Ruairi O'Connell

The power of symbols

2008-07-04T16:29:35+01:00

From the Embassy window, I can see a pair of eagles circling above Pristina; I've seen many in the Kosovo countryside, but I think it is rare to see them in an urban environment.

Eagles are revered across the Balkans (and more widely in Central and Eastern Europe). They feature on both the Albanian and Serbia (state) flag, in double-headed form. This set me thinking about the power of symbols in this part of the world.

There is a much-quoted story from the war in Croatia where a ceasefire was called between Croatian forces and Croatian Serb militia. The details of a local truce had been agreed, but the whole ceasefire collapsed over the issue of which flag - Serbian or Croatian - should fly over the local train station.

I can't vouch for the accuracy of the story, but it illustrates the importance given to symbols in this part of the world. Flags are everywhere in Kosovo; people fly them at weddings, when building houses, and on celebrations. And flags cause arguments, too: last week, a man was arrested after allegedly breaking into a Mosque and hanging a Serbian flag from the roof (and then, apparently, shooting at Kosovo police officers).

This was why so much effort was placed into the design of the new Kosovo flag, designed to represent ideals shared by all Kosovo's communities (its colours - blue, yellow and white - represent the European identity of Kosovo), and to alienate none. It is a commendable design, for this reason. But it will be a long time before we see Kosovo Serbs flying the flag. This is not the flag's fault. It's pretty obvious to say, but symbols represent people and views. So when the people are divided, the use of symbols will reflect that. Even the eagle symbol fails to unify; the Albanian eagle is black, the Serbian white. But the flag does represent a noble intention; to create new symbols that can represent everyone. And it is that intention - rather than the symbols themselves - that may mean that, in the future, everyone in Kosovo feels represented by shared symbols.

The Dog that Didn't Bark

2008-07-01T16:50:57+01:00

A weekend trip to the Albanian coast - nine hours, but worth it to find a beautiful, and genuinely unspoiled, beach at the end.

A chance piece of graffiti, however, set me thinking. By the main road in Fier, a town in Southern Albania, someone had written a slogan, roughly translated as 'Long Live Ethnic Albania!'

It occurred to me that 'Greater Albania' was the dog that didn't - and still doesn't - bark. The graffiti was striking because, living in Kosovo, I had never seen the slogan before. Whilst it is possible to meet people who long for a union with Albania, they are a tiny minority in Kosovo (and, I suspect, in Albania too). The graffiti was notable for its rarity.

What are not rare, however, are the Albanian flags which are still common throughout Kosovo (especially during wedding season, when they are waved from cars in the bridal procession). The Kosovo Albanian community still maintains a strong sense of being 'Albanian' - much as Kosovo's Serbs, Roma, Turks, Bosniaks seem themselves as Serbian, Roma, Turkish and Bosniak, in the 'ethnic' sense of the word. It is interesting, however, that for Kosovo Albanians especially, the strong sense of ethnic identity has not translated into a movement for political unification.

There are various reasons for this. The Albanian language spoken in Kosovo is different from that spoken in much of Albania (but all Albanian speakers would claim to speak a common language). Moreover, the experience of the Albanian communities in Albania and Kosovo has diverged greatly since the First World War, most obviously with the Kosovo Albanians' experience under Milosevic. The experience of autonomy in Socialist Yugoslavia (and its withdrawal under Milosevic) cast the political question in very Kosovo-centric terms, as well as creating a "Kosovar" identity (albeit a fluid one which overlaps with other layers). In similar terms, the Kosovo Serb experience under Yugoslavia, forming much of the administrative and military elite for the whole country, mitigated against the formation of a separate Kosovo Serb identity, and towards identification with Serbia (of which Kosovo was a province).

Of course, identity, by its nature, is fluid, and often defies exact definition (and for this reason, I hope to see lots of comments on the blog - and expect most of them to disagree vehemently with me!) But in any case, there has been very limited political activism (in my experience) for a 'Greater Albania'. Of all the provisions in the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal , the prohibition on union with other countries was the easiest to sell to the Kosovo Albanians.

Lunch with the Kosovo Minister of Education

2008-06-26T16:33:26+01:00

Lunch yesterday with Enver Hoxhaj, the Kosovo Minister of Education.

He has a significant challenge in front of him. Most socialist societies in transition benefit from having had a decent (and often excellent) educational system. Not so Kosovo. Following years of neglect since the second World War, under Milosevic, the K-Albanians were forcibly thrown out of the education system (the Milosevic-era Rector of Pristina University even suggested that Albanians should not 'even be given a pencil', lest they learn to become terrorists; he was later appointed Rector of the Mitrovica University by the Kostunica Government). For nearly ten years, K-Albanians had no access to the education system. Instead, they were taught in private homes which served as informal schools and universities, supported by voluntary funding from the diaspora. Throughout this period, teachers - and pupils - were subject to constant harassment and intimidation (and worse) from the police.

On top of this, schools were caught up in the systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Whilst schools in major towns were left intact (as the Serbian authorities would use them for the Serbian community), those in the villages were destroyed (along with houses and other buildings); in one part of Kosovo, 60% of schools are still accommodated in portakabins, which are hardly suitable for winters that can reach -20C.

After the war UNMIK and the creation of the Kosovo Ministry for Education, tried to redress the wrongs of the past. Importantly, the right to education in one's own language was guaranteed early on in Kosovo law (and further guaranteed by the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal ).

In 2005, we were approached by the municipality of Novo Brdo/Novobërdë to help support the construction of a school in the municipality. Their concept was to (re)create a multiethnic school; separate classes would be organised in both Serbian and Albanian, but practical classes and sports would be organised together. This was an initiative of the K-Serb mayor, and seemed a great way to use education to bring the communities together. We rapidly agreed.

However, whilst the school is now built, and due to open in September, we fell foul of attempts to use education as a weapon of ethnic separation. The Serbian government from 2005 started to put pressure on K-Serbian teachers to withdraw from receiving Kosovo salaries, and work exclusively for the 'Serbian' parallel authorities; pupils were to be taught in 'Serbian' schools with no contact with other communities. Our hopes to have this school used by both Serbs and Albanians fell foul of this; the K-Serb pupils, rather than using a school in their own village, are still forced to travel for miles to their own separate school. Even the K-Serb mayor and officials couldn't shield their community from this pressure. It is still depressing to see such policies in action, leading the K-Serbian community into a dead end.

To end on a positive note, I met representatives from Hope and Aid Direct , a UK charity bringing aid to vulnerable communities in Kosovo. Having seen the awful situation, they developed a 'school in a box project' to bring basic supplies to Kosovo schools (a lucky rural school will have windows and heating; many don't have enough desks or chairs, and are forced to re-use paper until there is no space left) [just moved this to the end of the sentence]. They rely on donations from the public in the UK, and from businesses generously donating surpluses. He was here, in part, to discuss ways of reaching those most at need in all ethnic communities (their slogan is "we bring aid, not sides"); so having seen one education project fall foul of attempts to use education to divide people, it was heartening to talk to someone trying to use education to help all of Kosovo's communities; regardless of ethnicity, they all need rapid investment in education.

Rule of Law in Kosovo - and why it matters to us

2008-06-26T10:09:42+01:00

I chaired a meeting on 24 June drawing together 'Rule of Law' experts from across the British Government to talk about support to the Rule of Law in Kosovo.

In an impoverished, post conflict part of Europe, it is clear that establishing a functioning rule of law is a top priority - and a major challenge.

But it is in our interests to deal with it - for two compelling reasons. Firstly, a functioning rule of law is the foundation for long term conflict resolution - and the prevention of its recurrence. The solutions to the 'drivers of conflict' in Kosovo - those issues that set people against each other - all have a basis in the rule of law. Resolving the fate of the many people still missing from Kosovo needs forensic medical structures. Helping refugees to return home needs functioning courts that can guarantee their property rights. Reconciling a divided society needs a criminal justice system that can give redress to victims.

Secondly, poor states with weak justice and police systems are easy prey for organised criminals; the kind of organised criminals that do damage across Europe, including in the UK. By working with the Kosovo government, and the EU's Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, EULEX, to improve Kosovo's abilities to fight organised and serious crime, we are tackling these problems at source.

I've written before about Kosovo's image abroad. Kosovo is known for having a serious problem with organised crime. However, even this can have a lighter side. After a large robbery in the UK, a local police service in England released details of a reward for information. We were contacted by a man who claimed to have information about the perpertrators and their addresses. We were excited; this was a large case, and it would be good to show that international co-operation could bring immediate results. I arranged for him to be interviewed by a British police officer serving in the UN, and I translated. As he arrived, the man introduced himself, and then said that "Jhon Smith" (sic) from "Djibt in Scotland" was responsible. How did he find this out, I asked? From my 'professional system' - he was a 'mjek popullor' - a witch doctor - and had used a ouija board. We just about managed to end the interview before collapsing into fits of laughter. That day's lesson - yes, there's a problem in Kosovo, but don't over-estimate it and end up chasing shadows.

For every one of these lighter moments, the Embassy assists on a large number of serious criminal investigations, by helping co-operation between Kosovo and UK law enforcement officers. But the most important contribution from the UK to the fight against crime in Kosovo are the numerous men and women who have served with the UNMIK police, and who will serve with EULEX. Their role has been vital in supporting a brand new police force - and the Kosovars appreciate this greatly. Although their work is not always visible in the UK, it has been vital in keeping the UK safe.

Blog: EURO 2008

2008-06-19T16:23:03+01:00

Watching Sweden vs Russia last night on a big screen in central Pristina (provided by the Swiss Government - and winning them a high profile and lots of friends in football-mad Kosovo!) made me realise how much EURO 2008 says about Kosovo.

Firstly, the positive image of Europe. Kosovo's citizens (of all ethnicities) share the aspiration to join (eventually) the European Union. But they bristle, understandably, at the suggestion (made usually by foreigners) that they might, one day, 'join Europe'. They counter that, whilst they want to join the EU, they are already part of Europe - geographically, culturally, and emotionally. This is a source of considerably pride, perhaps not obvious to those of us whose European identity is not under question. And this positive image of Europe expresses itself in the least expected places. One TV commentator here insists in calling spectular goals "Eurogoals" (as in 'what a Eurogoal from Christiano Ronaldo). The popular Balkan chocolate spread is called 'Eurokrem' too; so the prefex 'euro' carries a mark of quality and luxury.

Secondly, it's easy to see how qualifying for major sporting events (like EURO 2008) is a source of national pride. But for Kosovo, denied the chance to participate in sporting events since Milosevic came to power, international sporting competition is all the more important. I spoke last month to the head of the Kosovo Olympic Committee, who is trying (without much success so far) to get Kosovo athletes to the Beijing Olympics (I understand Kosovo has some credible boxers and weightlifters); they will redouble their efforts to make it to London in 2012. So Kosovo football fans have mixed feelings watching EURO 2008; they enjoy the spectacle, but wish they had at least a chance to qualify.

Thirdly, football tournaments in general illustrate the relationship of the Kosovo diaspora (about whom I have previously written) with their host country. The diaspora has been a bedrock of support for Kosovo's Albanian community since the early 1990s - both financially and politically. So it is intriguing to see the strength of support for the 'host' countries' teams - especially Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Sweden, who have large Kosovo Albanian diaspora, but also England (although sadly not this time). This stretches from people who now hold the citizenship of the host state, to those who spent a few years or months there (and even who may have been returned unwillingly to Kosovo). I am still struck by how quickly the K-Albanians adopt the identity of the host state, and the strength of gratitude towards it - and how they see no contradiction in remaining proudly Albanian.

Finally, the fans at the big screen show how Kosovo is still a very political place; whether a team gets supported seems to depend on whether or not the country has recognised Kosovo. A reminder, lest we forget the importance of independence.

Constitution Day

2008-06-18T12:36:08+01:00

15 June was Kosovo's Constitution Day - the day that the Kosovo constitution, passed in March, entered into force.

The Kosovo government organised a ceremony with the first public performance of the new Kosovo National Anthem. The Anthem was written, purposefully, without words. Called 'Europe', it reflects an aspiration that all Kosovo's ethnic groups can agree to - the desire to be seen, once again, as an integral part of European society. And without words, it avoids the potential controversies involved in finding words that everyone could feel proud of.

More concretely, the constitution provides a good basis for the two challenges - and goals - ahead of Kosovo now: the implementation of UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari's Comprehensive Settlement Proposal , and preparation for integration into international structures, most importantly, the EU. To show how the constitution speeds this process forward, President Sejdiu signed 41 'Ahtisaari' laws on the day, a role that, until now, has been fulfilled by the head of UNMIK.

However, other than an official concert, there were no public celebrations; nor were there protests from the Kosovo Serbs who, seeing the constitution as a symbol of independence, have rejected the move. This lack of public fanfare adds to the business-like feeling of the day; rightly, this was seen as helping Kosovo's people to govern Kosovo themselves - an important, but practical, step.

Roma Mahalla in Mitrovica

2008-06-16T10:07:26+01:00

Back in Mitrovica, in Northern Kosovo, twice this week. Much of the visits were spent talking about efforts to rebuild the part of Mitrovica known as Roma Mahalla*.

In 1999, following the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops, and as NATO was deploying, the Roma Mahalla in Mitrovica was burnt down in a terrible revenge attack. The Mahalla had been home to around 8,000 Roma, and was probably the largest Roma settlement in Europe. The inhabitants of the Mahalla fled. Some ended up in Serbia and elsewhere throughout Europe, but many ended up in makeshift camps in Northern Kosovo. This was meant to be a temporary solution; nine years later, many are still stuck there.

To make this worse, many of the temporary camps were established on old industrial sites - these were contaminated by heavy metals, mostly lead. Over the years, the Roma became exposed to heavy metal poisoning. The children were especially affected. In 2005, following WHO intervention , many of the families were evacuated to a cleaner area; some, however, refused to move fearing they would be moved from pillar to post, and thinking that, if they left, they would lose their leverage to find a permanent solution. Many families remain in these camps - and it now emerges that the 'safer' camps may themselves be subject to lead contamination.

It's clear that the Roma must be given a long-term solution that gives them a secure home, access to services, and a chance at prosperity. From 2005, the Mitrovica municipal government began work with the UN in Kosovo to rebuild the Roma Mahalla , and put in place opportunities (education, employment, access to services) that the Roma have rarely - if ever - enjoyed in the past. In the lead in calling for aid, perhaps for the first time, is the Roma community itself, now organising politically.

*Mahalla is the Turkish word for neighbourhood, in common usage thanks to Kosovo's Ottoman past.

Serbian Elections in Kosovo

2008-05-12T15:44:39+01:00

On 11 May, Serbia held Parliamentary and municipal elections

Despite clear warnings from the United Nations, Serbia also chose to organise local elections in Kosovo, in open defiance of UNSCR 1244, and in violation of the UN's mandate in Kosovo. The UN have said that they will not recognise the results of the municipal elections, which will have no legal validity in Kosovo - the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Joachim Ruecker said "Their outcome will not be recognized". So the holding of the elections seems to be leading Kosovo Serbs down a dead-end.

Seen from here, Serbia's decision to organise local elections is not designed to help the Kosovo Serbs - it is meant to keep them under Belgrade's control and part of a campaign to drive a wedge between Kosovo's Serbian and Albanian communities. I have written previously about Serbia's support for 'parallel structures' in Kosovo. The Ahtisaari plan - and Kosovo law - enshrine strong protections for Kosovo's minority communities; it just needs Kosovo Serbs to make use of these opportunities. Kosovo Serbs would be best served by efforts that help them to integrate into Kosovo's life, and Kosovo's economy. The Ahtisaari plan, and the benefits it offers, would also give them a high degree of control over their own lives; perhaps this is why the Serbian government doesn't want them to use these opportunities (I have heard Serbian government appointees in Northern Kosovo say that even reading the Ahtisaari plan is a traitorous act).

So, Kosovo Serbs will turned out to vote for municipal bodies that won't be able to improve their lives - but which do make it harder to integrate into Kosovo society. Not so much a missed opportunity, as a step in the wrong direction.

Europe Day

2008-05-12T10:58:57+01:00

9 May is Europe Day, marking the Schumann Declaration on 9 May 1950 which set the foundations for the European Union.

In Kosovo, the first post-Independence Europe Day has special significance. I have written previously about Kosovo's desire to enjoy all the opportunities that were denied to her until now. People feel that they have been watching a party from the sidelines; they have watched many of their neighbours pass through transition and join the European Union, and they are impatient to join them in this process.

I've also noted the realism here about Independence. People know that it is the start - not the end - of a journey. We used to talk, rather coyly, about Kosovo's 'final status', rather than independence. But this is misleading. There is no 'end state' for economic and democratic progress; there is always room for further development. The Kosovo Government's slogan for Europe Day says it all "And Now - The European Union".

Kosovo is, in this respect, very lucky to be in Europe. States risk losing political cohesion following independence. But Kosovo has ahead of it a long-term, all-emcompassing political vision, around which there is political and social consensus. And there needs to be. EU integration is a long and difficult process - and well it should be. It's not like joining any other international organisation. It is not simply a treaty commitment. Rather, for countries in transition, it is a top-to-bottom reworking of the state, to meet the standards and practices of the European Union (known as the 'acquis communautaire'. For the Western Balkans, accession is the last step in the 'Stabilisation and Association Process', guiding the states from conflict to accession.

Somewhat strangely, the 'Self-Determination' Movement (known by its Albanian name - Vetevendosja) chose to hold its latest protest on 9 May. One would have thought that their main demand - Kosovo's independence - was met on 17 February, when Kosovo declared independence. Instead, Vetevendojsa changed tack, claiming that Kosovo wasn't 'really' independent. Instead, they chose Europe Day to protest mainly about the Serbian elections (see below), but also to directed their anger at the Kosovo Government and UNMIK. They threw rubbish at the government and UNMIK, and sprayed sewage at the buildings, and at the Kosovo flag. I think people will judge for themselves what resorting to these tactics says about the strength of Vetevendosje's arguments.

In fact, the EU integration process is worth the effort. Not only does EU membership bring obvious benefits (including full access to the a huge potential market - something vital if the Western Balkans, or indeed any individual member state, is to attract foreign investment), but the reform process itself brings benefits across a range of areas (good government, anti-corruption are two obvious ones in this part of the world), and each step in the process is a reaffirmation of progress.

The Kosovo Question

2008-05-09T14:22:37+01:00

No - not 'that' Kosovo question; that one was answered on 17 February

There is another question that anyone who has spent time in Kosovo will have heard. I was at a modern dance workshop last weekend (I wasn't doing the dancing...) when I heard it again. The workshop was held by two US 'cultural envoys' , two modern dance instructors working with various dance groups in Kosovo, including the National Ballet. At the end of the session, one of the audience asked the envoys what I call the Kosovo Question - "how do our (in this case) dancers compare internationally?"

This gives a real insight into Kosovo. Kosovo's population under Milosevic (and commonly throughout the twentieth century) was surpressed, isolated, and often struggling to make ends meet from day-to-day. The first casualty of this was Kosovo's cultural life - be it the arts, media or sport. As Kosovo begins to make use of the new opportunities since 1999, people here naturally want to know how they compare. This stems in part from the natural pride of a brand new country, in part in reflection of a desire to learn and develop. But it also betrays a certain need for affirmation, and confirmation that Kosovo is on the right path. Again, after such isolation, this is understandable.

And, for the record, the US visitors were impressed by the technical skills of the Kosovo Ballet.

Trip to Gjakova/Djakovica

2008-05-08T11:01:56+01:00

A day trip to the South-West Kosovo town of " Gjakova " in Albanian; "Djakovica " in Serbian on Saturday. Gjakova , historically a centre of Albanian intellectuallism , and later Albanian nationalism (dating from Ottoman times), suffered heavily in the war. During the fighting in 1999, Yugoslav forces drove out the population of the city; many hundreds of people are still missing. Having driven out the population, the Yugoslav forces then proceeded to burn down or blow up the historic centre of the city.

After KFOR entered Kosovo in June, most of Gjakova's population returned - and set about rebuilding the destroyed town. Today, most of it is rebuilt, offering a glimpse of Kosovo's Ottoman past.

But, alongside the return and reconstruction, there was also further destruction; the Serbian Church in the centre of town was destroyed in a revenge attack. The church, a modern build, has not been a priority for restoration work, and the site remains empty. With no Serbian community in Gjakova to rebuild it for (even before the war, very few Serbs lived in Gjakova - mostly connected to the state structures) , it's not clear when, if ever, the Church will be rebuilt.

This leads me to consider some of the questions people have put on the blog. To answer some of your questions, as I noted before, Mosques and Churches were targetted by using culture as a weapon in the conflict. The war in Kosovo wasn't related to religion; Islam does not play a central role in Kosovo Albanian identity. Neither were Mosques used to store weapons; they were targetted as symbols of the Albanian community.

It also leads me to a final thought; the Kosovo that existed before the war will only be fully restored once the Kosovo Serbs come back to rebuild - and they themselves choose to get involved.

Earth Day

2008-05-02T16:00:14+01:00

On 22 April, I took part in a Kosovo Government event to mark 'Earth Day'. My chief contribution was, with other diplomatic colleagues, to plant a new tree in one of Pristina's parks (see photo).

Earth Day, a celebration conceived by US Senator Gaylord Nelson, offers a chance to reflect on the core concept in 'globalisation'; that we are all effected by actions elsewhere in the world. Specifically, Senator Nelson's idea was to raise awareness of the need to protect the environment; over thirty years later, and thanks in part to his efforts, there is increased understanding of the impact of human activity on the climate (see the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change website at http://www.ipcc.ch/).

Environmental issues have, understandably, not been very high on Kosovo's political or social agenda in the last twenty years; the conflict has dominated public discussion and private thought. Yet, with independence, Kosovo has had a cathartic moment; many issues, once starved of oxygen, are finding room for expression. Protection of the natural environment is one of those.

Kosovo approaches this issue from a specific perspective. In the UK, we are increasingly aware of the longer-term, global impact of human behaviour. For Kosovo, environmental issues are more immediate and tangible. A newly-independent, economically under-developed state, Kosovo will rely on agriculture and natural resources heavily in the coming years. These issues increasingly will be the focus of 'patriotic' politics here; in the words of one Kosovo politician, "why should we worry about negotiating a few hundred hectares with Macedonia, when our behaviour costs us tens of thousands of hectares in potential agricultural land annually". Earth Day also saw one of Kosovo's first environmental demonstration - by villagers living downwind from the (heavily-polluting) coal-fired power station.

So Kosovo comes to these issues from a heavy 'national interest' point-of-view. But this is welcome; indeed, our efforts to galvanise international action against climate change benefit if more countries begin to see environmental concerns as central to their natural interests.

The Kosovo Diaspora

2008-04-17T12:39:35+01:00

Away from Kosovo for ten days; a good time to think about the impact of the Kosovo diaspora.

During the 1990s, driven by political repression and economic hardship, large numbers of Kosovo Albanians left Kosovo -the Kosovo government estimate that 17% (of a population of 1.8-2.4m) live outside Kosovo. A large number of Kosovo Turks also left (mostly to Turkey), and Kosovo Serbs (mostly to Serbia, where there were better economic opportunities). At the same time, Milosevic settled large numbers of Serbs displaced from Croatia and Bosnia in Kosovo - many of whom left, along with other Kosovo Serbs, following the entry of NATO and UNMIK in 1999 (and also following revenge attacks immediately after the conflict).

Historically, diaspora communities, especially in the US and Western Europe, have exerted vast influence on conflicts. In many cases, the diaspora have provided funding. But otherwise, they provide a community in which activists can mobilise, and a way of energising Western opinion. However, as the conflict progresses, the diaspora can be a brake to progress; they often remain untouched by reconciliation initiatives, and remain relatively unaffected by the privations of conflict. Historically, there is some evidence that diaspora continue to fund conflicts, in part to maintain a link with their country of origin; what price the feeling of patriotism?

Kosovo is no different regarding the influence the Kosovo Albanian diaspora had on Kosovo. Much of a generation left Kosovo in search of work and educational opportunities from the early 1990s onwards. During the 1990s, diaspora funds (through a levy collected by the 'government-in-exile') supported the parallel education and healthcare systems for the Kosovo Albanians, after Serbia had excluded them from state structures. Through remittances, most Kosovo Albanian families received help from relatives in the diaspora (help that continues today and is vital for Kosovo's economy). It printed newspapers, and, along with the BBC world service, provided a source of information in Kosovo. It acted as a base for lobbying on Kosovo. As Milosevic stepped up his campaign in Kosovo, and the KLA emerged in the mid-1990s, the diaspora also provided funding - and recruits - for the new force.

The Kosovo Albanian diaspora still has a vital role to play. Importantly, the diaspora has, in the main, supported the compromises made by the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo as part of the final status process; this has been important in making them stick. The money has also kept on coming, but, perhaps, in lesser amounts than before. This is, however, a mixed blessing. The funds are vital to support many families, but they also distort the labour market. Kosovo has a relatively high 'reservation wage' (the notional wage necessary to attract new entrants into the labour market) compared to the region, which could potentially serve as an obstacle to economic development. The trick for Kosovo's government is to channel these payments away from support to everyday consumption and investment in Kosovo's future.

There is also a Kosovo Serb diaspora of sorts, consisting of those with links to Kosovo, and those displaced following the war. It is clear that the Kosovo institutions must do all that they can to show that, just as with Kosovo Albanians who left during the 1990s, Kosovo Serbs who left subsequently have a place in Kosovo's future. Not an easy task; but the alternative - separation and festering resentment - helps no-one.

The Remains of War

2008-04-15T10:20:26+01:00

Last week, I went to an event to mark the International Day for Landmine awareness and Assistance, held at a Kosovo Protection Corps (http://www.tmk-ks.org/new/english/fillimi/index.php) site just outside Pristina.

Following the conflict in the 1990s, the legacy of war still casts a long shadow over Kosovo. The event on Friday was a reminder how important it is to deal with this legacy - both physical and societal.

During the war, the Yugoslav armed forces used landmines extensively across Kosovo. Many, even most, of these minefields were not properly marked, vastly complicating their removal. On top of this, Kosovo still has traces of unexploded bombs in certain areas dating from the conflict; last week, a man was killed tampering with such a bomb. Together, these are known as unexploded ordnance (UXO)

Since 1999, 112 people have been killed in Kosovo by UXO, many of them children. However, from thousands of contaminated areas in 1999, there now remain only 60 areas to be cleared, with 73 to be checked. Much of this work was completed by the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams of the KPC, who have cleared over 700,000 square metres throughout Kosovo.

Under the guidance of UNMIK's KPC Co-ordinator (a British Major General), the KPC has built up an impressive EOD capacity, which was on show on Friday. This has meant that a national organisation, rather than an international NGO, has taken the lead in clearing Kosovo of the material legacy of war. They, as with all the other mine clearers and EOD teams in Kosovo and across the world, risk their lives daily to deal with this menace. I was struck most of all by the seemingly low-tech nature of much of the kit; the KPC use plastic funnels, like you would find in the kitchen, to mark and isolate pieces of UXO. It takes a certain kind of courage to do this for a living.

This UXO is as much part of the legacy of conflict as the small arms that still blight Kosovo. My piece on small arms attracted some comments. My understanding is that there is a tradition of holding arms across the Balkans, particularly in more remote areas. But also, as with other conflicts, the proliferation of small arms is a legacy of conflict, too. The problem will not be solved over night - the sheer scale shows that. And not everyone wants to give up their arms just yet. But the overall direction of travel is the right one.

The legacy of conflict is more than just physical - it is societal, psychological. And so the KPC contribution is significant beyond their concrete involvement with UXO-clearance. The KPC was formed following the demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army, after the conflict in 1999. A civil emergency organisation, it has worked on EOD, flood and fire response, as well as a range of humanitarian projects across Kosovo. However, its original provenance of ex-KLA members means that it has provided a clear way to reintegrate former fighters into society - and to get them contributing to reconciliation. I noted in a previous post the presence of a former KLA commander at an event against small arms. The point is that, after any conflict, it is vital to give former combatants a way to demobilise, and contribute to society - whatever one thinks about the group in question. Secondly, following last month's tragic explosion at Gerdec in Tirana (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7299187.stm), the KPC EOD teams were the largest international contribution to the clean-up operation. Just over a month after Kosovo's independence, this was a clear demonstration that Kosovo can contribute internationally. Conflicts world-wide share similar legacies; be they physical, social or psychological. Dealing with all these legacies is a vital foundation to preventing a resurgence of conflict.

Islam in Kosovo

2008-03-25T11:28:00+00:00

Easter Sunday tells us a lot about Islam in Kosovo.

During the Easter weekend, Kosovo's public broadcaster (RTK - http://www.rtklive.com/eng/index.php) transmitted a series of films about Easter, catering mainly, but not exclusively, to Kosovo's Catholic population (which consists of ethnic Albanians and Croats). Tellingly, Kosovo's Albanian Muslims also celebrated Easter, sometimes with their Catholic neighbours, but often on their own.

Islam arrived in Kosovo with the Ottoman empire. Beforehand, the Albanian population across the Balkans was mostly Christian, following either the Greek Orthodox Church or Roman Catholicism. The conversions to Islam were, in the main, voluntary. But they were also often 'economic', to get access to the exemption from tax granted to Muslims under the Ottomans. Hence Albanian Islam was famous historically for the practice of 'crypto-Christianity', where the head of the household converted to Islam, but women remained Christian, and children were raised (in varying degrees) in the Christian faith. This practice continued into the twentieth century - and has echoes even in the 1990s, when Kosovo Albanian Muslims, would, for example, visit the Decani Monastery (http://www.kosovo.net/main.html) on feast days. Colleagues who have served in other Muslim countries, including in the Middle East, tell me that this happens elsewhere too.

While Albanians were early, generally willing, converts, Islam never penetrated very deep into Albanian society. And unlike other Balkan Muslim communities, Islam played a very minor role in the creation of an Albanian national identity; instead, Albanian culture and language were the core around which Albanian identity was formed.

Earlier this month, Kosovo sent a delegation to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference Summit (http://www.oic-oci.org/oicnew/home.asp) headed by their Minister for Education, Enver Hoxhaj. Their aim was to use the opportunity to lobby a number of states to recognise Kosovo - many of whom have previously expressed solidarity with Kosovo. This has been and remains a difficult balancing act; seeking international recognition - but avoiding using Islam to define Kosovo.

Kosovo leaders play this balancing act elsewhere. A large number of mosques were destroyed by Yugoslav forces during the Kosovo war. I have written before about the corresponding destruction of churches after the war. Whereas the Kosovo government pledged to rebuild and repair all the damaged Churches - it made no such commitment for mosques (neither did the Serbian government); instead, those rebuilt were done so with private donations. For a few days, the decision to rebuild Churches but not mosques caused some minor controversy. But the feeling amongst most Kosovo Albanians, once people had reflected, was that it was right that they pay to repair the damage done by their co-nationals; some would also have felt uncomfortable with Kosovo paying for mosques from its budget. The draft Kosovo constitution (http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/DraftConstitutionEnglish.pdf - "The Republic of Kosovo is a secular state and neutral in matters of religious belief") is avowedly secular. Will Kosovo offer an example of a secular, European, majority-Muslim democracy?

A troubled day in Northern Kosovo

2008-03-20T11:48:00+00:00

A troubled day in Northern Kosovo.

On Friday 14 March, a mob, armed with metal bars, overran and destroyed the police points outside the court in North Mitrovica, and occupied the building. UNMIK made clear, early on, that such behaviour would not be tolerated, and the SRSG directed the police to restore law and order in Northern Mitrovica.

UNMIK attempted throughout the weekend to talk with those occupying the court to resolve the issue. By Monday, it was clear that these efforts would not bear fruit. UNMIK also had intelligence that K-Serb extremists were planning to attack another building in Mitrovica (either police or prison). So, in the early hours of 17 March, UNMIK Police, supported by KFOR forces, entered the court building and detained those still occupying the compound. They did not use force - they didn't need to (but they did, naturally, handcuff those they detained ). They made preparations to remove them for questioning elsewhere in Kosovo .

In response, an angry mob of Serbs formed by the courthouse. When UNMIK tried to move the second group of prisoners, they attacked the convoy, using vehciles to block its path, and set the prisoners free. They then turned their attention to KFOR and UNMIK at the courthouse, whom they attacked with rocks, firearms and grenades. Over 50 police and soldiers were injured, some seriously. 1 Ukrainian police officer, tragically, died of his injuries. KFOR and UNMIK were forced to defend themselves from the mob; Serbian media have reported 60 injured amongst the inhabitants of Mitrovica.

These are the facts of the matter as I understand them (see the UNMIK/KFOR press briefing [PDF] for more details, or the BBC report )

Serbia's 'Minister for Kosovo and Metohija'*, Slobodan Samardzic called the arrests 'unjustified', and accused UNMIK of violence.

But in a situation where a Serb mob overran and occupied the Court (which is run by UNMIK under UN Security Council Resolution 1244 - see unmikonline) and UNMIK exhausted every effort to persuade them to surrender with no success, the police would be justifed in taking action to resume control of the court - without harm to those inside.

And in a situation where the police came under sustained fire from an angry mob while carrying out its duties, the police, supported by KFOR, would be justified in responding with the minimum force necessary to retain control of the court building and protect their own personnel.

For two weeks, the court has been the focus of protests, and attempts at capture, by a group of former employees of the Serbian court system. This has prevented the court from carrying out its work for some time (the court covers all of Mitrovica region - not only for the Serb community). The protestors claim that they were expelled from their jobs in 1999, and only want them back. This is misleading. In 1999, the Serbian Court system (run by Serbs, for Serbs) was, along with other Yugoslav state structures, removed from Kosovo. In its place, UNMIK established a multiethnic judicial system, run for all Kosovo's communities. The protestors are not simply asking for their jobs back; they are asking us to turn the clock back to 1999, to an unacceptable situation where Kosovo Albanians were denied access to justice .

What we saw yesterday was an attack on law enforcement officers trying to carry ot their duty in ensuring justice for all in Kosovo, as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1244. To call this unjustified and to accuse UNMIK of violence seems to me like a return to the worst thinking of the past and echoes the kind of behaviour, and tactics, we saw in the Balkans in the 1990s.

*More name issues. During Kosovo's period of autonomy in Yugoslavia, it was known simply as Kosovo; when Milosevic came to power, he renamed the province to an earlier Serbian name - 'Kosovo and Metohija', Metohija being the Western part of Kosovo (known as Dukagjin by Albanians) home to many of the most historical Churches - from metokhe, Greek word meaning religious community. UNMIK, and the British government, simply use Kosovo.

Guns in Kosovo

2008-03-07T08:28:00+00:00

I spoke on Tuesday at the opening of new weapons storage and destruction facilities in Kosovo (see UNDP Kosovo)

This is part of the Kosovo Government's 'KOSSAC' (Kosovo Small Arms Control) project, funded by the UK, Sweden, The Netherlands and Belgium, and implemented with the UNDP's support (see UNDP Kosovo KOSSAC)

Kosovo, like many post-conflict societies, remains awash with small arms. After the war in 1999, many people simply buried their weapons in the ground in case they would be 'needed' again. This wasn't only armed groups like the Kosovo Liberation Army (which disbanded in 1999); it was civilians, of all ethnicities, who hold weapons for 'personal protection'.

The insecurities of the wars in the Balkans simply added to a deeper culture of carrying arms. My experience here causes me to doubt the axiom that 'guns don't kill, but people do'. I have heard of too many cases of family feuds (sometimes alcohol-fuelled) getting out of hand, and ending with someone shot (a colleague once saw, in a regional EU state, one man get up from a table in a cafe and shoot his friend dead, for having refused to allow the shooter to pay the bill). This isn't to say that life is considered cheap here - the opposite is true. It is rather to suggest that, even when there is no malicious intent or ongoing conflict, having small arms around tends to have devestating consequences.

The Kossac programme aims to give the Kosovo institutions the means to get rid of small arms. Despite some success in the past, with numerous amnesties since the conflict that have destroyed tens of thousands of guns (and 7000 from the current project alone), there still remains a large number of these weapons lying, for the most part, buried in people's gardens (UNDP suggest up to 400,000). Sadly, people hold on to them as an insurance policy, in case conflict returns. The converse is also true; if the government and people are beginning to destroy these weapons, it is a sign that they are more optimistic about the future. So the biggest surprise for me was, when delivering the speech, I saw one of the KLA's highest profile commanders (now a Kosovo MP) sitting, smiling, in the audience. Ex-KLA supporting destruction of small arms - surely a cause for optimism?

Water Troubles

2008-03-03T17:28:00+00:00

Access to water resources is meant to be the emerging 'driver of conflict' as we enter the 21st century. Climate change, population increases, and urbanisation mean increasing pressures on scarce water resources, making conflict more likely.

We are yet to see our first 'water war', thankfully. But in Kosovo, the government is keeping a close eye on the water issue - and the long term weather reports. Despite a brief - if quite fierce - downpour on Saturday, two dry winters caused a severe lack of water across Kosovo last summer, affecting domestic consumption, agriculture, and also industry (I hadn't realised quite how much cooling water Kosovo's two coal-powered power stations use). This winter has been even drier. This has left Kosovo's reservoirs at unprecedented, low levels - even before the summer begins.

Kosovo's position is noteworthy. A country the size, roughly, of Devon and Cornwall together, it sits astride three water tables, with rivers flowing to the Aegean, Adriatic and Black Seas. It is also home to the Nerodimka river (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nerodimka) once a unique example of river bifurcation in Europe. Landlocked, its major rivers either flowing from its neighbours (like the Ibar, from Serbia) or into them (like the Drin, to Albania), Kosovo will not be able to manage its water resources without reference to its neighbours.

Of course, Kosovo's neighbours, especially those also land-locked, will need to refer to Kosovo in managing their own resources.

Last summer, the Kosovo authorities took a series of emergency measures to conserve water (such as a hosepipe ban, reductions in shortages, drilling of new wells), but these are, by their nature, just stop-gap measures. Water provision is one of the first challenges that the newly-independent Kosovo faces; and its resolution will require strategic thought, tough (and unpopular, no doubt) decisions - and, as soon as possible, a regional approach.

Parallel Structures

2008-02-29T11:40:00+00:00

Reading through comments of the last few entries, I'm glad that this blog has inspired some debate; I hope to see more comments in due course. We have seen from the last few days that Kosovo's independence arouses significant feelings.

One of the issues that has come up is that of 'parallel structures' in Kosovo. Rory, for example, asks "Why was it okay and even laudable for ethnic Albanians to have their parallel structures under Milosevic and not for Serbs to have them now under an Albanian-ruled Kosovo?".

A potted history of 'parallelism' in Kosovo may put things in context. In 1989, Milosevic managed, through force of arms, to remove Kosovo's autonomy. This led the Kosovo Albanians to set up their own parallel political structures (President and Parliament) to organise themselves politically. However, the Serbian government did not stop with political measures. Kosovo Albanians were removed from their jobs in socially-owned enterprises (the Yugoslav version of nationalised industries) and the publicly-owned enterprises (like the electricity plan and railways). They were expelled from school by force. They were excluded from hospitals. Their pensions were withdrawn; their savings seized by the Serbian government. In response, and funded by a voluntary 'tax' on the diaspora and private businesses in Kosovo, the Kosovo 'government in exile' funded a parallel healthcare and education system, with many teachers and doctors working for free.

In 1999, with the entry of NATO, this situation changed. A great many of the Serbs working in the 'socially-owned' enterprises left or were expelled (in many cases by the original workers whose jobs they had occupied since 1989). As the Serbian administration left, those Serbs employed in government and courts lost their jobs. Many Serbs left, either forced out or leaving due to fear. Much of the public sector disappeared.

Forwarding a few years, by 2004, there were functioning political, administrative, social, healthcare and education systems in Kosovo. The Kosovo Assembly includes [can we say how many out of how many?] reserved seats for the non-Albanian communities; the Kosovo Government, by law, includes Ministers from non-Albanian communities (currently two Kosovo Serbs and a Kosovo Turk). The 'Standards for Kosovo' were designed to ensure that the civil service was broadly representative of Kosovo society (see UNMIK's assessment ) The success rate was mixed; although it was rare for an institution to meet the informal 16% target for 'non-Albanian' representation (the Kosovo Police Service exceeded 20%), most reached at least high double figures (in the lack of a census since 1981, the Statistical Office of Kosovo estimates that 92% of the population are Kosovo Albanian).

In Kosovo Serb areas, the Kosovo government funded schools and healthcare establishments (as elsewhere). However, the Serbian government augmented this funding with its own direct funding. The Ahtisaari package (see previous blog entries) foresees this, and even stipulates that it must be allowed to continue.

There has, however, been a tendancy to use this 'top-up' funding as a means of exercising control over the Kosovo Serbs. For instance, in 2006 the Serbian government forced the Kosovo Serbs to withdraw from the Kosovo institutions and refuse their salaries, or else they would be refused the Serbian salary. This prompted President Ahtisaari to include transparency provisions in his plan to ensure that the funding would not be a tool of political manipulation.

Serbia has also, however, maintained parallel judicial structures that claim jurisdiction over Kosovo; most recently, radical Kosovo Serb leaders announced an intention to hold elections for government bodies in Kosovo under Serbian law. This goes far beyond support for Kosovo Serbs; it is a direct challenge to the legal order of Kosovo.

Put simply, Kosovo Albanian 'parallelism' was the inevitable and understandable result of exclusion from the state institutions. But now, the Standards for Kosovo and the Ahtisaari plan are there to make sure that the Kosovo Serbs are included in Kosovo's institutions (and some have taken up that place). It's vital that those Serbs are not now forced to quit these institutions under pressure to create 'parallel structures'. Instead, a place must be kept for them - even if they don't take that place straight away.

Clash of Cultures?

2008-02-25T17:04:00+00:00

A friend's birthday on Friday provided a perfect counterpoint to a busy, and heavily political, week.

With typical creativity, he chose to celebrate it in the Pristina Hammam (a traditional bathhouse - some images on Agron Islami's website at http://www.pbase.com/agroni/kosova), to show support for efforts to protect and restore some of Kosovo's cultural treasures.

The Hammam was built whilst Kosovo was under Ottoman rule. SInce, then, it has fallen on hard times. Under the socialist Yugoslavia, historical heritage suffered at the hands of the modernisers (much of Pristina's old town was cleared to make way, so it seems, for a road junction, and a slightly tatty open space by the Kosovo municipal building) . The hammam now is little more than a shell. However, a project has begun to restore it to former glories, (see chwbkosovo) financed by the Pristina municipality and the Swedish government; good luck to them.

The protection of cultural heritage was a key part of the UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari's plan for Kosovo (see UNOSEK), because cultural heritage, and its protection, gives a real foundation to people's identity in this part of the world. It can be hard to understand from a British perspective. I understand it thus; the presence of churches, mosques, kulla (traditional Albanian fortified farmhouses, essentially) and hammams serves as physical proof that the communities who built these monuments and structures have historical roots and a living presence in Kosovo, in a region where both have, historically, been called into question.

Sadly, this can mean that culture becomes yet another area of political competition - and worse. For example, I talked on Friday to someone claiming that the Decani monastery ( see Decani monastery link), a UNESCO-listed Serbian Orthodox Monastery, was somehow equally Serb and Albanian and that the Serbs had made exclusive claims to it through historical revisionism. It's pretty uncontroversial to acknowledge that in past times Albanians would have visited the monastery, but I've yet to hear a convincing account of how the Albanians in the region built the Church, and I have little doubt that the Monstary was built by Serbian Kings

More worrying, however, are the attacks aimed at removing the physical evidence of the 'other' community's existence. Both Albanians and Serbs suffered; during the war, Albanian Kullas were targetted, as were Mosques across Kosovo, and the house in Prizren where the pan-Albanian autonomy movement met was blown up and bulldozed over by Serbian forces. Kosovo Albanians contrast this with their protection of Churches during the Ottoman times. There is evidence for this, but it rings pretty hollow following the events of March 2004 where Serbian Churches were deliberately targetted by extremists (leaving 35 damaged or destroyed).

From the contacts I have with both communities, it seems clear that, to the mainstream on both sides, this cycle is abhorent. But is is clear that, on the extremist fringes, there are groups who see cultural sites as fair game (and I don't think this is a question of religion - it is, instead, a battle of ethnic identities).

The challenge now is to break this cycle. The Kosovo government has to take the lead on this. The approach that they have taken so far makes sense; "these sites are part of everyone's heritage in Kosovo, and we should protect them". This, however, isn't so far from "these sites are ours, and we should protect them" - a line that, again, raises fears of cultural appropriation and assymilation, and has been used by, for example, the radical 'Self-Determination Movement' (or Vetevendosja in Albanian) to that end.

It will also take a degree of hard work and dedication (and not just positive rhetoric) to put in place the kind of protection foreseen in Ahtisaari when , historically, cultural sites have suffered not only from political competition, but also from simple neglect (as with the hammam). This offers a new way to deal with the problem, in a technical way (the British government has provided a grant to the Kosovo government to establish a system to monitor and protect cultural sites). Most importantly, the Kosovo government, who have funded the repair and reconstruction of the Churches damaged and destroyed in 2004 , need to keep on putting their money where their mouth is.

Independence Day: What was it like?

2008-02-21T19:26:00+00:00

The details are all over the news. Kosovo declared independence on 17 February. The UK, based on assurances given to us from the Kosovo government, recognised Kosovo on the 18 February, and, together with the US and some of our European partners, we established diplomatic relations.

Mark Mardell has an interesting account of the celebrations in Pristina. He makes one very insightful point; the celebrations in Pristina over the last few days (and I can still hear celebratory car horns in the background as I write) have had an extra intensity to those in Montenegro.

It's worth asking why. There is much comment in the media about how Independence will not be a panacea for Kosovo. Well, of course it won't be. Thing is - no Kosovar (or Kosovian, or Kosovan)* thinks it will be. They hope that independence will open up new opportunities, and perhaps encourage a few of the more pioneering investors to look into Kosovo. But the real reason they want independence is to leave behind the awful experience of the past. Even so, it was encouraging to hear the PM and President speak following the declaration. Both made a point of speaking in Serbian; both made efforts to show that, in the PM's words, 'the Kosovo government will stamp out discriminatory processes' ( it's good that they made this promise - the 'International Civilian Representative' will deploy to make sure they stick to them). The President said that Kosovo history could be divided into all that went before Independence, and Kosovo's new era. This has set the tone for the past few days; people want to get away from the cycle of violence so common in the Balkans.

The main celebrations stretched over two nights. The first - with the official concert, unveiling of the new flag (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_Kosovo) - and 80 tonnes of fireworks launched from the centre of the city (and causing one nervous diplomat - me - to obsess about public service broadcasts from my childhood about not launching fireworks in built up areas, even if the display was carried out by Croatian experts) went off pretty smoothly. But, to many Kosovo Albanians, it didn't feel 'real'. I sat with one young Kosovo MP at the concert. She kept on saying "I can't believe it". It seemed to me that people were celebrating, in part, to make it true. The most moving moment was when the audience stood, spontaneously, when the Kosovo philharmonic played Ode to Joy - the European anthem; a sign, for me, that people want to look forward, not back.

The second day was very different. The first countries to recognise Kosovo had made their announcements (see number ten website). So when the news broke, people flooded back onto the streets. This time, there was no government organisation, no firework display or concert. But, despite a second night of cold weather, people just wanted to be there. The town, again, was covered in flags - not just the Albanian flag, or the new Kosovo flag, but the flags of any number of European countries - Germany and Switzerland (the first country to declare in favour of independence in mid 2007) particularly prominent. There were also posters thanking Britain for our role - the role we played in 1999 has not been forgotten.

Worth noting one thing. Besides a handful of injuries from the inevitable celebratory gunfire that accompanies any celebrations in Europe east of a line from Vienna to Helsinki, there were no security incidents over either evening. The government had taken steps to make sure that nothing ruined the day - Kosovo was plastered with posters urging people to 'celebrate with dignity'.

We also spent the days on the phone with those Kosovo Serb villagers we had talked to as part of the outreach programme. They were nervous about what might happen; they were concerned that Kosovo Albanian 'euphoria' would spill over into violence, in a repeat of March 2004. I understand their fears. They had done nothing to provoke the violence in March 2004, yet had suffered deeply because of it, with 19 killed (Serbs and Albanians), and thousands more displaced. They feared that, again, they would be targetted through no fault of their own. But this time nothing happened. As a result, KFOR, the NATO-lead peacekeeping force, recorded zero population movement during the last few days. This is something to celebrate.

Sadly, we haven't got through the whole week without violence. Yesterday, mobs from the K-Serb inhabited Northern part of Kosovo over-ran and burnt down two customs posts on the border with Serbia. Thankfully, no-one was hurt, but it was a disgraceful act that only ended up hurting the Kosovo Serbs in Northern Kosovo, who rely on those crossing points to pass back and forth to Serbia.

These mobs exist on the fringes of Kosovo Serb society; they do not represent the vast majority of Kosovo Serbs, who, every time I speak to them, want to talk about jobs, education, and opportunities for their children before discussing anything political (although we do, of course, discuss their deeply-held political views). But Kosovo Serbs in central Kosovo are made more nervous by the actions of their counterparts in Northern Kosovo; they feel most vulnerable to potential violent counter-reactions, and to any resulting destabilisation.

But, for now, the events in the North are a sideshow. We will have a lot to do to build on the mostly positive start, but Kosovo is in pretty good shape in its first week.

* Names again: lots of debate about what to call someone from Kosovo. UN sometimes - but not always - says Kosovan. Kosovar is the term used by the Albanians - and thus rejected by the Serbs. Kosovian sounds too gothic and Kosovon like something from Dan Dare. I tend to use 'people of Kosovo', but that's hardly user friendly. Are there other ideas?)

Mitrovica

2008-02-15T18:49:00+00:00

A flying visit to Mitrovica, yesterday, allied to our 'outreach' efforts.

I've mentioned Mitrovica before. This Northern Kosovo city is a symbol of Kosovo's ethnic divisions. Put very simply, Mitrovica was Kosovo's most prosperous city, built on the mineral wealth in the nearby Trepca mining complex. The city had an identity - based on the mines and its successful football team - that transcended ethnicity. However, following the war, Mitrovica has been split in two. Essentially, ethnic Albanian extremists expelled Serbs from the southern part; Serb extremists expelled the Albanians from the North (except for two parts of the town - the 'Little Bosnia' area and three tower blocks beside the river Ibar/Ibri which divides the town). Nowadays, for the most part, Serbs keep to the North, Albanians to the South, many living in properties occupied by displaced people just a few hundred metres away across the river. In the North, leather-jacketed thugs make sure that no Albanians enter 'Serb' areas; few Serbs want or feel safe enough to cross South of the river.

The town has repeatedly been the scene of clashes following the war, most seriously in March 2004, which helped to trigger riots across Kosovo that left 19 dead (both Serbs and Albanians).

Unsurprisingly, there is a lot of media interest in the situation in the town; it's hard to take two steps down the main street without bumping into a camera crew. Community leaders on both sides of the river, however, have grown more savvy - they understand that whichever 'side' makes the first 'mistake' will lose the media fight. They are at pains to show that they have taken all measures to ensure that there is no violence or intimidation over the coming days. I think this message has got across - but people are still nervous about what could happen. In any event, it was clear to me from my visit yesterday that KFOR and the KPS are ready - and more importantly, determined - to deal with any problems (in response to Howard's comments earlier, I agree fully that the community itself must take action for dealing with its own thugs: the 'internationals' can support this process, but local ownership of, and responsibility for, justice is vital). Still, Mitrovica will remain under the international media glare in the coming days.

The Power of an individual

2008-02-14T17:55:00+00:00

I had lunch yesterday with Rame Manaj, one of Kosovo's Deputy Prime Ministers.

I have know Rame since 2005, when he was mayor of Klina* in central Kosovo. He had personally pushed through the first return of displaced Kosovo Serbs to an urban setting in Kosovo (rather than to a rural area); such returns have been historically more difficult to achieve, as the returnees are likely to be a very small minority in the area of return, do not have access to agricultural opportunities, and are returning, not to reconstructed or previously empty properties, but to properties whose temporary (and often illegal) occupants had recently been evicted. Klina itself had been the scene of some of the fiercest fighting in Kosovo, with possibly thousands killed or missing.

The return of the first families was something to be applauded in itself. What makes it remarkable is that 17 members of Rame's family, including his son, remain unaccounted for, after being removed by Yugoslav forces during the conflict. Rame was one of the first Kosovo mayors to stake his own reputation on ensuring that Kosovo Serbs could return safely to their homes, in one of the most tense parts of Kosovo.

The lunch was a reminder of the power of an individual, through his or her own actions, to have great influence for good. Rame's own example was a symbol of reconciliation; here was a man who clearly had suffered during the war, but it was he arguing for the return of Kosovo's Serbs, for reconciliation. His voice could not be ignored or dismissed. He told me "we'll never forget our history, but you can never move forwards by looking backwards".

Two and a half years since the first returns to Klina, there has been some progress. Of the missing persons, the fate of nearly one thousand more has been discovered; by August last year, 2,047 remain unaccounted for following the conflict, a fact that is still an open wound for the various communities in Kosovo (see http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/kosovo-news-290807?opendocument). The return of displaced people to Kosovo has not reached the pace that we hoped for (but a steady number continue to return - see http://www.kosovo.undp.org/?cid=2,104,64). But in both cases, someone has to be the first person who reports the site of a mass grave; someone has to be the first person to stand up and argue for the rights of displaced persons; someone has to be the first to return. These individuals should be applauded - without them, progress would be a lot harder.

* For those that read the past of my last blog entry on Kosovo place names, Klina is one of those places with the same name in Serbian and Albanian - depending on how you write the Albanian...

Outreach II

2008-02-12T13:36:00+00:00

I was down in the village of Babljak/Bablak*, south of Pristina, on Friday. An encouraging visit.

Bablak's history demonstrates an interesting problem in Kosovo. In 1999, the Albanian villagers were driven out, and many of their homes were destroyed. In 2004, many of the Serbian villagers in the Pristina had their houses burnt. In both cases, it was people from outside the village who caused the problems.

Relations in the village now are much the same as ever . The villagers talk to each other, get on, and have similar concerns, mostly about unemployment. The head of the municipal administration recently visited the village. The K-Serb villagers told me that the visit had been 'super'; they were happy to receive guarantees from him and the local police chief - but were now looking to the local politicians to fulfill their promises. But both Serbian and Albanian villagers are concerned that 'outsiders' will cause problems in their village. This is a lesson that we have learnt since 2004. In order to promote values of tolerance, and reconcile the communities, we need to focus less on the point of interaction between the communities (i.e. stop having multiethnic round tables) and deal more directly with each community.

This leads me to some of the points that Rory and Stefan have made - I look forward to hearing your thoughts.

The first is the idea that the Kosovo institutions discriminate against Kosovo Serbs, and that Kosovo Serbs cannot leave their villages 'without the danger of being shot'. Clearly, immediately after the conflict, when NATO entered, life was hard for the Kosovo Serbs. Many left - either by choice, through fear, or by force. There were revenge killings directed against the Kosovo Serbs who had chosen to stay. Progress was made; but the events of March 2004 were a big setback, when 19 people (Serbs and Albanians) were killed in riots across Kosovo.

However, the situation has improved since. Regarding K-Serb safety, it is true to say that many Kosovo Serbs feel insecure - the outreach programme is meant to help address this. But levels of inter-ethnic violence are low and decreasing. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Kosovo Serbs come to Pristina daily, mostly, but not exclusively, for work. People speak Serbian on the streets. People interact in the villages; I was at a point-to-point horse race south of Pristina last year, where Serbs took part alongside Albanians (I was the only foreigner there - the multi-ethnicity was spontaneous, not prompted by the international community). The story isn't the same across Kosovo; Serbs in North Mitrovica (the divided city in Northern Kosovo - see http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3650&l=1) do not feel safe to travel to South Mitrovica, and Albanians in the South (excluding those few tolerated in North Mitrovica) are prevented from crossing the river that divides the city by leather-jacketed thugs. But I can't agree that Serbs in Kosovo are in danger of being shot if they leave their homes; things have improved.

Equally, about the Kosovo government. I've frequently said in the past (including in the Kosovo media) that I'm not paid to lobby on behalf of the Kosovo government. They have got things wrong. But how one responds to problems is quite indicative. The riots of March 2004 were appalling. But the Kosovo government's reaction to it, I think, is interesting. Unprompted, they pledged to rebuild, from their own funds (the Kosovo budget even today is less than 1bn euro annually) every destroyed house and church. They have come through - although Church reconstruction is held up by disagreements in the committee designed to oversee the process, almost every house has been rebuilt.

The sense I got from my current and previous work in the Balkans is that it is almost impossible to talk about the Balkans without people seeing the issue in a zero sum way; if you want to help Albanians, then you must be 'against' the Serbs.

It is clear that the Serbs have suffered too since the start of the 1990s. My Serb friends often tell me that the Serbs were Milosevic's biggest victims. I don't buy this. But I would agree that no-one has done more harm to the Serbs - whether in Serbia or elsewhere - than Milosevic and the people who carried out his policies. In any case, I am clear about what our (UK, Europe, my) long-term goal is - it's to get the whole of the region ready for EU membership. The only way for this to work, is to shed the zero-sum mentality.

* All Kosovo's villages, towns and cities have at least two names - in Serbian and Albanian, and sometimes also in Turkish - similar to Londonderry/Derry in Northern Ireland. The UN convention is to list both in English, putting the name used by the majority population first. We follow this convention, but it can be a bit clunky, especially in speech ("I went to Ferizaj/Urosevac the other day"), so I often mix it up - use one name first, then the other. This works in Kosovo (where everyone knows the various names), but can be confusing for outsiders at first.

Police and Courts

2008-02-07T10:18:00+00:00

A friend told me (with some glee) a story today.

He was driving from Pristina to the city of Peja/Pec in Western Kosovo, when he was stopped by a Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officer.
The Officer asked:
"Is this your car sir? Only I notice that it is a private vehicle, but it has a government pass in the window"
"That's because I work for the government"
"What do you do, sir?"
"I'm an advisor to the Prime Minister"
"Congratulations. Anyway, you were speeding, so I'll have to give you a ticket".

Readers from the Balkans will see the relevance of the story. The idea that the police could, or would, issue tickets to senior political figures (and their entourages) is quite a novelty - and a big step forward. In fact, the Kosovo Police Service (or KPS - see <http://www.kosovopolice.com>) has been a success story in this regard. Created in September 1999, the KPS was created from scratch to be able, eight years later, to take on the primary responsibility for policing in Kosovo. A poll this week recorded a 79% satisfaction rate amongst the Kosovo population. A considerable achievement in such a short period of time.

However, this shouldn't disguise the challenges that remain. Whilst the public have faith in the KPS to carry out core policing tasks, maintaining public order and policing traffic fairly and effectively, they remain unconvinced about the police's ability to investigate more serious crime. And the KPS, whilst enjoying support from the other communities, is not much trusted by the Kosovo Serbs, mostly due to its perceived failings in investigating serious crimes (where actually the picture is mixed; little success in the aftermath of the 1999 conflict, but, for example, over 150 convictions following the March 2004 riots).

This contrasts with the poll results for the court system - just 18% trust. The latest European Commission report (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/kosovo_progress_reports_en.pdf) sets out the shortcomings well: "the system remains weak". I suspect that the international community finds it easier to support police development than the court system; it's easier to understand, and we've had more practice. Even so, it is vital to get the court system right; there is no point having a professional police force if the court system cannot provide 'downstream' support. A taxi driver (a great barometer for diplomats), on discovering I was a British diplomat, said, unprompted, that he looked forward to the EU Rule of law mission arriving in Kosovo (see <http://www.eupt-kosovo.eu>). He hoped that the EU would take what he called "harsh measures"; no national pride to damage, he hoped that the EU would be fearless in investigating crime - wherever the investigations lead. That's why, I told him, that the EU will deal not only with the police, but also with the court system. I think he approved.

Thanks to Rory and Stefan for their comments. I'm off to see some more Kosovo Serb villagers tomorrow. I'll try and answer your points next time.

History in Kosovo

2008-02-04T15:47:00+00:00

Any foreigner arriving in Kosovo has to brace him or herself for lessons in history. I have some trusted contacts with whom, in my first two months in Kosovo, I transacted no real business; to be able to work with me, they first needed to share their understanding of history with me - and that took some time. One often hears the claim that Kosovo has too much history for such a small place.

Certainly, the hand of history is heavy on Kosovo's shoulder. I was reminded of this by an article last week in a Kosovo newspaper (available in the Express archive at www.gazetaexpress.com - only in Albanian). This was a reprint of an article from the New York Times in 1912, following massacres perpetrated by the Serbian Army in Kosovo. As far as I can tell, there wasn't any particular reason to reprint the story. In any case, as I have seen in my time in Kosovo, these events from nearly a century ago are still live in the minds of Kosovo's Albanians.

For Kosovo Serbs, there are similar memories from the past; one example is the activities of the SS Skenderbeg Division (on wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/21st_Waffen_Mountain_Division_of_the_SS_Skanderbeg_%281st_Albanian%29>) at the end of the second world war.

From a British perspective, it is odd at first to see the impact that events in history still have today. We learn from, appreciate, acknowledge and respect our history, but we have managed to come to terms with what it does - and doesn't - still mean for us today. I feel this personally very immediately; I am proud of my Irish heritage, but see no contradiction in being proud to be a British diplomat. For me, the history of Anglo-Irish relations sets a context - but is not the sole definition of who I am, or what my place in the world is.

And here is the problem. We in Britain have been able to come to terms with our past - on an individual, and a society-wide level. This is, of course, an ongoing process. But in Kosovo, the opportunity has been repeatedly denied. After each conflict, the mantra has been 'don't mention the war'; indeed, Tito's Yugoslavia was built on a 'gentleman's agreement' that no-one would mention the past conflicts. Sadly, inevitably, this approach didn't work. Instead, we have merely levelled the ground (metaphorically) after each conflict, and built a new edifice over the ruins. The British Government commissioned a review of peacebuilding practice by CARE international and CDA (available at http://www.careks.org/content/eventsnews/CDA/Has%20Peacebuilding%20Made%20a%20Difference%20in%20Kosovo.pdf>) One of the mistakes of the international community following our intervention in 1999 was, again, our failure to deal with the past. Indeed, many reconciliation projects specifically prevented participants from talking about the past; the idea being that, if people talk about everyday issues, they will forget historical grievances. Of course, this doesn't work; people don't forget the injustices that they have suffered if they don't have the chance to discuss them.

Taken to its most basic level, the suffering of an orphaned child, a widow, or a father who has lost his children does not differ from community to community. But suffering on the scale seen in Kosovo transcends the individual. In Kosovo, both Serb and Albanian communities can point to historical crimes inflicted on their people. But, it was the scale of the suffering of the Kosovo Albanian community that lead us to act in 1999. I think it does an injustice to all Kosovo's communities to suggest that this was the 'war that NATO wanted'. It is a distraction in dealing with the real reasons we had to act - and provides a convenient excuse to those who would prefer not to come to terms with the past.

However, the definition of Kosovo's final status could present a cathartic moment to break the cycle of violence and resentment and give the people of Kosovo another chance to start a reconciliation process - to deal with the history. In reality, Kosovo doesn't have too much history - until now, it hasn't had enough.

Outreach in Central Kosovo

2008-02-01T10:52:00+00:00

As we approach the end of the 'final status' process, everyone in Kosovo is asking 'when?'.

For the Kosovo Serbs, this is a time of uncertainty. Many Serbs live in Northern Kosovo, or in and around the small towns of Gracanica and Strpce. But the majority of Kosovo's Serbs live in small, somewhat isolated villages; as one man told me today "we don't have any information - and don't know how much of that is disinformation".

So, working with the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (www.osce.org/kosovo), we put together a programme whereby each of these isolated villages would be matched with one of the 'country' offices . This would bring three benefits. The villages would have a 'buddy' in the international community, who could give them unmediated information. The villages would gain another advocate for their interests. And finally, it would ensure that the villages' concerns and perspectives were heard at the highest levels of the 'international community'.

As a British diplomat, I enjoy a specific relationship with these villages. At first, they were suspicious of me; they see the UK as one of the prime movers behind the airstrikes that forced Milosevic's forces out of Kosovo in 1999, and now see us in the vanguard of support for UN Special Envoy's proposal for Kosovo's supervised independence (at http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html ). But they really appreciate that, even despite our political disagreements, we are willing to invest time and energy to look after their interests.

I spent yesterday in the small villages of Plementina, Crkveno Vodica and Babin Most, in Obiliq/Obilic municipality. These are mostly rural communities, poor, with little access to information. In most cases, people just want to see and hear that, even though they have problems, the 'decision makers' are interested in what is happening to them. They also ask us to help with some small problems; in this case, we secured assurances from the local municipality that they would not change the names of the villages without the consent of their inhabitants (something vital for their own identity). But I also made one point to the villagers; we can sometimes help them with these issues, but wouldn't it be better if they had elected representatives who could raise these issues inside the institutions? In this light, the decision of the government in Belgrade to enforce a boycott of the Novemer 2007 local (as well as national) elections is even more damaging.

Kosovo's image

2008-01-30T15:28:00+00:00

A year after I arrived in Kosovo, a Kosovo MP asked me about the image of Kosovo in the UK.

I asked her if she wanted a truthful answer. "Of course", she said, expecting that the image of Kosovo in the UK would be the same of the UK amongst Kosovo Albanians (where we are seen as liberators following the 1999 NATO intervention).

She was somewhat taken aback by my reply. I said that, in all probability, most people in the UK would have no idea where Kosovo was, and, if they knew anything about Kosovo, it would be limited to the conflict during the 1990s. We agreed that such an image was hardly likely to draw investors or tourists to Kosovo.

Indeed, Kosovo has only featured on our TV screens when something goes wrong. Even then, the only issues we here are linked to the conflict. There are no Kosovo football teams in the champions league; no Kosovo bands in the charts; Pristina is not yet a destination for weekend breaks (or stag nights). There is a real sense that Kosovo = conflict.

So I was very happy to visit a craft fair at the Ethnological Museum in Pristina over the weekend. This followed a week-long 'artisan in residence' programme at the museum (details on the dardamedia website at http://www.dardamedia.com/muzeuetnologjik/?p=1), supported by a very small grant from the British Office. The event brought artisans from across Kosovo to perform demonstrations in Pristina - and provided the opportunity to sell their work.

Pleasingly, this included artisans and visitors from all of Kosovo's ethnic communities. This was not, in the memorable words of a friend, just 'multiethnicity for food'. The artisans and visitors came because they wanted to - not because someone had paid them to. This is the natural consequence of representing Kosovo's craft heritage; Kosovo culture, like that of the UK, involves many different traditions, and an exhibition of Kosovo crafts should draw them all in. But most importantly, the event gave people a way to interact, and to think about Kosovo, in a way that did not involve politics or 'The Conflict', and without being staged or artificial . As I said to the young and committed volunteer staff at the museum, since the war, Kosovo has seen itself, and we have seen Kosovo, through the prism of conflict. Work such as theirs promises to give us a new perspective.

My Irish grandmother used to tell me a story.

2008-01-23T13:20:00+00:00

A man found himself in the back of beyond, totally lost. Finally, after driving round in the dark for hours, he comes across an old farmer on a horse and cart. Winding down the window, he leans across and asks "Excuse me - I'm not from round here; could you help me get back to Dublin?"

The old farmer thinks for a while, then says: "Oh, I can get you back to Dublin all right - but I wouldn't start from here".

The point is, we can only deal with the situation we find ourselves in. Despite our efforts during the 1990s, the policies of Slobodan Milosevic and his government created the situation in Kosovo in early 1999 where NATO had no option but to intervene in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe (for background, look at the FCO Kosovo profile, or at the International Crisis Group website - for another perspective). Yes, Kosovo has a history of ethnic conflict that reaches back into history. Yes, Albanians weren't the only victims. But one cannot get away from the central issue; what the Milosevic regime did in Kosovo changed everything - and limited the possible solutions.

I often quote the example of Veton Surroi to my Kosovo Serb friends. Here is the son of a Yugoslav diplomat, who was closely involved in the Yugoslavia-wide drive for democracy at the start of the 1990s. A decade later, he is part of the 'Unity Team', leading Kosovo's efforts for independence. The events of the 1990s led him on this journey.

So, we are where we are. We have to deal with the situation as best we can. And we do have to deal with it, right now; this is vital for European Security, but, most importantly of all, to give all the people of Kosovo a hope for a better life. With all of this in mind, that's why the British government supports President Ahtisaari's proposal for the final status of Kosovo as the best way forward. This settlement gives us all a way of dealing with the past, and, importantly, a range of protections for those who feel most vulnerable and isolated in Kosovo, especailly the Kosovo Serb community.

We are right at the end of the political process now - the crucial time. The EU is ready to assume its responsibilities in dealing with Kosovo [PDF] (paras 65-71). The process is ready to move forward. That's why communication and dialogue are so important.

And so to the blog. I hope that this blog can provide a place to discuss the process that Kosovo is about to go through, and the work of what we in the British Office do to support this process. It's clear that Kosovo incites considerable passions (just look at comments on any Kosovo video on youtube). But equally, we have a responsibility to explain our views, to engage with people with different perspectives, and to keep communicating. That's diplomacy - and a large part of my job in the British Office (which will feature in a future entry in this blog). So I hope that people will add comments - and I will make every effort to reply to your comments, questions and ideas.