Fundamental changes need to be made in the way we teach.  It is not about parents, the government or society as a whole. It is about fundamentally changing how children are taught.

That said, a news item about doing homework in class caught my attention this week. Salman Khan[i], who founded Kahn Academy in Mountain View, Ca. has flipped homework and class work by putting the lectures on the internet, as homework, and then doing what used to be homework in the classroom. As Mr. Kahn points out, he is not the first to advocate this. Individualized instruction has been around for decades but has been used only in small private schools or with students with disabilities because it has been very expensive. However, with the internet and the ability to record video, using at a minimum a cell phone, a practical way to have the time to individualize instruction is now available to every teacher willing to put in the time.

If the U.S. public schools adopted Kahn’s method, academic achievement would soar. It is well-known that lecture is an inefficient method of knowledge transfer.   Homework, unsupervised, has its problems as well in that it is difficult to tell how much of it was done by the parent, friend or sibling. Additionally, it is not the teacher’s favorite task. In spite of these problems, homework is still considerably more efficient than the lecture.  What Mr. Kahn has done is to minimize the drawbacks of each technique by reversing them for time and place. Students can watch the video at home, which most are more likely to do than read, and practice in the class room with expert individualized assistance.

Something that he could add that would increase learning even more is a behavioral technique called fluency. Fluency is defined as “automatic non-hesitant responding”—that means that the student knows the material so well that he doesn’t have to think about it. When asked, “What is 12 X 12?” the average adult doesn’t have to think about it but responds instantaneously, 144! Other benefits of fluency are that it produces rather permanent learning.  How long do you think you will know 12X12? When one is fluent, it increases endurance as responding requires less effort. It also increases creativity and resistance to distraction when problem solving. Developing fluency requires high rates of responding – many times more opportunities to practice than is available in the typical classroom.

Founded in 1980, Morningside Academy in Seattle has incorporated fluency into their methods of teaching and produced outstanding results. The results are so consistent that the school gives parents a money-back guarantee. In over 30 years less than one percent of parents have asked for their money back. In an 11 year study of academic achievement, Morningside students achieved a 2.5 years growth in reading, almost four years in language arts, and more than three years in math per school year. Two things that are noteworthy considering what the Kahn Academy has done are that Morningside students have no homework and take a report card home every day. Forty minutes of the classroom hour is spent in practice.

In an article titled, “The Shame of American Education,[ii]” written in 1984, B.F. Skinner stated “…one could teach what is now taught in American schools in half the time with half the effort.” To paraphrase Skinner further, the shame of American education was not that we knew then how to double the rates of learning in American schools in 1984 but that we had known how for over 20 years! That is still true 29 years later.

However, hope springs eternal. Just maybe with the impressive results produced at schools like the Kahn and Morningside academies, it might soon change. We must not go another 50 years before we utilize nationwide what has been known for so long about how to teach more effectively and efficiently. Effective methods are available supported by research that has been replicated many, many times. There are experts out there that we as a country continue to ignore. Not surprising most of them are not in traditional educational systems. Private schools are paving the way. Educators need to follow quickly as we have no time to waste!

No related posts.

Related posts brought to you by Yet Another Related Posts Plugin.

It would go against logic to think that companies wouldn’t consider the customer first, especially today. Yet, I was surprised to read in a recent Fast Company article, Do Groupon and LivingSocial Do More Harm than Good? that despite taking in close to $3 billion in 2011, these daily deal providers seem to be declining after their meteoric rise.

While the concept seems simple, spend $20 to receive $40 to use in Restaurant A for example, why is it that there has been such significant decline?  One of the reasons many deal providers are losing money is the attrition of merchants who advertise via deal providers. The idea is that businesses can expand their customer bases quickly by reaching the masses via daily deal websites and email distribution lists with discounts that get new customers in the door, even though merchants typically lose money on the initial deal offering. Merchants of course accept the initial loss with the hope that once customers come into contact with their products and services, they will become repeat customers who continue to frequent their businesses, paying full retail prices after the deal is used. In most cases, that isn’t happening.

When new customers fail to turn into repeat customers, where does the accountability lie, with the deal providers or the merchants? Since it rarely helps to assign blame and point fingers, maybe it’s more helpful to ask, what can be done differently to increase the probability that customers will return for the same or new products and services after their initial experience?

Behavioral science offers a useful conceptual framework for understanding why this problem is occurring and what to do about it. Using the ABC model, in which the B stands for behavior, it tells us that there are two things that influence behavior, namely antecedents and consequences represented by the A and the C in the model. We know antecedents come before and prompt or trigger behavior, and that consequences, both positive and negative, follow behavior and determine whether it is strengthened or weakened over time (i.e., whether it’s repeated or it stops). So when customers purchase deal coupons, the deals themselves are antecedents for customers that prompt them to go try a merchant’s products or services maybe for the first time, and the deals do this well by reducing the costs associated with patronage. The experience the customer has when they interface with merchants is the consequence that determines whether customers will repeat the behavior of buying goods and services again or whether they leave and never return. The customer experience provided by the merchants, then, is where the rubber meets the road.

In the examples provided in the article of merchants who have and have not had success with deal providers, the ones who provided the best customer experiences got the most repeat business, and in turn returned to offer more deals through the providers. The ones who provided poor (i.e., negative) customer experiences generated little to no repeat business and in turn blamed the deal providers, and didn’t advertise with them again.  It is more than likely that the problem some merchants have in getting repeat business from customers is not exclusive to customers buying daily deals. But, if the customer experience is substandard, repeat business isn’t likely to be obtained regardless of how the customers were initially connected to the merchants.

With that said, what can merchants and providers do differently to develop a better return on their investments? Merchants can begin by asking some important questions such as, What do I want (new) customers to do and say when they walk in the door with (or without) deal coupons? One objective might be to get customers to ask questions about other goods and services and state what their current needs are. If so, merchants can ask, What can we do and say to prompt and reinforce these types of behaviors from customers?

If deal providers want repeat business from merchants, they should ask questions like, What do we want merchants to do and say when they advertise a deal with us? Objectives might be for merchants to first state a goal of how many deals they want sold and then acknowledge meeting or exceeding the goals. Providers might also state goals that report back on the amount of repeat business generated through daily deal advertising. Providers can then further ask, What can we say and do to help increase the likelihood of merchants’ success in these areas? Providers might consider offering recommendations and then following up with merchants.

In my research for this post, I spoke with a representative from RapidBuyr, a B2B daily deal provider specializing in providing companies with access to higher dollar services and products. He offered data-based guidance on the types of deals merchants are likely to sell. He also asked about the types of products and services we offered, and what kind of experience potential customers were likely to have if they purchased a deal. RapidBuyr representatives make a practice of circling back with merchants to follow up on the outcomes from advertising deals. In my opinion this deal provider is doing it well.

Asking these types of questions and offering guidance on strategies likely to help merchants reach their objectives are the types of provider behaviors that are likely to help merchants generate repeat business from advertising daily deals, which in turn will help providers get repeat business from merchants. Whether deal provider companies last over the long term remains to be seen, but it seems that a shift from providers simply advertising any and all merchant deals, to providers partnering together with merchants on strategies and providing ongoing support to identify what worked and what can be improved will be critical to the long-term success of the daily deal industry.

No related posts.

Related posts brought to you by Yet Another Related Posts Plugin.

The following is an excerpt from William Abernathy’s book Pay for Profit.

1. No one should design their own incentive plan.
The manager, or someone other than the individual receiving the incentive payments, should design the scorecard. The incentive plan designer can solicit input from those who will be assigned the scorecard, but should not negotiate the measures [SIC]. Otherwise, the participants will be put in a self-serving position which may prejudice the design. The employees in the job are often too close to the work and tend to design measures around processes and activities, rather than true results. In the design of incentive plans, management should think of itself as the “customer” and the participants as the “vendors.” The customer always specifies what he wants and what he is willing to pay for it.

2. The frequency of measurement feedback is as important as the incentive amount.
The more frequently the measures can be reported, the more effective the measures will be in guiding behavior. Try to implement measures that, at a minimum, provide monthly feedback.

3. Design ideal measures, then compromise.
Determine the strategic results of a job position and the key performance dimensions (productivity, quality, sales, etc.). Design the scorecard to improve these results without regard to what data are available. Then capture the data or compromise. Don’t design the scorecard exclusively to what data are currently available.

4. The performance measures should “mirror” the real world.
Try to design scorecard measures as though the participants are franchised or in business for themselves.

5. Where possible, design measures for small teams and individuals rather than large groups.
Individual measures have more impact on performance, are more equitable, and can more readily convert to leveraged incentive pay. Team measures may be combined with individual measures on the same scorecard, when appropriate.

6. Measure only controllable job outputs.
Design measures that are largely under the control of the participants. Do not use broad financial or subjective measures affected by events the performer cannot control.

7. Balance quality and quantity.
Never design one-dimensional scorecards that focus only on work quantity or quality. Make sure the two dimensions are balanced in terms of the economic consequences and the impact on long-term objectives.

8. Design “linked” measures to encourage employees in interdependent jobs to cooperate.
When the performance of one employee group consistently affects another employee group, you can improve cooperation by including one or more scorecard measures from group A’s plan in group B’s.

9. Provide equity of opportunity, but not necessarily equity of result.
All participants should have an equal opportunity to achieve the maximum incentive, but not necessarily every employee, nor every month. Employees should never come to see maximum achievement as guaranteed, or as an entitlement.

10. Try it, then fix it.
All the variables that may affect performance will only surface after implementation. Scorecards should be piloted using non-monetary recognition, or low payout opportunity “capped” cash plans. Once you test the plans and make adjustments, increase or remove the incentive caps.

Learn more about Pay for Profit.

No related posts.

Related posts brought to you by Yet Another Related Posts Plugin.

No related posts.

Related posts brought to you by Yet Another Related Posts Plugin.

No related posts.

Related posts brought to you by Yet Another Related Posts Plugin.

What Women Can Bring to the C-Suite

No related posts.

Related posts brought to you by Yet Another Related Posts Plugin.

Don’t Ruin My Basketball with your Mega Millions Jackpot

No related posts.

Related posts brought to you by Yet Another Related Posts Plugin.

Managing consequences such as incentives and punishment are thorny issues in safety. ADI has long held that monetary bonuses based on injury counts/rates are problematic for a number of reasons including the likelihood of generating underreporting and coverups. We have also held that overusing punishment for injuries has the same effect. Safety is an area that requires a thorough understanding of how consequences such as incentives and discipline affect the behavior of employees and employers. It is rarely as simple as it seems.

In a March 12, 2012 memorandum from OSHA Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard Fairfax, Regional Administrators and Whistleblower Program Managers were warned to be on the lookout for several employer practices that may discourage reports of injuries, violating several OSHA regulations. Regarding punishment practices specifically, OSHA is concerned that practices such as disciplining employees for getting injured regardless of the circumstances surrounding the injury, or for failing to report that injury in the time or manner prescribed by the employer, or for violating a rule in the course of getting injured if this is merely a pretext for discipline, will all discourage reporting of injuries. Similarly, if an employer has a safety incentive program in place that has such strong incentives that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from reporting injuries for fear of losing that incentive for him-/herself or for a group of people, such practices would be considered “unlawful discrimination” against a worker’s right to report injuries and invite further scrutiny from OSHA investigators.

Companies must be careful how they design consequence systems around safety. On the surface, a bonus for no injuries sounds like a good idea, but trying to reward outcomes like this leaves the chain of behaviors unspecified. True, one way to get fewer injuries is by being safer in all your actions, but an easier way is to simply do things as usual and suppress reports of injuries. Another way is through luck. Neither of these latter 2 strategies help create a safer workplace.

Similarly, when companies rely on punishment to do too much of the “heavy lifting” in managing safety, underreporting and coverups are common, and a safety culture where safety issues are openly and honestly discussed is out of reach. A successful safety program requires a sophisticated understanding of behavior and consequences.

See also Why Incentives and Safety Don’t Mix and Safe By Accident.

No related posts.

Related posts brought to you by Yet Another Related Posts Plugin.

It was about positive reinforcement and lots of it.

One thing that the “pay for performance bounty” did was to focus reinforcement on activities that would likely hurt a player to the extent that he would have to leave the game.  To understand the sources of reinforcement, all you had to do was watch the reaction of the player as he raised his hands triumphantly after the hit.  Watch the other players as they jumped on him giving him approving hand gestures.  Listen to the team fans as they cheered loudly and approvingly.  Watch as the player returned to the sidelines as the other players on the bench greeted and congratulated him.  Watch Williams as the player came off the field.  Oh I am sure that none of the players refused the money but I suggest it was more like a trophy than cash that they would spend after practice.  It would not surprise me if some of the players had the money framed and hung on the wall at home.

I am glad to see that the league is taking this seriously as it is still in the news and being investigated several weeks after the scandal was reported.  I am still worried that those who were not directly involved, like Head Coach Sean Payton and the Saints GM, receive consequences that will cause them to stop this kind of behavior.  I doubt that they will.  In my opinion they have had serious lapses of judgment in their decision-making.  Unethical behavior is difficult to change and a monetary penalty or suspension from the sidelines for a few games will have little effect.  Barring the team from the playoffs might get their attention but I think that will still have minimal effect on their judgment of what behavior constitutes fair play when they get out of “the penalty box.”  Speaking of which, why not eject a player from the game when he has the second illegal hit in a game or when he has more than three or four in a season.

Football is fun and exciting because the league is a stickler for abiding by the rules.  What constitutes where the ball is placed, when the knee is on the ground, whether both feet were in bounds and the ball under control are all determined as precisely as the replay and camera angles can detect.  What constitutes fair competition and the penalties that will stop it should be taken just as seriously.  Can it really be fun to win an athletic competition by cheating?

Full disclosure and transparency requires me to say that as a die-hard Atlanta Falcons fan, “I knew they cheated.”

No related posts.

Related posts brought to you by Yet Another Related Posts Plugin.

Although there are a lot of articles warning of the dangers of death and disease caused by nuclear power, most are based on estimates and speculation that are largely unconfirmed. What we do know is that fossil fuel power plants are a much more dangerous place to work than nuclear plants. In the last 15 years there have been no deaths at nuclear plants but over 400 at fossil fuel power plants.

The danger I see for the nuclear power industry comes from overconfidence resulting from the high reliability of processes and equipment in the industry.  Therefore, the real danger may be more from human performance than nuclear radiation. I say that because a lot of what employees do at nuclear power plants is to monitor, inspect and repair equipment.

What happens when you monitor something that, because of high reliability, never changes?  The non-scientific description of the result is “complacency.”  The scientific term for complacency is extinction.  It refers to the fact that previously reinforced behavior will eventually stop when it does not produce a reinforcer. Although it is invisible in that nothing is happening, the process does produce tell-tale signs that it is occurring.  Inattention is the one that is most pervasive and dangerous.  Under extinction there is a slowing response to changes, failure to see small changes, insensitivity to them and uncharacteristic emotional reactions to the behaviors of peers and management. All businesses face a similar problem when many jobs involve monitoring reliable processes.

The well-publicized examples of sleeping on the job that occurred in the air control towers last year are examples of what happens when there is no reinforcement for looking at the monitors. When data on monitors rarely change or where no response is required when processes are in control, it is unlikely that employees will be vigilant. The solution that the Transportation Secretary implemented in the control towers (adding another controller) will not fix the problem. The problem is not in the people.  It is in rate of reinforcement built into the job. In most cases it is woefully inadequate. Correcting such problems requires a more in-depth understanding of reinforcement than a pat-on-the-back, an atta-boy or a warm fuzzy.

While the nuclear industry pays great attention to processes and behavior surrounding them, the extinction problem may need to be identified and changes made to prevent it. Otherwise, it could be lulled into complacency by being “too safe.”

No related posts.

Related posts brought to you by Yet Another Related Posts Plugin.