http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/ en Copyright 2007 Wed, 02 May 2007 13:57:22 -0600 http://www.sixapart.com/movabletype/ http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss Burtnett vs Webster City Custom Meats, Inc., (Iowa App. January 2007) Burtnett on appeal urged that the commissioner’s should have awarded temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits for several periods in 2000. The deputy commissioner denied the claims for TPD benefits because absences due to the work injury during the periods claimed could not be specifically identified and that many absences were not due to the work injury. Burtnett contended that she only needed to show that her earning ability was reduced during the periods of TPD claimed and that she was injured in order to prove entitlement ot TPD benefits. The court of appeals held that the reduction in earning ability must be shown by the claimant to be as a result of the injury and not other absences. http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/05/tempoary_partial_disability_re.asp http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/05/tempoary_partial_disability_re.asp Iowa Court of Appeals Cases Wed, 02 May 2007 13:57:22 -0600 Kirk Gross Co. and United Fire Group vs. Schwab, (Ia. App. 11/30/06) Employer and insurance carrier filed petition in equity with district to request the court order Schwab to sign the settlement agreement so it could be submitted to the commissioner for approval. Schwab had contended that his attorney settled with the employer without his permission. Attorney is presumed to be acting with authority when settling clam but presumption can be rebutted. Schwab did not offer any evidence to rebut presumption. Court of Appeals affirmed district court order granting specific performance of settlement and ordered claimant to sign documents. http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/05/specific_performance_of_settle.asp http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/05/specific_performance_of_settle.asp Iowa Court of Appeals Cases Wed, 02 May 2007 06:30:33 -0600 John Arndt vs City of LeClaire and Highland Insurance Group, 728 N.W.2d 389 (Iowa 2007) The commissioner found that Arndt’s injuries not to be work related. On judicial review the district court reversed the decision of the commissioner finding substantial evidence did not support the commissioner’s decision. The court of appeals affirmed. On further review the Supreme Court reversed finding substantial evidence to support the decision of the commissioner. Arndt alleged that while at work on June 14, 2001 while climbing onto a road grader, he slipped on some grease and fell backward. He claimed that while attempting to break his fall he twisted his knee and popped his shoulder. The injury was not witnessed but Arndt claimed that he went back to the garage and told a co-employee. Arndt alleged that he told his supervisor about the injury the next day who told him to go see a doctor but Arndt said he did not want to see a doctor at that time but wanted to wait it out and see if it was a little sprain. A first report of injury was not filled out at that time. Arndt had an appointment with a chiropractor on June 28th that he had seen before. He told the chiropractor that he had twisted his knee a month before. Arndt did not seek any additional treatment until October when he began to see the chiropractor more regularly. He reported right knee and right shoulder pain on his October 1st visit. On October 25, 2001 Arndt saw an orthopedic surgeon. On a medical history form he indicated that private insurance would pay for his treatment, put a question mark on the line provided fro the patient to indicate the date of the accident and gave a history of slipping off a ladder at home twisting his knee and injuring his shoulder. The first report of injury had been admitted into evidence for the limited purpose allowed by Iowa Code section 86.11. (notice) The injury which was not witnessed was reported to the employer the day after the claimant claimed he was injured. The court of appeals found that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s decision. The court of appeals reasoned that to affirm the commissioner they would have to ignore the date on which the employee notified the employer of his work related injury as well as testimony from the employer’s representative confirming that work related injury occurred on the claimed date of injury. The employer City contended that the court of appeals was wrong to consider the first report to prove that the claimant’s injury occurred on the alleged date of injury. The Supreme held that the court of appeals incorrectly relied on the first report of injury as evidence of the injury date because section 86.11 only allows it to be admitted into evidence for the limited purpose of showing the employer had notice of the occurrence of an injury as required by section 85.23 When claimant went to an orthopaedic surgeon he filled out history form indicating that injury occurred at home when fell off ladder instead of at work. The district court concluded that the medical records containing this information was not substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s decision because the nurse who took the history did not testify. The court of appeal agreed and stated that the district court simply considered al the record evidence and determined that the employer’s admission of a work related injury on the alleged date of injury trumped the qualitatively weaker statements attributed to the claimant by medical personnel. In its opinion the Supreme Court stated that a determination as to whether evidence trumps other evidence or whether one piece of evidence is qualitatively weaker than another piece of evidence is not an assessment for the district court or the court of appeal to make when it conducts a substantial review of an agency decision. It is the commissioner’s duty as the trier of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. The reviewing court only determines whether substantial evidence supports a finding according to those witnesses whom the commissioner believed. The supreme court stated that the district court and court of appeals improperly weighed the evidence to overrule the commissioner’s findings. The supreme court stated that the medical records of the orthopaedic surgeon were admitted into evidence without objection and the commissioner was entitled to give them whatever weight they deserved. The supreme court found that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s finding that Arndt failed to prove his injury arose out of and was in the course of employment. http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/05/substantial_evidenceweighing_o.asp http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/05/substantial_evidenceweighing_o.asp Iowa Supreme Court Cases Tue, 01 May 2007 14:10:29 -0600 Tyson Foods, Inc. vs Migdahia Hedlund, (Iowa App. Ct. January 18, 2007) Hedlund alleged a work injury to her arms, shoulder and neck. Hedlund was seen by Dr. Timothy Schurman who diagnosed her with inflammatory arthritis and stated her condition had been materially aggravated by the work place. Dr. Schurman recommended that she be seen by a rheumatologist. Tyson sought a second opinion from Dr. Delwin Quenzer. Hedlund thought that Tyson was trying to switch care from Schwurman to Quenzer. She filed a petition for alternate medical care. At the alternate care hearing Tyson stated it accepted liability on her claim. The parties straightened out the misunderstanding about the purpose of the appointment with Dr. Quenzer and the petition was dismissed. Tyson obtained a second opinion from Dr. Donnal Bahls who gave the opinion that Hedlund had rheumatoid arthritis and this was not a work related condition. Because Tyson had not referred Hedlund to a rheumatologist she filed a new request for alternate medical care. At the second proceeding Tyson denied liability for Hedlund’s injuries based on Dr. Bahl’s opinion. A deputy commissioner determined that Tyson Foods was bound by its admission in the first alternate care proceeding, granted alternate medical care and ordered Tyson to schedule a rheumatology consultation. Tyson appealed to the district court which affirmed under the doctrine of issue preclusion. Tyson further appealed and the court of appeal rejected issue preclusion but affirmed on the basis of judicial estoppel based on the Winnebago Industries and Sentry Insurance vs Haverly, case discussed above. http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/05/judicial_estoppel_alternate_ca.asp http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/05/judicial_estoppel_alternate_ca.asp Iowa Court of Appeals Cases Tue, 01 May 2007 06:23:40 -0600 Asmus vs Waterloo Community School District and Employers Mutual Companies, 722 N. W. 2d 653 (Iowa 2006) Asmus, a middle school teacher for 26 years in the Waterloo Community School District alleged she is disabled from sever state of depression caused by the stresses that arose from an alleged tyrannical working environment at school. The worker’s compensation commissioner found that she established the medical causation elements of a work-engendered mental disability but had not proven the necessary elements to establish legal causation. A purely mental injury may be conpensable under the workers’ compensation laws in the absence of an accompanying physical injury. In order to prevail on such a claim the injured worker must prove medical causation and legal causation. Medical causation simply requires a claimant to establish that the alleged mental condition was in fact caused by employment-related activities. Legal causation, on the other hand, presents a question a question of whether the policy of the law will extend responsibility to those consequences that have in fact been produced by the employment. The standard for legal causation is whether the claimant’s stress was of greater magnitude than the day to day mental stresses experience by other workers employed in the same or similar jobs, regardless of the employer. The supreme court concluded while evidence presented by the claimant would permit a finding of legal causation it does not compel such a finding as a matter of law. The ultimate decision in such cases is entrusted to the agency. Claimant also challenged the legal requirements on a constitutional basis claimant they denied equal protection of the law because an additional burden is placed on mental injury claims that does not exist in establishing compensable physical injury. This assertion is premised on the fact that ordinarily it not required as a condition of compensability that workplace hazards must be of a specified magnitude in order to produce a compensable injury while such a requirement has been imposed with respect to mental injury claims. Since the law did not affect a fundamental right it only needed a rational basis to be upheld. The court held that the law has a rational basis because if all a claimant had to prove was causation in fact than this would convert the worker’s compensati0n system into general mental health insurance because few workers with nontraumatic mental problems could not show that job stress somehow contributed to that condition. The need to protect against that undesirable consequence provides a rational basis for the standard of legal causation that has been adopted. http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/04/mentalmental_injury.asp http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/04/mentalmental_injury.asp Iowa Supreme Court Cases Mon, 30 Apr 2007 19:50:57 -0600 Winnebago Industries and Sentry Insurance vs Haverly, 727 N.W.2d 567, (Iowa 2006) In 1992 Haverly sustained a work related back injury and in 1997 entered into an agreement for settlement. Winnebago provided ongoing medical care including surgery. On November 7, 2000 Haverly went to the doctor complaining of increased back pain. He sought medical care from Dr. David Beck who recommended surgery. In March of 2002 Haverly filed a petition for workers’ compensation benefits alleging that a work related back injury occurred on November 7, 2000. Winnebago responded that any injury sustained on Novembe 7, 2000 related to the 1992 injury and at most, caused a temporary aggravation of his preexisting back condition. After Winnebago would not authorized the surgery recommended by Dr. Beck Haverly filed a petition for alternate medical care on May 17, 200. The petition alleged a Novem ber 7, 2000 injury dated and requested that the surgery be provided by Winnebago. In its answer to the petition for alternate medical care and at the hearing Winnebago did not dispute liability for the injury. The petition for alternate medical care was granted and Winnebago was ordered to provide the surgery. At the hearing on the claim for benefits the deputy commissioner determined that issue of liability for the November 7 injury had been previously litigated in the alternate medical care proceeding and that this prior decision was, therefore, res judicata on the issue of liability. On appeal the commissioner affirmed stating that the alternate medical care proceeding was res judicate on the issue of liability for benefits. The commissioner further stated that even if issue preclusion did not preclude Winnibago from litigating the issue, the record amply demonstrate that Haverly suffered a new injury on November 7, 2000. Winnebago filed a petition for judicial review. The district court reversed ruling that issue preclusion did not apply because the issue of liability had not been raised and litigated in the prior action. The district court found that Winnebago’s admission of liability in the alternate medical care proceeding was an admission of liability for medical care only not an admission of liability for a new injury. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court on further review agreed that the admission of liability in the alternate medical care proceeding was not res judicata and was not the law of the case but concluded that Winnebago was judicially estopped from denying liability because it conceded that issue in the alternate care proceeding. The issue of judicial estoppel was not raised by Haverly but instead was mentioned and rejected by the district court. The supreme court stated that because judicial estoppel is intended to protect the integrity of the fact-finding process by administrative agencies and courts, the issue may be properly raised by the courts, even at the appellate stage, on their own motion. The doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits a party who has successfully and unequivocally asserted a position in one proceeding from asserting an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding. It is a common sense rule designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing deliberately inconsistent and potentially misleading assertions from being successfully urged in succeeding tribunals. The doctrine is properly limited in its application to cases involving privity with, or prejudice to, the party invoking the doctrine. Another fundamental feature of the doctrine is the requirement of proof that the inconsistent position has been successfully asserted in the prior tribunal. Without such proof, “application of the rule is unwarranted because no risk of inconsistent, misleading results exist http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/04/judicial_estoppel.asp http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/04/judicial_estoppel.asp Iowa Supreme Court Cases Mon, 23 Apr 2007 06:15:27 -0600 Hill v. Fleetguard, 705 N. W.2d 665 (Iowa 2005) The court held that there is substantial evidence to support commissioner’s conclusion of no permanent injury and no functional impairment due to injuries to chest, hip and elbow. Also substantial evidence to support commissioner’s finding that permanent restrictions were put in place to protect Hill from re-injuring her preexisting condition and not because of injuries at Fleetguard. The commissioner’s conclusion of no disability was affirmed. http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/03/industrial_disability_restrict.asp http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/03/industrial_disability_restrict.asp Iowa Supreme Court Cases Mon, 26 Mar 2007 15:38:15 -0600 Bremer vs. Jerry Wallace and Iowa Great Lake Lifts, 728 N. W.2d 803 (Iowa 2007) Bremer sustained a work related injury while working for Jerry Wallace, d/b/a Iowa Great Lake Lifts. Wallace did not carry workers’ compensation insurance, had not met the statutory requirements for self-insured status (Iowa Code §87.4) and had not complied with the procedures to be relieved of the obligation to carry workers’ compensation insurance (Iowa Code §87.11). Because Wallace was uninsured Bremer had the option of suing Wallace in an action at law for damages or collecting workers’ compensation benefits. Bremer chose to pursue a claim under the workers’ compensation statute. Bremer obtained an award of healing period and permanent partial disability benefits but Wallace did not pay any benefits. Bremer brought this suit for damages based on the employer’s failure to pay benefits as ordered by the workers’ compensation commissioner. Bremer also sought punitive damages base on Wallace’s reckless disregard in unreasonably refusing to pay benefits awarded. The district court entered judgment against Walllace and Iowa Great Lakes Lifts for compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held that Iowa does not recognize a common-law claim for bad-faith refusal to pay workers’ compensation benefit by an uninsured employer. Case dismissed http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/03/bad_faith_uninsured_employer.asp http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/03/bad_faith_uninsured_employer.asp Iowa Supreme Court Cases Mon, 19 Mar 2007 13:34:11 -0600 Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213 (Iowa 2006) Meyer obtained employment at an IBP plant in Waterloo through a staffing agency and was placed at IBP on October 10, 2000. Meyer remained an employee of the staffing agency until he completed a sixty day probationary period. Meyer first experience pain in his hand at work during this probationary period. His employment with the staffing agency concluded on December 15, 2000. On Monday December 18, 2000 IBP hired Meyer as a regular employee to perform the same job he performed during his probationary period. On December 22 Meyer stopped working and went to the health department at IBP. Meyer quit his job in March 2001. Dr. Knudson diagnosed Meyer with unlar neuropathy of the left elbow and probable carpal tunnel syndrome of the left wrist. Meyer sought workers’ compensation benefits from IBP. The deputy commissioner and commissioner concluded that Meyer had failed to establish an injury on December 22, 2000, that arose out of and in the course of his employment with IBP relying on uncontradicted medical testimony that the two days that claimant performed work as an IBP employee prior to December 22, 2000 would not, of itself, have produced his left upper extremity hand and elbow conditions. The Iowa Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the term “arising out of “employment. The term “arising out of” employment means there must be a “causal relationship between the employment and the injury.” Koehler Elec. V. Wills, 608 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2000). The “arising out of” element requires that the injury be a natural incident of the work meaning the injury must be a “ ‘rational consequence of the hazard connected with such employment.’ ” Id. At 3-4 (quoting 2800 Corp v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Iowa 1995)). “ ‘In other words, the injury must not have coincidentally occurred while at work, but must in some way be caused by or related to the working environment or the conditions of . . . employment.’ ” Id. At 3 (quoting Miedema, 551 N.W.2d at 311); see 1 Larson at 9-1 (“Injuries arising out of risks or conditions personal to the claimant do not arise out of the employment unless the employment contributes to the risk or aggravates the injury.”). In addition to the requirement of an injury, the court has said that our workers’ compensation act primarily requires the worker to establish: (1) an employer-employee relationship at the time of injury, (2) an injury arising out of and the course of employment, and (3) the disability . . . proximately caused by the injury. The court recognizes that proximate cause between the disability and injury is another requirement of compensation, but it is not directly implicated by section 85.3(1). Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 220, footnote 2 citing to Freeman v. Luppes Transp. Co., 227 N.W.2d 143, 148. (Iowa 2006). The injury must proximately cause the disability but it is not accurate to say that the employment must proximately cause the injury. The injury need only arise out of employment, a less onerous standard than the proximate cause standard. The Supreme Court reversed the commissioner stating that Meyer did not have to prove that the two days of employment was the cause of the injury but was only required to prove that a condition of his employment increased the risk of injury. The court noted that Meyer performed the same type of work for IBP and his prior employer and that the work involved highly repetitive motions which are known to lead to carpal tunnel syndrome or cumulative trauma injury. The court further found that the type of work that Meyer performed for IBP place him at greater risk of carpal tunnel syndrome and even though he only worked for IBP for two days the the type of injury he sustained was a rational consequence of a the work he performed for IBP. The court concluded that there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the injury was manifested before or after Meyer started working for IBP and the commissioner never made any findings on that issue. The matter was remanded back to the commissioner to decide the date of manifestation. http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/02/this_is_the_article_headline.asp http://www.desmoineslaw.com/blog1/2007/02/this_is_the_article_headline.asp Iowa Supreme Court Cases Sun, 11 Feb 2007 19:14:44 -0600