hour journey that sometimes made us feel as if we were traveling back in time. Weaving slowly among enormous potholes, we passed few other cars. As we got closer to Santiago de Cuba, Cuba’s second-largest city, we saw almost as many horse-drawn carts as motorized vehicles.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/pHn61klTXkfKv5-jwhrwp3xDluE=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_10/original.jpg" width="982" height="656" alt="2026_10_23_cuba_rw-10.jpg" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_10/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14401142" data-image-id="1867127" data-orig-w="2880" data-orig-h="1922"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Moises Saman / Magnum for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;A weathered roadside billboard, bearing a portrait of Fidel Castro, reads, &lt;em&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;Son las ideas las que nos hacen un pueblo combatiente&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/em&gt; (“It is ideas that make us a fighting people”).&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;Poverty is not new in the country, but the number of street beggars I saw shocked me. On the seafront in Santiago, a mother and daughter approached me, both of them skeletally thin, to ask for money. The mother, a white-haired 76-year-old, told me that their only means of support had been her son, who had worked as a security guard and died of cancer last year. Now they spend all day begging and collecting plastic bottles in the hopes of trading them for a few pesos, she said. They get nothing from the state. Later, I visited their home, a filthy ground-floor room where they sleep on metal bed frames topped with cardboard instead of mattresses. When I asked whether there was any electricity, the mother said that they did not even have a bulb.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-bleed"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/fhbC1N98_60aL7KFAuyKcbRUs2A=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_8/original.jpg" width="1600" height="1067" alt="an old woman sits on card board on a metal bed frame" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_8/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14401143" data-image-id="1867128" data-orig-w="2880" data-orig-h="1920"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Moises Saman / Magnum for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;The collapse of the state has left impoverished Cubans with few options besides begging or relying on charity.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;The failure of Cuba’s health-care system may be the most damning indictment of its Communist regime. Castro once held up the country’s network of local clinics as a model for the world, visible proof that socialism could triumph where capitalism had failed. He sent hundreds of thousands of doctors overseas, an “army of white coats” to bolster Cuba’s image and generate money for the state. (It later emerged that the doctors had been given little choice and many were victims of what has been called forced labor.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some doctors are still being sent abroad, but more have simply fled Cuba. On Cayo Granma, an island at the entrance to the bay of Santiago, I found a single nurse caring not only for all 870 residents but also for many people from the neighboring coastal areas. She no longer knows how many people she is responsible for, because doctors have been leaving the region so fast that she cannot keep track of the patients forced to seek new care.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Her name is Clara Luaces, a woman of 55 with a direct gaze and an air of brisk competence. Her clinic was a room the size of a large closet, hot and crowded with patients when I arrived; outside, it was almost 100 degrees. A 12-year-old boy with a fever sat on a bench, an IV drip in his arm; a girl with a skin infection sat nearby with her mother.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“We have to work miracles here,” Luaces said, answering my questions as she checked the boy’s pulse and adjusted his IV. The government had stopped piping water to the island three months earlier, she said, and the resulting lack of clean water had led to a sharp rise in bacterial fevers and skin infections. “Even young people are dying on me,” she said. She was chronically short on medicine and had very little money of her own to supplement the clinic’s supply.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The boy began moaning, and Luaces comforted him, putting a pillow under his head and calling him “sweetheart.” “I’m not going to retire,” she said, looking up at me, “because there is no one else to take this on.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Luaces did not want to talk about politics. She confined herself to saying that she had been a student during what Castro dubbed the “special period” in the 1990s, when Cuba went through a severe economic crisis after losing its Soviet patron and the regime seemed on the brink of collapse. What is happening now, she said, is “much more special.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/QNGDBpkiq_lsRfJGbNDjcPqAkLo=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_2/original.jpg" width="982" height="654" alt="people sit under a light in a darkened street" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_2/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14401153" data-image-id="1867130" data-orig-w="2880" data-orig-h="1920"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Moises Saman / Magnum for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Two people sit outside a house during a nighttime power outage in Camagüey.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;Others lashed out directly at the state. Not long ago, the country bristled with informants working for the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. But when I asked people about the CDR, some laughed, and few seemed worried about being overheard. One evening on a beach in Baracoa, a man in his 30s asked me what I thought about Communism. He was lying in a hammock talking with four other men, drinking cheap sugarcane rum from a plastic bottle; they had been complaining about the ever higher prices of rice, beans, and other basic foods. I told him I thought Communism was a lousy way to run a country.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;He looked squarely at me and said, “I shit on Fidel Castro’s mother.” The other men laughed. He uttered a few more obscenities. Then, suddenly, all of the humor drained from the man’s face. His voice went taut with anger, and tears welled up in his eyes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“Cuba is frozen in time!” he shouted. “There’s no hope. It’s a sad thing to be born a Cuban. That’s what I think, and I don’t care; they can send me to prison if they want.” The other men had gone silent.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Here is another measure of Cubans’ anger at their government: During nine days of travel around the island, I did not meet a single person who blamed Donald Trump or the United States for their situation. I sometimes reminded them about &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2026/04/19/cuba-oil-embargo-crisis-havana-nightlife/c0608bd8-3bb0-11f1-90c4-9772c7fabc03_story.html"&gt;the blockade Trump had started earlier this year&lt;/a&gt;, cutting Cubans off from the cheap oil that Venezuela had been supplying before the U.S. military captured Nicolás Maduro in January. Hadn’t things gotten worse since then?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/09/cuba-america-diplomat-economy-coercion/688627/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Cuba’s old economic model is ‘exhausted’&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“I don’t see any change since January,” a retired engineer named Guillermo Almeida told me. “That oil from Venezuela wasn’t reaching the people anyway.” He and others said that the more important turning point was the coronavirus pandemic, which &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/cuba-tourism-collapsing-1049d0ba"&gt;destroyed Cuba’s tourism industry&lt;/a&gt; and shrank the value of remittances from family members abroad that many Cubans depend on, exposing more fully a state that had long been depleted. Another man put it differently: “It seems to us that the real embargo is inside of Cuba.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;The churches have &lt;/span&gt;taken on much of the Cuban state’s old role in keeping people alive. In Baracoa, I met Raul de Jesus Muñoz Munder, a Pentecostal pastor who has been evangelizing in the area for 32 years. He had seen hunger and deprivation, he said, including during the years he spent in a tiny church in the mountains, but nothing as bad as the present.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Muñoz Munder described his work almost as if it were a military operation. Every week, he said, he meets with a team of associate pastors at his church, and each man reports on the situation in his home neighborhood: who is sick and needs medicine, who needs food, and how to get it to them. The pastor’s congregation has about 1,100 regular members, but he provides aid to a much larger group. His denomination, the Assemblies of God, has expanded from two to 40 churches in the Baracoa region over the past three decades.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The growth of the evangelical movement is hard to quantify in Cuba, where the Catholic Church was once almost universal. No independent numbers on religious affiliation exist—the government has long had a lock on surveys. But everyone I spoke with, both inside and outside the country, agreed that the evangelical presence has surged in recent years.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-bleed"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/OzDnHoeN48s_1AMVgEBtVGc4R3A=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_6/original.jpg" width="1600" height="1067" alt="a man sits at a desk while dozens of people sit in seats behind him" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_6/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14401155" data-image-id="1867132" data-orig-w="2880" data-orig-h="1922"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Moises Saman / Magnum for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;A pastor and a church secretary at the Iglesia Evangélica Pentecostal Asambleas de Dios de Baracoa, in eastern Cuba. The congregation is one of the city’s most active Protestant churches.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;In Baracoa, I stumbled upon several different evangelical services one Saturday evening, each of them loud and raucous, the congregation on its feet and clapping along. These kinds of scenes are still a little jarring to many older Cubans. They tend to associate church with more orderly Catholic rituals, and grew up without seeing much of the flamboyant evangelical religiosity that has become common across Latin America. But the island is changing. I heard a fair amount of God talk even on the street. One afternoon in Camagüey, a beautiful, decaying city in east-central Cuba, an elderly woman in a wheelchair called out to me as I passed her open front door.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“We have to tell people that God exists,” she said, in an urgent tone. “God’s word has to be fulfilled in its entirety.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;One of her children had left the country, and the other one, a high-school teacher, was in prison; she said he’d been given a 14-year sentence for accusing a high-ranking official of corruption. The old woman was living alone, and the only thing she had left was her faith.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In Havana, I visited a nursing home owned by the Catholic Church that was full of former civil servants and military officers. In one room I found a dozen old men, their beds lined up about a yard apart. Each had a single narrow locker for all of his earthly possessions. A nurse gave me permission to speak with residents but cautioned me that they were “very sad.” Many of them, she explained, had had distinguished government careers but had found themselves abandoned by both the state and their family at the end of their life. In many cases, their children had left the country.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/57ruQoCDKwGHZA22-Ep-izOJQ7A=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_5/original.jpg" width="982" height="654" alt="two elderly men sit and eat a meal while another man walks forward" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_5/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14401165" data-image-id="1867133" data-orig-w="2880" data-orig-h="1920"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Moises Saman / Magnum for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;People in need receive a meal at the Concatedral de Nuestra Señora de la Asunción, a Catholic church in Baracoa.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;One of the men, a wiry 65-year-old, had fought for two years in Angola, where Castro had sent hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the 1970s and ’80s to support a Communist-aligned government. The former soldier had once been a fan of the revolution; you could tell because he had a big tattoo of Che Guevara on his right arm. He’d gotten it when he was 18. He showed me several scars left over from battles in Africa, and I asked him how he felt about the situation in the country.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1964/09/cubas-fumbling-marxism-an-eyewitness-account/305929/?utm_source=feed"&gt;From the September 1964 issue: An eyewitness account of Cuba’s fumbling Marxism&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;He answered with an expletive. I asked him what should be done to make things better. Cuba needed to be bombed, he told me. Specifically, Raúl Castro, Fidel’s brother and successor, should be bombed. And Raúl’s daughter Mariela. And the prime minister, Manuel Marrero Cruz.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Again and again during my travels on the island, people told me: &lt;em&gt;Cuba is not like this&lt;/em&gt;. They didn’t just mean the hunger and sickness and lack of electricity. They meant the anger, the emptiness, the absence of music and laughter.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;There used to be a musical group on every corner of Santiago, an 81-year-old man who had spent 45 years as a singer in a band recalled. Now there were none.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;After the 1959 &lt;/span&gt;revolution, Fidel Castro &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://apnews.com/article/cuba-religion-diversity-communist-catholic-santeria-1a471b0c0100140d2f74c0ce1f6e03ac"&gt;enshrined atheism&lt;/a&gt; in the new state, exiling many prominent Catholic figures and sending believers to reeducation camps. But in a sense, he did not so much banish religion as create a new cult, with its own rituals and holy martyrs. That cult staggers on today in a weird half life, abandoned by most of its people after decades of misery and repression, yet somehow defying a final collapse.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/BGeLkqKYOohfQulNI43AreROLV4=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_4/original.jpg" width="982" height="655" alt="guards march in unison behind an iron gate" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_4/original.jpg" data-thumb-id="14401166" data-image-id="1867135" data-orig-w="2880" data-orig-h="1922"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Moises Saman / Magnum for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Soldiers perform a changing-of-the-guard ceremony at Santa Ifigenia Cemetery in Santiago, where Fidel Castro’s remains are entombed.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;The only immaculately clean place I saw in all of Cuba was the Santa Ifigenia Cemetery, where Fidel’s ashes are held, in Santiago. The grass there is green and mowed to razor-perfection, the walkways carefully swept; not a single visitor was in sight when I went there.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As I stood looking at the rounded granite boulder that marks Fidel’s tomb, patriotic music began blaring from invisible loudspeakers, and an honor guard of soldiers in neatly pressed uniforms began goose-stepping in unison, rifles pointed skyward. They marched to the mausoleum honoring José Martí, Cuba’s great nationalist hero; presented arms; and relieved a group of similarly uniformed compatriots, who marched back. They do this changing of the guard every half hour, all day long, I was told.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Watching those perfect soldiers, you could believe for a moment that you were in another place—perhaps that far-off country Castro had dreamed of, where socialism is triumphant, no one is sick or unhappy, and &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1988/08/cuba-havanas-military-machine/305932/?utm_source=feed"&gt;everyone aspires&lt;/a&gt; to follow the heroic example of the man who led a glorious revolution. Then a breeze swept across the grass, carrying the acrid stench of burning garbage, and I remembered where I was.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt;This article appears in the &lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/toc/2026/12/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt;December 2026&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt; print edition with the headline “How Castro’s Cuba Ends.”&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Robert F. Worth</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/robert-worth/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/7ac3QpqrnkPMaBhUBI6PZR5AUsk=/0x300:2880x1920/media/img/2026/10/2026_10_23_cuba_rw_3-1/original.jpg"><media:credit>Moises Saman / Magnum for The Atlantic</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The Collapse of Cuba</title><published>2026-10-26T09:00:00-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-27T11:31:55-04:00</updated><summary type="html">Hunger. Sickness. Blackouts. Abandoned streets. The withering of the state is shocking to behold.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/2026/12/post-revolutionary-cuba-society-religion/689018/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689118</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;On April 7, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson gave a &lt;a href="https://www.lbjlibrary.org/object/text/address-johns-hopkins-university-peace-without-conquest-04-07-1965"&gt;speech&lt;/a&gt; at Johns Hopkins University in which he effectively offered to build the equivalent of the Tennessee Valley Authority for North Vietnam on the condition that Hanoi cease supporting the insurgency in South Vietnam. On the helicopter ride back from the speech, Johnson &lt;a href="https://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-0z70v89m87"&gt;leaned&lt;/a&gt; across to an assistant, put his hand on his knee, and said of Ho Chi Minh, the North Vietnamese leader, “Old Ho can’t turn that down, Old Ho can’t turn that down.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Ho did turn Johnson down. Today, the incident is taught in political-psychology courses to illustrate how presidents can naively think that transactional politics, commonplace in states and cities, will work on the global stage, only to find out that nationalism, ideology, and rivalry matter more.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Donald Trump has fallen into the same trap with Vladimir Putin, apparently believing that the right economic incentives will persuade the Russian leader to make peace. This approach is not working. Instead, it’s closing off the one realistic pathway to end the conflict with Ukraine, and making the war likelier to expand and worsen.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Early in his second term, Trump was surprised that Putin would not end the war quickly with a freezing of the territorial lines and a promise that Ukraine would not join NATO. Rather than seeking to improve Ukraine’s position on the battlefield or apply leverage against Russia through sanctions, Trump decided to convince Putin that peace would be financially rewarding. Trump pulled his Ukraine envoy, Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg, off the negotiating team after the Kremlin &lt;a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-urkaine-war-kremlin-keith-kellogg-special-envoy-barred-talks-rcna195981"&gt;complained&lt;/a&gt; that he was too favorable to Ukrainians and replaced him with his friend Steve Witkoff, a real-estate tycoon. The Russian financier Kirill Dmitriev would be Trump’s conduit to Putin.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/05/russia-putin-kirill-dmitriev/687283/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Robert F. Worth: The magician of the Kremlin&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Witkoff and Dmitriev worked out a deal almost a year ago that included a full lifting of sanctions, joint U.S.-Russian business ventures, and even Russia’s readmission to the G7 (turning it into the G8), but it foundered on Putin’s demand that Ukraine cede territory on the battlefield. Witkoff and Dmitriev continued their efforts.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The latest version emerged in the past week as U.S.-Ukraine relations reached their lowest point since the Oval Office bust-up in February 2025. Trump and Putin struck an agreement in which Russia would &lt;a href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117412435306815143"&gt;provide&lt;/a&gt; diesel fuel to the United States and global markets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky slammed the arrangement, saying that it was “not fair and honest” and that it looked like “a happy-birthday present for Putin.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;An infuriated Trump called for Zelensky to be replaced and said that he was harder to deal with than Putin. In the days that followed, Kyiv accused Washington of curtailing intelligence cooperation, including by withholding information on incoming ballistic-missile strikes (the administration denied this). The &lt;i&gt;Financial Times&lt;/i&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.ft.com/content/54353d3a-afed-4fec-985a-50f3dfb9be8e"&gt;reported&lt;/a&gt; that the administration is considering returning some of the frozen assets to Russia as an incentive for a partial cease-fire. Trump then waived sanctions on Russia under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, saying that doing so was in the national interest of the United States. On Truth Social, Trump &lt;a href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117463828588421761"&gt;posted&lt;/a&gt; that he was in negotiations to end the war and didn’t “want to do anything that will drive, foolishly, Russia away from the bargaining table.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As U.S.-Ukrainian relations seemed to nose-dive, the administration tried to convey a larger rationale behind its decision making. A senior official &lt;a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/10/12/kushner-witkoff-ukraine-peace-plan-takes-shape-behind-scenes/"&gt;told&lt;/a&gt; &lt;i&gt;The Washington Post&lt;/i&gt;’s David Ignatius that because a Ukraine deal was proving difficult to negotiate, the White House would enlarge the problem and negotiate a regional deal. This would include provisions to supply energy to Europe through a new pipeline, with profits to be shared between Ukraine and Russia, and the resolution of Moscow’s differences with European countries.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This proposal is, in effect, the Johnson plan. The naivete behind it would perhaps be excusable if Putin were a new leader with no track record, but he is a known quantity. Ukraine is his obsession, his white whale. He wants to subjugate it and has proved that he will pay an enormous price to achieve this goal.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The immediate diplomatic problem that Trump needs to solve is that Putin will not settle for anything less than the surrender of additional territory by Ukraine, which is something no Ukrainian leader can accept. Putin stands little chance of taking this territory by force: The front line is largely static, thanks to the saturation of the area with drones. However, the Russian leader has two hopes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;One is to break Ukraine this winter with a brutal air offensive that would destroy its energy grid and deliver misery to millions. Maybe such pressure would cause Ukraine’s front line to collapse or lead Kyiv to accept Moscow’s demands at the negotiating table.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The other prospect is to escalate Russia’s shadow war against Ukraine’s European partners. Moscow is already linked to assassination plots, arson, and the planting of explosive-laden drones in airports. A number of European leaders, including Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and French President Emmanuel Macron, have &lt;a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/20/baltic-spy-chiefs-warn-moscow-is-preparing-for-more-decisive-action-in-europe"&gt;warned &lt;/a&gt;that Russia is considering hitting Eastern European states with drone and missile attacks that it would later deny. Putin hopes that this shadow war will weaken European governments and bring to power parties that will cut off aid to Ukraine and pressure it to capitulate to Russia’s demands.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/09/putin-russia-europe-trump-war/688565/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Russia’s real strategy in Europe&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;If Putin succeeds in these two gambits—weakening Ukraine over the winter while stoking unrest in Europe—he will be confident that Russia can grind out a bloody victory over the next couple of years.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Putin seems to think that time is on his side. Trump’s concessions reinforce that perception. But if Trump can change Putin’s expectations about the future, a diplomatic deal might become possible. In particular, Trump must convince Putin that the war will not get any better for Russia, and that the deal he can get now is better than the one he can get later.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This means doing everything possible to ensure that Ukraine survives Putin’s winter campaign: supplying Kyiv with as much air defense as possible, providing advance warning of incoming missiles, encouraging allies to seize Russia’s sovereign assets to provide Ukraine with economic relief, and helping Ukraine impose costs on Russia.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It also means helping Europe deter Putin from escalating his shadow war against NATO members. This is difficult but doable. Europe needs to convince Putin that increased attacks, especially any that result in casualties, will deepen Europe’s and the United States’ involvement in the Ukraine conflict. For instance, Europe could say that if Russia launches missiles or drones against NATO members, a European coalition will place air defenses in western Ukraine. Trump could tell Putin that if Russia keeps harassing Europe, he will clear the way with Elon Musk for Ukraine to use Starlink to hit military targets inside of Russia.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;If one of Russia’s attacks resulted in mass casualties, such as the downing of a civilian airliner, the allies could designate Russia a state sponsor of terrorism. When I served at the National Security Council in the Biden administration, we communicated this to the Russians after they &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/05/world/europe/russia-plot-dhl-planes.html"&gt;plotted&lt;/a&gt; to place flammable devices on airliners carrying DHL packages. We made clear that such a designation would likely lead to the closure of the Russian embassy in the United States. They stopped the plots.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Helping Ukraine survive the winter and deterring Russian attacks on Europe will help keep diplomacy alive. But to close the deal, Trump needs to convince Putin that his window of opportunity is closing. Here, Trump’s political weakness could work to his advantage.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Putin surely fears that Trump’s successor—if a Democrat or a Republican other than J. D. Vance—will be more favorable to Ukraine. A new administration will likely increase U.S. support for Ukraine and rebalance any deal made in the Trump years, possibly linking sanctions relief to Russian withdrawal from all of Ukraine.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Trump could turn this prospect into leverage. He can tell Putin that the opportunity for a favorable deal is real, but that it may not last forever. Only he can deliver it. If Putin keeps fighting, he will not make territorial gains, Ukraine will survive and retain the capacity to strike inside of Russia, Europe will become more involved, and the favorable terms will expire.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Then Trump needs to get serious about revising the offer so that it is acceptable to Ukraine. At a minimum, that means a freezing of the territorial lines, and no legal recognition of the occupied territory.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Trump wants to be remembered as the president who ended the war in Ukraine, but unless he changes course, he may instead be remembered as the president who gave Putin the confidence to widen and prolong it. Trump has spent nearly two years trying to convince Putin that peace will be more rewarding than war. To get a cease-fire, he must now convince him that war will be more costly than peace.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Thomas Wright</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/thomas-wright/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/eUDUCEjnTe-vnecvr-zqNM07yJk=/media/img/mt/2026/10/2026_10_22_policy_mpg/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by Matteo Giuseppe Pani / The Atlantic. Sources: Kent Nishimura / AFP / Getty; Mikhail Metzel / POOL / AFP / Getty.</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Why Trump Can’t Sell Putin a Deal</title><published>2026-10-23T07:00:00-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-23T07:00:57-04:00</updated><summary type="html">Economic incentives don’t persuade the Russian leader. Here’s what could.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/trump-putin-ukraine-nato/689118/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689088</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;As China’s manufacturers&lt;/span&gt; flood the global market with cars, chips, and just about everything else, the country’s economic juggernaut seems unstoppable. Policy makers in the United States and elsewhere fret that this onslaught will overrun their own industries, destroy jobs, and leave them reliant on a rival for vital products. But a growing number of Chinese factories are failing to produce at least one crucial thing: a profit. According to the London-based research firm Capital Economics, the &lt;a href="https://www.capitaleconomics.com/publications/china-economics-focus/how-long-can-chinese-industry-keep-losing-money"&gt;share&lt;/a&gt; of Chinese industrial firms that are losing money has doubled since 2018 to 30 percent this year.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Losses are piling up at Chinese firms even as exports surge. Local governments regularly prop up unprofitable enterprises to preserve employment and meet economic targets. This has had a perverse effect throughout the country. An economic program that was meant to make China stronger and more independent has in fact made it more vulnerable to the policies of other countries.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Profitability was never a top priority of the Chinese Communist Party. Economic planners have assumed that a large manufacturing base is essential to China’s national security, technological advancement, political stability, and global influence. China’s leaders therefore value the production, exports, and jobs that factories generate far more than any financial return on their investments. As a result, China’s economy has long been cluttered with “zombie” companies: effectively bankrupt firms that are kept alive by creditors.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/08/china-beijing-communist-xi-favorability/688454/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Michael Schuman: China is flatlining&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But as the economy has slumped in recent years, the strain on Chinese companies has increased and their finances have deteriorated. Total net profit at 5,400 Chinese companies listed on local stock exchanges fell for the third consecutive year in 2025, according to &lt;a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/economy/china-corporate-earnings-down-for-3rd-straight-year"&gt;data&lt;/a&gt; from &lt;i&gt;Nikkei Asia&lt;/i&gt;, a Japanese business news outlet. Excess factory capacity and weak domestic demand have created a brutal competition for shoppers, and the resulting price wars have narrowed profit margins.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In market-based economies, unprofitable companies either fold or reorganize. In China, however, the government tends to sustain uncompetitive companies. Major banks, controlled largely by the state, roll over loans for troubled enterprises that can’t pay. Government officials offer tax breaks, subsidies, and general support to reduce costs, stimulate sales, or engineer bailouts. In an analysis of subsidies received by industrial firms in major economies from 2005 to 2024, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development found that Chinese state support was as much as eight times larger than government assistance elsewhere.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This advantage serves Beijing’s agenda. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has promoted manufacturing to expand China’s global power and make the country less reliant on foreign supplies. American CEOs, who are under constant pressure to increase shareholder value and post ever larger quarterly profits, have to compete with Chinese companies that can simply slash prices, grab market share, and not worry as much about the bottom line. “I don’t think Xi Jinping thinks in terms of profits. I don’t think he cares,” Mark Williams, the chief Asia economist at Capital Economics, told me. Instead, Xi knows that getting other countries hooked on Chinese supplies “gives China a huge amount of leverage.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;But profits do matter. &lt;/span&gt;Without them, companies have fewer resources to invest and grow; in China’s case, they become more reliant on the state for their survival, which has knock-on effects for everyone. Capital thrown away on unproductive businesses can’t be invested in profitable ventures. Banks forced to direct funds to loss-making enterprises have trouble making money themselves, which limits their ability to lend. These inefficiencies are contributing to a massive rise in the nation’s debt-to-GDP ratio in the nonfinancial sector, which has nearly doubled since 2010 and now &lt;a href="https://fortune.com/2026/10/11/china-debt-interest-costs-fastest-budget-category-loans-public-private-gdp-growth/"&gt;exceeds 300 percent&lt;/a&gt;. By crowding the market with uncompetitive firms, China’s state-led economic policies make it harder for any company to turn a profit. This has resulted in an economy that is not quite collapsing, but is suffering a “prolonged decay,” &lt;a href="https://rhg.com/research/chinas-financial-and-fiscal-decay/"&gt;according to&lt;/a&gt; Logan Wright, a partner at the research firm Rhodium Group.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The more money that Chinese companies lose, the more the government must spend to sustain its economic model. Policy makers no longer have a lot of cash to spare. Government revenues declined in 2025. Tax collectors, scrambling for funds, are &lt;a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-tycoons-made-fortunes-offshore-now-the-party-is-over-7f5289ad"&gt;cracking down&lt;/a&gt; on Chinese tycoons who hold their wealth outside the country.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Xi could reduce the strain on the economy and help Chinese companies by stimulating domestic demand for their products. But he continues to show no interest in introducing the politically sensitive reforms that could encourage more household spending, such as building a stronger social safety net. Facing an unstable job market and slumping property prices, Chinese consumers are reluctant to shop—car sales, for instance, in China have &lt;a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-10/china-passenger-vehicle-retail-sales-drop-24-in-september"&gt;plunged&lt;/a&gt; by more than 20 percent so far this year.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;These problems at home have forced Chinese manufacturers to search more desperately for profits abroad. China’s &lt;a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-14/china-s-trade-surplus-nears-940-billion-as-export-growth-surges"&gt;trade surplus&lt;/a&gt; is on track this year to break the 2025 record of $1.2 trillion. But exports are no panacea. Chinese automakers shipped &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/chinas-car-exports-roar-august-while-domestic-sales-extend-declines-2026-09-08/"&gt;nearly 80 percent&lt;/a&gt; more cars overseas in August than they did a year earlier, but their profits still sank by 16 percent. In theory, Chinese manufacturers that gain market share should also gain more power to raise prices and increase profits. But their greater reliance on foreign customers leaves them vulnerable to protectionism. If policy makers around the world impose tariffs or other barriers on Chinese goods, the pressure on China’s economy may be too much for Beijing to bear. The Chinese government has already been scaling back tax breaks that help electric-vehicle companies even as the industry’s profits suffer.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;China’s leaders have largely managed to keep global markets open to its subsidized exports because most trading partners are wary of confronting Beijing. But as Chinese exports surge, Beijing is facing greater opposition to its predatory trade practices. The United States has already taken steps to protect its strategic industries, in part by slapping high tariffs on Chinese EV makers, effectively shutting them out of the American market. In a mostly contentious meeting of G20 finance ministers in September, a rare &lt;a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/u-s-says-its-fed-up-with-chinas-overcapacityand-more-countries-agree-ec6cc8e5"&gt;moment of amity&lt;/a&gt; involved a statement that criticized countries that rely too heavily on exports for growth—an implicit rebuke of China, which was the only member not to sign on. Even Russia, China’s supposed close friend, approved.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/2026/01/china-electric-cars-america/685734/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Patrick George: The firewall against Chinese cars is cracking&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In a report published earlier this year called “&lt;a href="https://www.strategie-plan.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/2026/2026-02-09%20-%20Rouleau%20compresseur%20chinois/HCSP-2026-REPORT-THE%20CHINESE%20STEAMROLLER-18fevrier14h30-COUV.pdf"&gt;The Chinese Steamroller&lt;/a&gt;,” the French government’s High Commission for Strategy and Planning asserted that China’s export surge “now threatens and directly affects the very core of Europe’s productive system.” Germany’s Volkswagen, undercut by Chinese automakers, announced in September that the company’s decade-long restructuring would include cuts to 100,000 jobs—&lt;a href="https://www.wsj.com/business/autos/volkswagen-board-approves-plan-to-cut-workforce-model-portfolio-ac933812"&gt;double&lt;/a&gt; earlier plans. Europe’s ballooning trade deficit with China, which has more than doubled over the past decade, has recently motivated European Union officials to &lt;a href="https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/with-china-facing-more-trade-barriers-it-cant-afford-to-lose-europe-d041ab25"&gt;discuss&lt;/a&gt; new mechanisms to block Chinese imports.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Protectionism in Europe would be especially damaging to Chinese companies, which can tap European consumers with bigger spending power than in many other parts of the world. Beijing had initially threatened to retaliate against proposed trade barriers by targeting European businesses—but earlier this month, Chinese leaders unexpectedly blinked. To avoid tariffs, Beijing agreed to a cap on exports of hybrid cars to Europe—a plan that could halve the number of these cars entering the EU over the next four years. By making this relatively minor concession, China’s leaders likely hope to stave off a wider trade war that could inflict even more harm on the domestic economy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Global trade is becoming a grudge match between a stretched but determined Beijing and its frustrated trading partners. At the moment, Xi still holds the upper hand: Advanced democracies, leaderless in the age of Donald Trump, have been slow to organize against his ambitions. But the struggles of Chinese companies—and their overreliance on foreign markets—undercut Xi’s leverage. How he navigates these negotiations and trade-offs will directly affect companies and consumers not only in China but around the world. At the moment, Xi seems set on ushering in an era of greater economic conflict in which everyone loses.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Michael Schuman</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/michael-schuman/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/Ljvz57XWCrEUthyxFlgnWKkAqHE=/media/img/mt/2026/10/2026_10_22_Chinas_No_Profit_Economy_Michael_Schuman/original.jpg"><media:credit>Cheng Xin / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">China’s Economy Has a Huge Weakness</title><published>2026-10-22T08:13:00-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-22T09:03:56-04:00</updated><summary type="html">Local manufacturers are struggling to make one very important thing.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/chinese-companies-profit-problem/689088/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:39-689033</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Photographs by Lynsey Addario&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt;Updated at 11:08 a.m. ET on October 27, 2026&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h2 style="text-align: center;"&gt;I.&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;We drifted past&lt;/span&gt; abandoned drilling platforms, ghostly remnants of better days. Cormorants perched on the metal bars of broken oil rigs, drying their wings in the sun. When we reached a swirling, brown-green oil slick, Carlos slowed his motor. Raw oil could damage the engine, he said, and we’d already had to return to shore once that day to swap boats. We floated for a bit. Carlos, who makes his living as a fisherman on Lake Maracaibo, pointed out some surface bubbles, evidence of a leaky pipeline beneath the water. There was a strong smell of gas. He lit a cigarette anyway and laughed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That morning, Carlos and his team had caught about 30 pounds of fish in the lake, a brackish estuary where oil was discovered more than a century ago. The subsequent boom built the cities of Caracas and Maracaibo, three generations of wealth, and four decades of democracy. A century later, tens of billions of barrels’ worth of reserves remain beneath the water. Some of them might now be controlled by the American government.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;They will not be easy to extract. After the boom came the bust, at first slowly and then very fast. Hugo Chávez, who ruled the country as a leftist authoritarian from 1999 to 2013, and then Nicolás Maduro, the autocrat who succeeded Chávez and ran the country until he was removed by an American military operation early this year, undermined the industry, chasing away engineers and impoverishing workers. Even as they said they were building “Bolivarian socialism,” they removed benefits, lowered salaries, and created a capricious, repressive regime. Millions of people left the country.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Most American and European companies left too. The Russian and Chinese companies that arrived to replace them invested very little. Lake Maracaibo, the largest body of water in South America, also became one of the &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://apnews.com/article/lake-maracaibo-venezuela-pollution-fishermen-ca80fea76eece2e733285d44b8dbdd80"&gt;largest environmental disasters in South America&lt;/a&gt;. Two decades of neglect produced leaks, spills, poisoned water, and the ghostly drilling platforms I saw from the fishing boat. Fishermen sometimes rinse their crabs and shrimp with gasoline to remove the crude oil. All of their nets turn brown.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Billions of dollars of investment will be needed to remediate the site and recover more oil. In the meantime, people who live around the lake, like millions of other Venezuelans, work hard and earn very little. Their fish have to be sold immediately, because electricity is unpredictable and freezers are thus unreliable. Rapid inflation—20 percent in July, an annualized rate of 783 percent—has made everything unaffordable. In a Caracas market, I found prices and exchange rates written on whiteboards, because they change every day.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure role="group" class="full-bleed"&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/x-pzmE2kERiOTZVISXjiRXPy6DI=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumOilBroken/original.png" width="665" height="443" alt="a photo of a collapsed transmission tower in Venezuela's Lake Maracaibo" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumOilBroken/original.png" data-thumb-id="14393907" data-image-id="1866284" data-orig-w="2000" data-orig-h="1333"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;A collapsed high-voltage transmission tower in Lake Maracaibo, amid other deteriorating oil and electrical infrastructure&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/Z-K4K_BjYKfYpKnOavbxHcQGAig=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumOilWater/original.png" width="665" height="443" alt="two children play along the shore of Lake Maracaibo in the background, while in the foreground, a man holds an orange bucket" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumOilWater/original.png" data-thumb-id="14393908" data-image-id="1866285" data-orig-w="2000" data-orig-h="1333"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Fishermen and their families live along the polluted shores of the lake, the largest body of water in South America—and one of the continent’s largest environmental disasters. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;The state is absent, or indifferent. Carlos pointed to a scar on his leg that he said was an old gunshot wound, the souvenir of an assault by one of the pirates who control the lake: “If you don’t pay them, they kill you and take your boat.” The coast guard is supposed to patrol the lake, he said, but it is rarely there.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The oil industry offers few well-paying jobs. At a lakeside town, its beaches blackened by oil, Francisco, a former boat mechanic at the state oil company⁠—Petróleos de Venezuela, or PDVSA—told me he had quit because he got tired of not having the right tools and spare parts. One of Francisco’s neighbors, Iliana, told me her husband had quit PDVSA too, after his salary plummeted from $50 a day to just a few cents a day. He now works for a Russian company that pays about $35 a day, but he has to spend most nights sleeping on the drilling platform.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;From a great distance—Washington, say, or Mar-a-Lago⁠—Venezuela is sometimes described as a bonanza for America, a trove of riches. On January 3, the day that the U.S. military captured Maduro, Donald Trump promised that it would be. “We’ll run it properly; we’ll run it professionally,” he said at a press conference that day. “We’ll have the greatest oil companies in the world going and invest billions and billions of dollars, and take out money, use that money in Venezuela, and the biggest beneficiary are gonna be the people of Venezuela.” But at that same press conference, he also announced that he would be working with a new president: Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s deputy and a leading member of the regime that had caused the destruction in the first place. He dismissed the country’s opposition leader, &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/10/maria-machado-nobel-peace-prize/684510/?utm_source=feed"&gt;María Corina Machado&lt;/a&gt;—who was the true winner of Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election—as a “nice woman” who “doesn’t have the respect within the country.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In Venezuela, this language sounded jarring. Since then, it has become even more confusing, because it is so at odds with reality. When I asked people living right next to some of Venezuela’s largest oil fields whether Rodríguez had made any difference to the industry or the country, they laughed or sneered. Iliana told me, “People thought that things would change, but in reality nothing changed.” José, another fisherman who used to work for PDVSA, had a darker view: “The gringos came to rob everything—the oil, the minerals. We are rich in everything, but here, we don’t have anything.” Later, a local oil engineer told me that none of the American agreements matters anyway, because the Venezuelan government is illegitimate and so “nothing is legal.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;These opinions are widely shared. Perhaps surprisingly, given the disparate worlds they inhabit, the views of Maracaibo fishermen are not far from those of Ricardo Hausmann, a Harvard economist who served decades ago in a very different Venezuelan government, one that opened the country’s natural resources to foreign investment through a transparent process. In the 1990s, PDVSA explained to legislators, foreign companies, and the public what it was doing. Contracts were made public. Money produced by oil investments long funded social programs, including scholarships to study at American universities. These produced warm feelings toward America among educated Venezuelans that outlasted years of Chavista anti-gringo propaganda.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The political and business relationship now being forged between America and Venezuela is completely different. It’s not a relationship of two equals, obviously. But nor is it exactly an occupation. Some have compared it to the Anglo-Persian oil deal of the early 20th century, or the 1905 treaty that gave the U.S. government control over the customs service of the Dominican Republic, but neither of those analogies is quite apt. Searching for a model or a reference point, I asked Hausmann how he would describe it. “A coalition of two kleptocracies,” he said.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/8GeiOHGZQ_1gAGrCtRr5Fnqgtmw=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumOilWoman/original.png" width="982" height="655" alt="a woman wearing a pink shirt and orange shirt sweeps debris with a rake, with oil derricks in the background" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumOilWoman/original.png" data-thumb-id="14393906" data-image-id="1866283" data-orig-w="2000" data-orig-h="1333"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Clauimar Aguiar lives beside an oil field in Cabimas, Venezuela, where vast petroleum reserves coexist with poverty and failing infrastructure.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;h2 style="text-align: center;"&gt;II.&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;What happens&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;to&lt;/span&gt; Venezuelan oil when it is pumped out of the ground? Where does the money go afterward? And how did that change following Trump’s announcement, on August 28, of “THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN WORLD HISTORY”? None of these questions has a simple answer. Over several days in Caracas and Madrid (where much of the Venezuelan opposition currently resides), and in telephone calls to Boston and Houston, I asked six people—two formerly in the oil industry, two still in the industry, and two in academia—to explain the details. All of them struggled to do so. One of them, an industry executive in Caracas who would speak only off the record, covered four pages of my notebook in diagrams and drawings, taking more than an hour and a half to explain how the previous legal system had worked, how a hydrocarbon law had been rewritten, how the new deals were unfolding and the old deals were being revised.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Perhaps the complexity is the point: Maybe the situation is hard to understand because neither the Rodríguez regime nor the Trump administration really wants anyone to understand it. Hausmann told me the Venezuelan constitution says that “anything of national interest should be approved by parliament, by the National Assembly. They haven’t done that, and so right now they are protecting themselves through obscurity.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Despite the obfuscation, some of what Trump says is true: The U.S. really is controlling the sale of “millions and millions of barrels of oil” in Venezuela, as well as the sale of gold and other minerals. As a condition of lifting the economic sanctions that the U.S. had previously imposed on the country, all royalties and taxes from licensed companies are deposited into a special account originally set up in Qatar and later moved to Citibank. Industry analysts believe that more than $13 billion worth of oil has been sold since January, but that number is speculative. At a congressional hearing on September 15, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent refused to confirm it. Repeated requests from congressional Democrats for more information have also received inadequate responses.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some of the funds have been returned to the Venezuelan government. At another congressional hearing, a State Department official told legislators that money was being provided to pay “the salaries of government workers in Venezuela,” among other things. Hard currency is also made available to Venezuelan banks. But although there is no evidence that money is being stolen or siphoned off to pay for other Trump-administration projects, there is also no evidence that it is &lt;em&gt;not&lt;/em&gt; being stolen or siphoned off. Ostensibly, the accounting firm KPMG is auditing the process, but despite requests from Democrats in Congress, an audit was not released by the October 8 deadline. In his congressional appearance, Bessent did not say if or when it would be.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Opacity has consequences. Partly thanks to this system, the major new investments necessary for a real recovery have been slow in coming. The old oil fields I saw near Maracaibo, as well as the untouched reserves in the Orinoco River belt, will require billions of dollars and very long time horizons to develop or redevelop. Any company planning such a project needs to believe that its contracts, and the political and social stability required to preserve them, will last for a decade or more. Francisco Monaldi, an oil-industry analyst at Rice University, told me that although the new hydrocarbon law, passed on January 29 under American pressure, is an improvement, it still affords Venezuela’s Ministry of Oil the flexibility “to give you the best deal in Latin America, or the worst”—and then to change the terms of that deal later if it chooses. No wonder the current situation—an unpopular, illegitimate Venezuelan president propped up by an unpredictable and term-limited U.S. president—makes big companies nervous.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;If the oil companies would prefer an elected Venezuelan president and a stable political system, this is not a matter of benign, high-minded principle. Oil executives “are not in the business of charity; these are not nuns,” Monaldi said. “But these guys know when things are being done in a way that will eventually create trouble for them.” With the exception of Chevron, which remained in Venezuela throughout the Chávez-Maduro era and is still reinvesting the revenues it earns in the country (although nothing more), most large companies have merely sent envoys to Caracas, signed memorandums of understanding, and returned home. Gold refiners are equally ambivalent about processing the Venezuelan gold bars that a &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/28/world/americas/venezuela-gold-trump.html"&gt;Trump-friendly company removed from the country&lt;/a&gt;, according to &lt;em&gt;The New York Times&lt;/em&gt;, because the gold was likely mined by criminal organizations and the industry has strict rules about proof of origin.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Trump’s “biggest oil deal in world history” seems to have been designed to encourage American companies to start drilling faster and, more important for him, to distract from the oil crisis created by his war in Iran. But the announcement may have had the opposite effect because the deal, at least as it has been described in public, is even more opaque than the existing arrangement, and is even more unpopular. After the announcement, thousands of people left angry messages on the U.S. embassy’s social-media pages, reflecting both fury and surprise. And no wonder: The U.S. administration’s main business partner is a company called North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), whose notorious CEO, Alejandro Betancourt, is a household name in Venezuela. Betancourt has been investigated for money laundering in multiple countries, including the United States, Switzerland, and Spain. (He has previously denied wrongdoing and has never been charged with a crime.) After being arrested at London’s Charing Cross Station on a Swiss warrant in November 2025, he was stuck in England for more than six months while the extradition case proceeded. Spanish police searched his estate outside Madrid as recently as August 28. &lt;em&gt;The Washington Post&lt;/em&gt; reported that the Trump administration &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/08/27/us-intervened-criminal-probe-venezuelan-oilman-alejandro-betancourt/"&gt;pressured Swiss officials to halt an investigation and lift an extradition request&lt;/a&gt;, seemingly in order to allow Betancourt to travel to the U.S. and Venezuela and close the deal.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-bleed"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/jaxAQS39xZw3hRN4Sp_0TIVp5zc=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumPowerOut/original.png" width="1600" height="1066" alt="four men play checkers at night while a fifth watches at a table set up in the street" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumPowerOut/original.png" data-thumb-id="14393910" data-image-id="1866287" data-orig-w="2000" data-orig-h="1333"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Venezuelans play dominoes by flashlight during a rolling blackout in Maracaibo. Although the region sits atop some of the country’s largest oil and gas reserves, many residents spend much of the day without electricity. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;Inside the country, Betancourt is infamous for bungling an upgrade of the electricity grid, overcharging for used, poor-quality equipment and enriching himself in the process. People openly blame him for blackouts and power cuts that continue to this day. An opposition leader told me that he’d been hearing Betancourt’s name cited as an example of regime corruption since he was a teenager. The fishermen in Lake Maracaibo knew exactly who he was, and everyone else I met did too. An analyst in Madrid told me that everything he thought he understood about U.S. intentions in Venezuela had been upended by the deal with Betancourt.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Like the system of oil payments, the deal with Betancourt is also suspiciously difficult to describe. In essence, the Venezuelan government has allocated 17 oil fields to NABEP, a company originally created with an American businessman, Harry Sargeant. According to the White House, the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital has acquired not ownership but “a 35% equity stake in its corporate parent”; others explained that the acquisition is a share in a contract, but this is again uncertain. The State Department seems to get the right to buy 20 percent of NABEP’s oil at production cost—whatever that means—as well as the first right of refusal on the other 80 percent. Some analysts told me they fear that the Rodríguez regime, to stay in power, will sell its oil below market prices.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;No money was exchanged, and none has been invested. The Pentagon and NABEP are now responsible for attracting people who actually know how to drill oil to Venezuela—including to places without roads or infrastructure of any kind. I asked several oil analysts and economists, inside and outside the country, if the Trump administration and Betancourt could simply give drilling contracts to their respective friend groups in America and Venezuela. They all said yes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A few people did try to see a glass half full. If more oil is pumped, then at least some money will eventually reach people, for example, which is better than no money. “It’s a process,” said Enrique Novoa, the former president of the Venezuelan Petroleum Chamber. “Tomorrow we hope to work a little bit better than today.” But even among those trying to look favorably on the deal, everyone I met was either surprised or confused that the United States—a longtime critic of the Marxist language and statist practices of the Chávez and Maduro regimes—had so quickly and enthusiastically embraced the corrupt habits, and the corrupt personnel, of the Chavista elite.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At the end of the day I spent floating through the postapocalyptic landscape of Lake Maracaibo, I met Juan Pablo Guanipa, one of the best-known opposition leaders in Venezuela. Guanipa, who lives in Maracaibo, was released in February after eight months in prison. He was detained on the street the next day, placed under house arrest, and then released again. He is still followed by the Venezuelan security service wherever he goes. Sitting in a room filled with books, we talked about the oil deal, the poor economy, the rising frustrations of Venezuelans.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I asked him whether he found the new union between Americans and Chavistas peculiar. Of course he did, he told me. Most perplexing to him, it seemed, was the absence of Yankee pragmatism, the most basic thing Venezuelans expected of Americans. At the very least, American capitalists should know about the rule of law. “I never thought we would reach a moment when we would have to convince the United States of the obvious—that Venezuela needs a legitimate government, that we need elections, and that we need change.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h2 style="text-align: center;"&gt;III.&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;There is a straightforward&lt;/span&gt; way for Venezuela to acquire a legitimate government, one that would reassure both oil companies and ordinary people that a stable political and social order will endure: The regime could hold an election or a referendum, and let people choose the next president.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The U.S. administration, which not only controls Venezuela’s most important sources of income but also holds the threat of further U.S. military action over the heads of Maduro’s former henchmen, could help make this happen. Indeed, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has repeatedly said that it will. He has described a three-stage process: stabilization, recovery, and transition. With American encouragement, the regime and a part of the opposition—members of the last legislature recognized as legitimate, elected in 2015—have begun transition negotiations. Several people involved told me that although slow, the negotiations have been productive. In the first round, in August, discussions focused on reforming the supreme court, which slavishly followed the demands of the Maduro government, and which must be independent to ensure that the regime does not refuse to recognize an election result, as it has done in the past.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, many still aren’t convinced that the transition is real. In large part, this is because Trump’s description of Venezuela—a country where he says people are “really happy” and “dancing in the streets”—differs so dramatically from the reality they can see. But it’s also because Trump seems so enthusiastic about a status quo that includes Betancourt, Rodríguez, and a host of other figures from the past. A few days after meeting with Rodríguez on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, he described her as “very nice, very terrific,” without naming a date for elections. On September 2, when a reporter &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.npr.org/2026/09/05/nx-s1-5954177/venezuelan-opposition-slams-new-u-s-oil-deal-warning-it-delays-democracy"&gt;asked him about Venezuelan elections&lt;/a&gt;, Trump said, “I just don’t think they’re ready yet. You know, it’s very new.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Is democracy in Venezuela “new”? Are Venezuelans “not ready”? This language sounds just as strange and discordant to Venezuelans as the talk of great wealth supposedly flowing in their direction. After all, they did have a presidential election, and not that long ago. In July 2024, when Rodríguez was the vice president, Maduro was the regime’s candidate. He lost decisively, even after stacking the cards in his favor. In the run-up to the vote, his regime disqualified María Corina Machado, who had been selected in a national primary, a decision she called “judicial criminality.” They also nixed her first-choice substitute before finally allowing Edmundo González, a retired diplomat, to run as her surrogate. Then they harassed his supporters, used state media to insult and demean them, and even arrested them for fake crimes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/zUkNo25TB7TuZ2ojzlLqitHRO_M=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumPolice/original.png" width="982" height="655" alt="a line of Venezuelan security forces dressed in body armor and holding riot shields" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumPolice/original.png" data-thumb-id="14393911" data-image-id="1866288" data-orig-w="2000" data-orig-h="1333"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Venezuelan security forces form a barricade on the streets leading to Miraflores, the presidential palace in Caracas, as anti-government protesters demand the release of political prisoners. More than 320 remained incarcerated as of early October.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;González won a landslide victory anyway, and the opposition could prove it. Anticipating that the regime might try to falsify the results, Machado and her team mobilized more than 600,000 volunteers to monitor polling stations and report irregularities using secure messaging apps. They collected and scanned the tally sheets produced by each voting machine, and uploaded them to a secure website, sometimes at great personal risk. In Antímano and La Vega, two barrios in western Caracas, I met community activists who regaled me with stories of that campaign. I was told of women who hid tally sheets in their underwear, of a man who stashed one underneath his toupee, of others who dressed as Maduro supporters to avoid being searched at the doors of polling stations. One local community leader told me that his 8-year-old son had gone around to polling stations on his bicycle and collected the printouts, knowing no one would suspect a child. Maybe Trump is “not ready” for democracy, but I met people in Antímano and La Vega who have fought for it longer and harder than most Americans.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The regime never published its own evidence. Instead, it declared victory and launched one of the most brutal repression campaigns in the country’s history. Security and paramilitary forces fanned out across the country, arresting thousands of people and killing dozens. Independent organizations, including humanitarian groups, were effectively banned.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;If Venezuelans aren’t convinced that their country is making progress toward democracy, it’s also because the apparatus that carried out this wave of repression is still in place. Numbers differ, depending on who counts as a political prisoner, but as of early October, 920 to 1,110 of them have been released since January, while more than 320 remain incarcerated. I met some of their relatives, camped outside the U.S. embassy because they had given up on their own government and hoped that the Americans would help them. “Marco Rubio says there are no political prisoners,” one of them told me. “But the political prisoners are still behind bars.” As of early September, no one from the U.S. delegation had acknowledged or interacted with the families. These kinds of protesters still face risks too: In the second week of September, a man who had joined a march organized by the prisoners’ families was arrested, in public view, by men without uniforms.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Even among the political prisoners who have been released, hundreds are still, like Juan Pablo Guanipa, constantly followed, or else forced to report regularly at a courthouse, as if the regime were reminding them that they are only temporarily free. Perkins Rocha, a lawyer who was one of the opposition campaign’s representatives before the electoral council in 2024, is still under house arrest. Seized off the street a month after the election, Rocha, a bespectacled scholar of constitutional law, was charged with terrorism, treason, criminal association, incitement to hatred, and conspiracy. He was taken to the country’s most notorious prison, &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/09/world/americas/venezuela-el-helicoide-prison-caracas.html"&gt;El Helicoide&lt;/a&gt;, where he spent two weeks in handcuffs, his head sometimes covered by a hood. After that, he spent many months in concrete rooms with no windows, sometimes shared by up to 20 people. Since his release in February, he has remained at home with an ankle bracelet, which he jokes is like “prison but with sunlight.” To visit him in his Caracas apartment, I had to check in with the policemen who stand in the lobby of his building and beside the elevator outside his front door. One of them took my name and wrote it on his hand.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But the most important reason Venezuelans doubt the prospects of a democratic transition is the long absence of Machado, the opposition leader. Machado went into hiding after the election, at an unknown location inside Venezuela. In December 2025, she finally escaped the country, taking a fishing boat to Curaçao, the Dutch island territory off the coast of Venezuela, before flying to Norway to receive the Nobel Peace Prize.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/WVBgXRxBV3cft8ghW3alybHUfSs=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumProtester/original.png" width="665" height="443" alt="a woman wearing pink-framed glasses and a red face covering holds a sign that says " data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumProtester/original.png" data-thumb-id="14393912" data-image-id="1866289" data-orig-w="2000" data-orig-h="1333"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;A protester holds a sign that says “Come back already Mari!”—a reference to the opposition leader, María Corina Machado. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;In January of this year, Machado visited Trump at the White House, and she made what seemed to be a bid to win his favor, presenting him with her Nobel medal in appreciation of his “unique commitment” to Venezuelan freedom. But if she hoped that this would persuade him to throw American power behind her and the country’s democratic opposition, that doesn’t seem to have worked: Nearly a year later, Trump has not proposed a date for an election and Machado has remained stuck abroad, first in Washington, D.C., then in Panama.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Initially, the U.S. administration advised her not to go back: Her safety could not be guaranteed. Later, her attempts to return were blocked, and not only by the Rodríguez regime. Rubio did &lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/09/27/venezuela-machado-opposition-protests-us-maduro/12262eca-bac6-11f1-81fc-9b76f8343b6c_story.html"&gt;explicitly say&lt;/a&gt;—albeit in a Spanish-language interview, which Venezuelans would understand but his boss would not—that Machado has “every right to enter her country whenever she wants to return.” But private planes she has chartered have been refused landing rights, even by Curaçao and Aruba, another Dutch territory. A boat she hired mysteriously developed “engine trouble.” A commercial airline would not let her board.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Multiple people in Caracas told me that U.S. diplomats in the city describe Machado as a “problem.” Indeed, if the Trump administration’s most important goal is to cement oil deals with corrupt figures linked to Rodríguez, then perhaps she is. Machado has been clearer than others about the need to hold the regime accountable for past crimes. She has long argued that private companies should play a bigger role in the Venezuelan economy, a position that, ironically, puts her at odds with those in the U.S. administration who want to work with the Venezuelan state to extract resources.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I spoke with her while she was in Panama in early September, and she told me that her main concern, other than returning home, is that too many people, Americans included, do not “understand at all what is going on in Venezuela. Everything I hear is about conventional formulas for transition that take into account everyone’s interests and opinions except the people’s, as if the people did not matter.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Both in Caracas and in Washington, there are clearly actors who aren’t that interested in “the people” or what they want. But if the U.S. government wants to carry out a transition without Machado, the attempt will backfire. If Betancourt is the country’s most famous symbol of past misrule and corruption, Machado remains the most famous symbol of a democratic future. Without her, no election will be legitimate, and legitimacy is a necessary part of ending the Venezuelan crisis. “There are 1.1 million Venezuelans living in the United States, and 65 percent are willing to come back,” Machado told me. “But they are not going to do it while the same regime that expelled them in the first place is still in power.” Legitimacy is required for the construction of a Venezuelan military that can cooperate with the U.S. in the fight against criminal networks in the region, instead of being part of them. And again, legitimacy is the missing ingredient in oil-market reform, the insurance that companies need before they will make long-term investments.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Even if Machado returns (as perhaps she will have done by the time you are reading this article), nobody imagines that the country’s path will be straightforward. In a busy open-plan office, crowded with people talking over small plastic cups of black coffee, I met Henry Alviárez, the national coordinator of Vente, Machado’s political party. Alviárez told me that after he was released from prison in February, Vente had to “rebuild everything—regroup, recover the organization, and recover our direction.” Vente started with 55,000 people, Alviárez said, and was up to 150,000 in September: “We now have structures throughout the country and in all municipalities, and according to the polls, we are the leading party in Venezuela.” It is planning to launch a national debate—using online platforms, social media, and town halls—about what Machado calls a “grand national agreement” to amend the constitution, the educational system, the health-care system, and more. Vente isn’t asking for an immediate election. But the party’s leaders at least want to know when one will take place so that they can plan.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some do believe they should wait: wait for the influence of the Rodríguez regime to wane further; wait for the Trump administration to lose power; wait for the congressional Democrats and the Republicans who support Venezuelan democracy to take action; wait for more oil to start flowing. There are risks to a transition, after all. No one can be sure when the economy will start growing again, and a new government could be blamed if it doesn’t. But if waiting seemed like a good strategy six months ago, the risks are increasing quickly. Everything here looks normal, Alviárez said, gesturing at the people drinking coffee. But appearances of normality are deceptive: “There is a feeling of exhaustion and a desire for change that can only be channeled through a clear leadership and a clear objective. It can only be resolved if people finally have a date for elections. That could prevent a social explosion.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/a6l1qYgZ1vnukDOHooA8mtG6mzI=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumOilHand/original.png" width="982" height="654" alt="crude oil drips from the fingers of a hand into an oil-slicked body of water" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumOilHand/original.png" data-thumb-id="14393913" data-image-id="1866290" data-orig-w="2000" data-orig-h="1333"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Oil pollution is so pervasive in Lake Maracaibo that fishermen sometimes rinse their catch with gasoline to remove the crude oil.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some people, he told me, without naming names, “have said that María Corina is coming to destabilize the country. No. She is coming to channel that anger and conduct it toward a civic, peaceful process: an election.” After fighting Chavistas and their Russian, Iranian, and Cuban allies for so long, nobody in Venezuela’s historically pro-American democratic opposition ever expected a U.S. administration to stand in their way. But if it does, they are preparing to fight that obstacle too.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h2 style="text-align: center;"&gt;IV.&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;On June 24&lt;/span&gt;, two earthquakes shook Caracas, the seaside city of La Guaira, and several smaller towns along the coast. Suddenly, the risks of waiting became clear.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Within minutes of the quakes, several large apartment buildings collapsed, including a public-housing complex built by the Chávez regime for victims of a 1999 mudslide. Tens of thousands of other buildings were damaged. At least 6,500 people died (the full number is still unknown), more than 16,800 were injured, and about 17,000 became homeless.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-bleed"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/IgdIMHJdVT0KXC-FvvHVWZcRNRg=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumTentBaby/original.png" width="1600" height="1066" alt="a child bathes in a bucket outside of an orange and blue tent, with an open cardboard box emblazoned with an American flag in the background" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumTentBaby/original.png" data-thumb-id="14393914" data-image-id="1866291" data-orig-w="2000" data-orig-h="1333"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;A 2-year-old child bathes outside her family’s tent at a camp for people displaced by the earthquakes, which left more than 17,000 Venezuelans homeless. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/NBjYqbtBY6RFbQe8F74ySPA8kGw=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumTentsChildren/original.png" width="665" height="443" alt="a child sleeps in a blue tent in the background while a child in a green top and shorts stands in the foreground" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumTentsChildren/original.png" data-thumb-id="14393916" data-image-id="1866293" data-orig-w="2000" data-orig-h="1333"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Two sisters, both sick with chickenpox, live in a makeshift shelter at a beachside camp for displaced people. Heavy rains flooded the shelter the night before. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some governments, even some authoritarian governments, rally during a crisis. In the face of this tragedy, the Venezuelan regime froze. Rodríguez has enough police officers to guard Perkins Rocha’s elevator. But she did not have enough soldiers, police, or rescue workers to dig Venezuelans out of the rubble, to offer people medical help and food, or to find homes for them in the days that followed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I visited La Guaira, the city most badly affected, the week before school was scheduled to begin. No one I met in the refugee camps knew where their children were supposed to go, or whether studies would resume at all this year. One local school had been taken over by refugees who had no intention of relinquishing it, because they still had nowhere else to live. On the site of the collapsed public-housing complex, where bulldozers had finally arrived to take away the rubble, I met Ellie Solano, a bereaved mother who asked the men with machines to leave one part of the debris untouched, because she knew it lay on top of a sports field where her son had been playing. Two months after the disaster, she was searching for his corpse, digging in the early mornings and in the evenings, when it wasn’t too hot.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure class="full-width"&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/XeBV0KQldmkLogqADeqg-bf310U=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumQuake1/original.png" width="982" height="655" alt="rescue workers in helmets and masks dig through a large pile of dirt and rubble " data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumQuake1/original.png" data-thumb-id="14393917" data-image-id="1866294" data-orig-w="2000" data-orig-h="1333"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Volunteers and relatives dig through rubble in search of the bodies of missing loved ones after back-to-back earthquakes flattened entire neighborhoods.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;Over the course of a day in La Guaira, I asked everyone I met how long it had taken for a government official to offer help after the earthquake. Some said four days. Some said five. Some thought it had been more. “We didn’t see policemen. No army, no nothing,” one woman told me. “It was people helping people, neighbors helping neighbors, and like that, many, many days.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It still is. Just as grassroots movements emerged in Ukraine to support the army after the 2022 Russian invasion, many different kinds of voluntary organizations suddenly appeared in La Guaira after the earthquakes. Some, like Alimenta la Solidaridad, a charity founded a decade ago, had deep roots in the community already. Before 2024, Alimenta had more than 200 soup kitchens around the country. After the election, the regime restricted the activity of independent organizations and Alimenta had to shut down the kitchens. But the group revived itself after the earthquakes, reasoning that the situation had changed and, as Juan Andrés Saavedra, one of the group’s leaders, told me, “the government didn’t exist.” Saavedra now organizes teams of volunteers who bring food every day to several sites, including the refugee camp inside the school.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;figure role="group" class="full-bleed"&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/SDt3L3ZEHE-SNd1CUscZWt6NsGY=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumWindowWoman/original.png" width="665" height="443" alt="a woman gazes through an opening in a bright green door, with a blue-painted building in the background" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumWindowWoman/original.png" data-thumb-id="14393909" data-image-id="1866286" data-orig-w="2000" data-orig-h="1333"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Skarlys Rodríguez looks through a classroom door at a school in La Guaira that has been converted into a temporary shelter for families displaced by the earthquakes. Rodríguez runs the shelter. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figure&gt;&lt;img src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/4jg0hkFZ0dUGyNR3Y5qWSuph0u4=/https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumFeedingKids/original.png" width="665" height="443" alt="a large group of children eats lunch at a community kitchen" data-orig-img="img/posts/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumFeedingKids/original.png" data-thumb-id="14393915" data-image-id="1866292" data-orig-w="2000" data-orig-h="1333"&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;Lynsey Addario for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;Children gather for free lunch at a community kitchen. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;figcaption&gt;&lt;div class="credit"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="caption"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/figcaption&gt;&lt;/figure&gt;&lt;p&gt;In some societies, the absence of the state leads to anarchy. In others, people organize themselves instead. Venezuela is one of those countries, as Machado herself told me in an interview in December 2024. Even when she was in hiding, even when the political situation was at its most dire, Machado was certain that the experience of election organization had brought about “anthropological change,” forging connections among people from different parts of society, inspiring them to want to reform their country from the bottom up.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Nearly two years later, Venezuelans kept telling me the same thing. One young woman, a political activist who had left the country and only recently returned, told me that the earthquakes and the chaos that followed were a sobering reminder of the lessons learned during the 2024 election campaign: &lt;em&gt;The government won’t save us; the Americans won’t save us; we have to work together&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“We are on our own,” she said.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt;A photo caption in this article originally described a group of Venezuelans playing checkers by flashlight during a rolling blackout. In fact, they were playing dominoes. The article appears in the &lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/toc/2026/12/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;u&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt;December 2026&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/u&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;small&gt; print edition with the headline “After the Apocalypse.”&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Anne Applebaum</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/anne-applebaum/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/kpwvQCMc2X50HvezR95mHbQNdHo=/0x208:2000x1333/media/img/2026/10/WEL_ApplebaumOilBroken/original.png"><media:credit>Photograph by Lynsey Addario</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">What the U.S. Is Really Doing in Venezuela</title><published>2026-10-22T07:00:00-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-28T12:31:46-04:00</updated><summary type="html">Suppressing democracy and extracting resources at the expense of its people</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/2026/12/trump-oil-venezuela-exploitation/689033/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689041</id><content type="html">&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":19,"w":665,"h":264,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":2170}'&gt;Suddenly, Canada is in the middle of a defense boom. Like other NATO countries that have skimped on their armed forces for decades, Canada is trying to quickly build up its military in the face of both rising international-security threats and a White House that regularly treats friends like foes. In the absence of trustworthy American leadership, many allies are working to become more self-reliant. But this is easier said than done, especially for Canada, which has enmeshed its own self-defense with the U.S. military more than any other American ally.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":313,"w":665,"h":231,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":2464}'&gt;Since 1957, when Canada and the United States established the North American Aerospace Defense Command to jointly defend the continent during the Cold War, the Canadian military has grown closer to America’s. The otherwise small and underfunded Canadian Armed Forces is structured to deploy alongside its U.S. counterparts and to interoperate seamlessly with them. This has allowed Canada to make valuable military contributions in both countries’ interest at relatively low cost.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":574,"w":665,"h":297,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":2725}'&gt;Until Donald Trump’s return to the White House, few in Canada were worried about how deeply intertwined the two militaries had become. Former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government had contracted for billions of dollars’ worth of American-made military capabilities, including new surveillance planes, the combat system on Canada’s new warships, and 88 F-35 fighter aircraft. These investments have spared Canada the cost of developing cutting-edge equipment and allowed Canadian forces to operate interchangeably with the U.S. military. As long as the United States remained a benign ally, Canada was getting a great deal.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":901,"w":665,"h":48,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":3052}' data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a bis_size='{"x":172,"y":903,"w":633,"h":43,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":3054}' href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/09/allies-trump-canada-foreign-policy/688729/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Vivian Salama: America’s allies are no longer waiting for Trump to leave&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":979,"w":665,"h":231,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":3130}'&gt;Trump has shaken Canadian thinking. His repeated talk of making Canada the 51st U.S. state and his jokes about “Governor Trudeau” went from weird to worrisome, and his unprovoked trade war has hurt Canadian businesses and consumers. Early last year, in one of his &lt;a bis_size='{"x":548,"y":1083,"w":114,"h":22,"abs_x":580,"abs_y":3234}' href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-full-spech-trump-trade-war-1.7474451"&gt;final speeches&lt;/a&gt; as prime minister, Trudeau warned that Trump wants “to see a total collapse of the Canadian economy, because that’ll make it easier to annex us.” Canada’s longtime military and economic partner had suddenly become a threat.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":1240,"w":665,"h":462,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":3391}'&gt;Trudeau’s successor, Prime Minister Mark Carney, has responded in part by trying to appease Trump. He has addressed long-standing American complaints about Canada’s limited defense spending and has emphasized the importance of continued military cooperation. Carney has increased Canada’s military expenditures to 2 percent of the country’s GDP and agreed to Trump’s demand that NATO countries spend at least 5 percent of their GDP on defense by 2035. Carney has also said that his government is in talks about taking part in Trump’s plans for a &lt;a bis_size='{"x":459,"y":1476,"w":123,"h":22,"abs_x":491,"abs_y":3627}' href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/archive/2025/08/trump-reagan-golden-dome-missile-defense/683799/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Golden Dome&lt;/a&gt; missile-defense system. Even amid the tariff fight, Carney has been trying to win the president over by pitching a vision of deeper economic integration with the U.S.—a so-called Fortress North America—to help push back against China’s economic influence. Carney’s defense minister reportedly told the U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth that Canada is “moving in lockstep” with the U.S. on continental defense.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":1732,"w":665,"h":363,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":3883}'&gt;Yet Carney is also trying to reduce Canada’s dependence on the U.S. military. He &lt;a bis_size='{"x":203,"y":1770,"w":94,"h":22,"abs_x":235,"abs_y":3921}' href="https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/videos/2025/10/22/prime-minister-carney-delivers-remarks-canadas-plan-ahead-budget-2025"&gt;announced&lt;/a&gt; last year that “new security threats” necessitated “the biggest investments in our military in generations.” Instead of spending &lt;a bis_size='{"x":172,"y":1803,"w":661,"h":55,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":3954}' href="https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/videos/2025/10/22/prime-minister-carney-delivers-remarks-canadas-plan-ahead-budget-2025"&gt;more than 70 percent&lt;/a&gt; of the country’s military-capital budget on American equipment, his government &lt;a bis_size='{"x":278,"y":1869,"w":44,"h":22,"abs_x":310,"abs_y":4020}' href="https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2026/02/17/prime-minister-carney-launches-canadas-first-defence-industrial"&gt;plans&lt;/a&gt; to route 70 percent of Canada’s defense contracts to Canadian firms within a decade. His government has also been diversifying Canada’s industrial partnerships by negotiating new agreements with European and Pacific allies. This has included selecting a Swedish airborne-surveillance early-warning aircraft instead of an American one, and rethinking that fleet of F-35s—perhaps buying some Swedish Saab Gripen fighters instead.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":2125,"w":665,"h":297,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":4276}'&gt;Most Canadians applaud these efforts, according to &lt;a bis_size='{"x":612,"y":2130,"w":39,"h":22,"abs_x":644,"abs_y":4281}' href="https://www.global-canada.org/foreign-policy-by-canadians#report"&gt;polls&lt;/a&gt;. And domestic firms are poised to benefit; core defense spending is &lt;a bis_size='{"x":563,"y":2163,"w":78,"h":22,"abs_x":595,"abs_y":4314}' href="https://canadiandefencereview.com/procurement-barriers-could-limit-canadas-1-trillion-defence-opportunity-chamber-warns/"&gt;projected&lt;/a&gt; to grow from about $64 billion in 2025 to $160 billion by 2035. But there are good reasons to question whether these ambitions will become a reality. The spending that Carney has pledged would normally be unthinkable during peacetime, and the country will struggle to meet these promises without new taxes, cuts to social programs, or serious debt. Carney has not said how his government will finance these plans through 2035, and the public has not had to make any sacrifices so far.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":2452,"w":665,"h":132,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":4603}'&gt;Another problem is that Canada’s defense industry is neither large nor self-sufficient. Canadian firms will need time to expand their production to deliver Canadian-made capabilities. Those capital costs require access to long-term contracts, not grand political pronouncements.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":2614,"w":665,"h":297,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":4765}'&gt;Even if Carney figures out how to pay for this domestic military buildup, Canada’s dependence on the U.S. military runs so deep, and has been entrenched over so many decades, that pivoting away will involve more than just a few years of strategic spending. Canada cannot mount a major military operation overseas without American support and, like most NATO allies, is utterly reliant on the United States for core capabilities in communications, command and control networks, intelligence, and other areas. Developing non-American alternatives will require unprecedented levels of investment and cooperation among Canada and European NATO allies.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":2941,"w":665,"h":132,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":5092}'&gt;Mounting threats from China and Russia make the challenges of disentangling from the U.S. military only more profound. Despite simmering tensions with the U.S., the defense of North America will always be a joint endeavor, with Washington in the lead.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":3103,"w":665,"h":330,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":5254}'&gt;The Trump administration has already shown that it is willing to use the continental-defense relationship to rebuke its northern neighbor. In May, the U.S. suspended its participation in a joint board for continental defense that dates back to World War II, partly in &lt;a bis_size='{"x":491,"y":3207,"w":72,"h":22,"abs_x":523,"abs_y":5358}' href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trump-canada-us-joint-defence-board-9.7203211"&gt;response&lt;/a&gt; to Carney’s widely praised speech at Davos in which he warned that “the rules-based order is fading.” This was troubling for Canada, which is ostensibly on equal footing with the U.S. in well-established continental-defense institutions. If the larger, more powerful U.S. demands that the continent’s defense requires the exclusive use of American equipment, such as the F-35 or U.S.-made surveillance planes, Canada’s options may be limited.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":3463,"w":665,"h":24,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":5614}' data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a bis_size='{"x":172,"y":3465,"w":460,"h":19,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":5616}' href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/09/canada-america-trade-negotiations/688807/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Chrystia Freeland: The art of dealing with Trump&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":3517,"w":665,"h":264,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":5668}'&gt;Notwithstanding escalating political and economic tensions between the two neighbors, Canada has been quietly keeping its relationship with the U.S. military steady. Intelligence sharing, military exchanges, and North American air-defense cooperation are operating as normal. Most of the Canadian military leaders I’ve spoken with assume that the relationship between the two countries will largely recover when Trump is no longer in office. Defense planners in both countries recognize the importance of continued cooperation, regardless of tariffs or hostile rhetoric.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p bis_size='{"x":172,"y":3811,"w":665,"h":264,"abs_x":204,"abs_y":5962}'&gt;Trump may not single-handedly undo decades of close military cooperation between Canada and the U.S., but his presidency has certainly forced America’s northern neighbor to be less trusting and complacent. Canada may not be able to fully divest itself from the U.S. military, but relying too heavily on American defense cooperation and goodwill no longer seems wise. Fixing this problem will require more time and money than Canadians are typically willing to spend, but Canadians appear at least willing to pay this price if it will deliver better security for themselves.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Philippe Lagassé</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/philippe-lagasse/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/1iMDQs3h7j1oHe7aCgOniN2IhIY=/media/img/mt/2026/10/2026_10_19_Can_Canada_Really_Separate_its_Military_from_the_US_Philippe_Lagasse/original.jpg"><media:credit>Peter Power / AFP / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Decoupling From the U.S. Is Awkward</title><published>2026-10-19T07:00:00-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-19T14:53:31-04:00</updated><summary type="html">Canada is experiencing a sudden and complicated defense boom.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/canada-military-buildup-defense/689041/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689039</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;What has the Islamic Republic done for Iranians? Under its rule, citizens have suffered decades of economic decline, sociopolitical repression, and international isolation. Now the country is engaged in an open-ended war. In almost every way, Iranians are doing much worse than they were 20 years ago.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Not even the regime’s propagandists can deny these realities. Many of them therefore insist that the Islamic Republic’s failures are justified by its unbending resistance to American imperialism. Nearly all of Iran’s economic suffering, defenders say, can be explained as the price of this heroic stance, to which the West has responded with sanctions that have crushed Iran’s standard of living.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But the story of the Islamic Republic’s relationship to American power, and of how that relationship has and has not served the cause of Iranian sovereignty, is more complicated.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Iran’s prerevolutionary ruler, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was an anti-communist autocrat who prized ties with the United States. His successors condemned him as an American stooge and claimed to have freed Iran from its slavish dependence on the “&lt;a href="https://www.npr.org/2009/12/27/121954311/debunking-the-great-satan-myth"&gt;Great Satan&lt;/a&gt;.” In its early days, the Islamic Republic signaled independence from both the Soviet Union and the United States with the slogan “Neither East nor West,” which still adorns the facade of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headquarters in Tehran. The foundational anti-imperialism of the new regime was also a promise that Iran would fight for the “oppressed of the world,” as well as a call to resist cultural absorption by the West—a fate one revolutionary intellectual decried as “Westoxification.”   &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/oil-hormuz-iran-war/688890/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: The battle for Hormuz is not the war&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Islamic Republic has failed in its anti-imperialism by all of these measures, especially as compared with the monarchy. Pahlavi was an American ally who owed his throne in part to a CIA-abetted coup that elevated him over a popular prime minister in 1953. But he sustained Iran’s independence by skillfully playing the United States and its rivals, the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, off of each other when doing so suited Iranian interests. The Soviets helped build Iran’s ironworks and welcomed the shah as a rare royal to pay a state visit to Communist Moscow. Pahlavi’s slogan could well have been “Both East and West.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The shah backed the United States in some Cold War battles, but he also threatened to sign security deals with Moscow when he wanted better terms from Washington, and he offered to mediate the conflicts in the Middle East and in Vietnam. In most ways, Pahlavi’s foreign policy was closer to that of the Non-Aligned Movement countries than to that of either Cold War bloc. In the ’70s, scholars of Iranian foreign policy &lt;a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Foreign_Relations_of_Iran/O-XeEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&amp;amp;gbpv=0"&gt;described&lt;/a&gt; Tehran as following “defacto non-alignment.” By the end of the shah’s rule, Iran had considerable international influence and was respected by both superpowers, not only as a sovereign country, but also as a regional power. You might even say that Pahlavi was a successful anti-imperialist—not in the sense of having stuck a finger in the eye of the great powers, but in the sense of having effectively secured Iran’s sovereign interests rather than being forced to capitulate to those he cooperated with.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The revolutionaries who toppled the shah accused him of servility to Washington. They pointed to the coup that had cemented his power in 1953 and halted the nationalization of Iran’s oil resources. But in fact the monarchy had restored Iran’s sovereignty over its oil industry in 1973. They pointed to a 1964 agreement with the United States, ratified by the Iranian Parliament, that gave U.S. military personnel immunity from local prosecution. But such agreements were common around the world and hardly represented Iran’s “capitulation,” as its critics claimed. The shah was in any case far from passive in his relationship with Washington and worked to improve his position.     &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The monarchy’s foreign policy belonged to a long tradition of efforts to extend Iran’s independence. Well before 1979, Iran had spent centuries fending off the designs of the British and Russian empires. Standing up for the country’s sovereignty was the work of generations of Iranian statesmen, just as it was for their counterparts in other countries of the global South. But not every Iranian government has been equally successful at it. The one that came to power in 1979—the Islamic Republic—has been manifestly terrible.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Islamic Republic has not prioritized classic anti-imperialist goals. Among these is improving the economic position of postcolonial states, as set forth in the New International Economic Order that the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1974 (and that Iran voted for). The Iranian government since 1979 has rarely prioritized such goals. The former supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, reportedly boasted that he didn’t care about his people’s welfare, just about how religious they were. (His office has denied this.) He thus preferred to fight the West rather than attend to his people’s needs—even basic ones, as, for example, in 2021, when he refused to import COVID-19 vaccines from the United States, a decision that likely cost thousands of Iranian lives.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Islamic Republic has pursued an ideological campaign against the United States and other Western countries, not just for being imperialist, but also for being, according to Iran’s Islamist standards, licentious and morally depraved. Iran’s rulers frame these objections as opposition to cultural imperialism, but in practice they have become a pretext for domestic repression. The regime’s austere, draconian version of Islam is less a celebration of Iran’s endogenous culture than a suppression of its traditional creativity.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In the name of anti-imperialism, Iran has quixotically attacked the international order without making it any fairer for itself or others. In fact, Iran’s actions have put the country at the mercy of foreign powers. The Islamic Republic committed itself to the pursuit of a nuclear program, on the grounds that this would buttress its sovereignty and demonstrate its independence from imperial diktats. Instead, its nuclear intransigence incurred sanctions from the United States and Europe as well as the UN Security Council, with support from Russia and China. Iran’s involvement in terrorism and international crime (including drug running and counterfeiting) has made it one of only three countries, alongside Myanmar and North Korea, on the blacklist of the Paris-based anti-money-laundering outfit Financial Action Task Force. These measures have interfered with Iran’s ability to collect payments for its energy exports, even from friendly countries, such as neighboring Iraq. Sanctions have so weakened Iran’s position in trade that it is selling its oil at a discount to China.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The regime’s proponents will argue that the country is a victim of foreign-imposed sanctions. But the sanctions are the result of Tehran’s choices, which have prized refusal and defiance over actually improving Iran’s stake in the international order vis-à-vis the great powers that might seek to dominate it. The world abounds in examples of better strategies. Many of those involve sustaining ties with competing superpowers as a hedge against domination by any one of them. Nonaligned countries such as India, heir to a proud tradition of opposing colonial dominance, have pursued this course. Turkey remains a key NATO ally, but it has managed to play an independent role in Ukraine while maintaining relations with Russia and the United States. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have aligned with the West on many issues while nurturing significant trade ties with China. Even Argentina’s right-wing president has toned down his anti-China rhetoric for economic reasons.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/israel-iran-palestine-khamenei/688959/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Fighting Israel to the last Palestinian&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In contrast, Iran’s foreign policy remains ideologically defined, and the country suffers from what the political scientist Mohiaddin Mesbahi has called “strategic loneliness.” At the outset, the revolutionary regime rejected both East and West. But in recent years, it has tried to draw closer to Beijing, only to discover that China sees Western allies, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and even Israel, as better investment prospects. Until this year, Iran’s closest partner was the socialist government of Venezuela—but that was an alliance of desperation, born of both regimes’ isolation. Then the Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro was overthrown by the United States.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Iran has failed to secure effective sovereignty for itself and to deliver on its promise of reducing imperial dominance globally. Instead of helping the “oppressed,” it has become a scourge to the sovereignty of other countries. Throwing away Iran’s traditional policy of neutrality in foreign conflicts, Khamenei robustly backed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and equipped Moscow with Iranian drones. Iran has also played an imperialist role in its own region by funding and arming militias in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Gaza, and Syria, and by intervening in several Arab civil wars.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Islamic Republic still claims to stand in principled opposition to imperialism, now on the grounds that it has withstood an American and Israeli assault without capitulating. But the claim rings hollow for Iranians, who have reaped no dividends from this great resistance and now must endure a devastating war with no end in sight. That’s hardly a win for Iranian sovereignty.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Arash Azizi</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/arash-azizi/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/kJxWvi5CZXXpy6Cnb7SR6kTC0RU=/media/img/mt/2026/10/2026_10_17_Irans_Anti_Imperialism_Is_a_Dead_End_Arash_Azizi/original.jpg"><media:credit>Atta Kenare / AFP / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Iran’s ‘Anti-Imperialism’ Is a Dead End</title><published>2026-10-17T07:00:00-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-17T09:13:03-04:00</updated><summary type="html">An ideology of refusal has not made the international order fairer for Iranians or anyone else.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/west-iran-economy-us/689039/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-689035</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;Starlink and its military-grade counterpart, Starshield, have become indispensable to Ukraine’s armed forces. That much became clear this week, when a sudden outage plunged Ukraine’s air defenses into semidarkness. As one &lt;a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-starlink-restrictions-disrupt-drone-strikes/"&gt;Ukrainian officer&lt;/a&gt; told &lt;i&gt;Politico&lt;/i&gt;, “This is comparable to a nuclear strike against us. All operations are on hold.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Ukraine uses Starshield to control drones via secure internet. These include &lt;a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/oct/14/ukraine-soldiers-combat-access-starlink-satellite-internet-restricted"&gt;interceptor drones&lt;/a&gt; as well as other short- and &lt;a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-starlink-restrictions-disrupt-drone-strikes/"&gt;medium-range drones&lt;/a&gt; inside Ukraine. This week, Starshield connectivity abruptly cut out as soon as Ukrainian drones and vehicles began to move faster than 100 miles an hour (and, in some cases, well short of that threshold), making the interception of incoming Russian fire virtually impossible.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As of Thursday morning, Starshield service was reportedly restored. But the outage revealed a vulnerability that hasn’t gone away. Russia has been hitting Ukrainian energy infrastructure with drones and missiles every winter since the war began and has made clear that it intends to begin targeting &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/02/world/europe/russia-ukraine-winter.html"&gt;water infrastructure&lt;/a&gt; as well. Ukraine’s primary counter to Russian drones has been a fleet of &lt;a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/2026/10/14/ukraine-races-to-field-faster-interceptors-as-russia-hammers-its-energy-grid/"&gt;small, cheap, fast drones&lt;/a&gt; controlled remotely by operators on the ground using Starshield. Without access to these high-speed data links, Ukraine loses most of its defensive capability.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/07/zelensky-asked-trump-for-a-favor-from-elon-musk/688122/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Zelensky asked Trump for a favor from Elon Musk&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Without Starshield, Ukraine also loses its “middle strike” capability. The military deploys drones to hit moving targets &lt;a href="https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/middle-strike-operations-how-ukrainian-drones-are-degrading-russia-s-military-potential"&gt;as near as 20 and as far as 125 miles&lt;/a&gt; behind the front lines, with the goal of disrupting Russian logistics, particularly by destroying fuel trucks. Ukraine has been blowing up more than &lt;a href="https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/10/09/counterlogistics-continues/"&gt;700 supply trucks a month&lt;/a&gt;, leaving Russian troops &lt;a href="https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russian-troops-complain-of-fuel-shortages-1784764617.html"&gt;short on fuel&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/12/with-drone-dropped-food-on-ukraines-frontline-do-soldiers-starve"&gt;other necessities&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;To a lesser extent, the throttling of data could also affect Ukraine’s front-line tactics, which involve the use of drones against infantry and small vehicles near the front. This week, some reports suggested that data cut out for vehicles moving as slowly as &lt;a href="https://x.com/JulianRoepcke/status/2110362971637530678"&gt;45 miles an hour&lt;/a&gt;, which could include short-range drones chasing down motorcycles, trucks, and all-terrain vehicles carrying Russian troops.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The importance to the warring armies of Starlink, Starshield’s civilian cousin, has already been demonstrated. In February, SpaceX &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/starlink-used-by-russian-forces-deactivated-battlefield-ukraine-says-2026-02-05/"&gt;shut down Russia’s pirated access to Starlink&lt;/a&gt; in Ukraine, and the effects were immediate: Communication between distant outposts and field units &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q3ndj7052o"&gt;collapsed&lt;/a&gt;, forcing Russian troops into a chaotic retreat coordinated by radio and other unreliable wired alternatives. Thousands of these pirated Russian Starlink terminals &lt;a href="https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukraine-retakes-400-sq-km-after-russia-loses-starlink-access-wsj-reports-50593784.html"&gt;continued to try to connect to the network&lt;/a&gt;, and in doing so gave away their position to the Ukrainians. This became actionable intelligence for artillery strikes and psychological disruption.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The chaos coincided with a change in fortunes for Russia, as its gains in Ukraine ground to a halt and were &lt;a href="https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2026/"&gt;even reversed&lt;/a&gt;. Since then, the front lines have been practically frozen, with &lt;a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/08/27/2026/cia-warned-russia-against-attacking-nato-countries"&gt;neither side&lt;/a&gt; decisively gaining or losing ground. Russia is scrambling to develop its &lt;a href="https://jamestown.org/russia-trying-to-replace-starlink/"&gt;own version of Starlink&lt;/a&gt; but is years away from implementing it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The timing, abruptness, and severity of this week’s disruption invite questions—most obvious, about who was responsible and why. SpaceX has &lt;a href="https://avbrief.com/starlink-lowers-in-motion-speed-limits/"&gt;adjusted Starlink’s maximum&lt;/a&gt; operating speed in the past, bringing it down from 550 miles an hour to 450 at the end of last year, and then capping standard plans to a strict &lt;a href="https://starlink.com/support/article/50e933eb-54f5-1a77-cc85-c6c8325564cf?srsltid=AU7gw4UYdS1oIiCmloGEYpivFUtuUZRs1ByzzhGjWV30zDVEv8Gc1Tbr"&gt;100 miles an hour&lt;/a&gt; in March. &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/14/business/starshield-spacex-ukraine-starlink-satellites-musk.html"&gt;Starshield&lt;/a&gt; satellites and government services, however, are owned and controlled by the American government. &lt;a href="https://satnews.com/2026/10/14/spacex-restricts-military-starshield-speeds-in-ukraine-disrupting-pentagon-funded-tactical-drone-operations/"&gt;Some news outlets&lt;/a&gt; have reported that this week’s sudden speed cap came from SpaceX, but &lt;a href="https://x.com/elonmusk/status/2110445577184133456"&gt;Elon Musk indicated on X&lt;/a&gt; that the ultimate decision lay with President Trump. A Reuters &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/order-limit-starshield-ukraine-came-inside-white-house-sources-say-2026-10-15/"&gt;report&lt;/a&gt; last night confirmed that the order originated inside the White House.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The limitation came at a time when U.S.-Ukrainian relations are at a nadir. Trump has publicly blamed Ukraine and its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, for high diesel prices in the United States. He points to Ukrainian strikes on Russian refining facilities, despite the far greater likelihood that the price hikes are tied to &lt;a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2026/10/11/trump-blames-kyiv-for-diesel-but-the-barrels-went-missing-in-hormuz/"&gt;America’s war&lt;/a&gt; in the Middle East, and he has demanded that Ukraine &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/video/watch/idRW919711102026RP1/"&gt;hold new elections&lt;/a&gt; to replace Zelensky. He also claimed to have negotiated an &lt;a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/zelenskyy-russia-violating-energy-ceasefire-9.7377881"&gt;“&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/zelenskyy-russia-violating-energy-ceasefire-9.7377881"&gt;energy ceasefire&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/zelenskyy-russia-violating-energy-ceasefire-9.7377881"&gt;,”&lt;/a&gt; in which Ukraine would stop attacking Russian petroleum facilities in exchange for Russia ceasing to attack Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Russia effectively rejected this offer and &lt;a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/zelenskyy-says-russia-strikes-energy-facilities-despite-trump-claim-of-an-energy-ceasefire"&gt;continued to hit&lt;/a&gt; Ukrainian electrical facilities. Over roughly the same period, Trump &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/trump-big-announcement-coming-up-diesel-2026-10-09/"&gt;announced a surprise deal&lt;/a&gt; with Russian President Vladimir Putin to supply more than 4 million metric tons of Russian diesel to U.S. and global markets.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/08/ukraine-ally-trump-patriot-missile/688226/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Ukraine may be just the ally America needs&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Starshield decision was likely meant to pressure Ukraine into complying with U.S. demands to stop hitting Russian oil facilities, so that the president could be seen as bringing fuel prices down before the midterm elections. But why, then, would the administration call for Starshield to be switched back on?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Maybe Trump sought to avoid a showdown over the decision in Congress. Maybe the idea was just to scare the Ukrainians and not to actually destroy them. Or just as likely, Elon Musk, who has spent &lt;a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/12/elon-musk-spends-366m-to-bolster-republican-party-in-us-midterm-elections"&gt;$366 million&lt;/a&gt; on Republican campaigns in 2026, could have let the White House know he was unhappy with actions that might lead Starshield clients to seek alternatives to his products.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Surely other defense-industry leaders and U.S. allies were also alarmed. Messing with Ukraine’s defensive capabilities doesn’t cause problems for just Kyiv: &lt;a href="https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/10/14/spacex-restricts-starlink-for-ukraines-troops-poland-which-supplied-29500-of-terminals-tells-musk-as-your-european-customers-we-are-watching-you/"&gt;Poland&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/87169"&gt;Germany&lt;/a&gt; supply and pay for Ukraine’s Starlink and Starshield terminals, and these are directly pertinent to Poland’s defense. Russian drones have &lt;a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2026/10/how-polands-air-force-is-responding-to-russian-drones-in-the-skies/"&gt;repeatedly&lt;/a&gt; breached the Polish border, many of them &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Russian_drone_incursion_into_Poland"&gt;passing first through Ukrainian airspace&lt;/a&gt;. The episode signaled something that many American allies already feared: that U.S.-made military technology could become a liability to those who depend on it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Starshield is reportedly back online, and so are Ukraine’s operations, for now. But the incident puts all American allies on notice: Developing homegrown technology, however expensive, may be better than relying on SpaceX and the United States.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Brynn Tannehill</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/brynn-tannehill/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/GroYtTp5tU3_0ZT1seSzPnp7iEk=/media/img/mt/2026/10/2026_10_16_Throttling_Starlink_in_Ukraine_is_Very_Serious_Brynn_Tannehill/original.jpg"><media:credit>Andre Alves / Anadolu / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">What the Loss of Starshield Revealed</title><published>2026-10-16T10:22:48-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-16T10:36:11-04:00</updated><summary type="html">Ukraine’s defenses depend on the high-speed data links that Washington may have briefly shut down.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/starshield-ukraine-military-technology-vulnerability/689035/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-688990</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;i&gt;Sign up for our &lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/national-security/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;i&gt;newsletter about national security&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;i&gt;here&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;S&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;ometimes, disasters can be clarifying&lt;/span&gt;. Not so long ago, the Houthi warriors who have ruled northern Yemen for the past decade seemed more like a nuisance to Saudi Arabia than a threat. The Saudi leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, was busy glad-handing with tech bros and AI executives, talking up the kingdom’s future as a tourism destination. Then, on Saturday, a Houthi missile struck two terminals in the Saudi capital’s main airport, sending fire and smoke through the halls and causing ceiling tiles to collapse on terrified passengers. Pilgrims making their way to Mecca rolled their suitcases through trails of blood.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Although Houthi strikes are not new in the kingdom, Saturday’s attack on the Riyadh airport, which killed 13 people and wounded hundreds, signaled something different. The Houthis apparently have the ability to evade the kingdom’s dwindling supply of missile interceptors by launching coordinated waves of drone swarms, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. Saudi Arabia is now a country where the ruler must shuttle among palaces equipped with underground bunkers.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“Total disbelief,” a friend in Riyadh told me. “I don’t think people thought this could happen to them.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia cannot realize the crown prince’s dreams of economic and social transformation—or even continue luring foreign investors—if this kind of mayhem becomes routine. But the Houthis have become ever more intransigent, and the limits of Saudi Arabia’s ability to contain them ever more apparent.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/09/houthis-yemen-iran-trump-saudis/688768/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: The Houthis have a rich sense of irony and timing&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“It is starting to look as if there is no diplomatic third way,” Adam Baron, a fellow at the New America Foundation, in Washington, who specializes in Yemen and the Gulf, told me. “The Saudis will have to try to push the Houthis back militarily or accept a settlement that essentially leaves the Houthis in control of Yemen.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Both of those possibilities are risky. Experience has taught the Saudis that only a sustained ground offensive will make real headway against the Houthis, who have survived multiple bombing campaigns over the past decade, including last year’s seven-week air war by the United States. But the Saudis don’t have a ground force equal to the task. They depend on the perennially divided armed forces commanded by Yemen’s weak, internationally recognized government, based in the country’s south.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Last month, the Houthis captured the area around the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a crucial conduit for global oil supplies, and the Saudis responded by coordinating a new offensive to recapture the lost terrain. That effort has had mixed results; the Saudi-backed forces retook some ground, but the Houthis have unleashed a new level of firepower at the kingdom, including the strikes on the Riyadh airport.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Saudis hope to build a larger military coalition against the Houthis and have held talks with the leaders of Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey. But those countries have made clear that their support goes only so far. They might be willing to help defend the kingdom’s borders in the event of a major ground incursion (one of the nightmare scenarios being discussed in Riyadh), but they will not become involved in a war to recapture northern Yemen.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This reluctance is rooted in history: The Turks suffered legendary defeats in Yemen in the 17th and 19th centuries. Egypt got drawn into a civil war in Yemen in the 1960s—a draining conflict that has been called Egypt’s Vietnam.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Saudis could instead seek some kind of settlement with the Houthis in exchange for peace, but this seems equally elusive. The United Nations has been mediating talks in Yemen since 2012. It helped negotiate a 2022 truce that ended a seven-year war between the Houthis and a Saudi-led coalition. But the Houthis, who adhere to a revolutionary ideology rooted in an offshoot of Shiite Islam, have grown steadily more aggressive in their demands.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Although the Houthis are fiercely independent and have their own ideas about ruling Yemen, their strategy appears to be carefully coordinated with Iran, which is still locked in its own struggle against Israel and the United States. Tehran has helped train and arm the Houthis over the years, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps advisers are widely said to be taking part in the current fighting. The Houthis appear to be using fiber optics supplied by China to build a far more sophisticated drone force. All of this makes any kind of reliable settlement with the Houthis more difficult to achieve.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/10/only-thing-houthis-have-done-successfully/688972/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Graeme Wood: The only thing the Houthis have done successfully&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“If you listen to the speeches by Houthi leaders, they basically say there is no such thing as Saudi Arabia—they see the kingdom as totally illegitimate and want to see it fall,” Bernard Haykel, a professor of Middle Eastern Studies at Princeton University and an expert on Saudi Arabia and Yemen, told me. “And unfortunately, they are able to draw on a deep well of resentment against the role that Saudi Arabia has historically played in Yemen.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In recent months, the Houthis have stepped up their demands, insisting that the Saudis withdraw all support from the internationally recognized government in the south, lift all sanctions, and pay reparations. But they have a long-standing habit of moving the goalposts in negotiations.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;“What would it take to placate the Houthis?” Haykel asked. “Can you live with them?”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Many Saudis fear the answer is no. But the alternative is a war that could turn the whole country into a battleground.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Robert F. Worth</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/robert-worth/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/qKZOvTt-iCaydC59PydYEYUNj14=/media/img/mt/2026/10/SaudiHouthisFinal/original.png"><media:credit>Illustration by The Atlantic. Sources: Brendan Smialowski / AFP / Getty; BISWAS / AFP / Getty; Osamah Abdulrahman / AP.</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Saudi Arabia Is Running Out of Options</title><published>2026-10-14T11:43:35-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-20T15:57:28-04:00</updated><summary type="html">Houthi violence is undermining the kingdom’s best-laid plans.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/houthi-strikes-saudi-arabia/688990/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-688953</id><content type="html">&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;I&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;n 2017, when French voters&lt;/span&gt; first elected Emmanuel Macron as president, pundits hailed him as the &lt;a href="https://www.lesoir.be/90374/article/2017-04-18/macron-est-vu-comme-un-antidote-au-declinisme"&gt;antidote&lt;/a&gt; to their nation’s “decline.” The term, in the parlance of that moment, seemed to encompass a condition that was not just economic and cultural but existential: France, as an idea and ideal, was decaying as surely as its national debt was deepening.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Nearly 10 years later, as Macron’s second presidential term comes to an end, the French are nearly unanimous in their belief that their country is still on a downward slope. In a recent Ipsos-BVA &lt;a href="https://www.valeursactuelles.com/politique/presidentielle-2027-les-francais-jugent-le-pays-en-declin-et-se-disent-en-colere-selon-un-sondage"&gt;poll&lt;/a&gt;, 85 percent of French respondents said that France was in decline, and 98 percent were dissatisfied with the present state of the country.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;One might have seen such numbers in the spring of 1789, if opinion polls had existed then. In that prerevolutionary time, France was burdened with staggering debt, skyrocketing prices, and in a sclerotic state overseen by a clueless and corrupt elite. Today similar factors, together with the memory of past glory, are driving the public’s belief that France’s Fifth Republic is faltering. And declinism, in turn, seems to be fueling the rise of extremist radicals intent on remaking the republic itself.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;G&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;allic morosity might be&lt;/span&gt; easy to dismiss. After all, few peoples are more inclined toward claims of national decay than the French. Members of the country’s political and intellectual elite point to auguries of its descent throughout the 19th and 20th centuries—a sweep of time punctuated by the rise and fall of authoritarian states (whether Bonapartist or Pétainist) and republican governments (from the Second to the Fifth). Charles de Gaulle’s assertion that France could not be France without &lt;i&gt;la grandeur&lt;/i&gt; could be said to channel a certain anxiety as much as pride.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Soon after de Gaulle’s death in 1970, &lt;i&gt;le déclinisme&lt;/i&gt; was again on the rise. Thirty years of economic growth came to an end with the global energy shocks and financial crises of that period. In 1976, the distinctly non-Gaullist president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, declared that France was no longer a fully autonomous power as it had been in the past, but was instead what commentators have described as a “world middle power”—an observation that angered his opponents across the political spectrum. An influx of immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East had helped fuel decades of industrial growth; they then became scapegoats for growing fears over national decline and disintegration.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/07/america-france-enduring-relationship/687844/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Eliot A. Cohen: Our oldest ally&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As the 20th century gave way to the 21st, this French fixation expanded and darkened. Following Robert Frank’s fine historical account &lt;i&gt;La hantise du déclin&lt;/i&gt; (&lt;i&gt;The Obsession With Decline&lt;/i&gt;), published in 1994, came works such as Nicolas Baverez’s wildly polemical 2003 tract, &lt;i&gt;La France qui tombe &lt;/i&gt;(&lt;i&gt;Falling France&lt;/i&gt;). And then the public appetite for books proclaiming the End Times for France grew fiercer. Pundits furiously supplied the grim prognoses—most notoriously Éric Zemmour, who a little more than a decade ago published his best-selling &lt;i&gt;Le suicide français&lt;/i&gt;, which married xenophobic rage to potted history. The book boosted the “Great Replacement” theory, which claims that Western elites are enabling great waves of Muslim immigrants to replace &lt;i&gt;les français de souche&lt;/i&gt;—the loaded term for those of “purely French heritage.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Zemmour went on to found a political movement named &lt;i&gt;Reconquête!&lt;/i&gt;, a heavy-handed reference to the medieval “reconquest” by Catholic rulers of Moorish Spain. The party remains politically marginal, but its message—that France’s immigration policies amount to national suicide—has gone mainstream. The current justice minister, Gérald Darmanin, recently proposed a three-year moratorium on legal immigration, declaring that France has reached “the limit of our capacities for integration and assimilation” of immigrants. This view, and the moratorium idea, have the approval of 63 percent of the public, judging from a CSA Institute opinion &lt;a href="https://www.seneweb.com/en/news/International/poll-63-of-french-people-support-a-suspension-of-legal-immigration-for-three-years_n_493763.html"&gt;poll&lt;/a&gt; conducted in May.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Those numbers partly explain Marine Le Pen’s remarkable lead in polling for next spring’s presidential election. The movement she inherited from her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, then called the National Front, once gathered neo-Nazis, anti-Semites, and die-hard supporters of the French colonial administration of Algeria. Now called National Rally, the party mainly demonizes Muslims in place of Jews as the source of all of France’s ills. But just last week, the party’s president, Jordan Bardella, was revealed to have spent his late teens marinating in the writings of the Holocaust denialist Alain Soral. In line with her party’s ethno-nationalist ideals, Le Pen promises a policy that she calls a “national priority,” which would give French citizens preferential treatment over noncitizens for an array of social benefits, and she has said she’d be willing to change the constitution by referendum.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The most recent Ifop-Fudicial &lt;a href="https://www.tf1info.fr/politique/elections/presidentielle/sondage-lci-presidentielle-2027-ce-que-revelent-les-resultats-de-notre-derniere-enquete-2467226.html"&gt;poll&lt;/a&gt;, published on September 30, put Le Pen in the lead with 31 to 36 percent support. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the founder of the extreme-left party France Unbowed, is fighting for second place, at 14 to 17 percent. Like Le Pen, Mélenchon has pledged to disobey certain European Union regulations that infringe on French sovereignty; also like her, he seems to trust Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky less than Russian President Vladimir Putin; and, along with some members of Le Pen’s party, he enjoys flirting with anti-Semitic tropes. Both candidates exercise full control of the parties they either created or re-created and seem to satisfy the public’s broad desire, according to a 2019 Ipsos &lt;a href="https://www.ipsos.com/fr-fr/la-france-en-tete-des-pays-en-attente-dun-leader-fort-pour-casser-les-regles"&gt;poll&lt;/a&gt;, for a “strong leader who will break the rules.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Le Pen, the reactionary, and Mélenchon, the revolutionary, share a common goal: to bury the French Republic in its current form. Mélenchon seeks to replace the hybrid regime of the Fifth Republic, which fuses presidential and parliamentary institutions, with a Sixth Republic dominated solely by Parliament. Le Pen’s “national priority” would undermine the universalist foundation of French republicanism—and imposing it by referendum would elevate that instrument as a means of circumventing the legislature.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="dropcap"&gt;F&lt;span class="smallcaps"&gt;or French voters repelled&lt;/span&gt; by both extremes, the prospects are grim. Their predicament stems from a decision President Macron made in 2024. His party, Renaissance, and other centrist parties took a beating in elections for the European Parliament that year. Infuriated, Macron dissolved the National Assembly and called for snap elections. Rather than the usual face-off between the traditional right and left, three blocs of roughly equal size emerged: the remnants of Renaissance, the National Rally, and a hastily slapped-together coalition of left-wing parties—France Unbowed, Communists, Socialists, and the Ecologists—that purported to form a “republican rampart” against Le Pen.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Personality clashes have since reduced the republican rampart to rubble, allowing the National Rally and France Unbowed to solidify their places in the polls while a now-lame-duck president has meanwhile presided over a series of flailing governments that can’t seem to pass a budget through Parliament. The National Assembly has been paralyzed, and a host of politicians have tossed their hat into the ring for the upcoming presidential election. The first round of votes will happen on April 18 and, in the extremely likely case of no candidate winning a majority, the second round will take place on May 2. At last count, 34 presidential candidates have declared themselves, mostly from the center left and center right. Several others, including former President François Hollande and former Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, are testing the waters.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/10/france-schools-student-protest/688903/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Thomas Chatterton Williams: The violence sweeping France was never really about schools&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The proliferation of candidates attests to the fragmentation of a political landscape that once neatly divided into left and right. It is a sign not of healthy competition but of democratic fragmentation: This multitude of candidates, most with relatively few supporters, will ultimately help secure the second-round election for one of the two contenders who represent the greatest danger to democracy in France.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The growing prospect of this face-off reinforces a widespread perception of decline—of a nation not just reduced to the ranks of middle powers, but where the political center no longer holds. This explains, in part, what the &lt;i&gt;Le Monde&lt;/i&gt; columnist Solenn de Royer describes as “a spirit of defeatism” now haunting French politics. During an August visit to a town in southern France, Macron adopted that language, urging a small crowd to resist “the rampant spirit of defeatism,” whether in response to recent wildfires or in politics. A few weeks later, two well-known establishment political figures, the conservative Xavier Bertrand and the socialist Bernard Cazeneuve, joined forces to press their followers not to give in to despair in response to Le Pen’s seemingly irresistible rise.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The call to resist such fatalism has been sounded before in France—from within the walls of the Paris Commune of 1871, and across the trenches of World War I. A presentiment of decline was thought to fuel pacifism in the interwar period, and de Gaulle decried such thinking in his BBC address in 1940. But perhaps no one in France has offered greater insight into the declinist mentality, and greater courage to combat it, than Marc Bloch, the historian who chronicled France’s defeat by Nazi Germany, in 1940. He attributed the debacle in part to an elite “only too ready to despair of the country they had been called upon to defend, and of the people who furnished the soldiers they commanded.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;More than 80 years later, the problem is less that France’s political elite is ready to despair of the country than that the nation is ready to despair of its political elite.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Robert Zaretsky</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/robert-zaretsky/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/Ptn_kpqy61fTz2etkMk5FmrmtU0=/media/img/mt/2026/10/2026_10_09_French_Elections/original.jpg"><media:credit>Artur Widak / NurPhoto / Getty</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The French Are Very Worried, and That’s Making Things Worse</title><published>2026-10-10T07:00:00-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-10T10:37:40-04:00</updated><summary type="html">The belief that the country is on a downward slope fuels the appeal of radicalism.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/french-decline-politics-extremism/688953/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-688919</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;The self-styled secretary of war strode confidently across the stage as he outlined his vision for America’s armed forces. He spoke of establishing an autonomous warfare command and an office of religious affairs, of developing preferred relationships with select universities, of reducing the number of senior officers by 20 percent, and of creating an external team of civilians to chart the future of warfare. Unlike last year, when the senior officers Pete Hegseth called to order in Quantico responded with silent stoicism, this year the junior officers and enlisted troops he addressed gave him a standing ovation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some of Hegseth’s supporters have compared him to George Marshall, the legendary U.S. Army chief of staff who reshaped that service before World War II, because Marshall relieved at least 600 senior officers of their positions. He &lt;a href="https://historynet.com/failure-not-option/"&gt;defended the choice&lt;/a&gt; on the grounds that “most of our senior officers on such duty are deadwood and should be eliminated from the service as rapidly as possible.” Only 11 of 42 generals retained their commands for combat; only one was given a top command during the war.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But the taciturn, disciplined Marshall would never have crowed that “the ideological clowns are out. The patriotic cowboys are in, with testosterone testing on top,” or suggested that journalists who criticized a military mission were guilty of treason, both of which Hegseth did in his speech. And this is just the beginning of what makes the comparison both ridiculous and patently self-serving for Hegseth.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Marshall had to create a wartime military from an Army that hadn’t fought in 20 years. Hegseth is leading a military that has been at war for more than 25 years. Marshall’s judgments were trained on his long experience in important positions inside the military hierarchy. Hegseth sits in judgment of an officer corps that found his performance wanting at a fairly junior level of leadership. Marshall evaluated combat capabilities through rigorous field experiments known as the Louisiana Maneuvers, in which officers tested new technology, such as tanks, and were assessed by experienced officers. Hegseth proposes to test combat fitness largely through a two-hour &lt;a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/6104382-pentagon-new-general-promotion-test/"&gt;written exam&lt;/a&gt; administered by &lt;a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2026-09-22/hegseth-promotions-joint-warfighter-evaluation-22929821.html"&gt;an ideologue&lt;/a&gt; drummed out of service for insubordination. Marshall gained congressional authorization before enacting his program. Hegseth’s comportment has drawn articles of impeachment from a congressman of his own political party.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/2026/07/ra-black-patriots/687773/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Listen: The military Pete Hegseth wants&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;What Marshall and Hegseth do have in common is that their plans for radically reshaping the military begin with selecting its senior leadership. In Marshall’s day—he was appointed chief of staff in 1939—seniority, meaning time in service, was the main criterion for promotion. But technological advances had increased the Army’s mobility and firepower, and Marshall believed that more imaginative leadership was needed to make the adjustment. At the time, the U.S. Army was rated the world’s &lt;a href="https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/gen-george-c-marshall-eliminates-dead-wood/"&gt;19th-largest fighting force&lt;/a&gt;, behind Portugal’s and just ahead of Bulgaria’s.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Marshall established a two-part system of officer evaluation. First, a board of ranking veterans, selected by Marshall for their rigor and judgment, would review the officers’ records. Then the commanders would undergo a demanding field test to evaluate performance in combat conditions. The processes Marshall put in place—merit-based evaluation boards, an up-or-out promotion system, rotations through field testing at a national training center—produced the military leadership that Hegseth is culling.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The U.S. military is, in fact, top-heavy. Congress has authorized &lt;a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R44389"&gt;857 general and flag officers&lt;/a&gt; for a force of only about &lt;a href="https://usafacts.org/answers/how-many-troops-are-in-the-us-military/country/united-states/"&gt;1.35 million active-duty&lt;/a&gt; personnel and 771,200 reservists. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2024 called for the armed forces to study the possibility of drawing down the number of such officers, and in 2025, Hegseth &lt;a href="https://media.defense.gov/2025/May/05/2003704210/-1/-1/1/MEMORANDUM-DIRECTING-GENERAL-AND-FLAG-OFFICER-REDUCTIONS.PDF"&gt;directed&lt;/a&gt; a minimum 10 percent reduction in general officer billets, and a minimum 20 percent reduction in both four-star and National Guard generals. In his State of the Force speech, Hegseth raised the level to &lt;a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b5b79e91-37d6-45c1-9907-cd3ea957cb5d?syn-25a6b1a6=1"&gt;20 percent&lt;/a&gt;, with a deadline of January 2027—just about 90 days from the announcement—while also establishing a new four-star command.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;An organization as large as the U.S. military no doubt can, and perhaps even should, cut back its senior management. The proportion of generals has increased by 31 percent over the past 50 years, as have the responsibilities, as the American way of war has come to rely more and more on technology, joint operations, leadership of coalition forces, and managing and reporting on financial resources. Some responsibilities have also migrated from the one- and two-star levels up to the three- and four-star levels, and these could be forced back down the grade structure.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/07/top-gun-hegseth-pentagon-leadership/687997/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Missy Ryan: The ‘Top Gun: Maverick’ theory of Pete Hegseth&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But the way Hegseth is doing his job does not merit the benefit of the doubt that was accorded to Marshall—an officer so concerned about even the appearance of political favoritism that he declined to vote. Hegseth, by contrast, claims that he’s eradicating political bias from the military but is in fact &lt;a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-trumps-washington/pete-hegseth-just-declared-victory-in-the-wrong-war?utm_mailing=tny_nl_6671_newspolitics_100126_8fi8upzpnn&amp;amp;utm_brand=tny&amp;amp;cndid=63377214"&gt;importing the culture wars&lt;/a&gt; into the force in a way that damages both the military and the public’s trust in it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;He convenes troops for partisan purposes. At the Quantico meeting, he distributed a collection of his speeches titled “The War Department Field Manual.” He relieved or coerced into retirement without explanation 23 senior officers, and in &lt;a href="https://www.aei.org/military-ouster-and-replacement-tracker/"&gt;at least two cases&lt;/a&gt; replaced them with dramatically less qualified successors. He removed &lt;a href="https://www.military.com/hegseth-removing-militarys-senior-leaders-faster-than-any-defense-secretary-in-recent-history"&gt;80 officers&lt;/a&gt; from merit-based promotion lists, and precipitated the &lt;a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/6065013-hegseth-again-removes-army-officer-promotions/"&gt;resignation&lt;/a&gt; in protest of the secretary of the Army. He &lt;a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/12/kelly-hegseth-pentagon-trump-censure.html"&gt;attempted to censure&lt;/a&gt; and court martial a sitting senator. He revoked press access to the Pentagon. The U.S. has been at war for five months without a single Pentagon press briefing. Most dangerously, as the Quantico meeting demonstrated, he and the president are corroding the chain of command by encouraging disrespect for “the generals” and inculcating loyalty to themselves instead. Such politicization of the military &lt;a href="https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/political/the-roman-republic-with-bret-nN01_BXp2ls/"&gt;destroys republics&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Hegseth is arrogating to himself authorities that properly belong to Congress. Article I of the U.S. Constitution vests Congress with the authority to raise armies and maintain a navy. Congress is the body that establishes the standards for appointments, assignments, duties, and grades of general and flag officer positions. Congress determines these officers’ promotions. And this Congress is overdue to protect the American military from a civilian leadership that is its greatest threat.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Kori Schake</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/kori-schake/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/Mhi88f_5vq6RUT2NA47j20fsEgM=/media/img/mt/2026/10/2026_10_07_We_Could_Use_Fewer_GeneralsJust_Not_Like_This_Kori_Schake/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by The Atlantic. Sources: Bettmann / Getty; Alex Wong / Getty.</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">Reducing the Number of Generals Isn’t the Problem</title><published>2026-10-08T07:00:00-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-08T08:11:59-04:00</updated><summary type="html">Hegseth is damaging the military and the public’s trust in it.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/generals-hegseth-military-public-trust/688919/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry><entry><id>tag:theatlantic.com,2026:50-688890</id><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;i&gt;Sign up for our &lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/sign-up/national-security/?utm_source=feed"&gt;&lt;i&gt;newsletter about national security&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;i&gt;here&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Proponents of the war with Iran have taken recent increases in crude-oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz as proof that the U.S. strategy is finally working. President Trump is so confident in this that he recently rejected a seven-day plan, set forward by Iran’s foreign ministry, to end the war and open the strait. The United States is “winning tremendously,” Trump boasted.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A confused administration is conflating tactical dominance with strategic success. Seven months into a war that its planners suggested would last four to five weeks, the Trump administration’s understanding of Iran remains deeply flawed, and increases in oil exported through the strait don’t mean that the U.S. is close to ending the conflict on its terms.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The president’s self-assurance doubtless derives in part from his reported belief that this conflict will come down to which side is able to endure economic pain the longest. The countdown clock on Iran’s economy appears to be ticking ever faster: The U.S. Navy’s blockade on Iranian ports has been ruthlessly effective, as, to a lesser extent, has the Treasury Department’s Operation Economic Outcast, announced in August as “an unprecedented campaign to sever every remaining economic lifeline sustaining the Islamic Republic of Iran.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/09/trump-iran-successor-blame/688754/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Trump could leave the Iran mess to his successor&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Iran’s economy was in bad shape before the war. Now it is in deep crisis. The Iranian rial is trading at a record rate of more than 2.5 million to a dollar, versus a prewar exchange rate closer to 1.2 million. Year-over-year food inflation was more than 125 percent in late August, according to Iranian-government statistics. A country accustomed to cheap, plentiful gasoline now has severe shortages, and its government is progressively scaling back subsidies. The International Monetary Fund projects that the Iranian economy will contract by 5.4 percent in 2026, and the U.S. administration has assessed, as Treasury Secretary Bessent said early last month, that Iran is in a “death spiral,” desperate to make a deal.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The administration appears to believe that the clock on American economic pain, meanwhile, has been slowed by Iran’s decreased ability to close or even significantly constrain maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s grip on that choke point, through sea mines and attacks on tankers, had reduced the daily transit of oil from 20 million barrels a day before the war to fewer than 3 million a day by March. But in late August, the U.S. military claimed a “major milestone”: It had cleared the strait’s transit routes of mines. A mid-September Centcom press statement said that the strait was “open for transit.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Regional oil exports rose significantly in September. According to a JP Morgan assessment that circulated on social media late last month, regional exports rebounded to just 11 percent below prewar levels. The maritime intelligence company Kpler reported the September daily average of oil through the strait at 10 million barrels; an additional 6 million barrels left the area by means of ports and pipelines that avoided the strait. A late-September headline on CNN seemed to capture the general assessment: “Iran has lost considerable leverage in the Strait of Hormuz. It can’t go on like this forever.”  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;One reason for the resumption of oil flows is that Saudi, Emirati, Qatari, and Kuwaiti oil companies, working with the U.S. Navy, have started pulling off risky transfers that evade the Iranian anti-ship missiles and drones threatening the strait. Shuttle tankers inside the waterway turn off their transponders, load up with oil, and, watched over by U.S. Navy fighter jets and attack helicopters, leave the strait by hugging the Omani coast. Once in safe waters, they transfer their crude cargo to larger supertankers for onward transport.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But the new status quo in the strait is neither sustainable nor scalable. Ship-to-ship transfers are dangerous and expensive, and they rely on active U.S. military operations, which currently involve two Navy aircraft-carrier strike groups already in the region and a third on its way.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Meanwhile, transit through the strait remains dangerous. At least eight tankers have been attacked in the week ending October 5, and the multinational Joint Maritime Information Center, based in Bahrain, still assesses the threat for strait passage as “severe.” According to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization, strait traffic remains 75 percent below pre-conflict levels. The global supply of crude and refined products trails demand, and regional exports of refined products are at only 58 percent of prewar norms. As the Kpler trade-risk analyst Ana Subasic recently told &lt;em&gt;The New York Times&lt;/em&gt;, the passage of more ships and oil through the region than earlier in the war “doesn’t mean we’re seeing a normalization of flows.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Trump could well be right in believing that Iran’s economic pain is increasing faster than America’s. But the Iranian regime, engaged in a fight it believes to be existential, will tolerate pain levels much higher than those acceptable to a U.S. administration mired in an unpopular war. The soaring price of gasoline and diesel could be a problem for Republicans in the midterm elections next month. By contrast, the Iranian regime, with its extensive and tested infrastructure of popular repression, has shown its willingness to slaughter its citizens en masse and is not calibrating its policies to the ballot box.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p data-id="injected-recirculation-link"&gt;&lt;i&gt;[&lt;a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/2026/09/trump-midterms-gas-prices/688616/?utm_source=feed"&gt;Read: Gas prices could cost the Republicans the midterms&lt;/a&gt;]&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Trump administration seems not to realize that Iran’s leaders—more militarized and hard-line than those the U.S. and Israel killed at the start of the war—are operating on the assumption the United States is dead set on toppling the Islamic Republic.  They see compromise under pressure as hastening, not delaying, their own destruction. In response to intensifying U.S. economic pressure and a worsening strategic situation, they are far likelier to escalate militarily than to capitulate.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Shortly after the Vietnam War ended, an American colonel talking with his Vietnamese counterpart is reported to have asserted, “You never defeated us on the battlefield.” The Vietnamese colonel allegedly thought about it, then replied, “That may be so, but it’s also irrelevant.” The same could be true with Iran. Yes, the U.S. has destroyed huge swaths of Iran’s military. Yes, it is crippling Iran’s economy and immiserating ever more of its citizens. And yes, it is getting more oil out of the region than earlier in the war. But none of that is getting America much closer to a win.&lt;/p&gt;</content><author><name>Alan Eyre</name><uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/author/alan-eyre/?utm_source=feed</uri></author><media:content url="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/WTI3MevkMxnTMUFnpPPaiD0kpAk=/media/img/mt/2026/10/2026_10_02_Hormuz_mpg/original.jpg"><media:credit>Illustration by The Atlantic. Source: Getty.</media:credit></media:content><title type="html">The Battle for Hormuz Is Not the War</title><published>2026-10-06T07:00:00-04:00</published><updated>2026-10-07T15:27:10-04:00</updated><summary type="html">More oil is flowing through the strait, but that doesn’t mean the U.S. has won.</summary><link href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/oil-hormuz-iran-war/688890/?utm_source=feed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"></link></entry></feed>