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While all of them were fretting about being burnt or how their tans would look (some hairs go blond, some faces go pink) I was very happily (& easily) able to soak up the scorching sun’s rays.

I should have used sun factor (all people should regardless of colour or complexion) but it felt so good to be able to stride through the broad sunlight uplands without any care or concern. We coloreds of the world (the vast & growing majority btw) be proud to be brown, black & yellow if only because we can tan so well (use sun screen though wherever you are).

To repeat, there is much to disagree (which is fine) but dont make it personal.

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ZackNote: To echo what Sid has just written. Let’s try to make BP above the personal attacks & abuse in general. I’ve always encouraged an open forum format but let’s also keep it constructive & meaningful; it’s not about trolling the comments board but also gaining from the experience (which is why I’ve always encouraged commentators to transition to authors, vox populi vox dei peeps).

Otherwise I’m happy to report that Sid is a lucky token for BP; it’s the first time in a month that we’ve topped 300 views, no idea why but I’m declare today Sid (& ND) Appreciation Day.

Lashkar-e-Taiba founder Hafiz Saeed has given a ‘fatwa’ that militant activities within Pakistan cannot be considered a part of ‘jihad’ and asked terrorists to desist from carrying out attacks in the country.
“Militant activities in Pakistan do not fall in the category of jihad. I appeal to all jihadi organizations not to carry out attacks inside Pakistan as it is not jihad (holy war). America and India are taking benefit from their activities,” Saeed alleged in a statement. He said: “Our strength is in unity and not in infighting among us. However, Muslims will have to continue jihad to maintain their freedom”.

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Police said the arrested man was local, believed to be of Somali origin. He was attending the mosque for the first time. Dr Arshad Mahmood, who was at the mosque, told the BBC: “A man started stabbing one of the guys who was just sitting right next to him. I don’t know what exactly was the reason but he just started stabbing him. “We went to save him. He had multiple injuries, three or four wounds. Then the policeman came and was also attacked and stabbed.”

Mohammed Shafiq, the leader of the Ramadhan Foundation, a Muslim organisation, said: “I have spoken to someone who lives a few doors down from the mosque and they described hearing an argument inside the mosque. “It escalated into violence and a police officer has been stabbed. People, anti-Muslim extremists, are going to try to take advantage of this – it’s very serious that a police officer has been stabbed during duty.”

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The thing that interested me were the names. Javed and Honey (Irani) had children Farhan (Urdu name means pleasant) and Zoya (Urdu name means caring). Farhan and Adhuna have children named Shakya and Akira (Japanese name means knowledgeable, also film background).

How about Shakya? Shakayamuni is of course the Buddha but then again this is a girl. Regardless we have culturally middle-eastern (CME) people choosing a CSA name (and a CEA name for the other daughter). Food for thought.

Shakya background (ref. Wiki): Shakya is a Suryavanshi Kshatriya dynasty of Hindu religion in India.The Genealogy of Shakyas is found in Book IV of Vishnu Purana, the Shrimad Bhagavatam and the Brahma Purana.

King Shakya was one of the last decendants of Ikshvaku dynasty, commonly known as Suryavansha. Rama was one of the earlier decendants of Ikshvaku. Chapter 1 of Vishnupurana mentions that Brahma created Daksha out of his thumb. Daksha had a daughter Aditi, who was mother of Sun. From the Sun was born Manu. Since the Sun-god was Manu’s father, his lineage came to be known as the Suryavansha. Manu had many sons…Ten sons survived, one of whom was Ikshvaku.

Shakyas considered themselves as the purest race. To protect their race they married only within their community. So when Prasenjit king of Kosala asked to marry a Shakyan princess, they gave him a slave girl instead. Son of Prasenjit and the slave girl was Virudhaka. When Virudhaka came to know about this he was ashamed and wanted to take revenge. He attacked the Shakya empire, Kapilvastu. Shakyans were killed in masses. Some fled from Kaplivastu to a place named Pipphalvana and adopted a fake title “Maurya” probably because of the large number of peacocks in that area who were considered sacred…..As the history goes, Chandragupta Maurya overthrew the ruling Nanda Dynasty and establised the Maurya Empire.

regards

Hamid

June 14, 2013

Thanks Sir for bringing an important topic for discussion.  Let me jump head first into the debate. I’ll apologize right at the start as I’ll be a bit frank.  We are all grown ups (I think) and should be able to look at all angles; our comfort or discomfort zone.  We acknowledge that every party to the conflict has its own narrative that is partially based on facts and part fantasy and dreams as well as delusions. 

Majority of Pakistani officers agree with your general theme (based on my own limited interaction) and COAS General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani openly argued with Americans against resurrection of Afghan National Army (ANA) (this was supposed to be secret but as we know Washington leaks from all orifices so it is public now). I’ll tackle conceptual and practical aspect of why Pakistan army in general is against the idea of a decent ANA and remainder of my two cents about specifics in bold and italics in your main text.

-         In general terms, Pakistan army dismisses ANA as upstarts.

-         It sees ANA as anti-Pakistan. 

-         Concern that a reasonably functioning ANA will markedly reduce Pakistan’s ability to blatantly interfere in Afghanistan especially militarily supporting its proxies.

-         Fear that a fairly strong ANA can threaten its western borders. 

-         Concern that if Afghanistan goes for another round of civil war then ANA will break down into militias increasing Pakistan’s headaches. 

-         GHQ is aghast at the sight of billions spent on ANA while Washington bookkeepers used to come to Islamabad every few months to check the books of a fraction spent on Pakistan.  Pakistan sees money spent on ANA as something that could be better spent on Pakistan army.

Now may take on all these aspects; Yes, ANA is in early stages of development with many weaknesses.  In the early phases, dominance of non-Pushtuns in ANA was concern but now increasing representation of Pushtuns resulted in some balance.  In terms of anti-Pakistan, whether right or wrong, even a large number of Afghan Pushtuns blame Pakistan for their country’s woes.  It is true that a reasonably stable civilian government and functioning ANA will result in marked reduction in Pakistan’s ability to influence events in Afghanistan.  This should be seen as a positive thing for Pakistan.  Problem is not a conventional army threatening its borders but ungovernable areas along its border that result in more swamps full of alligators.  See exhibit A; Maulvi Fazlullah parked in Kunar.  Imagine Pakistan’s nightmares if similar outposts appear across Waziristan, Mohmand, Bajuar etc.  That will keep next generation of Pakistani soldiers busy on western borders.  Many Pakistani officers are genuinely concerned about this scenario and hence favouring cleaning swamps east of Durand Line prior to 2014.  Let’s go few years back to 2008 with no ANA in sight but Pakistan had to deploy over 150’000 troops to tackle militancy.  Even in the absence of ANA, if civil war erupts, militias will mushroom.  I think, Pakistan has some genuine concerns but overall a functional ANA is a win-win situation for both countries.  Pakistan should be a facilitator rather than a blocker in this effort.  ANA will be as good or as bad as any other army but Afghanistan with ANA will be much better off than Afghanistan without ANA.

The Afghan National Army

in

Internal Security Role

• Ever since one has learnt that the ANA was being raised, equipped and trained to take over from NATO the counter-insurgency role in Afghanistan, I have asked myself a few questions. Primarily;
  • Was any national army in Afghanistan ever given this role; if yes, under what circumstances and with what results?
  • How come that the Afghan national armies are overwhelmed by superior invading forces in short order, but the latter in turn are checkmated by tribesmen and local militias waging unconventional warfare?

• My (provisional) understanding is as follows:
  • Afghanistan- since it is divided along all possible fault lines; geographic, tribal, ethnic, even sectarian and cultural- can only be held together if all its major components are on board. The state is so configured that any tribe or faction that has staying power in its own area, has the potential to keep the country in turmoil, indefinitely.
  • This may have been one of the factors that in 1747 led Baba Ahmed Shah, the founder of the Country, to forge a “grand bargain” amongst its major constituents. He might have argued: “while retaining our respective autonomy, we should unite against foreign aggressors who in the absence of any unified resistance trample over our territory too easily, and all too often”.  (Above statement has nothing to do with Ahmad Shah’s strategy as his venture was for aggressive and not defensive purpose.  He gathered tribes for periodic looting expeditions to India.  Money accumulated kept tribes happy for a while and when kitty was empty, another expedition was arranged.  People conveniently forget the fact that he was in fact head of bodyguard of Persian King Nadir Shah Afshar and his first looting trip to Delhi was in this capacity. I know that every group has its own mythical reading of history and many Pushtuns don’t like it when I discuss the subject.)
  • It seems to have worked. From then on, instead of being a thoroughfare for the intruders, Afghanistan has become for them a quagmire. (In 18^th & 19^th century, country’s borders changed and its stability owed much to the buffer status between two rival powers. Two major attempts by British in 19^th century to change this status proved disastrous. As far as internal central control, it occurred over decades and Afghans did it in their own ‘native way’.  In some cases wholesale slaughter and forced relocations were used to put the fear of God among fractious and rebellious communities and extend central control.  See Exhibit: Kafiristan was conquered and forcibly converted.  Hazaras faced which could be labelled as genocide and enslavement.  In fact, a large number had to migrate to British India to avoid annihilation and proudly served in British Indian army especially in famous Hazara Pioneers. Rebellious eastern Pushtun tribes faced beheadings and forced relocations.  When Shinwaris rebelled, so many were beheaded that for years to come tribe had difficult time finding grooms for brides and many Shinwaris under British protection east of Durand Line benefited from shortage. Point is that like any other nation, modern nation building is an awful bloody business at the beginning.  For the uninitiated, U.S. civil war is a good starting point.  Second point is that natives are not passive bystanders or mere spectators in the blood sport but they are active participants.  Like any blood sport, when you win, you win the throne and when you loose, you loose your head.  In case of Afghans, price of failure was usually blindness to permanently extinguish the desire of power.  No surprise that every Afghan looser preferred to come to India and live under British protection as pensioner in Ludhiana rather than risk his eyes or head in Afghanistan courtesy of his fellow Afghans.)  One no longer has to explain how it happens, but the fate of the first British expedition (1842) is particularly illustrative. It was not decimated by any army on its way out but by the tribal raiders who inflicted “a thousand cut”. (Every body and his cousin hold this simplistic version while actual historical events are not so romantic.  Combination of factors was responsible for the debacle.  From time immemorial border tribes have extracted their share in the form of toll/bribes as this was their only source of income in addition to raiding settled areas on both sides of Durand Line.  Even Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah had to pay these tolls.  Now 1839-42 chapter.  Eastern Ghilzai border tribes were receiving 80’000 rupees for keeping the passes open and they were doing good job for a while and all supplies of diminishing British force in Kabul including jams, pickles and musical instruments and even some women and children passed safely back and forth from Kabul to India.  East India Company was a business venture and everybody cried about expenditure.  It was decided to cut in half the subsidy paid to eastern Ghilzais and when decision was announced to elders, they simply scratched their scraggy beards and the rest as they say is history.  Many British officers had affairs with women of Kabul and that incensed many Afghans but that is a whole different story.)
  • All armies have limitations when employed on internal security: constraints of fighting against own people; need to win “hearts and minds”; inherent pros of insurgents who can merge with the population; and most importantly, the militaries can only provide temporary relief. The real pacification is to be done by a competent civil leadership. (How can civilian leadership achieve this without coercive arm of the state no matter what its composition? Afghan state fragmented over decades and its stability will also take time.)

·         In the present Afghan scenario, the challenges for the nascent force are even more complex.

o   The last two decades have caused deep ethnic divisions. The current resistance is mainly by the Pashtuns; with the non-Pashtuns, mostly if not exclusively, siding with the regime established by an occupying power.  (Real elephant in the room is the word ‘occupying power’.  Legitimacy question can not be separated from occupation. I think we need to focus on post 2014 when hopefully most of U.S. troops will be gone.  I feel this will happen as patience has never been an American virtue.)

o   The ANA too suffers from an ethnic imbalance. Employed in any part of the country, loyalty of one or the other group would be suspect. Killings may take place within the rank and file. Desertions would not be rare, at times to avoid inter-tribal conflicts.  (This is a problem but solution is to address these problems and not to disband the whole structure.  Let’s take the example of Pakistan army and paramilitary in the last decade.  A large standing army with historical roots going back over a century and a sixty year standing as national army.  Once launched, many refused to fight and court martialled, very small but few actually convicted of colluding with enemy, in one case close to 200 including commanding Officer and Second in command of an elite infantry battalion surrendered without firing a shot and desertion of over 3000 soldiers of paramilitary Frontier Scouts.  Using these statistics, should one argue for failure and thus disbandment of Pakistan army.  No.  The answer is how to improve and how to face the challenge looking at the conflict holistically. Once, properly trained and equipped, same Pakistani soldiers performed very well in recent operations.)

o   A force raised under foreign tutelage, and in the foreseeable future dependent upon its support, would be seen by the majority of Afghans as a legacy of the occupation and not really “national”. (I assume this means scenario post U.S. withdrawal.  If one accepts this argument then what about Pakistan army?  Pakistan inherited the sword arm of the Raj and a large number of volunteers and not conscripts fought under Union Jack all over the world.  However, once foreign rule ended, Pakistan army became the most respected and admired institution of the new nation.  There are no reliable surveys about what Afghans think.  Like any society, there are many opinions.  Most agree that in general ANA has more respect among ordinary Afghans compared to other state institutions. This should improve after U.S. withdrawal.)

o   One can reasonably assume that many of the Taliban sleeper cells- red or green- will be activated as and when required. (This is the risk in every insurgency and Afghanistan will not be immune even after U.S. withdrawal)

·         In the Afghan context, one can always ask: where the mightiest of the armies fail; how would a half-baked force succeed? And just in case, ANA’s local character was to be counted as a plus, I remember the plight of the PDPA’s army (much better organised, trained and led than the present ethnic hybrid) after the Soviet withdrawal. Unable to move out of its few encampments, it survived for three years because the Mujahideen could not dislodge entrenched forces and many of us feared the consequences if they did.

·         Following are the fundamentals of security in Afghanistan:

o   It is a function of broad base consensus: which Ahmed Shah Durrani created; that lasted almost till the Sour Revolution; and what has been, “at least” the declared policy objective of Pakistan. (Every sane person can agree with this point.  The problem is that in view of history of Pakistan’s involvement in Afghan affairs, even if Pakistan is sincere now, many including a large number of Afghans don’t trust it. Helping in consensus building and peace is one thing but pushing one proxy at the cost of other factions will not earn Pakistan any good will.)

o   No Afghan (or non-Afghan) army, regardless of its size and ability can ensure security and stability in Afghanistan without the consent and cooperation of all its major tribes and factions. (This is universal principle and not limited to Afghanistan. To ensure this end, Pakistan can help to encourage Afghan factions to find common ground and this will help Pakistan’s security in the long run.)

o   Of course, a country needs an army; if for no other reason, than as a symbol of its sovereignty. The Swiss Army is one of the best, but with no likelihood of any brush with combat. The Saudi Army can’t even defend its barracks, but it is still there.

·        One may legitimately ask: if the above makes any sense; why is the US “sinking” billions of dollars in a project that stood no chance to deliver. The honest answer is: I do not know. But one can always speculate: interest of defence contractors; exhausting yet another option; the “fear” of ANA’s failure would provide grounds to maintain considerable combat presence; continuing turmoil helps retain leverage with one or the other side; and who knows, the US might even believe that the ANA could fulfil the given mission! (Simple reason.  No country can survive as a reasonably functional state without a security apparatus and army is part of the equation although one can argue about its structure, function and role.  Even when occupation forces leave, what instrument of the state authority will replace it?  ANA project essentially started in 2009.  My own estimate is that about $2 billion per year will be needed. A reasonably trained ANA along with police, paramilitary and local defence forces will be needed for security but more importantly a reasonable consensus among Afghan factions will be needed to avoid another round of bloodshed. Afghans will make the final decision and not any outsider.  Overall, despite many shortcomings, in my view ANA has made good progress in four years as I see actual ANA project starting in 2009.  Fully aware, that even a first class ANA can not solve Afghan riddle but I think, Afghan, regional and international efforts to strengthen ANA is an important peg of stability and worth investing.)

“Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, and of one’s people, is better after the war than before.”   Liddelhart

Warm Regards,

Hamid

coeusconsultant@optonline.net

On June 6, a new venture capital fund was launched by the Dalit Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DICCI) to raise Rs 500 crore from investors for investment in companies run by dalits and tribals. ….The fund aims to provide investors with a commercial 25% pre-tax internal rate of return.

DICCI now has 3,000 millionaire dalit members. Over a thousand of these have turnovers exceeding Rs 100 crore. The richest, Rajesh Saraiya, runs Steel-Mont Pvt Ltd, based in Ukraine and spanning eight countries. His turnover exceeds Rs 2,000 crore, and he is the first dalit billionaire.

Dalit and tribal entrepreneurs find it difficult to get funding or mentoring. To make this easier, the DICCI SME Fund aims to raise money to provide equity, loans and technical advice to small and medium enterprises run by dalits and tribals. The aim is not to get donations from bleeding hearts for the needy. The minimum subscription for investors in the fund is one crore rupees….. Milind Kamble, chairman of DICCI….sees capitalism as a revolutionary force that has finally blasted apart the caste system, and allowed dalits to rise…Historically, says Kamble, business was dominated by traditional occupational castes who did not let others come in or compete. The licence-permit raj of Nehru and Indira Gandhi was supposedly socialist, yet protected a few big business houses (who hogged all licences) from competition from below. Economic reform and globalization after 1991 finally launched competition……Money became more important than caste.

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My “involvement” with Operation Blue Star began on the morning of May 30, 1984 when, during a routine visit to an army officer friend, a Major posted in the Chandimandir cantonment, I noticed a flurry of activity. “Partner, we are moving for Operation Woodrose along the Punjab border…so see you on return.”….Armed with this information, I filed a report about the army being called out in Punjab to deal with the situation. Late in the evening, a message from our Delhi office said that the report was incorrect and should be spiked.

On the afternoon of June 1, I again visited Chandimandir and noticed a lot of activity. The initial information of the army moving into Punjab was bolstered by the presence of the entire top brass of the Western Command. The goc-in-c, Lt Gen K. Sundarji, himself was also camping there. That evening, I again filed a report reiterating that the army was in the process of moving into Punjab. This too was spiked. I was told that sources in the Union home ministry and the Rashtrapati Bhavan had not confirmed any such move. I was politely told not to believe in canards…It was the very next evening that the ‘canard’ turned out to be true when the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, addressed the nation on national television to announce that the army was being called out in Punjab in aid of civilian authorities.

One of the primary reasons for working on the television series Operation Blue Star, The Untold Story was the fact that whenever one has travelled abroad, one has faced persistent questions from Sikhs about the operation. Some of these queries bordered on myths and half-truths despite a number of books written on the subject.

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Luxury carmakers ET spoke to say Kochi has been clocking 40% year-on-year growth for the last three years, much higher than the rest of India, and it now sells more luxury cars than Chennai, Kolkata and Hyderabad.“Kerala has been a key market for us and it has grown nearly four times in the last four years for us,” Eberhard Kern, managing director and CEO at Mercedes-Benz India, says.
Ashish Chordia, whose Shreyans Group imports superluxury cars such as Ferrari, Maserati and Porsche, says, “Over the past few years, we have seen a definite increase in the demand from Kerala, especially Kochi, for all the brands we represent.” Besides Kochi, people in smaller cities such as state capital Thiruvananthapuram, northern port city and spice centre Kozhikode and Kottayam, the land of rubber estates, too, have started to flaunt luxury cars.
Driving this demand is the state’s increasing entrepreneur class as well as wealthy farmers of spices and rubber. While rubber prices have eased from its historical highs of 2011, it still hovers around Rs 175 per kg. Kerala — mainly Kottayam, Pathanamthitta and Idukki districts — account for about 90% of rubber produced in India.

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