Bankwatch https://bankwatch.org Fri, 19 Jun 2026 15:01:26 +0000 <![CDATA[The Trump peace pipelines framework: a renewed threat to Western Balkan decarbonisation]]> Fri, 19 Jun 2026 17:01:26 +0200 Magda Wiejak 156206 2026-06-19 17:01:26 2026-06-19 17:01:26 Most Western Balkan countries are known for their heavy coal use and slow decarbonisation, but the region has at least one advantage compared to its EU neighbours: low or no gas dependence. In 2024, fossil gas still made up 20.6% of the EU’s gross available energy. But in the Western Balkans, most gas-dependent countries are Serbia (14.3%) and North Macedonia (11.6%). In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), gas makes up less than 3% of energy, with Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo not connected to international gas infrastructure. This is a strength to capitalise on, not a disadvantage to be remedied. The United States has for years lobbied southeast European governments to build new import infrastructure like the Greece to North Macedonia interconnector, LNG terminals in Montenegro and Albania and the southern gas interconnection between Croatia and BiH. And for a long time, EU policy encouraged them, promoting gasification even in the gas-free countries.  But as the EU gradually moves away from promoting gas, US policy has doubled down on it. Fossil gas projects are no longer eligible for priority status under the Energy Community Treaty or for EU funding in the region, but overt US pressure on the Western Balkan governments to build new gas pipelines has ramped up during Trump’s second mandate. At the Three Seas Initiative Summit in Dubrovnik in April, all eyes were on the inter-governmental agreement between BiH and Croatia on the southern gas interconnection, which hit the headlines due to the appointment of a Trump-linked company, AAFS, as project promoter.  AAFS was only founded in 2025, its ownership structure is not public, it has no track record and is represented by lawyers who campaigned on Trump’s behalf to overturn the 2020 U.S. election results. A special law appointing AAFS was passed in record time by the Federation of BiH Parliament in April 2026, bypassing the mandatory tender and concession-granting procedures, and allowing AAFS to use public land without paying expropriation fees.    At the Dubrovnik summit, the U.S. government also announced a vaguely-defined ‘Trump peace pipelines framework’, which aims to ‘advance strategic energy infrastructure projects across Central and Eastern Europe, expanding the region's capacity to import U.S. LNG’. The U.S. has also initiated a series of agreements with Western Balkan governments, and the government’s May 2025 Report to Congress on United States Policy to Promote Regional Stability and Prosperity in the Western Balkans clearly prioritises gas infrastructure and sales. 

New import infrastructure could triple the countries’ consumption – or become stranded assets

The fact that Europe is in its second oil and gas crisis this decade seems to have escaped the region’s governments, who are actively planning gas pipelines, power plants and LNG terminals that could collectively triple their 2023 gas consumption. These would either entrap the countries in costly dependence on US LNG imports, or end up as stranded assets. Albania relies on hydropower and solar for its electricity, as the two floating oil-fired units moored at Vlora since 2022 barely generate any power. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline passes through the country to Italy, but so far no exit point has been built on Albanian territory. Yet Albania plans to transition towards fossil fuels. It is planning at least two gas power plants – at Roskovec and Vlora – an LNG terminal, and a distribution system in Korca. Works started earlier this year at Roskovec despite permitting irregularities and a lack of financing. And in April, Albania signed a 20-year framework agreement to buy US LNG – worth no less than USD 6 billion – and a memorandum to develop the Vlora plant. Bosnia and Herzegovina mainly uses gas to heat Sarajevo, but in the last two years the Federation entity’s ambitions have grown. Its government is mainly concentrating on the southern gas interconnection, but has also revived plans for two more pipelines from Croatia, added 85 kilometres to the southern gas interconnection plans, and started planning three gas power plants. The Republika Srpska entity has made no secret of its plans to keep using Russian gas and building a new pipeline from Serbia. But it has recently signed an agreement for a pipeline within Republika Srpska, from Šepak to Novi Grad, that would connect to the old existing import pipeline. Kosovo is the only country in the region whose energy strategy rightly rules out building a gas pipeline. But even there, the government has left open the option of teaming up with a neighbouring country to build a gas power plant. Montenegro’s national spatial plan, after massive controversy around plans for a U.S.-backed LNG terminal at Bar, does not include the terminal or associated power plant. But after its adoption, in September 2025, the Prime Minister signed a memorandum with Japan’s JERA for a feasibility study for an LNG terminal and power plants. A planned US-Montenegro agreement has already met with strong resistance from civil society and people living near the planned LNG terminal. North Macedonia announced the start of works on the gas interconnector from Greece last year, although expropriation is not yet completed and several legal issues are outstanding. It also plans to build at least two more gas power plants, and in 2025 signed a memorandum with Turkiye’s Kazancı Holding to build unspecified gas plants and distribution grids. In April 2026, the government signed a memorandum with the U.S. for ‘improving the security’ of the gas supply, and in June, a grant agreement was signed with the World Bank to support the preparation of project documentation for the planned gas power plant at Bitola.   Serbia’s difficulty in securing its gas supply has not put its government off steadily expanding the country’s gas network, and signing an agreement with Azerbaijan for a 500 megawatt gas power plant in Niš. It also plans a new plant in Novi Sad. The World Bank is also considering financing for a gas project that includes new pipelines within Serbia. In addition to long-term infrastructure lock-in and the climate impacts of gas, these plans don’t make economic sense. None of them have up-to-date, public feasibility studies, and they would end up either as stranded assets or heavily subsidised by taxpayers. Permitting, expropriation and construction could easily take a decade and the infrastructure alone would cost billions, even before the costs of gas are included. Even if some of the planned projects do not go ahead, the region does not have money, human capacity or time to waste on such costly distractions.

Will the U.S. put its money where its mouth is?

Previous U.S. efforts to push gas in southeast Europe were limited by its lack of willingness to pay for infrastructure construction. However, with the EU halting such funding, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. will use domestic sources like the Development Finance Corporation, or multilateral banks where it has strong influence, to finance gas build-out. The recent announcements of potential World Bank financing for two gas projects do not bode well, and suggest that the latter may already be happening.

The way forward

The Western Balkan countries can still avoid high levels of gas dependence if we act now. Appropriately-sited solar and wind generation, supported by existing hydropower, strong grid connections and battery storage, is much more cost-effective for electricity generation, while heat pumps, geothermal, and ambient or leftover heat avoid import dependence for heating and cooling. Instead of falling into the decades-old trap of gas dependence, Western Balkan governments finally need to increase energy efficiency and focus on electrification of the heat and transport sectors.

]]> <![CDATA[When citizens speak: Lessons on energy poverty from the Romanian town of Petroșani]]> Wed, 03 Jun 2026 13:13:58 +0200 Dora Crnčević 156130 2026-06-08 11:47:06 2026-06-03 13:13:58 Last year, 28 residents of Petroșani came together to discuss something most of them experience every day but rarely raise in public: the struggle to keep their homes warm. The result was a citizens’ forum that cut through statistics and policy language to reveal something far more important: the lived reality behind energy poverty and what meaningful support could look like when shaped by those directly affected.  The situation on the ground  Petroșani illustrates what can happen when a regional economy built entirely around a single industry collapses. Following the insolvency of the town’s local energy conglomerate, mines began to shut down, jobs disappeared and many residents moved away. Those who stayed are now living in buildings constructed between the 1950s and 1970s, with crumbling roofs, draughty windows and heating systems that were never designed to be efficient or affordable.  Energy poverty here is not an abstract policy concept. It’s a daily negotiation over which essential needs can be sacrificed. One participant described living on the top floor of a building where the ceiling freezes in winter and rainwater leaks into the apartment during heavy downpours. The home is damp and cold, the windows have never been replaced, and heating is only available when there’s enough money to buy firewood. Unfortunately, these are not isolated cases – they’re the norm.  The many layers of energy poverty  What made the forum particularly valuable was not just what participants shared, but how their experiences reflect the broader reality of energy poverty. It’s not simply about high energy costs; rather, it’s the result of multiple factors stacking on top of one another: low incomes, ageing buildings with poor insulation, limited job opportunities, and an administrative system that’s often difficult to navigate and slow to respond.  In many households, a significant share of income goes directly towards utility bills. While heating assistance schemes exist, participants described them as either insufficient to meet their actual needs or difficult to access in practice due to bureaucratic hurdles and outdated eligibility criteria. The frustration expressed was not only about material hardship, but also about the gap between people’s needs and the institutions meant to respond to them.  Barriers to collective action  A key issue raised during the forum, and one well known in policy discussions, is the role of homeowners’ associations. These are a prerequisite for accessing most public funding for building renovations or energy-efficiency programmes.  In Petroșani, however, very few apartment blocks have functioning associations. Participants’ experiences confirmed how complex and burdensome the process of establishing one can be, requiring time, financial resources, legal knowledge, and agreement from all residents, including those who have already left town.  One resident explained that, without an association, neighbours must go door to door whenever anything needs to be done in the building, and that setting up an association took an entire year.  Depopulation further complicates the situation, as vacant apartments make collective decision-making difficult, while the costs and responsibilities fall on those who remain. These barriers are not new, but the experiences of these residents make it clear how administrative requirements can become real obstacles in practice.  What people actually want  Despite the challenges, participants were constructive and forward-looking. They expressed strong support for solutions such as solar panels, thermal renovation and other green technologies. There was a general openness to change and a clear understanding of its benefits.  At the same time, participants highlighted the need for stronger and more accessible connections with public institutions to make these solutions achievable. Their proposals were practical: a single point of contact for energy and housing matters, support in setting up and managing homeowners’ associations, neighbourhood-level renovation programmes instead of piecemeal interventions, and better public information delivered not only online but also in person for those less digitally connected.  Many participants viewed renewable energy as part of the solution, arguing that solar panels could reduce both pollution and household energy costs. What clearly emerged from the discussions is that citizens are not simply passive beneficiaries of policy; they’re ready to engage if given the tools and support to do so.  Lessons for Romania’s energy transition  While the challenges in Petroșani are shaped by its post-industrial history, energy poverty is not limited to such communities. Across Romania, households are struggling with a similar combination of low incomes, inefficient buildings and limited access to support mechanisms.  This makes energy poverty not just a local issue, but a systemic one. Addressing it requires more than financial support alone: it calls for policies that are accessible, coordinated, and grounded in peoples’ lived realities.  As the experience in Petroșani shows, solutions already exist. Yet their impact depends on whether institutions can truly reach the people they’re supposed to support. Strengthening this connection will be critical, not just for addressing energy poverty, but also for shaping a transition that is fair and inclusive across Romania.]]> <![CDATA[Slovakia’s billion-euro opportunity: Redirecting climate revenues and fossil-fuel subsidies to tackle energy poverty]]> Wed, 20 May 2026 11:55:01 +0200 Magda Wiejak 155963 2026-05-26 17:28:13 2026-05-20 11:55:01 Amid this geopolitical turmoil, we at Friends of the Earth-CEPA (CEPA) have been assessing Slovakia’s potential to support long-term solutions to energy poverty through EU funding mechanisms. Our analysis reveals a staggering EUR 986 million that could be mobilised annually to finance energy poverty solutions in Slovakia. 

A lifeline for vulnerable households left on the table 

To reach this total, Slovakia must first address the chronic underutilisation of its existing resources. The Environmental Fund derives its revenues primarily from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), as well as from other environmental fees. However, its annual reports indicate a consistently low rate of expenditure, averaging only 37% annually between 2012 and 2024.  In theory, this means that Slovakia should have more than EUR 2.539 billion available through the Environmental Fund to finance environmental measures, such as energy efficiency improvements for low-income households.  Yet questions remain regarding the practical use of these resources. Historically, the Ministry of Finance has prioritised fiscal objectives over the climate goals of the Ministry of Environment, which has typically received insufficient support. This reflects the tendency of Slovak governments to favour the economic benefits of retaining funds in bank accounts to strengthen the country’s lending position, rather than directing them towards environmental spending. 

The cost of inaction  

The impact of this strategy is clear from the most recent data. In 2024, Environmental Fund revenues reached EUR 489 million, while expenditures amounted to only EUR 332 million – meaning just 68% of the available allocation was spent.  Slovakia should be using 100% of these annual revenues to meet its clean energy transition needs, rather than to improve its fiscal or lending position on international financial markets. In 2024 alone, this would have made an additional EUR 156 million available for environmental spending.  Looking at the broader trend, the average annual unspent amount between 2012 and 2024 was EUR 195 million – resources that could have been channelled directly into social climate solutions.  

The Modernisation Fund’s untapped potential 

Our calculations reveal a EUR 1.14 billion investment gap in the Modernisation Fund. Based on publicly available data, this represents a major surplus that remains unspent or unallocated compared to projected revenues. This gap is driven by different assumptions in ETS price projections over time, as well as the relatively slow pace of the Fund’s implementation – with less than one-third spenthalfway through the 2020–2030 period. The figure also represents almost 89% of Slovakia’s agreed EU contribution to the Social Climate Fund between 2028 and 2032.  There is already a positive precedent. The Ministry of the Environment has approved the allocation of EUR 186 million from the Modernisation Fund to the Renovate House programme, which is the first shortlisted measure under Slovakia’s social climate plan. More energy poverty and transport poverty solutions should follow.  At the same time, the Ministry of the Environment is preparing funding allocations for other areas, although these remain unclear despite our efforts to obtain further details through information requests. As a result, the final available amount could be lower.  It should also be noted that the social climate plan has yet to be published. However, a study prepared by technical assistance experts has already shortlisted several measures for potential support under the Social Climate Fund. 

From fossil fuel subsidies to energy efficiency and renewable support 

The national energy and climate plan lists dozens of subsidies in the energy sector, including support for fossil fuels. Most of these have no defined end date. They include highly problematic exemptions from excise duty for heat production from coal, combined heat and power (CHP), and fossil gas. Other fossil fuel subsidies include support for CHP within the system operation tariff, as well as regulated prices for gas supplied to households.  In its December 2024 review of expenditure and revenue in the energy sector, the Value for Money Division at the Ministry of Finance identified significant potential for savings in the energy sector, estimated to range between EUR 155.1 and 223.5 million per year. From a climate perspective, the most important measures include phasing out direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies and aligning environmental taxes more closely with EU averages.   Additionally, the current government’s approach of placing price caps on gas, electricity and district heating – costed at EUR 385 million for 2026 – contradicts EU energy and climate policy, State aid rules, and initiatives such as the Affordable Energy Action Plan and the 8th Environment Action Programme. Several aspects of this approach are problematic: 
  • The price-cap scheme ‘targets’ around 90% of Slovak households, reflecting weak prioritisation of support.  
  • Under the broader definition of energy poverty proposed by the Institute for Forecasting of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, around 18% of households (330,000) are energy-poor, including those without access to electricity, making them ineligible to avail of the scheme. 
  • It undermines the ‘energy efficiency first’ principle, as it removes incentives to invest in building renovations or replace gas boilers.  
  • It fails to prioritise the most vulnerable households, including those relying on solid fuels such as biomass.  
  • Households are given no incentive to transition away from coal and waste-based heating to more sustainable or legally compliant solutions, despite the availability of support programmes such as Green Solidarity.
Finally, the response to the 2022–2023 energy crisis showed that windfall taxation of excess profits in the fossil fuel sector can provide an additional source of funding to absorb geopolitical shocks and protect vulnerable households.  

Increasing household resilience 

Rather than subsidising fossil fuel consumption, these resources could be redirected towards long-term investments in household energy resilience, including:  
  • EUR 195 million annually through full utilisation of the Environmental Fund;  
  • EUR 228 million annually through full utilisation of the Modernisation Fund, assuming stable ETS prices;  
  • EUR 178 million through the abolition of indirect fossil-fuel subsidies and implementation of other recommendations from the Value for Money Division;  
  • EUR 385 million through the removal of fossil-fuel, electricity, and district-heating price caps; and 
  • additional income from a properly calibrated windfall tax.  
Collectively, this totals an enormous EUR 986 million annually, in addition to potentially hundreds of millions from windfall taxation. This is almost four times more (386%) than Slovakia’s annual allocation under the Social Climate Fund between 2028 and 2032.   In principle, ETS revenues – combined with the measures listed above – could significantly strengthen support for households, provided the Slovak government reconsiders its current ETS position. These massive annual revenues could be used to finance long-term energy efficiency and renewable energy solutions for 141,280 households. For example: 
  • Up to 61,280 households could receive EUR 10 000 each under the Renovate House programme to replace windows and doors, and insulate roofs or ceilings;   
  • A further 40,000 households could receive a EUR 4 380 subsidy for heat pumps through the Green to Households programme, reduce long-term heating costs; 
  • Around 20,000 vulnerable households could receive a EUR 3 600 subsidy for solar thermal collectors under the Green Solidarity programme, cutting their hot water expenses;  
  • And finally, 20,000 energy-poor households could receive a EUR 6 300 subsidy for rooftop solar photovoltaic systems under Green Solidarity, reducing their electricity bills. 
The above examples illustrate the scale of support that could be mobilised for households if Slovakia pursued a more ambitious and socially targeted climate and energy policy. A comprehensiveenergy poverty strategy would also need to include measures related to sustainable and affordable housing, alongside other structural social and energy reforms.    ]]> <![CDATA[The EBRD’s new gender strategy risks falling short at a critical moment]]> Tue, 12 May 2026 08:12:25 +0200 Michaela Kozminova 155883 2026-05-12 08:12:25 2026-05-12 08:12:25 Today, only 4% of women live in countries close to achieving full legal equality. No economy provides equal economic opportunities, and nearly a quarter of countries have experienced a backlash against gender equality. These are not just trends, but early warning signs. They lead to shrinking civic space, weakened democratic institutions, poor economic governance, and an increasing risk to those the EBRD aims to support. Unless the EBRD explicitly recognises and addresses these dynamics, it risks investing in environments where its own objectives are undermined.  The draft Strategy rightly acknowledges that women and other underserved groups continue to face structural barriers when it comes to accessing jobs, finance, infrastructure and public services. More and more countries are introducing laws targeting the reproductive rights of women or the rights of LGBTIQ+ people. However, recognition alone is no longer enough. If the EBRD is serious about an inclusive economic transition, its new Strategy must move beyond business as usual and confront the political and economic realities shaping its operations through stronger, more ambitious and more targeted actions. 

A test of the EBRD’s mandate 

The EBRD is not just a development bank. It has a mandate to support democracy and pluralism. Gender equality and inclusion are not optional extras, but core to its mission. Yet the draft strategy still primarily frames gender equality as an economic issue rather than a matter of rights, governance and democratic resilience.   While the EBRD may see this as a more convincing approach to stakeholders, the current backlash against gender equality and inclusion in many countries, including those in Europe and Central Asia, calls this approach into question. If applied in isolation, this approach limits the EBRD’s ability to respond to realities on the ground, where economic exclusion is often reinforced by legal discrimination and political repression.  The Strategy highlights the importance of policy dialogue in shaping lasting reform. However, such engagement is often confined to politically convenient areas that neatly align with national priorities. That is not enough. In many EBRD countries of operation, national laws and policies are increasingly being used to restrict gender equality and the inclusion of LGBTIQ+ people. In other regions, harmful practices such as child marriage and female genital mutilation persist, and consensual same-sex relations are criminalised in multiple countries.  If policy dialogue avoids these realities, it risks becoming merely performative. To be effective, policy dialogue must engage precisely where the barriers are greatest, even when doing so is politically sensitive. After all, policy dialogue should be driven not by what is easiest, but by what is most necessary. 

A worrying decline in ambition 

Equally concerning is the proposed reduction in ambition. The Strategy sets a target of 40% of projects promoting gender equality, which is lower than the EBRD’s recent performance. Meanwhile, the proposed impact indicators for human capital suggest no significant increase in skills development or workplace reforms.  More significantly, the Strategy lacks the tools required to respond when commitments are weakened during implementation, whether due to political pressure, client resistance or shrinking civic space.   At a time when opposition to gender equality and inclusion is intensifying, standing still effectively means falling behind. Instead, the EBRD should raise its ambitions, targeting at least half of its portfolio to meaningfully advance gender equality, while ensuring that commitments deepen alongside growing investment volumes. 

Inclusion must be explicit 

The Strategy frequently refers to ‘underserved groups’ without clearly defining them. This ambiguity matters. Without explicit recognition, groups facing the most severe discrimination – particularly LGBTIQ+ people, ethnic minorities, women living in rural areas, and groups experiencing intersecting inequalities – risk being overlooked in practice. Clear definitions are essential to ensure that interventions reach those most affected by exclusion.  Experience shows that what is not named is often not measured, and what is not measured is rarely prioritised. If the EBRD is committed to inclusion, it must clearly identify its target groups and track outcomes through precise, disaggregated indicators.   Without robust monitoring that captures systemic changes such as gender pay gaps, leadership representation, the inclusion of LGBTIQ+ people, and rates of gender-based violence and harassment – rather than just project outputs – it will be difficult to assess whether investments are transforming inequalities or merely operating within them. 

A critical turning point 

The EBRD’s new Strategy comes at a pivotal moment. Around the world, the fight for equality is facing growing opposition from increasingly organised forces. The EBRD has an opportunity to take the lead, but only if it strengthens its approach. 
  • First, the EBRD must recognise the backlash against gender equality and LGBTIQ+ inclusion as a material risk, integrating it into its country strategies and project design. 
  • Second, the EBRD should raise – not lower – its ambitions by ensuring that at least 50% of its investments actively promote gender equality. 
  • Third, the EBRD must clearly define which vulnerable groups it seeks to support, ensuring that dedicated programmes, effective tools, including policy dialogue, and robust impact monitoring are in place to reach those most at risk. 
  • Finally, the EBRD must treat gender equality and inclusion as central to its democracy mandate, not just as drivers of economic growth.  
The question is not whether the EBRD recognises the challenges; it clearly does. The question is whether it is willing to match this recognition with the ambition, clarity and political courage required to address these challenges. If it does, the Strategy could become a meaningful tool for advancing inclusive development. If not, it risks becoming just another well-intentioned document that fails to deliver when it matters most. ]]> <![CDATA[More buses, but is the system better? Evaluating Bishkek’s public transport network]]> Wed, 29 Apr 2026 08:30:20 +0200 Michaela Kozminova 155786 2026-04-29 08:30:20 2026-04-29 08:30:20 Over the past few years, the public transport fleet in Bishkek – Kyrgyzstan’s capital city – has changed visibly. In a city where privately operated minibuses, known as marshrutkas, dominated for years, new gas-powered buses and electric buses are now in service.  Today, the municipal fleet includes around 1,600 vehicles. Of these, 424 were purchased through grants and loans provided by international financial institutions, including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and Germany’s development bank (KfW).  At first glance, this appears to be a clear move towards more sustainable urban mobility. However, an analysis of Bishkek’s public transport system, conducted by local researchers with support from CEE Bankwatch Network, suggests that fleet renewal alone has not made public transport genuinely attractive or efficient. 

Modernisation, but to what end? 

According to an official survey commissioned by the Bishkek mayor’s office as part of the city’s 2050 General Plan, only 38% of residents selected public transport as their primary mode of travel, with 41% of residents travelling by car. The rest walk or use personal mobility devices. These figures point to a deeper structural issue: the reform has focused primarily on replacing vehicles, while the system itself remains in need of fundamental improvement.  The analysis identified several key barriers that may prevent residents from shifting from cars to public transport. First, only 18% of the fleet can be described as fully comfortable, inclusive, safe and environmentally friendly. Many buses lack air conditioning, not all interiors are fully inclusive, and part of the fleet still fails to meet modern environmental standards.  Second, pedestrian access to stops remains limited. GIS analysis shows that only 25% of Bishkek’s built-up area lies within a 500-metre walking distance of existing stops. This means that many residents must already incur additional time and effort costs at the very first stage of their trip, making public transport less competitive compared to cars.  Third, the city still lacks a connected bus priority system. Dedicated bus lanes cover only 2% of the total route network length. Passengers lose time in traffic congestion alongside motorists. Because of traffic jams, service intervals are disrupted, travel times increase, and travel itself remains unpredictable.  International practice in public transport development recommends three types of measures known as the ‘avoid–shift–improve’ approach: 
  • avoid – reduce the need for trips through better urban planning; 
  • shift – switch demand to more sustainable modes of transport; 
  • improve – upgrade vehicles and technologies. 
However, the changes in Bishkek primarily focus on the third measure: fleet renewal. Yet even the most modern ‘green’ buses do not, on their own, solve passengers’ problems, shorten travel times, or make public transport a more attractive option. 

Beyond new buses 

For public transport in Bishkek to truly become more convenient and attractive, the city must adopt a more comprehensive approach, including: 
  • developing a polycentric urban structure to reduce the need for long-distance travel; 
  • optimising excessively long routes and introducing a free transfer system; 
  • increasing pedestrian access to stops, particularly in residential districts and peripheral areas; 
  • creating a connected network of dedicated bus lanes; and 
  • integrating buses with rail, cycling, and pedestrian infrastructure as well as car use. 
In summary, while investment in greener and more modern rolling stock is necessary, it remains insufficient. Unless the city implements these changes, it will be left with a system that is modern in form, yet fundamentally ineffective – one that ultimately fails to compete with the speed, convenience and reliability of the car.]]> <![CDATA[Power to the people: How distribution grid improvements can speed up energy transformation in the Western Balkans]]> Thu, 23 Apr 2026 13:50:16 +0200 Magda Wiejak 155760 2026-04-29 15:06:35 2026-04-23 13:50:16

The transformation of the energy sector in the Western Balkans is progressing at different speeds. Much of the system still relies on outdated fossil fuel plants and large-scale hydropower production. However, all countries in the region have started to see an influx of intermittent renewable energy. While there are exceptions, this new capacity generally consists of utility-scaleinstallations directly connected to the transmission or distribution grids, functioning as additions to the existing centralised system.   Yet the system can only absorb so much intermittent production at present. Transmission system operators in Western Balkan countries typically estimate that around a third of grid connection requests can be accommodated without compromising the stability or security of supply. They also identify the connection of multiple utility-scale photovoltaic plants to the distribution grid as a cause of excessive voltage variations and increased power losses.  While power transmission systems have their own issues to resolve, investment in the distribution grid needed to speed up the transition is lagging behind. Most of the infrastructure was built in the last century and has hardly been upgraded, despite legally binding obligations.   Distribution grid losses are significantly higher in most Western Balkan countries than in EU Member States. Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only country in the region with losses below 10%. However, losses in Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia are around 11 to 14%, in Albania almost 20%, and in Kosovo above 20%. Part of the issue lies with the non-technical lossescaused by outdated energy consumption metering and billing systems.   The current situation does not allow for sufficient capacity to enable more prosumers and energy communities to connect. To achieve this, the grid needs to be flexible and capable enough to redistribute electricity in real time from many small producers to wherever it is needed most at that moment.   Enabling households and small and medium-sized enterprises to actively participate in the energy system by generation as well as consuming electricity is a necessary step in the energy transformation. This will motivate them to invest more in energy efficiency and to proactively contribute to policy development.   The benefits will be shared by everyone. The more prosumers and energy communities that join the system, the lower electricity prices will be. Lower losses and modern metering and billing systems will benefit the system operators. And finally, more stable national systems will lead to stability in the regional and European electricity markets.   This is why financiers, such as development banks and the EU, must prioritise investment not only in electricity generation, but also in improving the distribution grid. This is the only way the system can move away from large-scale, climate-damaging, centralised power plants and truly embrace an energy-efficient and renewable future for all.  ]]> <![CDATA[Community energy gathers momentum in Estonia]]> Wed, 15 Apr 2026 14:51:43 +0200 Dora Crnčević 155730 2026-05-20 13:31:08 2026-04-15 14:51:43 Energy Sector Development Plan (ENMAK) adopted earlier this year, has taken the first steps towards mapping the potential obstacles and opportunities for community energy at the national level. Unlike in many other EU Member States, the development of community energy in Estonia has yet to become a separate strategic goal, largely due to a lack of state support. Supporting community energy initiatives and promoting their wider adoption would bolster the functioning of Estonia’s local energy sector, the transition to renewable energy, and its overall resilience. At the local level, this strategy would in turn help communities cope with a variety of challenges, from ensuring energy security to creating new opportunities in areas like transport and the energy supply of public buildings.

What motivates Estonian communities to generate energy together? 

Despite the scarcity of subsidies, a few trailblazing communities in Estonia have taken the initiative to produce energy locally. Energy cooperatives are today rarely formed out of convenience, but out of necessity. When an existing solution no longer works or becomes too expensive, alternatives have to be found. The effects of high electricity prices, an unreliable heat supply, or poor infrastructure – all of which are keenly felt during a harsh winter – tend to motivate communities to come together and act. The experience of Seto Aiad, a gardening cooperative in the village of Obinitsa in the southernmost part of Estonia, is an example of how economic pressure can provide the impetus for action. Faced with high electricity costs for keeping their cold storage facility running during the summer, the members were left with no other option but to establish an energy cooperative. With an eye on long-term sustainability, this local initiative is taking a far more climate-friendly approach than simply relying on transporting oil shale energy, much of which is lost on its journey from the other end of the country in Ida-Virumaa, the country’s just transition region. Even within Ida-Virumaa itself, which has been mass-supplying electricity to households for the past century, the transition to community energy has begun. In the village of Savala, the community is now working together to renovate six apartment buildings, with the logical next step of generating the electricity consumed on-site. However, these pioneers often face significant challenges. There are no guarantees, and collaborative investment in the community and local life has yet to sufficiently take root in wider society. Leaders of the Kääpa village energy cooperative in Jõgeva County in the east of the country have found that, even when the community does show interest and the idea of shared energy seems exciting and sensible, people become much more cautious during the implementation phase. And this is precisely why success stories that can be later replicated in other villages and regions are so crucial, as they build confidence and reduce the fear of getting started. Community energy has the potential to play a significant role not only in gardening and consumer cooperatives, but also in other forms of collective action where networks of cooperation and trust already exist. Where people are accustomed to making decisions together and sharing responsibility, energy cooperation is a natural next step.

Looking to the future 

Beyond inspiration and determination, the wider adoption of energy cooperatives requires systemic support. Currently, the development of community energy is being held back by a lack of awareness, limited infrastructure and financial complexity. Until Estonia introduces the targeted subsidies that are widely available elsewhere in Europe, energy cooperatives will continue to have to make a large initial investment using their own funds, which rules out many potential participants from the outset. Another major bottleneck is Estonia’s electricity grid, historically designed for one-way electricity transmission of power from large producers to consumers. But this structure does not sufficiently support distributed and community-based production or allow for flexible electricity distribution. As a result, current initiatives often have to focus on ensuring that as much of the energy produced as possible is consumed locally. Community energy is more than just a niche solution in Estonia - it’s a transformative opportunity to shape a fairer, cleaner and more resilient energy system. To support this shift, steps need to be taken on multiple fronts. At the national level, the government can send a clear signal by making community energy a strategic priority, creating simple and understandable support measures, and adapting the grid and regulatory framework to better suit distributed electricity generation. Even modest, targeted start-up grants or financial guarantees would help cooperatives overcome the most challenging initial phase. Local governments can also take the lead by mapping regional opportunities, launching pilot projects, and bringing together interested parties, including residents and businesses. At the community level, the most important thing is to start a conversation about how shared needs can be met collectively while keeping an open mind. From this point of strength, communities can seek out partners and expert advice. As the above success stories show, growth only occurs when people dare to learn and experiment together.]]> <![CDATA[True electricity market integration requires environmental compliance]]> Thu, 19 Mar 2026 09:30:13 +0100 Magda Wiejak 155612 2026-03-19 09:30:13 2026-03-19 09:30:13 Before the EU’s CBAM definitive regime began on 1 January this year, many stakeholders questioned whether CBAM should be delayed in the electricity sector. Some even questioned whether electricity should even remain included at all. After all, the Energy Community Treaty has for 20 years promoted integration of the Western Balkans’ energy markets with those of the EU, rather than adding new barriers.  Although CBAM is likely impacting this process to some extent – it’s too early to tell how much – much of the debate currently focuses on its negative impacts, without acknowledging the positive potential of CBAM to drive forward alignment with EU energy and climate policy. The right of Western Balkan renewable energy producers to export electricity to the EU unhindered is also often taken as a given in the debate.   Our new position paper, signed by 63 civil society organisations, therefore seeks to highlight another side of the story: that electricity market integration is desirable, but it must go hand in hand with environmental and climate compliance in the electricity sector.

Not playing by the rules

The Western Balkans’ deadly coal power plants are notorious, but it’s not merely a question of fossil fuels versus renewables, but also a wider lack of environmental governance. Despite being a biodiversity hotspot, the countries fail to properly protect their valuable natural areas, and to properly apply basic EU safeguards like strategic and project-level environmental impact assessments. Appropriate assessments under the Habitats Directive and water impact tests under the Water Framework Directive are barely applied at all. Western Balkan governments want to participate in the EU energy markets without playing by the rules, and this isn’t fair to their people, nature or others who do play by the rules. The Energy Community Treaty was designed to avoid this situation. And while it has contributed significantly to moving forward the Western Balkan countries’ legislative alignment with the EU, its environmental safeguards are lagging behind. It also lacks financial penalties, allowing its Contracting Parties to procrastinate for years on compliance. 

Finally, deadlines with consequences

CBAM has therefore been a breath of fresh air, finally providing clear deadlines for the countries to either face its consequences or gain exemptions for electricity by applying EU energy and climate law, including emissions trading schemes equivalent to that of the EU by 1 January 2030. Progress has been slow, but Serbia, Montenegro and Moldova have transposed the legislation needed for electricity market coupling – the first precondition for exemption from CBAM. Montenegro has also recently committed to carbon neutrality by 2050.  The EU must therefore not give up on CBAM in electricity, but rather use it to the maximum to help move forward compliance with EU energy and climate policy. More broadly, the European Commission must make sure the exporting countries finally comply with all the relevant EU rules, including environmental safeguards.

The way forward

Western Balkan governments may not realise it yet, but the Commission would be doing both the EU and the region a favour by applying the CBAM exemption criteria and reductions in CBAM charges strictly. Insisting that the countries meaningfully advance on decarbonisation in order to gain CBAM exemptions for electricity will help to make up for the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the Energy Community Treaty, and introducing carbon pricing would help them mobilise resources to fund a just energy transition.  More broadly, the Commission also needs to apply joined-up thinking. Access to EU funds for energy must be conditioned on enforcement of the Energy Community Treaty, and full transposition and enforcement of nature and water protection safeguards in the countries, to improve renewable energy sustainability. The EU also needs to avoid creating uncertainty about its own policy directions. Recent calls by Italy’s government and others to suspend the ETS are totally irresponsible. They largely result from countries’ own misguided investments in gas, and would increase the EU’s dependence on imported fossil fuels, and vulnerability to price shocks like the current one. Although the Western Balkan countries need to mobilise their own resources for just transition via carbon pricing, the EU also needs to show it is serious about supporting a just transition in the region by earmarking financial support for carbon-intensive regions in the next EU long-term budget. Only this way can we ensure a level playing field in the electricity sector and a more socially and environmentally sustainable energy transition.]]> <![CDATA[How a pioneering Slovak town is modernising its district heating system]]> Tue, 17 Mar 2026 14:52:29 +0100 Magda Wiejak 155595 2026-05-20 13:30:19 2026-03-17 14:52:29 How Slovakia’s coal phase-out changed the game  Partizánske is a mid-sized town in western Slovakia, located along the Nitra River in the Upper Nitra region. It was founded in the 1930s as an industrial town connected to the nearby Nováky coal power plant. Home to roughly 20,000 residents, the town has its own municipally owned district heating system, which today is powered by 66% fossil gas and 34% biomass.  In December 2018, the Slovak government announced that coal would be phased out by 2023 at the latest, giving the Nováky plant a five-year countdown until shutdown. This meant that all municipalities connected to the plant needed to find a new heating source. However, unlike some neighbouring towns, Partizánske was no longer directly dependent on domestic brown coal for its district heating.  Yet the national coal phase-out changed the outlook for the entire region. With coal leaving the energy mix, district heating systems across the region would have to reinvent themselves. By December 2023, all of the municipalities had successfully developed plans for replacement systems for all of the affected households across the region.   However, the reinvention couldn't stop simply at transitioning to gas. With the EU's target of complete decarbonisation by 2050, the transformation of these systems had to go further. This meant municipalities had to start planning how to modernise their district heating systems using sustainable, renewable and modern technologies.  

Planning for the future 

Partizánske started by working with the Slovak non-governmental organisation Friends of the Earth–Centre for Environmental Public Advocacy (Friends of the Earth–CEPA). It developed an in-house pre-feasibility study, outlining a structured plan for transforming the town’s district heating system. The study mapped: 
  • heat consumption across individual buildings and zones;
  • the technical condition of boiler rooms;
  • equipment efficiency and emissions; 
  • operating costs;  
  • precise pipeline routing;
  • collisions with underground utilities; and
  • terrain constraints; 
Three core ideas emerged: interconnecting of the two currently separate heating systems, utilising geothermal resources and, in the long term, recovering waste heat from the town’s wastewater treatment plant. The next step was to consult external experts to assess the viability of these conclusions.  In February 2023, Partizánske reached out to the European Investment Bank (EIB). The EIB’s advisory services typically focus on larger infrastructure projects in major cities. Yet the 2022 launch of the Technical Assistance for Regions Undergoing a Green Energy Transition (TARGET) programme by the EIB and the European Commission opened the door for regions like the Upper Nitra region that have been historically dependent on fossil fuels like coal, peat, and oil shale.  As the municipality increasingly demonstrated readiness, clarity and technical preparation, interest grew. Eventually, a formal technical assistance agreement was signed in August 2024 under the Energy Efficiency and Energy Advisory Division of the EIB’s Energy Department. By September 2024, the terms of reference had been approved, with external experts procured up until March 2025. A kick-off meeting followed in April 2025, and the final feasibility study was published in February 2026.   The technical assistance confirmed the conclusions of the earlier Friends of the Earth–CEPA study: the need to interconnect the existing heating systems, and the potential to use geothermal energy and recover heat from wastewater. This endorsement will help the municipality apply for funding, as it gives investors and partners confidence in the viability of the planned project, which the EIB estimates at around EUR 6.1 million.

Next steps 

With this feasibility study now complete, Partizánske is moving forward by preparing a technological concept. This will define specific technologies, required capacities and preliminary cost estimates, helping the municipality to secure building permits and negotiate financing, including an application to the Slovak Environmental Fund’s district heating modernisation financing schemes from the EU’s Modernisation Fund.   Other immediate major structural decisions have already been agreed. The current four-pipe system will be replaced with a two-pipe system, simplifying infrastructure and improving efficiency. Boiler rooms in critical or emergency condition will be prioritised and integrated first.  Additionally, Partizánske is now preparing a communications strategy aimed at residents, with the goal of building long-term public support through clear, accessible information – a particularly important step as municipal elections approach.   This pathway shows that even small municipalities can use EUservices such as the TARGET programme. Thanks to thorough preparation and municipal readiness, Partizánske is set to become a first mover in Slovakia in decarbonising its district heating system. This approach has potential for replication across Europe, where additional EU support programmes are available through the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO), the Joint Assistance to Support Projects in European Regions (JASPERS) programme, Horizon Europe, and networks like the EU Covenant of Mayors.  [/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row]]]> <![CDATA[Can the EU’s Social Climate Fund reach vulnerable households in Estonia?]]> Thu, 05 Mar 2026 15:17:54 +0100 Dora Crnčević 155561 2026-03-05 15:20:50 2026-03-05 15:17:54 Like other EU Member States, Estonia has submitted its social climate plan to the European Commission. The plan, which has recently undergone changes based on the Commission’s recommendations, is expected to focus primarily on building renovation and energy efficiency measures, while also addressing the broader complexities of energy and transport poverty.   The Estonian Green Movement is currently working closely with national decision makers to answer a fundamental question: How can the Social Climate Fund – one of the EU’s first major instruments linking climate policy with social justice – best reach vulnerable households?  To find an answer, we hosted a round-table discussion on 13 January 2026 in Tartu. The event brought together regional and national representatives to identify and evaluate successful solutions and innovative measures adopted in countries across central and eastern Europe.   Regions left behind  While Estonia has made major strides in the renovation of multi-apartment buildings in recent years, the benefits have not been distributed equally. A clear gap remains in regions with high levels of energy poverty, such as in Ida-Virumaa – Estonia’s just transition region – as well as in the south-east of the country.  Our recent round-table event focused on these weaker regions, identifying two key bottlenecks: first, regional authorities urgently require greater technical assistance and knowledge; second, the current ‘first-come-first-served’ approach to funding often leaves regional authorities with less administrative capacity behind. Participants also agreed that future measures must be intentionally designed to target vulnerable households.   In these regions, the high proportion of older people are typically reluctant to invest in large-scale building renovations. Additionally, many of the regions’ five-storey multi-apartment buildings contain as few as 10 households, making the individual financial outlay required to renovate a property prohibitively high, which also discourages residents from the idea of renovating in the future. However, regional officials noted that the existence of a renovated roof is often a sign that an apartment association is cooperative and potentially open to a deep renovation.  While Estonian cities offer examples of neighbourhood-based initiatives successfully tackling building renovations – notably the SOFTAcademy project in Tallinn – regional authorities indicate that these urban models are difficult to replicate in rural areas.   Finally, the language barrier must also be taken into account. According to 2021 statistics, 73% of the population in Ida-Virumaa are native Russian speakers. All of the regional authorities agreed that information must be accessible in Russian to be effective. Success in these areas also depends on informal engagement and sharing information among the local community. Establishing a ‘friendly connection’ at the regional level is not only possible but essential for building trust.   A fairer way to fund renovations  Researchers at the Centre of Applied Social Sciences at the University of Tartu recently released the results of a new data-driven model aimed at improving how renovation subsidies for apartment buildings are allocated in Estonia. Already tested in Tallinn’s Annelinn and Karlova neighbourhoods, the model seeks to direct financial support towards households experiencing the highest rates of energy poverty.  According to the model’s creator, Mariia Chebotareva, Estonia’s existing renovation support scheme focuses solely on the technical parameters of buildings and fails to reflect the socio-economic status or financial capacity of households. The new model seeks to address this gap by combining socio-economic data with building-level technical parameters. Using specific datasets, the model generates a ranking of apartment buildings based not only on their energy efficiency, but also on the risk of energy poverty among households.   This innovative model is a first for Estonia. If implemented, it would replace the existing performance-based approach – aptly described in the Estonian language as a ‘race of nimble fingers’ – with a more socially just system. Though the researchers note that accessing and integrating the data required will be a challenge, simplifying the system for regional authorities could help them better identify and support those most at risk.  Making EU money work  Ensuring that EU funds deliver equitable benefits to the regions and people of Estonia is crucial. The model introduced by the Centre of Applied Social Sciences has the potential to become a ‘best practice’ in Estonia and inspire similar models across central and eastern Europe. At the Estonian Green Movement, we’re committed to making sure that EU policy translates into real benefits at the local level – and that those who need the most support are not overlooked. As the cost of living in Estonia continues to rise, the design and implementation of future measures is now more important than ever. ]]>