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		<title>Supply Chain Security Incident Update</title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/supply-chain-security-incident-update/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Udi-Yehuda Tamar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 23:11:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Checkmarx Security Update]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=108520</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[For All Related Updates: Date Post Link 27-Apr-26 Checkmarx Security Update: April 27 https://checkmarx.com/blog/supply-chain-security-incident-update/ 26-Apr-26 Checkmarx Security Update: April 26 https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-26/ 22-Apr-26 Checkmarx Security Update: April 22 https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-22/ 23-Mar-26 Checkmarx Security Update: March 23 https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/ What happened? On March 23, 2026, Checkmarx identified a cybersecurity incident originating from the Trivy Supply Chain Attack. The cybersecurity [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<div class="ci-doc">

<h2 class="article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">For All Related Updates:</h2>

<table style="width:100%; border-collapse:collapse; border:1px solid #140921;">
  <thead>
    <tr style="background-color:#6B34FD; color:#FCF9FE;">
      <th style="padding:12px 16px; text-align:left; border:1px solid #140921; width:18%;">Date</th>
      <th style="padding:12px 16px; text-align:left; border:1px solid #140921; width:42%;">Post</th>
      <th style="padding:12px 16px; text-align:left; border:1px solid #140921; width:40%;">Link</th>
    </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
    <tr style="background-color:#FCF9FE;">
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">27-Apr-26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">Checkmarx Security Update: April 27</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;"><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/supply-chain-security-incident-update/" style="color:#6B34FD;">https://checkmarx.com/blog/supply-chain-security-incident-update/</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr style="background-color:#F1E9FE;">
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">26-Apr-26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">Checkmarx Security Update: April 26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;"><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-26/" style="color:#6B34FD;">https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-26/</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr style="background-color:#FCF9FE;">
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">22-Apr-26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">Checkmarx Security Update: April 22</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;"><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-22/" style="color:#6B34FD;">https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-22/</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr style="background-color:#F1E9FE;">
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">23-Mar-26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">Checkmarx Security Update: March 23</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;"><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/" style="color:#6B34FD;">https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/</a></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

<h2 class="article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">What happened?</h2>

<p>On March 23, 2026, Checkmarx identified a cybersecurity incident originating from the Trivy Supply Chain Attack. The cybersecurity community previously reported on March 19 that the TeamPCP attack affecting the Trivy scanner could potentially be used to harvest credentials from downstream users.</p>

<p>While we are still investigating the incident, we believe this is the likely vector that enabled the attackers to obtain credentials and to gain unauthorized access to our GitHub repositories. As a result of that access, the attackers were able to interact with Checkmarx&#8217;s GitHub environment and subsequently publish malicious code to certain artifacts.</p>

<p>As part of our investigation into the incident, we identified that exfiltration of data took place on March 30, 2026. A cybercriminal group subsequently published data related to Checkmarx to the dark web on April 25. Current evidence indicates that this data originated from Checkmarx&#8217;s GitHub repositories, and that access to those repositories was facilitated through the initial supply chain attack of March 23, 2026.</p>

<p><strong>Importantly, Checkmarx&#8217;s GitHub repositories are maintained separately from our customer production environment. As standard practice, we do not store customer data in our GitHub repository.</strong></p>

<p class="ci-timeline-heading">Incident Timeline</p>

<table class="ci-banner">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● FROM MARCH 23 — DAY ONE ONWARDS
<p>Checkmarx has been conducting active containment, investigation, remediation and communication efforts continuously from the first day of the incident.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table class="ci-timeline">
<tbody>
<tr class="ci-month">
<td colspan="4">— MARCH —</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="ci-bar ci-bar-breach"> </td>
<td class="ci-date">Mar 23</td>
<td class="ci-tag ci-tag-breach">EVENT</td>
<td class="ci-body">
<strong>Compromised artifacts published</strong>
<p>Malicious Checkmarx artifacts are published. Attacker pushes malicious code directly into the Checkmarx GitHub repository.</p>
<p>Containment, investigation, remediation and communication efforts commenced immediately, and remain ongoing.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr class="ci-month">
<td colspan="4">— APRIL —</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="ci-bar ci-bar-persistence"> </td>
<td class="ci-date">Apr 22</td>
<td class="ci-tag ci-tag-persistence">PERSISTENCE</td>
<td class="ci-body">
<strong>Compromised artifacts published</strong>
<p>A second wave of malicious Checkmarx artifacts are published, indicating continued or renewed attacker access.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="ci-bar ci-bar-disclosure"> </td>
<td class="ci-date">Apr 25</td>
<td class="ci-tag ci-tag-disclosure">DISCLOSURE</td>
<td class="ci-body">
<strong>LAPSUS$ publishes stolen data</strong>
<p>LAPSUS$ publicly releases data stamped March 30, nearly one month after the suspected exfiltration of data from the Checkmarx GitHub repository by the attacker.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<div class="ci-legend">
<span><span class="sq sq-breach">■</span>Breach / Exfiltration</span>
<span><span class="sq sq-persistence">■</span>Persistence</span>
<span><span class="sq sq-disclosure">■</span>Disclosure</span>
</div>

<h3>Actions we have taken</h3>

<p>Upon identification of the incident, Checkmarx commenced a formal investigation and engaged external forensic specialists to support that work.</p>

<p>Initial steps Checkmarx took to contain and remediate the incident included:</p>

<ul>
<li>Removed unauthorized code and published clean artifacts</li>
<li>Implemented additional safeguards within our development and distribution workflows</li>
<li>Rotated credentials identified as potentially exposed, with validation and follow-up rotation continuing as the investigation progressed</li>
<li>Reviewed our environments for indications of further compromise</li>
</ul>

<p>Following evidence of further malicious artifacts we took additional steps to strengthen our security posture:</p>

<ul>
<li>Engaged law enforcement to make them aware of the incident</li>
<li>Retained Mandiant, an elite incident response, digital forensics, and threat intelligence firm to bolster our investigation efforts</li>
<li>Conducted a wider rotation of credentials across the environment</li>
<li>Implemented additional security controls, tools, and access restrictions within our development environment</li>
<li>Performed additional reviews of access pathways and integrations</li>
<li>We have locked down access to the affected GitHub repositories while the investigation continues</li>
<li>A code audit is also currently underway to verify that no further malicious code is present beyond the findings already identified</li>
</ul>

<p>We are now in the final stages of our investigation and confirming that the unauthorised access has been fully contained. We will share further on this as soon as we are able.</p>

<h3>Additional Information</h3>

<p>We have communicated with our customers throughout this process and will continue to provide relevant updates as more information becomes available. Further information, including recommended steps customers can take, is available on our Support Portal or in our Security Updates.</p>

<ul>
<li><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-26/">Checkmarx Security Update: April 26</a></li>
<li><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-22/">Checkmarx Security Update: April 22</a></li>
<li><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/">Checkmarx Security Update: March 23</a></li>
</ul>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Checkmarx Security Update: April 26</title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-26/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Udi-Yehuda Tamar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 10:36:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Checkmarx Security Update]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=108507</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[For All Related Updates: Date Post Link 27-Apr-26 Checkmarx Security Update: April 27 https://checkmarx.com/blog/supply-chain-security-incident-update/ 26-Apr-26 Checkmarx Security Update: April 26 https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-26/ 22-Apr-26 Checkmarx Security Update: April 22 https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-22/ 23-Mar-26 Checkmarx Security Update: March 23 https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/ New Development: GitHub Repository  We are writing to inform you of a new development in the ongoing&#160;Checkmarx&#160;supply chain security incident.&#160; [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">For All Related Updates:</h2>



<table style="width:100%; border-collapse:collapse; border:1px solid #140921;">
  <thead>
    <tr style="background-color:#6B34FD; color:#FCF9FE;">
      <th style="padding:12px 16px; text-align:left; border:1px solid #140921; width:18%;">Date</th>
      <th style="padding:12px 16px; text-align:left; border:1px solid #140921; width:42%;">Post</th>
      <th style="padding:12px 16px; text-align:left; border:1px solid #140921; width:40%;">Link</th>
    </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
    <tr style="background-color:#FCF9FE;">
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">27-Apr-26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">Checkmarx Security Update: April 27</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;"><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/supply-chain-security-incident-update/" style="color:#6B34FD;">https://checkmarx.com/blog/supply-chain-security-incident-update/</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr style="background-color:#F1E9FE;">
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">26-Apr-26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">Checkmarx Security Update: April 26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;"><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-26/" style="color:#6B34FD;">https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-26/</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr style="background-color:#FCF9FE;">
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">22-Apr-26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">Checkmarx Security Update: April 22</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;"><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-22/" style="color:#6B34FD;">https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-22/</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr style="background-color:#F1E9FE;">
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">23-Mar-26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">Checkmarx Security Update: March 23</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;"><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/" style="color:#6B34FD;">https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/</a></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">New Development: GitHub Repository </h2>



<p>We are writing to inform you of a new development in the ongoing&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;supply chain security incident.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Our investigation, conducted with support from a leading third-party forensic firm,&nbsp;indicates&nbsp;that a cybercriminal group has published data&nbsp;related to&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;to the dark web.&nbsp;Based on current evidence, we believe this data originated from&nbsp;Checkmarx’s&nbsp;GitHub repository, and that access to that repository was&nbsp;facilitated&nbsp;through the&nbsp;initial&nbsp;supply chain attack of March 23, 2026.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>Checkmarx’s&nbsp;GitHub repository is&nbsp;maintained&nbsp;separately from our customer production environment. As standard practice, we do not store customer data in our GitHub repository.&nbsp;</strong>Our forensic investigation is&nbsp;ongoing&nbsp;and we are actively working to verify the nature and scope of the posted data.&nbsp;</p>



<p>As part of our immediate response, we have locked down access to the affected GitHub repository while the investigation continues.&nbsp;</p>



<p>If we&nbsp;determine&nbsp;that customer information was involved in this incident, we will notify customers and all relevant parties&nbsp;immediately.&nbsp;</p>



<p>We expect to share a more detailed update within 24 hours.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">
<strong>Questions and Support</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>If you have questions about this incident or need&nbsp;assistance&nbsp;assessing your environment, please open a case via the&nbsp;<a href="http://support.checkmarx.com/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><u>Support Portal</u></a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Guardrails for Agentic Development</title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/guardrails-for-agentic-development/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rebecca Spiegel]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 04:42:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & LLM Tools in Application Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AppSec]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Agents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI generated code]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=108459</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Securing AI-generated code at machine speed without slowing the business. ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Software used to be written in sprints. Now it is generated continuously, reviewed in minutes, and deployed before most security teams have time to react.</p>



<p>That speed has a cost. According to the <a href="https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Cybersecurity_Outlook_2026.pdf">World Economic Forum</a>, <strong>94% of surveyed leaders expect artificial intelligence to be the most significant driver of change in cybersecurity</strong>, even as <strong>87% identify AI-related vulnerabilities as the fastest-growing cyber risk</strong>. Vulnerabilities now propagate faster than traditional controls can detect them. At this speed, pausing development to evaluate risk isn’t just inconvenient – it&#8217;s operationally impossible. </p>



<p>Security has to move with the code, not after it.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">The Scale Problem: Vulnerability Growth Is Now an Operational Constraint</h2>



<p>Alongside this explosion of AI-driven development, the global vulnerability landscape is expanding just as fast. <a href="https://www.first.org/newsroom/releases/20260211">The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST)</a> projects that <strong>2026 will be the first year to exceed 50,000 published vulnerabilities</strong>, with a median forecast of approximately 59,427. Manual prioritization is no longer viable.</p>



<p>The numbers alone don’t capture the operational shift. For decades, application security programs depended on predictable development cycles that created natural pauses for risk evaluation. AI-driven development removes those pauses. Code is generated automatically, refined instantly, and deployed continuously. Traditional security gates depend on time – and continuous delivery eliminates it.</p>



<p>A recent breach illustrates how quickly this can play out in practice. Using GenAI, a small group of attackers generated more than 400 custom scripts and launched attacks across 300+ servers, automating what once required coordinated teams and significantly compressing the time from vulnerability discovery to exploitation.</p>



<p>Security is no longer restrained by <em>detection capability</em>, but by <em>decision capacity</em>. The challenge is no longer whether organizations can find vulnerabilities. It is whether security teams can make decisions fast enough to keep pace with the volume and velocity of AI-generated code. Teams must determine which risks matter most and how to reduce exposure fast. As the<a href="https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/news-insights/new-live-guidelines-secure-software-development-security-and-operations-practices"> National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)</a> has observed, secure practices must be embedded directly into lifecycle stages rather than appended as separate steps.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">From Engineering Problem to Organizational Risk&nbsp;</h2>



<p>AI security has moved from an engineering concern to an organizational one. Leaders increasingly recognize that the risks associated with AI-driven development extend beyond technical vulnerabilities to affect organizational resilience, regulatory compliance, and customer trust.</p>



<p>The risks are operational: misconfigured dependencies can introduce vulnerabilities, unauthorized access can compromise systems, and automated workflows can propagate errors at scale. Governance and engineering are describing the same problem from different angles, and the challenge isn’t choosing between them but integrating them.</p>



<p>That integration doesn’t happen through policy updates alone. It requires rethinking how AI development is structured, how dependencies are managed, and how security controls are embedded into the workflow itself.</p>



<p>The supply chain is where that challenge becomes most visible.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">The Expanding Supply Chain: From Software Components to AI Systems</h2>



<p>Supply chain risk has always been a central concern in software security, but AI introduces new layers of dependency that are harder to observe and harder to control. Traditional software supply chains included libraries, frameworks, and external services, while modern supply chains include AI models, prompts, orchestration layers, and runtime agents.</p>



<p>The <a href="https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2025">European Union Agency for Cybersecurity reports</a> that <strong>supply chain risks currently account for 10.6 percent of identified threat categories</strong>. As software ecosystems become more interconnected, the number of potential entry points for attackers increases – and dependencies that once served as conveniences become liabilities.</p>



<p>The <a href="https://www.securityweek.com/cursor-ai-vulnerability-exposed-developer-devices">recent attack on Cursor</a> illustrates how quickly trust assumptions can be exploited. Attackers chained a prompt injection with a sandbox bypass and remote tunneling capability to obtain shell access simply by convincing a developer to open a repository. Because the attack leveraged legitimate tooling features rather than traditional malware, perimeter defenses offered little protection. Modern supply chain risk increasingly originates inside the developer workflow itself, where trusted automation interacts directly with untrusted code and content. Developer tool itself has become part of the attack surface.</p>



<p>This is part of a broader pattern. When applications automatically retrieve and execute external artifacts without verifying their integrity or origin, malicious actors can substitute compromised components into the execution environment – turning trusted dependencies into attack vectors.</p>



<p>These attacks do not rely on advanced exploitation techniques, but on assumptions: when AI systems automatically trust external components, attackers can manipulate that trust.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4">The Two-Layer Guardrail Architecture&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Security leaders are responding to these challenges by adopting a new architectural principle that treats AI-generated code as untrusted input until it has been verified through independent controls. This guardrail model gives this principle operational form, organizing security into two complementary control loops: prevention (inner loop) and enforcement (outer loop).</p>



<p>The <strong>preventive loop</strong> operates at the moment code is created. This is the stage when developers have the most context, and the remediation costs are lowest. Errors caught here can be immediately corrected, before vulnerabilities have a chance to propagate downstream. Traditional review processes were designed for a world where code arrived in batches. AI-generated code arrives continuously, which means security controls must operate continuously as well.</p>



<p><a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/developer-assist/">Checkmarx&#8217;s Developer Assist</a> embodies this approach. Working within the developer workflow, it analyzes generated and handwritten code in real time, identifies patterns associated with security risk, and provides contextual guidance before changes leave the local environment. Security shifts from reactive to proactive, preventing vulnerabilities during creation instead of after deployment. </p>



<p>The <strong>enforcement loop </strong>operates at the moment that code is integrated. This is where organizations apply consistent policies across environments, evaluate risk in context, and establish accountability for security decisions.</p>



<p><a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/triage-and-remediation/">Checkmarx&#8217;s Triage Assist and Remediation Assist</a> operationalize this by analyzing vulnerabilities in relation to runtime behavior, dependency relationships, and exposure paths. Rather than surfacing large volumes of findings ranked by severity alone, the agent evaluates which issues are realistically attackable and generates prioritized remediation actions.</p>



<p>This distinction between detection and decision-making is central to the scalability of modern security programs. At the scale of today’s vulnerability landscape, the ability to prioritize effectively determines whether security controls reduce risk or simply generate noise.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-5">A Continuous Security Workflow for AI-Driven Development&nbsp;</h2>



<p>The guardrail model operates as a continuous workflow across three stages.</p>



<p><strong>As code is written</strong>, Developer Assist evaluates changes in real time, identifying potential vulnerabilities and recommending secure alternatives before anything leaves the local environment.</p>



<p><strong>At integration</strong>, automated pipelines execute security scans and policy checks. Triage Assist and Remediation Assist analyze the results, determining which vulnerabilities pose immediate risk and generating remediation guidance. Human approval is required before deployment, keeping accountability for critical decisions with the team.</p>



<p><strong>After deployment</strong>, monitoring systems track system behavior, detect anomalies, and feed insights back into the development workflow. This feedback loop allows security controls to dynamically adapt as new threats emerge, rather than waiting for the next scheduled review.</p>



<p>The result is a system where security is no longer a checkpoint, but a continuous property of the development process itself.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-6">What Effective Governance Looks Like in Practice&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Organizations that succeed in AI-driven development environments build operational guardrails that define how software is generated, validated, and deployed. Governance works when risk management is translated into enforceable controls embedded directly into the development workflow.</p>



<p>A practical governance baseline for 2026 includes the following minimum controls:</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">1. Govern AI Systems as First-Class Assets&nbsp;</h3>



<p>AI coding tools, agents, and model components are now part of the software supply chain. They must be managed with the same rigor as production infrastructure.</p>



<p><strong>Operational controls</strong>: </p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Maintain a centralized inventory of AI coding tools, agents, and model dependencies&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Assign accountable owners for each AI&nbsp;component&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Classify AI systems by risk and operational impact&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Enforce approved usage policies for AI development tools</li>
</ul>



<p><strong>Why this matters</strong>: AI systems become governable infrastructure rather than unmanaged productivity tools.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">2. Enforce Risk-Based Prioritization</h3>



<p>At the current vulnerability scale, remediation effectiveness depends on prioritization accuracy. Organizations cannot fix everything; they must fix what is exploitable in their environment.</p>



<p><strong>Operational controls</strong>:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Implement contextual risk scoring based on exploitability and exposure&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Automate triage workflows within pull request and CI/CD pipelines&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Define remediation service-level&nbsp;objectives&nbsp;tied to business risk&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Suppress non-exploitable findings to reduce operational noise&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<p><strong>Why this matters:</strong> Engineering effort is directed toward vulnerabilities that materially increase risk.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">3. Centralize Software and AI Supply Chain Controls</h3>



<p>Modern supply chains include models, prompts, orchestration components, and external dependencies. These assets must be continuously verified to prevent trust-based compromise.</p>



<p><strong>Operational controls:</strong></p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Enforce dependency provenance and integrity validation&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Maintain software and AI bills of materials (SBOM and AI-BOM)&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Monitor repositories and registries for unverified or malicious components&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Apply consistent security policies across software and AI dependencies&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<p><strong>Why this matters:</strong> Supply chain risk becomes observable and controllable across the full development ecosystem.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">4. Establish Guardrails for Agentic Systems</h3>



<p>Agentic workflows introduce operational risk because automated systems can execute actions without direct human oversight. Governance must define the boundaries within which agents operate.</p>



<p><strong>Operational controls:</strong></p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Assign unique identities to all AI agents and automation services&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Define permission boundaries for agent actions&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Enforce tool invocation policies for automated workflows&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Maintain auditable records of agent decisions and system interactions&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<p><strong>Why this matters</strong>: Agent behavior becomes predictable, accountable, and traceable across environments.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">5. Standardize Prompts as Governed Inputs</h3>



<p>Prompts influence system behavior and security outcomes. They must be treated as controlled inputs rather than informal instructions.</p>



<p><strong>Operational controls:</strong></p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Develop approved prompt templates for common development tasks&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Enforce prompt validation and policy checks before execution&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Log prompt activity for audit and incident response&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Restrict generation patterns that introduce known security risks&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<p><strong>Why this matters</strong>: Prompt usage becomes consistent, auditable, and aligned with secure development practices.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">6. Measure Security Performance Using Operational Metrics</h3>



<p>Governance is only sustainable when performance is measurable. Metrics must reflect real risk reduction, not activity volume.</p>



<p><strong>Operational controls</strong>:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Track time-to-fix for exploitable vulnerabilities&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Measure reduction in non-actionable findings&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Monitor policy compliance across development workflows&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>Report risk reduction outcomes to executive leadership&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<p><strong>Why this matters</strong>: Security performance becomes quantifiable and aligned with business resilience.</p>



<p>The <a href="https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-cybersecurity-outlook-2026/">World Economic Forum emphasizes</a> that guardrails and secure-by-design practices must accompany AI adoption. Without them, misconfiguration and adversarial manipulation become predictable outcomes rather than isolated incidents. The lesson is straightforward: resilience depends on architecture, not intervention.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-7">The Strategic Shift Ahead</h2>



<p>The most common mistake organizations make when confronting AI security challenges is assuming that the solution is more tools. Tools improve visibility, but they cannot compensate for structural misalignment between development speed and security processes.</p>



<p>Traditional security models assumed that software was produced by humans operating predictable workflows, but that assumption no longer holds. Software is now continuously produced by AI and security controls must operate at the same speed. This isn’t an incremental change; it’s a different relationship between development and risk. Organizations that recognize this shift early will be able to adapt their workflows and maintain confidence in their software. Those that don’t will find themselves managing the complexity of modern systems instead of reducing risk.</p>



<p>The organizations that succeed in the age of agentic development won’t rely on stronger gates or stricter controls. They’ll build smarter guardrails.</p>



<p><em>Want to see this in practice? Explore <a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/triage-and-remediation/">Triage Assist and Remediation Assist</a>. Still evaluating your options? Check out the <a href="https://checkmarx.com/the-agentic-ai-buyers-guide/">Agentic AppSec Buyer’s Guide</a></em>.</p>



<p></p>



<p></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Checkmarx Security Update: April 22</title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-22/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Udi-Yehuda Tamar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 09:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Checkmarx Security Update]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=108473</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[For All Related Updates: Date Post Link 27-Apr-26 Checkmarx Security Update: April 27 https://checkmarx.com/blog/supply-chain-security-incident-update/ 26-Apr-26 Checkmarx Security Update: April 26 https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-26/ 22-Apr-26 Checkmarx Security Update: April 22 https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-22/ 23-Mar-26 Checkmarx Security Update: March 23 https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/ What Happened On April 22, we communicated with customers about a new development in the supply chain security incident that [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">For All Related Updates:</h2>



<table style="width:100%; border-collapse:collapse; border:1px solid #140921;">
  <thead>
    <tr style="background-color:#6B34FD; color:#FCF9FE;">
      <th style="padding:12px 16px; text-align:left; border:1px solid #140921; width:18%;">Date</th>
      <th style="padding:12px 16px; text-align:left; border:1px solid #140921; width:42%;">Post</th>
      <th style="padding:12px 16px; text-align:left; border:1px solid #140921; width:40%;">Link</th>
    </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
    <tr style="background-color:#FCF9FE;">
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">27-Apr-26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">Checkmarx Security Update: April 27</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;"><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/supply-chain-security-incident-update/" style="color:#6B34FD;">https://checkmarx.com/blog/supply-chain-security-incident-update/</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr style="background-color:#F1E9FE;">
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">26-Apr-26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">Checkmarx Security Update: April 26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;"><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-26/" style="color:#6B34FD;">https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-26/</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr style="background-color:#FCF9FE;">
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">22-Apr-26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">Checkmarx Security Update: April 22</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;"><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-22/" style="color:#6B34FD;">https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-22/</a></td>
    </tr>
    <tr style="background-color:#F1E9FE;">
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">23-Mar-26</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;">Checkmarx Security Update: March 23</td>
      <td style="padding:12px 16px; border:1px solid #140921;"><a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/" style="color:#6B34FD;">https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/</a></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2"><strong>What Happened</strong></h2>



<p>On April 22, we communicated with customers about a new development in the supply chain security incident that our team is actively investigating and addressing. We deeply value the trust you place in Checkmarx and are committed to keeping our customers informed as we continue to respond.</p>



<p>As part of our immediate response, we retained outside experts and are working around the clock to get to the bottom of this as quickly as possible. In the interim, we are sharing key findings to-date and recommended actions for our customers to take.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3"><strong>Key Findings</strong></h2>



<p>Notably, our investigation thus far indicates that the malicious artifacts did <strong>not</strong> override previously published, known safe versions. Customers using versions or SHAs published prior to the affected timeframes are <strong>not affected.</strong></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4"><strong>Affected Artifacts</strong></h2>



<p>The following artifacts have been identified as potentially affected:</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>
<strong>Checkmarx public DockerHub KICS image</strong> &#8211; <a href="https://hub.docker.com/r/checkmarx/kics">https://hub.docker.com/r/checkmarx/kics</a>
<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>Malicious tags: v2.1.20-debian, v2.1.21-debian, debian, v2.1.21, v2.1.20, alpine, v2.1.20, v2.1.21, latest</li>



<li>Malicious SHAs: sha256:222e6bfed0f3b, sha256:9183908decd0f, sha256:a6871deb0480e, sha256:ff7b0f114f87c, sha256:1b01a97753780, sha256:2588a44890263, sha256:54f8a56bf1f71, sha256:d186161ae8e33, sha256:415610a42c5b5, sha256:e35bc6afc4857, sha256:a0d9366f6f016, sha256:903eef3c05f6e, sha256:26e8e9c5e53c9, sha256:7391b531a07fc, sha256:4c963fa00e585</li>



<li>Timeframe: from 2026-04-22 12:31:35.883 UTC to 2026-04-22 12:59:46.562 UTC</li>
</ol>
</li>



<li>
<strong>Checkmarx public ast-github-action</strong> &#8211; <a href="https://github.com/checkmarx/ast-github-action">https://github.com/checkmarx/ast-github-action</a>
<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>Malicious tags: 2.3.35</li>



<li>Timeframe: from 2026-04-22 14:17:59 UTC to 2026-04-22 15:41:31 UTC</li>
</ol>
</li>



<li>
<strong>Checkmarx VS Code extension</strong>
<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>Microsoft marketplace: <a href="https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=checkmarx.ast-results">https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=checkmarx.ast-results</a>
</li>



<li>Open VSX marketplace: <a href="https://open-vsx.org/extension/checkmarx/ast-results">https://open-vsx.org/extension/checkmarx/ast-results</a>
</li>



<li>Malicious tags: 2.63, 2.66</li>



<li>Timeframe – Microsoft marketplace: From 2026-04-22 13:06:00 UTC to 2026-04-22 17:48:00 UTC <br>Timeframe – Open-VSX marketplace: From 2026-04-22 13:06:00 UTC to 2026-04-22 21:20:00 UTC</li>
</ol>
</li>



<li>
<strong>Checkmarx Developer Assist extension</strong>
<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>Microsoft marketplace: <a href="https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=checkmarx.cx-dev-assist">https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=checkmarx.cx-dev-assist</a>
</li>



<li>Open VSX marketplace: <a href="https://open-vsx.org/extension/checkmarx/cx-dev-assist">https://open-vsx.org/extension/checkmarx/cx-dev-assist</a>
</li>



<li>Malicious tags: 1.17, 1.19</li>



<li>Timeframe – Microsoft marketplace: From 2026-04-22 13:06:00 UTC to 2026-04-22 17:48:00 UTC <br>Timeframe – Open-VSX marketplace: From 2026-04-22 13:06:00 UTC to 2026-04-22 21:20:00 UTC</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-5"><strong>Actions We’ve Taken</strong></h2>



<p>To date, in response to this development we have:</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>Removed the malicious artifacts;</li>



<li>Revoked and rotated exposed credentials;</li>



<li>Blocked outbound access to attacker-controlled infrastructure;</li>



<li>Reviewed our environments for any signs of further compromise.</li>



<li>Initiated a forensic investigation with the assistance of an independent, third-party forensic firm.</li>
</ol>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-6"><strong>Recommended Actions</strong></h2>



<p>We recommend that our customers take the following steps as soon as possible:</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>Block access to these domains and IP addresses:
<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>checkmarx.cx =&gt; 91[.]195[.]240[.]123</li>



<li>audit.checkmarx.cx =&gt; 94[.]154[.]172[.]43</li>
</ol>
</li>



<li>Use pinned SHAs and review or disable auto-update settings in IDE marketplaces</li>



<li>Rotate secrets and credentials if a compromise is suspected or detected
<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>DockerHub KICS image: latest, v2.1.20, alpine, Debian</li>



<li>Checkmarx ast-github-action: v2.3.36</li>



<li>Checkmarx VS Code extensions: v2.67.0</li>



<li>Checkmarx Developer Assist extension: v1.18.0</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>


<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-7"><strong>Next Steps</strong></h2>
<p>This is an ongoing investigation. Please continue to monitor the <a href="https://support.checkmarx.com/CheckmarxCustomerServiceCommunity/s/article/Checkmarx-Security-Incident-22-April-2026">Checkmarx Community Incident Page</a> for more information.</p>
<p>If you have questions about this development, please open a case via the Support Portal.</p>
<p>We are grateful for your continued support and patience as we work to address this incident.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Securing Your AI Supply Chain: Your AI Is Running, But You Don&#8217;t Know What It&#8217;s Doing </title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/ai-llm-tools-in-application-security/securing-your-ai-supply-chain-your-ai-is-running-but-you-dont-know-what-its-doing/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Emma Datny]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 08:38:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & LLM Tools in Application Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Application Security Trends & Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Supply Chain Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ADLC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Software Supply Chain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SSCS]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=108380</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[You passed your security audit. SAST came back clean. SCA found no critical vulnerabilities. Secrets scanning turned up nothing. Your release moved forward with confidence.&#160; Then, weeks later, leadership asks: &#8220;Are we using AI in any of our applications?&#8221;&#160; Honestly? No one knows.&#160; Somewhere in your codebase, invisible to every tool you have, an application [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You passed your security audit. SAST came back clean. SCA found no critical vulnerabilities. Secrets scanning turned up nothing. Your release moved forward with confidence.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Then, weeks later, leadership asks: &#8220;Are we using AI in any of our applications?&#8221;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Honestly? No one knows.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Somewhere in your codebase, invisible to every tool you have, an application is calling a hosted LLM service. An agent framework arrived through a dependency. Prompts are loading from runtime configuration. Embeddings are being sent to a vector store.&nbsp;</p>



<p>None of it shows up in your SBOM. None of it is on anyone&#8217;s radar.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This&nbsp;isn&#8217;t&nbsp;a failure of your security team.&nbsp;It&#8217;s&nbsp;a structural gap.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">
<strong>The Supply Chain is Changing (Again)</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>For years, traditional AppSec protected a predictable set of things: application code, open-source packages, secrets, containers, and infrastructure. SAST, SCA, vulnerability management, all built for that world. </p>



<p>Then AI became a production dependency.&nbsp;</p>



<p>More than&nbsp;<a href="https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2025-08-26-gartner-predicts-40-percent-of-enterprise-apps-will-feature-task-specific-ai-agents-by-2026-up-from-less-than-5-percent-in-2025" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">75% of enterprises are already embedding LLMs, AI SDKs, and AI services directly into their applications</a>. But the security and governance programs designed to manage software&nbsp;haven&#8217;t&nbsp;caught up.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>Modern applications now depend on:</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Hosted AI services (LLM APIs) </li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>AI frameworks and SDKs </li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Agent code and MCP servers </li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Prompts and datasets </li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Embeddings and vector stores </li>
</ul>



<p><strong>These&nbsp;don&#8217;t&nbsp;behave like traditional dependencies:</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>A model can be safe in testing and unsafe under real-world prompts </li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>A prompt can quietly change system behavior without changing application logic </li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>An MCP tool can expand execution capability beyond what developers intended </li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>A service provider can change data retention terms without a code change </li>
</ul>



<p>Traditional AppSec tools&nbsp;don&#8217;t&nbsp;detect these risks because they&nbsp;weren&#8217;t&nbsp;designed to. They&nbsp;can&#8217;t&nbsp;assess model poisoning, unverified weights, unsafe adapters, malicious MCP servers, or licensing violations.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>None of these are hypothetical. They&#8217;re showing up in real pipelines, real codebases, and real compliance conversations, often without anyone realizing it. </p>



<p>At the same time, regulatory&nbsp;pressure is real. The EU AI Act, ISO 42001, and&nbsp;other&nbsp;frameworks&nbsp;are&nbsp;creating&nbsp;real accountability for AI governance.&nbsp;Yet, most organizations lack even a basic AI asset inventory, let alone the ability to&nbsp;demonstrate&nbsp;compliance.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">
<strong>The Hidden Threats in Your AI Dependencies</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Below are 10 prominent AI supply chain risks&nbsp;validated&nbsp;by&nbsp;<a href="https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm032025-supply-chain/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">OWASP LLM03:2025</a>&nbsp;(the industry standard) and our own&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;Zero research team.&nbsp;</p>



<p>These risks reflect where visibility gaps&nbsp;typically become security gaps in this new supply chain structure:&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>Group A: Trust &amp; Provenance</strong>&nbsp;Poisoned models, fake models, abandoned models, vulnerable AI packages—risks tied to where models actually come from and whether you can trust them.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>Group B: Modification &amp; Fine-Tuning</strong>&nbsp;Malicious adapters, model merge exploits—risks introduced when models are altered without visibility.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>Group C: Deployment Risks</strong>&nbsp;Mobile and edge model attacks where compromised models are embedded outside standard update mechanisms.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>Group D: MCP Supply Chain</strong>&nbsp;Tool poisoning, compromised dependencies, shadow MCP servers, unauthorized integrations that expand what AI can&nbsp;actually do.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>Group E: Governance &amp; Exposure</strong>&nbsp;Licensing violations, unclear terms-of-service, privacy policy drift that quietly changes how your data is used.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Each reflects a different failure mode: compromised artifacts, unmanaged modifications, invisible deployments, unauthorized connections, and untracked obligations.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">
<strong>Where Does Your Organization Actually Stand?</strong>&nbsp;</h3>



<p>Most security teams assume&nbsp;they&#8217;re&nbsp;at least partially aware of their AI exposure. In practice, the answer is usually Stage 1: Unknown.&nbsp;There&#8217;s&nbsp;no inventory, no policy enforcement,&nbsp;and&nbsp;no audit trail,&nbsp;just scattered usage across repos and environments.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Getting from Unknown to Governed&nbsp;isn&#8217;t&nbsp;a single leap.&nbsp;It&#8217;s&nbsp;a defined progression: from discovery, to control, to compliance-ready reporting. Understanding where you sit today is the prerequisite to knowing what to do next.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">
<strong>Visibility First, Then Everything Else</strong><strong>&nbsp;</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>What connects&nbsp;all&nbsp;these risks is something simple: if you&nbsp;don&#8217;t&nbsp;know an AI&nbsp;component&nbsp;exists in your software, you&nbsp;can&#8217;t&nbsp;assess it, govern it, or protect against what it might do.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This requires building what&nbsp;didn&#8217;t&nbsp;exist before: an AI-BOM, an inventory that captures what AI is running your applications and what that implies for risk and compliance.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This requires four capabilities:&nbsp;</p>



<ol start="1" class="wp-block-list">
<li>
<strong>Discover</strong> AI assets across code and configuration </li>
</ol>



<ol start="2" class="wp-block-list">
<li>
<strong>Assess</strong> AI-specific risks (not just CVEs) </li>
</ol>



<ol start="3" class="wp-block-list">
<li>
<strong>Control</strong> through policy enforcement and approved registries </li>
</ol>



<ol start="4" class="wp-block-list">
<li>
<strong>Report</strong> compliance-ready documentation </li>
</ol>



<p>AI is already embedded in your stack, whether you know it or not. The goal&nbsp;isn&#8217;t&nbsp;to slow adoption,&nbsp;it&#8217;s&nbsp;to bring the same AppSec discipline to AI dependencies that teams already apply to everything else they ship.&nbsp;</p>



<p>That starts with visibility.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4">Want to go deeper?&nbsp;&nbsp;</h2>



<p>We&#8217;ve&nbsp;put together a full breakdown of the threat&nbsp;landscape&nbsp;with&nbsp;all 10 risk categories, real-world examples, and the controls mapped to each. But more than that: the guide walks through a practical AI Supply Chain Maturity Model so you can identify where your organization stands today, a side-by-side comparison of traditional SBOMs vs. AI-BOMs, and a two-floor security architecture that tells you what to preserve from your existing AppSec program and what to add on top of it.&nbsp;</p>



<p><a href="https://checkmarx.com/resources/10-ai-supply-chain-risks-hiding-in-your-codebase/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Read it now</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Checkmarx Application Security Guide to Claude Mythos</title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-application-security-guide-to-claude-mythos/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jonathan Rende]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2026 20:52:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & LLM Tools in Application Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Claude Mythos]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=108259</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Claude Mythos highlights a new era of dynamic, AI-driven applications, and the growing security blind spots they create. Securing them requires agentic AppSec that combines deterministic precision with probabilistic intelligence, delivering full AI visibility and high-fidelity, low-noise results.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1"><strong>Introduction</strong></h2>



<p>On April&nbsp;7, 2026,&nbsp;Anthropic revealed its new AI Model named “Mythos”&nbsp;(currently&nbsp;in private mode)&nbsp;that aims to secure software in the AI&nbsp;era.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Anthropic claims that&nbsp;AI has reached a turning point in cybersecurity. With the&nbsp;expected&nbsp;release of Mythos,&nbsp;AI models are&nbsp;poised to be&nbsp;capable of&nbsp;identifying&nbsp;and exploiting software vulnerabilities at a level that rivals and, in many cases, surpasses top human experts. Mythos has already uncovered thousands&nbsp;of&nbsp;high-severity vulnerabilities across major operating systems and browsers,&nbsp;signaling&nbsp;rapid&nbsp;acceleration in both capability and risk.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Quickly in the wake of the Mythos announcement,&nbsp;Anthropic&nbsp;launched a&nbsp;coalition,&nbsp;named&nbsp;Project<strong>&nbsp;</strong>“<a href="https://www.anthropic.com/glasswing" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Glasswing</a>”&nbsp;after&nbsp;the clear-winged,&nbsp;tropical&nbsp;butterfly. The project, which includes over 40 major technology organizations such as Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Nvidia, is critical to redirecting this&nbsp;vast new LLM&nbsp;power toward defense rather than exploitation.&nbsp;</p>



<p>A recent&nbsp;<a href="https://red.anthropic.com/2026/mythos-preview/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">example</a>&nbsp;shared by Anthropic highlights the leap in capability: while the Opus 4.6 model was able to generate a working JavaScript shell exploit for a Firefox 147 vulnerability only&nbsp;two&nbsp;times out of hundreds of attempts, Mythos achieved a dramatically higher success rate, producing a working exploit in 181&nbsp;cases.&nbsp;That’s&nbsp;not a marginal&nbsp;gain;&nbsp;it’s&nbsp;a fundamentally different level of capability.&nbsp;</p>



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  <h2 class="cx-title article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">Firefox JS shell exploitation</h2>
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    <div class="cx-legend-item">
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<span>Percentage of trials model generated a successful exploit</span>
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<span>Percentage of trials model achieved register control (but could not exploit)</span>
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  <div class="cx-footer-note">In a previous blog, we noted that Opus 4.6 was able to successfully generate exploits for crashes it found in Firefox in two separate trials out of many, which was a success rate of less than 1%. We plot this success rate next to Claude Mythos Preview, which succeeds at creating a working exploit nearly 100 times more often.</div>
</div>



<p></p>



<p>In this article, we will provide a useful guide to allow you to better understand the&nbsp;announcement, what it means for&nbsp;application security leaders as well as&nbsp;some recommendations&nbsp;that&nbsp;you can learn from&nbsp;as you are moving forward&nbsp;with&nbsp;your AI journey.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2"><strong>Why did Anthropic Make&nbsp;this Announcement?&nbsp;And,&nbsp;Why Now?</strong></h2>



<p>For years, many software vulnerabilities have gone undetected because&nbsp;identifying&nbsp;and exploiting them requires highly specialized&nbsp;expertise. With the rise of advanced AI models, the&nbsp;barriers due to&nbsp;cost, effort, and skill have dropped&nbsp;dramatically,&nbsp;making both discovery and exploitation&nbsp;accessible,&nbsp;fast,&nbsp;and&nbsp;scalable. As you can see in&nbsp;Checkmarx’s&nbsp;own research&nbsp;below, the time to exploit a security vulnerability decreases&nbsp;dramatically&nbsp;with the power and adoption of AI.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Vulnerabilities that took weeks, months,&nbsp;or&nbsp;even years to exploit&nbsp;until&nbsp;recently, can now be weaponized in a matter of minutes.&nbsp;This&nbsp;defines&nbsp;an entirely&nbsp;new&nbsp;reality&nbsp;for application security,&nbsp;and it&nbsp;needs to be top&nbsp;priority&nbsp;for any head of&nbsp;security,&nbsp;head of&nbsp;engineering, and the entire executive team.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



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<strong>81%</strong> of organizations admit to knowingly release software with code they know is vulnerable</div>
    <div class="cx-footer-cite2">— Checkmarx, &#8220;Future of Application Security&#8221; Report</div>
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<p></p>



<p>According to our&nbsp;annual&nbsp;Future of Application Security&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/report-future-of-appsec-2025/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">report</a>, over 81% of organizations knowingly ship vulnerable code driven by overwhelming noise, uncontextualized backlogs, and limited resources. This is just one of several AI-driven challenges AppSec leaders must now confront. In the next section, we break down the most critical ones.&nbsp;</p>



<p><em>For&nbsp;additional&nbsp;perspective on how&nbsp;security&nbsp;is&nbsp;evolving with advances like Mythos, watch this industry discussion:</em>&nbsp;</p>



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<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3"><strong>The Challenges of Adopting only AI Model-Based Security Solutions</strong></h2>



<p>As organizations accelerate toward AI-native development, the security landscape is shifting just as rapidly, and not always in predictable ways. New AI models are&nbsp;demonstrating&nbsp;an unprecedented ability to uncover vulnerabilities in existing codebases, including long-standing flaws that have gone undetected for years. At the same time, these models are dramatically lowering the barrier to exploitation, enabling faster weaponization of both known and unknown vulnerabilities. This creates a dual challenge: while discovery improves, the volume and velocity of risk increase just as quickly.&nbsp;</p>



<p>With that in mind,&nbsp;here are some of the&nbsp;key security challenges&nbsp;that are&nbsp;emerging&nbsp;in agentic development,&nbsp;that&nbsp;enterprises must acknowledge:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>New models are uncovering large volumes of zero-days in older code.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>AI Speeds weaponization of vulnerabilities:&nbsp;Known &amp;&nbsp;unknown.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>A great reference to learn from is the recent&nbsp;<a href="https://tomtunguz.com/the-jagged-frontier-of-ai-security/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">article</a>&nbsp;around the&nbsp;“jagged frontier”&nbsp;of AI security.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>As much as 45% of&nbsp;AI-generated code&nbsp;may be&nbsp;insecure.&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>LLMs&nbsp;are&nbsp;missing&nbsp;vulnerabilities;&nbsp;coverage is incomplete.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Models are trained from&nbsp;different sources, thus producing inconsistent results from one LLM to another.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>AI Models are not comprehensive enough and are lacking context.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4"><strong>Deterministic &amp; Probabilistic AppSec for Known &amp; Unknown Vulnerabilities</strong></h2>



<p>As the software landscape evolves into an agentic one and LLMs continue to advance,&nbsp;it’s&nbsp;critical to recognize that AI-driven security analysis alone is not sufficient. Models that generate, and flag issues based on probabilistic reasoning must&nbsp;operate&nbsp;alongside deterministic systems grounded in real-world context, customer environments, true exploitability, policy enforcement, auditability, and full visibility. At enterprise scale, this also means supporting thousands of repositories, distributed teams, and highly interconnected systems.&nbsp;</p>



<p>As highlighted in&nbsp;<em>Tomasz&nbsp;Tunguz’s&nbsp;“Jagged Frontier of AI Security”&nbsp;article above</em>, AI capabilities are not&nbsp;linear;&nbsp;they are inconsistent and context dependent. While models like Mythos can&nbsp;demonstrate&nbsp;breakthrough performance in discovering and exploiting unknown vulnerabilities, similar outcomes can often be reproduced by smaller models when given the right inputs. At the same time, known vulnerabilities,&nbsp;often buried in backlogs and lacking prioritization,&nbsp;remain a significant and weaponizable risk in the age of AI.&nbsp;</p>



<p>In this uneven reality, some vulnerabilities are identified with high precision, while others are missed entirely. This leads to false confidence, inconsistent outputs, and critical gaps in risk coverage. If detection&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;consistent, it&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;trustworthy.&nbsp;</p>



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<div class="cx-quote">
  <p class="cx-quote__text">If detection isn&#8217;t consistent, it isn&#8217;t trustworthy.</p>
</div>



<p>This is where a hybrid model becomes essential&nbsp;&#8211;&nbsp;AI&nbsp;with its&nbsp;probabilistic&nbsp;reasoning&nbsp;provides speed and scale, but it must be complemented by a deterministic security layer that&nbsp;validates&nbsp;findings based on context and real exploitability, and this is where&nbsp;we are focused.&nbsp;Brought together,&nbsp;probabilistic&nbsp;and deterministic approaches&nbsp;establish&nbsp;a new standard for agentic application security,&nbsp;one that delivers high-fidelity, actionable results at scale.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-5"><strong>Making the case for Agentic Triage &amp; Remediation</strong></h2>



<p>We’ve&nbsp;established&nbsp;that combining LLM-driven security which uncovers a wide range of unknown vulnerabilities with an already unmanageable backlog of known issues (leaving 81% of organizations exposed) requires a hybrid approach that blends probabilistic and deterministic analysis. But that alone is not enough.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The sheer volume of vulnerabilities now demands agentic triage and remediation. Manual processes cannot keep up; they&nbsp;fail to&nbsp;provide context, prioritize effectively, or resolve risk with confidence at scale.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This is where AI agents become critical. By automatically performing intelligent triage to&nbsp;eliminate&nbsp;noise and prioritize truly exploitable risk, and by driving fast, automated remediation, they bring together reasoning and precision. The result is security that is not only scalable, but truly actionable in an AI-native development environment.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-6"><strong>Final Thoughts &amp; Recommendations</strong></h2>



<p>The&nbsp;Mythos&nbsp;announcement and the formation of Project&nbsp;Glasswing&nbsp;mark a major milestone in AI-driven security, but they are not, and cannot be, a standalone solution. As outlined above, AI models both amplify existing risks and expose new ones, creating challenges that require a broader, more integrated approach.&nbsp;</p>



<p>To build a truly enterprise-grade, trustworthy AI security program, we recommend the following steps:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>
<strong>Hybrid AppSec Model</strong>&nbsp;<br>Combine deterministic precision with probabilistic AI to cover both known and unknown risk.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>
<strong>Agentic Triage &amp; Remediation</strong>&nbsp;<br>Leverage AI agents to scale context-aware triage and accelerate remediation.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>
<strong>Shift Left to the Source</strong>&nbsp;<br>Identify and fix AI-generated vulnerabilities at code&nbsp;creation, before&nbsp;they reach production.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<p>Learn more about Checkmarx’s agentic agents: <a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/developer-assist/">Developer Assist </a>and <a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/triage-and-remediation/">Triage and Remediation Assist</a>.</p>



<p></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
		<media:content url="https://www.youtube.com/embed/B9AJK5LbEds" duration="860">
			<media:player url="https://www.youtube.com/embed/B9AJK5LbEds" />
			<media:title type="html">Checkmarx Application Security Guide to Claude Mythos</media:title>
			<media:description type="html">Claude Mythos highlights a new era of dynamic, AI-driven applications, and the growing security blind spots they create.</media:description>
			<media:thumbnail url="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/b9ajk5lbeds.jpg" />
			<media:keywords>Agentic AI,Claude Mythos,security</media:keywords>
		</media:content>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Stop Manual Triaging, Start Agentic Fixing</title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/stop-manual-triaging-start-agentic-fixing/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rebecca Spiegel]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 06:49:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Agents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI in Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[developer assist]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=108185</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Why execution, not detection, is now the defining AppSec challenge.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Most security leaders are not struggling because they lack visibility. They are struggling because execution does not scale.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Triage capacity, decision consistency, and remediation throughput are being outpaced by modern development velocity, especially as AI-assisted coding becomes standard practice. The operating environment has changed. There is more code, more change, more dependencies, and more AI tooling.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>These conditions are turning manual triage into&nbsp;a governance&nbsp;and audit liability. The only sustainable path forward is to move security decisions&nbsp;and remediation into the pull request. There,&nbsp;risk decisions are documented, fixes are verified, and accountability already exists through governed, reviewable AI-assistance&nbsp;that accelerates execution without surrendering control.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">The Reality Security Executives Are Living In </h2>



<p>Security and AppSec leaders are seeing the same pattern repeat across teams: findings accumulate, remediation cycles aren’t keeping pace with development, and audit conversations are becoming more demanding. The reason isn’t just rising expectations, but the reality that modern software delivery keeps expanding the attack surface while simultaneously making risk decisions harder to track and standardize. </p>



<p>This exposure isn’t an insufficient tooling or coverage problem. Application security testing has expanded significantly over the past decade, introducing more scan types, deeper integrations, and great vulnerability visibility. Despite this progress, a consistent pattern remains: organizations often release new software even when they know risk is present, simply because their operating model cannot keep pace with delivery. </p>



<p><a href="https://checkmarx.com/resources/reports/appsec-knowledge-gap/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Checkmarx research found that</a> 81% of organizations knowingly shipped vulnerable code, and 98% experiences a breach tied to vulnerable code within the last year. Risk exposure is not cause by a lack of awareness; it&#8217;s a breakdown in execution. As AI-assisted development becomes the norm, that pressure only grows.</p>



<p>Leaders at major software organizations have&nbsp;publicly stated&nbsp;that&nbsp;AI now generates&nbsp;a significant share&nbsp;of their code, with&nbsp;some&nbsp;<a href="https://techcrunch.com/2025/04/29/microsoft-ceo-says-up-to-30-of-the-companys-code-was-written-by-ai/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">estimates ranging from 20 to 30 percent of code</a>&nbsp;in repositories and more than a quarter of new code.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>As software production&nbsp;accelerates,&nbsp;risk&nbsp;enters&nbsp;at the same pace.&nbsp;And when risk enters the system faster&nbsp;than teams can triage&nbsp;it,&nbsp;remediation becomes unpredictable.&nbsp;That unpredictability is what boards and regulators&nbsp;ultimately penalize. Detection has scaled. Execution has not.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">Detection Scaled, Execution Didn’t. Now What? </h2>



<p>Application security programs have made substantial progress over the last decade. Most enterprises now&nbsp;operate&nbsp;with broad coverage that includes SAST, SCA, CI/CD integrations, and developer-focused tooling. However, many programs are now over-detecting&nbsp;vulnerabilities&nbsp;relative to their ability to act on findings. This imbalance creates operational friction and weakens overall security outcomes.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The symptoms are consistent across organizations. Triage bottlenecks form as teams struggle to review large volumes of findings. Identical issues are handled differently across teams, creating inconsistency in decision-making. Findings remain unresolved for extended periods because priority is unclear, or remediation effort is high. Backlogs grow with items that are technically valid but not treated as immediate risk, while other issues are escalated without sufficient context. </p>



<p>This dynamic explains why&nbsp;more&nbsp;findings rarely reduce&nbsp;exposure. When everything is flagged,&nbsp;nothing gets fixed.&nbsp;Security leaders&nbsp;feel&nbsp;this as a credibility gap:&nbsp;dashboards show activity, but stakeholders&nbsp;want to know if the organization is&nbsp;getting&nbsp;more secure.&nbsp;That’s&nbsp;a hard&nbsp;question&nbsp;to answer when decision-making is&nbsp;inconsistent,&nbsp;and remediation throughput cannot be predicted.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">NIST Secure Software Development Framework</a> reinforced this shift, by requiring organizations to document how risk decisions are made and demonstrate evidence of secure development practices. Detection alone is not sufficient. Organizations must show that vulnerabilities were evaluated in context and resolved in a consistent, auditable way.  </p>



<p>Detection is not the end state. Evidence-backed execution is.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">Why Manual Triage Is Now a Business Risk </h2>



<p>At enterprise scale, manual triage is no longer simply inefficient. When security teams manually interpret findings across hundreds of repositories, inconsistency is inevitable and becomes an operational and governance risk. Depending on the team reviewing, identical findings receive completely different treatment. One team immediately remediates, another dismisses it, and another marks it as accepted risk without a standardized rationale. That inconsistency becomes a liability as regulators and auditors increasingly expect organizations to formally document how vulnerabilities are categorized and managed. When the answers to basic governance questions vary across the organization, regulators interpret that variability as a lack of control. Who made the decision? What evidence supported it? Which policy is applied? Without consistent answers, risk exposure becomes unpredictable and difficult to defend.  </p>



<p>These growing expectations arrive precisely when&nbsp;teams are least equipped to meet them.&nbsp;Security teams face ongoing budget pressures and staffing shortages while vulnerability volumes&nbsp;keep rising. Headcount cannot scale in proportion to code volume.&nbsp;&nbsp;Instead, organizations need to scale execution by relying on more consistent, efficient, and automated approaches to vulnerability management.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4">The Pull Request Is the New Control Plane </h2>



<p>If risk is introduced continuously throughout development, governance must be applied at the point where decisions are actually made.&nbsp;In modern engineering environments, that point is the pull request.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The pull request is where code changes become official:&nbsp;approvals&nbsp;granted, discussions&nbsp;recorded, checks&nbsp;enforced, and ownership is&nbsp;established. It is the&nbsp;<em>only place</em>&nbsp;where execution can be&nbsp;observed&nbsp;and governed at the same speed as development.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Security decisions belong where code is reviewed, approved, and merged, not buried in dashboards and ticketing systems.&nbsp;</p>



<p>&nbsp;Checkmarx’s&nbsp;<strong>Triage Assist</strong>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<strong>Remediation Assist</strong>&nbsp;operate&nbsp;directly within pull requests, ensuring that risk decisions are made in the same place where change control already exists. The principle is straightforward:&nbsp;if security execution is not visible within the pull&nbsp;request,&nbsp;it&nbsp;cannot be&nbsp;governed.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-5">From Alerts to Outcomes: What Changes </h2>



<p>This shift does not&nbsp;eliminate&nbsp;human involvement;&nbsp;It&nbsp;just&nbsp;changes where human judgment is applied. Instead of spending time manually investigating large volumes of findings, teams focus on policy definition, exception handling, and approval.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>Triage Assist</strong> introduces a contextual, risk-based prioritization model that converts scan output into decision-grade outcomes. It evaluates vulnerabilities using attackability-driven analysis, combining reachability, exploitability, and policy context to determine which issues require action. This approach moves triage away from severity-based sorting toward context-based decision-making. Findings are classified into clear outcomes such as false positive, acceptable risk, or action required, enabling consistent and defensible decisions across teams. The shift toward context-driven decisioning aligns with broader industry efforts such as the <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/vulnerability-exploitability-exchange-vex" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange (VEX)</a>, which communicates the exploitability of a vulnerability in context , not simply if it’s present. </p>



<p><strong>Remediation Assist</strong>&nbsp;addresses the next stage of execution. Once a decision is made, it generates reviewable, merge-ready fixes directly within the pull request workflow. These fixes are delivered as diffs or remediation pull requests that align with existing development processes. Nothing merges automatically; developers review and approve changes as part of their standard workflow, preserving governance while accelerating remediation throughput.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Together,&nbsp;Triage Assist and Remediation Assist&nbsp;transform application security from a process centered on alerts&nbsp;to one&nbsp;focused on outcomes.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-6">Governed AI, Not Autonomous Chaos </h2>



<p>Security leaders&nbsp;don’t&nbsp;need&nbsp;autonomous systems&nbsp;making&nbsp;unchecked changes to code. They need&nbsp;governed&nbsp;execution that improves speed while&nbsp;maintaining&nbsp;control. This distinction&nbsp;matters more&nbsp;as AI expands both development capabilities and&nbsp;the&nbsp;attack surface&nbsp;that comes with it.&nbsp;</p>



<p>New risks, including prompt injection, supply chain manipulation, and excessive agent permissions, require careful control over how AI is used within development workflows. Even systems that include human oversight can introduce risk if decisions are not transparent or if context is incomplete.&nbsp;Industry frameworks such as the&nbsp;<a href="https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-for-large-language-model-applications/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications</a>&nbsp;highlight emerging risks including prompt injection, supply chain manipulation, and excessive agent permissions, reinforcing the need for controlled and explainable execution.&nbsp;</p>



<p><em>Read more: <a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/when-the-ai-lies-a-new-threat-emerges-for-human-in-the-loop-security/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">When the AI Lies: A New Threat Emerges for “Human-in-the-Loop&#8221; Security</a> </em></p>



<p>A governed approach to AI-driven security execution is grounded on clear principles. Human review remains mandatory through established approval workflows. Decision rationale is preserved to support auditability. Usage is scoped and controlled across repositories and environments. Automated changes are never merged without review. </p>



<p>This model ensures that AI accelerates your execution without also introducing uncontrolled behavior. It aligns with the needs of regulated, audit-driven environments where traceability and accountability are essential.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-7">What Success Looks Like for Security Executives </h2>



<p>The goal&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;better&nbsp;visibility alone, but predictable execution with measurable outcomes:&nbsp;reduced time to decision, faster remediation cycles, and smaller vulnerability backlogs. Standardized, evidence-based triage reduces the need to repeatedly evaluate the same issues across teams,&nbsp;which improves both&nbsp;efficiency and consistency.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Higher fix acceptance rates and fewer regressions indicate that remediation is delivered in ways that fit developer workflows, without destabilizing applications. Consistent outcomes across teams means that governance is being applied systematically rather than left to individual judgement.</p>



<p>Audit readiness matters just as much. Security artifacts must be tied directly to execution, including pull request discussions, approvals, and documented decisions. This reduces reliance on retrospective explanations when auditors and boards come asking. These outcomes are becoming more critical as exploitation windows continue to shrink. Vulnerabilities are often exploited shortly after disclosure, which mean delayed triage is no longer a workflow preference. It&#8217;s a business risk.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-8">The Strategic Shift </h2>



<p>Security leaders do not need more&nbsp;alerts,&nbsp;they need more finished work. Moving away from manual triage is not about reducing security effort, but&nbsp;about operationalizing security in a way that scales with modern development.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Effective application security requires decisions that are grounded in context, remediation&nbsp;delivered within the development workflow, and governance&nbsp;preserved through auditable processes. This is the shift toward agentic application security, where the gap between how quickly software is created and how quickly risk&nbsp;is&nbsp;understood and mitigated&nbsp;can be&nbsp;closed without slowing innovation.&nbsp;</p>



<p><em>Ready to move from manual triage to scalable, governed execution? Explore Checkmarx&#8217;s <a href="https://checkmarx.com/the-agentic-ai-buyers-guide/">Agentic AI Buyer’s Guide</a> to see how leading teams are operationalizing this shift.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>RSAC 2026 Marked a Turning Point for AppSec. The Reason – Agentic Security </title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/rsac-2026-marked-a-turning-point-for-appsec-the-reason-agentic-security/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eran Kinsbruner]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Mar 2026 16:02:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & LLM Tools in Application Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Application Security Trends & Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Checkmarx One]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Checkmarx Product News, Use Cases & Guides]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ADLC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AppSec]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conferences]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RSAC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RSAC 2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=107906</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[RSAC 2026 Marked a Turning Point for AppSec. The Reason – Agentic Security&#160; RSA Conference 2026 has just wrapped in San Francisco.&#160; If&#160;you’ve&#160;been to enough of these events, you know that while&#160;they’re&#160;valuable for innovation, connection, and hearing where the industry is headed, they tend to blend into&#160;the collective memory of past events&#160;after a couple&#160;months,&#160;with little [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>RSAC 2026 Marked a Turning Point for AppSec. The Reason – Agentic Security&nbsp;</p>



<p>RSA Conference 2026 has just wrapped in San Francisco.&nbsp;</p>



<p>If&nbsp;you’ve&nbsp;been to enough of these events, you know that while&nbsp;they’re&nbsp;valuable for innovation, connection, and hearing where the industry is headed, they tend to blend into&nbsp;the collective memory of past events&nbsp;after a couple&nbsp;months,&nbsp;with little to distinguish them.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>But then&nbsp;there’s&nbsp;the 1%.</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<p>The rare moment you recognize&nbsp;immediately&nbsp;when something shifts.&nbsp;<br>Not a gradual step forward, but a leap.&nbsp;When what felt experimental or theoretical suddenly becomes real.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>RSAC 2026 felt like one of those moments.</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<p>What set this year apart was&nbsp;the emergence of&nbsp;<strong>Agentic AppSec</strong>, not as an idea or&nbsp;an&nbsp;experiment,&nbsp;but rather an&nbsp;operational reality&nbsp;already being adopted and executed, as part of&nbsp;the&nbsp;growing recognition that AI-driven development is fundamentally reshaping the software lifecycle&nbsp;–&nbsp;into&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/ai-llm-tools-in-application-security/goodbye-sdlc-hello-adlc-how-will-appsec-adapt/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Agentic Development&nbsp;Lifecycle&nbsp;(ADLC)</a>&nbsp;&#8211;&nbsp;&nbsp;and&nbsp;security models that must&nbsp;evolve to&nbsp;support it.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">
<strong>What Defined This Turning Point&nbsp;in RSAC 2026</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>To understand why RSAC 2026 felt so unique, it helps to take a closer look at the themes that consistently&nbsp;emerged&nbsp;across the event.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">From Assistive AI → Autonomous (Agentic) Security&nbsp;</h3>



<p>The biggest shift:&nbsp;Agents&nbsp;have grown to be&nbsp;more than&nbsp;‘assistants’. Security is no longer just&nbsp;assisted&nbsp;by&nbsp;AI&nbsp;&#8211;&nbsp;AI agents increasingly execute it.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Agents are moving from copilots to decision-makers&nbsp;who&nbsp;can investigate, triage, and act.&nbsp;The industry is transitioning from human-paced workflows to&nbsp;<strong>machine-speed security operations</strong>.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">“Security for AI” and “Security by AI” Converge&nbsp;</h3>



<p>A major theme across sessions:&nbsp;</p>



<p>Organizations must secure AI systems (LLMs, agents, MCPs),&nbsp;while simultaneously using AI to secure software and pipelines.&nbsp;</p>



<p>AppSec is now responsible for both sides of the equation:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Protecting AI-generated code and AI components&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Using agents to secure the SDLC,&nbsp;and increasingly, the ADLC&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Rise of the Agentic Development Lifecycle (ADLC)&nbsp;</h3>



<p>AI is reshaping how software is written, reviewed, and deployed.&nbsp;Security must adapt to a lifecycle where agents generate,&nbsp;modify, and ship code.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>AppSec implication:</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Security shifts from left →&nbsp;<strong>everywhere</strong>&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>From reactive →&nbsp;<strong>embedded into autonomous workflows</strong>&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Explosion of AI Supply Chain Risk&nbsp;</h3>



<p>RSAC highlighted growing concern around the security risks introduced by new supply chain components and dependencies, such as LLMs, agents, MCP servers, plugins, and AI SDKs.&nbsp;</p>



<p>There is a clear need for visibility (AI-BOM), provenance, and trust in AI components.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>AppSec implication:</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>SBOM is evolving into&nbsp;<strong>AI-BOM</strong>&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>You now secure not just code dependencies, but AI dependencies&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">
<strong>AI-Native Security Vendors vs. Legacy Players</strong>&nbsp;</h3>



<p>There’s&nbsp;a clear market shift:&nbsp;</p>



<p>The rise of AI-native security companies&nbsp;is&nbsp;challenging traditional vendors.&nbsp;Winning platforms are being rebuilt&nbsp;from the ground up&nbsp;as AI-first, not AI-enhanced.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>AppSec implication:</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Expect consolidation around platforms that embed agents deeply&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Not bolt-on AI features&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">
<strong>Trust, Governance, and Identity Become Foundational</strong>&nbsp;</h3>



<p>As agents act autonomously, the question becomes:&nbsp;</p>



<p>Who authorized the agent? What can it do?&nbsp;</p>



<p>Identity and governance are now core security primitives, not add-ons.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>AppSec implication:</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<p>Security must enforce:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Agent identity&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Policy boundaries&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Auditability of decisions&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<p>Taken together, these themes highlight a clear gap: traditional AppSec approaches were not designed for an agentic development lifecycle.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>That gap — and how to close it — was a central focus of what we introduced, as it raised the question:</strong>&nbsp;how do you secure an&nbsp;ecosystem&nbsp;that is&nbsp;agent-driven&nbsp;as much, if not more,&nbsp;than human-driven?&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>At RSAC 2026, we introduced&nbsp;our new&nbsp;capabilities designed to address exactly that.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full is-resized"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="930" height="673" src="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-1.webp" alt="" class="wp-image-107932" style="aspect-ratio:1.3818985682338123;width:601px;height:auto" srcset="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-1.webp 930w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-1-300x217.webp 300w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-1-768x556.webp 768w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-1-808x585.webp 808w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-1-400x289.webp 400w" sizes="(max-width: 930px) 100vw, 930px" /></figure>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">
<strong>Securing the Agentic Development Lifecycle</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>At RSA this year,&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/rsac-2026/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">unveiled</a>&nbsp;a new set of innovations designed to secure the&nbsp;ADLC:&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Expansion of&nbsp;the&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;Assist family of agents&nbsp;</h3>



<p>Building on&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/developer-assist/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Checkmarx&nbsp;Developer Assist</a>, we introduced two new agents:&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/triage-and-remediation/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><strong>Triage Assist</strong>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<strong>Remediation Assist</strong></a><strong>,&nbsp;</strong>designed to secure the critical post-commit phase. These agents help teams quickly prioritize real risks and fix them efficiently within pull requests (PR), reducing noise and accelerating secure code delivery.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Introducing&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;AI Supply Chain Security&nbsp;</h3>



<p>As organizations increasingly build with AI components,&nbsp;an entirely new layer is introduced into the supply chain, requiring dedicated security to address its unique challenges and risks.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;AI&nbsp;Supply Chain Security&nbsp;provides&nbsp;<strong>full visibility and risk assessment across the AI stack</strong>. With a centralized inventory and AI-BOM covering MCP servers, LLMs, AI agents, SDKs, and more, teams can move fast with AI, without losing control over security.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">SAST AI and DAST for AI&nbsp;&nbsp;</h3>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;enhanced its two core security engines to support AI-powered SAST scanning across&nbsp;virtually any&nbsp;programming language, helping organizations future-proof their technology adoption. In parallel, we strengthened our DAST engine to deliver runtime protection aligned with the realities of AI-driven and “vibe coding” development.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Risk Orchestration within ASPM&nbsp;</h3>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;also announced a new and enhanced risk management and visibility solution&nbsp;across applications, projects, and repositories to improve decision-making, reduce noise, and highlight critical vulnerabilities.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Agent identity&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Policy boundaries&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Auditability of decisions&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<p>the tooling landscape must evolve to keep pace with the speed of AI-driven development. The shift is no longer about “AI in AppSec,” but about AppSec itself becoming&nbsp;an entirely different paradigm &#8211;&nbsp;agentic, autonomous, and continuous by design.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full is-resized"><img decoding="async" width="922" height="687" src="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-2.webp" alt="" class="wp-image-107933" style="aspect-ratio:1.342087525276481;width:642px;height:auto" srcset="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-2.webp 922w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-2-300x224.webp 300w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-2-768x572.webp 768w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-2-785x585.webp 785w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-2-400x298.webp 400w" sizes="(max-width: 922px) 100vw, 922px" /></figure>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">Closing Notes&nbsp;</h2>



<p>The idea that “AppSec is becoming agentic” goes beyond a shift in tooling — it reflects a fundamentally&nbsp;different way&nbsp;of working with and understanding application security.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>AppSec is changing its DNA.</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<p>That is why, compared to 2025, this year’s event was overwhelmingly focused on AI and Agentic Application Security, with a clear emphasis on how&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
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			<media:title type="html">CX RSAC 1</media:title>
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			<media:title type="html">CX RSAC 2</media:title>
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		<title>Why Vulnerability Detection Doesn’t Scale  </title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/why-vulnerability-detection-doesnt-scale/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rebecca Spiegel]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 17:03:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Agents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI generated code]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AppSec]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=107874</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The execution gap that is quietly breaking modern AppSec programs.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Most AppSec teams are not&nbsp;failing to detect&nbsp;risk.&nbsp;They’re&nbsp;just&nbsp;failing to remediate&nbsp;it fast enough.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Security programs now find more vulnerabilities than they can fix, and remediation&nbsp;hasn’t&nbsp;kept pace with how fast teams ship code. AI-generated code has made that gap worse, adding volume and complexity faster than security processes have adapted.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Coverage has&nbsp;expanded,&nbsp;scanning is continuous, and visibility is no longer the bottleneck&nbsp;–&nbsp;but the ability to act on that visibility at scale&nbsp;hasn’t&nbsp;kept up. Backlogs&nbsp;grow,&nbsp;MTTR stays stubbornly high, and the same classes of vulnerabilities reappear across releases, even as detection improves.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The gap&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;that security teams lack maturity.&nbsp;It’s&nbsp;that AppSec was never built to&nbsp;operate&nbsp;at&nbsp;this scale.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">Detection&nbsp;Has&nbsp;Scaled. Execution&nbsp;Has&nbsp;Not.&nbsp;</h2>



<p>A growing share of&nbsp;<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2025/07/29/the-hidden-costs-of-ignoring-application-security/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">organizations now acknowledge shipping software with known vulnerabilities</a>&nbsp;to keep delivery moving&nbsp;But&nbsp;the pace of exploitation is accelerating at the same time.&nbsp;Research shows that the average time to exploit newly disclosed vulnerabilities has dropped dramatically in recent years, with attackers increasingly weaponizing vulnerabilities within days of disclosure and sometimes within hours.&nbsp;In 2025, nearly&nbsp;<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2025/07/29/the-hidden-costs-of-ignoring-application-security" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">one-third of known exploited vulnerabilities were exploited on or before the day they were publicly&nbsp;disclosed</a>, leaving&nbsp;organizations&nbsp;little time to evaluate and remediate risk.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>The&nbsp;distance&nbsp;between discovery and remediation is no longer&nbsp;a&nbsp;theoretical&nbsp;chasm. It is operational, measurable, and increasingly visible to boards, regulators, and customers.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">Detection Solved Visibility, Not Outcomes&nbsp;</h2>



<p>For more than a decade, AppSec investments focused on improving detection&nbsp;–&nbsp;and that&nbsp;initially&nbsp;worked.&nbsp;Coverage expanded across proprietary code and open-source&nbsp;dependencies,&nbsp;scanning became faster, findings became&nbsp;richer,&nbsp;&nbsp;and&nbsp;dashboards&nbsp;and reporting&nbsp;improved. But&nbsp;risk&nbsp;outcomes&nbsp;did not.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Security teams now&nbsp;operate&nbsp;in an environment where visibility is&nbsp;abundant,&nbsp;but action is constrained. Thousands of findings accumulate without clear prioritization, causing analysts&nbsp;to&nbsp;spend hours&nbsp;validating&nbsp;reachability and exploitability.&nbsp;At the same time, developers receive findings without enough context to determine what actually matters.&nbsp;Different teams&nbsp;end up&nbsp;making&nbsp;different decisions on identical&nbsp;issues&nbsp;and the&nbsp;result is a system that knows&nbsp;more&nbsp;but&nbsp;fixes&nbsp;less.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This mismatch is&nbsp;becoming more pronounced as&nbsp;AI continues to accelerate&nbsp;development&nbsp;velocity.&nbsp;Leaders at major software organizations have&nbsp;publicly stated&nbsp;that&nbsp;a s<a href="https://unanswered.io/guide/how-much-of-googles-code-is-written-by-ai" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">ignificant portion&nbsp;of new code is now generated with AI&nbsp;assistance</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;only&nbsp;reviewed by engineers before release.&nbsp;</p>



<p>More code, shipped faster, means more potential risk, and more risk requires more capacity to remediate, not just more capacity to detect.&nbsp;Detection surfaced the problem. It&nbsp;didn&#8217;t&nbsp;solve it.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">The Execution Gap Is the New AppSec Bottleneck&nbsp;</h2>



<p>The execution&nbsp;gap&nbsp;is not a single failure point, but&nbsp;the accumulation of small inefficiencies that compound at scale.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Triage still depends on human judgment&nbsp;that gets repeated inconsistently across teams, with prioritization varying based on who happens to review a given finding.&nbsp;Fix guidance is&nbsp;often&nbsp;advisory, leaving developers to interpret and implement solutions themselves.&nbsp;And&nbsp;governance&nbsp;tends to&nbsp;exist&nbsp;in policy&nbsp;documents instead&nbsp;of&nbsp;the workflows where decisions are actually made.&nbsp;Individually, these issues are manageable. At AI-scale, they become&nbsp;systemic, thereby compounding&nbsp;AppSec&nbsp;challenges, not because teams&nbsp;lack&nbsp;tools, but because the system connecting detection to action is inconsistent. When execution varies, risk becomes unpredictable&nbsp;and&nbsp;auditability degrades. When workflows depend on manual interpretation, service-level commitments&nbsp;become&nbsp;unenforceable.&nbsp;</p>



<p>&nbsp;What looks like a technical problem is, at its core, actually an operational one.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4">The&nbsp;Pull Request Is the Only Place Execution Can Scale</h2>



<p>For years, AppSec findings have flowed into tickets, dashboards, and reports –&nbsp;but that’s not where&nbsp;fix&nbsp;decisions get made.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Execution happens&nbsp;in&nbsp;the pull request,&nbsp;where code is reviewed, discussed, approved, and merged. It is where context exists,&nbsp;accountability is enforced, and&nbsp;decisions are recorded by default.&nbsp;Pull requests can be configured to block merges until required checks pass, including security scanning results.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>In practice, this means remediation decisions and risk acceptance already occur in the pull request workflow, whether security teams formally recognize it or not.&nbsp;So why&nbsp;are&nbsp;security&nbsp;decisions&nbsp;still being made outside of this workflow?&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-5">From Detection to Decision Infrastructure&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Modern AppSec needs a system that can turn findings into decisions. Not every vulnerability is exploitable; some represent real, reachable risk, others are false positives, and others fall within acceptable risk thresholds depending on context. Today, this distinction is made manually and inconsistently.</p>



<p>Decision infrastructure changes that. It classifies findings with reasoning, distinguishes between what must be fixed and what can be deprioritized, and surfaces those decisions directly in the pull request. It enables guided, reviewable remediation that is aligned with how the application actually works.</p>



<p>The industry has largely moved toward context-driven prioritization, with modern vulnerability management frameworks emphasizing exploitability and real-world impact over severity scores alone. But translating detection signals into actionable risk decisions requires decision infrastructure, and without it, the value of detection is incomplete.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-6">Where Triage and Remediation Actually Happen&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Modern AppSec programs are beginning to embed agentic workflows directly in the pull request, delivering security decisions and fixes where code is actually reviewed and merged.&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;One&nbsp;is&nbsp;built&nbsp;on&nbsp;this&nbsp;model.<strong>&nbsp;</strong><a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/triage-and-remediation/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><strong>Triage</strong></a><strong>&nbsp;</strong><a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/triage-and-remediation/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><strong>Assist</strong></a>&nbsp;addresses&nbsp;the first execution bottleneck: deciding what&nbsp;requires&nbsp;immediate&nbsp;action.&nbsp;It evaluates findings using contextual analysis to&nbsp;determine&nbsp;whether a vulnerability is reachable, exploitable, and relevant within the application environment. Instead of presenting developers with raw scan output, it produces decision-ready outcomes that&nbsp;identify&nbsp;which&nbsp;issues must be&nbsp;fixed, deferred, and&nbsp;or&nbsp;represent acceptable risk under policy.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This shift replaces manual triage queues with consistent, evidence-based decision logic that can be applied across repositories, teams, and applications. Decisions become standardized, rationale becomes&nbsp;visible&nbsp;and governance becomes enforceable.&nbsp;</p>



<p><a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/triage-and-remediation/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><strong>Remediation Assist</strong></a>&nbsp;addresses the second execution bottleneck: turning decisions into completed work. Once an issue is identified as requiring action, remediation guidance is delivered directly in the pull request as a reviewable code change that aligns with the&nbsp;application’s&nbsp;frameworks and dependencies. Developers evaluate the proposed fix using their existing review process, preserving accountability and control while accelerating resolution. Human approval&nbsp;remains&nbsp;mandatory,&nbsp;but&nbsp;developers&nbsp;don’t&nbsp;need to&nbsp;start from scratch&nbsp;when addressing security issues. The path from detection to remediation becomes shorter, more predictable, and easier to govern.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Together, these capabilities transform the pull request into a true execution layer for application security. Risk decisions are made where code changes&nbsp;occur,&nbsp;fixes are delivered where developers work,&nbsp;and evidence is recorded where auditors expect it.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>And this approach scales.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-7">Why Governance Must Be Embedded, Not Enforced Later&nbsp;</h2>



<p>When governance exists outside the workflow, it is optional by default. It relies on teams remembering to follow it, interpreting it correctly, and applying it consistently. At scale, that approach breaks down.&nbsp;</p>



<p>But when governance is embedded in execution, it becomes part of how work gets done.&nbsp;This principle is increasingly reflected in secure software development standards.&nbsp;Frameworks such as the NIST Secure Software Development Framework emphasize the importance of&nbsp;maintaining&nbsp;evidence and artifacts that&nbsp;demonstrate&nbsp;how security decisions were made and implemented throughout the&nbsp;development&nbsp;lifecycle.&nbsp;</p>



<p>That requirement changes&nbsp;what AppSec governance actually means.&nbsp;&nbsp;Policy alone&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;sufficient; what matters is documented execution that preserves human oversight, where prioritization criteria are applied consistently, remediation is scoped and controlled, and decisions are captured automatically without&nbsp;additional&nbsp;administrative&nbsp;overhead. This&nbsp;is&nbsp;the difference between policy and control.&nbsp;Triage and remediation capabilities built directly into development workflows&nbsp;don&#8217;t&nbsp;replace decision-making,&nbsp;they structure it, bringing prioritization, reasoning, and fix guidance into the pull request where decisions are already happening.&nbsp;The result is&nbsp;governed&nbsp;execution, not autonomous remediation.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-8">What Changes When Execution Is Operationalized&nbsp;</h2>



<p>When execution is built into the workflow, the system begins to behave differently.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Manual triage effort drops because classification is no longer repeated across teams. Time to&nbsp;decision&nbsp;shrinks because context and reasoning are already available. Remediation becomes more consistent because developers are not guessing what matters or how to fix it. Risk acceptance becomes explicit, not implied. Auditability improves because decisions are captured as part of normal development activity.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Perhaps most&nbsp;importantly, the relationship between security and engineering changes.&nbsp;When developers receive clear, contextualized guidance in the pull request,&nbsp;security stops being perceived as noise and starts being seen as actionable&nbsp;input, reducing friction.&nbsp;The conversation shifts from asking why a finding exists to deciding what action should be taken.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This shift is increasingly necessary as development complexity grows. Software supply chain risk, third-party dependencies, and AI-assisted development are expanding the attack surface faster than traditional workflows can keep pace. </p>



<p><a href="https://www.techradar.com/pro/security/software-supply-chain-attacks-pose-huge-dangers-heres-how-to-bolster-your-defenses" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Recent reporting</a> shows that most organizations have experienced supply chain attacks within the past year, reinforcing the need for consistent, scalable remediation processes.  By adopting this approach, AppSec can scale effectively without requiring a proportional increase in headcount. </p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-9">The Necessary&nbsp;Shift&nbsp;to Agentic AppSec&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Detection is table stakes in 2026. The organizations that optimize detection alone will continue to generate more findings than they can act on. Backlogs will grow and the gap between visibility and execution will widen. Security teams will remain overwhelmed, and risk decisions will remain inconsistent.  </p>



<p>The organizations that operationalize execution will close that&nbsp;gap.&nbsp;They will make&nbsp;decisions&nbsp;where work happens. They will standardize how those decisions are made. They will embed governance into the workflow instead of enforcing it after the fact.&nbsp;And&nbsp;they will measure success not by how much they find, but by how much they&nbsp;fix.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>This shift is&nbsp;defining modern, agentic&nbsp;application security.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Read the next article:&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/ai-llm-tools-in-application-security/reachability-was-a-breakthrough-but-now-its-not-enough/">Attackability: Why Context, Not Reachability, Should Drive Remediation</a></p>



<p>Learn how modern AppSec teams prioritize vulnerabilities based on reachability, exploitability, and real-world impact to reduce noise and focus remediation where it matters most.&nbsp;</p>



<p></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Attackability: Why Context, Not Reachability, Should Drive Remediation </title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/ai-llm-tools-in-application-security/reachability-was-a-breakthrough-but-now-its-not-enough/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rebecca Spiegel]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 15:30:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI generated code]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[checkmarx one]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[developer assist]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=107714</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Reachability is not exploitability. Modern software development requires more than execution analysis.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For years, reachability has been the security industry’s go-to approach for vulnerability prioritization.&nbsp;Instead of flagging every vulnerable dependency, the idea was to determine whether an application could actually reach the vulnerable function.&nbsp;This marked&nbsp;a meaningful&nbsp;step forward in&nbsp;application security, shifting focus to code that&nbsp;executes&nbsp;in production.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>But reachability is not exploitability.&nbsp;</strong>A function can be reachable and still pose no practical risk if it sits behind authentication, processes only trusted inputs, or is mitigated by runtime controls. Reachability confirms that code can run, not that an attacker can abuse it.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Modern software development requires more than execution analysis.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;Triage Agent addresses this&nbsp;head on&nbsp;with&nbsp;<em>Attackability</em>:&nbsp;AI-driven triage that traces attacker-controlled inputs from real ingress points to potential impact and verifies which controls prevent exploitation&nbsp;–&nbsp;and which do not.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>The result is triage based on&nbsp;demonstrated&nbsp;exploitability, not theoretical reachability.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">What Reachability Actually Tells You&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Most SCA tools define reachability at the function level:&nbsp;is there a path from your code to the vulnerable function? If yes, the finding is flagged as reachable. If not,&nbsp;it&#8217;s&nbsp;deprioritized.&nbsp;</p>



<p>That’s&nbsp;useful, but&nbsp;it’s&nbsp;also incomplete.&nbsp;Here’s&nbsp;what reachability&nbsp;doesn’t&nbsp;tell you:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Whether the input reaching that function is attacker-controlled, or only comes from trusted internal sources&nbsp;</li>



<li>Whether&nbsp;there&#8217;s&nbsp;a real ingress point (a public API, a webhook, a file upload) that a real attacker could use&nbsp;</li>



<li>Whether required preconditions exist, like a specific protocol behavior or a privileged network position&nbsp;</li>



<li>Whether controls on the path, such as a safe parser, an authentication check, or an allowlist, already break the exploit chain&nbsp;</li>



<li>What the actual impact would be: RCE, data exposure, privilege escalation, or something else</li>
</ul>



<p>A finding can be technically reachable yet completely unexploitable in production.&nbsp;When that happens, engineering&nbsp;time&nbsp;is wasted&nbsp;for no&nbsp;reason, and&nbsp;real risk competes for attention.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Security teams&nbsp;don’t&nbsp;need to know “can this function run?”&nbsp;they need to know&nbsp;“<strong>can an attacker exploit this in our application, given our ingress points, our controls, and our runtime environment?”</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<p>That’s&nbsp;the difference between reachability and&nbsp;attackability.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">How&nbsp;Attackability&nbsp;Works&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;Triage Assist&nbsp;introduces&nbsp;Attackability: AI-driven triage that traces attacker-controlled input from real ingress points to&nbsp;potential&nbsp;impact,&nbsp;and&nbsp;validates&nbsp;which controls prevent exploitation and which do not.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Attackability&nbsp;follows a consistent five-step flow regardless of the scanner type:&nbsp;</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>
<strong>Identify&nbsp;the vulnerable capability and candidate sink.</strong>&nbsp;Confirm what the vulnerable library, pattern, or API surface is, and form&nbsp;an initial&nbsp;hypothesis about how exploitation would occur.&nbsp;</li>



<li>
<strong>Prove or disprove a real execution path.</strong>&nbsp;Trace whether the vulnerable code path is reachable in the repository, including direct calls, indirect framework behavior, and configuration-driven invocation.&nbsp;</li>



<li>
<strong>Validate&nbsp;attacker control and real ingress.</strong>&nbsp;Identify&nbsp;how data enters the system (API endpoints, file uploads, queues, webhooks, scheduled jobs) and whether an external attacker can&nbsp;actually influence&nbsp;the data that reaches the sink.&nbsp;</li>



<li>
<strong>Validate&nbsp;controls and preconditions.</strong>&nbsp;Check whether security controls apply on the relevant path: safe parsing, allowlists, auth boundaries, sanitization, runtime hardening. Document any required preconditions, such as a MITM position or specific deployment settings.&nbsp;</li>



<li>
<strong>Conclude exploitability and explain impact.</strong>&nbsp;Give a clear verdict (exploitable, not exploitable, or risk accepted with rationale),&nbsp;state&nbsp;the concrete impact, and provide a minimal-disruption remediation</li>
</ol>



<p>This moves the conversation from “is this reachable?” to “is this exploitable?”&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">Not Just&nbsp;for&nbsp;SCA&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Attackability&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;limited to dependency&nbsp;finding;&nbsp;it&nbsp;applies&nbsp;the same&nbsp;reasoning&nbsp;across&nbsp;most&nbsp;scanner types.&nbsp;</p>



<p>For&nbsp;<strong>SAST findings</strong>, it connects a detected code pattern to a real exploit chain by asking whether&nbsp;there&#8217;s&nbsp;a genuinely attacker-controlled source, whether the data flow reaches a dangerous sink, and whether controls on the path already prevent exploitation. A tainted data flow that never crosses an authentication boundary, or&nbsp;that&#8217;s&nbsp;constrained by an allowlist, can be reachable in code without being attackable in production.&nbsp;</p>



<p>For&nbsp;<strong>IaC&nbsp;and cloud misconfigurations</strong>, it evaluates whether a configuration issue is externally accessible and whether it creates a realistic path to impact, factoring in exposure surfaces, identity controls, and network controls.&nbsp;</p>



<p>For&nbsp;<strong>container findings</strong>, it assesses whether a vulnerable package is used at runtime, whether the container runs with elevated privileges, and whether the affected&nbsp;component&nbsp;is exposed through a reachable service.&nbsp;</p>



<p>For&nbsp;<strong>secrets&nbsp;detection</strong>, it evaluates whether the credential is valid, scoped, and exposed in a way an attacker can&nbsp;actually leverage, factoring in repository visibility, rotation state, and downstream blast radius.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4">What Makes the Output Credible&nbsp;</h2>



<p>The&nbsp;Attackability&nbsp;data&nbsp;is useful precisely because&nbsp;it’s&nbsp;verifiable. It includes concrete code references showing how the library or sink is used, a path narrative describing the chain from ingress to sink to impact (including where the chain breaks if the finding&nbsp;isn&#8217;t&nbsp;exploitable), explicit control validation, and a precise impact statement.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This&nbsp;matters&nbsp;more than triage speed. It means developers can see exactly how the issue is triggered and what minimal change breaks the chain. It means risk acceptance decisions are documented with&nbsp;evidence, so security and engineering teams are&nbsp;aligning on&nbsp;facts (not assumptions).&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-5">Reachability Is&nbsp;Just&nbsp;a Starting Point&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Reachability made&nbsp;vulnerability&nbsp;data&nbsp;more relevant.&nbsp;But&nbsp;reachability&nbsp;is not enough.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;Triage Assist’s&nbsp;Attackability&nbsp;adds attacker context, environmental context, and control validation, turning a reachability result into something a team can&nbsp;actually make&nbsp;a decision on.&nbsp;</p>



<p><em>Ready to go deeper? Read the <a href="https://checkmarx.com/the-agentic-ai-buyers-guide/"><strong>Agentic AI Buyer’s Guide</strong></a> to understand what separates decision-grade triage from theoretical analysis or watch the <a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/triage-and-remediation/#video">Checkmarx Triage Assist demo video</a> to see Attackability in action.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
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