Aristophanes

For details of Bobby Wolff’s autobiography, The Lone Wolff, contact theLoneWolff@bridgeblogging.com. If you would like to contact Bobby Wolff, please leave a comment at this blog. Reproduced with permission of United Feature Syndicate, Inc., Copyright 2015. If you are interested in reprinting The Aces on Bridge column, contact reprints@unitedmedia.com.

Ben Jonson

For details of Bobby Wolff’s autobiography, The Lone Wolff, contact theLoneWolff@bridgeblogging.com. If you would like to contact Bobby Wolff, please leave a comment at this blog. Reproduced with permission of United Feature Syndicate, Inc., Copyright 2015. If you are interested in reprinting The Aces on Bridge column, contact reprints@unitedmedia.com.

Duc de La Rochefoucauld

For details of Bobby Wolff’s autobiography, The Lone Wolff, contact theLoneWolff@bridgeblogging.com. If you would like to contact Bobby Wolff, please leave a comment at this blog. Reproduced with permission of United Feature Syndicate, Inc., Copyright 2015. If you are interested in reprinting The Aces on Bridge column, contact reprints@unitedmedia.com.

One of their favorites was to come to the table very late to make us nervous. Our tactics to deal with that was to wait till they arrived and then have one of us say that we had to go to the bathroom. We played quickly and this tactic evened things out.

We also became aware of local players who decided to play pro and then later were caught cheating. Playing pro put enough pressure on them that they went from ethical players to cheaters. In fact in the days where pros were not really allowed, one of the arguments for keeping bridge “amateur” was to prevent sharp practices and cheating. It would ruin the game.

And now as we find that quite a few pro players are likely cheating I wonder if it really hasn’t had a terrible effect on the game.

I love watching great players find incredible plays and somehow make just the right bid on a challenging hand. Now I wonder if they did this as a result of skill or if they are cheaters.

So many things have already been done to prevent cheating. Forbidding electronic equipment, screens, writing notes to opponents to explain bids, having monitors walk you to the bathroom and so on. But in the end no matter what the organizers do if you want to cheat badly enough than you can find a way.

Is the big money pro-client system the problem? There was cheating before and there is cheating in club games and probably even in home games. But maybe the big money provides more of an incentive.

The only answer I can think of is to be ready to have some experts on hand who look for pairs who are getting results that are too good, too precise, too many good guesses. Be alert for cheating and expect it in even the best bridge players.

This just seems too sad to me. For me bridge is “the beautiful game.” It is so sad to see it sullied.

Earl of Chesterfield

For details of Bobby Wolff’s autobiography, The Lone Wolff, contact theLoneWolff@bridgeblogging.com. If you would like to contact Bobby Wolff, please leave a comment at this blog. Reproduced with permission of United Feature Syndicate, Inc., Copyright 2015. If you are interested in reprinting The Aces on Bridge column, contact reprints@unitedmedia.com.

I know most people play a double of a four heart opening bid as optional – maybe with an emphasis on take-out. What about a double of four spades, or a double after partner opens and the next hand overcalls four spades? I’d also be interested to know how the experts treat doubles of five-level overcalls.

Hunting the Snark, Galveston, Texas

I’d say that most play that one removes a double of four spades to a contract one expects to make, but otherwise passes. The same applies even more clearly to a double of a five-level bid. Try not to remove the double from fear; play partner for the odd trick or two for his double, and hope he can beat their contract in his own hand.

I had always been taught that the double of a major always showed the ability to play in the other major. Is that right or if a hand is strong enough can you start by doubling on a one or two-suited hand?

Heartfelt Harry, Albany, Ga.

With spades and a strong hand one can generally double, then insist on playing one’s suit. With hearts the position is less clear. The problem is that if the opponents bid spades you may find it hard to introduce your suit at a convenient level. Doubling with a one-suiter in spades is fine by me on 17 or so. If you have another one-suiter or a two-suiter, you need even more to start with a double.

I have seen your comments on leading high from three or four small in a suit you have raised. Would you lead your highest card if you had four card support: J-94-2, for instance?

Mumbles, Schaumburg, Ill.

This holding looks appropriate for a low card lead to me (the jack is an honor here). Whenever partner might need to know count, I’d try to give him that on lead (playing third and fifth leads the count is easier to read than in standard fourth highest methods, by the way). Whenever I think it is important to partner to know if I have an honor, I go with a high or low card as appropriate.

Can you comment on when, if ever, opener can rebid a five-card suit, without it promising six?

Nanny Goat, Staten Island, N.Y.

Opener strives not to repeat a five-card suit after a one-level response. Exceptions come (typically over partner’s one spade response) when with a 2-4-2-5 pattern and 12-15, including a small doubleton in diamonds, you might repeat the clubs. Things are different after a 2/1 game-forcing auction. If you play opener’s new suit at the three-level shows five or extras, and that two no-trump guarantees stoppers (or length) in the unbid suits, you sometimes have to rebid a chunky five-carder.

If the opponents overcall my partner’s opening bid, should I use weak-jump responses? Or is there a better meaning for jumps in new suits?

Grasshopper Mind, Laredo, Texas

I hate weak jump responses if the opponents are silent – I see no reason to preempt our side out of the auction when the opponents have shown no sign of bidding. But when the opponents overcall or double, using a jump as weak makes sense, particularly by an unpassed hand. And all jump raises in competition should always be weak. By passed hands, use fit-jumps in all new suits.

For details of Bobby Wolff’s autobiography, The Lone Wolff, contact theLoneWolff@bridgeblogging.com. If you would like to contact Bobby Wolff, please leave a comment at this blog. Reproduced with permission of United Feature Syndicate, Inc., Copyright 2015. If you are interested in reprinting The Aces on Bridge column, contact reprints@unitedmedia.com.

Gloria Steinem

For details of Bobby Wolff’s autobiography, The Lone Wolff, contact theLoneWolff@bridgeblogging.com. If you would like to contact Bobby Wolff, please leave a comment at this blog. Reproduced with permission of United Feature Syndicate, Inc., Copyright 2015. If you are interested in reprinting The Aces on Bridge column, contact reprints@unitedmedia.com.

George Eliot

For details of Bobby Wolff’s autobiography, The Lone Wolff, contact theLoneWolff@bridgeblogging.com. If you would like to contact Bobby Wolff, please leave a comment at this blog. Reproduced with permission of United Feature Syndicate, Inc., Copyright 2015. If you are interested in reprinting The Aces on Bridge column, contact reprints@unitedmedia.com.

Book of Common Prayer

For details of Bobby Wolff’s autobiography, The Lone Wolff, contact theLoneWolff@bridgeblogging.com. If you would like to contact Bobby Wolff, please leave a comment at this blog. Reproduced with permission of United Feature Syndicate, Inc., Copyright 2015. If you are interested in reprinting The Aces on Bridge column, contact reprints@unitedmedia.com.

Peter Drucker

For details of Bobby Wolff’s autobiography, The Lone Wolff, contact theLoneWolff@bridgeblogging.com. If you would like to contact Bobby Wolff, please leave a comment at this blog. Reproduced with permission of United Feature Syndicate, Inc., Copyright 2015. If you are interested in reprinting The Aces on Bridge column, contact reprints@unitedmedia.com.

G. B. Shaw

For details of Bobby Wolff’s autobiography, The Lone Wolff, contact theLoneWolff@bridgeblogging.com. If you would like to contact Bobby Wolff, please leave a comment at this blog. Reproduced with permission of United Feature Syndicate, Inc., Copyright 2015. If you are interested in reprinting The Aces on Bridge column, contact reprints@unitedmedia.com.

What distinguishes matchpoint from Teams is the amount of consideration one gives to what others are doing with the same cards. At matchpoint scoring emphasis is placed upon reaching a common contract and outscoring the field through clever declarer play, and/or uninformative bidding practices. There are added advantages to be got from uncertainty. The general perception is that accurate bidding gives a pair a better chance of reaching the right contract but a lesser chance of beating par. An example from a recent club game illustrates the downward trend.

Playing in a mixed field of 13 tables using 2/1 methods, how might West approach the problem of what to open in third seat holding ♠ AKJT3 ♥ 6 ♦ AKQ9 ♣ KT4, 20 HCP with 3+ losers and 7 controls. In making decisions, sooner or later, one will tend to bid what is best according to what is most probable given the partial information available at the time. Only rarely can one bid with perfect certainty, so it is usually a question of how much information one feels is needed to make a decision and achieve a good result. Most follow the expert advice inspired by successful Wall Street traders: ‘bid on rumor, defend on count.’

As West holds 20 HCP, there are 20 HCP up for grabs, and the fact that 2 players have passed already, it is reasonable to assume partner holds the expected number, 7. That should be enough to cover one loser, but not necessarily 2. Should one explore for the perfect cards opposite or merely blast to 4♠, the most attractive contract, with high expectations of making it? On this deal we can tell you that 10 of 13 pairs played in 4♠ and you will score 70% if you play in 4♠ without a club lead. Using Wall Street logic, if you took the gamble, you deserve the reward. Of course, your gain from taking an unusual route to a common contract would be an innocent opponents’ loss.

If West plays by the book by opening 1♠ to begin a cooperative auction, who knows where it might lead? After a pass by North, East now faces a problem with ♠ 9876 ♥ AQ754 ♦ JT9 ♣ 7. From his point-of-view the expectation is that the other three players hold 11 HCP each. In his book, Passed Hand Bidding(1989), Mike Lawrence placed considerable emphasis on the possibility that partner may have opened in third seat with a load of garbage, and that the opponents, if given the chance, may be poised to enter the auction, or at least gain information valuable for their defence. A jump raise would show this degree of support, 4 trumps and an unspecified singleton, thus serving 2 strategic purposes simultaneously.

Of course, nondescriptive bids based largely on HCP ranges are not conducive to accurate slam bidding. 4NT usually constitutes a desperate attempt to extract some useful information albeit above game level. Three Wests felt it is incumbent upon themselves to try RKCB, and finding there was an ace missing, they signed off in 5♠, held to 12 tricks. This awful approach scored an undeservedly high 33%, 37% less than any blaster to game who escaped the club lead.

To be sure there are ways to reach 6♠ with 2/1 methods, and 2 pairs out of 12 achieved that, scoring 11 matchpoints while being held to 12 tricks only. A pair of ‘super-blasters’, the kind that can ruin an opponent’s a good game, got to slam in an auction that was the mental equivalent of arm wrestling: 2♣ – 2♦( an Ace or King); 2♠ – 4NT; 5♦ (3 key cards) – 6♠. Overall they scored 42%, so we can cancel the committee.

Only one pair reached slam presumably by legitimate 2/1 methods as they are both bridge teachers who always have their bids. That good result may ease their consciences as they preach the word to their congregations of unrepentant transgressors. They got to the slam, yes, but devoid of sharp practices scored just 50% overall, a field-happy result.

Finally, the only pair of Precision bidders in the field managed to bid slam informatively and scored 67% overall. They adhere to the strategy of ‘accuracy in construction, aggression in competition’, made feasible by their limited-bid structure.

The auction was brief and to the point. Declarer decided the final contract without knowing everything about responder’s hand, but he knew the essentials. It is worth noting that responder’s 4♥ bid promised the ace, so was informative. It was not of the vague ‘wait-and-see’ kind which crops up in co-operative 2/1 auctions.

So now we can see how the slam could be bid with 2/1 methods, in fact, in a superior manner: 1♠ – 3♣ (splinter by a passed hand); 3♦ – 3♥; 3♠(forcing) – 4♥, etc. Below game level the opening bidder knows more about responder’s hand than does the Precision bidder and is in a position to extract even more information. So why didn’t the field reach slam? Well, the system lends itself to a great deal of variation. Maybe responders don’t play a limit–raise splinter by a passed hand. Maybe 3♣ is a preemptive jump shift, or maybe a fit showing jump, or a nondescriptive mixed raise. Does the pair play Drury? Is responder strong enough for Drury, and if so, what are his options on the next round? The fact there are so many choices indicates none is very good, although each might work best on any given deal. Overall it’s a mess.

Swinging to Catch Up

There was one peculiar result manufactured by a competent veteran pair – 4♠ making 5.

Checking their scores reveal a series of tops and bottoms during the session. One can imagine a state of mind in which declarer feels desperate to get back in the running after a disappointing result on the previous board. After a nondescriptive auction to 4♠, declarer can see his side has missed a slam if the ♠Q drops. To generate a swing he hopes the ♠Q will not drop, so he goes against the field and finesses on the second round of trumps, the only way to hold himself to 11 tricks.

Some would accuse him of antisocial behaviour for operating in this selfish fashion, asserting that a player should strive to preserve the integrity of the field, such as it is, especially if he is having a bad game. Personally I have lost many a matchpoint by playing against the odds in an attempt to make up some ground. I blame Hugh Kelsey for suggesting one should modify one’s approach based on what one thinks the field has done. This is akin to driving downtown traffic while constantly looking in the rearview mirror. If the field is in 6♠, 2 overtricks in 4♠ will be wasted. So you may hope the ♠Q doesn’t fall. However, if it does fall, you can’t beat the slam bidders, and all you can hope for is to match the others who, like yourself, play in 4♠. You will score below average by making 12 tricks, but you will not score a bottom. If the ♠Q doesn’t fall, you will have a decent score making just 11 tricks. It pays to overcome your disappointments.

Here is an example of declarer play that may be more in line with what Kelsey had in mind.

One can see what declarer was thinking when he opted for 3NT rather than 4♥. His hand taken in isolation is very suitable for play in a NT contract with decent chances of making as many tricks in NT as in a heart game. He knew he was bidding against the field. I picture The Field as a Granny full of commonsense advice, a bit behind the times, and mostly unaware of what’s going on behind the scene. Granny won’t bid a slam unless she can count on 12 tricks off the top, and it is pretty obvious that on these cards The Field will be playing sensibly in their 4-4 heart fit, normally making 10 tricks.

The opening lead was a non-life-threatening fourth-highest ♦3, a reprieve from the quick establishment of defensive tricks in clubs. Two aces are missing so timing will be important. Hearts, which are known to be divided 4-4, seemed to be the suit to tackle. If the hearts are played in the manner of those in 4♥, usually declarer will take 2 heart tricks, but be held to 9 tricks, thus getting a bottom. Nevertheless declarer won the diamond lead in his hand with the ♦A and played the hearts abnormally, ducking to ♥9 on his right, an onerous safety play not usually recommended at matchpoints. Ominously the RHO regained the timing for the defence by switching to clubs. Declarer won the ♣A in dummy and ducked another heart, losing to the ♥J on his left when the ♥T appeared on his right. This went against the rule of restricted choice, as with ♥JT9 initially the RHO might have played the ♥J previously. Disaster ensued, down 2 being the woeful result.

Rather than worry about how the field might handle the trumps in 4♥, declarer might have considered how to play for the maximum number of tricks in his NT contract. Spades are a 7-card suit and hearts an 8-card suit, but the spades lack only ♠AJ8 whereas hearts lack ♥AJT9. Spades will have to be played eventually, so a reasonable play is to win the ♦K in dummy and finesse the ♠9. This gives a 3-times better chance of making 3 tricks than does playing on hearts and has the added attraction that one can still entertain the hope that the hearts are behaving badly. Furthermore, it is often advantageous psychologically to make your early play towards the hidden hand.

With the RHO holding ♠AJ8 the play yields 3 spade tricks and the freedom to establish a trick in hearts for the 9th trick. This would be a good recovery at Teams, whereas at matchpoints it is a ‘costs nothing’ play, because down 2, down 1, or making 9 tricks will score the same zero. The best result is got when upon winning the ♠A the RHO persists in diamonds – now 10 tricks come home – another top attributable to a misguided defence. Well, doesn’t Granny advise, ‘always return your partner’s suit’?

2015 GNT SF Segment 4 of 4. Board 21. N-S Vulnerable. Dealer North.

Open Room.

Ken Scholes

Dan Jacob

At the close room.

Dick’s team generated a double doubled game swing to win 17 imps.

GNT Championship Fight Segment 3 of 4. Board 7. All vulnerable. Dealer South.

At the other table North-South was allowed to play in Four Hearts made 10 tricks for +620. Here Rock bid a 2 way Four Spades, either making or a cheap sacrifice, pushed Sylvia to the five level where she failed by a trick.

Sylvia Shi

GNT Segment 3 of 4. Board 11. Non Vul. Dealer South.

3♣ = 2 of top three honors. 4♣ = Keycard ask. 6♣ = 1 Keycard + void.

Rock and Maks had a nice auction. Found the Club fit. Rock had all the controls, trump support and source of tricks. Knew Maks can’t have a bad Heart holding. Bid and made Seven Clubs for +1440, won 14 imps when their opponents at the other table had an accident in the auction, stopped in Four Hearts for +420.

Rock Shi Yan

Bryan Maksymetz

In the SF Segment 1 of 4. Board 10. All Vul. Dealer East.

3♠ = Clubs. 4♣ = Key card ask. 4♠ = 2 Keycards no Queen.

The whole hand boiled down to finding the trump Queen. The percentage play with a 9 card fit is to play for a 2-2 break. Before a card is played the 3-1 break is 49.74% and a 2-2 break is 40.70%. however once each defender followed to the play of the suit, the odds changed. 2-0 break of the residues two cards is 48% and a 1-1 break is 52%.

Rock had very little to go on. Trusting his judgement that the ♣ 9 from South was a restricted choice situation, he finessed North for the Club Queen. He was right, made 12 tricks for +1370 and gained 12 imps. At the other table E-W were in 3NT made 10 tricks for +630.

Well done Rock.

Dick Yarington

Before his untimely passing our District 19 team including Dick Yarington qualified to play in Chicago Summer NABC GNT Championship. In honor of Dick, the team of Ken Scholes, Dan Jacob, Bryan Maksymetz and Rock Yan Shi made Dick their non-playing captain

South chose to lead the ♥A and then follow with a small heart as her partner played up the line.  Surprisingly, the ♥J won Trick 2.

Expecting an easy time at the play, I reconsidered after the ♠Q from dummy revealed that South was void in spades.

I next played the ♣A and ruffed a club.  I led a spade to dummy and ruffed another club.  I cashed my remaining high spade and knew that I was now facing a potentially key decision.

If one opponent owns Jxxx of diamonds, my best chance now is to cash the ♥K to pitch dummy’s fourth diamond.  A diamond to dummy would then allow me to draw the last trump and claim.

On the other hand, if hearts are 6-2 (would the inexperienced North player have high-lowed if owning a doubleton heart?), a lead of ♥K to pitch a diamond will be ruffed for the setting trick.  In that case, I should now lead a diamond to dummy, without first playing the ♥K.

The odds favor playing diamonds, I think, but the signaling favors playing hearts.

I played a diamond to dummy, winning the trick with the ♦A but seeing no ♦J.  I drew the last trump, pitching a small diamond from hand, and cashed a second high diamond.  And North failed to follow …

-50.

I don’t really wish I could peek.  But it would be nice to have taken advantage of the defense from the first two tricks to score +980.

However … when engaging a post mortem with benefit of the hand records, my partner on the hand, Barry Black of Brookline, MA, made a point I had not considered: if I were going to play for a twelfth trick in diamonds and not hearts, why not draw all trumps right away and then play on diamonds? This line would establish a twelfth trick in diamonds not only when diamonds are 3-2, or 4-1 with the stiff jack, but also when …

Oh! A 4-1 diamond break with a stiff nine, allowing me to have played two rounds of diamonds and then enter hand with a club ruff  to take a proven diamond finesse against the ♦J.  THAT was not a blip on my radar screen!

By the way, would I have had choices how to play the hand, had South — even after having led the ♥A at Trick 1 –, continued with the ♥Q to blot the jack and establish her ♥ T at Trick 2?

East was declarer in 3NT after an auction of 1♦-1♠; 1NT-3NT.  South led a small heart, small from dummy, queen from North, king from declarer.

Declarer ran five clubs.  North pitched his three remaining hearts, East pitched a small diamond and South pitched his two remaining hearts and a diamond.

At this point declarer could settle for ten tricks by establishing a diamond trick (with a heart entry to such trick should a high diamond honor lose to the ♦A) and refusing the spade finesse (1+3+1+5).  However, at matchpoints it is difficult to avoid the temptation for an extra trick by taking the spade finesse.  Alas, there is a potential danger in the parlay of establishing a diamond trick AND taking the spade finesse.  What if the ♦A is held by South, South chooses to withhold the ace, the spade finesse loses to North, and North then returns a diamond through the remaining high diamond honor of East?  In that case, the defense might win THREE diamond tricks and a spade trick, holding declarer to only nine tricks.

At the table, declarer chose to lead not a diamond at the shown position, but rather to lead a heart to his jack and take the spade finesse, losing to North’s king.

North might possess enough clues to choose to now return the ♠J.  East opened 1♦ and yet has four clubs, leaving East with no more than five major suit cards.  South’s failure to have discarded a spade suggests that South holds exactly four spades and is maintaining parity with dummy’s spade length.  If South were dealt four spades, then a return of the ♠J both unblocks the spade suit and could possibly pin a doubleton ♠T in declarer’s hand.

At the table, however, North chose to return a diamond to declarer’s high honor and South’s ace.  South returned his smallest remaining spade to dummy’s ♠A, giving North a second opportunity to jettison the ♠J.  North instead played the ♠9.  Declarer now cashed the ♥A, and, being locked in dummy, presenting North with a third opportunity to discard the ♠J.  That opportunity was declined, and a third spade from dummy placed North on lead with the ♠J.  With only diamonds left in North’s hand, the forced diamond return provided declarer a steppingstone to the stranded diamond winner.  Ten tricks.

Had North jettisoned the ♠J on the second round of spades, a third spade from dummy would have allowed South to execute a Crocodile Coup by opening the jaws of his ♠T to swallow his partner’s ♠9 and then closing the jaws to cash the ♠8, winning three spades as well as the ♦A.  Sadly, however, the crocodile remained unfed.

After an auction of 1♦ by South in third chair, 1♥ overcall by me as West, and 1NT by North, all passed at today’s club duplicate, Board 17.

(Disregard the automatic table positions of the diagram.  The hand with five diamonds is in South position and is the dummy.  The hand with four diamonds is in West position.)

Partner led the ♥T.  Declarer called for dummy’s king, of course.

Do you have a memory about a mistake you made in bridge, a mistake so costly that you feel that the lesson was learned well enough that you are unlikely to ever repeat the mistake?

I probably should own a boatload of such lessons.  But one that did resonate happened on the getaway day Swiss at a NABC a long time ago.  I remember declarer in a 3NT contract attacking a suit where dummy’s holding was a stiff king.  Thinking no more deeply than what better present for my ace can there be than to capture a king, I won the ace right away.  That play subjected my poor partner to a progressive squeeze and on a hand where we should have scored -600 — had I only ducked the king and forced declarer to use an entry to his hand to continue the suit — we scored -690.

Well, this time I knew to duck the ♥K.  And declarer now played the ♦K from dummy.  This king, too, I ducked, so as to retain an AJ tenace position over the ♦Q.

Declarer shrugged his shoulders and finally continued ♣A and ♣K.  I pitched a heart on the second club. Declarer now played a third club toward his hand.  Feeling in danger of being endplayed, I discarded my ♠J.  Declarer played the ♣8 from his hand, partner winning the ♣9.  Partner returned the ♣J and I discarded a diamond as declarer won the ♣Q.  Declarer chose now to finesse in diamonds (a spade exit should work the same.)  I won the ♦J, cashed the ♠A and exited my preserved small spade to partner’s ♠T.  Partner cashed a long club and the ♠K.  At this point declarer has won the two red kings and three clubs, while our side has won two clubs, three spades and the ♦J.  With two tricks remaining, partner leads a heart and I claim my two red aces for down two tricks.

Here are a couple of examples from recent play.

First example.  At none vulnerable, your RHO opens 1♣ in second seat.  You hold AKJ42, K9854, J82, —.  Assume that your partner has convinced you to play a version of Michaels called weak/strong Michaels (not my favorite agreement, but that is neither here nor there).  Holding the neither-weak-nor-strong version, you are forced to overcall 1♠.  Your LHO passes and your partner raises to 2♠.  Now opening bidder bids 3♦.

Do you follow through with your original intention to show your heart suit?

No.  Assuming you agree you do not have enough for a game try, 3♥ is not the bid that your partner wants to hear.  To your partner, 3♥ must show a game try.  After all, what other bid is there between 3♦ and a competitive 3♠ in order to show a game try?  (Double, I assume, would be for penalty; elsewise, 3♦ is nearly riskless.)

Second example.  Dealer before you opens 1♣.  You overcall 1♠ on KT9632, 9843, A3, 5.  LHO passes and partner cue bids.  Assume your partner, who has convinced you to play new suit advances as nonforcing constructive (again not my favorite agreement; why do all of these matters keep coming up?), cue bids 2♣.   RHO passes. 

Considering you might have overcalled on a 5-3-3-2 hand, you have some extras.  Do you show them by bidding above 2♠?

No.  Because partner has not promised spade support, bidding above 2♠ on a 7 point hand is not the bid your partner wants to hear.  Partner might have a strong hand with no club stopper, meaning that under your partnership’s agreements, cue bidding was partner’s only option.  Bidding 2♥ seems to keep all options open and thus should keep partner happy.  (If partner has a limit raise in spades, he will next offer 2♠ and you can then, after hearing about the fit, choose to upgrade your seven loser hand if you feel that is appropriate.)

I highly recommend Karen’s articles.  In fact, I so much support the theme of telling partner what he wants to hear that it colors my choices of conventions and treatments to play and conventions and treatments to avoid.  I tend to disfavor methods that I perceive as short-sighted in favor of methods that anticipate problems of partner.  Maybe someday I will be motivated to write more about this.

West, a novice, is a student of East.

After two passes, West opened 1♦.  My overcall of 1NT ended the bidding.

I won the heart opening lead cheaply with the ♥T in hand.  (Remember North is declarer.)  Naturally, I attacked clubs, playing high clubs from my hand.  East showed out on the second round, pitching one of each red suit until West won the club ace on the third round.  West quickly cashed the ♦A and played back a second diamond.

By winning this trick with my queen and forcing out the ♥A, I have ten tricks assured (2+2+2+4).  Before embarking on that line, however, I took stock.  East had not opened a weak 2♥ and so rated to have only five hearts, apparently to the AJ.  East had shown up with a singleton club.  East had failed to lead her partner’s suit of diamonds, which implied a lack of either or both of length and strength in diamonds.  This seems to mark East with 4=5=3=1 or 5=5=2=1 distribution.

If the ♦T is onside and I win a finesse of the ♦9, East is ripe to be squeezed in the major suits.  After four rounds of diamonds (losing one), three rounds of clubs (losing one), and one round of hearts, everyone is down to five cards.

I envisaged this ending:

East can discard a spade on the first club winner, but then has no good discard (while I can discard my ♥Q) on the second club winner, making eleven tricks for me on a hand where I am off three aces.

Back to the position at Trick 6: even if the ♦9 should lose to the ♦T, I can recover to make ten tricks on the same squeeze, unless  East immediately cashes the ♥A.

So … I took the diamond finesse and lost to the ♦T.  After some thought, East cashed the ♥A and held me to nine tricks.

All props to East, Jori Grossack, mother of US junior internationalists Adam and Zach Grossack (who are also NABC+ Fast Pairs champions).  Her sons should be proud.  I?  I am just greedy.  And punished.

At Monday morning’s matchpoint club game Boards 17 and 23, we recovered from bidding errors nicely (Board 17) and spectacularly (Board 23).

Our auction was pretty normal through 2NT: 2♦ (alerted) was artificial and game forcing and 2NT was promising a diamond stopper and giving the best description of my hand.  For some reason, partner now chose to bid 3♠.  That choice induced me to think that partner had four spades and that the motivation behind his choice of 2♦ was to show a hand that was too strong for a raise of 1♠ to 4♠.  We play non-serious 3NT in game forcing auctions where we have shown an 8+ card major suit fit and so 3NT was what I bid next.  When 3NT was not alerted, I suspected something fishy.  But the 3NT bid ended the auction, too.  Before the opening lead was made, I undertook to explain the meaning of all of our side’s bids to the opponents, including explaining the apparent forget about the meaning of 3NT.

No matter.  When partner faced a dummy with only three spades, we had reached the normal contract, albeit in a weird way.

On Board 23, I had to cope with a third hand all vulnerable preempt of 2♥ before my nice hand.

I decided to bid 3♥, thinking that our agreement is that 3♥ is Michaels, showing 5 spades and 5 of a minor.

Partner surprised me by now jumping to 5♦!  Opposite a Michaels’ call, where I had not promised any diamonds, partner must have a pretty spectacular suit, perhaps something like KJT9-seventh at a minimum, I was thinking.  My hand is huge opposite such a hand: first and second round control of every side suit, an unexpected Qxx of trumps when I might well have been void!  If a grand slam is making, I would not be the least surprised.  Both absence of tools to investigate a grand slam and matchpoint expectation odds caused me to take the easy route and just raise 5♦ to 6♦.

Well, a couple of problems with our auction.  First of all, because I could have chosen to bid 4♣, Leaping Michaels, my thinking that 3♥ was Michaels was wrong.  Instead our agreement is that 3♥ is a stopper ask, the kind of bid I would make with, say, long and solid clubs and hopes for nine tricks if only partner can stop the heart suit.  Second of all, I don’t understand the reasoning behind partner’s 5♦ call, whether my 3♥ is taken as a stopper ask (as per our agreements) or as Michaels (as I thought it to be).

Partner won the feels-like-a-singleton spade lead.  He then played the ace of clubs and ruffed a club in hand and a heart in dummy.  Next he played the king of clubs to pitch a heart (the suit split 4-3) and drew trumps.  A second spade to dummy yielded five diamonds, four clubs, the heart ruff, and two top spades for +1370  and 12.5 of 15 matchpoints.  (An admission: the opponents went wrong in the end and so we actually scored +1390 for 14 matchpoints.)

We were awfully lucky on each hand to receive fair to outstanding results when we had erred in the auction.  Well, if one pair has to be lucky, I am surely glad that it is my pair …

What do you think could be the best contracts?  What bid do you make to try to investigate those contracts?

Well, if partner has seven clubs made solid by your ace, 6♣ or a greedy 6NT look playable.  You would have eleven tricks on top with chances in at least the spade suit for a twelfth trick.

3NT holds little appeal to me.  If you have seven solid club tricks, then why not go for the gusto and try 6♣?  Partners have been known, yes – even in second seat –, to have preempted on suits that are not so good as KQ(J)-seventh.  Even QJT-seventh would not be a misbid.  If clubs are not solid, notrump looks pretty scary.  Where are your tricks if you have only one or two club tricks?

I decided to forego a notrump contract and focus on spade or club contracts instead.  Accordingly, I responded 3♠.  Partner raised to 4♠ and that was the last bid in the auction.  LHO led ♥2.

I was pleased to have avoided a diamond lead.  On the heart lead, if the black suits behaved, I could have twelve tricks, losing only to the ♠K and pitching all three diamond losers on long clubs.  Or … I could play safely, as I would at IMPs, by taking a diamond ruff early and winning ten tricks by virtue of four spades, two hearts, ♦A, diamond ruff, and two clubs. 

I chose the line for twelve tricks.  I won the heart lead with my king and began with ♠A and a small spade toward dummy’s JT.  The ♠T won the trick but RHO failed to follow suit.  Well, so much for having a third round spade entry to dummy.  Still, if clubs behave for no losers, I can still make twelve tricks.

Or … should I, having seen the 4-1 spade split, change plans and ruff a diamond with dummy’s remaining spade honor?  Further thought led to a conclusion that ruffing a diamond at this stage is not so safe, either.  When I eventually lose the spade king to my LHO, a switch to good diamonds of my RHO could result in the loss of not only two diamond tricks but also the promoting of a second trump trick in the form of the ♠8 of my LHO.

So … I went back to my plan to hope that clubs run and win twelve tricks that way.  Preserving my ♦A, I played a third spade from dummy, overtaking with my ♠Q as LHO won the spade king.  She switched to a diamond.  I won the ♦A, drew the ♠8 with my ♠9 and played the ♣A.  Disaster, as my LHO failed to follow suit!  No matter what happened now, I was destined to lose three minor suit tricks to add to the ♠K.  Twelve tricks?  I did not even make ten tricks!

I think the most significant error I made in this hand is misjudging the field.  Out of 16 pairs, we were the only pair to play in 4♠!  3NT was by far the most popular contract.  If clubs run, the pairs in 3NT will make eleven or twelve tricks.  Perhaps, then, I should assume that clubs do not break, so that there might be no entry to the slow club suit winners and declarer is struggling for even nine tricks (on a diamond lead) or for only nine tricks (only two clubs, but also four spades and three top red suit tricks) on a heart lead.  Had I judged the opposing contracts better, I would have adopted my IMPs line and made ten tricks in 4♠ (for about an 80% board).

South leads a Rusinow ♠K.

I submitted this hand to Bridge Winners asking the question in the title and not offering more than my side’s 26 cards, after I had chosen a play line that adversely swung 22 IMPs for my team.  (By the way, kudos to my partner and teammates who failed — well, at least in my presence — to have criticized my line of play.)  Oh yeah, we lost that match by 21 IMPs.

I led a diamond to my king at Trick 2 (not entirely safe, but perhaps South would have led a red suit singleton if owning one), so that I could lead a club through South at Trick 2, hoping that South might show a singleton ♣J, or much less likely, a singleton ♣A.  Well, the diamond was not ruffed (good) but the club lead produced only a small club from South (disappointing).  Dummy’s ♣Q was topped by North’s ♣A.

North returned a club.

What do you play?  What might have caused the hesitation of North?

I concluded that North might have been concerned that a double would telegraph a trump holding of AJx.  Accordingly, I ducked the club return …

… and lost to the doubleton ♣J.  Converting +1090 into -100, when matched against my teammates’ -300, swung the board from a gain of 13 IMPs to a loss of 9 IMPs, a 22 IMP difference!

The publishing of this hand in Bridge Winners did produce a small consolation prize.  Kit Woolsey commented and independently inferred the same cause as did I for the hesitation of North.

Perhaps I am not as hopeless as I felt by going -100.

But I would still rather own the 22 IMPs.

But any tool works best when wielded by a craftsman.

At a recent club game, responder was favored with a very nice hand opposite a partner who had opened the bidding with 1♠.

Playing 2/1, responder began well by choosing to bid 2♦ (where high cards by partner will help develop extra tricks) rather than 2♣ (where high cards by partner could well be wasted).  Opener rebid 2♥.

Responder now bid 2♠.  By partnership agreement, the 2♠ bid shows three card spade support and requests opener to describe his distribution.

Opener rebid 3♣, showing  a fragment in clubs.  3♣ is, in effect, a splinter in diamonds.  Opener has shown either 5=4=1=3 or 5=4=0=4 distribution.

3♣ is not, or at least should not be, the bid responder wanted to hear.  3♦, on the other hand, would be the magic bid.  (Opener’s other rebid choices: 3♠ shows a sixth spade; 3♥ shows a fifth heart; 2NT shows doubletons in each minor suit.)

Still, with 17 HCP, much more than promised by the sequence to date, responder is worth a control bid and chose now to bid 3♥, probably hoping to hear 4♣ from his partner.  Instead, however, he heard a (non-serious) 3NT from his partner, evidencing a minimum opening bid.

Even a control-rich maximum for his previous bidding, say, AQxxx, xxxx, x, AQx, would not provide an adequate play for slam, and so responder should sign off now in 4♠.  Perhaps not exhibiting the craftsmanship for operating the club fragment/diamond splinter tool used by the partnership, responder nonetheless control bid 4♦.  Perhaps more unadvisedly, responder then bid keycard over opener’s subsequent 4♠ bid, reaching 6♠ on this collection.

Please notice how good would be slam had opener (hand marked North) shown a diamond fragment, rather than a club fragment, (that is, showing club splinter, rather than diamond splinter) by reversing opener’s minor suit holdings.

Continuing the building trades theme of this post, the opening leader East, having received an explanation of the declaring partnership’s bidding agreements (in effect, a blueprint), can be considered to be the building inspector, ready to identify the weakness in the hand construction.  With a minor suit cross-ruff being expected, leading a trump seems like a good choice.  Or, perhaps more trickily, leading a diamond to require declarer to make an early guess in that suit and complicating transportation between the two hands, might be considered.  Alas, opening leader East failed at exhibiting craftsmanship, too, and led the ♣T.

(As an aside, which suit might be an attractive lead had opener shown a diamond fragment at his third turn?  I think then a club would be best, because when the declaring side has shown not only a spade fit but also a diamond fit, defense should attend to the risk that a losing club can be pitched on an extra diamond winner.)

The ♣A by declarer’s (North’s) RHO West won Trick 1 and a heart was returned.  Declarer was fairly certain that he would find the ♣Q onside and make the slam, but had nothing to lose by playing for a minor suit show-up squeeze just in case.  If West held ♣Qx and ♦Kx in the end position of declarer’s ♠x, ♦x, ♣KJ opposite dummy’s ♦AQ, ♣xx, West would have no good answer to declarer’s play of the last spade and the pitch of a club from dummy.  Declarer would next play a diamond to the ace.  If the ♦A does not fell the ♦K, then a subsequent club from dummy will fell the queen.

As the hand lay, both minor suit finesses were onside and the ♣J became the lucky declarer’s twelfth trick.

But … both responder South and opening leader East need to refine their craftsmanship!

However, what struck me as interesting were the requirements for a 1-level opening bid in a suit. Now I realize that of the pairs in the final, winner-takes-all, most were playing a strong-club system, so systemically they can handle lighter opening bids — but how light is “lighter”?

I just quickly skimmed through the final half of that final: 4 segments of 15 boards each and picked out some hands to illustrate my question. I’d be curious to hear your comments. Am I a wimp because I would not have opened some of these as 1-level openings? Before saying yes, keep in mind that with a couple of partners I play a non-vulnerable 10-12 1NT opening (except in 4th position!).

Board 3, 1st position, favourable vulnerability. South opened 1♦ on this 10-count. Goren, or his ghost-writer, would have said that doubleton jack was not pulling its weight.

Board 8, 1st position, both not vulnerable. West opened 1♦ at both tables on this 4-3-3-3 11-count.

Board 16, 1st position, neither vulnerable. West opened 1♦. You may have noticed that these first 3 openings were 1♦, which is interesting because in the systems being played, an opening 1♦ bid is “nebulous” as it often is in strong-club systems. Most of the examples turn out to be 1♦ openings.

Board 18, 1st position, favourable vulnerability. East opened 1♦. I notice these are also all in 1st position — maybe you don’t get to open if you are not in 1st position!

Board 19, 1st position, favourable vulnerability. South opened 1♦. Geoff has an Ace, King, Queen, Jack, 10, but two 9’s — perhaps that makes it a better than average hand

Board 22, 1st position, unfavourable vulnerability. East opened 1♥. Well, at least this is a change from diamonds. It is also an 11-count and not a 10-count as in the previous couple of hands.

Board 28, 3rd position, favourable vulnerability. East opened 1♠ on this 8-count — it must be all those 10’s and 9’s. Or is that with a 10-count being an opening bid in 1st or 2nd position, 8 is more than enough in 3rd?

Board 29, 1st position, both vulnerable. North opened that quacky, flat, 11-count — what else? — 1♦.

Here are a couple from the last two segments (there were more than two, but I don’t think I need more to make my point).

Board 8, 1st position, neither vulnerable. Sitting E-W are a pair that are not playing a strong-club system. That enables West to open this semi-balanced 11-count 1♣.

This is getting repetitive so lets skip a bunch. Here’s a hand that is less than average — it has no 8!

Board 27, 1st position, neither vulnerable. South opened 1♦. That’s a whole 10 HCP, including a stiff queen.

So, am I a wimp in not considering any of those hands a 1 of a suit opening?

Henry Kissinger once confessed that to be known as an expert one must tell the people what they already have been led to believe. I was reminded of that when I read for the first time the much praised book by Jeff Rubens entitled, ’The Secrets of Winning Bridge’.  It is chock full of commonsense, but has he uncovered any secrets?  As Fred Gitelman points out in the introduction of the latest edition, what Rubens does so well is put into words the ideas we already believe about playing bridge. That is no mean feat. Does the book advance our ideas beyond what is commonly held to be true? No, but being a good teacher is achievement enough.

Al Roth was Rubens’ ultra-conservative mentor, whose ideas may have been based on his experience that if a Manhattan millionaire wants to give you his money for the sport of it, you’d be a fool not to take it. And you must not give it back. He wrote of bidding as ‘painting a picture’. I think he was referring to the works of Impressionist School, where with a few deft strokes the artist may capture the essence of a subject, leaving it to the viewer to fill in the details from his own imagination. Presumably the artist then hurries off to Café Montmartre for a few quick one with his friends. The bidding tools available to the bridge player are necessarily crude instruments, so we paint with broad strokes and it becomes expedient that one captures the essence of one’s collection of cards within the limits of the inadequate tools at hand. This process goes beyond the bounds of systemic rules, and some creativity and imagination are required, especially in contested auctions, otherwise we are merely painting by numbers, numbers of high card points, that is.

Location, Location, Location
As he is addressing the average bridge player, Rubens is quick to point out that HCP  evaluation is accurate about 90% of the time when both partners hold flat hands. That is comfort for the masses, but he then points out that HCP evaluation is not perfect as there are cases where the expectation is far from reality. Here are two hands he uses to illustrate the shortcoming of relying solely on HCP totals.

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With Hands A and B the standard opening bid is 2NT. The responder has 12 HCP. The simple approach is for responder to bid 6NT on a combined HCP total of 33 HCP, yet with Hand B 10 tricks are the limit, whereas with Hand A 12 tricks are easy. What is wrong? As Rubens describes it, whereas the top cards remain in place, the movement of the apparently insignificant 2’s and the 3’s from one suit to another makes a big difference. The thought that insignificant cards are often crucial some may find disturbing. Are we therefore condemned to a bridge life governed by hidden factors?

The solution is rather simple: as with real estate, the value of controls depends on location, location, location. That means more than the locations within one’s own hand, but the locations with respect to the controls held in partner’s hand. One can discover the degree of fit through an honest exchange of information with one’s partner. Furthermore, it is not the weak responder who should be asking the questions and making the decisions, it is the stronger hand, as the holder of the most controls can better place the controls opposite and better evaluate the fit. Standard bidders don’t follow this principle; they want to preserve the right to decide no matter what, exercising what they call judgment.

There is a relay system that allows for better evaluation, the Viking Club, because the initial response structure is based largely on showing shape. Asking for controls follows later in the auction. So both Hand A and Hand B are opened 1♣ and the bidding proceeds to 3♠ with responder showing 12-14 HCP with 3=4=2=4 shape. With Hand B the opener soon discovers the existence of a mirrored distribution in a division of sides of  6=8=4=8, all even numbers. It is not difficult to avoid 6NT and stop in a heart game contract where declarer may play along elimination lines with the hope of avoiding 3 club losers. With Hand B opener uncovers a more likely distribution, 7=6=5=8, which provides 12 tricks of the top. (Note the odd numbered splits allow for the discarding of losers.) This division of sides is much more likely than the other which justifies bidding 6NT if one is making a blind guess. It is a question of probability based on partial knowledge. Gather more information about the division of sides and the probabilities change.

Late in life I have discovered the importance of the division of sides. I call it the sweet mystery of bridge. It is a mystery that can be explained, but most players don’t want to talk about it. Instead, they are eager to tell you how many points they held.

Yin and Yang Hand Types
Jeff Rubens is recognized as the man who put forward the Useful-Space Principle that states that in a constructive auction space should be assigned where it is most useful regardless of the natural or traditional meanings of the call. Transfer bids are a good example of such an assignment. Today overcallers realize that their job is to remove useful space when the deal belongs to the other side thereby undoing Rubens’ good work.
Overcalls are getting to be very light and the suit bid can be weak. In the face of interference the emphasis is clearly on showing support for partner’s suit, and authors have devised methods to distinguish the kind of support partner can expect. There is the other side of the coin: how much value exists in the overcaller’s suit. This aspect has been largely neglected. Obviously with the sides balanced in HCP, the more your side holds in their suit, the more points they are likely to hold in yours – a reason for caution.

It is best when painting a picture with your bids is to attempt to capture the essence of your holding by separating flat (Yin) hands from distributional (Yang) hands as early as possible, and among flat hands to distinguish hands that are well stocked in the opponents’ suit and those that are not. Suppose partner opens the bidding and your RHO overcalls. For flat hands the high card content is a major means of evaluation whereas for shapely hands losing trick count and controls come to the fore. Troubles occur when responder’s reaction can be a mix of the two categories. We are thinking here of the all encompassing negative double which can be made with a long suit and limited values or with a flat hand and scattered values. The long suit may never enter the consciousness of the opener, who will tend to use high card content as the default means of evaluation.

Flat hands have little potential for contributing significantly to the number of total trumps. The difference between the longest suit and the shortest suit sets the absolute limit. A 5-4-3-1 shape is excellent as it contributes 4 to the total trumps if there is a fit in the 5-card suit, 3 if the best fit is in the 4-card suit, and even 2 in the third worst candidate. Of course, you will not uncover the best fit unless you bid, sometimes incautiously. The one thing one should not do is press on aggressively when holding top honours in an opponent’s suit.

Information Reveals the Unusual
Bidding systems are based largely on the assumption of normal circumstances, and encounter difficulty when conditions are not normal. A bid is most informative when it reveals something unexpected. An overcaller normally has values in the suit he chooses to bid, and an advancer may also. So bidding a topless suit has a deceptive element that may work to one’s advantage. If the AKQ in a suit are missing, the chances are they are distributed around the table with no one player the wiser. If someone holds two of these cards, that player will know that something unusual is in the offing. So in competition, especially with a flat hand, one does best to keep partner informed of the abnormal state of affairs when the opponents are bidding a weak suit. Here is an extreme example from the 2005 Bermuda Bowl Final.

According to the analysis of Eric Kokish, Lauria and Versace are known for their aggressive style in competition which leads them to bid many a hopeless game. Furthermore, the Italian’s attitude towards doubling is less shape-restrictive than one expects (but doesn’t always get) from American players. Presumably with this cat-and-mouse style one has to rely on the opponents’ reactions more than is healthy in order to glean from the auction the necessary information on the lie of the cards, which leads to the dangerous condition of reliance on the opponents more than one’s partner.

The HCPs are divided 19 to NS who have a 9-card spade fit and 21 to EW who have an 8-card heart fit in addition to a supplemental 8-card fit in diamonds. The Law of Total Tricks if crudely applied leaves to the expectation of 17 total tricks in the play. Indeed, Meckwell could come to 9 tricks in a spade contract, but what about EW? With the expectation of only 8 tricks it appears rather too aggressive to bid even a vulnerable game, as the Italians are wont to do. As the cards lie, they should be held to 6 tricks, so the number of total tricks was 15, not a total one wants to encounter at the 4-level, or even the 3-level, as Hamman-Soloway discovered when they reached 3♥, unopposed and undoubled, off 300.

One can see on a double dummy basis that the problem is that EW are missing the AK in one red suit, and AQJ in the other. Versace took the final fatal step, however, the blame lies with Lauria who can see in his hand the AK of the suit introduced freely on his right, representing 7 of the 12 HCP he holds. Any bid by him at this stage will be altogether too encouraging. The warning signs are up. Leaving Meckwell to play in a spade partial making 9 tricks would give Italy 4 superfluous IMPs to add to their final winning total. Which proves what? Overall, aggression pays, but it should be exercised with discretion.

In a competitive auction one problem is how to best describe the hand, another, how best  inconvenience the opponents. Over 1♠ Lauria had 2 reasonable space-saving options: a responsive double or a pass. Of course, we are all reluctant to pass, Lauria more so than most, so a double would fit the bill, if it were defined to show this type of hand – an opening hand with nowhere to go linked with a willingness to go somewhere. He chose to be disruptive, which didn’t inconvenience Meckstroth one bit. It is safe enough to bid 9-card fits missing top honors. As for Verace’s 4♥ bid, well, sometimes one can be too clever – or should I say, too trusting, which is not the same thing.

It is in human nature that conservatism increases in proportion to uncertainty. After World War II and The Great Depression, anxious parents filled piggy banks and taught their kids to save their pennies and the dollars would take care of themselves. Of course, we can now see that they would have done better to borrow to the hilt to buy stocks in devastated and discredited companies like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of Japan.  

It was a time when Charles Goren was the King of Bridge. He was known for not doing anything flashy – he left that side of the game to his partner, Helen Sobel. While his bidding system is a thing of the past, his books on card play are still worth reading. Today’s attitude is more upbeat, and the current King of Bridge is the aggressive and inventive Jeff Meckstroth, who plays a system that remains a mystery to the uninformed masses.

In his book, Secrets of Winning Bridge (1969), Jeff Rubens gives his opinion that matchpoint game does not qualify ‘real’ bridge, because one’s score on a given board depends on how one’s results compares with the large number of pairs who play the same cards as you do. I ask, ‘what’s wrong with that?’ It’s like major league baseball: over a long season you must score well against the poorer opponents while holding your own against the better ones. Situations arise that are beyond one’s control, however, and overall it’s technique that determine how well you will do.

In a matchpoint contest each board is scored on the basis of a ranking from best result to poorest result. The rankings are added over all the boards. This gives a statistic based on the sum of ranks, a perfectly valid indicator of achievement. A board passed out, defended at 1NT or bid to 7NT carry the same weight. So what does the final statistic measure? At best it measures your overall efficiency in all aspects of the game, at worst how well your opponents played against you. Bridge is a game, the rules are arbitrary, and your score, for better or worse, is what you live with until next time. Don’t take it personal.

What is the relationship between the results at the tables and the double dummy results? One would like to believe that the two are highly correlated. Achieve the double dummy result and you should score well. That is not guaranteed on any given board. More often the results at the table reflects how closely the bidding has conformed to the bidding system most favoured by the majority of the players, in my club 2/1 GF with 5-card majors. The bidding system possesses a certain degree of accuracy but the design is geared to seeking high scoring contracts like 3NT and 4 of a major that will succeed under normal circumstances. Go down in 3NT with 25 HCP and you are assured of not having suffered a bottom score. It is even worse than that. Here is what can happen.

Eight pairs got to 3NT uncontested after West opened 1NT. One East, Blaster Bob, merely raised 1NT to 3NT, whereas 7 others went through an invitational sequence, having subtracted a point due to the poor 4-3-3-3 shape as they had been taught to do. At these tables the bidding proceeded as follows: 1NT – 2♣; 2♠ – 2NT; 3NT – Pass. There are 2 advantages to this long-winded  approach: East will be absolved of blame no matter the result, and the opening leader may be deceived into thinking East holds 4 hearts for his Stayman enquiry. At one table an expert pair did better (in theory) using the delicate sequence that follows.

Against the field’s adherence to 2/1 bidding with a strong NT, Sid and Sam were playing a weak NT system in which a 1♦ opening bid promises at least 4 cards in the suit.  Without interference 2♦ would be a transfer, but after an overcall it could best be described as ‘nonforcing but constructive.’ Which is to say, any squeak for an opponent reduces their elaborate structure to natural rubble. Similarly, in an uncontested auction opener’s 2♠ rebid would be a strong reverse and 2NT would show a standard strong NT opening bid. After interference with diamonds established as trumps, 2♠ was merely forcing to 3♦. Sam evaluated his cards in the light of these developments. A return to diamonds would not show his true worth, and he had a weakness for playing in 4-3 major fits, so he gave a raise to 3♠, ending the auction, but arriving happily at the optimal EW contract. Three rounds of hearts were lead, declarer discarding a club on the 3rd round. Sid gave a sigh of relief when both defenders followed to the ♦A and ♦Q.

‘Phew,’ exclaimed Sid, ‘lucky the diamonds were 3-2. 3NT is down off the top on the heart lead, so we should score pretty well’. As with most statements made immediately following the play this was misguided wishful thinking, for pairs in 3NT were making 9 or 10 tricks even on a heart lead. S&S scored 1 out of a top of 8.

Five pairs in 3NT made 10 tricks on the fourth-best lead. Two players led the ♥A to look at the dummy. In one case South played the ♥2, upside-down attitude, blocking the suit, but getting an above-average score. Immediately upon checking the score this pair agreed the method which they were trying for the first time was superior to standard hi-lo they had been playing together for 20 years. At another table South unblocked the ♥T, but North continued with a low heart, giving declarer his 10th trick.
South: What’s wrong? I was unblocking.
North: You played the Ten, denying the Jack
South: So what’s the difference? Just cash your King.

Blaster Bob’s partner, Passive Polly, once more unlucky, was the only declarer to go down when two Grandmasters got it right, partly because they approach all games bid by Bob with an appropriate degree of suspicion.

A rose by any other name may smell as sweet, but a contract by any other route may not be a good. It depends on what information has become available to the defenders. Probabilities are not fixed stars in the firmament, they move around as information becomes available. Probability is linked to information which is linked to choice.

On aggregate Sid and Sam may gain on their use of the weak NT, but there will be hands where the strong NT puts declarer in a better place because of the uncertainties remaining. Here Sid could have been more crafty. Once Sam raised to 3♠, Sid could guess the field would be playing in 3NT on a heart lead. If he aimed to minimize his loss if he were wrong, as suggested by Kit Woolsey in his book, Matchpoints, he would have bid 3NT despite the opponents’ actions, faking a stopper. It might have worked. How often the opening lead against a freely bid 3NT is not in the suit bid and raised by the opponents. Instead he aimed to maximize his gain, expecting the vast majority to be going down in 3NT. He was unlucky on this hand because the ♥A and ♥K were with the opening leader rather than divided between the defenders. Crudely speaking by going against the field Sid had a 2 to 1 chance of a top score.

There should be no grounds for complaint if 1 in 3 times one scores poorly. Indeed, we should all be glad to play a session where on two-thirds of the hands one starts with an advantage over the field. Just playing the cards well and counting out the hands is the mark of a consistent winner in a mixed field, but there is no virtue in resting on one’s superior abilities in that regard. Although there is safety within a crowd, it is regressive to suggest that there is an advantage to be got from bidding as badly as the majority. There is such a thing as progress, after all, even though there remains uncertainty in execution

Were We Fixed?
A common lament from also-rans is that they lost because they were fixed by some silly action by the opponents. My partner might say likewise, but I don’t think that way. Here is a recent deal where the defenders bid strangely to our great disadvantage.

 As she put down the dummy, Connie apologized for her bidding, something I always avoid before the results are in. ‘I know this is wrong,’ she said, ‘but I had one of my hearts in with my diamonds.’ If she hadn’t said that I would have congratulated her on her fine bidding, but one can’t congratulate someone for their poor eyesight. You see, she was apologizing for bidding the hand correctly, that is, against the standard matchpoint procedure of always doubling a spade overcall when you hold 4 hearts. Naturally by bidding correctly the pair outbid the field to an ice-cold slam and handed us a bottom.

There are lessons to be learned. Perhaps I should have passed and awaited developments? Naaa. Maybe I should add another convention to the card and adopt Roman Jump Overcalls? Naaa. Maybe, partner should have jumped to 3♠ on nothing? Get real, these things happen. I don’t blame Dame Fate in the guise of a nice lady for our falling one short in the rankings. There were two other hands where we scored poorly when the opponents bid to 6♥ with 13 tricks off the top. Painful, perhaps, that the field offered us no protection against competent bidding, but if on the last round I had counted out a hand correctly we would have ended in first place. So, control what you can control, and forget about what you can’t.

While in New Orleans playing the Mixed Pairs with June Pocock I came across this deal.

Dealer West. Neither side vulnerable.

The lead was Ace of clubs, dropped the King from dummy, Jack, 7. North switched to the Queen of hearts, 3, Ace and once again dropped the King! South led the 10 of Diamonds, Ace, at this point I half expected another King to drop, but it was the 7, 5. Now June led the Queen of Spades, 5, Ace, dropped another singleton King!!!

What an amazing hand, three times the Rabbi’s rule.

Preempts these days hardly conform to any rules. During the 2014 Reisinger Final against Levin-Weinstein, Andrew Gromov tied the record for the worst 6-card suit opened at the 3-level in first seat. He opened 3♠ on: ♠ 765432 ♥ 7 ♦ 54 ♣ 984. Not to be outdone in the record-tying department, his partner, Aleksander Dubinin, raised on ♠ AKQJ matching the previous best 4-card raise to game. In the subsequent confusion the Russians defeated their opponents’ 5♥ contract by 3 tricks. It would be remiss of me not to mention that Gromov-Dubinin would have won the board even if they had passed throughout.  Here is the full deal with the auction at the other table.

Meckstroth unimaginatively passed initially. Rodwell eventually doubled 4♥ by Grzegorz Narkiewicz and gave up 590 to the opposition. The loss was only 1 board at BAM scoring. Meckstroth does what Meckstroth does, but how should we approach a similar situation? Larry Cohen’s guidelines regarding total tricks suggest a player in doubt should bid 4♠ over 4♥. With respect to total trumps East might expect 18 in the form of 10 spades and 8 hearts. The Law requires a reasonable balance of HCPs, which we do have here, 17 versus 23, but the East hand is pretty much useless on defence. It is reasonable for a strong hand to double expecting partner not be without an entry, otherwise one will not be doubling enough. Rodwell’s double should not mean, ‘leave it in, I’ve got them down in my own hand.’ So Meckstroth’s pass indicates he was trusting his partner more than his opponents, hard to do but always the right approach. With no sign of an entry in the East hand Rodwell has to develop tricks entirely from his own hand. Even with BAM scoring passing the double is rather too strong a position to take when your partner isn’t of the caliber of Eric Rodwell, and even then …..

Let’s turn our attention to Meckstroth’s 2♠ bid. When I emulate the experts and bid on nothing, it usually comes back to haunt me. Partner is more likely to be fooled than are the opponents. After all, partners are supposed to trust one another whereas the opponents are rightfully suspicious. Beyond that, the opponents can guess more easily that you have nothing, and may be encouraged to bid on to their best contract, and play it correctly to boot given the information you have given them free of charge. If partner forces you to bid, that’s different. So I think over 1♥ Meckstroth should either have passed, giving up the hand early, or bid 4♠ on the assumed 10-card fit. It is of interest to note that 5♥ should make double dummy (Deep Finesse) so the fact that Levin was defeated by 3 tricks points to the fact that the insane overbid is often more effective than the reasonable wait-and-see approach. It is always hard to gauge the depth of insanity.

Bidding Topless Suits
Those who preempt or overcall on topless suits do leave clues, which relate primarily to the length of the suit bid. The deception in the clue lies in the lower than average high-card content within the suit. Usually length and strength go together, so disjointedness may steer the opponents in the wrong direction, the deception being greatest when the missing honours are split between defenders. It doesn’t work so well if one opponent is well stocked, so can see through the deception.

Last month at my club South, nonvul vs vul, opened 2♠ on ♠ JT9875 ♥ 84 ♦ 954 ♣ K9. My partner, West, bravely passed on ♠ AK843 ♥ J72 ♦ 3 ♣ AQ32, and when I made a balancing double on 0=4=5=4 shape with 9 HCP, he had 2 chances for a good score: pass for penalty (500) or bid 3NT (600). John greedily chose to play the hand in 3NT. North led the ♠Q from ♠Q2. Declarer held up on the first lead and won the second. After a lead to the dummy’s ♦KJT87, winning the ♦J, he was able to count the hand and manufacture an endplay against North to yield the 9th trick. With no major fit, most EW pairs played undisturbed in a club partial.

The preemptor had deception in mind with no redeeming feature in hand. One can hardly expect to shut out the others at the table with such flimsy values. A good preempt presents the opposition with a losing option, but here there wasn’t one.

Opening Very Light
The ACBL allows very light opening bids in a suit provided a prior announcement is made. This warning is ineffective as most opening bids will be normal. It’s like the boy crying, ‘Wolf’. Let’s just assume that everyone opens light upon occasion.

Trouble arises if one assumes the HCP content is directly related to the playing potential of the hand. The HCP descriptor takes on the role of an evaluator. This is a common assumption foisted on beginners, some of whom never learn better. If the official 2/1 rule is simply that an opening bid of 1♥ promises at least 5 hearts and at least 10 HCP, as the newer player is led to believe, then the opening bid on less is a ‘lie’, but it is not outside the law and it makes bridge sense. So the ‘lie’ is not even a fib: it is a systemic flaw.

There are many ways to evaluate a hand that go beyond the simple point count. Taking into account the shape of the hand, a player is allowed to add points because of distribution, so a sound 1♥ bid may contain less than 10 HCP. In The Joy of Bridge by Audrey Grant and Eric Rodwell, the authors suggest adding 5 points for an 8-card suit, so the opening bid of 1♥ may legitimately contain a mere 8 HCP yielding the required 13 ‘points’. Only the bidder knows how much he owes to shape and how much to high-card strength.

Let’s consider a hand that appeared in the Ask Jerry column of the August 2014 ACBL Bulletin. Presumably Helms’ answers to questions from ‘newer players’ meet with ACBL approval. The hand was ♠ AJ ♥ 98765432 ♦ 5 ♣ A7, and the question was, ‘what would you bid as dealer?’ Helms recommended opening 1♥ as ‘the least lie’. Certainly a 6-loser has playing potential. With regard to defensive values, Helms believes that the presence of two aces is sufficient defence for an opening bid at the one level. It is a sad situation indeed when a new player is told it is in his best interest to ‘lie’.

The offense to defence ratio is not the main consideration here: it’s the effect on an opponents’ thinking. For ‘newer players’ the least lie with the above hand is 3♥. This hand wouldn’t be much of a surprise to an inexperienced opponent when it is eventually revealed. The poor quality of the suit argues for treating it as a 7-carder. Bidding and play can follow normal procedures, and decisions will have a reasinable basis to work from. Of course, 3♥ is not the most effective bid for the opening side, because 1♥ gives a better chance of getting to slam. On the other hand, if partner has a poor hand, the opponents may be confused during both the bidding and the play. The opponents will not be able to come to a well-reasoned solution based on probabilities, luck will be the determining factor, and it is most likely to benefit the opening bidder. One concludes that by ‘the least lie’, 2/1 teachers actually mean, ‘the most effective lie’ within the context of the system as it has been taught to beginners. So why not start by teaching truthfully from the start?

The Effect of Mysterious Bidding
Consider the classic ending of an Agatha Christie mystery. Hercule Poirot has gathered the suspects in the library and is about to reveal the identity of the killer of the nasty millionaire with a shady past. ‘I am baffled; it appears none of you did it,’ he reveals, ‘It may have been a mysterious contract killer who mistakenly came to the wrong address.’ Agatha would get howls of protest from her fans; the out-of-the-blue ending has made a mockery of the reader’s attempt to sift the truth out of the evidence and overcome the false clues provided. Well, the same applies to playing a hand of bridge. There has to be a chance of getting it right by thinking it through, otherwise the whole exercise becomes a farce. If the ending comes by chance after one has been misled all along the way, the work of the little grey cells has been wasted entirely. ‘No, no, no, mes amis, it was suicide made to look like murder.’ Bridge players are prepared to believe that for they have seen it often enough with their own eyes.

Better Than 50%
A slam on a finesse is condemned by senior experts, especially in a matchpoint game, but some finesses are better than 50%.  As Terrance Reese has noted, there is usually a clue.

John Miller opened a potent 1♥ (5 losers, 4 controls) and I had an old-fashioned 4-card raise, 12+ – 15 HCP. John asked for controls in the minors, and I showed my 5. He did not hesitate to bid the slam. It is always a temptation to bid a slam merely to celebrate having a convention others haven’t got, but that wasn’t the reason here. Over 3NT South passed quickly before John remembered that 3NT was a conventional raise.  It had never arisen before. Belatedly he alerted, and South noted she could take back her pass. John agreed, and she thought some time before passing again. So who would you think holds the ♠A? It was unlucky I didn’t have another queen lurking in the background, but the doubleton spade was a hidden chance that worked as well.

Another factor that enters the calculation is that playing in 4♥ making 12 tricks was a below average score, because 2 players were doubled in that contract. So you don’t need a full 50% chance to bid slam. What you need is a method that convinces an opponent that you are over your head in 4♥. Maybe some opened a putrid 3♥ and were raised to 4♥ – that could do it.

What I have noticed is that many of the psychological issues are consistent in all three of these activities.

The first one may be called things like pregame jitters or performance anxiety or stage fright. It is the feelings you get when you are waiting to begin an important match. These are based on the human “flight or flee” response. In short when humans feel “threatened”, the pitituary gland secrets ACTH and the adrenal gland secretes epinephrine. This is to prime you to either face the enemy or run away (Fight or flee). The body releases glucose and also starts the production of addition energy to prepare muscles for action. Blood is diverted to the muscles, and all parts of your body work to supply extra energy.The heart beats faster, you breath faster, you may start to shake, and so on.

In sports  (and here bridge is a sport) performance anxiety is often worse when the game seems important. It may relate to having an audience (you should have seen me play when I was first on Vugraph or on the Internet – no its best not to!).

If the bridge player lacks confidence than it will be tough for self talk or other similar techniques to help them to do their best.  I remember once when I was playing in the World Championships I met Bob Hamman in the elevator. We were in the quarterfinals I think and I was nervous because we were up against a good team. Bob told me that they put their pants on one foot at a time to reassure me. I have never forgotten his attempt at relaxing me but it really didn’t help. I knew they were better than our team.

Instead of fighting the pregame jitters, better advice is probably to accept it as normal and as part of the natural preparation for competition. Once the game starts you feel better. I think we all have pregame routines. What I have learned in all the games/sports I play is that the pregame routine can calm me and get me ready for the start. Other ideas might be using positive self-talk. “I am going to do my best.”, to smile and try to separate the outcome from just bidding and playing each hand.

Self Talk

Most people have running dialogues with themselves. If you have make a bad bid or play do you shoot yourself down? (I do!) The goal is to replace negative messages with positive ones. “I am going to figure out the right line of play.”

One thing that I do when I run and play tennis is use mantras: short positive statements that are encouraging or provide focus.” In tennis I use one word: “Ball” to remind myself to focus on the ball. In bridge I might use the one word on play: “Count” to remind myself to work and count out the hand. In running as I get tired I use: “You can do it!”

Scientists deplore the introduction of human factors into the game, (why can’t we act more like computers?), but really, doesn’t that add to the game’s challenges? Facing a married couple who have been playing together for 40 years, one needs to know more than what’s in a book of mathematical tables – one has to know something of human nature. They won’t always do what you would have done with the same cards, and you can’t expect the said couple to forget, much less forgive, all those annoying habits they have come to recognize over decades. It works both ways.

If you come to our club seeking a partner you will probably be assigned Edna, a former club owner, now, alas, suffering from Parkinson’s disease and confined to a wheelchair. Her most enduring memories include shaking (left) hands with Pete Grey, the one-armed outfielder for the St Louis Browns. Apparently what drives her still is an abiding desire to screw up a Precision auction as long as she’s still able to do so. Your pre-game preparation might go something like this.
‘Hello, my name is Edna and I’m a nonagenarian. Do you know what that means?’
‘Does it mean you belong to an ancient sect that rejects The Book of Genesis?’
‘No! It means I’m over 90 years old.’
‘Congratulations, I wouldn’t have guessed. Well, Edna, what do you play?’
‘I play whatever you play.’
‘Precision?’
‘No, not Precision’
‘Flannery?’
‘No, not Flannery.’
‘Drury?’
‘No, not Drury – you will find I always have my bids.’
‘Stayman?’
‘Yes. Last week I came in first without any of this fancy stuff.’
‘Now we’re getting somewhere. 15 to 17 No Trump?’
‘Not with 4-3-3-3.’
‘You don’t open 1NT with 4-3-3-3?’
‘No! I don’t use Stayman with 4-3-3-3. 4NT is always straight Blackwood.’
‘That avoids confusion. How about , no, not Ogust….’
‘I won’t start without my tea and cookie. The cookies are over there on the shelf.’
‘Lots of milk in the tea? I’m guessing here.’
‘Yes, please, if you would be so kind, but make sure it’s hot.’

I daresay anyone could have a good game playing with Zia, but here you would be facing a real challenge, but the same problem at the table that your opponents will be facing. The only difference is that they will be moving on after 2 boards. Still, bridge is bridge, and the most important factor is where the cards lie. It’s important to maintain your concentration. Here is a recent deal that was particularly upsetting to my partner, John, who once more was done in by the redoubtable Edna.

Ben, a naval veteran of the Korean War, has been witness to many astonishing feats in his day, especially in the port cities of the Orient, but even he took some time before passing Edna’s unusual 3NT. When John asked what 3NT meant, Ben shook his head and replied thoughtfully, ‘I don’t know.’ That made sense. Knowing Edna as we do, ‘impervious’ is the adjective that comes to mind, one should take him at his word. There is no need to call for the director. As South I would have bid a pass-or-correct 5♣, even 6♣ is a good save against 4♥ making, but in the light of history one can understand Ben’s reluctance to support with support. At the club passing with nothing is usually the best course of action, and doubling merely adds to the confusion, but, of course, one can’t double one’s partner even if at times you feel like it. As it was, John got to show both his suits and eventually reached the optimum EW contract.

Despite the wayward auction, on a club lead declarer has only to play the diamonds for one loser.  So, the ♣A ruffed, a heart to the lightning-fast ace, and the ♣K, ruffed, put declarer in his hand with the diamond suit foremost in his mind. John drew a second trump with the ♥K in dummy and ran the ♦8, losing to the ♦T. The ♠J was returned. A third trump to dummy allowed for a finesse of the ♦Q, losing to the bare ♦K for down 1, leaving us to wonder if there wasn’t a better play. Just because a play doesn’t work doesn’t mean it’s wrong, although it always feels that way. If it feels good, it might be wrong. Even if it feels good and is good, some smart-ass will tell you it’s wrong.

Playing at our club where the uncertainties are greater than previously thought theoretically possible, it pays to distrust the bidding and gather information on card placement before committing to a line of play in a critical suit. In the face of partial knowledge one is supposed to assume what is most probable. Cashing the ♠AK entails a little risk, but if one does that before drawing the last trump it enables one to ruff a third spade and conclude North began with a tripleton spade and a singleton heart. Entries to dummy are few, so declarer must unblock some intermediate trumps to preserve entries. Here the conclusion would be that the diamonds sit 2 in the North and 3 in the South. This is exactly the way it was.

There are 2 ways to approach the diamond suit under these circumstances. One way is to finesse twice starting by running the ♦8, as John did. The other is to play the ♦A first and see what transpires – a discovery play rather than an attempt to drop a singleton ♦K. If the ♦T appears from the North, go to dummy, lead the ♦8 and cover South’s card. .The Principle of Restricted Choice tells us it is 2:1 that North was dealt ♦KT rather than ♦JT. Let’s compare the results for the 10 possible combinations. In loving memory of my high-school algebra teacher, ‘Grumpy’ Gordon, let a and b stand for the missing low cards.

Playing the ♦A first loses in 3 cases out of 8. Ironically this sequence scores up the game. The commonly held belief is that optimally one runs the ♦8 and finesses the ♦Q on the second round. This loses in 2 cases. The key combination is JTa opposite Kb. If Ben plays the ♦J on the second round, it is twice as likely to be from ♦KJa than from ♦JTa.

There is more to the story. The optimum play clearly depends on whether you feel Ben is capable of playing the ♦J from ♦Jab on the first round. If you are a stranger to our club, you won’t know Ben, so you could assume that he is capable of this expert play. But if, based on his scruffy appearance, you feel Ben is not up to the extravagant expenditure, you would assume he would never play the J from J53 on the first round. Under that assumption, the optimum play is to go up with the ace on the second round once the 2 low cards have appeared from his hand. Then one loses only in one case out of ten, Kab opposite JT. Technically, John’s play of the ♦Q on the second round was a compliment to Ben’s abilities. Maybe, Ben, knowing John’s expertise, had purposefully double false-carded? Intriguing thought; sometimes it’s hard to distinguish between accident and intent.

As the cards lay, going on a voyage of discovery would have accomplished nothing. The standard plays are based on what is most probable, so discovering the cards are placed where they most probably are adds little. That is the reason why so many play carelessly. However, one gains when the cards are not distributed as expected. Suppose John plays off the top spades before playing a second trump. The defensive signals may suggest Edna held 2 spades and Ben, 5. The distribution of the diamonds is now most probably 3 in the North and 2 in the South. That recommends an alternative line of play with this 7-card ending and the lead in the dummy.

The ♦8 is led and South’s jack is covered, leaving the old lady helplessly endplayed. What sweet revenge that would have been against an old nemesis! Playing off the ♠AK to a 7-card ending works most of the time when North holds 3 spades and 2 diamonds, as we have seen, but in this case success is guaranteed. So technique should have overcome psychology, which is the way we scientists would like it to end.

Well, that was just one of the exciting hands played that day that could have been dull, but weren’t. The local club presents the participants with problems they will not find in textbooks. If one wants to win, it is nobler to win by making smart plays, rather than sitting back and profiting from the opponents’ frequent mistakes. One should strive to actively take advantage of the opportunities presented. On the given deal 5 out of 8 players declared in 4♥, only one making an overtrick. Let’s give Edna some credit for her initiative in pushing us higher. Three players were in 5♥, only one making it. Playing off the ♠AK early as suggested would result in a 90% score. So good declarer play would be amply rewarded. On the other hand, bad play is not punished as much as it would be in an expert game, which keeps the majority coming back for more. As the less fortunate transgressors often remark, ‘we had company, partner.’ Which is nice.

Another approach is to bid informatively in the hopes of finding a better contract. It usually doesn’t pay to bid with a view of avoiding a close game, so what is meant here is bidding to a minor suit slam. A making slam is rarer than a making 3NT, so this approach is working against the a priori expectations. Information by its very definition is what separates prior expectations from reality. If information is exchanged and the expectations are fulfilled, the bidders have to some extent reduced their chances of success in 3NT, especially when they have stretched to their limit. Many inferior players have a phobia against describing their hands and look for ways to win by guile.

The Bias towards 3NT
Here is a real-life illustration of a systemic failure which came up on BBO in a Portuguese tournament. As the opening bidder how do you view the following hand: ♠ — ♥ A53 ♦ K64 ♣ AKQ9763? Would you think of it as a hand that will play well in 3NT if partner has the semblance of a spade stopper? Or would you see it as a 4-loser hand for which slam is probable if partner has cover cards in the red suits? The best contract depends on whether partner’s honors lie primarily in the red suits or in spades. A priori one would bet on spades as an honour in one suit is more probable than honours in two, but it pays to find out, if the system allows you to do so. This was the auction at one table.

6NT was doubled for a spade lead, and the contract was down off the top as the ♠AQ sat behind the ♠KJ86. One might consider this an unlucky result, but actually it was lucky because at the other table the contract was 7NT, down 2, doubled! Nonetheless the result was horrible as 7♣ is an obvious lay-down contract. 6NT played the other way was cold, so why did the opening bidder bid NT with a void? The system made him do it. His incredible tunnel vision followed as a consequence of his view that his was a 3NT rebid.

Rather than opener trying to describe his highly unusual, strong hand it is better if responder describes his hand. A 4-4-3-2 shape is not unusual. Here is a sequence we could use starting with a Precision 1♣, that says nothing about clubs.

Opener has the option of bidding 2NT/2♠ to ask for a 4-card major. Instead he is able to set the priorities towards a club slam in the knowledge that responder has at least 2 clubs. Natural control bids follow until responder shows a preference for 6NT, which would have scored well in Portugal. From his point of view 6NT is in keeping with the general nature of his hand. Opener should know enough by this time to bid the Grand Slam.

1NT within the 2/1 System
1NT is the anchor bid with regard to reaching 3NT contracts. In the past the lower limit for 1NT was 16 HCP. The average number of points opposite was 8, so 3NT was within grasp nearly half the time. With the passage of time the lower limit has decreased so that today , playing 14-16 limits I find this 13-point hand worthy of 1NT: ♠ Q8 ♥ KT7 ♦ KJ96 ♣ AT93. The most likely contract will be in NT, but the hand contains decent support for the majors. The average number of points opposite is 7, so game is available less than half the time which means one is bidding primarily to win the part score battle. If partner proceeds to 3NT on 10 HCP, it’s true that an extra Jack might make a difference, but a sequence of 1♦ – 1♥; 1NT doesn’t appeal to me at all. Exchange the minors with the majors and there is too great a chance of missing a major partial on a 4-4 fit, so I open 1♦.

In the 2/1 system described by Max Hardy (1989), a higher range of HCP is maintained, which leaves a gap between the rebids after a light minor suit opening bid. To remedy this, Hardy includes some very good hands with a 6-card minor in the 1NT category, presumably to benefit from a bolstering of the lower limit from 11 HCP to 15 HCP. The effect of this is to place a poison pill within the 1NT bid, for example, ♠ A7 ♥ K6 ♦ 942 ♣ AKQ965 – a 5-loser hand with 6 controls, the equivalent power of  20 HCP. To show such power opener must bid 2NT freely at his next turn. Most of the time, this will work in giving a good description of the exceptional holding, however, there is a theoretical problem. For responder to show interest in a diamond slam this sequence is recommended: 1NT – 2♦; 2♥ – 2♠; 2NT – 3♦, where 3♦ is the first meaningful bid. It shows a 6-loser hand with a broken 6-card diamond suit. 2♦ normally shows hearts, but 2♠ cancels that meaning and says responder is about to show a hand with a good minor suit. However, opener may have the big hand folded into 1NT and he must bid 2NT/2♦ to show it. Here is a possible outcome.

Responder plans to bid 2♠/2♥ as a forcing relay canceling the normal meaning and enabling him to bid 3♦ to show a broken diamond suit with 6 losers. Opener ruins this plan by showing a ‘solid’ minor, obviously clubs. Responder follows through showing diamonds, but opener can’t tell if this was his original intent. In these circumstances 3♦ could have several interpretations.

• a broken diamond suit, 6 losers
• a re-transfer to hearts
• hearts and diamonds

 Because the 2♠ cancellation has not occurred, the original intended meaning should be no longer a valid interpretation. In fact 6NT is a good contract on this particular placement of the major suit controls, but the bidding system is not helping the players to reach it. It is bad practice when one must fight one’s system. I would expect a gutsy responder to jump to 6♦ and hope partner makes the right choice.

Some players will not worry about missing the occasional slam because they use the hide-and-seek approach foisted on them by 2/1 designers. It appears many have a phobia about giving up information, which means they prefer to guess unnecessarily in order to take advantage of the uncertainty in the auction. The argument is that they gain overall on frequency. However, this is not an either-or choice as there are approaches that allow one to distinguish between situations for which one should take a flyer at 3NT, and for which one should go slowly and bid informatively.

Bidding within a Context
The system designer has given users guidelines to see him through under normal circumstances, but during a cooperative auction a player is free to choose one bid over another, in that way selecting the information he prefers to convey. The selection process begins at the first bid. It is best if a target contract can be assumed earlier rather than later in order to choose the information within in a particular context. If 1NT can be opened with a 5-card major, the bidding veers towards 3NT. It will be difficult for the opener to revert to his major. If one is bidding in the context of a NT contract, revealing the locations of stoppers is of prime importance, whereas in the context of a suit contract revealing controls is most relevant. It is well known that if the target is a suit contract, a player should ‘support with support’ immediately in order to set the agenda. A ‘worthless doubleton’, the anathema of a 3NT contract, can be quite useful in a suit contract.

In his book, The No Trump Zone, Danny Kleinman discusses at length the many aspects of an opening 1NT bid. Here is his guideline: ‘A 1NT opening should deliver a narrow range of value in support of partner’s suit or on defense against an opposing suit contract.’ That puts 1NT within the right context from the start.

If one opens 1♦, diamonds are not strongly suggested as trumps, and the search is just beginning with the contract of 5♦ being something of a last resort. The system designer works around the possibilities. If the best contract is 5♦, the only way to find out whether this is one of those rare occurrences, is to have the informative methods to discover the exceptional circumstances. Responder has need of a forcing raise, but where is it? As we have seen previously in the context of a weak NT system, Doug and Sandra Fraser play that a 3♣ response conveys this message. From this point on the auction is geared primarily to choosing between 3NT and 6♦. Subsequent bids have a meaning related to this task. It is much harder under a 2/1 system where 1♦-3♣ is nonforcing (10-12 HCP) showing 6 clubs, as it is uncertain as to where the auction is leading. Because it is difficult to establish a fit in either suit, 3NT looms large through the fog.

3NT ends most auctions. The bidding falls flat because the 3♥ bid is interpreted as showing a heart stopper and indirectly asking for a spade stopper, which responder has. Bidding 3♠/3♥ would deny a spade stopper, not show support for diamonds. One might consider this a rare, unlucky combination for the system. Most of the time 1♦ will be bid on a hand limited to at most 14 HCP, the top priority being given initially to finding a major suit fit. 3♣ will be useful in reaching a close 3NT without giving away information concerning the weaker major suit holding, or even the strength of the diamond suit. There is value in uncertainty in such cases, which the system designer planned to exploit.

The HCP limits on 3♣ are not a useful measure of the playing potential in a minor suit contract. Five controls are worth the equivalent of 16 HCP, which applies to both hands. Only 2 controls are missing. The worthless heart doubleton turns out to be a useful asset. The system should provide a way to exploit this strength in the cases where the 1♦ opening bid is not the expected flat minimum. Needless to say, a Precision 1♣ auction will reach 6♣ with ease, because the club fit will be revealed on the first response and the focus will be on controls not the total number (28) of HCP held. Opener can ask questions of responder without directly revealing his own holding, thereby hiding behind a veil of secrecy without having to put on a false mask

In the December ACBL Bulletin August Boehm notes that even the concept of captaincy is foreign to many of the younger generation of players. They are overly concerned about how the opponents react rather than where the cards lie. Perception outweighs truth. Yes, bidding blindly does have the potential of increasing the chances of success, if a high scoring contract is reached with little information given up to the defenders. Here is an example of how not to do it from the recent Winter Nationals in India. With both vulnerable North opened a 3rd seat 1NT on ♠ T76 ♥ A5  ♦ AQJ9652 ♣ K. The BBO commentator noted that the most frequent game contract is 3NT, as if this somehow justified this strange start. The second most common game contract is 4M, he noted apologetically, when NS eventually reached 4♠ on a 5-3 fit without North having mentioned his diamond suit. Well if one is going to adopt this mode of operation, why not open 3NT and be done with it?  Opening 1NT is misguided deception for its own sake with little upside, whereas 3NT was unbeatable on any lead.

The key to successful master-minding is to guess according to what is most probable given what is known at the time. Guided by the predominance of 3NT contracts, our Indian declarer might imagine a hand opposite that would contain about a third of the missing points and fulfill an 8-7-6-5 division of sides, the most likely division as well as one suitable for a NT contract. In this case one might assume a  4=3=1=5 shape with 8 HCP. So it is not unreasonable to assume a hand opposite that looks something like this: ♠ Kxxx ♥ Qxx ♦ x ♣ QJxxx. On a blind lead the timing may be there to establish the diamonds, and there is nowhere else one would prefer to play the hand.

Here is the actual 8=5=8=5 combination, which in character isn’t that much different from the most likely expectation.

Actually, partner was well stocked in both majors and the ♣JTxx were most useful, so it was not necessary to rely on the diamonds for tricks: 4 spades, 2 hearts, 2 clubs and 1 diamond make up 9 tricks. With 4 losers outside diamonds declarer must not create a 5th by finessing for the ♦K. 4♠ represented a 10 IMPs loss against a diamond partial. Well, one can’t apply this technique if partner’s bidding is all over the lot; someone has to provide real information, otherwise it’s like bingo.

Bidding a Grand Slam
The ACBL Bulletin contains a feature called The Bidding Box in which successful pairs compete in the bidding of 8 hands. The aim of the contest is to present possible bidding sequences using common practices. It is a question of the use of what limited information can be made available, rather than a test of alternative means of obtaining information. Indirectly it is a justification of common practices under trying circumstances. The judge’s scoring is based on a matchpoint scale with a top of 12. In the Dec 2014 issue the victorious pair was a married couple from our local club, Douglas and Sandra Fraser, who play a souped up version of 2/1. Their successes in the NABC Senior Mixed Pairs come as no surprise to those who know and admire their commitment to excellence.

Slam hands are a major component of the contests, and this is where detailed agreements such as those devised by Doug Fraser, come to the fore. Let’s have a detailed look at Problem 5 for which both pairs scored 10 out of 12 for reaching 7♦. The second-seat opener (East) holds 16 HCP and flat hand, for most an automatic 1NT opening bid. Responder holds 11 HCP. General rule: with 26 HCP between the 2 hands, no shortage, stoppers in every suit and a long minor, play in 3NT. However, pairs who bid 1NT-3NT are not likely to win many bidding contests.

Responder holds ♠ A7 ♥ 9 ♦ KT86532 ♣ A76 – 6 losers and 5 controls. A priori the most likely distribution for a 1NT opening bid is 4-4-3-2, and the most likely division of sides is 8-7-6-5. Responder does better by considering the most likely shape given by the a posteriori probabilities based on what he sees in his own hand. Here is a reasonable expectation based on 5=6=9=6 with 15 HCP opposite.

The argument for 3NT goes as follows. The opening lead in a major suit will be useful coming up to the strong NT hand with its tenaces. Slam may come down to playing the diamonds for 6 tricks and just 1 loser somewhat less than a 50% chance. Not many will bid slam on 26 HCP, and if they do they might be defeated. A jump to 3NT could result in a useful opening lead and lots of matchpoints. There is slam potential in responder’s hand, but can one explore slam without fully committing to it?

An aggressive responder might aim for a NT contract and ignore diamonds as a candidate trump suit. He can ask for aces (using Gerber) and hope for 5 cover cards for his 6 losers. That might lead to a risky 4NT, however, the Bidding Box hand is much better than expected (6 controls, not 5) so it proves rewarding to explore in a simple manner.