CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES

Retainer Agreements: Diane Karpman Has Some Nice Reminders In February 2010 Edition of the California Bar Journal

2010-02-09T09:22:55-08:00

Diane Karpman, a legal ethics expert, has the following reminders for “tuning up” attorney-client retention agreements:

Lawyers should consult the State Bar fee forms on the California State Bar website, because they represent the “gold standard”—tested, blessed and familiar to fee arbitrators.
Include a disclaimer of any guarantee, result or successful outcome.
Specifically delineate the scope of duties, especially in “limited scope” representations.
List the services that are excluded from the scope of the retention (such as appellate work, post-trial motions and collections).
Cooperation clauses are necessary additions to retention agreements.
Consider clauses for file retention, document destruction, arbitration and methods of communications.

Ms. Karpman’s article “Time for tuning up those fee agreements,” can be found in the February 2010 edition of the California Bar Journal.

Special Fee Shifting Statutes: Chacon Opinion Involving San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance Is Published.

2010-02-09T09:19:13-08:00

In our January 19, 2010 post, we examined Chacon v. Litke, Case Nos. A122026 & A123889 (1^st Dist., Div. 2 published Feb. 8, 2010), which was unpublished at the time. This decision established that the lodestar analysis was the presumptive method for gauging special fee-shifting provisions, including those enacted under governmental ordinances. On February 8, 2010, the Court of Appeal certified it for publication so that it can now be cited.

Family Law: Fees On Appeal Are A Matter For Trial Courts Consideration First

2010-02-09T09:08:28-08:00

Remand to Trial Court Under CRC 3.1702(c) and 8.278(c)(1).

In Bardales v. Duarte, Case No. D048239 (4^th Dist., Div. 1 Feb. 8, 2010) (certified for publication), the Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court determination that it had the power to dismiss a petition seeking return of children under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction because of petitioner’s delay in prosecuting it and then proceeding to decide custody and related matters under state law.
Respondent then sought fees on appeal for prevailing under Family Code section 271. However, in a good primer on how this type of request is generally treated, the appellate panel indicated it should be addressed to the trial court first, remanding for consideration of entitlement of appellate fees. That gives a good illustration of how most appellate courts deal with fee issues, given that they are not set up to address the many contested issues that may arise in this area of the law.

Peace Palace, The Hague.

In The News . . . . Irvine Has Incurred About $1.3 Million In Irvine Business Complex Vision Plan Development Fights

2010-02-06T16:19:27-08:00

As reported by Sean Emery in “Irvine legal fees in development fight run $1.3 million” (available for reading in the February 6, 2010 edition of The Orange County Register), the City of Irvine has incurred about $1.3 million in various legal fights over the Irvine Business Complex “vision plan”—an urban revitalization project near the John Wayne Airport

made up of 43 million square feet of commercial space and 5,011 residential units. Although there have been some settlement with opponents, most of the battles involved City and Newport Beach, Tustin, and Allergan (although a total of 14 lawsuits have been filed in connection with this project). The fees are going to be roughly split between the City and the Irvine Business Complex developers based on provisions written into the developers’ original city approvals. (Actually, the developers will cover about $628,000, with the City picking up the remaining $674,000).

Class Action And Arbitration Crossover: Appellate Court Affirms Arbitrator Computational Error Correction In Class Action Attorneys Fee Allocation Dispute

2010-02-06T15:41:07-08:00

First District, Division 1 Addresses Claimed Conflict Between JAMS Rules and CCP Arbitration Correction Provision.

     Here is a decision that involves consideration of class action and arbitration crossover issues.

     Two attorneys deserving of attorney’s fees in a substantial class action settlement entered into an agreement among themselves on the allocation of fees, calling for binding JAMS arbitration to resolve any allocation dispute. A lot was at stake—over $9.4 million in fees were subject to division.

     The case—Thierman v. Kelson, Case No. A124367 (1^st Dist., Div. 1 Feb. 5, 2010) (unpublished)—is interesting in its discussion on the rules that govern JAMS arbitration proceedings. The JAMS arbitrator made a post-award computational error correction, and the aggrieved party argued over whether JAMS rule 24(j) or Code of Civil Procedure section 1284 applied. The appellate court found no conflict between the two rules, but has a nice discussion on what parties can contractually agree to in an arbitration agreement. Also, the appellate court reversed an approximate $10,000 fee award arising out of the allocation dispute, finding no fee clause that allowed such entitlement in the allocation agreement.

Costs: Court Of Appeal Affirms Determination On Some Gnarly Costs Issues

2010-02-06T15:26:21-08:00

Trial Court Has Inherent Discretion to Strike Costs Memo on Due Process Grounds, Limited Reversal Does Not Necessarily Vacate Prior Costs Award, and Post-Remittitur Costs Are Allowed in Trial Court’s Discretion.

     Although it might put you to sleep to recount the unusual procedural setting of the next case, Apex Wholesale, Inc. v. Fry’s Electronics, Inc., Case No. D054780 (4^th Dist., Div. 1 Feb. 5, 2010) (unpublished) does have some interesting points to consider in challenging and defending costs memorandum filed by the prevailing party in litigation.

     They are:

Courts at any time have inherent, equitable power to grant relief from a judgment or order based upon “extrinsic fraud or mistake,” terms interpreted broadly to not require fraud/mistake in the strictest sense and terms interpreted as allowing a grant of relief where “papers were lost, stolen, forwarded to the wrong person or eaten by the dog.” (Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 126 Cal.App.4^th 1294, 1301 (2005).) In this particular case, the lower court granted a motion to strike a costs memo almost a year after the memo had been filed, finding that the other party did not receive it. (BLOG OBSERVATION—Co-contributor Mike and his dog Riffle like the “eaten by the dog” reference, although Riffle likes biscuits rather than pleadings. However, co-contributor Marc does have a cat who likes to nibble on an occasional draft or pleading.)

A limited reversal does not render a costs award automatically null and void, but rather requires a reconsideration by the trial court of the prevailing party issue. (Zagami, Inc. v. James A. Crone, Inc., 160 Cal.App.4^th 1083, 1097 (2008).) In Apex Wholesale, the party moving to strike the costs memo conceded that one prior ruling was still in effect such that the lower and appellate courts did not have to reconsider the validity of that prior ruling on costs.

A properly verified costs memo is prima facie evidence that the costs were necessarily incurred, with the burden on the costs opponent to show otherwise (including they were unreasonable). A party’s mere statements in points and authorities are insufficient to rebut the prima facie showing. (Jones v. Dumrichob, 63 Cal.App.4^th 1258, 1266 (1998).)

Messenger services can be recovered as reasonable post-remittitur costs, in the discretion of the trial court. (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn., 19 Cal.App.4^th 761, 774 (1993).)

Civil Code Section 1717: You Gotta Have A Contract Predicate As A Condition Of 1717 Fee Recovery

2010-02-06T14:46:25-08:00

Absence of Contract Between the Parties With a Fee Clause Precluded Recovery.

     The Fourth District, Division 1, in Cornelius v. Vogt, Case Nos. D053035, D053286 (4^th Dist., Div. 1 Feb. 5, 2010) (unpublished), reminds us all that there must be a governing contract between the parties to allow recovery of prevailing party fees under Civil Code section 1717.

     In the case itself, there was a Date Street agreement, but between the agreement itself, its revisions and oral modifications, no attorney’s fees clause was included. However, there was a separate deed of trust between one party and an outside bank that did have a fees clause. The prevailing party under the Date Street agreement attempted to recoup fees under the trust deed provision. No way, said the appellate panel in Cornelius. Using section 1717’s own language, plaintiff did not “bring his action on the contract” that involved the trust deed, meaning there was no contract predicate upon which to base a fee award. The lower court correctly denied fees to plaintiff.

California Disabled Persons Act: State Appellate Decision Finds That ADA Does Not Preempt, So Prevailing Defendant Entitled To Fee Award Without Showing Action Was Frivolous, Unreasonable, Or Groundless

2010-02-06T14:34:26-08:00

First District, Division 4 Disagrees with Ninth Circuit’s Hubbard Decisions.

     In our July 3, 2008 and January 12, 2009 posts, we discussed the Ninth Circuit’s Hubbard decisions (Hubbard v. SoBreck, LLC, 531 F.2d 983 (9^th Cir. 2008) and Hubbard v. SoBreck, LLC, 554 F.3d 742 (9^th Cir. 2009)), which held that a mandatory award of fees to a prevailing under the California Disabled Persons Act (Civil Code § 55) was preempted by the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) because Civil Code section 55 allowed a defense fee award without the ADA’s showing that plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.”

     Now, a California intermediate decision—Jankey v. Lee, Case No. A123006 (1^st Dist., Div. 4 Feb. 5, 2010) (certified for partial publication)—has expressly disagreed with Hubbard II’s preemption finding, concluding that attorney’s fees are awardable to a prevailing defendant under section 55 without the more elevated ADA entitlement showing.

     In reaching this result, the state appellate court primarily found that (1) nothing in the ADA imposed uniform standards for complementary state law remedies (slip opn., p. 10), and (2) the California Legislature’s imposition of a two-way guaranteed fee provision in section 55 makes sense in light of the fact that the CDPA affords plaintiffs greater rights than the ADA (CDPA allows both monetary and injunctive relief, while ADA provides for only injunctive relief) (slip opn., p. 12.)

     That said and done, the $118,458 (out of a requested $129,264) fee award was affirmed. In an unpublished part of the decision, plaintiff challenged the reasonableness of the award. However, his challenges did not persuade the appellate court. Contrary to his argument, detailed billing records are not required to affirm a fee award, with attorney testimony on the number of hours expended being sufficient in the right circumstances. (Martino v. Denevi, 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559 (1986).) Attorneys’ claimed hourly rates—with the lead attorney asking for $165—as well as distribution of work (lead attorney worked 76% of the claimed time)—were found reasonable given the low sought-after hourly rate for the San Francisco legal community and the relative complexity of the case.

President and Mrs. Coolidge with their military aides, greeting two veterans in wheelchairs.

SLAPP: $24,442.50 Fee Award To City Of Pico Rivera Goes POOF Upon Reversal of SLAPP Grant

2010-02-06T14:06:02-08:00

Second District, Division 1 Rules Plaintiff’s Mandate Challenge to Compel City To Award a Contract Through Competitive Bidding Not Subject to anti-SLAPP Statute.

     City of Pico Rivera likely felt pretty good after SLAPPing a plaintiff business’s mandate challenge to City’s invalidation of a contract with plaintiff and reentry into a contract with one of plaintiff’s competitors. It probably even felt better after the trial court granted plaintiff a mandatory award of $24,442.50 in attorney’s fees under the SLAPP mandatory fee-shifting statute.

     Plaintiff’s appeal resulted in a POOF!—the SLAPP grant was reversed as well as the fee award in Graffiti Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera, Case No. B213322 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Feb. 5, 2010) (certified for publication).

     Presiding Justice Mallano, writing for a likeminded 3-0 panel, determined that plaintiff’s challenge—based on the lack of competitive bidding when it reawarded the contract to a competitor—was not subject to being SLAPPed. Plaintiff was not basing liability on protected communications, but only using them as evidence in establishing that City violated the law. Plaintiff’s challenge was to illegal conduct, and the SLAPP statute should not be construed to discourage attempts to compel public entities to comply with the law. With that decision, the fee award fell also.

Jurisdiction To Award Fees And Prevailing Party Status: Borrower Substantially Reducing Loan Exposure Through Usury Defense Awarded Fees Of $43,960

2010-02-06T13:53:52-08:00

Trial Court Had Jurisdiction to Award Fees While Merits Appeal Pending and Borrower Was the Prevailing Party.

     Borrower on a loan, even after an initial appeal, reduced a loan balance to only $3,602.72 after an offset for usurious interest. The lower court refused to award costs to lender and also awarded $43,960 to borrower based on a fees clause in the promissory note.

     Lender appealed, but lost all fees/costs issues in Gilbert v. Wisdom, Case Nos. E047235, E048425 (4^th Dist., Div. 1 Feb. 4, 2010) (unpublished).

     Lender first argued that the appeal from the merits judgment, before the fee motion was filed, divested the trial court of jurisdiction to hear borrower’s fee motion. Wrong, because numerous courts of appeal have rejected similar arguments. (See, e.g., Robertson v. Rodriguez, 36 Cal.App.4^th 347, 360 (1995); Bankes v. Lucas, 9 Cal.App.4^th 365, 368 (1992).) Although relying on some isolated language in Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux, 154 Cal.App.4^th 918, 928 (2007), the Court of Appeal noted that Butler-Rupp, when viewed in context, did not dictate a different result.

     Lender next argued that the trial court did not explain the legal basis for the fee award. However, the appellate panel found no court rules or statutes that required such a statement of reasons for ruling on a motion for fees. (Slip Opn., p. 36; Laabs v. City of Victorville, 163 Cal.App.4^th 1242, 1272 (2008).)

     Lender also contended that borrower did not prevail for Civil Code section 1717 purposes. Wrong again. A lawsuit attacking a note as usurious is an action on the contract for purposes of fee recovery, and borrower reduced a loan balance to minimal proportions.

     Lender also challenged the striking of his costs memorandum request. However, this appellate challenge was dismissed because lender failed to appeal 60 days after the service of notice of the costs strike ruling.

For Our Venerable Readers

2010-02-06T13:25:57-08:00

     We have changed the font of our posts to Times New Roman, 14 pt. It makes it easier for us to read what we have written. Please let us know if you have a preference.

Routine Costs: Court Has Discretion To Award Where No Net Monetary Recovery Or Only Limited Success Achieved In Declaratory Relief Action

2010-02-06T13:09:08-08:00

Lower Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Award Costs, Says Fourth District, Division 3.

     In Helmy v. Assaf, Case No. G041883 (4^th Dist., Div. 3 Feb. 4, 2010) (unpublished), plaintiffs achieved limited success in a declaratory relief action over the membership and control of the board of directors of a nonprofit named the Orange County Islamic Foundation. No monetary relief was awarded, and the lower court refused to award routine costs to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed, but did not obtain a reversal.

     The Fourth District, Division 3, in a 3-0 decision authored by Acting Presiding Justice Rylaarsdam, found that Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(a)(4) was dispositive, which provides that the lower court has discretion to determine the prevailing party where other than monetary relief is recovered. Because plaintiff only obtained limited success in its declaratory relief action, the lower court acted in its discretion in denying an award of costs under section 1032(a)(4). (Chinn v. KMR Property Management, 166 Cal.App.4^th 175, 188 (2008).)

Consumer Fee-Shifting Statute: Plaintiff Obtains Fee Recovery In Lemon Law Case Against GM

2010-02-05T01:45:18-08:00

Second District, Division 1 Affirms Substantial Judgment in Favor of Lemon Law Plaintiff.

    California’s Lemon Law, codified in the Song-Beverly Act (Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.), has a mandatory fee-shifting provision in favor of prevailing plaintiffs. (See Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) The next decision affirmed a substantial judgment, inclusive of compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, penalties, and fees/costs in favor of the prevailing Lemon Law plaintiff.

    The Second District, Division 1, in Lukather v. General Motors, LLC, Case No. B209979 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Feb. 4, 2010) (certified for publication), affirmed an aggregate $185,306.57 judgment in favor of Lemon Law plaintiff, broken down this way: about $66,000 for compensatory damages and prejudgment interest; about $61,400 in civil penalties authorized under the Act; and $57,755.69 in attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses.

    BLOG UNDERVIEW—The winning plaintiff attorney was Lawrence J. Hutchens, who co-contributor Mike has litigated against.  Mike sends his congratulations.

Prevailing Party: California Supreme Court Decides Goodman v. Lozano

2010-02-05T01:28:18-08:00

Plaintiff Cannot Recover Fees From Nonsettling Litigants Where Offsets From Settling Litigants Result in a Zero Judgment.

    The California Supreme Court, in a much anticipated decision, has decided an important “prevailing party” issue in Goodman v. Lozano, Case S162655 (Cal. Supreme Ct. Feb. 4, 2010) (published).

    Our state supreme court decided that plaintiffs suffering a zero judgment against nonsettling defendants, after offsets allowable for settlements made by settling defendants under CCP § 877, are not entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs because plaintiffs did not obtain a “net monetary recovery.”

    The decision was authored by Justice Chin on behalf of a 7-0 court. In the process, the high court disapproved Wakefield v. Bohlin, 145 Cal.App.4^th 963, 982-983 (2006) and distinguished several other appellate decisions.

Mediation Clause: Fee Recovery Affirmed For Seller Where She Produced Evidence Of Not Receiving Mediation Requests

2010-02-03T22:52:14-08:00

Evidence Code Section 641 Mailing Presumption Can Be Rebutted.

     In our category “Mediation,” we have seen that courts routinely enforce mediation clauses in real estate purchase contracts where the clauses are condition precedents to fee recovery. However, certain provisions are only triggered where the nonsuing party refuses mediation—which may require proof that the mediation request was actually received.

     That burden was not met in Kempton v. Clark, Case No. B213386 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Feb. 2, 2010) (unpublished).

     There, defendant seller prevailed in a real estate purchase agreement dispute and was awarded attorney’s fees under a standard attorney’s fees clause, but one requiring that the suing party first attempt mediation and one requiring the nonsuing party to accede to presuit mediation requests as conditions to fee recovery. Aggrieved purchasers appealed.

     Purchasers first argued that seller waived the right to fees because seller did not request mediation before filing her winning demurrer. Wrong, because the parties who initiated the action (the purchasers) are the ones required to request mediation, not the nonsuing seller. (Van Slyke v. Gibson, 146 Cal.App.4^th 1296, 1299 (2007).)

     Purchasers then claimed that seller forfeited fee recovery because she failed to respond to purchasers’ mediation request. The problem here was that, in spite of the Evidence Code section 641 presumption that a letter correctly addressed and properly mailed is received, the presumption was rebutted by seller’s testimony that she never received any mediation requests. (Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc., 84 Cal.App.4^th 416, 421 (2000).) Because the trial court credited seller’s testimony, seller could not have been deemed to refuse mediation when she never received any mediation request. Fee award affirmed.

Special Fee Shifting Statute: Fee Recovery Under Hyde Amendment Overturned

2010-02-02T22:27:15-08:00

Ninth Circuit Finds Government Reliance on Expert Opinion Not Tantamount to Misconduct.

     Here is a rare one for you federal criminal practitioners.

     The Hyde Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, permits the court to award attorney’s fees to a defendant in a criminal prosecution where the government has acted in a manner that was “vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith ….”

     In U.S. v. Capener, 2010 L.A.D.J. DAR 392 (2010), the Ninth Circuit overturned a fee award under the Hyde Amendment, finding that it was not misconduct for the government to rely on an expert opinion for a certain theory even though the criminal charges were ultimately dismissed. The record simply contained no facts showing that further investigation was needed or that bad faith was involved.

Civil Code Section 1717: Attorneys Fees Awarded To Assignor And Against Assignee Reversed Where Nothing Showed Ability to Recoup Fees From the Assignment Relationship

2010-02-02T22:00:14-08:00

Mutuality Principle Did Not Kick In Where No Basis For Fee Recovery Existed Between Assignor and Assignee.

     Civil Code section 1717’s mutuality principle is well renowned and followed frequently. However, it will not even come into operation if there is no basis for the nonprevailing party to have recovered any contractual fees from the prevailing party had the nonprevailing party won. This particular principle resonated loudly in the assignment situation addressed in the next case we examine.

     DeSantis v. Bilello & Costa Trading, Inc., Case No. F055817 (5^th Dist. Feb. 2, 2010) (unpublished) involved a narrow contractual fees clause stating that “Seller agrees to pay all costs of enforcement or collection incurred by the holder hereof including, reasonable legal fees and costs” to enforce certain contractual obligations. Seller had a contractual relationship with an assignor assigning certain rights to an assignee. In rather convoluted litigation, assignor won a merits judgment and significant attorney’s fees of $575,324 against assignee.

     Although assignee lost challenges to the merit judgment, it did win a reversal of the significant fee award to assignor.

     The main problem was that nothing in the documents indicated a basis for an entitlement to fee recovery as between the assignor and assignee. Rather, the fees clause was narrowly drafted to grant fee entitlement to the assignor (or assignor’s successor) by seller (and no one else). Not close enough, said the appellate court with respect to allocation of fees as between assigning parties. “We decline to be the first court to interpret section 1717 to provide a party with rights to collect attorney fees when that party had no contractual obligation to pay attorney fees. Simply put, before the mutuality of remedy requirement can be applied to create liability, the litigant to be held liable for the prevailing party’s attorney fees must have had a contractual right to recover attorney fees from the party that prevailed, not just any party.” (Slip Opn., at pp. 20-21.)

     Assignor also argued that judicial estoppel should apply because assignee received a $50,000 fees award in early stage default judgment proceedings that were eventually vacated by the lower court. No go. The Fifth District joined with other courts in rejecting the estoppel theory as a basis for imposing a fee award, citing Sessions Payroll Management, Inc. v. Noble Construction Co., 84 Cal.App.4^th 671, 682 (2000) and Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC, 162 Cal.App.4^th 858, 899 (2008).) [Use our SEARCH function to find past posts on Sessions and Blickman Turkus.]

     Moral: Ex nihilo nihil fit (out of nothing comes nothing).

NOTHING

          BONUS: Alan Watts On Nothingness.

Civil Rights: Nominal Damages In Civil Rights Case Involving Novel Issue and Deterrence Justifies $136,687.35 Fee Recovery Under Section 1983

2010-02-02T21:27:49-08:00

Ninth Circuit Affirms District Judge’s Fee Award In One Dollar Award Case.

     The circumstances of a case often dictate its result. This is the hallmark of jurisprudence, highlighted in the next fee case that we review.

     In Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, Case No. 08-15694 (9^th Cir. Feb. 1, 2010) (for publication), estate of a decedent won a nominal damages award of one dollar on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, although suffering summary judgment on many, many claims and another nominal one dollar award on a wrongful death claim.

     The sad facts of the case involved a CHP Officer who shot and killed John Watkins during a struggle. Mr. Watkins was unemployed and had a history of schizophrenia, accompanied by drug and alcohol abuse. Mr. Watkins’ mother brought civil rights claims premised on the use of excessive police force, and also brought conspiracy claims.

     The mother sought to recover almost $700,000 in attorney’s fees under the mandatory civil rights fee shifting provision (§ 1988). The district judge did award $136,687.35 in fees based on the limited success achieved in the civil rights case. Defendant appealed saying no fees were justified, and mother appealed that the fee reduction was unfair.

     Result—a tie; fee award affirmed.

     Defendant claimed that the nominal award meant no fees should be awarded.

     Not so, under the particular facts at play, said the Ninth Circuit.

     Three factors must be considered in determining whether a civil rights plaintiff succeeded in some way beyond the judgment for nominal damages: (1) the delta between the amount recovered and damages sought; (2) the significant legal issue in play; and (3) plaintiff’s accomplishment of some public goal. (Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 947 (9^th Cir. 2005).)

     The first factor weighed against a fee award, despite the fact that the availability of a compensatory award (even nominal) in favor of a deceased’s estate was an unsettled legal issue. The second factor tilted heavily in favor of a fee award, given that the state should not sanction excessive force resulting in death by a police officer. The third factor also weighed in plaintiff’s favor, with the district judge finding that the verdict might be a deterrent to the policeman’s actions in the future.

     Mother argued the fee award was too small. She did not file a cross-appeal, which meant the appellate court had discretion to entertain the argument, which it did. (Lee v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 245 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9^th Cir. 2001).) However, the Ninth Circuit found the fee reduction was no abuse of discretion.

Rent Stabilization Ordinance: East Palo Alto Ordinance Does Not Allow For Fee Recovery in Actions Between Landlord And The City

2010-02-02T07:19:36-08:00

Appellate Court Reverses Fee Award in Favor of Landlord.

     Woodland Park Mgt., LLC v. City of East Palo Alto Rent Stabilization Bd., Case No. A124154 (1^st Dist., Div. 5 Feb. 1, 2010) (certified for publication) involved “prevailing party” fee recovery language in East Palo Alto’s Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance (RSO) in a mandate proceeding where landlord successfully challenged an increase in a landlord registration fee imposed by the City. Landlord was also awarded $20,037.25 in fees under the RSO fee recovery provision.

     On appeal, Justice Bruiniers, writing for a 3-0 panel of the First District, Division 5, reversed. Based on an examination of all the provisions of the RSO, the appellate court concluded that fees are only authorized in actions between landlords and tenants to determine their respective rights. However, the RSO does not grant fee recovery in actions between landlords and the City.

     For a plot summary of the television movie Rent Control, click here.

In The News . . . . Spammer Gets Whacked With Attorneys Fees And O.C. Treasurer-Tax Collector Chriss Street Has Spent A Lot of Fees In Pending Bankruptcy Litigation Case

2010-01-31T16:38:16-08:00

Tagged.com Wins Large Default Judgment Against Spammer, Plus Attorney’s Fees.

     Social networker Tagged.com has won a $151,975 default judgment against Erik Vogeler, who is alleged to have spammed thousands of Tagged members with unsolicited links to an adult dating website. A district judge in the Northern District of California ordered the default judgment, as well as ordered Mr. Vogeler to pay Tagged $50,000 in attorney’s fees.

     For more on this one, see Robin Wauters’ January 29, 2010 article, “Tagged.com Wins $201,975 In Default Judgment Against Spammer,” available for reading on The Washington Post’s website.

Chriss Street Has Run Up More Than $1 Million in Legal Fees Contesting Bankruptcy Lawsuit Scheduled For Trial This Week.

     This week, before U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Richard M. Neiter (of Los Angeles), Orange County Treasurer-Tax Collector Chriss Street will be on trial for his actions as trustee of the End of the Road Trust, successor to Fruehauf Trailer Corp. L.A. money manager Dan Harrow has sued Mr. Street for $7 million. The trial is scheduled to last three days. The price tag for Mr. Street? More than $1 million in legal bills, according to a January 31, 2010 article “Treasurer To Confront Fraud Accusations” by Ronald Campbell in The Orange County Register. What we do not know is whether these fees were paid by Mr. Street, an insurance carrier, or combinations of the two. Expensive, needless to say, no matter what person or entity paid.