Carlo Ierna's Blog

The Value of Science?

Carlo Ierna — Tue, 06 Oct 2026 13:10:44 +0000

According to Husserl, positivism “decapitates” science, because it excludes subjectivity, consciousness, values, etc., or reduces them to something else. Science then can neither reflect on its own meaning and value, nor offer true value to society. In the end then the only “value” left is economic, the only “rationality” is administrative, not epistemological. The original rationality of philosophy as a universal science is far beyond what is allowed by positivism and managerialism. If you exclude all questions of meaning and value as unscientific, because they would not be objective or measurable, then this value-free science (in this specific sense) is also worthless science. Science merely delivers a return on investment based on business plans, education merely delivers skiled workers to industry, and universities are coopted into a political agenda focused on material “prosperity” (Husserl specifically uses the english term here, Hua VI, p.3). Wouldn’t any other kind of science just be a waste of money? Husserl aims to rescue science and philosophy, to enable a much broader cultural shift. Only once we become aware again of the full depth and breadth of what reason and science mean for humanity, we can also fully understand ourselves as rational beings.

The Scientificity of Philosophy and Science

Carlo Ierna — Thu, 01 Oct 2026 11:50:13 +0000

Husserl, following his teachers Franz Brentano and FriedrichPaulsen, states that philosophy is science. However, philosophy is not one specialised science among many, but universal: not “a” science, but “the” science. Philosophy and science in their most general form seek knowledge not only of nature and its history, but also of humanity and its history, not only of events and facts, but also of actions and ideas. “Science” should not be limited to what Husserl calls “positive sciences”, the sciences of (the objects of) experience in complete abstraction from the experiencing (subject) itself.

Yet this is exactly the conception of science that prevailed then and seems to also prevail now. Something is objective precisely insofar as it is not subjective. Even the subject itself must be objectified and made measurable, reduced to a physical fact, like the brain or behaviour. We can study the mind only indirectly. This is often also made explicit in policy documents where the Geisteswissenschaften are described as actually not concerned with the human mind itself, but only with its (historical) products, i.e. measurable facts and things.

It is this absurdity that Husserl adresses in the Crisis. Husserl argues that all sciences are inseparable branches of philosophy. Sciences of the mind and of nature are equal in scientific character. The division of labour in universities in separate faculties of natural sciences and humanities and social sciences etc. does not reflect an essential subdivision of science as such, but merely the practical organization of human activities. In terms of “scientificity”, all disciplines face their questions with the same rigour, whether they are about facts or values, about things or thoughts.

Such considerations about the scientific character of philosophy and the sciences have direct implications for the value of science as well.

The Crisis then and now

Carlo Ierna — Tue, 29 Sep 2026 13:09:28 +0000

Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology remains timely and relevant, because the “crisis” has not been overcome. The book’s diagnosis of the central problem remains applicable to our times. Then as well as now, the sciences seem extremely successful, and Husserl needed to spend the introduction to explain this “crisis” and its implications for humanity as a whole. What Husserl identifies is therefore not a crisis in productivity or theorizing, but a crisis in our conception of what science is, can be, and should be: a crisis in the lack of reflection and meaning. The sciences, precisely because of their success, are focused on delivering ready-made solutions for practical problems. This leads to material prosperity, but spiritual poverty. Science produces the ways and means, but neglects the goals and ends. What are the value, meaning, and purpose of science, beyond a return on investment for the national economy? In my article I extend Husserl’s account from the philosophy of science also to the politics and policies of science. The first step is then a short sketch of what makes science science, followed by an account of the value of science.

Husserl’s Crisis and Science Policy

Carlo Ierna — Tue, 15 Sep 2026 12:08:47 +0000

Besides Husserl and Awakened Reason, recently also another article of mine has been published in Principia “Husserl’s Crisis from the Philosophy of Science to the Politics of Science”. Here I link Husserl’s The Crisis of European Science to current trends in science policy, effectively arguing that not just nature, not just science, but also our thinking about science (in science politics and policy) has been mathematized. In the coming weeks I’ll summarize the main points of my argument here on my blog.

Husserl’s Crisis remains a very relevant work today, because the “crisis” has by no means been overcome. The crisis is not primarily a crisis in scientific productivity or theorizing, but rather a crisis in our conception of what science is, can be, and should be. The crisis consists in a lack of reflection and meaning: the sciences, precisely because of their successes, focus on delivering ready-made solutions for practical problems: material prosperity, but spiritual poverty. In this article, I extend Husserl’s account of the philosophical crisis of the sciences also to the politics and policies of science. Not only have the sciences themselves been mathematised (in the sense of studying only what is quantifiable), but also our thinking about science, especially our science policy, has been mathematised: not only what the sciences study, but also how the sciences operate must be quantifiable. Scientific achievements are measured and managed by quantitative assessments and rankings: number of publications, citations, projects, PhDs supervised, H-index, impact factor, etc. Through the mathematization, technization, and then mechanization of science itself, the practical results have grown a hundredfold, but at the expense of genuine thought. By limiting science, we limit who we are and can be as humans: the crisis of the sciences is therefore essentially also a crisis of humanity. Besides a diagnosis of the nature of the crisis, Husserl’s work can also offer a potential cure: Besinnung. A fundamental questioning and reflecting on the sense of science, to clarify the means and ends of science, would also help to make sense of and give meaning to human existence. Only in this way can society fullyrealize the potential of scientific inquiry to enrich human existence beyond mere material prosperity.

Ethically Justifying Mechanical Calculation

Carlo Ierna — Fri, 28 Aug 2026 12:55:24 +0000

The final step in my article is to analyze the ethical aspects. Husserl states that we should ultimately justify our actions “from autonomous insight”, but also cautions that: “then I would not be allowed to use any logarithmic table, any calculating machine, without having knowledge in all seriousness of the theory.” (Hua XLII, 272). Husserl hence acknowledges that this is impossible in practice for us as individuals. The world is far too complex and so we cannot avoid using tools to understand and act in the world:

Science, according to its own conception, is as infinite as the world and can only be realised in the finitude of a scientific community in stages and by using symbolic aids [Hilfsmittel der Symbolik], by sharing the lived insights [lebendigen Einsicht] among a communicative scientific community. (Hua XLII, 273, n. 1)

Symbolic aids do not only enhance our capacity for (scientific) knowledge, but also our capacity for (ethical) action. If we have the obligation to choose the greater good, then we have an obligation to use our symbolic aids. Even if we do not have the required “autonomous insight” as individuals, we have it collectively, as a community. In the scientific community, “autonomous insight” cannot mean that everyone needs to know everything. Division of labor is unavoidable and is based on trust in the respective specialization (Hua XLII, 274, n. 1. Also see Hua XVIII, § 71). This division of labor is enabled again by the use of symbolic aids for obtaining, storing, and communicating knowledge. However, Husserl warns us in the Crisis about this progressive technicization of science:

Thinking becomes a thinking with surrogates, that has its own evidence in the context of this technique, its own goals, its own tasks and solutions, which diverge from the evidence of goals, tasks, solutions, that were originally indicated by such words and symbols. (Hua XXIX, 35)

Husserl’s terminology from the 1890s for symbolic intentionality in the context of mathematics is now used in the same way for science at large. When we convert concepts into signs, manipulate the signs according to an algorithm, and then convert signs into concepts, we risk forgetting our original aims and values for which the whole symbolic technology was invented in the first place (see i.a. Hua XLII, 430, 436). There is a risk of loss of meaning in the “thoughtless” intermediate phase without awakened reason as a historical-critical reflection (see e.g. Hua XXIX, 190).

If science and rationality are to guide humanity and help it flourish with the tools it develops, the trust and division of labor in science and society need to be well-founded on historical-critical thinking that can provide the ultimate proper, insightful justification. This requires a thorough analysis of symbolic intentionality and symbolic technologies: how humans and machines use signs. Husserl’s theory of symbolic computation can still help us today: in order to understand the world and act ethically in it, we need to understand the tools to which we have outsourced our thinking and the theories on which this very possibility is based.