Piyasvasti Amranand was axed as Thai Airways’ president and chief executive officer yesterday in a move he described as politically motivated.

THAI chairman Ampon Kittiampon told a press conference that although Mr Piyasvasti passed his performance evaluation, he had communications problems with the board.

Thirteen members of the 15-man THAI board of directors were present at yesterday’s meeting during which 12 of them voted to dismiss Mr Piyasvasti despite passing the performance evaluation test last year.

Mr Piyasvasti, also a board member, was also present at the meeting.

He said he sought an explanation from Mr Ampon about his dismissal during the meeting but was not given a clear answer.

Mr Piyasvasti said his evaluation score was 86% and he thought his removal from his post was politically influenced. Mr Ampon did not accept this.

Mr Piyasvasti said it was also possible that his firing resulted from someone who wanted his position, from his investigations into graft at THAI, and from his punishment of corrupt THAI staff who might have sought help from some powerful figures.

…

He pointed out that he had brought THAI back from a loss of more than 20 billion baht to profits in two years and managed its costs including those of fuel toward a targeted profit of 6 billion baht this year.

…

He said 10 of the 15 THAI board members were appointed by the previous government and of the 12 board members who attended yesterday’s meeting excluding Mr Piyasvasti, seven worked with Mr Piyasvasti since the past government was in office.

According to Mr Ampon, an evaluation committee headed by Areepong Bhoocha-oom, permanent secretary for finance, gave Mr Piyasvasti 4.3 points out of a total of 5 last year, compared with 4.6 points he got in 2010.

Mr Ampon admitted that THAI had posted a profit during the first four months of this year but Mr Piyasvasti had encountered problems in implementing the board’s policies.

He said communications between Mr Piyasvasti and the board were not unified while Mr Piyasvasti’s performance in many areas had not been in line with the direction set by the board.

The Nation:

“I feel strange. Personally, I remain doubtful about the board’s decision,” Piyasvasti said. He has asked for the board to clarify its reasons.

The THAI board’s 15-12 vote put an end to widespread rumours that Piyasvasti would be removed, which started when Yingluck Shinawatra’s coalition government was formed.

The firing is sure to spark controversy in the corporate sector because Piyasvasti had a high key performance indicator (KPI) rating of 4.3 per cent out of 5 per cent for this year, down slightly from last year’s score of 4.6 per cent.

Board chairman Ampon Kittiampon said the reason they discharged Piyasvasti was his lack of ”unity in communication” with the board and failure to push ahead some of the airline’s projects. Amphon denied that politics had anything to do with the president’s removal, adding that nine members of the board worked with the Democrat-led government.

Ampon said Piyasvasti had been a capable leader, working to keep THAI successfully ”level” as it survived a financial storm of Bt12 billion in losses in 2011. Piyasvasti also oversaw an improvement of the company’s financial structure and launched a fuel-hedging fund to reduce the airline’s costs from rising oil prices.

…

In the first quarter of this year, net profits increased to Bt3.64 billion, up from Bt618 million year-on-year, while its gain from the fuel-hedging scheme was Bt909 million. Overall outlook for the year remains optimistic, thanks to reduced operating costs and improvements in the fleet over the next seven years.

Piyasvasti said his employment contract allowed the board to remove the president without any reason but that it must inform him one month in advance and pay six month’s salary in compensation.

…

Piyasvasti started working at THAI in October, 2009. He served as Energy minister from 2006 to 2008 and chairman of Kasikorn Asset Management and chairman of the panel of advisers to the CEO of Kasikornbank. Prior to that, he was the secretary-general of the National Energy Policy Council.

BP: BP is flabbergasted that neither the Bangkok Post or The Nation in these articles pointed to the white elephant in the room which is wife.

The Nation a few months back on a different story:

Anik Amranand, wife of Piyasvasti, defended herself, saying that at the time of the transaction, she was not yet an MP. Also, her husband does not hold any shares in PTT, she said.

Thailand Tatler:

Piyasvasti lives with his wife Anik Vichiencharoen, who’s an active member of parliament in the Democrat party...

BP: She serves on the Board of Directors of the Democrat Party and has been an Abhisit adviser. From her parliamentary profile:

Advisor to the Leader of the Opposition (2005-2006)
Expert to the Member of the House of Representatives (2008)
Member of the Advisory Council for Democrat Party (since 2008)
Member of the House of Representatives, Democrat Party, Proportional Representatives, Changwat Cluster 6

BP: She became an MP at the 2011 election, but as you see she has been working officially for the Democrats for a while. This is her prerogative and BP is not suggesting any conflict of interest, but he was appointed by the previous government and his wife is a Democrat MP who has acted as an advisor to Abhisit. Are these not relevant? Heavens above, if the situation was reversed we would have congratulatory stories of a Puea Thai crony being removed after losing over 10 billion Baht last year,* but BP finds it odd in stories about whether he was removed for political reasons that there is no mention of his wife…..

[UPDATE: The answer to the question in the headline is a 'yes']

*Obvious factors of the loss are the high oil prices + bad economy so not necessarily down to him, but if he had been making record profits year after year then it would have made it difficult to sack him. He wasn’t though….

Two months before the 2011 election, they surveyed voters in all 20 provinces in the Northeast on which party people would vote for in the July 3, 2011 election. The result was Puea Thai, 63.9%; Democrats, 20.7%; and  Bhum Jai Thai, 9.1%. The actual election results for the party vote for the Northeast was Puea Thai 68.2%, Democrats 14.7%, and Bhum Jai Thai 6.5%. Given the survey took place before Yingluck’s introduction (which helped PT), and PT’s strong election performance and the Democrats’s poor performance, the E-san poll appears to have a history – although that pre-election poll surveyed over 2,000 people whereas more recent polls have only surveyed just over 1,000 people each time.

The big advantage of the E-san poll compared with other polls that provide a regional breakdown is that the E-san poll surveys people in all 20 provinces whereas most other pollsters only survey a handful of provinces in each region which are not necessarily reflective of the entire region. This means regional breakdowns are not always accurate.

BP has blogged on the 3 previous E-san polls in the post here. The latest poll surveyed 1,033 people between May 4-5, 2012.**

Q1 surveys the performance of the government on 6 aspects (ผลสำรวจการประเมินผลงานรัฐบาลใน 6 ด้าน). This is a pass or not pass grade. The figures below are those who give the government a pass:

Source: December 2011; January 2012 (here, here, and here); February and March 2012 (here and here); May 2012 (here and here)

In the May poll, people were also asked what the main issue was a problem for which they wanted the government to quickly solve the problem (ประเด็นปัญหาที่คนอีสานเรียกร้องให้รัฐบาลเร่งแก้ไขมากที่สุด). The top answer was the cost of living, wages, debts etc with 66.4% of those in the Northeast seeing it as the main issue to solve; following by drugs at 5.9%, supporting agriculture and price of agricultural products, 5.7%, other problems include the tablets, and the South.

BP: From today’s earlier post:

Other polling suggests that the cost of living and the cost of goods is a concern although people don’t necessarily blame the government or think the government is doing a bad job compared with previous government.  A more recent post on a series of Suan Dusit polls clearly shows the serious problem of the rising cost of living. Yes, a poll of some provinces for those who have received the 300 Baht a day minimum wage increase shows they are better off since the increase, but not all workers are on the minimum wage and not all workers will be getting increases in wages (you have self-traders and those who don’t receive a wage too).

The continued decline in performance on economic issues should be a serious concern for the government (from 76.1% in December to 41% in May). Now, you may say that overall, the government’s score has gone up, but the “overall” score may be misleading. The E-san poll also asked if there was a new election, which party would you vote for (เมื่อถามความคิดเห็นว่าหากมีการเลือกตั้งครั้งใหม่คนอีสานจะเลือกพรรคการเมืองใด), the result was 39.4% undecided which was up from 35.7% in February/March; for Puea Thai the result was 34.3% which is down from 47% in February/March, and 19.5% said they won’t vote for any party [BP: They won't vote??? One assumes then the remaining 6.8% will vote for other parties].

Regardless, a drop in support from 47% to 34.3% shows a problem for Puea Thai although as of now, the support still hasn’t got to other parties and the undecided camp is the majority. This is also reflects polls over the last few years – see here and here - where the neutrals/those who don’t want to take sides were sometimes either a plurality or in some cases a majority. There is also one other recent poll where the neutrals/those who don’t want to take sides scored highly (yet to blog on!). By election time, most people choose a party, but given 68.2% of voters in the Northeast gave their party vote to Puea Thai in 2011 if only 34.3% are willing to do so now then Puea Thai will need to pick up a majority of the undecideds to get close to 68% score again.

Q2 is not a straight support or not support. People are being asked to choose between politicians (you can only choose one).

NOTE: There is no “others” for May; it is “none” only.

BP: So Yingluck drops in May, but she is still above her January score (the December to January drop is partly explained from oversampling lower income voters in December versus undersampling them in January). Chalerm is less in the news and if he is those in the Northeast don’t see him as being the most impressive. Abhisit reflects the core Democrat support. The May figures don’t add up to 100%, but the poll only lists these 5 and we don’t know about others.

**Survey Data for April

Gender:
Males   53.3%
Females 46.7%

BP: Usually women are overrepresented….

Age:
18-25, 17%
26-35, 22.4%
36-45, 36.5%
46-60, 20.2%
61+, 3.9%

Education:

Grade 6 or lower (ประถมศึกษา/ต่ำกว่า), 22%
Grade 9 (มัธยมศึกษาตอนต้น), 12%
Grade 12/vocational certificate (มัธยมศึกษาตอนปลาย/ปวช), 23%
Associate degree/higher vocational certificate (อนุปริญญา/ปวส), 12.7%
Bachelor’s degree, 25%
Master’s degree & Ph.D, 4.9%

Occupation:
12.58% are traders/self-employed,
18.3% are contractors/general labour,
15.2% are farmers,
11.52% are students,
13.75% are civil servants/state enterprise employees,
19.85% work for private enterprises,
8.13% are housewives/househusbands,
.6% others

BP: Farmers seem a little low, but then again traders/self-employed and contractors/general labour may include those who work in the farming area and it is how people have define themselves.

Income:
Less than 5,000, 30.6%
5,001-10,000, 32.3%
10,001-15,000, 15.2%
15,001-20,000, 12.5%
20,001-40,000, 8%
40,001+, 1.4%

BP’s plan is to blog the survey results each month – see  October 2011, November 2011, December 2011, January 2012, and February 2012 posts. BP was busy so have blogged on both the March and April surveys in this single post. The survey from March was from March 25-31; April from April 25-30. BP has compared the March and April results with the first 7 months of Yingluck’s government and the final 4 surveys that BP can find for the Abhisit government so we have a point of comparison (BP can’t find the surveys for the months of May, June, and July 2011 (ie last 3 months of the Abhisit government) although this could be that Suan Dusit diverted their surveys to election surveys). The points are out of 10:

Sources:  January-April (PDF); August-November; December; January 2012; February 2012 (PDF); March and April 2012 (PDF)

NOTE: For a larger image, go here.

BP:

1. Yingluck has continued to increase her support. She is now up to 6.04 and is close to the level she was just after having won the election (i.e before the floods caused her score to drop).

Yingluck’s improvement in performance is also reflected in other polls. An ABAC poll showed a 7% increase in support for Yingluck from January to February (yes that is getting old, but it does match the January and February data on the Suan Dusit poll) and a NIDA poll in April showed that her weighted nationwide approval rating went from 63% to 71%.

2. The performance of the government has been fairly steady over the past 3 months from 5.7 to 5.71 to 5.68. From October-January, the government trailed the opposition, but for the last 3 months they had been ahead of the opposition.

3. The opposition (i.e mainly the Democrats) have recovered from their poor score in February of 5.09 although in April they did drop slightly in April back to 5.33.

Other polling suggests that the cost of living and the cost of goods is a concern although people don’t necessarily blame the government or think the government is doing a bad job compared with previous government.  A more recent post on a series of Suan Dusit polls clearly shows the serious problem of the rising cost of living. Yes, a poll of some provinces for those who have received the 300 Baht a day minimum wage increase shows they are better off since the increase, but not all workers are on the minimum wage and not all workers will be getting increases in wages (you have self-traders and those who don’t receive a wage too).

Now, you may be asking, does this all really matter? In BP’s view it does. There are clearly behind-the-scenes deals/arrangements in place, but they do depend on the strength of the government. If the government loses popularity then Thaksin’s position is much weaker (and vice-versa). Yes, the PM is doing well, the overall performance of the government is also doing well, but there are rising costs which is a problem for Puea Thai (hard to quantify precisely, but they have don’t as well in local elections – although local elections are not always about national issues – will blog on the local elections separately). There is also growing criticism by some red shirts of the government, for some on economic issues and for others on issues related to justice and lese majeste.

NOTE: One reason that BP likes poll results is well BP thinks they are more relevant than “man-on-the-street interviews” in newspapers. It is one thing to ask a couple of people and to have some of their answers included or different prominence being given to different answers (i.e when different people are quoted some are quoted at length and/or at the top of the article whereas other people only have a short quote/appear at the bottom), but this pales in comparison with anywhere between 1,000-7,000 people being asked the same question and there being no editing of their answers or equal importance to their answers in polls. Yes, polls and polls in Thailand are far from perfect, but BP thinks they are more relevant to assessing the state of play than man-on-the-street interviews. Man-on-the-street responses are useful in explaining polls results (i.e a poll shows drop in support for the government in one area and the man-on-the-street interview has responses from former government supporters which reflects discontent in this one area and they explain why they are unhappy).

Finally, for the overall political index, you have a regional breakdown:

BP: BP has often wondered the value of the above. It is the overall political index score per region, but is this a reflection on the government’s performance or just a reflection of politics/political situation? Not all categories are necessarily ratings of the government. For example, performance of politicians/unity, overall state of society, overall carrying out of duties of political parties, role of the media in giving info to the public, participation of the people in independent organizations, performance of the opposition, and unity of the country etc  are not necessarily ratings of the government so these scores could drop, all other scores remain the same (am talking hypothetically) and the overall index would drop, but this doesn’t then mean that the government’s performance has dropped.

*Survey data methodology for March 2012:

Gender:
Males   32.78%
Females 67.22%

BP: Need one point out how this is skewed although April’s one isn’t.

Age:
Under 20,  8.55%
21-30,  18.18%
31-40,  25%
41-50,  34.22%
50+, 12.7%
Not specified, 1.35%

BP: Those aged 41-50 are undersampled whereas those aged over 50 are oversampled.

Education:
Less than Bachelor’s, 51.69%
Bachelor’s degree, 36.72%
More than Bachelor’s degree, 4.46%
Not specified, 7.13%

BP: Those with less than Bachelor’s are undersampled whereas those with a Bachelor’s Degree are oversampled.

Occupation:
Farmers, 21.84%
Contractors, 25.23%
Civil servants/state enterprise employees, 14.84%
Soldiers/military, 1.41%
Doctors/nurses, 1.02%
Private sector employees, 9.68%
Self-traders, 12.18%
Students, 8.66%
Others, 5.15%

Region:
Bangkok and surrounding provinces, 22.52%
Central, 19.77%
North, 14.84%
Northeast, 32.17%
South, 10.7%

BP: The Northeast is accurate, but the North and the South are undersampled with Bangkok and surrounding provinces oversampled.

Survey data methodology for April 2012:

Gender:
Males   50.23%
Females 49.77%

Age:
Under 20,  9.61%
21-30,  22.06%
31-40,  29.17%
41-50,  23.18%
50+, 15.5%
Not specified, .49%

Education:
Less than Bachelor’s, 63.27%
Bachelor’s degree, 29.42%
More than Bachelor’s degree, 4.85%
Not specified, 2.45%

Occupation:
Farmers, 23.4%
Contractors, 22.76%
Civil servants/state enterprise employees, 13.35%
Soldiers/military, 1.23%
Doctors/nurses, .97%
Private sector employees, 10.63%
Self-traders, 11.71%
Students, 10.83%
Others, 5.1%

Region:
Bangkok and surrounding provinces, 21%
Central, 22.46%
North, 16.18%
Northeast, 29.75%
South, 10.61%

BP: The Northeast is accurate, the North, and the South are slightly undersampled with Bangkok and surrounding provinces oversampled.

Then yesterday, freedom of speech was executed by the firing squad at the Ministry of Culture. The National Film and Television Board – officially chaired by PM Yingluck Shinawatra, though she never has time to watch any serious films – upheld the initial verdict of the censors board and banned Shakespeare Tong Tai (Shakespeare Must Die), an adaptation of Macbeth and a political allegory based on our contemporary fracas. The death sentence rests comfortably on a vague justification: the film, which is about a general who kills a king to become king and a politician who lusts after power, will cause disunity among the people. The film’s title serves as its own dark prophecy: Shakespeare must die, and is dead.

I just hope not. I’m not talking about resurrection; I’m talking, perhaps, about the lifting of the spirit from the body to somewhere else. I wonder if the brilliant censors – whose members are mainly bureaucrats – realise that even if you ban and burn a film, the film lives, on a hard disk, on a thumb drive, and on the live stream of the digital cosmos, should the filmmaker chooses to let it live. And indeed the director of Shakespeare Must Die, Ing Kanjanavanit, vowed to fight on, and that “you will see this film”.

BP: There are implicit political undertones to the movie with references to Dear Leader and personality cults, but also use of the color red. The Bangkok Post:

“I don’t know how a movie could undermine the unity of people. A character may wrap his head with red cloth but he is not representative of the red shirts. It’s because the theme colours of Macbeth [which the film is based on] are red and black,” he said.

BP: From this perspective, it can easily be seen as censoring criticism again, a reference to someone killing the king and talk of a personality cult is also not the type of movie that the Thai authorities want to promote..

The absurdity is that this film would likely have had very limited distribution without the ban. It would likely have got a few mentions because of the political overtones, but aside from that fact it would have quickly dropped off the rader. Now, it is forever on the radar.  Such bans are counterproductive and just encourage people to get around them.

1st poll: Suan Dusit surveyed 1,206 people between April 5-10 (HTML, PDF) in Bangkok and surrounding provinces which focuses on what people have spent the extra money on.

BP: There is no survey data methodology, but BP is not 100% sure they only surveyed those on the minimum wage. It refers to those who received a salary/wage who have got extra money, but it is not necessarily the case that only those on the minimum wage received extra salary/wages (i.e those with more experience or skills who were paid more than the minimum wage may also have got a salary increase in order to maintain a gap with minimum wage workers).

Q1: Today, what are you using the extra money you received to pay for? (การนำเงินค่าจ้างของคนที่ได้รับ “ค่าจ้าง/เงินเดือน” เพิ่ม ณ วันนี้ ไปใช้จ่ายในเรื่องอะไรบ้าง?)

A. Food and items used daily (อาหารการกิน ของกิน ของใช้ในชีวิตประจำวัน), 45.38%

B. Regular installment payments, such as for mortgage, car, motorcycle and electronics (ค่าผ่อนชำระต่างๆ เช่น เรื่องบ้าน รถยนต์ รถมอเตอร์ไซด์ และเครื่องใช้ไฟฟ้าต่างๆ), 22.69%

C. School and educational expenses (ค่าเทอม ค่าเล่าเรียน), 10.08%

D. Payment of debts both within the system [i.e banks] and outside the system [i.e money lenders/ and shaar payments [an informal mutual fund system usually among a group of friends] (การผ่อนชำระหนี้ในระบบและนอกระบบ /แชร์), 8.40%

E. Transportation expenses/petrol (ค่าใช้จ่ายในการเดินทาง /น้ำมัน), 7.56%

F. Others, saving, making merit, sending money back home etc. (อื่นๆ เก็บออม ,ทำบุญ ,ส่งเงินให้ที่บ้าน ฯลฯ), 5.89%

Q2. Behavior in saving of people who received extra salary/wages today (พฤติกรรมการเก็บออมของคนที่ได้รับ “ค่าจ้าง/เงินเดือน” เพิ่ม ณ วันนี้)

A. Not saving (ไม่ได้เก็บออม), 44.65%. Because as still have debts within and outside the system that have yet to be settled. Income not sufficient for expenses (เพราะ ยังมีภาระหนี้สินทั้งในระบบและนอกระบบที่ยังเคลียร์ไม่ได้ รายได้ไม่พอกับรายจ่าย ฯลฯ)

B. Saving less, (เก็บออมน้อยลง), 36.90%. Because still have burdens which are necessary to pay such as school fees and payment of installments etc. (เพราะ ยังมีภาระในเรื่องที่จำเป็นต้องใช้จ่ายอยู่มาก เช่น ค่าเล่าเรียน การผ่อนชำระต่างๆ ฯลฯ)

C. Saving more (เก็บออมมากขึ้น), 18.45%. Because have extra little money left over. Necessary to save money for time when it is necessary etc. (เพราะ มีเงินเหลือออมเพิ่มขึ้นนิดหน่อย จำเป็นต้องเก็บเงินไว้ใช้จ่ายในยามจำเป็น ฯลฯ)

Q3. Behavior of those who borrow money who receive extra salary/wages as of today (พฤติกรรมการกู้หนี้ยืมสินของคนที่ได้รับ “ค่าจ้าง/เงินเดือน” เพิ่ม ณ วันนี้)

A. Borrowing more (กู้หนี้ยืมสินมากขึ้น), 37.72%. Because don’t have sufficient money, necessary to borrow more to pay for things such as buying car, house (เพราะ เงินไม่พอใช้ มีความจำเป็นที่จะต้องกู้ยืมมากขึ้นเพื่อนำมาใช้ในเรื่องที่จำเป็น เช่น ซื้อบ้าน ซื้อรถ ฯลฯ)

B. No borrowing at all (ไม่ได้กู้หนี้ยืมสินเลย), 35.33%. Because don’t like to be in debt, spend money only as necessary, practice sufficiency, have money saved to spend in time of necessity (เพราะ ไม่ชอบเป็นหนี้ ใช้จ่ายเท่าที่จำเป็น ยึดหลักพอเพียง มีเงินออมจากการทำงานไว้ใช้ในยามที่จำเป็น ฯลฯ)

C. Borrow less (กู้หนี้ยืมสินน้อยลง), 26.95%. Because afraid that have no money to pay debts, don’t live life carelessly, use money that have saved to spend etc. (เพราะ กลัวว่าจะไม่มีเงินใช้หนี้ ใช้ชีวิตอยู่บนความไม่ประมาท นำเงินเก็บบางส่วนออกมาใช้ ฯลฯ).

BP: Initially when BP say  Q2, and in particular B in Q2, in a newspaper (hadn’t seen the actual  poll at that point) BP assumed it meant that they were borrowing more as the recent cost of living increases were higher than the increase in their salaries which differed from the Bangkok University poll which found that  a clear majority of those on the minimum wage stated that the increase had helped them. However, the two listed reasons given for people borrowing more in B in Q2 are for school fees (which is an expense at this time of the year and is not necessarily  related to the minimum wage increase) and installment payments (which BP assumes means that people have taken on more debt to purchase things before and anticipation of the wage increase OR just after i.e it is not necessarily because things have got more expensive). Now, people are certainly spending more money on food and other goods used daily (see A in Q1), but they are not necessarily borrowing more money because of the increased cost of living.

————–

2nd poll: Suan Dusit surveyed 1,440 Thai laborers between April 25-30 (HTML, PDF) in large provinces throughout the country (จากผู้ใช้แรงงานไทยตามจังหวัดใหญ่ทั่วประเทศ)

Q1: Life in 2012 of Thai laborers compared with 2011 (ชีวิตความเป็นอยู่ของผู้ใช้แรงงานไทยใน “ปีนี้ (พ.ศ.2555)” เมื่อเทียบกับ “ปีที่ผ่านมา (พ.ศ.2554)”)

A. This year is worse than the previous one (ปีนี้แย่กว่าปีที่ผ่านมา), 44.45% because of impact of problems from floods so need to use their money for repairs or to help those back home, cost of living increases (เพราะ ได้รับผลกระทบจากปัญหาน้ำท่วมที่ผ่านมา ต้องนำเงินไปซ่อมแซมหรือช่วยเหลือที่บ้าน ,ค่าครองชีพสูงขึ้น ฯลฯ)

B. The same (เหมือนๆเดิม), 31.94%. Because of salary, wages the same; income and expenses about the same; have enough to use for each day (เพราะ เงินเดือน ค่าจ้างรายวันยังเท่าเดิม ,รายได้กับรายจ่ายพอๆกัน มีกินใช้ไปวันๆ ฯลฯ)

C. This year is better than the previous one (ปีนี้ดีกว่าที่ปีผ่านมา), 23.61%. Because of increase in salary or wages; better job position; family obligations have decreased, kids have finished schooling and are working (เพราะ เงินเดือนขึ้น ค่าจ้างเพิ่ม ได้เลื่อนตำแหน่ง ,ภาระครอบครัวลดลง ลูกเรียนจบมีงานทำ ฯลฯ)

Q2: Issues that Thai laborers are troubled about today are (“ความหนักใจ” ของผู้ใช้แรงงานไทย ณ วันนี้ คือ)

A. Cost of goods being expensive, cost of living such as petrol, electricity, and transportation costs being higher (สินค้าราคาแพง ค่าครองชีพต่างๆ เช่น ค่าน้ำ ค่าไฟ ค่าใช้จ่ายในการเดินทางเพิ่มขึ้น), 60.75%

B. Money is not sufficient; wages/salary received is not consistent with present situation (เงินไม่พอใช้ /เงินเดือน ค่าจ้างที่ได้ไม่สอดคล้องกับสภาพสังคมปัจจุบัน), 29.74%

C. Natural disasters, various disasters which may impact on work or daily life (ภัยธรรมชาติ ภัยพิบัติต่างๆ ที่อาจส่งผลกระทบต่อการทำงานหรือการดำรงชีวิตประจำวัน), 5.70%

D. Benefits, various protections for laborers particularly healthcare and education expenses for their children (สวัสดิการ การคุ้มครองดูแลต่างๆให้กับผู้ใช้แรงงาน โดยเฉพาะเรื่องการรักษาพยาบาลค่าเล่าเรียนของบุตรหลาน เป็นต้น), 3.81%

Q3: What should laborers do to make your life better? (“ผู้ใช้แรงงานไทย” ควรทำอย่างไร? ชีวิตความเป็นอยู่จึงจะดีขึ้น)

A. Economize, 60.15%

B. Work harder, don’t be so selective with work, 23.43%

C. Improve yourself, 9.38%

D. Cut out bad habits,  7.04%

Q4: What should the government do to make lives for laborers betters? (“รัฐบาล” ควรทำอย่างไร? ชีวิตความเป็นอยู่ของ “ผู้ใช้แรงงานไทย” จึงจะดีขึ้น)

A. Increase salaries, wages, and look into various benefits to make sure they are appropriate to the present situation (ขึ้นเงินเดือน ค่าจ้าง และดูแลสวัสดิการต่างๆให้เหมาะสมกับสภาพสังคมปัจจุบัน), 45.88%

B. Control prices of goods, solve problems of expensive goods, arrange fairs/reduce costs of public utilities (ควบคุมราคาสินค้า แก้ปัญหาของแพง จัดงานธงฟ้า /ลดค่าสาธารณูปโภค), 39.41%

C. Control employers or operators so they don’t take advantage of Thai laborers/foreign workers coming to work illegally in Thailand (ควบคุมดูแลนายจ้างหรือผู้ประกอบการไม่ให้เอาเปรียบแรงงานไทย/การจ้างแรงงานต่างด้าว เข้ามาทำงานโดยผิดกฎหมาย), 7.64%

D. Training for laborers, supporting professions/arranging fairs for those unemployed (การจัดฝึกอบรมแรงงาน ส่งเสริมอาชีพ /จัดหางานให้แก่ผู้ว่างงานหรือตกงาน), 7.07%

BP:   Interesting to see that for Q2, the top answer is the increased cost of living, but for Q4 when asked what people want the government to do, the top answer is increasing their wages (compared with controlling prices of goods).

Q5. Comparison of taking care of/looking after  laborers of  the Yingluck and Abhisit governments (เปรียบเทียบการดูแลผู้ใช้แรงงานระหว่าง “รัฐบาลยิ่งลักษณ์” กับ “รัฐบาลอภิสิทธิ์” เป็นอย่างไร?)

A. Taking care of about the same (ดูแลพอๆกัน), 43.26%.

B. Yingluck government is better (“รัฐบาลยิ่งลักษณ์” ดูแลดีกว่า), 25.53%. Because they understand and reach the grassroots or laborers more, clear policy of increasing wages/salaries (เพราะ มีความเข้าใจและเข้าถึงประชาชนระดับรากหญ้าหรือผู้ใช้แรงงานมากกว่า ,มีนโยบายขึ้นเงินเดือน ค่าแรงที่ชัดเจน ฯลฯ)

C. Both don’t care of about the same (ไม่ดูแลพอๆกัน), 16.32%

D. Abhisit government is better (“รัฐบาลอภิสิทธิ์” ดูแลดีกว่า), 14.89%. Because they had project for supporting laborers, adjusted upwards the salary as appropriate based on regions or localities (เพราะ มีโครงการส่งเสริมสนับสนุนเกี่ยวกับผู้ใช้แรงงาน โครงการแรงงานคืนถิ่น ,การปรับขึ้นค่าแรงให้เหมาะสมกับสภาพท้องถิ่นของในแต่ละภูมิภาค ฯลฯ)

BP: This matches a previous Bangkok University poll from late March where 27.5% said the Yingluck government is doing a better job versus 18.2% who said the Abhisit government is doing a better job.

btw,  the Bangkok Post reported on the poll, but not on Q5 which when assessing the performance of the government and where things stand BP thinks is the most important question…

—–

3rd poll: Suan Dusit surveyed 1,356 people between May 1-3 (HTML, PDF) in Bangkok and surrounding provinces.

Q1: Expenses that have gone up clearly in the last 2-3 months (ค่าใช้จ่ายของประชาชนที่เพิ่มขึ้นอย่างชัดเจนในช่วง 2-3 เดือนนี้)

A. Food expenses/single dish cooked food (อาหารการกิน /ข้าวราดแกง), 32.37%

B. Consumers goods/personal goods, household goods (สินค้าอุปโภค บริโภค /ของใช้ส่วนตัว ของใช้ในบ้าน), 25.09%

C. Transportation expenses/petrol (ค่าเดินทาง ยานพาหนะ ค่าน้ำมัน), 21.48%

D. Water, electricity (ค่าน้ำ ค่าไฟ), 18.36%

E. School fees and cost of uniforms (ค่าเทอม ค่าเล่าเรียน ชุดนักเรียนในช่วงเปิดเทอม), 2.70%

Q2. Goods which are more expensive today (สินค้าที่แพงขึ้น ณ วันนี้ คือ)

A. Foods/fresh goods, dried goods/meat, vegetables, and various sauces (อาหาร /ของสด ของแห้ง / เนื้อสัตว์ ไข่ ผัก ผลไม้ ซอสปรุงรสต่างๆ ฯลฯ) 49.64%

B. Transportation expenses and petrol (ค่าเดินทาง น้ำมัน), 29.82%

C. Water and electricity (ค่าน้ำ ค่าไฟ), 10.75%

D. LPG ( แก๊สหุงต้ม), 5.72%

E. Clothes (เสื้อผ้า), 4.07%

BP: Note Q1 refers to just increases in the last couple of months whereas Q2 doesn’t provide a point of comparison. While the the minimum wage increase has no doubt contributed to the production cost and that is being and will continue to be passed onto consumers, there is not much the government can do now aside from reversing the policy (which is not going to happen). Energy prices have also increased the second half of last year and first few months of this year (although have just started to decrease over the last month). Energy prices have a flow-on impact on other prices and well unless they go down the government is screwed…..

Q3. How people are managing or solving the problem of expenses in the period of expensive goods (การจัดการหรือการแก้ไขปัญหาค่าใช้จ่ายในยุคสินค้าแพงของประชาชน)

A. Economize, not spend money extravagantly, apply sufficiently (ใช่จ่ายอย่างประหยัด ไม่ฟุ่มเฟือย ยึดหลักพอเพียง), 48.79%

B. Buy less/buy specifically what is needed/buy cheaper goods (ลดปริมาณการซื้อ /ซื้อเฉพาะของที่จำเป็น /ซื้อสินค้าราคาถูก), 37.48%

C. Use public transport instead (ใช้บริการรถสาธารณะหรือขนส่งมวลชนแทน), 6.76%

D. Must accept the situation and that it is real (ต้องทำใจยอมรับกับสภาพความเป็นจริงที่เกิดขึ้น), 4.90%

E. Find extra income, find an extra job (หารายได้เพิ่ม หาอาชีพเสริมทำ), 2.07%

BP: Interesting that E is so low….

Q4. What confidence do you have regards the solving of expensive goods (ประชาชนมีความมั่นใจต่อการแก้ไขปัญหาของแพงหรือไม่อย่างไร?)

A. Have confidence that can solve the problem of expensive goods (มีความมั่นใจว่าแก้ปัญหาของแพงได้), 52.27%. Because the good has the authority to look into and control prices so they do not rise, the Ministry of Commerce is investigating operators, stores should not take advantage of consumers, the people are suffering great troubles so if the government can solve problems there will be more confidence in the government (เพราะ รัฐบาลมีอำนาจในการดูแลควบคุมดูแลราคาสินค้าไม่ให้สูงขึ้นได้ ,กระทรวงพาณิชย์มีการตรวจตราผู้ประกอบการ ร้านค้า ไม่ให้เอาเปรียบผู้บริโภค ,ประชาชนได้รับความเดือดร้อนโดยตรง ถ้ารัฐบาลสามารถแก้ปัญหาได้ก็จะได้รับความไว้วางใจ)

B. Not sure whether can solve the problem of expensive goods (ไม่มั่นใจว่าจะแก้ปัญหาของแพงได้), 47.73%. Because almost all types of consumer goods have increased, government unlikely to be able to control all, the floods last year have had an impact on production and severe lack of goods, petrol prices have increased which have increased transportation costs ( เพราะ ทั้งสินค้าอุปโภค บริโภคเกือบทุกประเภทมีราคาสูงขึ้น รัฐบาลไม่น่าจะควบคุมดูแลได้ทั้งหมด, น้ำท่วมเมื่อปีที่แล้วส่งผล ให้ผลผลิตเสียหายและขาดแคลนอย่างหนัก ,น้ำมันมีราคาแพงขึ้นส่งผลให้การขนส่งมีค่าใช้จ่ายเพิ่มขึ้นตามมา ฯลฯ).

BP: See BP’s answer in Q2. Petrol prices fall and prices will slowly come down (you have other factors like minimum wage increase to consider too). If they don’t or increase, prices will either stay the same or go up….

Q5. Things that the people want to tell the government and related agencies in the case of expensive goods (สิ่งที่ประชาชนอยากฝากบอก “รัฐบาลและหน่วยงานที่เกี่ยวข้อง” กรณี สินค้าแพง)

A. The government especially the Ministry of Commerce must be serious about solving the problem of expensive goods (รัฐบาลโดยเฉพาะกระทรวงพาณิชย์และหน่วยงานต่างๆที่เกี่ยวข้องต้องเด็ดขาดและเอาจริงเอาจัง ในการแก้ปัญหาสินค้าแพง), 35.55%

B. Want all sides to consider the people as being important/petrol, free electricity, free buses, and free transportation in order to reduce the burden on the people (อยากให้ทุกฝ่ายคำนึงถึงประชาชนเป็นสำคัญ /ค่าน้ำ ไฟฟรี รถเมล์ฟรี ระบบขนส่งมวลชนฟรี เพื่อลดภาระให้กับประชาชน), 26.22%

C. Be strict in looking into the increase of salaries, increase salaries to be sufficient for expenses and appropriate for the economic situation (ดูแลกวดขันเรื่องการขึ้นเงินเดือน ขึ้นค่าแรงให้เพียงพอกับรายจ่าย เหมาะสมกับสภาพเศรษฐกิจ), 21.22%

D. Set up stores, distribute cheap goods in order to reduce the burden of people in all regions/blue flag stores [BP: see here]  มีการออกร้าน จัดจำหน่ายสินค้าราคาถูกเพื่อเป็นการลดภาระให้กับประชาชนทุกพื้นที่ /ร้านธงฟ้า) 13.65%

E. Have a campaign so the people know about economizing, sufficiency economy/budgeting  รณรงค์ให้ประชาชนรู้จักประหยัด อดออม ยึดหลักพอเพียง /วางแผนการใช้จ่าย), 3.36%

BP: Some more comments to come.

AP:

A THAI court yesterday sentenced a man to 20 years in prison for sending text messages deemed insulting to the monarch.

The Nation:

The Criminal Court on Wednesday sentenced Ampon Tangnopakul, 61, to serve 20 years in jail after finding him guilty of four counts of texting offensive remarks against Her Majesty the Queen in May 2010.

BP: These were the four articles referred to in BP’s  post at the time of the jailing.* Lese majeste covers insults, defamation, and threats. Hence, BP understood at the time that the judgment was only in relation to insulting or defamatory comments. However, two of the 4 SMS messages go beyond insulting and defamatory comments. The 3rd SMS states “…[We] must stamp on their faces with our heels” (….ต้องเอาส้นตีนเหยียบหน้ามัน). The 4th SMS states “Please tell …. and all of their children, you’ll all die” (ช่วยบอก…และลูกหลานมันทุกๆ คนต้องตาย).

Lese majeste covers insults, defamatory statements, and threats. However, as pointed out in this post, there is clear difference between a threat (which is a criminal offence in most, if not all, jurisdictions) and insults and defamatory statements (which in many countries is not a criminal offence or where it is then the punishment is usually a light sentence, suspended sentence, or a fine – most lese majeste cases are about insults and defamatory statements). Now, BP views the contents of the SMS messages as constituting a threat. The court judgment in the Uncle SMS case also deems it to be a threat.

Not all instances of threats are prosecuted although threats against a Head of State would certainly be investigated, but if the threat was not deemed as credible or there was not an actual threat, the person may not be prosecuted – see here and here for US examples. This is an issue of prosecutorial discretion and if** the person is prosecuted the sentence would be light. Some cases in the US have resulted in a jail sentence of less than 1 year for threatening to kill Obama although other cases have resulted in 2-3 years in jail. Hence, a 20-year sentence is very severe, but then the question is of proportionality of the sentence and not whether the person should have been jailed in the first place.

The messages “indicated intent to harm and defamation against Her Majesty that would trigger hatred,” the court said. “All the messages were untrue.”

Prachatai has more details on that:

According to the lawyer, Ampon has been suffering from stomachache for months, but he was first transferred to hospital around noon last Friday and was admitted around 3.40 pm. He did not immediately receive diagnosis as the hospital lab was closed on weekend. His blood was taken for testing on Monday, but before the results were made known, he passed away around 9.10 am today.

“If Ampon was granted bail and could go see doctor regularly, such incident might not have happened” said the lawyer. Prior to this, Ampon has just had operation for oral cancer.

BP:  Am unsure of the exact prognosis of his cancer and we don’t know exactly what caused his death, but his lawyer is very likely correct when he says his condition would have been better on the outside. And the rationale for no bail again was? That the hospital lab was closed on the weekend shows you that they don’t have the facilities to treat people properly. Yes, public healthcare in Thailand is far from perfect, but it is even worse in the Thai prison system (despite the Klong Prem facility having a hospital).

The Bangkok Post:

The chief justice of the Criminal Court has explained the reason why lese majeste inmate Ampon Tangnoppakul, who died on Tuesday, was denied bail.

Thawee Prachuablarp said yesterday that after the Criminal Court delivered its verdict against Ampon, his lawyer appealed for bail release on the grounds of his ill health.

While the Appeal Court was considering his bail appeal, his lawyer also lodged an appeal for bail release directly with the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal on March 15, Mr Thawee said.

Mr Thawee said Ampon’s lawyer decided to halt the appeal process in the Appeal Court on April 3 and instead ask for a royal pardon for his client. The process of seeking a royal pardon can begin only after a case is finalised.

Mr Thawee explained that since the lawyer stopped the appeal process, Ampon’s right to bail had been forfeited.

BP:  Because the lawyers decided to withdraw the request and try for a royal pardon explains why no recent grant of bail, but that doesn’t explain the 8 previous refusals to grant bail.

Sanitsuda Ekachai in the Bangkok Post:

After eight failed attempts to obtain bail on lese majeste charges, 62-year-old Ampon Tangnoppakul, or Ah Kong, finally won his freedom when he was no longer breathing, his body stiff and cold.

Ah Kong, meaning grandpa, had cancer and could not possibly jump bail because he was too sick, too poor, and too attached to his grandchildren.

He also needed to see his doctor regularly because of his illness. Yet the court repeatedly turned down his bail requests, arguing the severity of the lese majeste charge might make him jump bail, and that his illness was not an issue because he could get medical care at the prison hospital.

….

Despite his denial and public doubts over an old man’s ability to navigate difficult text message buttons on the phone, the court believed he was guilty and sentenced him to 20 years in jail.

His spirit crushed by repeated bail refusals and no prospect of freedom due to the atrociously lengthy court procedures, he eventually decided to give up the legal fight, and opted to seek a royal pardon instead. He had high hopes of reuniting with his family until the fatal stomach pain struck.

….

Also, why can’t we see that securing bail is a legal right when the grounds for bail requests are justifiable?

With Ah Kong’s illness and inability to flee, the court’s decision to deny him bail came across as heartless.

BP: Exactly….

btw, this Prachatai article has all the details (in Thai) of the bail applications.

AP:

A Thai man in his 60s who became known as “Uncle SMS” after he was convicted of defaming Thailand’s royal family in mobile phone text messages has died while serving his 20-year prison term, his lawyer said Tuesday.

The case of Amphon Tangnoppakul, a grandfather who had suffered from mouth cancer, drew attention to Thailand’s severe lese majeste laws last November when he received one of the heaviest-ever sentences for someone accused of insulting the monarchy.

Thai activist jailed 15 years

Amphon’s cause of death was not immediately known, but he had complained of stomach pains on Friday and was transferred to a correctional department hospital, his lawyer Anon Numpa said.

It was not immediately clear when he died, but Amphon’s wife learned the news early Tuesday during a visit to the Bangkok prison where he was being held, Anon said.

Amphon was arrested in August 2010 and accused of sending four text messages to a government official that were deemed offensive to the queen. He denied sending them, however, and said he didn’t even know how to use the SMS function on his telephone to send texts.

He wept during his court proceedings, saying, “I love the King.”

The sentence was believed to be the heaviest ever received in a lese majeste case because of additional penalties issued under a related law, the 2007 Computer Crimes Act.

Before his arrest, Amphon had lived with his wife, daughter-in-law and three grandchildren in a rented room in Samut Prakan province, on the outskirts of Bangkok. He was retired and suffered from cancer of the mouth.

AFP:

“His wife called me this morning [Tuesday] and told me that he has passed away in prison,” Ampon’s lawyer Anon Numpa said, adding that his client had hoped for a royal pardon.

The cause of death was still being investigated, according to a doctor at the Corrections Department hospital where Ampon’s body was taken from the Bangkok Remand Prison.

“His medical record showed that he used to have mouth cancer, and currently his stomach was swollen, which is under investigation,” he said. “A witness said last night he was fine, but this morning he wasn’t moving and was already dead.”

Reuters:

Successive governments have ignored international calls to reform the lese-majeste laws, a highly sensitive issue in a country where 84-year-old King Bhumibol Adulyadej is regarded as semi-divine.

The laws are increasingly questioned in Thailand itself, with some critics arguing the legislation is abused to discredit activists and politicians opposed to the royalist establishment.

Thomas Fuller in the New York Times:

Mr. Ampon, who is widely referred to as “Uncle SMS,” was repeatedly denied bail despite a history of cancer. The court ruled last year that Mr. Ampon was a flight risk and that his condition “did not appear to be fatal.” His lawyer, Anon Numpa, said in a telephone interview on Tuesday that prison may have worsened his condition.

Mr. Ampon complained of stomach pains last week and was sent to a prison hospital, where he died. An autopsy was being performed Tuesday, Mr. Anon said. “His condition would have been better had he been on the outside,” he said.

…

In a handwritten note to his lawyer from prison last month, Mr. Ampon said he was “often disheartened,” and missed his wife and grandchildren. “I’m trying to be patient,” he said. “I have high hopes that I will get freedom soon.”

Bloomberg:

Ampol Tangnoppakul died at 9 a.m. at the government-run Klang Hospital, Suchart Wong-ananchai, director-general of the Department of Corrections, told reporters in Bangkok. In November a court sentenced him to 20 years in prison for sending text messages that threatened and defamed Queen Sirikit, 79.

“Grandfather died,” Arnon Numpa, Ampol’s lawyer, wrote on his Facebook page. “Please accompany him at the prison.”

Ampol’s sentence prompted the U.S., European Union and United Nations to issue statements calling on Thailand to respect freedom of speech. The Southeast Asian country has seen a surge in the number of cases alleging insults against the royal family in recent years, coinciding with political violence since a 2006 coup.

BBC:

He was convicted in November last year of sending four messages to an official working for then Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.

He denied the claims and said he did not know how to send a text.

The conviction – the heaviest for a lese majeste case – sparked outrage among rights groups, with Amnesty International describing Ampon as a political prisoner and the European Union expressing ”deep concern”.

Sunai of Human Rights Watch has some audio comments on ABC.

BP: First, prison conditions in Thai jails are not good.  For someone in their 60s who has/had cancer in the crowded conditions of a Thai prison cell (e.g. 35 prisoners in a 40 sqm cell) you are more susceptible to picking up other illnesses and combined with the poor quality of prison food, a person’s health can easily deteriorate in a Thai jail. Prachatai has more details on that:

According to the lawyer, Ampon has been suffering from stomachache for months, but he was first transferred to hospital around noon last Friday and was admitted around 3.40 pm. He did not immediately receive diagnosis as the hospital lab was closed on weekend. His blood was taken for testing on Monday, but before the results were made known, he passed away around 9.10 am today.

“If Ampon was granted bail and could go see doctor regularly, such incident might not have happened” said the lawyer. Prior to this, Ampon has just had operation for oral cancer.

BP:  Am unsure of the exact prognosis of his cancer and we don’t know exactly what caused his death, but his lawyer is very likely correct when he says his condition would have been better on the outside. And the rationale for no bail again was? That the hospital lab was closed on the weekend shows you that they don’t have the facilities to treat people properly. Yes, public healthcare in Thailand is far from perfect, but it is even worse in the Thai prison system (despite the Klong Prem facility having a hospital).

Second, a general theme mentioned in the articles is of lese majeste reform. Veera in the Bangkok Post:

Regrettably, the calls for the amendment, or even lifting, of the lese majeste law, fell on the deaf ears of the Pheu Thai Party-led  government, which seems set on reconciling with the amataya clique in its attempt to push through  its reconciliation plan and pave the way for the return home of fugitive former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

The party does not want to offend the military, which has stated clearly it does not want the lese majeste law to be amended. Hence, the law remains intact even if the constitution is to be rewritten.

After his conviction, Ah Kong appealed against the verdict but he later withdrew the appeal and instead sought royal clemency. Unfortunately, he died before there was an answer to his plea.

Given the extensive responses to Ah Kong’s death in the Twitter social media, and in foreign news reports, it seems likely that his sudden demise while serving his jail term will re-ignite the calls for changes to the lese majeste law by the free expression and human rights advocacy groups.

It is doubtful that the government, or the Pheu Thai Party, will change its stand on the issue.

BP: BP is also doubtful. It is not so much about offending the military; it is about staying in power. The previous pro-Thaksin government in 2008 was paralyzed by street protests which were indirectly (and directly at times) by the establishment. No change of the law and no protests. Hence, it becomes a fairly easily political calculation. If the establishment agreed on changes, BP thinks they would happen relatively, but there are no signs on that happening. It is not as though the opposition are pushing for reform either.

Nevertheless, his death places the spotlight clearly on lese majeste law and what the government will do. The government can’t just release those convicted from jail tomorrow, but it can provide them with better treatment – as of last report they hadn’t been moved to the new facility* – and make more progress on limiting the number of prosecutions – still no word on what the committee is doing. Economic concerns, particularly over the cost of living, is the most pressing issue facing the government, but can’t ignore other issues including lese majeste.

*On the need for the move, lese majeste prisoners are low on the totem pole. How low? This quote from Dr John Lerwitworapong, director of the Medical Correctional Institution, at the prison  shows you their position in a prison:

Others separated from the general population are violent offenders who are forced to wear leg irons. “Paedophiles are generally tolerated in the prison community, but inmates are not so forgiving when it comes  to offences against religion or His Majesty the King,” Dr John said.

BP: That is from 2007 and well Thai attitudes to lese majeste are changing, but many people are very much opposed to any reform and those who commit what is deemed lese majeste as sub-human traitors. Hence, lese majeste prisoners are still likely to attract unwanted attention.

 A lawyer for a man sentenced to 20 years for sending text messages deemed insulting to the monarchy says his client has died.

Amphon Tangnoppakul was in his 60s and became known as “Uncle SMS” when a Thai court issued the verdict in his case in late 2011. It was the heaviest sentence ever handed down in Thailand for a so-called lese majeste case.

The Nation though seems to have later report where the lawyer says it was cancer:

Meanwhile his lawyer, Anon Ampa of Rassadornprasong Law Office said on his Facebook page, that it was believed that Amphon, known as Akong or grandpa in Chinese, died from cancer.

Amphon was arrested on August 3, 2010 and was convicted on November 23 last year. Anon recently withdrew his client’s appeal, as the elderly man wished to ask for a royal pardon.

If true, it would not be surprising. The Bangkok Post:

He had steadfastly denied the charges, arguing his mobilephone was not in his possession at the time the messages were sent and that he did not even know how to send a text message.

A grandfather, who suffered from mouth cancer, he was jailed last November.

The cause of death was not immediately known, but he had complained of stomach pains on Friday and was transferred to the Corrections Department hospital, his lawyer was reported as saying.

BP: It is hard to know whether he would have received better treatment outside the prison as we don’t know for sure the cause of death, but having cancer while living on Thai prison food and being reliant on the prison hospital are unlikely to be factors in helping you live longer. The extent though is unclear and will never be known. Nevertheless, one does wonder how much of a national security threat a man in his 60s with cancer is that he needs to be locked up in jail?

Matichon has sourced photos showing Uncle SMSes after she find out the news and other reaction.

btw, Andrew has some comments here.

BP: Obviously, one cannot take the views of those in Bangkok, Pathum Thai, Nonthaburi, and Samut Prakan as reflecting the views of all 77 provinces. However, given the minimum wage increase to 300 Baht a day has only been implemented in 7 provinces for now and this poll surveyed 4 of these provinces then this some value to this poll on the minimum wage increase.. Of course, the minimum wage only covers those in the formal sectors of the economy who are employed and receive a salary/wage.

Survey data methodology

Gender
Male, 50.2%
Female, 49.8%

Age
18-25, 32.2%
26-35, 29.4%
36-45, 19.4%
46+, 19%

BP: Obviously, younger people are oversampled as they are more likely to be working in minimum wage jobs….

Profession:
Industrial factory (โรงงานอุตสาหกรรม), 15%
Construction (กรรมกรก่อสร้าง), 5.5%
Security guard or janitor (รปภ. / ภารโรง), 14.1%
Maid or gardener (แม่บ้าน / คนสวน), 16.1%
Contractor (รับจ้างทั่วไป), 11.3%
Repairman/handyman/mechanic (ช่างซ่อม), 3.7%
Service sector employee or traditional massage (พนักงานบริการ / นวดแผนโบราณ), 11.8%
Driver/transport (พนักงานขับรถ), 4.5%
Sales (พนักงานขาย), 18%

BP: Some of the terms don’t translate that well. Have no idea how reflective the above is.

Education
Lower than Bachelors, 93.9%
Bachelors, 5.9%
More than Bachelors, .2%

BP: Some service sector employees, even with a degree, get minimum wage….

Covered by the social security system or not?

Yes, 74.3%
No, 25.7%

1. Have you received 300 Baht a day according to the government announcement?(ท่านได้รับค่าจ้างขั้นต่ำ 300 บาทต่อวัน ตามที่รัฐบาลประกาศแล้วหรือไม่)

A. Yes, 79.1%
B. Not yet, 20.9% (most give the reason that the business has not approved the increase, business is waiting to see its profits first, it is small business and cannot increase)(โดยส่วนใหญ่ให้เหตุผลว่า กิจการยังไม่อนุมัติปรับขึ้นให้ กิจการรอดู ผลประกอบการก่อน และกิจการมีขนาดเล็กไม่สามารถปรับขึ้นให้ได้)

BP: Not all workers received the minimum wage previously. On page 70 of the ILO Global Wage Report 2010/11 “[i]n Thailand, for instance, about 25 per cent of workers in the manufacturing sector were estimated to earn less than the minimum wage in 2009″ (PDF). Nevertheless, you can see at least for those in Bangkok and surrounding provinces the vast majority of workers have.

2. After the increase to 300 Baht a day, is there any difference between your work compared with previously (asked only those who get 300 Baht a day) (หลังจากมีการปรับค่าจ้างขั้นต่ำ 300 บาทต่อวันแล้ว การทำงานของท่านมีการเปลี่ยนแปลงอย่างไรเมื่อเปรียบเทียบกับช่วงก่อนหน้านี้ (ถามเฉพาะผู้ที่ได้รับค่าจ้างขั้นต่ำ 300 บาท))

A. Work harder (ทำงานหนักขึ้น), 15.4%
B. Work the same (ทำงานเหมือนเดิม), 82.4%
C. Work less (ทำงานน้อยลง), 1.3%
D. Other problems, such as less overtime, more regulations (มีปัญหาการทำงานอื่น ได้แก่ ให้ทำงานล่วงเวลาน้อยลง มีระเบียบ กฎเกณฑ์ของบริษัทเพิ่มมากขึ้น), .9%

BP: Employers will want employees to work harder, but there is not mass unemployment in Thailand. In fact, even in some semi-skilled areas of employment in Thailand that BP is familiar with there is competition for employees/shortage of workers so hence if conditions are too onerous they go elsewhere.

NOTE: No mention in the answer of mass layoffs….

3. Opinion on the 300 Baht a day, what will happen with the business you are with? (ความเห็นต่อการเพิ่มค่าจ้างขั้นต่ำ 300 บาทต่อวัน จะทำให้กิจการที่สังกัดอยู่เป็นอย่างไร)

A. More profit, (กำไรเพิ่มขึ้น), 23%
B. Less profit (กำไรลดลง), 26.9%
C. Lose money (ขาดทุน) 1.4%
D. Close down the business (เลิกกิจการ), .8%
E. Don’t know (ไม่ทราบ), 47.9%

BP: This is the opinion of employees and not that of employers or what will happen, but it does go the mindset of what they think (even if optimistic) of what will happen. Some businesses will do well as there will be more spending…

4. Opinion on the minimum wage of 300 Baht a day which the government has increased, will it help your life when compared with previously? (ความเห็นต่อค่าจ้างขั้นต่ำ 300 บาทต่อวัน ที่รัฐบาลปรับขึ้น จะช่วยให้ชีวิตความเป็นอยู่ของท่าน เป็นอย่างไร เมื่อเปรียบเทียบกับช่วงก่อนหน้านี้)

A. Better (ดีขึ้น), 60.7%
B. The same (เหมือนเดิม), 36.5%
C. Worse (แย่ลง), 2.8%

BP: Despite talk and man on the street interviews in some papers, the above is fairly clear that for minimum wage employees things are better for them

NOTE: Those who are not minimum wage employees are different and other polls that survey all voters can reflect the situation for everyone.

5. Opinion on the minimum wage of 300 Baht a day, will it held decrease inequality in society? (ความเห็นต่อค่าจ้างขั้นต่ำ 300 บาทต่อวัน จะช่วยลดความเหลื่อมล้ำทางสังคมได้หรือไม่)

A. Yes, 45.1%
B. No, 54.9%

BP: Too low? This is a different poll which BP will come back

6. Workers, do you agree with 300 Baht a day minimum wage across the country? (ผู้ใช้แรงงานเห็นด้วยหรือไม่กับการเพิ่มค่าจ้างขั้นต่ำ 300 บาทต่อวัน ทั่วประเทศ)

A. Yes, 93.2%
B. No, 6.8%

BP: Not surprising given their answer in 4 although if you are a cynic and think people only care about themselves then it could be surprising (i.e 80% of workers already have got

7. Workers, how concerned are you about foreign workers seizing work from Thais? (ผู้ใช้ แรงงานกังวลมากน้อยเพียงใด เกี่ยวกับแรงงานต่างด้าวที่อาจจะเข้ามาแย่งงานคนไทย)

A. Very to very much (divided in very much with 8.3% and very with 22.8%), 31.1% (มากถึงมากที่สุด (โดยแบ่งเป็นมากที่สุดร้อยละ 8.3 และมากร้อยละ 22.8))
B. Little to least (divided into little 14.6% and least 2.9%) (น้อยถึงน้อยที่สุด (โดยแบ่งเป็นน้อยร้อยละ 14.6 และน้อยที่สุดร้อยละ 2.9 ), 17.5%
C. Not at all (ไม่กังวลเลย), 51.4%

BP: Argh, the foreign migrant worker bogey-man question…. Most people are not biting.

8. What labour issue does the government need to look into the most and to change (เรื่องที่ต้องการให้รัฐบาลเข้ามาดูแล ปรับปรุงแก้ไขมากที่สุด เกี่ยวกับผู้ใช้แรงงาน).

A. Benefits (สวัสดิการ), 32.3%
B. Look into employers complying with the law (ดูแลให้นายจ้างปฏิบัติตามกฎหมายแรงงาน), 29.7%
C. Look into qualify of life (ดูแลคุณภาพชีวิต), 14.9%
D. Salary/wages (ค่าแรง / ค่าจ้าง), 11.9%
E. Safety in the work place (ความปลอดภัยในการทำงาน), 6.4%
F. Develop the skills of workers (การพัฒนาฝีมือแรงงาน), 3.1%
G. Lower the cost of social security payments (อื่นๆ เช่น ให้เก็บเงินประกันสังคมลดลง ลดปัญหาค่าครองชีพ) 1.7%

BP: B no doubt reflects those who are not getting the minimum wage increase.

Look BP has been behind in blogging recently and will try to catch up. There are a few polls that BP wants to refer to in future posts about the recent PT by-election loss, other local election losses, Yingluck’s out-of-touch gaffe on inflation, and a wide range of other related topics. Hopefully, BP will be up-to-date by the beginning of next week.

AP:

A fire caused by explosions in one of the world’s largest petrochemical industrial estates has killed 12 and injured more than 100 people in eastern Thailand.

The blaze yesterday forced an evacuation of workers and more than 1,000 residents near the Map Ta Phut industrial estate, Thailand’s largest industrial park, in Rayong province, 110 miles south-east of Bangkok.

Rayong governor Seni Jittakasem said today authorities were investigating the cause of the explosions that occurred when workers were cleaning a chemical tank at Bangkok Synthetics plant, a synthetic rubber manufacturer.

He said all evacuees have returned home.

The fire was put under control after four hours of chemical burning that sent plumes of thick smoke over a wide area.

The Bangkok Post:

Industry Minister Pongsvas Svasti said he had ordered the closure of the factory where the explosion occurred. He has also instructed other factories in the industrial estate to recheck their security systems since the operations of more than half of them concern chemicals.

….

Early today, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra visited the industrial estate and met the people injured in the explosion.

Ms. Yingluck has also set up a tripartite committee to examine possible toxic contamination in the area. The committee comprises experts from the Industry Ministry, the Pollution Control Department and representatives from local communties.

Thousands of people in 12 communities around Map Ta Phut were evacuated yesterday.

Reuters has some more, particularly with some details about Bangkok Synthetics:

The Bangkok Synthetics plant, 20-percent owned by Thailand’s largest industrial group, Siam Cement Pcl, produces butadiene and other raw materials used in the manufacturing of synthetic rubbers and plastic resins.

BP: Ok, it is only a 20% ownership, but Siam Cement is a very important and influential Thai company with its largest shareholder being the Crown Property Bureau….BP has already blogged about how Siam Cement were big losers from the initial court decision in 2009, but in early 2010 the Central Administrative Court announced that seven suspended projects in the Map Ta Phut industrial zone can resume construction with 6 out of the 7 projects being Siam Cement ones. Later in 2010, a Thai court ruled that 74 of the 76 industrial projects halted in 2009 because of pollution and licensing concerns can be restarted.

The Stop Global Warming Association, who were involved in the initial 2009 lawsuit, does not seem satisfied with the Minister’s decision to close the factory and has called on the government to revoke the license. The Nation:

“The Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT) should cancel its licence,” Stop Global Warming Association chairman Srisuwan Janya said.

He pointed out that the disaster was not the first harmful incident at Bangkok Synthetics.

He said in 2009, this company was also responsible for a chemical leak inside the Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate in Rayong.

“The IEAT should consider withdrawing the factory licence of Bangkok Synthetics Company to protect the quality of life of people who live in 30 communities around the Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate. If not, it would be an example for other factories to follow this failure,” he said.

 

BP: This latest incident is likely to bring much further scrutiny on all factories in Map Ta Phut….

The explanation on page 10:

With rising incomes, high employment, high savings and low leverage, Thai households are well positioned to spend more.
(1) High savings rate. Thai households have become bigger savers over the last decade by saving nearly 10% of disposable income, and have now amassed savings in excess of Bt200,000 per household over the past 10 years. Interestingly, during times of instability, Thai households become more conservative by increasing savings rates to nearly 12% as in 2007 and 2008 (Figure 16).

(2) Strong real wage growth. We discussed the outlook for nominal wage growth above, but when coupled with less than 4% inflation, annual real wage growth should come in at 7-10% over the next couple of years.

(3) Low household leverage. Thai households have a debt-to-personal income ratio of less than 0.6x (Figure 17), and total debt servicing costs are only slightly over 1% of income. Household balance sheets are under levered and rising leverage will be a catalyst for the housing market. Total mortgage lending has grown 14% annually from 2004, and we expect at least the same level of growth for the next three years. Simply put, Thai  households are not stretched, accumulated savings more than cover total outstanding debt and the balance sheet can be utilised for higher spending.

Then from the IMF:

Source: IMF

BP: This is not necessarily to say that people should take on more debt, but that current household debt is not unsustainable.

The big shots at the Ministry of Commerce seem to be living in the twilight zone, completely oblivious to the harsh realities confronting the ordinary men and women on the streets struggling to make ends meet in the face of runaway living costs.

The latest consumer price index (CPI) compiled by the Commerce Ministry put the inflation rate for April at 2.47 per cent year-on-year, about one percentage point below that of February and March. The index also shows that the prices of food items such as pork and chicken meat and string beans are relatively lower than actual market prices.

…

Whether it was sheer incompetence, or a gross mistake, the Commerce Ministry’s CPI figures are anything but reliable and credible. Had it been a private corporation, it would have gone belly up a long time ago, or its top executives sent packing.

The Commerce Ministry’s latest consumer price index should be consigned to the garbage bin at Taopoon market, where it belongs.

TMB Analytics in the Bangkok Post:

The April figure was the lowest in 29 months. Core inflation, which removes raw food and energy prices, was at a 12-month low of 2.13%.

This mismatch between public perceptions and statistical reality has led some public figures to discount the complaints as purely psychological responses. But could there be something more than what the figures convey?

The first thing we must first look at is the base effect. April 2011 was a highly inflationary month with the culmination of the Libyan civil war and its impact on oil prices. Thai headline inflation topped 4% that month, for the first time since September 2008. In that one month alone, aggregate prices jumped 1.4% from a month earlier, or at an annualised rate of almost 18%. There is only a 2% chance that an inflation rate in any given month will register at this level or higher. That was how prices were in April 2011, making whatever inflation rate we see this year seem tiny by comparison.

So what would the current inflation rates look like without the base effect? Let’s start with the month-on-month comparison. April headline inflation was 0.4% higher than in March, or an annualised rate of 5.2%, while core prices grew 0.1%, or 1.2% annualised. So headline price growth was not as slow as the announced figure may seem, even though we can’t say this was extraordinary growth. In contrast, core prices were actually dormant in both respects.

Looking at aggregate inflation alone is not enough to properly evaluate claims about the rising cost of living. The devil always lies in the details. What are most of the complaints about? Food first, then energy. Energy costs take multiple forms, whether for transport, food preparation, or electricity. Let’s look at the sub-categories, some of which are illustrated in the chart. Prices of food and beverages rose 4.5% year-on-year, with prepared and processed food prices rising 6.7%. If you cook at home, you faced a 3% higher food cost, and eating out cost 5% more. Worst, if you buy prepared and processed food to eat at home, be ready to digest a price jump of 8.1%. The solution? Buy and prepare more raw food, which rose just 2.7%, though fruit was up 17%.

Energy prices also increased unevenly, but definitely more than what the aggregate inflation figures suggest. Overall, energy prices rose 4.4% over last April, even though Brent crude was 3-5% lower than last April, while Dubai crude was just 1.2% higher. Both benchmarks were 4% lower than in March, even though retail fuel prices in Thailand increased in April, with the biggest gains for NGV and LPG. Electricity also rose by a painful 12.1% in April, before another increase in the Ft cost in May.

…

All in all, April’s inflation was not as low as it seemed, though hardly a threat to economic stability. The rising cost of living is not only psychological, but more categorical when we look at inflation rates. Some categories will matter to consumers more than others, and those are the ones we should pay attention to.

BP: You can see the April CPI report from the Ministry here (Thai only for now – the full one in English has been finished, but will be here when it is). In May and for the rest of the year, we are likely to see a sharp rise in inflation as we won’t be going from a high base of April. The same will be for Q4 GDP figures this year which will be very high as it will be compared with Q4 2011 GDP figures which were negative because of the floods.  It is the low base effect which is slightly misleading when going on a year-on-year basis. The annualized 5.2% rate for April 2012, on a month-on-month basis, shows the inflationary problem to come….

It should also be noted that the CPI figures don’t capture all price rises. It is of a basket of goods.

Nevertheless, Veera does raise some points on what information that the Ministry uses to calcuate

Unlike some polls, NIDA provides full access to survey data methodology so BP has included this at the end of this post (as noted below they have gone for equal geographic distribution by region which doesn’t reflect the nationwide population).*

For comparison purposes, BP has included previous NIDA polls to get some context about what the scores mean (i.e is 6.5 out of 10 a phenomenally good score or well just average). It is best to compare polls from the same organization and when the same questions are asked. BP has found NIDA polls on the performance of former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his government from August 2009-May 2010 and have included those (yes, it would have been better to have included a more diverse time period like BP did with the Suan Dusit polls, but these are the only ones that BP could find) and from the December 2011 NIDA poll on the Yingluck government.

1. Satisfaction that the people have towards the Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (ความพึงพอใจของประชาชนต่อตัวนายกรัฐมนตรี “นางสาวยิ่งลักษณ์ ชินวัตร”).

Source: Aug 09-May 10 (DOC); December 2011 (HTML and PDF); April 2012 (HTML and PDF)

Note: Ratings are not out of 100, it is simply satisfied/not satisfied (approval rating).

1.1. To explain the weighted and population fields, the poll surveyed 1,245 people nationwide, but it did so equally by region regardless of the population of that region which resulted in the number of people being surveyed as follows: Bangkok 249, Central 247, North 249, Northeast 252, and South 248.

Mahidol University has a population gazette - used January 2011figures – which provides the population of each region and so the “Pop” field in BP’s chart above is the percentage of Thailand’s total population which is in that region. For the “Weighted” field, the key figure is the total of 71.38% which is the adjusted figure that comes out when you weigh the April 12 figures by the percentage of the population of each region. This means that Yingluck has a 71.38% approval rating which is an increase from 63.16%

This is  more reflective than the unweighted nationwide figure of 68.5% which you get when you add the Dec 11 figures together and divide by 5 with no adjustment made for population.** BP hasn’t adjusted the Democrat figures downwards as BP found no mention in the NIDA source of the geographical breakdown for the previous polls - from BP’s experience with NIDA polls and looking at the survey data from the elections, they were very accurate with their geographical breakdown (see here and here) – so it would be unfair to adjust the Democrat government ratings (they would likely go down slightly given the Democrats do better in the South which has a smaller population than the Northeast). The unweighted figures show an increase from 57.14% to 68.5%. This is because Yingluck’s biggest jump in support is in the South (13% of population) and her drop in support in the Northeast (33% of population).

Note: The individual regional figures for December 11 and April 12 are still accurate. It is only the total figures which aren’t reflective.

1.2 Yingluck’s improvement in performance is also reflected in other polls. An ABAC poll showed a 7% increase in support for Yingluck from January to February and a Suan Dusit showed Yingluck went from 5.49 (out of 10) in December to 5.9 in February (now it is above 6 for April – but well have yet to blog on that).

2. Percentage of people who are satisfied with the performance of Yingluck government in solving various problems (ร้อยละของประชาชนที่พึงพอใจต่อการแก้ไขปัญหาด้านต่างๆ ของรัฐบาลนางสาวยิ่งลักษณ์ ชินวัตร)

NOTE: Ratings are not out of 10, it is simply satisfied/not satisfied (approval rating). Bkk, Central, North, NE, and South are from April 2012.

BP:

2.1 Again, BP has included the weighed numbers based on the population of each region. See explanation in 1.1 (used same population stats from Mahidol).These are issues chosen by NIDA and well, the choosing of them is quite subjective – the economic one is likely to be important in an election than say the South – but at least they asked the same questions for the Abhisit government so there is some point of comparison. Needless to say, those in the North and the Northeast are relatively happy with most things, ie 55% are satisfied with the performance in solving problems in the Deep South compared with only 11% in the South who are satisfied. Clearly, their views of the government – positive or negative – is reflected in their assessment.

2.2 That the Yingluck’s government does well – increase from 47% to 69% – for its drugs policy. This is not surprising as an ABAC poll from mid-February, the drugs policy it was the top-rated government policy.

2.3 On all other issues, the government’s performance has declined. On the Deep South, down from 37% to 21%; Corruption from 40% to 30%; political conflict from 43% to 30%. These are big declines. The decline in the Deep South, well the Hat Yai and the Yala coordinated bombings no doubt played a big part in the poor score. Political conflict/unity decline can be seen from increased tension regarding constitutional amendments and amnesty.

2.4 Also, and most crucially on the economy/living costs there is a decline from 51% to 50%.  Other polling suggests that the cost of living and the cost of goods is a concern although people don’t necessarily blame the government or think the government is doing a bad job compared with previous government. Actually, the decline on the economy/cost of living varies from region – you see the non-weighted figures shows an increase in performance which can be explained by the regional figures. For Bangkok, from December 2011 to April, it went from 41.88 to 41.4; for Central region, it went from 44.77 to 41.7; for the North it went from 56.32 to 56.2; for the Northeast from 71.69 to 56.3 and the South from 14.13 to 48.4 (hence, this is why the unweighted figure shows an increase in the economy, it is all from the South).

So not much change for Bangkok, Central and the North. For the Northeast, a dramatic decline. This is also consistent with the E-san poll which showed a decline from 76.1 (December 2011) to 50.9 (February-March 2012). For the South, a dramatic increase. Not sure what the explanation is. 14.13 was not really reflective of the actual economy and was more reflective of the fact that the South is strongly Democrat and so partisan responses were reflected according (vice-versa for the Northeast). This doesn’t mean they will all vote Puea Thai.

NOTE: While you have real cost of living increase problems – reflected in various polls – you also have a rebounding economy in Q1.

3. Points for performance of the Yingluck government (คะแนนผลงานโดยรวมของรัฐบาลนางสาวยิ่งลักษณ์  ชินวัตร).

This was one is rather short as NIDA don’t have a regional breakdown so no chart. There has been a drop from 6.24 (unweighted) to 6.23 (unweighted).

3.1 From one perspective, it seems odd that the PM’s approval rating is going up, but the government’s performance is declining (albeit by only .01). BP should note that there is a difference between ratings out of 10 and satisfaction/approval. For example, if you are somewhat supportive of the government, but not overall satisfied, you may only give the government a rating of 3 or 4 which still helps for government when working out the overall rating, but in such an example you would give a “not satisfied” which means Yingluck gets the equivalent of a zero. This can also work in reverse and if you are only somewhat satisfied with the government, you may only give a 6, but you still give Yingluck a satisfied so it is a full score.

Of course, you have the separate fact that one is asking about Yingluck and the other is asking about the government and people may have different views on these. The same was for Abhisit and his government – see Abhisit’s scores in the South versus those of his government. Nevertheless, Abhisit always scored much higher than his government and now we are seeing the same trend for Yingluck.

3.2 On the 6.23 score being higher than the average score for the issues in 2. Well, these are specific issues asked by NIDA. There are many other issues, from education, foreign affairs, healthcare etc which are not included in 2, but are issues which people will take into consideration when giving a rating for the government.

*Survey data methodology:

Region: Bangkok 249, Central 247, North 249, Northeast 252, and South 248

Sex: Males 53%; Females 47%

Age:
Under 25, 143 (11.5%)
25-39, 492 (39.5%)
40-59, 515 (41.4%)
60+, 95 (7.6%)

BP: As with most polls, this seems to under-represent those aged over 60 although not as badly as most polls. This is probably because these people are more likely to be at home and are harder to survey.

Religion:
Buddhist 94%,
Christian 1%,
Muslim 5%

Education Status : Grade 6 or less, 315 (25.3%)
Grade 12 or equivalent, 456 (36.6%)
Vocational Certificate or equivalent, 106 (8.5%)
Bachelor’s degree or equivalent, 328 (26.3%)
Higher than Bachelor’s degree, 40 (3.2%)

Employment Status:
Civil Servant/state enterprise, 171 (13.7%)
Private company employee, 277 (22.2%)
Business owner/freelance (includes self-employed), 282 (22.7%)
Farmers/laborers, 245 (19.7%)
Housewife/house-husband/retired/unemployed, 157 (12.6%)
Students, 113 (9.1%)

BP: Again, the “Housewife/house-husband/retired/unemployed” category probably under-represents this group and the student group is over-represented although this is the nature of most polls (i.e as they are mostly at home and hence more difficult to survey).

Income (monthly):
None, 233 (18.7%)
Less than 10,000, 497 (39.9%)
10,001-20,000, 382 (30.7%)
20,001-30,000, 33 (2.7%)
More than 40,000, 64 (5.1%)
Unspecified, 36 (2.9%)

BP: They missed out 30,000–40,000 in the poll, but all the numbers add up to 100% so assume it should be “More than 30,000″.

**BP couldn’t find an explanation that NIDA had already adjusted the regional ratings by population. There is mention of the  SE Mean figure but the Poll itself doesn’t say that NIDA has already adjusted the ratings and given that the total figure is simply reached by adding up the regional ratings and dividing by 5, BP has to assume NIDA hasn’t. The alternative is that NIDA has adjusted the regional ratings which would be a little bizarre if they did so as the regional ratings are accurate, the only figure you need to adjust is the total.

In 2005, at the height of Thaksin’s power, the PAD took to the streets on the platform of fighting corruption. But fighting corruption is never a strong enough platform, at least not in the Kingdom of Thailand. The factor that inspired people to don yellow and take to the streets was defence of that most sacred institution, the monarchy.

As for whether the Thaksin network was ever anti-monarchy, there is not and never has been any proof of that. But that is neither here nor there. The lips of society were flapping less about corruption, but more of anti-monarchy sentiments.

With disgust and condemnation, the lips vented about how the former prime minister made funny faces during a royal audience. With rumours and speculation, the lips fumed over how the fugitive prime minister planned to turn Thailand into a republic, with him as the president.

Corruption is never enough to incite passion. The love of the King always is plenty more than enough. As a strategy to undermine the Thaksin political machine, it worked wonders _ seven years ago.

The problem is, seven years have gone by and no plot to overthrow the monarchy has been exposed. In fact, Thaksin’s ruling Pheu Thai Party has proclaimed itself the defender of the monarchy and a staunch supporter of the lese majeste law.

…

Today, the PAD is splintered into various smaller groups, including the most active one in recent time, Tul Sitthisomwong’s multi-coloured group. But none of them could ever muster more than a few hundred supporters.

They have also split with an important ally, the Democrat Party. Their own political party, the New Politics Party, is practically a non-entity in parliament. And now, the army has closed its doors to them, seemingly in any case.

Corruption, it’s not enough to rally a crusade. Charter amendments are also not enough to rally a crusade, even if many have argued that said amendment is in the interests of granting amnesty to Thaksin.

As for defending the monarchy, how is one to defend the monarchy against someone else who’s also defending the monarchy? Everybody is defending the monarchy. The platform is crowded. There’s not enough of a foothold, not enough space to shout and scream from _ and hence, the passion subsided, the funds drained and the movement waned.

…

The question then becomes if and when Thaksin sets foot on Thai soil, would the fear/hatred for him spur enough passion to resuscitate the fading yellow? Does the PAD have the logistics, infrastructure and funding to take on the Thaksin political machine for a third time?

As BP blogged back in September which touched on the decline of the yellow shirts:

What kind of reaction are we likely to get if Thaksin was to come back and receive a pardon? Yellows are split into a different groups.

You have the multi-colored shirts who are lead by Dr. Tul, who appear to be mainly middle-class, upper class Democrat voters who organize via Facebook. They don’t have a media arm so there are questions on whether they capable of sustaining a mass protest. So far they have staged brief, symbolic protests in Lumpini Park (adjacent to Silom) of  a couple of hundred.

Another part of the yellows is of course, Sondhi L and his media network and those who still use the PAD name. They don’t appear to be in any mood to protest. Sondhi L said on ASTV TV on Sep 14 that “we will not used as their tool again and the Democrats need to fight”. Then, he launched into a tirade against the Democrats and the multi-colored group linking them to the Democrats. So far the PAD have not joined the multi-colored groups in protesting.

So far this is just speculation, but where this is smoke there can sometimes be fire. Many people are still opposed to Thaksin and well there are risk of protests – and well there is the Q of does Thaksin want to take the risk when he is sitting in the jail that something like a coup will go wrong – but there is now a plausible path to Thaksin returning this year. Of course, you then have the possible associated protests although if he does actually spend some time in a jail then the outrage from the anti-Thaksin side is likely to be more muted. Protests cannot be ruled out though. Nevertheless, this is the most plausible path that BP has seen for Thaksin returning to Thailand. As does he want to wait until December next year in the hope that nothing has gone wrong? The possibility of Thaksin returning – it may not be to live, but just to enter Thailand at times This is also part of the reason why you have been hearing mention of tensions in December…

BP: So you can see there are three issues on which the yellow shirts would protest again, namely (a) anti-monarchy activities by the government including lese majeste reform, (b) constitutional amendments, and (c) amnesty law.

For (a) as noted by Voranai above, Puea Thai have now become the defender of the monarchy. As blogged in March 2012:

 In recent months, the Yingluck government has made it clear that lese majeste will not be amended. Yingluck states she will focus on the economy and rehabilitating the country after the floods (her standard answer). Before the election and even recently, Thaksin has referred to problems with the excessive use of lese majeste, but he has not indicated any reform. It appears as part of some deal/arrangement with the establishment that there will be NO reform of lese majeste in the near future.  The government is only focusing on enforcement of the law – and it seems we may get another committee to review lese majeste cases – but as we saw under Abhisit there was also a committee, but we still had a record number of cases. So focusing on enforcement may not mean much.

BP: For now, this seems unlikely to change so it isn’t a reason to protest.

For (b), as blogged in December 2011:

This is what the Speaker said a few months ago and this would mean a referendum in early 2013. A Puea Thai MP and the party’s chief legal advisor was quoted in Matichon a few days ago as saying the referendum was likely to be held in May/June 2013. This is because it will take a few months to amend Section 291 of the Constitution to set up the drafting assembly – currently the constitution can be amended by parliament without a referendum – and then you are electing the assembly which will take another couple of months, an estimated eight months to draft the amendments, public education and hearing, and then a referendum.This has been the basic plan for a while – see also this earlier post where Chalerm said the same thing. Some red shirts and some within Puea Thai disagree about the process and want it to do be done quicker, but most public statements back the drafting assembly and then a referendum. This is also what Yingluck stated a few days ago that the referendum shouldn’t be held until after the amendments are proposed.

BP: The amendment before parliament is only a procedural amendment on the process to amendment the constitution so the real amendments won’t be for a number of months, but because of the likely process of the real amendments will be a committee made of 99 people (77 being elected and the 22 being appointed by parliament) and then this will go to a referendum, this weakens the ability of PAD to protest. It will be easy to say let the people decide in a referendum – assuming that provisions related to the royal family are not touched. PAD’s method of protest against the procedural amendment is to file a lawsuit (which seems very weak). Chamlong confirmed that the PAD wouldn’t take to the streets to protest against a procedural amendment. MCOT:

Meanwhile, Chamlong Srimuang, a top leader of the Yellow Shirt PAD denied media reports that the PAD will rally later this month at the Army Club to oppose the attempt to amend the Constitution.

He said the PAD will demonstrate only if the constitutional amendment affects the monarchy, and the move paves the way for granting an amnesty to wrongdoers

BP: This leaves (c) which PAD confirmed a few days ago was the main issue they were preparing for. As blogged back in July, the yellow shirts would oppose amnesty:

Actually, BP suspects that even if the PAD were to gain from the amnesty they would still strongly protest against it* because why not? They have nothing to lose. They fail to stop it, the PAD leaders still gain from the amnesty; they stop the amnesty bill, they will be credited with stopping it and well it still seems unlikely the cases will result in them being convicted – it is 30 months since the airport takeover and as we have seen the case against the PAD leaders are still languishing compared with those of the red shirt leaders from last year. A Puea Thai government is the best thing for PAD and ASTV….

The Bangkok Post quotes PAD spokesman Parnthep Pourpongpan:

“Once the monarchy’s power is affected and an amnesty law is launched, we will begin our [large] movement,” he said.

The Nation recently:

The ruling party yesterday gave a signal that it is switching its reconciliation move to a low gear, with a possible plan to sponsor a relevant bill next April.

The timing will coincide with the passage of a new charter. Whether or not the slowing down of reconciliation push would affect Thaksin Shinawatra’s intention to return home remain to be seen.

“The draft reconciliation law should be ready after the charter change,” Pheu Thai MP Kokaew Pikulthong affirmed yesterday.

The Bangkok Post though has more details and we see that Korkaew was stating that the process would not be complete until next April:

The Pheu Thai Party will table a reconciliation bill for House deliberation after the charter amendment draft has been passed by parliament in the final reading, party list MP Korkaew Pikulthong said on Wednesday.

Mr Korkaew said details of the bill had not been finalised because party members still had differing opinions about the scope of the amnesty.

Some MPs were of the opinion the amnesty should cover all political offenders, starting from protests by the yellow-shirt People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) before the 2006 coup to protests by the red-shirt United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) in 2010 and afterwards.

Other MPs thought the amnesty should not cover protests and government leaders.

Therefore, the amnesty bill would not be filed until after the charter amendment had been passed by parliament, he said.

Mr Korkaew, a UDD core member, expected the reconciliation process to be completed before the next Songkran festival in 2013.

BP: Parliament is currently debating the procedural amendment to the constitution and this is likely to 1-2 more months as the process is drawn out by the Democrats to obtain concessions from the government. Hence, the process is still a number of weeks away from starting. Initially, it seemed that Puea Thai would rush the process after the Interior Minister stated that public hearings would be a waste of time and just delay the process, but he then reversed himself per the Bangkok Post:

Deputy Prime Minister Yongyuth Wichaidit, in his capacity as head of a panel to follow up on implementation of the recommendations made by the Truth for Reconciliation Commission, said on Friday that his committee had decided to stage public hearings in all regions throughout the country plus Bangkok to allow all stakeholders to voice their views on the reconciliation plan.

He said the King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI) might be invited to join the hearings process. A report about the hearings must be completed and sent to parliament within 60 days; however, the dateline can be slightly extended, he added.

BP: This makes it more difficult for the PAD or a yellow shirt-aligned group to start protesting too early. Will they protest against public hearings? Who will protest? Dr. Tul? The PAD including Sondhi L (who has various legal cases and convictions and as of last month he was abroad).  Recently, there was a protest outside the Army Club. The Bangkok Post:

A group of about 200 people rallied outside the Army Club in Bangkok yesterday, calling for the military to take action against the Yingluck government.

The rally began outside the club on Vibhavadi Rangsit Road about 7am,

The message from demonstrators, who called themselves Riak Khuen Amnart Jak Nak Karnmuang Nerakhun Phaendin was that they wanted the army to take action against the government to pave the way for what they called ”parliamentary reform”. They did not specify what action the military should take.

BP: 200 people? The PAD were not involved and an ASTV Manager article has labelled the protesters as the “establishment mob” (ม็อบอำมาตย์). Then, of course, you have the issue of what establishment support there is for the yellows. Crispin in March 2012 in Asia Times:

A new drive to achieve an amnesty through parliamentary means has met predictable resistance from the opposition Democrat party and anti-Thaksin People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protest group, and raised the specter of new instability after over a year of relative political calm.

Recommendations submitted by a local think-tank to a parliamentary reconciliation subcommittee proposed an amnesty for offenses committed on both sides of the political divide and a reversal of decisions handed down against Thaksin by military coup maker-created bodies.

A similar amnesty proposal in 2008 by a previous Thaksin-aligned government provided the initial spark for PAD protests that for months laid siege to Government House and temporarily shut down Bangkok’s international airport. While the Democrats and PAD have claimed that adoption of the new amnesty recommendations could lead to new instability, that will likely depend more on how the military’s royalist leadership perceives the latest proposed deal.

…

The establishment is also apparently divided on whether its interests would be best served by mobilizing again around the PAD.

The PAD’s recent decision to call off a planned mass rally against proposed constitutional changes came amid a weak popular showing and is indicative of the broad establishment’s lack of support for more destabilizing street protests. New illegal assembly charges filed against PAD leaders were likely also factored into the PAD’s decision to remain inactive.

BP: Indeed. Regardless, we seem weeks, if not many months, away from something happening. For now, we are still in wait-and-see mode. All signs suggest things between the government and the establishment is stable and so, as long as this holds, there will be little establishment support for the yellows who have been increasingly fractured…..

BP: While Bangkok’s dominance is waning, the economic power is remaining in the “center” and not the periphery of more rural provinces.  Many companies have operations at industrial estates in Central Thailand and with supply chains – and also easy access to Bangkok and transport links – it is not surprising to see the rise of Central Thailand.

h/t Wake Up Thailand (April 27, 2012)

*You may remember Porphant for his research on the Crown Property Bureau – see previous posts here and here.

Somchai Homla-or, a member of the Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand, said he believed the problem involving Section 112 is caused by the law itself, its enforcement, and the court’s interpretations. He suggested that the law be amended in regards to penalties it prescribes. He said he did not agree with amending the section by imposing a minimum penalty of three years because the move would deprive judges of the right to exercise their discretion.

He said he believed penalties should vary depending on the damage done to the monarchy. For instance, if a person sends an insulting message once, but the message gets disseminated across the globe, judges can exercise their judgement on how many years of imprisonment a convict deserves. Somchai also believes there should be a proper procedure to file lese majeste complaints, not a normal complaint that anyone can lodge with police.

…

Worajet Pakeerat, a member of Nitirat group and a Thammasat University lecturer, pointed to the problem of interpretation by judges. He said judges are very sensitive about the issue, resulting in ambiguous legal interpretations.

He insisted the lese majeste law should be amended by excluding the Queen and royal family members from protection under the section. He pointed out that the same law in foreign countries protects only the head of the state or the King and his representatives.

Prachatai has an article quoting Permanent Secretary of the PM’s Office Tongthong Chandransu, a well-known legal expert and royalist, who gave evidence in a recent trial for Somyot:

Even though Thailand now is a democracy, the penalty under Section 112 of the Criminal Code currently is harsher than it was during the absolute monarchy. And in his view the penalty of 3-15 years’ imprisonment is too harsh and not proportionate to the offence.

He said that the words ‘defame or insult’ in Section 112 should have the same meaning as those in Section 326 which involved ordinary people, but the penalties under these two sections are very different. And defendants in lèse majesté cases are not allowed exemptions from punishment or from the offence in line with Section 329.

BP: On judicial interpretation, the Veera’s case is a classic example – see here for more – and below is a translation of what was said by Veera from David Streckfuss’s excellent article:

BP: Veera was found guilty, but if this had been the case of defamation under Section 326 of the Criminal Code, would Veera have been found guilty? BP doesn’t think so. Such indirect statements would be not considered defamation under Section 326 which states “Whoever imputes anything to another person before a third person in a manner likely to impair the reputation of such other person or to expose the other person to hatred or contempt is said to commit defamation, and shall be punished with imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding 20,000 baht, or both” (source). Judges have interpreted lese majeste so broadly that it captures indirect comments which they don’t do for defamation of ordinary persons under Section 326. This is a question of interpretation and is separate from the issue of the text of the law and enforcement. No part of the text of lese majeste says that indirect defamatory statements or insults are punishable. Judges have decided this amongst themselves.

Now, there have been attempts over the past few years to set up committees to review lese majeste cases before they go to trial, but this means the big elephant in the room is clearly the judiciary. According to David Streckfuss, the conviction rate is 94% so obtaining a conviction has not been a problem. So it is not the situation that prosecutors have been bringing weak cases to trial only for cases to be thrown out. Normally, a major factor when a prosecutor brings a case to trial is the chances of getting a conviction. The prosecutor will look at previous cases. If there is a poor chance of obtaining a conviction then the case would be dropped. For lese majeste this is not the case. As you can see above, while the comments are often indirect (no one wants a contempt of conviction), the question remains and has rarely been asked, why has the Thai judiciary interpreted lese majeste so widely?

PPT also has some comments about The Nation article although you can see BP disagrees on on some points.

To accuse or doubt someone’s ‘Thainess’ or Thai identity is taking this negativity to yet another level, however. It is as if they can’t believe that you can be both Thai as well as critical to the monarchy institution or simply want an institution that is transparent, accountable and not God-like.

I came across a disturbing encounter on Monday when one ultra-royalist Twitter-user demanded that I tell where I was born. After getting the answer, plus my voluntary reminder that even the current King was born abroad in the USA, she went on to ask where my parents were born nonetheless. I replied Thailand.

But she went on to ask where my grandparents were born. It was then that it became clear to me that I am dealing with some kind of neo-fascist and neo-racist mentality.

BP: Pravit has screenshots of the exchange. Pravit often retweets some of the questions or comments directed at him and well, to put it politely, he has some obsessive detractors…..

Chiranuch Premchaiporn. Pic: AP.

and arrested the online editor Chiranuch Premchaiporn. Chiranuch was charged under the Computer Crimes Act as she did not delete comments posted by readers that were alleged to constitute lese majeste. More posts on her arrest and the aftermath here, here and here.  Then, in 2010, Chiranuch was arrested again… after attending a conference about  online freedom of expression – see post by BP here and by Saksith here. Chiranuch’s trial started  in February 2011 – see a post at Siam Voices about it here – but after a few days of hearings, the rest of the trial was delayed until September. BP blogged about the trial here.

The verdict is due to be handed down on April 30 and immediately after the verdict SEAPA will hold a press conference at the FCCT:

Immediately after the Criminal Court’s verdict on Executive Director of Prachatai.com Chiranuch Premchaiporn on April 30, Bangkok-based Southeast Asian Press Alliance, Media Defence – Southeast Asia and International Committee of Jurists will co-organise a press conference between 2.30 and 4.30pm at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand FCCT. Partly in solidarity with Jiew (Chiranuchs’ nickname), bloggers, lawyers and media activists from the region will join this press conference to discuss implications of the verdict on internet freedom and freedom of expression in the region.

Chiranuch is facing a criminal liability under Section 15 of Thailand’s Computer-related Crime Act (2007) for allowing 10 postings deemed as Lese Majeste to appear in Prachatai webboard at different periods of time in 2008. She could face up to 20 years in prison.

Chiranuch’s case and her trial, which was only completed at the end of February this year after several adjournments, has become a focus of local and international advocacy for the protection of intermediaries against the abuses of cyber-crime and security laws. The verdict will have important implications not only on Internet service providers in Thailand but the region and beyond.

Public and the media are invited to attend this event. For more information please contact Ms. Kulachada Chaipipat, campaign officer at seapa@seapa.org or call 02 243 5579

On what the trial means HRW issued a statement:

“Thailand’s lese majeste laws are being overused and abused,” said John Sifton, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “The government’s assault on internet service providers sends a chilling message to webmasters and internet companies that they either censor other people’s content or face severe penalties.”

The Computer Crimes Act provides that any service provider “intentionally supporting or consenting” to posting unlawful content is subject to the same penalty imposed on the poster, which is a maximum imprisonment of five years. Holding internet service providers liable is a particularly pernicious practice that makes third-parties responsible for the content of others, effectively turning them into the enforcers and censors for the government, Human Rights Watch said.

Frank La Rue, the United Nations special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, strongly condemned such practices in his May 2011 report to the UN Human Rights Council, stating that, “No State should use or force intermediaries to undertake censorship on its behalf.” He said that, “Holding intermediaries liable for content disseminated or created by their users severely undermines the enjoyment of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, because it leads to self-protective and over-broad private censorship, often without transparency and the due process of the law.”

BP: We are not talking about something Chiranuch wrote herself. It is something written by someone else. We are not talking about a fine. We are talking up to 20 years in jail. If there was ever a case where the jailing would receive worldwide coverage, this is the case. For these reasons and the facts of the case – particularly the record of Prachatai deleting comments deemed illegal – BP is skeptical that we will get a guilty verdict. To deem that failure to delete comments quickly enough constitutes intentionally supporting or consenting would be an extraordinary broad interpretation of the law, but who knows what kind of message will be intended to be sent.

Q1. Today, overall do you have confidence in Thai politics? (ความเชื่อมั่นของประชาชนท่ีมีต่อ “การเมืองไทย” ณ วันนี้ในภาพรวม)

NOTE: Fair bit of confidence can also be translated as some confidence or rather confident.

BP: 68% have little confidence/don’t have confidence whereas only 32% do. It is those in the North and not the Northeast who have a fair bit of confidence/a lot of confidence (49%) whereas those in the South have not so much confidence/no confiden (83%).

Q2. On people having or not having confidence in Thai politics ( เรื่องที่ประชาชน “เชื่อมั่น” และ “ไม่เช่ือมั่น ” ต่อ “การเมืองไทย”)

Have confidence:
A. Confidence in the PM, 59.96%
B. Development of the economy, finance, and investment, 20.78%
C. Solving of society’s problems, 19.28%

BP: That is not a straight approval rating and it is only amongst those who confidence, it is those have confidence in and what people or entities. The PM is the only individual or political entity mentioned and she gets a majority.

No confidence:
A. Confidence in the creation of political reconciliation, 46.68%
B. Behavior and ethics of politicians, 33.77%
C. Solving cost of living problems and the price of goods, 19.55%

BP: How do you reconcile a Manchester United and Liverpool fan OR a Tottenham and Arsenal fan? (insert appropriate derby as for your country). It is not going to happen. The only thing to achieve is an acceptance of the rules of the game.

Q3. Today, overall do you have confidence in the Thai economy (ความเชื่อมั ่นของประชาชนท่ีมีต่อ “เศรษฐกิจไทย” ณ วันนี้ ในภาพรวม)

BP: 58% don’t have confidence/little confidence. Again the North is the highest with 60% having some confidence/a lot of confidence and 40% not whereas 81% in the South don’t have confidence/little confidence, but only 19% confidence do.

Q4.  On having or not having confidence in the Thai economy (เรื่องที่ประชาชน “เชื่อมั่น” และ “ไม่เชื่อมั่น ” ต่อ “เศรษฐกิจไทย”)

Have confidence:
A. Support for business, trade, and investment, 53.4%
B. Support of tourism, 23.67%
C. Stimulating the economy, such as increasing salaries and setting up of loan facilities [BP: กองทุนกู้ยืม has a name?], 22.93%

No confidence:
A. Solving the problems of cost of living/cost of goods, 60.35%,
B. Transparency in solving economic problems in the country, 25%
C. Looking after exports and imports for agriculture and industry, 14.65%

BP: Again cost of living/cost of goods is the major concern. That issue is not going away.

Q5. Today, overall do you have confidence in Thai society ความเชื่อมั่นของประชาชนท่ีมีต่อ “สภาพสังคมไทย” ณ วันนี้ ในภาพรวม

BP: So around 26%  don’t read and watch TV regularly so they are not upset at what happened.

Q6: On having or not having confidence in Thai society เรื่องที่ประชาชน “เชื่อมั่น” และ “ไม่เช่ือมั่น” ต่อ “สภาพสังคมไทย”

Have confidence:
A. Solving drug problems, 52.77%
B. Solving problems about the quality of life and education, 28.8%
C. Carrying on and preserving Thai culture and traditions, 18.43%

BP: Large numbers of people don’t need to die for a “war on drugs” to be popular.

No confidence:
A. Unity and reconciliation in the nation, 44.09%
B. Be occupied with extravagant popularity/use of technology incorrectly, 39.53%
C. Safety in life and property, 16.38%

BP: They don’t believe reconciliation will happen? Or they are unhappy with the methods?

Q7. Today, overall do you have confidence in the government (ความเชื่อมั่นของประชาชนท่ีมตี่อ “ฝ่ายรัฐบาล” ณ วันนี้ ในภาพรวม)

BP:  29% of people in Bangkok and the South have some confidence/a lot of confidence in the government; 48% in the Central region; 68% in the North; and 56% in the Northeast. Overall, 48% of people have some confidence/a lot of confidence in the government.

Q8. On having or not having confidence in the government? (เรื่องที่ประชาชน “เชื่อมั่น” และ “ไม่เช่ือมั่น” ต่อ “ฝ่ายรัฐบาล”)

Have confidence:
A. Confidence in the PM, 58.29%
B. Drug suppression, 25.37%
C. Increasing salary and wages, 16.34%

BP:  An ABAC poll also showed that dealing with the drug problem was the most popular policy….

No confidence:
A. Solving cost of living problems, 49.30%
B. Solving gas, oil and energy prices, 39.46%
C. Preventing and suppressing corruption, 11.24%

BP: A and B both are the cost of living, but people may blame the government more for A and not so much for B – see here - but as already noted previously it is the biggest problem facing the government.

Q9. Today, overall do you have confidence in the opposition? ( ความเชื่อมั่นของประชาชนท่ีมีต่อ “ฝ่ายค้าน” ณ วันนี้ ในภาพรวม)

BP:  33% of people in Bangkok have some confidence/a lot of confidence in the government; 37% in the Central region; 20% in the North; 41% in the Northeast; and 56% in the South. Overall, 38% of people have some confidence/a lot of confidence in the government.

Q10. On having or not having confidence in the opposition (เรื่องที่ประชาชน “เชื่อมั่น” และ “ไม่เช่ือมั่น” ต่อ “ฝ่ายค้าน”)

Have confidence:
A. Investigating the role of the government, 59.33%
B. Confidence in the opposition leader, 31.24%
C. Undertaking the duties of the opposition with its fullest ability, 9.43%

No confidence:
A. Playing political games, 53.24%
B. Opposing all issues when there is no reason to oppose, 33.17%
C. Controlling behaviour of opposition MPs, 13.59%

 Q11. Do you have more confidence in the government or the opposition?  (ระหว่าง “ฝ่ายรัฐบาล” และ “ฝ่ายค้าน” ประชาชนเช่ือมั่นฝ่ายใดมากกว่ากัน)

BP: When looking directly and not a comparison, the government outscores the opposition 48% to 38%, but what is key for the government is they score over 50% in the North and the Northeast which make up around 53% of the electorate. They also do well in the Central Region whereas the Democrats does better in the South and to a lesser extent in Bangkok. When asked to compare, Bangkok almost becomes a tie with high dissatisfaction of both sides.

Period of survey: March 10-17, 2012

Gender:
Males   50.31%
Females    49.69%

Age:
18-20,  8.86%
21-30,  30.1%
31-40,  26.24%
41-50, 23.06%
50+, 11.74%

Occupation:
Civil Servant/State enterprise employee, 15.9%
Private sector employee, 19.23%
Traders/self-employed, 13.87%
Contractors, 15.03%
Farmers, 18.75%
Students, 13.66%
House or wife husbands, 2.31%
Retired, 1.26%

Education
Primary school, 12.49%
Secondary school, 15.51%
Vocational certificate, 19.98%
Bachelor’s degree, 43.97%
Higher than bachelor’s degree, 8.06%

BP: 51% of people don’t have a bachelor’s degree or higher. That is the problem with surveying so many people under 30.

Salary
Less than 5,000 Baht a month, 13.96%
5,001-10,000, 35.58%
10,001-20,000, 24.98%
20,001-30,000, 13.54%
30,001-40,000, 5.78%
40,001+, 6.17%

Region
Bangkok and surrounding provinces, 15.39%
Central region, 16.47%
North, 19.08%
Northeast, 34.62%
South, 14.44%

BP: That regional breakdown is reasonably accurate.

Karom Polpornklang and Suwit Thongnuan argued that the penalty under lese majeste law is too harsh and undemocratic, as it is more severe than that for other civil defamation cases. With a maximum imprisonment term of 15 years under the lese majeste law, compared to three years for an ordinary defamation case, the current law is tantamount to placing the monarchy “above the constitution”, the lawyers argued.

The lawyers urged in their petition letter that Thailand needs to bring itself in line with international standards, “otherwise [Thailand] will not be accepted among civilised nations, which would be detrimental… to the Thai justice system.”

“We’re doing this not just for Somyos but for others,” Karom told reporters.

If the Constitution Court accepted the petition, it might take up to a year for a ruling and Somyos could end up in jail longer, as he has already been denied bail seven times and spent nearly a year under detention.

Somyos told The Nation yesterday that he has decided the petition is worth trying.

“It’s for posterity. I’m just a scapegoat,” said Somyos.

BP: You can see the reason why so few challenges. It will mean extra time in jail including by the estimate of up to one year. Principles have a price and this is normally why  bail is rarely given for lese majeste offences as it incentivises the choice to plead guilty and get a pardon. Will the court even accept the case? Of course, if the court finds the punishment excessive that would be a convenient way to amend the law, but without some signal that seems unlikely.

btw, the recently appointed Permanent Secretary of the Office of PM has some interesting comments – compared with what we normally from civil servants testifying – about lese majeste…..*

*His thesis was on “A constitutional legal aspect of the king’s prerogatives” – see details here (page 36).

Yesterday evening, BP was looking at the Bangkok Post and you had the below image:

In addition, an unidentified MP was caught by an unnamed photographer looking at an erotic photo on his cell phone during the House meeting today.

NOTE: To be clear, he is not looking at the photo of the image that was on the monitor. See the uncensored version of the image he was looking at (girl is in black and a different pose) vs the one on the monitor where the girl is in white.

BP: You see despite his beige suit and easily identifiable tie, he is labelled “an unidentified MP” although to be fair they do say it is from an unnamed photographer so they don’t know from which side of the chamber the photo was taken. ASTV Manager have a range of photos from that day. All the MPs are either identified by name or by party except for the MP looking at the erotic photo, but what surprised BP was when watching Channel 9′s Kao Kon Kon Kao news program last night, they deliberately blurred the MP’s face as can be seen from the below screenshot:

Source: From around 5:33 mark of this video - they show the blurred face for a while and then again around 6:40 mark as well.

BP: It is one thing to not label the MP, but to blur out his face (although not to blur out the crotch shot!). What is the rationale for this?  Do MPs need protecting?

btw, the MP was revealed as a Democrat MP when he confessed……

The big advantage of the E-san poll compared with other polls that provide a regional breakdown is that the E-san poll surveys people in all 20 provinces whereas most other pollsters only survey a handful of provinces in each region which are not necessarily reflective of the entire region. This means regional breakdowns are not always accurate.

This is the first time that BP has blogged on the E-san poll , but this poll will cover three surveys.* The latest poll surveyed 1,084 people between February 9-March 3, 2012.**

Q1 surveys the performance of the government on 6 aspects (ผลสำรวจการประเมินผลงานรัฐบาลใน 6 ด้าน). This is a pass or not pass grade. The figures below are those who give the government a pass.

Source: December 2011; January 2012 (here, here, and here); February and March 2012 (here and here)

BP: Initially, the extent of the drop from December to January surprised BP particularly on economy, but it can be partially explained by the differences in those surveyed (71% in December earned 10,000 Baht or less; but for February-March  this dropped to 58.3%). Normally, those who earn less  support the government slightly more so BP thinks the oversampling of those who earn under 10,000 Baht in December overinflated the actual figures. Polls consistently show the government doing well, but 83.3% pass rate is very high. This only partially explains the difference and the obvious problem with the rising prices – see here and here - explains the majority of the drop in the economic pass rate. This is not surprising, but overall (it is the overall mark which is the most relevant) the government still scores a 72.1% pass mark. Given 68.2% of voters in the Northeast gave their party vote to Puea Thai, this suggests that nothing has really changed since the election.

Q2 is not a straight support or not support. People are being asked to choose between politicians (you can only choose one).

BP: So the oversampling of lower income voters probably slightly skews the December figures although it is likely the economic situation. On Chalerm’s rise, tough-talking and the war on drugs. Simple. Yingluck has gone up in February-March though. Voters in the Northeast make up one-third of the country and well Abhisit in the single figures – behind Chuwit!

*Poll is hard to find as their surveys receive little media coverage, they don’t upload all polls to their Web site, and the RSS feed that BP uses which aggregates poll results does not include the E-san poll)

**Survey Data for February-March

Gender:
Males   46.6%
Females 53.4%

BP: There are a few polls that oversurvey women. One just assumes women are easier to survey as they are more accessible.

Age:
18-25, 23.3%
26-35, 24.8%
36-45, 20.2%
46-55, 24.0%
56+, 7.7%

ส่วนระดับการศึกษาส่วน ใหญ่จบปริญญาตรี  ร้อยละ 30.5  รองลงประถมศึกษา/ต่ำกว่า ร้อยละ 25.3  มัธยมปลาย / ระดับปวช. ร้อยละ 18.0  อนุปริญญา / ปวส. ร้อยละ 11.6  มัธยมต้น  ร้อยละ  9.7ปริญญาโทและเอก ร้อยละ 4.8

Education:

Grade 6 or lower (ประถมศึกษา/ต่ำกว่า), 25.3%
Grade 9 (มัธยมศึกษาตอนต้น), 9.7%
Grade 12/vocational certificate (มัธยมศึกษาตอนปลาย/ปวช), 18%
Associate degree/higher vocational certificate (อนุปริญญา/ปวส), 11.6%
Bachelor’s degree, 30.5%
Master’s degree & Ph.D, 4.7%

Occupation:
18.9% are traders/self-employed,
10.7% are contractors/general labour,
16.9% are farmers,
14.9% are students,
15.1% are civil servants/state enterprise employees,
10.5% work for private enterprises,
6.6% are housewives/househusbands,
1.4% others

BP: Farmers seem a little low, but then again traders/self-employed and contractors/general labour may include those who work in the farming area and it is how people have defined themselves. People don’t always do the same thing and move between occupations.

Income:
Less than 5,000, 29.4%
5,001-10,000, 28.9%
10,001-15,000, 14.9%
15,001-20,000, 12%
20,001-40,000, 10.1%
40,001+, 4.8%

Two major populism policies are now causing headaches for Yingluck because they are backfiring on the administration. The policies to raise the minimum wage to Bt300 throughout the nation and the entry salary for university-educated civil servants to Bt15,000 are now creating economic problems for the government.

Yingluck has not yet been able to raise the minimum wage and salary but the prices of consumer goods have been inflating dramatically in advance of the pay hikes.

….

Yingluck seemed not to give in as she tried to keep her promise to voters by adding some money to the incomes of university-educated civil servants. Their base salary remains the same but the government has given them an extra fillip to make their income reach Bt15,000 per month. The base salary cannot be hiked now since the government has no budget to adjust the salary system for all grades.

The minimum wage hike also covered only seven provinces, not the entire country, as the policy was strongly opposed by employers.

BP: First, the article says Yingluck has not yet been able to raise the minimum wage and then a few paragraphs later says the minimum wage hike only covers seven provinces. The sentences contradict each other.

Second, it says the base salary of university-educated civil servants has remained the same. Wrong. Their base salary increased as of January 1, 2012. On January 31, the Bangkok Post reported:

The salary adjustment would proceed over three years, starting this year with retrospective effect to Jan 1.

The cabinet approval covered only the first year. The cabinet would deliberate the second and the third year increase later, Mr Nonthikorn said.

In the first year, 2012, the new salary structure will provide a minimum monthly income of 7,620 baht per month for government officials with a lower vocational certificate, known as Por Wor Chor in Thai, and a 9,300-baht minimum monthly income for those acquiring an upper vocational certificate, or Por Wor Sor.

Those holding a bachelor’s degree will get a minimum 11,680 baht a month, a master’s 15,300 baht and a doctoral degree 19,000 baht.

Below is a chart from the Bangkok Post showing the initial rise:

BP: Yes, the government has not been able to fully implement the policy of a 15,000 baht salary (which it seems won’t be implemented fully until 2014) although the allowance + base salary for bachelor’s degree holders now equals 15,000 Baht a month.  The base salary of university-educated civil servants has already increased by 11.7%-27.8%.

Third, the article states the minimum wage hike covers only 7 provinces. Again, wrong. At the time of the election last year, the  daily minimum wage was  between 159 to 221 Baht – with the amount being higher in urban provinces and lower in rural provinces.  In October, a tripartite committee of employers, employees, and the government approved an approximate 40% nationwide increase of the minimum wage starting from April 1, 2012 for all 77 provinces. Because of the differing minimum wages, the approximately 40% increase for workers in Bangkok, Phuket, and 5 other provinces surrounding Bangkok  the daily minimum wage of 300 Baht, but workers in Thailand’s other 70 provinces also received an approximately 40% increase as well on April 1, 2012. Hence, the minimum wage hike did not cover just 7 provinces.

Sometimes mistakes happen, but these are three glaring mistakes in a few paragraphs. This is not the first time and, in fact, BP often reads something and thinks “what? really?” and then you Google and read a bit more and you realize you have wasted your time chasing down a non-story.

Teteran politician Sanoh Thienthong on Tuesday advised fugitive former premier Thaksin Shinawatra to accept that he will not get back the 46.37 billion baht [US$1.5 billion] confiscated by the courts in his assets seizure case, in return for the likelihood of receiving amnesty.
…

The amnesty bill would be pushed through parliament in the name of the majority Pheu Thai Party, not the coalition government, he said.

“if an amnesty bill is enacted, there should not be any resistance. I don’t see anyone has any problem. Apart from the Democrats, who don’t want to reconcile.

“Well, I don’t care, I don’t have to care about them,” Mr Sanoh said.

BP: Actually, if the only sticking point was the money then BP thinks that Thaksin may give up as blogged last year:

An amnesty then is only possible not only if Thaksin waits – as he indicated he will – but that he also gives up some things as well. One could imagine there are three things that Thaksin would, in theory, want, (a) not to go to jail (or at worst, only 1 day then a pardon), (b) the 40+ billion that was seized, and (c) to lesser extent, to be able to run again.

There is no way he will go to jail so giving up (a) is the out of the question. From the recent Al Jazeera interview [around 11 minute mark] and although he complained it was unfair, he seemed to say at the end he would give up (b). This means he has learnt from the 2006 mistake where if he had paid tax/made a very large donation on the Shin Corp sale it would have weakened the PAD argument. This would also prevent the attack that he is taking away money that could be used on various programs which is something that the Democrats attacked the government on the campaign trail for. He has to give up (c) for sure and from all indications, and given his age and that well he controls things behind-the-scenes as it is now, he seems happy with this.

So waiting 1-2 years until Puea Thai are able to implement a number of their economic policies + giving up (b) and (c) + a referendum is a pathway for an amnesty, but will Thaksin be content with this?

BP: Actually, if Thaksin was allowed to return to Thailand, BP is unsure whether he would spend much time in Thailand. He would likely continue to do business abroad and also out of safety concerns. Hence, it is more about being able to return to Thailand – don’t see he would run for office again in the near future – so would Thaksin actually give up the return of the 46 billion baht to stay out of prison?