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	<title>Checkmarx</title>
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	<description>The world runs on code. We secure it.</description>
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	<item>
		<title>Stop Manual Triaging, Start Agentic Fixing</title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/stop-manual-triaging-start-agentic-fixing/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rebecca Spiegel]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 06:49:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Agents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI in Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[developer assist]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=108185</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Why execution, not detection, is now the defining AppSec challenge.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Most security leaders are not struggling because they lack visibility. They are struggling because execution does not scale.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Triage capacity, decision consistency, and remediation throughput are being outpaced by modern development velocity, especially as AI-assisted coding becomes standard practice. The operating environment has changed. There is more code, more change, more dependencies, and more AI tooling.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>These conditions are turning manual triage into&nbsp;a governance&nbsp;and audit liability. The only sustainable path forward is to move security decisions&nbsp;and remediation into the pull request. There,&nbsp;risk decisions are documented, fixes are verified, and accountability already exists through governed, reviewable AI-assistance&nbsp;that accelerates execution without surrendering control.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">The Reality Security Executives Are Living In </h2>



<p>Security and AppSec leaders are seeing the same pattern repeat across teams: findings accumulate, remediation cycles aren’t keeping pace with development, and audit conversations are becoming more demanding. The reason isn’t just rising expectations, but the reality that modern software delivery keeps expanding the attack surface while simultaneously making risk decisions harder to track and standardize. </p>



<p>This exposure isn’t an insufficient tooling or coverage problem. Application security testing has expanded significantly over the past decade, introducing more scan types, deeper integrations, and great vulnerability visibility. Despite this progress, a consistent pattern remains: organizations often release new software even when they know risk is present, simply because their operating model cannot keep pace with delivery. </p>



<p><a href="https://checkmarx.com/resources/reports/appsec-knowledge-gap/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Checkmarx research found that</a> 81% of organizations knowingly shipped vulnerable code, and 98% experiences a breach tied to vulnerable code within the last year. Risk exposure is not cause by a lack of awareness; it&#8217;s a breakdown in execution. As AI-assisted development becomes the norm, that pressure only grows.</p>



<p>Leaders at major software organizations have&nbsp;publicly stated&nbsp;that&nbsp;AI now generates&nbsp;a significant share&nbsp;of their code, with&nbsp;some&nbsp;<a href="https://techcrunch.com/2025/04/29/microsoft-ceo-says-up-to-30-of-the-companys-code-was-written-by-ai/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">estimates ranging from 20 to 30 percent of code</a>&nbsp;in repositories and more than a quarter of new code.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>As software production&nbsp;accelerates,&nbsp;risk&nbsp;enters&nbsp;at the same pace.&nbsp;And when risk enters the system faster&nbsp;than teams can triage&nbsp;it,&nbsp;remediation becomes unpredictable.&nbsp;That unpredictability is what boards and regulators&nbsp;ultimately penalize. Detection has scaled. Execution has not.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">Detection Scaled, Execution Didn’t. Now What? </h2>



<p>Application security programs have made substantial progress over the last decade. Most enterprises now&nbsp;operate&nbsp;with broad coverage that includes SAST, SCA, CI/CD integrations, and developer-focused tooling. However, many programs are now over-detecting&nbsp;vulnerabilities&nbsp;relative to their ability to act on findings. This imbalance creates operational friction and weakens overall security outcomes.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The symptoms are consistent across organizations. Triage bottlenecks form as teams struggle to review large volumes of findings. Identical issues are handled differently across teams, creating inconsistency in decision-making. Findings remain unresolved for extended periods because priority is unclear, or remediation effort is high. Backlogs grow with items that are technically valid but not treated as immediate risk, while other issues are escalated without sufficient context. </p>



<p>This dynamic explains why&nbsp;more&nbsp;findings rarely reduce&nbsp;exposure. When everything is flagged,&nbsp;nothing gets fixed.&nbsp;Security leaders&nbsp;feel&nbsp;this as a credibility gap:&nbsp;dashboards show activity, but stakeholders&nbsp;want to know if the organization is&nbsp;getting&nbsp;more secure.&nbsp;That’s&nbsp;a hard&nbsp;question&nbsp;to answer when decision-making is&nbsp;inconsistent,&nbsp;and remediation throughput cannot be predicted.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">NIST Secure Software Development Framework</a> reinforced this shift, by requiring organizations to document how risk decisions are made and demonstrate evidence of secure development practices. Detection alone is not sufficient. Organizations must show that vulnerabilities were evaluated in context and resolved in a consistent, auditable way.  </p>



<p>Detection is not the end state. Evidence-backed execution is.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">Why Manual Triage Is Now a Business Risk </h2>



<p>At enterprise scale, manual triage is no longer simply inefficient. When security teams manually interpret findings across hundreds of repositories, inconsistency is inevitable and becomes an operational and governance risk. Depending on the team reviewing, identical findings receive completely different treatment. One team immediately remediates, another dismisses it, and another marks it as accepted risk without a standardized rationale. That inconsistency becomes a liability as regulators and auditors increasingly expect organizations to formally document how vulnerabilities are categorized and managed. When the answers to basic governance questions vary across the organization, regulators interpret that variability as a lack of control. Who made the decision? What evidence supported it? Which policy is applied? Without consistent answers, risk exposure becomes unpredictable and difficult to defend.  </p>



<p>These growing expectations arrive precisely when&nbsp;teams are least equipped to meet them.&nbsp;Security teams face ongoing budget pressures and staffing shortages while vulnerability volumes&nbsp;keep rising. Headcount cannot scale in proportion to code volume.&nbsp;&nbsp;Instead, organizations need to scale execution by relying on more consistent, efficient, and automated approaches to vulnerability management.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4">The Pull Request Is the New Control Plane </h2>



<p>If risk is introduced continuously throughout development, governance must be applied at the point where decisions are actually made.&nbsp;In modern engineering environments, that point is the pull request.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The pull request is where code changes become official:&nbsp;approvals&nbsp;granted, discussions&nbsp;recorded, checks&nbsp;enforced, and ownership is&nbsp;established. It is the&nbsp;<em>only place</em>&nbsp;where execution can be&nbsp;observed&nbsp;and governed at the same speed as development.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Security decisions belong where code is reviewed, approved, and merged, not buried in dashboards and ticketing systems.&nbsp;</p>



<p>&nbsp;Checkmarx’s&nbsp;<strong>Triage Assist</strong>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<strong>Remediation Assist</strong>&nbsp;operate&nbsp;directly within pull requests, ensuring that risk decisions are made in the same place where change control already exists. The principle is straightforward:&nbsp;if security execution is not visible within the pull&nbsp;request,&nbsp;it&nbsp;cannot be&nbsp;governed.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-5">From Alerts to Outcomes: What Changes </h2>



<p>This shift does not&nbsp;eliminate&nbsp;human involvement;&nbsp;It&nbsp;just&nbsp;changes where human judgment is applied. Instead of spending time manually investigating large volumes of findings, teams focus on policy definition, exception handling, and approval.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>Triage Assist</strong> introduces a contextual, risk-based prioritization model that converts scan output into decision-grade outcomes. It evaluates vulnerabilities using attackability-driven analysis, combining reachability, exploitability, and policy context to determine which issues require action. This approach moves triage away from severity-based sorting toward context-based decision-making. Findings are classified into clear outcomes such as false positive, acceptable risk, or action required, enabling consistent and defensible decisions across teams. The shift toward context-driven decisioning aligns with broader industry efforts such as the <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/vulnerability-exploitability-exchange-vex" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange (VEX)</a>, which communicates the exploitability of a vulnerability in context , not simply if it’s present. </p>



<p><strong>Remediation Assist</strong>&nbsp;addresses the next stage of execution. Once a decision is made, it generates reviewable, merge-ready fixes directly within the pull request workflow. These fixes are delivered as diffs or remediation pull requests that align with existing development processes. Nothing merges automatically; developers review and approve changes as part of their standard workflow, preserving governance while accelerating remediation throughput.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Together,&nbsp;Triage Assist and Remediation Assist&nbsp;transform application security from a process centered on alerts&nbsp;to one&nbsp;focused on outcomes.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-6">Governed AI, Not Autonomous Chaos </h2>



<p>Security leaders&nbsp;don’t&nbsp;need&nbsp;autonomous systems&nbsp;making&nbsp;unchecked changes to code. They need&nbsp;governed&nbsp;execution that improves speed while&nbsp;maintaining&nbsp;control. This distinction&nbsp;matters more&nbsp;as AI expands both development capabilities and&nbsp;the&nbsp;attack surface&nbsp;that comes with it.&nbsp;</p>



<p>New risks, including prompt injection, supply chain manipulation, and excessive agent permissions, require careful control over how AI is used within development workflows. Even systems that include human oversight can introduce risk if decisions are not transparent or if context is incomplete.&nbsp;Industry frameworks such as the&nbsp;<a href="https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-for-large-language-model-applications/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications</a>&nbsp;highlight emerging risks including prompt injection, supply chain manipulation, and excessive agent permissions, reinforcing the need for controlled and explainable execution.&nbsp;</p>



<p><em>Read more: <a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/when-the-ai-lies-a-new-threat-emerges-for-human-in-the-loop-security/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">When the AI Lies: A New Threat Emerges for “Human-in-the-Loop&#8221; Security</a> </em></p>



<p>A governed approach to AI-driven security execution is grounded on clear principles. Human review remains mandatory through established approval workflows. Decision rationale is preserved to support auditability. Usage is scoped and controlled across repositories and environments. Automated changes are never merged without review. </p>



<p>This model ensures that AI accelerates your execution without also introducing uncontrolled behavior. It aligns with the needs of regulated, audit-driven environments where traceability and accountability are essential.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-7">What Success Looks Like for Security Executives </h2>



<p>The goal&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;better&nbsp;visibility alone, but predictable execution with measurable outcomes:&nbsp;reduced time to decision, faster remediation cycles, and smaller vulnerability backlogs. Standardized, evidence-based triage reduces the need to repeatedly evaluate the same issues across teams,&nbsp;which improves both&nbsp;efficiency and consistency.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Higher fix acceptance rates and fewer regressions indicate that remediation is delivered in ways that fit developer workflows, without destabilizing applications. Consistent outcomes across teams means that governance is being applied systematically rather than left to individual judgement.</p>



<p>Audit readiness matters just as much. Security artifacts must be tied directly to execution, including pull request discussions, approvals, and documented decisions. This reduces reliance on retrospective explanations when auditors and boards come asking. These outcomes are becoming more critical as exploitation windows continue to shrink. Vulnerabilities are often exploited shortly after disclosure, which mean delayed triage is no longer a workflow preference. It&#8217;s a business risk.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-8">The Strategic Shift </h2>



<p>Security leaders do not need more&nbsp;alerts,&nbsp;they need more finished work. Moving away from manual triage is not about reducing security effort, but&nbsp;about operationalizing security in a way that scales with modern development.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Effective application security requires decisions that are grounded in context, remediation&nbsp;delivered within the development workflow, and governance&nbsp;preserved through auditable processes. This is the shift toward agentic application security, where the gap between how quickly software is created and how quickly risk&nbsp;is&nbsp;understood and mitigated&nbsp;can be&nbsp;closed without slowing innovation.&nbsp;</p>



<p><em>Ready to move from manual triage to scalable, governed execution? Explore Checkmarx&#8217;s <a href="https://checkmarx.com/the-agentic-ai-buyers-guide/">Agentic AI Buyer’s Guide</a> to see how leading teams are operationalizing this shift.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>RSAC 2026 Marked a Turning Point for AppSec. The Reason – Agentic Security </title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/rsac-2026-marked-a-turning-point-for-appsec-the-reason-agentic-security/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eran Kinsbruner]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Mar 2026 16:02:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & LLM Tools in Application Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Application Security Trends & Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Checkmarx One]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Checkmarx Product News, Use Cases & Guides]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ADLC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AppSec]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conferences]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RSAC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RSAC 2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=107906</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[RSAC 2026 Marked a Turning Point for AppSec. The Reason – Agentic Security&#160; RSA Conference 2026 has just wrapped in San Francisco.&#160; If&#160;you’ve&#160;been to enough of these events, you know that while&#160;they’re&#160;valuable for innovation, connection, and hearing where the industry is headed, they tend to blend into&#160;the collective memory of past events&#160;after a couple&#160;months,&#160;with little [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>RSAC 2026 Marked a Turning Point for AppSec. The Reason – Agentic Security&nbsp;</p>



<p>RSA Conference 2026 has just wrapped in San Francisco.&nbsp;</p>



<p>If&nbsp;you’ve&nbsp;been to enough of these events, you know that while&nbsp;they’re&nbsp;valuable for innovation, connection, and hearing where the industry is headed, they tend to blend into&nbsp;the collective memory of past events&nbsp;after a couple&nbsp;months,&nbsp;with little to distinguish them.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>But then&nbsp;there’s&nbsp;the 1%.</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<p>The rare moment you recognize&nbsp;immediately&nbsp;when something shifts.&nbsp;<br>Not a gradual step forward, but a leap.&nbsp;When what felt experimental or theoretical suddenly becomes real.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>RSAC 2026 felt like one of those moments.</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<p>What set this year apart was&nbsp;the emergence of&nbsp;<strong>Agentic AppSec</strong>, not as an idea or&nbsp;an&nbsp;experiment,&nbsp;but rather an&nbsp;operational reality&nbsp;already being adopted and executed, as part of&nbsp;the&nbsp;growing recognition that AI-driven development is fundamentally reshaping the software lifecycle&nbsp;–&nbsp;into&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/ai-llm-tools-in-application-security/goodbye-sdlc-hello-adlc-how-will-appsec-adapt/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Agentic Development&nbsp;Lifecycle&nbsp;(ADLC)</a>&nbsp;&#8211;&nbsp;&nbsp;and&nbsp;security models that must&nbsp;evolve to&nbsp;support it.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">
<strong>What Defined This Turning Point&nbsp;in RSAC 2026</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>To understand why RSAC 2026 felt so unique, it helps to take a closer look at the themes that consistently&nbsp;emerged&nbsp;across the event.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">From Assistive AI → Autonomous (Agentic) Security&nbsp;</h3>



<p>The biggest shift:&nbsp;Agents&nbsp;have grown to be&nbsp;more than&nbsp;‘assistants’. Security is no longer just&nbsp;assisted&nbsp;by&nbsp;AI&nbsp;&#8211;&nbsp;AI agents increasingly execute it.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Agents are moving from copilots to decision-makers&nbsp;who&nbsp;can investigate, triage, and act.&nbsp;The industry is transitioning from human-paced workflows to&nbsp;<strong>machine-speed security operations</strong>.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">“Security for AI” and “Security by AI” Converge&nbsp;</h3>



<p>A major theme across sessions:&nbsp;</p>



<p>Organizations must secure AI systems (LLMs, agents, MCPs),&nbsp;while simultaneously using AI to secure software and pipelines.&nbsp;</p>



<p>AppSec is now responsible for both sides of the equation:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Protecting AI-generated code and AI components&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Using agents to secure the SDLC,&nbsp;and increasingly, the ADLC&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Rise of the Agentic Development Lifecycle (ADLC)&nbsp;</h3>



<p>AI is reshaping how software is written, reviewed, and deployed.&nbsp;Security must adapt to a lifecycle where agents generate,&nbsp;modify, and ship code.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>AppSec implication:</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Security shifts from left →&nbsp;<strong>everywhere</strong>&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>From reactive →&nbsp;<strong>embedded into autonomous workflows</strong>&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Explosion of AI Supply Chain Risk&nbsp;</h3>



<p>RSAC highlighted growing concern around the security risks introduced by new supply chain components and dependencies, such as LLMs, agents, MCP servers, plugins, and AI SDKs.&nbsp;</p>



<p>There is a clear need for visibility (AI-BOM), provenance, and trust in AI components.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>AppSec implication:</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>SBOM is evolving into&nbsp;<strong>AI-BOM</strong>&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>You now secure not just code dependencies, but AI dependencies&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">
<strong>AI-Native Security Vendors vs. Legacy Players</strong>&nbsp;</h3>



<p>There’s&nbsp;a clear market shift:&nbsp;</p>



<p>The rise of AI-native security companies&nbsp;is&nbsp;challenging traditional vendors.&nbsp;Winning platforms are being rebuilt&nbsp;from the ground up&nbsp;as AI-first, not AI-enhanced.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>AppSec implication:</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Expect consolidation around platforms that embed agents deeply&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Not bolt-on AI features&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">
<strong>Trust, Governance, and Identity Become Foundational</strong>&nbsp;</h3>



<p>As agents act autonomously, the question becomes:&nbsp;</p>



<p>Who authorized the agent? What can it do?&nbsp;</p>



<p>Identity and governance are now core security primitives, not add-ons.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>AppSec implication:</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<p>Security must enforce:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Agent identity&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Policy boundaries&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Auditability of decisions&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<p>Taken together, these themes highlight a clear gap: traditional AppSec approaches were not designed for an agentic development lifecycle.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>That gap — and how to close it — was a central focus of what we introduced, as it raised the question:</strong>&nbsp;how do you secure an&nbsp;ecosystem&nbsp;that is&nbsp;agent-driven&nbsp;as much, if not more,&nbsp;than human-driven?&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>At RSAC 2026, we introduced&nbsp;our new&nbsp;capabilities designed to address exactly that.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full is-resized"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="930" height="673" src="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-1.webp" alt="" class="wp-image-107932" style="aspect-ratio:1.3818985682338123;width:601px;height:auto" srcset="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-1.webp 930w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-1-300x217.webp 300w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-1-768x556.webp 768w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-1-808x585.webp 808w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-1-400x289.webp 400w" sizes="(max-width: 930px) 100vw, 930px" /></figure>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">
<strong>Securing the Agentic Development Lifecycle</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>At RSA this year,&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/rsac-2026/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">unveiled</a>&nbsp;a new set of innovations designed to secure the&nbsp;ADLC:&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Expansion of&nbsp;the&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;Assist family of agents&nbsp;</h3>



<p>Building on&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/developer-assist/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Checkmarx&nbsp;Developer Assist</a>, we introduced two new agents:&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/triage-and-remediation/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><strong>Triage Assist</strong>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<strong>Remediation Assist</strong></a><strong>,&nbsp;</strong>designed to secure the critical post-commit phase. These agents help teams quickly prioritize real risks and fix them efficiently within pull requests (PR), reducing noise and accelerating secure code delivery.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Introducing&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;AI Supply Chain Security&nbsp;</h3>



<p>As organizations increasingly build with AI components,&nbsp;an entirely new layer is introduced into the supply chain, requiring dedicated security to address its unique challenges and risks.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;AI&nbsp;Supply Chain Security&nbsp;provides&nbsp;<strong>full visibility and risk assessment across the AI stack</strong>. With a centralized inventory and AI-BOM covering MCP servers, LLMs, AI agents, SDKs, and more, teams can move fast with AI, without losing control over security.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">SAST AI and DAST for AI&nbsp;&nbsp;</h3>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;enhanced its two core security engines to support AI-powered SAST scanning across&nbsp;virtually any&nbsp;programming language, helping organizations future-proof their technology adoption. In parallel, we strengthened our DAST engine to deliver runtime protection aligned with the realities of AI-driven and “vibe coding” development.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Risk Orchestration within ASPM&nbsp;</h3>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;also announced a new and enhanced risk management and visibility solution&nbsp;across applications, projects, and repositories to improve decision-making, reduce noise, and highlight critical vulnerabilities.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Agent identity&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Policy boundaries&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Auditability of decisions&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<p>the tooling landscape must evolve to keep pace with the speed of AI-driven development. The shift is no longer about “AI in AppSec,” but about AppSec itself becoming&nbsp;an entirely different paradigm &#8211;&nbsp;agentic, autonomous, and continuous by design.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full is-resized"><img decoding="async" width="922" height="687" src="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-2.webp" alt="" class="wp-image-107933" style="aspect-ratio:1.342087525276481;width:642px;height:auto" srcset="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-2.webp 922w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-2-300x224.webp 300w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-2-768x572.webp 768w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-2-785x585.webp 785w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-2-400x298.webp 400w" sizes="(max-width: 922px) 100vw, 922px" /></figure>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">Closing Notes&nbsp;</h2>



<p>The idea that “AppSec is becoming agentic” goes beyond a shift in tooling — it reflects a fundamentally&nbsp;different way&nbsp;of working with and understanding application security.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>AppSec is changing its DNA.</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<p>That is why, compared to 2025, this year’s event was overwhelmingly focused on AI and Agentic Application Security, with a clear emphasis on how&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
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			<media:title type="html">CX RSAC 1</media:title>
			<media:thumbnail url="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CX-RSAC-1-150x150.webp" />
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			<media:title type="html">CX RSAC 2</media:title>
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		<title>Why Vulnerability Detection Doesn’t Scale  </title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/why-vulnerability-detection-doesnt-scale/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rebecca Spiegel]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 17:03:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Agents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI generated code]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AppSec]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=107874</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The execution gap that is quietly breaking modern AppSec programs.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Most AppSec teams are not&nbsp;failing to detect&nbsp;risk.&nbsp;They’re&nbsp;just&nbsp;failing to remediate&nbsp;it fast enough.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Security programs now find more vulnerabilities than they can fix, and remediation&nbsp;hasn’t&nbsp;kept pace with how fast teams ship code. AI-generated code has made that gap worse, adding volume and complexity faster than security processes have adapted.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Coverage has&nbsp;expanded,&nbsp;scanning is continuous, and visibility is no longer the bottleneck&nbsp;–&nbsp;but the ability to act on that visibility at scale&nbsp;hasn’t&nbsp;kept up. Backlogs&nbsp;grow,&nbsp;MTTR stays stubbornly high, and the same classes of vulnerabilities reappear across releases, even as detection improves.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The gap&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;that security teams lack maturity.&nbsp;It’s&nbsp;that AppSec was never built to&nbsp;operate&nbsp;at&nbsp;this scale.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">Detection&nbsp;Has&nbsp;Scaled. Execution&nbsp;Has&nbsp;Not.&nbsp;</h2>



<p>A growing share of&nbsp;<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2025/07/29/the-hidden-costs-of-ignoring-application-security/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">organizations now acknowledge shipping software with known vulnerabilities</a>&nbsp;to keep delivery moving&nbsp;But&nbsp;the pace of exploitation is accelerating at the same time.&nbsp;Research shows that the average time to exploit newly disclosed vulnerabilities has dropped dramatically in recent years, with attackers increasingly weaponizing vulnerabilities within days of disclosure and sometimes within hours.&nbsp;In 2025, nearly&nbsp;<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2025/07/29/the-hidden-costs-of-ignoring-application-security" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">one-third of known exploited vulnerabilities were exploited on or before the day they were publicly&nbsp;disclosed</a>, leaving&nbsp;organizations&nbsp;little time to evaluate and remediate risk.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>The&nbsp;distance&nbsp;between discovery and remediation is no longer&nbsp;a&nbsp;theoretical&nbsp;chasm. It is operational, measurable, and increasingly visible to boards, regulators, and customers.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">Detection Solved Visibility, Not Outcomes&nbsp;</h2>



<p>For more than a decade, AppSec investments focused on improving detection&nbsp;–&nbsp;and that&nbsp;initially&nbsp;worked.&nbsp;Coverage expanded across proprietary code and open-source&nbsp;dependencies,&nbsp;scanning became faster, findings became&nbsp;richer,&nbsp;&nbsp;and&nbsp;dashboards&nbsp;and reporting&nbsp;improved. But&nbsp;risk&nbsp;outcomes&nbsp;did not.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Security teams now&nbsp;operate&nbsp;in an environment where visibility is&nbsp;abundant,&nbsp;but action is constrained. Thousands of findings accumulate without clear prioritization, causing analysts&nbsp;to&nbsp;spend hours&nbsp;validating&nbsp;reachability and exploitability.&nbsp;At the same time, developers receive findings without enough context to determine what actually matters.&nbsp;Different teams&nbsp;end up&nbsp;making&nbsp;different decisions on identical&nbsp;issues&nbsp;and the&nbsp;result is a system that knows&nbsp;more&nbsp;but&nbsp;fixes&nbsp;less.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This mismatch is&nbsp;becoming more pronounced as&nbsp;AI continues to accelerate&nbsp;development&nbsp;velocity.&nbsp;Leaders at major software organizations have&nbsp;publicly stated&nbsp;that&nbsp;a s<a href="https://unanswered.io/guide/how-much-of-googles-code-is-written-by-ai" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">ignificant portion&nbsp;of new code is now generated with AI&nbsp;assistance</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;only&nbsp;reviewed by engineers before release.&nbsp;</p>



<p>More code, shipped faster, means more potential risk, and more risk requires more capacity to remediate, not just more capacity to detect.&nbsp;Detection surfaced the problem. It&nbsp;didn&#8217;t&nbsp;solve it.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">The Execution Gap Is the New AppSec Bottleneck&nbsp;</h2>



<p>The execution&nbsp;gap&nbsp;is not a single failure point, but&nbsp;the accumulation of small inefficiencies that compound at scale.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Triage still depends on human judgment&nbsp;that gets repeated inconsistently across teams, with prioritization varying based on who happens to review a given finding.&nbsp;Fix guidance is&nbsp;often&nbsp;advisory, leaving developers to interpret and implement solutions themselves.&nbsp;And&nbsp;governance&nbsp;tends to&nbsp;exist&nbsp;in policy&nbsp;documents instead&nbsp;of&nbsp;the workflows where decisions are actually made.&nbsp;Individually, these issues are manageable. At AI-scale, they become&nbsp;systemic, thereby compounding&nbsp;AppSec&nbsp;challenges, not because teams&nbsp;lack&nbsp;tools, but because the system connecting detection to action is inconsistent. When execution varies, risk becomes unpredictable&nbsp;and&nbsp;auditability degrades. When workflows depend on manual interpretation, service-level commitments&nbsp;become&nbsp;unenforceable.&nbsp;</p>



<p>&nbsp;What looks like a technical problem is, at its core, actually an operational one.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4">The&nbsp;Pull Request Is the Only Place Execution Can Scale</h2>



<p>For years, AppSec findings have flowed into tickets, dashboards, and reports –&nbsp;but that’s not where&nbsp;fix&nbsp;decisions get made.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Execution happens&nbsp;in&nbsp;the pull request,&nbsp;where code is reviewed, discussed, approved, and merged. It is where context exists,&nbsp;accountability is enforced, and&nbsp;decisions are recorded by default.&nbsp;Pull requests can be configured to block merges until required checks pass, including security scanning results.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>In practice, this means remediation decisions and risk acceptance already occur in the pull request workflow, whether security teams formally recognize it or not.&nbsp;So why&nbsp;are&nbsp;security&nbsp;decisions&nbsp;still being made outside of this workflow?&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-5">From Detection to Decision Infrastructure&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Modern AppSec needs a system that can turn findings into decisions. Not every vulnerability is exploitable; some represent real, reachable risk, others are false positives, and others fall within acceptable risk thresholds depending on context. Today, this distinction is made manually and inconsistently.</p>



<p>Decision infrastructure changes that. It classifies findings with reasoning, distinguishes between what must be fixed and what can be deprioritized, and surfaces those decisions directly in the pull request. It enables guided, reviewable remediation that is aligned with how the application actually works.</p>



<p>The industry has largely moved toward context-driven prioritization, with modern vulnerability management frameworks emphasizing exploitability and real-world impact over severity scores alone. But translating detection signals into actionable risk decisions requires decision infrastructure, and without it, the value of detection is incomplete.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-6">Where Triage and Remediation Actually Happen&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Modern AppSec programs are beginning to embed agentic workflows directly in the pull request, delivering security decisions and fixes where code is actually reviewed and merged.&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;One&nbsp;is&nbsp;built&nbsp;on&nbsp;this&nbsp;model.<strong>&nbsp;</strong><a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/triage-and-remediation/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><strong>Triage</strong></a><strong>&nbsp;</strong><a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/triage-and-remediation/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><strong>Assist</strong></a>&nbsp;addresses&nbsp;the first execution bottleneck: deciding what&nbsp;requires&nbsp;immediate&nbsp;action.&nbsp;It evaluates findings using contextual analysis to&nbsp;determine&nbsp;whether a vulnerability is reachable, exploitable, and relevant within the application environment. Instead of presenting developers with raw scan output, it produces decision-ready outcomes that&nbsp;identify&nbsp;which&nbsp;issues must be&nbsp;fixed, deferred, and&nbsp;or&nbsp;represent acceptable risk under policy.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This shift replaces manual triage queues with consistent, evidence-based decision logic that can be applied across repositories, teams, and applications. Decisions become standardized, rationale becomes&nbsp;visible&nbsp;and governance becomes enforceable.&nbsp;</p>



<p><a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/triage-and-remediation/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><strong>Remediation Assist</strong></a>&nbsp;addresses the second execution bottleneck: turning decisions into completed work. Once an issue is identified as requiring action, remediation guidance is delivered directly in the pull request as a reviewable code change that aligns with the&nbsp;application’s&nbsp;frameworks and dependencies. Developers evaluate the proposed fix using their existing review process, preserving accountability and control while accelerating resolution. Human approval&nbsp;remains&nbsp;mandatory,&nbsp;but&nbsp;developers&nbsp;don’t&nbsp;need to&nbsp;start from scratch&nbsp;when addressing security issues. The path from detection to remediation becomes shorter, more predictable, and easier to govern.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Together, these capabilities transform the pull request into a true execution layer for application security. Risk decisions are made where code changes&nbsp;occur,&nbsp;fixes are delivered where developers work,&nbsp;and evidence is recorded where auditors expect it.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>And this approach scales.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-7">Why Governance Must Be Embedded, Not Enforced Later&nbsp;</h2>



<p>When governance exists outside the workflow, it is optional by default. It relies on teams remembering to follow it, interpreting it correctly, and applying it consistently. At scale, that approach breaks down.&nbsp;</p>



<p>But when governance is embedded in execution, it becomes part of how work gets done.&nbsp;This principle is increasingly reflected in secure software development standards.&nbsp;Frameworks such as the NIST Secure Software Development Framework emphasize the importance of&nbsp;maintaining&nbsp;evidence and artifacts that&nbsp;demonstrate&nbsp;how security decisions were made and implemented throughout the&nbsp;development&nbsp;lifecycle.&nbsp;</p>



<p>That requirement changes&nbsp;what AppSec governance actually means.&nbsp;&nbsp;Policy alone&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;sufficient; what matters is documented execution that preserves human oversight, where prioritization criteria are applied consistently, remediation is scoped and controlled, and decisions are captured automatically without&nbsp;additional&nbsp;administrative&nbsp;overhead. This&nbsp;is&nbsp;the difference between policy and control.&nbsp;Triage and remediation capabilities built directly into development workflows&nbsp;don&#8217;t&nbsp;replace decision-making,&nbsp;they structure it, bringing prioritization, reasoning, and fix guidance into the pull request where decisions are already happening.&nbsp;The result is&nbsp;governed&nbsp;execution, not autonomous remediation.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-8">What Changes When Execution Is Operationalized&nbsp;</h2>



<p>When execution is built into the workflow, the system begins to behave differently.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Manual triage effort drops because classification is no longer repeated across teams. Time to&nbsp;decision&nbsp;shrinks because context and reasoning are already available. Remediation becomes more consistent because developers are not guessing what matters or how to fix it. Risk acceptance becomes explicit, not implied. Auditability improves because decisions are captured as part of normal development activity.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Perhaps most&nbsp;importantly, the relationship between security and engineering changes.&nbsp;When developers receive clear, contextualized guidance in the pull request,&nbsp;security stops being perceived as noise and starts being seen as actionable&nbsp;input, reducing friction.&nbsp;The conversation shifts from asking why a finding exists to deciding what action should be taken.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This shift is increasingly necessary as development complexity grows. Software supply chain risk, third-party dependencies, and AI-assisted development are expanding the attack surface faster than traditional workflows can keep pace. </p>



<p><a href="https://www.techradar.com/pro/security/software-supply-chain-attacks-pose-huge-dangers-heres-how-to-bolster-your-defenses" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Recent reporting</a> shows that most organizations have experienced supply chain attacks within the past year, reinforcing the need for consistent, scalable remediation processes.  By adopting this approach, AppSec can scale effectively without requiring a proportional increase in headcount. </p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-9">The Necessary&nbsp;Shift&nbsp;to Agentic AppSec&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Detection is table stakes in 2026. The organizations that optimize detection alone will continue to generate more findings than they can act on. Backlogs will grow and the gap between visibility and execution will widen. Security teams will remain overwhelmed, and risk decisions will remain inconsistent.  </p>



<p>The organizations that operationalize execution will close that&nbsp;gap.&nbsp;They will make&nbsp;decisions&nbsp;where work happens. They will standardize how those decisions are made. They will embed governance into the workflow instead of enforcing it after the fact.&nbsp;And&nbsp;they will measure success not by how much they find, but by how much they&nbsp;fix.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>This shift is&nbsp;defining modern, agentic&nbsp;application security.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Read the next article:&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/ai-llm-tools-in-application-security/reachability-was-a-breakthrough-but-now-its-not-enough/">Attackability: Why Context, Not Reachability, Should Drive Remediation</a></p>



<p>Learn how modern AppSec teams prioritize vulnerabilities based on reachability, exploitability, and real-world impact to reduce noise and focus remediation where it matters most.&nbsp;</p>



<p></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Attackability: Why Context, Not Reachability, Should Drive Remediation </title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/ai-llm-tools-in-application-security/reachability-was-a-breakthrough-but-now-its-not-enough/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rebecca Spiegel]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 15:30:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI generated code]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[checkmarx one]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[developer assist]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=107714</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Reachability is not exploitability. Modern software development requires more than execution analysis.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For years, reachability has been the security industry’s go-to approach for vulnerability prioritization.&nbsp;Instead of flagging every vulnerable dependency, the idea was to determine whether an application could actually reach the vulnerable function.&nbsp;This marked&nbsp;a meaningful&nbsp;step forward in&nbsp;application security, shifting focus to code that&nbsp;executes&nbsp;in production.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>But reachability is not exploitability.&nbsp;</strong>A function can be reachable and still pose no practical risk if it sits behind authentication, processes only trusted inputs, or is mitigated by runtime controls. Reachability confirms that code can run, not that an attacker can abuse it.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Modern software development requires more than execution analysis.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;Triage Agent addresses this&nbsp;head on&nbsp;with&nbsp;<em>Attackability</em>:&nbsp;AI-driven triage that traces attacker-controlled inputs from real ingress points to potential impact and verifies which controls prevent exploitation&nbsp;–&nbsp;and which do not.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>The result is triage based on&nbsp;demonstrated&nbsp;exploitability, not theoretical reachability.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">What Reachability Actually Tells You&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Most SCA tools define reachability at the function level:&nbsp;is there a path from your code to the vulnerable function? If yes, the finding is flagged as reachable. If not,&nbsp;it&#8217;s&nbsp;deprioritized.&nbsp;</p>



<p>That’s&nbsp;useful, but&nbsp;it’s&nbsp;also incomplete.&nbsp;Here’s&nbsp;what reachability&nbsp;doesn’t&nbsp;tell you:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Whether the input reaching that function is attacker-controlled, or only comes from trusted internal sources&nbsp;</li>



<li>Whether&nbsp;there&#8217;s&nbsp;a real ingress point (a public API, a webhook, a file upload) that a real attacker could use&nbsp;</li>



<li>Whether required preconditions exist, like a specific protocol behavior or a privileged network position&nbsp;</li>



<li>Whether controls on the path, such as a safe parser, an authentication check, or an allowlist, already break the exploit chain&nbsp;</li>



<li>What the actual impact would be: RCE, data exposure, privilege escalation, or something else</li>
</ul>



<p>A finding can be technically reachable yet completely unexploitable in production.&nbsp;When that happens, engineering&nbsp;time&nbsp;is wasted&nbsp;for no&nbsp;reason, and&nbsp;real risk competes for attention.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Security teams&nbsp;don’t&nbsp;need to know “can this function run?”&nbsp;they need to know&nbsp;“<strong>can an attacker exploit this in our application, given our ingress points, our controls, and our runtime environment?”</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<p>That’s&nbsp;the difference between reachability and&nbsp;attackability.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">How&nbsp;Attackability&nbsp;Works&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;Triage Assist&nbsp;introduces&nbsp;Attackability: AI-driven triage that traces attacker-controlled input from real ingress points to&nbsp;potential&nbsp;impact,&nbsp;and&nbsp;validates&nbsp;which controls prevent exploitation and which do not.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Attackability&nbsp;follows a consistent five-step flow regardless of the scanner type:&nbsp;</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>
<strong>Identify&nbsp;the vulnerable capability and candidate sink.</strong>&nbsp;Confirm what the vulnerable library, pattern, or API surface is, and form&nbsp;an initial&nbsp;hypothesis about how exploitation would occur.&nbsp;</li>



<li>
<strong>Prove or disprove a real execution path.</strong>&nbsp;Trace whether the vulnerable code path is reachable in the repository, including direct calls, indirect framework behavior, and configuration-driven invocation.&nbsp;</li>



<li>
<strong>Validate&nbsp;attacker control and real ingress.</strong>&nbsp;Identify&nbsp;how data enters the system (API endpoints, file uploads, queues, webhooks, scheduled jobs) and whether an external attacker can&nbsp;actually influence&nbsp;the data that reaches the sink.&nbsp;</li>



<li>
<strong>Validate&nbsp;controls and preconditions.</strong>&nbsp;Check whether security controls apply on the relevant path: safe parsing, allowlists, auth boundaries, sanitization, runtime hardening. Document any required preconditions, such as a MITM position or specific deployment settings.&nbsp;</li>



<li>
<strong>Conclude exploitability and explain impact.</strong>&nbsp;Give a clear verdict (exploitable, not exploitable, or risk accepted with rationale),&nbsp;state&nbsp;the concrete impact, and provide a minimal-disruption remediation</li>
</ol>



<p>This moves the conversation from “is this reachable?” to “is this exploitable?”&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">Not Just&nbsp;for&nbsp;SCA&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Attackability&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;limited to dependency&nbsp;finding;&nbsp;it&nbsp;applies&nbsp;the same&nbsp;reasoning&nbsp;across&nbsp;most&nbsp;scanner types.&nbsp;</p>



<p>For&nbsp;<strong>SAST findings</strong>, it connects a detected code pattern to a real exploit chain by asking whether&nbsp;there&#8217;s&nbsp;a genuinely attacker-controlled source, whether the data flow reaches a dangerous sink, and whether controls on the path already prevent exploitation. A tainted data flow that never crosses an authentication boundary, or&nbsp;that&#8217;s&nbsp;constrained by an allowlist, can be reachable in code without being attackable in production.&nbsp;</p>



<p>For&nbsp;<strong>IaC&nbsp;and cloud misconfigurations</strong>, it evaluates whether a configuration issue is externally accessible and whether it creates a realistic path to impact, factoring in exposure surfaces, identity controls, and network controls.&nbsp;</p>



<p>For&nbsp;<strong>container findings</strong>, it assesses whether a vulnerable package is used at runtime, whether the container runs with elevated privileges, and whether the affected&nbsp;component&nbsp;is exposed through a reachable service.&nbsp;</p>



<p>For&nbsp;<strong>secrets&nbsp;detection</strong>, it evaluates whether the credential is valid, scoped, and exposed in a way an attacker can&nbsp;actually leverage, factoring in repository visibility, rotation state, and downstream blast radius.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4">What Makes the Output Credible&nbsp;</h2>



<p>The&nbsp;Attackability&nbsp;data&nbsp;is useful precisely because&nbsp;it’s&nbsp;verifiable. It includes concrete code references showing how the library or sink is used, a path narrative describing the chain from ingress to sink to impact (including where the chain breaks if the finding&nbsp;isn&#8217;t&nbsp;exploitable), explicit control validation, and a precise impact statement.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This&nbsp;matters&nbsp;more than triage speed. It means developers can see exactly how the issue is triggered and what minimal change breaks the chain. It means risk acceptance decisions are documented with&nbsp;evidence, so security and engineering teams are&nbsp;aligning on&nbsp;facts (not assumptions).&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-5">Reachability Is&nbsp;Just&nbsp;a Starting Point&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Reachability made&nbsp;vulnerability&nbsp;data&nbsp;more relevant.&nbsp;But&nbsp;reachability&nbsp;is not enough.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;Triage Assist’s&nbsp;Attackability&nbsp;adds attacker context, environmental context, and control validation, turning a reachability result into something a team can&nbsp;actually make&nbsp;a decision on.&nbsp;</p>



<p><em>Ready to go deeper? Read the <a href="https://checkmarx.com/the-agentic-ai-buyers-guide/"><strong>Agentic AI Buyer’s Guide</strong></a> to understand what separates decision-grade triage from theoretical analysis or watch the <a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/triage-and-remediation/#video">Checkmarx Triage Assist demo video</a> to see Attackability in action.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Checkmarx DAST for the AI Coding Era: Runtime Security at Machine Speed</title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-dast-for-the-ai-coding-era/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Avi Hein]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 15:09:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & LLM Tools in Application Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DAST]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AppSec]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dast]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=107564</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The question is no longer whether to implement DAST. It is whether your DAST can keep pace with how fast your teams are building.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>DAST is suddenly on everyone’s mind – and for good reason.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Most DAST tools were designed for a world where release cycles were measured in&nbsp;months&nbsp;and penetration testing happened once a year. That model made sense when development moved slowly enough for episodic security reviews to provide meaningful coverage.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Then AI accelerated everything, with&nbsp;AI coding assistants compressing&nbsp;weeks of work into hours.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The gap between how fast applications&nbsp;are&nbsp;being built and how quickly they can be validated is exactly&nbsp;where risk lives. Runtime validation has moved from a nice-to-have to a foundational part of any serious application security program.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>The question is no longer whether to implement DAST. It is whether your DAST can&nbsp;keep pace with how&nbsp;fast&nbsp;your teams are building.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;has been investing&nbsp;and&nbsp;adapting in&nbsp;runtime security&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/shift-everywhere-with-checkmarx-one-and-dast/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">since 2023,</a>&nbsp;well before AI-driven development made it&nbsp;a&nbsp;market-wide&nbsp;priority.&nbsp;So,&nbsp;when AI&nbsp;fundamentally&nbsp;changed&nbsp;the pace of software development,&nbsp;we&nbsp;didn’t&nbsp;need to retrofit our approach&nbsp;– because we&nbsp;were already&nbsp;building&nbsp;for this moment.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The result is the next generation of&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;DAST: runtime security designed to move at AI speed.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">
<strong>Why Traditional DAST&nbsp;Can’t&nbsp;Keep Pace</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Legacy DAST often depends on heavy&nbsp;<strong>infrastructure&nbsp;setup</strong>. Scanning internal applications can require&nbsp;firewall&nbsp;changes, VPN access, security exceptions, or container deployments. These dependencies introduce approval cycles and coordination overhead that simply&nbsp;don’t&nbsp;align with applications being built in days or hours.&nbsp;&nbsp;That model may work for annual testing, but it breaks down completely when security needs to run continuously in your CI/CD pipeline.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>Configuration&nbsp;</strong>adds another layer of friction. Authentication scripting, scan tuning, and policy setup frequently&nbsp;require specialized&nbsp;expertise. When onboarding takes longer than development itself, coverage gaps become inevitable.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Even when scanning runs successfully,&nbsp;<strong>context</strong>&nbsp;is often fragmented. If SAST and DAST operate in separate systems, teams must manually reconcile findings, deduplicate issues, and correlate risk. That overhead slows remediation and reduces the practical value of runtime testing.&nbsp;</p>



<p>In short, traditional DAST&nbsp;wasn’t&nbsp;built for continuous, developer-driven workflows. It was built for episodic&nbsp;pen&nbsp;testing. And in the AI era,&nbsp;this&nbsp;security creates exposure.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">
<strong>Runtime Validation Is Now Foundational</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Runtime testing has become a core&nbsp;component&nbsp;of modern application security programs.&nbsp;</p>



<p>In fact, according to the&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/report-future-of-appsec-2025/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>Future of AppSec</em></a>&nbsp;report, DAST adoption increased 24% year over year, with 47% of organizations now deploying DAST&nbsp;–&nbsp;up from 38% the previous year. The reason is clear:&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/unifying-sast-and-dast-the-key-to-fostering-fearless-innovation/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">static analysis alone&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;enough to secure</a>&nbsp;dynamic, API-driven, AI-assisted applications.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Many vulnerabilities, such as&nbsp;business logic flaws, authentication weaknesses, and configuration errors only&nbsp;emerge&nbsp;when applications are running.&nbsp;So,&nbsp;validating&nbsp;behavior in live environments is no longer optional;&nbsp;it’s&nbsp;essential.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The conversation has shifted from&nbsp;<em>whether</em>&nbsp;to implement DAST to&nbsp;<em>how</em>&nbsp;to implement it effectively&nbsp;without slowing development.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">
<strong>Why Runtime Validation Matters in the AI Era</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>AI-generated code increases productivity,&nbsp;but it also introduces&nbsp;new&nbsp;risks. Large language models (LLMs)&nbsp;generate functional code, yet they lack full business context and architectural awareness. At higher velocity, human review becomes more constrained.&nbsp;</p>



<p>SAST&nbsp;remains&nbsp;critical for&nbsp;identifying&nbsp;vulnerabilities in source code before deployment. But it does not verify how an application behaves once it is running,&nbsp;especially in environments with complex authentication, APIs, client-side logic, and layered infrastructure.&nbsp;</p>



<p>DAST provides&nbsp;that validation.&nbsp;</p>



<p>By simulating real-world attacker behavior against live applications, it&nbsp;identifies&nbsp;issues that only appear under&nbsp;real operating&nbsp;conditions.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Static analysis shows you what the code is. Runtime validation&nbsp;and DAST&nbsp;show you how it behaves. <strong>Modern application security requires both.</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4">
<strong>How&nbsp;Does&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;DAST Solve This?</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Complete AppSec in One Platform</strong></h3>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;DAST is built natively within&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;One, delivering unified SAST and DAST findings&nbsp;in&nbsp;a single&nbsp;platform.&nbsp;DAST vulnerabilities&nbsp;are incorporated into&nbsp;a unified&nbsp;risk scoring, enabling faster triage and&nbsp;eliminating&nbsp;duplicate effort.&nbsp;</p>



<p>It is true platform integration&nbsp;with&nbsp;shared context from code to runtime.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Live API scanning further strengthens coverage. REST, SOAP, and gRPC endpoints are tested dynamically, and APIs discovered by both SAST and DAST are consolidated into one unified inventory. </p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Production-Ready in Minutes</h3>



<p>Traditional DAST adoption has been slowed by infrastructure and configuration barriers.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;DAST removes them.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Teams can begin scanning&nbsp;immediately&nbsp;without complex network reconfiguration or custom authentication scripting through:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>
<strong>Pre-configured tunneling</strong>&nbsp;for secure internal application scanning</li>



<li>
<strong>Advanced authentication support</strong>&nbsp;with guided setup and MFA validation</li>



<li>
<strong>Pre-built templates</strong>&nbsp;that simplify configuration&nbsp;</li>



<li>
<strong>Direct CI/CD integration&nbsp;</strong>for continuous testing</li>
</ul>



<p>What once required weeks&nbsp;to set up&nbsp;now&nbsp;can be done in&nbsp;minutes.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">
<strong>Designed for Developer Workflows</strong>&nbsp;</h3>



<p>With legacy tools, teams file networking tickets, wait for authentication scripts, and manually reconcile findings before deployment.&nbsp;</p>



<p>With&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;DAST, scanning is configured quickly, authentication is&nbsp;validated&nbsp;through guided workflows, and SAST and DAST findings appear together with correlated risk scoring. Developers receive actionable feedback directly within their pipeline and deploy confidently&nbsp;without introducing bottlenecks.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Security moves with development, not against it.&nbsp;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">
<strong>Runtime Validation You Can Trust</strong>&nbsp;</h3>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;DAST validates live applications and uncovers vulnerabilities that only&nbsp;emerge&nbsp;at runtime. Because it&nbsp;operates&nbsp;within a unified platform, findings are correlated with SAST results to reduce false positives and improve prioritization.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The result is&nbsp;accurate,&nbsp;actionable&nbsp;runtime security&nbsp;without added friction.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-5"><strong>Here’s&nbsp;What&nbsp;Makes&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;DAST Different</strong></h2>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;DAST stands apart because it is:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>
<strong>Integrated seamlessl</strong>y&nbsp;within&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;One,&nbsp;not&nbsp;acquired&nbsp;technology stitched together&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>



<li>
<strong>Infrastructure-light,</strong>&nbsp;eliminating&nbsp;complex agent and network requirements</li>



<li>
<strong>Comprehensive in scope</strong>, covering full web applications and APIs</li>



<li>
<strong>Enterprise-grade</strong>, while&nbsp;remaining&nbsp;accessible to development teams</li>
</ul>



<p>It is built on the proven ZAP foundation with commercial-grade enhancements.&nbsp;The&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/press-releases/checkmarx-joins-forces-with-zap-to-supercharge-dynamic-application-security-testing-dast-for-the-enterprise-and-enhance-community-growth/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Checkmarx-ZAP collaboration</a>&nbsp;enables&nbsp;open-source innovation&nbsp;alongside&nbsp;enterprise reliability and scalability.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>In fact, ZAP project leaders Simon Bennetts, Rick Mitchell, and Ricardo Pereira joined&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;to help build the next generation of our enterprise-grade DAST offering, while continuing to invest in the open-source ZAP project and grow its global community.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-6">
<strong>Getting Started</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p><strong>Existing&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;customers</strong>: Professional and Enterprise plans include DAST. Essentials customers can add DAST to their existing subscription.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>New customers</strong>: See the unified&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;One platform in action and discover how DAST integrates seamlessly with SAST for complete code-to-runtime security.&nbsp;</p>



<p>You can also&nbsp;tune into our&nbsp;DAST&nbsp;webinar&nbsp;to see it in action&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/the-future-of-dast/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a>.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-7">
<strong>What’s Next</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>The shift is already underway.&nbsp;According to&nbsp;the&nbsp;Future of&nbsp;AppSec report,&nbsp;DAST&nbsp;adoption grew&nbsp;24% year over year&nbsp;–&nbsp;not because security teams suddenly discovered runtime testing, but because the old model of annual pen tests and periodic scans no longer provide meaningful coverage. Teams building with AI-generated&nbsp;codeneed&nbsp;security that moves on the same timeline.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;DAST is built for that reality: unified&nbsp;with SAST&nbsp;on&nbsp;a single platform, deployable in minutes, and designed to work within developer workflows rather than around them.&nbsp;</p>



<p>If you are an existing&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;customer, DAST is already included in Professional and Enterprise plans. Essentials customers can add it to their current&nbsp;subscription&nbsp;and new&nbsp;customers can&nbsp;see it in action at our&nbsp;upcoming&nbsp;webinar.&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Checkmarx Security Update</title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Udi-Yehuda Tamar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 10:19:33 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=107865</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Last Updated April 2, 2026 On March 23, 2026, Checkmarx identified a cybersecurity supply chain incident affecting certain Checkmarx‑related developer artefacts distributed via third‑party channels. This post contains a structured overview of the incident and the steps we have taken to date, as well as additional resources to support our clients and team members. What [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Last Updated April 2, 2026</strong></p>



<p>On March 23, 2026, Checkmarx identified a cybersecurity supply chain incident affecting certain Checkmarx‑related developer artefacts distributed via third‑party channels.</p>



<p>This post contains a structured overview of the incident and the steps we have taken to date, as well as additional resources to support our clients and team members.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1"><strong>What Happened</strong></h2>



<p>On March 23, 2026, Checkmarx was the target of a cybersecurity supply chain incident which affected two specific plugins distributed via the OpenVSX marketplace and two of our GitHub Actions workflows.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2"><strong>OpenVSX Plugins</strong></h2>



<p>On March 23, 2026, at approximately 02:53 UTC, malicious versions of two plugins were published to the OpenVSX registry.</p>



<p>Only organizations that downloaded the following artifacts from OpenVSX on 23 March, 2026 between 02:53 UTC and 15:41 UTC and ran it are potentially impacted by this incident.</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>ast-results-2.53.0.vsix</li>



<li>cx-dev-assist-1.7.0.vsix</li>
</ul>



<p>The affected plug-ins are no longer available and all older GitHub versions have been permanently removed.</p>



<p>Plugins downloaded from the VS Code Marketplace were not affected.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Recommended actions</h3>



<p>The following guidance is provided as a precautionary measure to support customer‑led assessments and remediation, where relevant to their environments.</p>



<p>If a client downloaded and ran either of the above extensions from the Open VSX registry, their organization may be affected.</p>



<p>If the client organization may have been affected, we strongly recommend taking the following steps as soon as possible.</p>



<p><strong>1. Remove Malicious Components</strong></p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Uninstall the following VSIX extensions from all environments:<ul><li>checkmarx.ast-results-2.53.0.vsix&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</li></ul>
<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>checkmarx.cx-dev-assist-1.7.0.vsix</li>
</ul>
</li>



<li>use ast-github-action – v2.3.33 only</li>



<li>use kics-github-action – v2.1.20 only</li>



<li>Ensure they are removed from:<ul><li>All developer machines</li></ul>
<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>All VSCode profiles and environments</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>



<p><strong>2. Revoke and Rotate Credentials</strong></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3"><strong>GitHub Actions</strong></h2>



<p>An issue was also identified in KICS and AST GitHub Action on March 23, 2026. The attacker injected malicious payloads into the following GitHub Actions workflows which were available between 12:58 and 16:50 UTC:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>checkmarx/ast-github-action</li>



<li>checkmarx/kics-github-action</li>
</ul>



<p>Maintainers revoked the affected tags, securing access, and preventing unauthorized changes.</p>



<p>All GitHub Actions have been updated to the following latest verified releases, and all older versions have been permanently deleted from the organization&#8217;s repositories:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>ast-github-action — v2.3.33 (released March 23, 2026)</li>



<li>kics-github-action — v2.1.20 (released March 23, 2026)</li>
</ul>



<p>Both versions are the only ones available in our repos. All pipelines must reference these versions exclusively or newer.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Recommended actions</h3>



<p>If you downloaded the malicious versions of either plugin (ast-results-2.53.0.vsix or cx-dev-assist-1.7.0.vsix) from OpenVSX during the affected period, we strongly recommend following these precautionary steps:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Revoke and rotate all secrets and credentials accessible to CI runners during the affected period, including GitHub Personal Access Tokens (PATs), cloud service credentials, and repository or organization-level secrets.</li>



<li>Review GitHub Actions runs, search for suspicious indicators such as references to tpcp.tar.gz, aquasecurity, or checkmarx.zone, and check for unexpected repositories like tpcp-docs. In case you spot any occurrences of these, please remove them or contact the Checkmarx Support for guidance.</li>



<li>Revoke access to the following tokens, and issue new ones:<ul><li>GitHub credentials</li></ul>
<ul><li>Microsoft Azure access</li></ul>
<ul><li>Google Cloud (GCP) access</li></ul>
<ul><li>AWS access</li></ul>
<ul><li>Kubernetes service account tokens and kubeconfigs</li></ul>
<ul><li>SSH keys</li></ul>
<ul><li>Docker registry credentials</li></ul>
<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Block Malicious Infrastructure by restricting access to checkmarx[.]zone and review historical network traffic for any communication with this domain</li>
</ul>
</li>



<li>Review logs and systems for GitHub activity such as unexpected API usage, suspicious repositories or artifacts such as docs-tpcp and/or tpcp.tar.gz, unauthorized releases or CI-triggered changes</li>



<li>For any revoked token, key or credentials from previous stages:<ul><li>Review related activity within exposure time frame, to validate no lateral movement took place</li></ul>
<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Monitor for any future attempts to use these credentials to identify ongoing attempts to attack infrastructure</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4"><strong>Containment &amp; Remediation</strong></h2>



<p>Upon identification of the issue, we took immediate steps to contain and remediate the incident. We removed the unauthorized code, pinned our workflows to safe verified commit SHAs, revoked and rotated relevant credentials, blocked outbound access to the attacker-controlled domain, and reviewed our environments for any signs of further compromise.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-5"><strong>Investigation Status</strong></h2>



<p>We have commenced a formal investigation and engaged external forensic specialists to support that work. This investigation is ongoing and includes investigating the behaviour and objectives of the malicious code.</p>



<p>Available information indicates that the primary functionality of the code was focused on the attempted collection and exfiltration of credentials and secrets from affected environments, without evidence to date that such data was successfully exfiltrated from any customer environment.</p>



<p>Based on the investigation to date, and subject to the evidential limitations described below, we recommend continued vigilance and that you notify us promptly if you become aware of any suspicious activity.</p>



<p>While the investigation is ongoing, to date, we do not have evidence indicating that the incident resulted in unauthorised access to customer data or systems, that data held by Checkmarx has been accessed, nor can we yet confirm that any particular customer environment was compromised<strong>.</strong></p>



<p>It is important to note that because the affected artefacts execute within customer‑controlled environments, confirmation of whether a particular customer was impacted depends on an assessment of those environments, rather than on telemetry held by Checkmarx. Those CI/CD pipelines and developer workstations are customer‑controlled environments, and Checkmarx does not have independent visibility into their execution or logs.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-6"><strong>Our Commitment to You</strong></h2>



<p>If you have any questions or need assistance assessing client exposure, please reach out to our security team at&nbsp;<a href="mailto:infosec@checkmarx.com">infosec@checkmarx.com</a>. Additionally, we have published detailed assessment and remediation guidance, including indicators of compromise, version information and recommended next steps for customers on our support <a href="https://support.checkmarx.com/CheckmarxCustomerServiceCommunity/s/login/">portal</a>. &nbsp;</p>



<p>Protecting the security and privacy of our clients and team members is a responsibility we hold to the highest standard. As part of our commitment to transparency, we will provide updates as appropriate and as our investigation progresses.</p>



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        <h2 class="section-title article-anchor" id="article-anchor-7">Frequently Asked Questions</h2>
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                                How can a customer determine whether its specific environment was affected?                            </h3>
                            <div class="js-accordion-content fag-accordion__content">
                                <p>&#8220;Determining whether a specific environment was affected requires a structured assessment across two vectors: CI/CD pipelines and developer workstations.</p>
<p><strong>Assessment — CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions):</strong></p>
<ol>
<li>Search all GitHub workflow files (.github/workflows/*.yml) for references to checkmarx/kics-github-action and checkmarx/ast-github-action.</li>
<li>If references are identified, determine the version or tag in use (e.g., @main, @v2.3.32, a commit SHA).</li>
<li>Ascertain whether any workflow runs referencing these actions occurred during the affected window in March 2026. GitHub Actions run logs are retained for a configurable period and should be reviewed for the relevant timeframe.</li>
<li>If runs occurred during the affected window, review runner logs for: outbound connections to checkmarx[.]zone, execution of a setup.sh script not forming part of the customer&#8217;s own workflow, or any anomalous network activity.</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Assessment &#8211; Developer workstations (Open VSX plugins):</strong></p>
<ol>
<li>Identify all developers utilizing VS Code within the organization.</li>
<li>Determine whether Checkmarx extensions were installed from the Open VSX Registry (open-vsx.org) rather than the official VS Code Marketplace (marketplace.visualstudio.com).</li>
<li>Verify the extension version and installation or last-update timestamp. Any Checkmarx VS Code extension installed or auto-updated from the Open VSX Registry during the affected window should be treated as potentially compromised.</li>
<li>Inspect the workstation for the relevant plugin directories (refer to FAQ F10 for applicable paths) and review proxy or DNS logs for connections to checkmarx[.]zone.</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Important note regarding Checkmarx scan-based detection:</strong></p>
<p>Executing a Checkmarx SAST or SCA scan against your organization&#8217;s codebase will not detect whether your environment was compromised by this incident. The incident involves malicious code executed within a CI/CD runner or IDE environment and does not constitute a vulnerability in application code that a scan would identify. Exposure assessment must be conducted through log analysis, workstation inspection, and credential audit as described above.&#8221;</p>
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                                How did the compromise happen, how was it discovered, and what is Checkmarx doing to prevent similar supply-chain attacks in the future?                            </h3>
                            <div class="js-accordion-content fag-accordion__content">
                                <p>See Checkmarx Security Update, 26 March 2026 (<a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/">https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/</a>)</p>
                            </div>
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                                        </g>
                                    </g>
                                </svg>
                                Which Checkmarx GitHub Actions and plugins were affected?                            </h3>
                            <div class="js-accordion-content fag-accordion__content">
                                <p>Both checkmarx/ast-github-action and checkmarx/kics-github-action were affected by this incident, as were the two Open VSX Registry plugins referenced in Checkmarx&#8217;s security communications.</p>
                            </div>
                        </div>
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                                What IOCs can Checkmarx share (hashes, filenames/folders, domains, IPs, SHAs, setup.sh artifacts)?                            </h3>
                            <div class="js-accordion-content fag-accordion__content">
                                <p>The following indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been identified through Checkmarx&#8217;s investigation and independent third-party security research. The investigation remains ongoing and additional IOCs may be published.</p>
<p><strong>Malicious domain / command-and-control infrastructure:</strong></p>
<p>checkmarx[.]zone &#8211; This attacker-controlled domain was intended to be used for the exfiltration of any stolen credentials and secrets. Any outbound DNS query or HTTP/HTTPS connection to this domain originating from CI/CD runners or developer workstations during the affected window should be treated as a confirmed indicator of compromise.</p>
<p><strong>Malicious VSIX filenames (Open VSX):</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>ast-results-[version].vsix</li>
<li>cx-dev-assist-[version].vsix</li>
</ul>
<p>The specific filenames checkmarx.ast-results-2.53.0.vsix and checkmarx.cx-dev-assist-1.7.0.vsix have been referenced in customer communications. Customers should evaluate any version downloaded from the Open VSX Registry during the affected window, not solely these specific version numbers.</p>
<p><strong>On-disk extension directories:</strong></p>
<p>The presence of Open VSX-sourced Checkmarx extension directories within VS Code&#8217;s extension folder constitutes a potential indicator. Refer to FAQ F10 for applicable file paths.</p>
<p><strong>Runner artifacts (setup.sh):</strong></p>
<p>The compromised GitHub Actions injected a script (setup.sh) on the CI/CD runner as part of the action&#8217;s initialization sequence. The presence of this script or associated runner artifacts constitutes a behavioral indicator of compromise. The full contents of setup.sh cannot be publicly disclosed at this time given the ongoing investigation.</p>
<p><strong>File hashes (SHA256)- sourced from Wiz threat intelligence reporting:</strong></p>
<p>ast-results-2.53.0.vsix: 65bd72fcddaf938cefdf55b3323ad29f649a65d4ddd6aea09afa974dfc7f105d</p>
<p>cx-dev-assist-1.7.0.vsix: 744c9d61b66bcd2bb5474d9afeee6c00bb7e0cd32535781da188b80eb59383e0</p>
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                                Which credentials, secrets, or keys must be rotated, and was only GitHub affected or potentially other credentials too?                            </h3>
                            <div class="js-accordion-content fag-accordion__content">
                                <p>The malicious payload embedded in both the GitHub Actions and the Open VSX plugins was designed to exfiltrate environment variables and secrets from the execution context of the affected GitHub repository.</p>
<p><strong>Credentials at risk &#8211; GitHub Actions (CI/CD):</strong></p>
<p>Any secret configured within the affected GitHub repository or organization and accessible to the workflow at the time the compromised action executed is potentially at risk. This includes, but is not limited to: GITHUB_TOKEN, API keys, cloud provider credentials, database credentials, and Checkmarx API tokens.</p>
<p><strong>Credentials at risk &#8211; Developer workstations (Open VSX plugin exposure):</strong></p>
<p>Any credential accessible within the VS Code environment, including those stored in environment variables, configuration files, or tokens used by the IDE, should be treated as potentially at risk.</p>
<p><strong>Credentials requiring rotation:</strong></p>
<ol>
<li>All GitHub repository secrets in any repository or organization where the compromised actions executed.</li>
<li>Checkmarx API keys and tokens used within the affected pipelines.</li>
<li>Cloud provider credentials (AWS, Azure, GCP) if present as environment variables in affected workflows.</li>
<li>All other API keys, tokens, or passwords configured as GitHub secrets or environment variables in the affected workflows.</li>
<li>On developer workstations: any tokens or secrets stored in VS Code settings, environment variables, or configuration files where the malicious Open VSX plugin was installed and active<strong>. </strong>
</li>
</ol>
                            </div>
                        </div>
                        </div>
<div>                        <div class="js-accordion__item fag-accordion__item ">
                            <h3 class="js-accordion__btn fag-accordion__btn">
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                                        </g>
                                    </g>
                                </svg>
                                Will Checkmarx provide a formal root-cause analysis (RCA) report?                            </h3>
                            <div class="js-accordion-content fag-accordion__content">
                                <p>Checkmarx recognizes that many enterprise customers — particularly those in regulated industries or with formal vendor risk management programs — require a written root-cause analysis or incident statement from strategic suppliers following a supply chain security incident such as this.</p>
<p>Checkmarx is commited to providing material updates, and preparing a post-incident report. While the investigation is still ongoing — including with support from a third-party forensic firm we have engaged — we expect the report to include:</p>
<ul>
<li>Our findings with respect to the root cause and attack vector exploited by the TeamPCP threat actor, as established by the investigation</li>
<li>A timeline of events from initial compromise through detection and remediation</li>
<li>Findings with respect to affected artifacts and the scope of customer impact, as confirmed by the investigation</li>
<li>The remediation actions taken by Checkmarx</li>
<li>Forward-looking  preventive controls to enhance Checkmarx&#8217;s security posture</li>
</ul>
                            </div>
                        </div>
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                            <h3 class="js-accordion__btn fag-accordion__btn">
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                                        </g>
                                    </g>
                                </svg>
                                Does this incident affect Checkmarx One SaaS / cloud or scanning engines, and do SaaS-only customers need to take action?                            </h3>
                            <div class="js-accordion-content fag-accordion__content">
                                <p>The Checkmarx One SaaS platform, including cloud-hosted scanning engines, the Checkmarx One web application, and associated backend services, do not appear to be affected by this incident.</p>
<p>This incident constitutes a supply-chain compromise targeting specific open-source distribution artifacts (GitHub Actions and Open VSX plugins). It does not represent a breach of Checkmarx&#8217;s SaaS infrastructure. It does not appear that the threat actor obtained access to Checkmarx One customer tenants, customer data, scan results, or the platform&#8217;s internal systems.</p>
<p>Notwithstanding the above, SaaS customers who utilize the affected GitHub Actions (checkmarx/kics-github-action or checkmarx/ast-github-action) within their own CI/CD pipelines, or whose developers installed plugins sourced from the Open VSX Registry, may be indirectly affected.</p>
<p>We understand the residual risk pertains to the customer&#8217;s own CI/CD runner environments and developer workstations on which the malicious code may have executed.</p>
<p><strong>Recommended action for SaaS customers:</strong></p>
<p>If your organization does not use checkmarx/kics-github-action or checkmarx/ast-github-action in its GitHub pipelines and developers do not use Open VSX-sourced plugins, no specific action with respect to the SaaS platform is required. If the affected GitHub Actions are in use, any runner that executed those actions during the affected window should be treated as potentially compromised, and customers should follow the remediation guidance including credential rotation, log review, and runner inspection. We recommend heightened vigilance at this time.</p>
                            </div>
                        </div>
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                            <h3 class="js-accordion__btn fag-accordion__btn">
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                                        </g>
                                    </g>
                                </svg>
                                Which versions, tags, and time windows were affected, and which versions are safe now?                            </h3>
                            <div class="js-accordion-content fag-accordion__content">
                                <h3>Affected versions and tags:</h3>
<p><strong>checkmarx/ast-github-action:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>3.32 was compromised.</li>
<li>References to @main during the exposure window (March 2026) were compromised.</li>
<li>Any unpinned or floating reference that resolved to a compromised commit during the exposure window should be treated as affected.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>checkmarx/kics-github-action:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>All versions and tags active on the @main branch during the exposure window (March 2026) were compromised.</li>
<li>Any unpinned or floating reference that resolved during the exposure window should be treated as affected.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Open VSX plugins:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>ast-results v2.53.0 was compromised.</li>
<li>cx-dev-assist v1.7.0 was compromised.</li>
<li>Any version of either plugin installed or auto-updated from the Open VSX Registry during the exposure window should be treated as compromised.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Safe versions (post-remediation):</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>checkmarx/ast-github-action v2.3.33 or later has been confirmed clean.</li>
<li>checkmarx/kics-github-action: pin to a version or commit SHA published following remediation; customers should confirm the specific safe tag with their Checkmarx account team.</li>
<li>Open VSX plugins: reinstall from the official VS Code Marketplace. Current Marketplace versions are confirmed clean.</li>
<li>@main as of the date of remediation references clean code; however, pinning to an explicit version tag or commit SHA is strongly recommended as best practice.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Exposure window:</strong></p>
<p>Malicious artifacts were active during March 2026. The precise commencement date remains under investigation. Any pipeline execution or plugin installation or auto-update occurring during this period should be evaluated for potential exposure.</p>
                            </div>
                        </div>
                                                <div class="js-accordion__item fag-accordion__item ">
                            <h3 class="js-accordion__btn fag-accordion__btn">
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                                        </g>
                                    </g>
                                </svg>
                                Is a third party involved in the investigation, what is the investigation timeline, and has/will the incident be reported to regulators or law enforcement?                            </h3>
                            <div class="js-accordion-content fag-accordion__content">
                                <p>Yes. We have appointed external breach counsel, and a leading forensics expert to assist with our investigation.  We are unable to provide an estimated timeline.  At this stage, we are notifying regulators and law enforcement as we deem necessary.</p>
                            </div>
                        </div>
                                        </div>
            </div>
        </div>
    </div>
</section>


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GitHub Actions run logs are retained for a configurable period and should be reviewed for the relevant timeframe.\nIf runs occurred during the affected window, review runner logs for: outbound connections to checkmarx[.]zone, execution of a setup.sh script not forming part of the customer&#8217;s own workflow, or any anomalous network activity.\n\nAssessment &#8211; Developer workstations (Open VSX plugins):\n\nIdentify all developers utilizing VS Code within the organization.\nDetermine whether Checkmarx extensions were installed from the Open VSX Registry (open-vsx.org) rather than the official VS Code Marketplace (marketplace.visualstudio.com).\nVerify the extension version and installation or last-update timestamp. Any Checkmarx VS Code extension installed or auto-updated from the Open VSX Registry during the affected window should be treated as potentially compromised.\nInspect the workstation for the relevant plugin directories (refer to FAQ F10 for applicable paths) and review proxy or DNS logs for connections to checkmarx[.]zone.\n\nImportant note regarding Checkmarx scan-based detection:\nExecuting a Checkmarx SAST or SCA scan against your organization&#8217;s codebase will not detect whether your environment was compromised by this incident. The incident involves malicious code executed within a CI/CD runner or IDE environment and does not constitute a vulnerability in application code that a scan would identify. Exposure assessment must be conducted through log analysis, workstation inspection, and credential audit as described above.&#8221;"}},{"@type":"Question","name":"How did the compromise happen, how was it discovered, and what is Checkmarx doing to prevent similar supply-chain attacks in the future?","acceptedAnswer":{"@type":"Answer","text":"See Checkmarx Security Update, 26 March 2026 (https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update/)"}},{"@type":"Question","name":"Which Checkmarx GitHub Actions and plugins were affected?","acceptedAnswer":{"@type":"Answer","text":"Both checkmarx/ast-github-action and checkmarx/kics-github-action were affected by this incident, as were the two Open VSX Registry plugins referenced in Checkmarx&#8217;s security communications."}},{"@type":"Question","name":"What IOCs can Checkmarx share (hashes, filenames/folders, domains, IPs, SHAs, setup.sh artifacts)?","acceptedAnswer":{"@type":"Answer","text":"The following indicators of compromise (IOCs) have been identified through Checkmarx&#8217;s investigation and independent third-party security research. The investigation remains ongoing and additional IOCs may be published.\nMalicious domain / command-and-control infrastructure:\ncheckmarx[.]zone &#8211; This attacker-controlled domain was intended to be used for the exfiltration of any stolen credentials and secrets. Any outbound DNS query or HTTP/HTTPS connection to this domain originating from CI/CD runners or developer workstations during the affected window should be treated as a confirmed indicator of compromise.\nMalicious VSIX filenames (Open VSX):\n\nast-results-[version].vsix\ncx-dev-assist-[version].vsix\n\nThe specific filenames checkmarx.ast-results-2.53.0.vsix and checkmarx.cx-dev-assist-1.7.0.vsix have been referenced in customer communications. 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The full contents of setup.sh cannot be publicly disclosed at this time given the ongoing investigation.\nFile hashes (SHA256)- sourced from Wiz threat intelligence reporting:\nast-results-2.53.0.vsix: 65bd72fcddaf938cefdf55b3323ad29f649a65d4ddd6aea09afa974dfc7f105d\ncx-dev-assist-1.7.0.vsix: 744c9d61b66bcd2bb5474d9afeee6c00bb7e0cd32535781da188b80eb59383e0"}},{"@type":"Question","name":"Which credentials, secrets, or keys must be rotated, and was only GitHub affected or potentially other credentials too?","acceptedAnswer":{"@type":"Answer","text":"The malicious payload embedded in both the GitHub Actions and the Open VSX plugins was designed to exfiltrate environment variables and secrets from the execution context of the affected GitHub repository.\nCredentials at risk &#8211; GitHub Actions (CI/CD):\nAny secret configured within the affected GitHub repository or organization and accessible to the workflow at the time the compromised action executed is potentially at risk. This includes, but is not limited to: GITHUB_TOKEN, API keys, cloud provider credentials, database credentials, and Checkmarx API tokens.\nCredentials at risk &#8211; Developer workstations (Open VSX plugin exposure):\nAny credential accessible within the VS Code environment, including those stored in environment variables, configuration files, or tokens used by the IDE, should be treated as potentially at risk.\nCredentials requiring rotation:\n\nAll GitHub repository secrets in any repository or organization where the compromised actions executed.\nCheckmarx API keys and tokens used within the affected pipelines.\nCloud provider credentials (AWS, Azure, GCP) if present as environment variables in affected workflows.\nAll other API keys, tokens, or passwords configured as GitHub secrets or environment variables in the affected workflows.\nOn developer workstations: any tokens or secrets stored in VS Code settings, environment variables, or configuration files where the malicious Open VSX plugin was installed and active."}},{"@type":"Question","name":"Will Checkmarx provide a formal root-cause analysis (RCA) report?","acceptedAnswer":{"@type":"Answer","text":"Checkmarx recognizes that many enterprise customers — particularly those in regulated industries or with formal vendor risk management programs — require a written root-cause analysis or incident statement from strategic suppliers following a supply chain security incident such as this.\nCheckmarx is commited to providing material updates, and preparing a post-incident report. While the investigation is still ongoing — including with support from a third-party forensic firm we have engaged — we expect the report to include:\n\nOur findings with respect to the root cause and attack vector exploited by the TeamPCP threat actor, as established by the investigation\nA timeline of events from initial compromise through detection and remediation\nFindings with respect to affected artifacts and the scope of customer impact, as confirmed by the investigation\nThe remediation actions taken by Checkmarx\nForward-looking  preventive controls to enhance Checkmarx&#8217;s security posture"}},{"@type":"Question","name":"Does this incident affect Checkmarx One SaaS / cloud or scanning engines, and do SaaS-only customers need to take action?","acceptedAnswer":{"@type":"Answer","text":"The Checkmarx One SaaS platform, including cloud-hosted scanning engines, the Checkmarx One web application, and associated backend services, do not appear to be affected by this incident.\nThis incident constitutes a supply-chain compromise targeting specific open-source distribution artifacts (GitHub Actions and Open VSX plugins). It does not represent a breach of Checkmarx&#8217;s SaaS infrastructure. It does not appear that the threat actor obtained access to Checkmarx One customer tenants, customer data, scan results, or the platform&#8217;s internal systems.\nNotwithstanding the above, SaaS customers who utilize the affected GitHub Actions (checkmarx/kics-github-action or checkmarx/ast-github-action) within their own CI/CD pipelines, or whose developers installed plugins sourced from the Open VSX Registry, may be indirectly affected.\nWe understand the residual risk pertains to the customer&#8217;s own CI/CD runner environments and developer workstations on which the malicious code may have executed.\nRecommended action for SaaS customers:\nIf your organization does not use checkmarx/kics-github-action or checkmarx/ast-github-action in its GitHub pipelines and developers do not use Open VSX-sourced plugins, no specific action with respect to the SaaS platform is required. If the affected GitHub Actions are in use, any runner that executed those actions during the affected window should be treated as potentially compromised, and customers should follow the remediation guidance including credential rotation, log review, and runner inspection. We recommend heightened vigilance at this time."}},{"@type":"Question","name":"Which versions, tags, and time windows were affected, and which versions are safe now?","acceptedAnswer":{"@type":"Answer","text":"Affected versions and tags:\ncheckmarx/ast-github-action:\n\n3.32 was compromised.\nReferences to @main during the exposure window (March 2026) were compromised.\nAny unpinned or floating reference that resolved to a compromised commit during the exposure window should be treated as affected.\n\ncheckmarx/kics-github-action:\n\nAll versions and tags active on the @main branch during the exposure window (March 2026) were compromised.\nAny unpinned or floating reference that resolved during the exposure window should be treated as affected.\n\nOpen VSX plugins:\n\nast-results v2.53.0 was compromised.\ncx-dev-assist v1.7.0 was compromised.\nAny version of either plugin installed or auto-updated from the Open VSX Registry during the exposure window should be treated as compromised.\n\nSafe versions (post-remediation):\n\ncheckmarx/ast-github-action v2.3.33 or later has been confirmed clean.\ncheckmarx/kics-github-action: pin to a version or commit SHA published following remediation; customers should confirm the specific safe tag with their Checkmarx account team.\nOpen VSX plugins: reinstall from the official VS Code Marketplace. Current Marketplace versions are confirmed clean.\n@main as of the date of remediation references clean code; however, pinning to an explicit version tag or commit SHA is strongly recommended as best practice.\n\nExposure window:\nMalicious artifacts were active during March 2026. The precise commencement date remains under investigation. Any pipeline execution or plugin installation or auto-update occurring during this period should be evaluated for potential exposure."}},{"@type":"Question","name":"Is a third party involved in the investigation, what is the investigation timeline, and has/will the incident be reported to regulators or law enforcement?","acceptedAnswer":{"@type":"Answer","text":"Yes. 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	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Vibe Coding Security: Risks, Vulnerabilities, and How to Secure AI-Generated Code</title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/security-in-vibe-coding/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Checkmarx Team]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 09:06:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & LLM Tools in Application Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Application Security Trends & Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=101022</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Vibe coding security risks are not theoretical. When AI generates code without strong guardrails, teams can inherit the same classes of issues security teams already know well, only faster and at greater scale.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em><strong>updated March 17, 2026</strong></em></p>



<p>With GenAI taking over almost everything we do, a great emerging use case is “vibe coding.” The formal defintion of vibe coding is: “an AI-dependent programming technique where a person describes a problem in a few sentences as a prompt to a large language model (LLM) tuned for coding.”</p>



<p>Basically it allows anyone to create applications without knowing how to code a single line. It has the potential to help accelerate velocity, untangle previous bottlenecks, and reduce the need to have every request go to R&amp;D &#8211; allowing R&amp;D to focus more on complex business logic.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">What Is Vibe Coding?</h2>



<p>Vibe coding describes a style of AI-assisted development where a user prompts an LLM or coding assistant to generate code, refine logic, and iterate quickly toward a working outcome. It lowers the barrier to entry, increases development speed, and helps teams prototype and ship faster.</p>



<p>But the same acceleration that makes vibe coding attractive also creates new security pressure. AI can introduce insecure logic, unsafe dependencies, weak access controls, or exposed secrets at a pace that quickly outstrips manual review. In other words, the more software is created at machine speed, the more important vibe coding security becomes.</p>



<p>For engineering leaders, the opportunity is clear: faster delivery, fewer bottlenecks, and more experimentation. For security leaders, the challenge is equally clear: less visibility, more change volume, and a wider software supply chain to govern. The real question is not whether teams should use AI-assisted development. It is how to make it secure at scale.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">The Security Risks of Vibe Coding</h2>



<p>Vibe coding security risks are not theoretical. When AI generates code without strong guardrails, teams can inherit the same classes of issues security teams already know well, only faster and at greater scale.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">1. Insecure AI-generated code</h4>



<p>AI coding tools can reproduce insecure patterns from training data or generate flawed logic under pressure to produce fast results. That can lead to issues such as injection flaws, weak authentication, broken authorization, or unsafe handling of sensitive data.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">2. Vulnerable and unverified dependencies</h4>



<p>AI-generated code often introduces open-source packages, frameworks, and libraries automatically. Without validation, teams can inherit vulnerable, malicious, or simply inappropriate dependencies that expand software supply chain risk.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">3. Hard-coded secrets and unsafe configuration</h4>



<p>Generated code may expose API keys, tokens, credentials, or permissive defaults. These issues are easy to miss during rapid iteration and can become high-impact weaknesses once merged or deployed.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">4. Over-trust in AI output</h4>



<p>One of the biggest vibe coding security issues is not just bad code. It is uncritical acceptance of AI-generated code. If teams assume generated output is production-ready, vulnerabilities can move downstream without meaningful validation.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">5. Reduced auditability and governance</h4>



<p>As AI tools generate more code and suggest more changes, it becomes harder to explain how decisions were made, what dependencies were introduced, and whether policy requirements were followed. That creates friction for governance, compliance, and risk ownership.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">6. More change volume than traditional security processes can absorb</h4>



<p>AI-assisted development increases code volume, dependency churn, and pull request activity. Traditional detection-only workflows struggle to keep up, which means backlogs grow even when teams are trying to move faster.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Why Traditional AppSec Struggles With Vibe Coding Security</h3>



<p>Most security programs were built for a world where code moved at human speed. Vibe coding changes that. AI can generate, modify, and refactor code continuously, which means security teams are no longer dealing with occasional bursts of change. They are dealing with a new operating model.</p>



<p>That is why securing vibe coding requires more than periodic scanning or post-hoc review. Security has to work in parallel with creation. Teams need visibility into AI-generated and human-written code, the dependencies AI introduces, and the real business risk associated with each issue. The goal is not to slow innovation down. The goal is to make trust scale as fast as development does.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">How to Improve Vibe Coding Security in Practice</h3>



<p>Organizations do not need to choose between AI-driven velocity and secure development. They need guardrails that fit the way modern teams actually build.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">Treat AI-generated code like any other untrusted input</h4>



<p>Every AI-generated change should be validated before merge. Teams should review generated logic, check dependencies, and verify that security controls still hold under real usage conditions.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">Add security guardrails where developers already work</h4>



<p>Security works best when it fits naturally into the developer workflow. That means surfacing security feedback in the IDE, pull request, and CI/CD pipeline instead of forcing teams into disconnected tools and manual handoffs.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">Prioritize what is truly risky</h4>



<p>High-volume AI-assisted development can flood teams with findings. Prioritization should account for exploitability, reachability, runtime context, business impact, and policy alignment so teams can focus on what materially reduces risk.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">Validate runtime behavior, not just code patterns</h4>



<p>Static analysis matters, but so does verifying how applications behave at runtime. AI-generated code can introduce logic flaws, authentication gaps, and API weaknesses that only become visible when applications are tested under real conditions.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">Govern dependencies and the AI software supply chain</h4>



<p>Securing vibe coding also means governing the packages, frameworks, models, and other AI-related components that code generation tools introduce. Visibility and policy enforcement are essential if teams want to prevent risky components from shipping.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">Preserve human oversight</h4>



<p>AI can accelerate triage and remediation, but production-bound changes should still remain reviewable, explainable, and auditable. The strongest security programs use AI to help teams move faster while preserving control.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">What Securing Vibe Coding Looks Like at Scale</h3>



<p>As AI-assisted development becomes part of normal engineering workflow, security teams need more than isolated scanners and after-the-fact review. They need a way to secure human and AI-generated code as it is created, prioritize the issues that matter most, and keep remediation inside the workflows developers already use.</p>



<p>That is the shift from reactive AppSec to continuous assurance. Instead of waiting for risk to pile up, organizations can reduce exposure earlier with security controls in the IDE, richer prioritization across the platform, and governed remediation that supports developer speed without sacrificing oversight.</p>


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    <p class="section-description-top">Secure AI-Generated Code</p>    <h3>Protect vibe-coded applications without slowing developers down</h3>
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    <p>Checkmarx Developer Assist helps teams secure human and AI-generated code in real time inside the IDE, with explainable guidance and safe remediation that keeps developers in flow.</p>
            <a href="https://dev.checkmarx.com" class="btn btn-2 btn-bg accent demo">Start 30-day Free Trial Now</a>
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            player.playVideo();

        })
    })
</script>


<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">Conclusion</h2>



<p>Vibe coding is here to stay. It can unlock major gains in speed, experimentation, and developer productivity, but it also creates a faster, more complex risk surface. That makes vibe coding security a business and engineering priority, not just a coding hygiene issue.</p>



<p>The organizations that succeed will be the ones that secure AI-generated code without interrupting the flow of development. That means combining visibility, prioritization, runtime validation, supply chain governance, and developer-first guardrails so teams can move quickly with confidence.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
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		<title>Confident Developers Are the New Security Risk </title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/confident-developers-are-the-new-security-risk/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Frank Emery]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2026 11:58:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & LLM Tools in Application Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Application Security Trends & Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI generated code]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AppSec]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[developer assist]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=107381</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Teams are shipping more code, faster than ever. It looks polished, it runs smoothly, and it works - so developers trust it. That's the problem.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>AI coding tools have fundamentally changed how software gets built.&nbsp;</p>



<p>After attending and speaking with security and development leaders at OnPoint Ski &amp; Snowboard CyberCon 2026, one theme stood out to me: teams are shipping more code, in more languages, across more projects than ever before. Features that used to take days now take minutes and complex logic can be scaffolded from a single prompt. </p>



<p>The output is fast, it looks polished, and it runs smoothly.&nbsp;</p>



<p><em>And&nbsp;that’s&nbsp;exactly the problem.</em>&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">When Confidence Outpaces Security </h2>



<p>As developers rely more on AI tools, something subtle happens: the speed and quality of the output create <em>confidence</em>. The code looks clean, it compiles, it works as expected – so it gets trusted. </p>



<p>But AI models only predict what is likely to work, they don’t understand your threat model and they aren&#8217;t able to assess exploitability in your environment. AI-generated code can function perfectly and still introduce serious vulnerabilities. </p>



<p>This&nbsp;gap&nbsp;between what works and&nbsp;what’s&nbsp;secure&nbsp;is where risk&nbsp;exponentially&nbsp;builds.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;a criticism of developers. AI tools are powerful productivity accelerators, and teams&nbsp;absolutely should&nbsp;use them. But&nbsp;validating&nbsp;functionality is&nbsp;not the same as&nbsp;validating security. And right now, that distinction is getting blurred.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">More Code, Same Security Team</h2>



<p>This confidence issue&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;happening in a&nbsp;vacuum;&nbsp;it’s&nbsp;the byproduct of broader organizational shifts.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The development lifecycle is shifting&nbsp;to be&nbsp;more agentic, more automated, and moving faster than ever. That means more code written with fewer reviewers, pull requests that are more frequent&nbsp;but also&nbsp;more complex, and an AppSec team expected to keep pace without any&nbsp;additional&nbsp;resources.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>So,&nbsp;the backlog&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;stabilizing –&nbsp;it’s&nbsp;growing.&nbsp;</p>



<p>I see this tension in organizations all the time. AppSec teams are expected to keep up with the speed of development while&nbsp;maintaining&nbsp;strong security standards. In practice, they&nbsp;can’t&nbsp;fully do both. Slowing down development usually&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;an option, so security is expected to adapt.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img decoding="async" width="616" height="411" src="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/image.png" alt="" class="wp-image-107382" srcset="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/image.png 616w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/image-300x200.png 300w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/image-400x267.png 400w" sizes="(max-width: 616px) 100vw, 616px" /></figure>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">Development Is Now Human + AI </h2>



<p>Development is no longer purely human-led – but it&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;exclusively&nbsp;AI-led either. It is now driven by developers working alongside AI.&nbsp;</p>



<p>AI is&nbsp;assisting, suggesting, generating, and accelerating, but humans are still making decisions and shipping code. The model has shifted from developers writing everything themselves to developers collaborating with AI systems throughout the process.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This shift significantly increases output. Teams are producing more features, services, and integrations at a much faster pace. But AI is optimized for speed and plausibility, not security. It can produce functional code, but not inherently secure code. </p>



<p>The speed AI delivers builds confidence and trust, but it also increases the likelihood of security gaps slipping through unnoticed – especially when developers are shipping code they didn’t write and don&#8217;t fully understand. We recently dug more into this trend in our <a href="https://checkmarx.com/ai-llm-tools-in-application-security/securing-code-no-one-actually-wrote-2/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>Don’t Trust the Code</em></a> paper and you can read more about it <a href="https://checkmarx.com/resources/dont-trust-the-code/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a>.  </p>



<p>But these tools&nbsp;don’t&nbsp;just change how developers work – they also add new components to the software supply chain. Every&nbsp;model&nbsp;integration, MCP connection, and AI-assisted workflow becomes another potential entry point, and the environment is expanding faster than many security teams can track.&nbsp;</p>



<p>I&#8217;ve&nbsp;seen cases where thousands of AI coding assistant licenses were active before the Head of Security even knew they existed. And when organizations&nbsp;don’t&nbsp;know which AI tools are in use or how data is flowing, they&nbsp;can’t&nbsp;properly assess&nbsp;risk&nbsp;–&nbsp;and the attack surface grows,&nbsp;unnoticed.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4">Security Has To Evolve </h2>



<p>One of my biggest takeaways is that if AI-driven productivity is the new baseline, security can&#8217;t operate the way it did five years ago – it must evolve across these three categories: </p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>How we&nbsp;identify&nbsp;vulnerabilities in code is changing.</strong></li>



<li><strong>How we&nbsp;identify&nbsp;vulnerabilities in the tools we are using is changing.</strong></li>



<li>
<strong>How we address vulnerabilities is changing.</strong> </li>
</ol>



<p>Traditional scanners&nbsp;weren’t&nbsp;built for this environment. They struggle with modern languages and frameworks, generate noise, and&nbsp;can&#8217;t&nbsp;keep pace with modern CI/CD pipelines.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>Meanwhile,&nbsp;AI is introducing new threat vectors:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Generated logic that hasn’t been deeply reviewed</li>



<li>New dependencies</li>



<li>Expanded supply chain components</li>
</ul>



<p>Organizations still need every line of that code scanned quickly, with findings developers can&nbsp;actually act&nbsp;on.&nbsp;This is why&nbsp;we’re&nbsp;seeing the rise of agentic scanning approaches: hybrid engines that combine deterministic analysis with AI reasoning, LLM-powered workflows, and automated context-aware triage.&nbsp;</p>



<p>But securing the code is only&nbsp;half of&nbsp;the&nbsp;problem,&nbsp;we&nbsp;also need to secure the AI&nbsp;tools&nbsp;writing it. AI Bills of Materials&nbsp;(AI-BOMs)&nbsp;are&nbsp;emerging&nbsp;to&nbsp;provide visibility into where AI is being used, which models are connected, and how data flows through them. Securing the full AI stack is quickly becoming a core AppSec responsibility.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-5">From Backlog to Automation </h2>



<p>Detection alone&nbsp;won’t&nbsp;solve the scaling problem. The traditional&nbsp;identify&nbsp;– triage – remediate – verify cycle cannot be managed manually when code is growing exponentially. Without automation, quality declines and backlogs grow.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Agents become valuable when&nbsp;they’re&nbsp;embedded directly into the&nbsp;development&nbsp;lifecycle, especially in high-volume stages like triage, remediation, and verification. These are areas where automation can absorb the workload security teams&nbsp;can’t&nbsp;handle manually.&nbsp;</p>



<p>When agents&nbsp;operate&nbsp;within a defined AppSec strategy, they form the foundation for applications that can secure themselves, freeing teams to focus on policy and governance rather than reactive risk management.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-6">Securing at the Speed of Confidence </h2>



<p>The paradox is clear. AI increases output, which increases risk. At the same time, it increases confidence, and confident developers move faster, question less, and merge code more quickly.&nbsp;</p>



<p>But beneath that momentum, the gap between perceived security and actual security continues to widen.&nbsp;Since slowing down is not a realistic&nbsp;option, the only path forward is to secure software at the speed AI now sets.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Checkmarx&nbsp;is built for this shift.&nbsp;It&nbsp;combines deterministic scanning with&nbsp;AI-driven detection to give&nbsp;clear visibility into how AI&nbsp;is&nbsp;being used across&nbsp;development environments, while&nbsp;also automating&nbsp;remediation&nbsp;with&nbsp;tools&nbsp;like&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/developer-assist/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Checkmarx&nbsp;Developer Assist</a>.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p>The result is security embedded directly into the development process – instead of&nbsp;tacked at the end.&nbsp;</p>



<p>And the goal isn’t to reduce developer confidence – confidence is a good thing! The goal is to ensure that this confidence is earned, backed by real visibility and security controls that scale with the volume of code being produced. </p>



<p>At the end of the day,&nbsp;confident developers&nbsp;with&nbsp;guardrails in place move fast&nbsp;<em>and&nbsp;</em>stay secure. Confident developers without them just move fast.&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
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		<title>AI Code Needs AI Security: Why Claude’s Announcement Signals a Bigger Shift </title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/ai-code-needs-ai-security-why-claudes-announcement-signals-a-bigger-shift/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eran Kinsbruner]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:26:54 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & LLM Tools in Application Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Application Security Trends & Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Checkmarx One]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Claude Code]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[developer assist]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vibe coding]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=107161</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Claude Code Security marks a shift toward AI-native vulnerability detection. Explore why AI-generated code demands enterprise-grade, agentic AppSec at scale.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Let’s&nbsp;start this article by&nbsp;stating&nbsp;that the launch of Claude Code Security is good news for the industry.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Not because it replaces traditional application security.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Not because it suddenly makes AI-generated code safe.&nbsp;</p>



<p>But because it validates something many security leaders already know: <strong>AI coding introduces new risks that require <a href="https://checkmarx.com/product/developer-assist/">AI-native, agentic application security</a>.</strong> </p>



<p>In an era where code is increasingly written by AI assistants, security cannot remain an afterthought bolted on after commit. If vulnerabilities are discovered only after the AI coding phase,&nbsp;it&#8217;s&nbsp;already too late. </p>



<p>Velocity and scale&nbsp;have&nbsp;increased, risk has compounded, and exposure scales faster than remediation.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Claude’s announcement acknowledges this reality. And&nbsp;that’s&nbsp;a positive step forward.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">
<strong>A New Way To Think About Detection</strong> </h2>



<p>At first glance, Claude Code Security and <a href="https://dev.checkmarx.com/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Checkmarx Developer Assist</a> may look similar. Both live in the IDE, both surface vulnerabilities, and both suggest fixes. </p>



<p>But the philosophies differ.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>Claude Code Security</strong>&nbsp;reasons about code the way a human security researcher might:&nbsp;mapping data flows, understanding&nbsp;component&nbsp;interactions, and&nbsp;identifying&nbsp;logical flaws that&nbsp;don’t&nbsp;match known signatures&nbsp;and predefined security rules. This reasoning-first approach allows it to uncover subtle, context-dependent vulnerabilities that traditional rule-based scanners often miss.&nbsp;</p>



<p>That’s&nbsp;meaningful&nbsp;progress.&nbsp;However, it is only in early preview and covers&nbsp;a very specific&nbsp;angle across the entire Agentic AppSec lifecycle.&nbsp;</p>



<p><strong>Checkmarx&nbsp;Developer Assist</strong>, part of the broader&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;Assist family&nbsp;and a complete Agentic AppSec platform, takes a complementary but enterprise-proven approach. It provides real-time feedback in the IDEs (Cursor, Windsurf,&nbsp;VSCode, AWS Kiro,&nbsp;JetBrains)&nbsp;across:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>SAST vulnerabilities</li>



<li>Open-source and malicious packages (SCA)&nbsp;</li>



<li>Secrets exposure</li>



<li>Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC) misconfigurations</li>



<li>Container security risks</li>
</ul>



<p>It is fast, comprehensive, and powered by years of curated security intelligence and proven rule libraries, built to operate at true enterprise scale. </p>



<p><strong>Unlike </strong>Claude Code Security, Checkmarx goes beyond pre-commit issue detection. With <strong>Safe Refactor</strong>, we validate that security fixes don&#8217;t introduce regressions, break dependencies, or disrupt the build, so remediation is secure and production-ready.</p>



<p>In simple terms: </p>



<p><strong>Claude Code Security is deep and novel.</strong> </p>



<p><strong>Developer Assist is broad, fast, and supply-chain aware.</strong>&nbsp;</p>



<p>Both&nbsp;matter,&nbsp;but&nbsp;they&nbsp;solve different layers of the problem.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">
<strong>Scope Matters in the AI Era</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Claude Code Security currently focuses on reasoning over the application code itself. But modern risk doesn’t live only in application logic. </p>



<p>It lives in:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>AI-generated dependencies&nbsp;</li>



<li>LLM models, MCPs, offensive agents, IDE extensions, SDKs, etc.</li>



<li>Malicious packages</li>



<li>Container images</li>



<li>Infrastructure misconfigurations&nbsp;</li>



<li>Exposed credentials&nbsp;</li>



<li>Policy violations across pipelines</li>



<li>Runtime environments</li>
</ul>



<p>AI coding doesn’t just produce insecure code, it accelerates insecure ecosystems. </p>



<p>And this is where a unified, enterprise-grade platform becomes critical. </p>



<p>Checkmarx One integrates with Developer Assist for broader capabilities including policy enforcement, compliance reporting, ASPM, and auditability, providing visibility across the entire AI supply chain, not just inside a single file in an IDE. </p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full is-resized"><img decoding="async" width="800" height="800" src="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Untitled-design-22.webp" alt="Checkmarx Developer Assist in action" class="wp-image-107164" style="width:825px;height:auto" srcset="https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Untitled-design-22.webp 800w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Untitled-design-22-300x300.webp 300w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Untitled-design-22-150x150.webp 150w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Untitled-design-22-768x768.webp 768w, https://checkmarx.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Untitled-design-22-585x585.webp 585w" sizes="(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px" /></figure>



<p>In large enterprises, security needs to do more than catch clever bugs. It needs to enforce governance, consistency, and control across thousands of developers and millions of lines of code. </p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">
<strong>Remediation: Human-In-The-Loop, but at Scale</strong> </h2>



<p>Claude Code Security introduces an interesting concept:&nbsp;attempting&nbsp;to disprove its own findings before surfacing them. This aims to reduce false positives at the&nbsp;source, an&nbsp;important improvement over pushing noise downstream.&nbsp;</p>



<p>But accuracy in detection is only part of the equation. Even high-confidence findings create friction if remediation is slow or disconnected from the developer workflow. Developer Assist addresses this by using agentic AI remediation, initiating an AI session enriched with contextual intelligence and proprietary databases to generate safe, actionable fixes directly in the IDE. Developers can accept, refine, or interact with the agent to tailor the resolution. </p>



<p>The difference is operational scale and ecosystem integration.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4">
<strong>Enterprise Readiness Is Not an Afterthought</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Claude Code Security is currently in limited research preview.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Developer Assist, by contrast, is&nbsp;generally available&nbsp;and integrated natively into modern AI-powered IDEs. It is architected with enterprise data handling in mind,&nbsp;minimizing data exposure and ensuring sensitive source code&nbsp;remains&nbsp;protected.&nbsp;</p>



<p>For regulated industries, large enterprises, and global development organizations, these distinctions matter.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Innovation is exciting, but operational maturity is essential. </p>



<p>The Developer Assist agent as stated in this article is one of many agents that Checkmarx Assist offers. It joins the Triage and Remediation Assist agents that operate at the post-commit phase of the agentic development lifecycle (ADLC), offering an agentic-based cleanup solution for any missed or ignored security true positives that can slip into production. That second layer of defense, which is also part of the Checkmarx platform, ensures continuous autonomous AI coding across a large scale of repositories and applications. </p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-5">
<strong>This&nbsp;Isn’t&nbsp;Replacement —&nbsp;It’s&nbsp;Evolution</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Market reactions often jump to “disruption.” But even financial analysts have noted that this is not a direct replacement scenario today.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The more honest framing is this:&nbsp;</p>



<p>Claude Code Security highlights a long-term shift in how vulnerabilities will be discovered,&nbsp;toward reasoning-based, AI-native analysis.&nbsp;</p>



<p>And that shift reinforces the broader truth: <strong>AI-generated code requires AI-native AppSec (agentic AppSec).</strong> </p>



<p>But AI reasoning alone does not replace enterprise-grade coverage across the supply chain, runtime, policy enforcement, compliance, and governance.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-6">
<strong>The Bigger Opportunity</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Claude’s move validates the future. It acknowledges that traditional static scanning models are not sufficient in an AI-driven development lifecycle. </p>



<p>What it does not yet deliver is a unified, enterprise-ready&nbsp;<a href="https://checkmarx.com/rsac-2026/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Agentic Application Security</a>&nbsp;platform spanning:&nbsp;</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>IDE prevention</li>



<li>Post-commit triage and remediation&nbsp;</li>



<li>AI supply chain visibility&nbsp;</li>



<li>Runtime validation&nbsp;</li>



<li>Centralized governance and risk assessment&nbsp;</li>
</ul>



<p>That broader vision is where the real transformation lies.&nbsp;If&nbsp;you’re&nbsp;attending the RSAC conference, come by the&nbsp;Checkmarx&nbsp;booth to learn more about this platform.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The future of security&nbsp;isn’t&nbsp;defensive.&nbsp;</p>



<p>It’s embedded. It’s agentic. It’s platform-driven. </p>



<p>And, most importantly, it evolves as fast as the AI writing the code. </p>



<p>The era of AI coding has begun. Now AI-native AppSec must scale with it. </p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
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		<title>Reducing Noise With Contextual Risk Scoring: Why Critical Doesn’t Always Mean Urgent </title>
		<link>https://checkmarx.com/blog/reducing-noise-with-contextual-risk-scoring/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Emma Datny]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 10:29:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & LLM Tools in Application Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Secure Coding Best Practices for Developers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Threat Intelligence & Vulnerability Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AppSec]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDE Scanning]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vulnerability Remediation]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://staging.checkmarx.com/?p=107057</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[AppSec teams aren’t failing to find risk in their applications, they’re overwhelmed by it. A constant flood of critical alerts, false positives, and disconnected security findings has created a severe signal‑to‑noise problem, making it nearly impossible to distinguish business risk from background static. Every commit now triggers a chain reaction of scans across SAST, SCA, [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>AppSec teams aren’t failing to find risk in their applications, they’re overwhelmed by it. A constant flood of critical alerts, false positives, and disconnected security findings has created a severe signal‑to‑noise problem, making it nearly impossible to distinguish business risk from background static.</p>



<p>Every commit now triggers a chain reaction of scans across SAST, SCA, IaC, containers, APIs, secrets, and cloud infrastructure, with each producing its own findings, severity rating, and risk interpretation. And when everything appears critical, developers are left with no guidance on what to fix first. The introduction of AI coding propelled new risks almost overnight speeding everything up. While AI tools help teams ship faster, they also create more code, more components, and more attack surface – leading to more alerts and more noise.</p>



<p>The alert problem that existed before AI? It intensified. And when everything looks urgent, teams lose focus on the vulnerabilities that create business risk.</p>



<p>Developers can’t operate effectively when they’re constantly buried under alerts without prioritization or clarity. Because when they can’t distinguish between theoretical and real threats, critical vulnerabilities slip through unnoticed, exposure windows widen, and business risk increases.</p>



<p>This is exactly the outcome we need to prevent. Detecting vulnerabilities is easy; the real challenge is understanding which ones matter, why they matter, and what to fix first.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-1">
<strong>The Noise Problem: Volume vs. Actionable Insights</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Noise isn’t just annoying, it’s dangerous. When teams are forced to sift through endless alerts, fatigue sets in and important issues get overlooked.</p>



<p>To make matters worse, these alerts rarely tell a coherent story. Each scanner operates independently, surfacing different symptoms of potentially related problems.</p>



<p>SAST may identify a potential injection risk, SCA may flag a critical CVE in a transitive dependency, and IaC may highlight risks in cloud configuration – all at the same time.</p>



<p>Individually, each issue appears “critical,” but without understanding how the vulnerabilities relate to each other and to real execution paths, AppSec teams are flying blind, leading to:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Multiple tools reporting versions of the same underlying issue</li>



<li>High‑severity findings in code paths that cannot execute</li>



<li>Duplicate tickets routed to different teams</li>



<li>“Critical” vulnerabilities treated equally, regardless of real impact</li>
</ul>



<p>The problem isn’t the volume of alerts, but the absence of context. Raw vulnerability data means nothing without the intelligent insights to prioritize them. Because when every vulnerability is “urgent,” nothing actually is.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-2">
<strong>Contextual Risk Scoring: What It Is, How It Works, and Why It Matters</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>When teams understand a vulnerability’s real-world impact, they can stop chasing theoretical risks and instead fix the issues that matter most.</p>



<p>Instead of treating all “critical” tags equally, contextual risk scoring evaluates how a vulnerability behaves in your specific application and if it presents a realistic threat. This allows teams to move from severity‑driven triage to intelligent risk‑driven prioritization.</p>



<p>Contextual risk scoring takes the following into account:</p>



<p><strong>Exploitability</strong>: Is there a realistic attack path? Are exploit techniques known or emerging? Is the weakness commonly abused in the wild?</p>



<p><strong>Reachability</strong>: Is the vulnerable code path actually executed? Can untrusted input reach it? A flaw in unreachable or dead code may pose minimal risk despite its severity.</p>



<p><strong>Correlation</strong>: Do signals from multiple scanners converge on the same root issue? Correlation provides a deeper understanding of location, impact, and propagation across services.</p>



<p><strong>Business impact</strong>: How critical is the asset? Does it handle sensitive data? Is it externally exposed? Does it support a revenue‑generating or regulated function?</p>



<p>By combining these factors, contextual risk scoring aligns remediation with real exposure. This is how a “critical” issue in an unused library becomes low urgency, while a “medium” flaw in an internet-facing API becomes top priority. Severity alone can’t make that distinction, but contextual risk scoring can.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-3">Correlation Between Scanners: Full Context Requires Multiple Signals Working Together</h2>



<p>We need to get smarter about where we focus. Not every vulnerability is worth dropping everything for, and only teams that filter out the noise and focus on what really matters are able to stay ahead of risk.</p>



<p>Teams today rely on a variety of scanners, but no single engine provides complete risk context.</p>



<p>A dependency vulnerability flagged by SCA is just random data until you know whether your application code calls the affected function. An exposed cloud configuration only becomes urgent when tied to the services and code running on that infrastructure.</p>



<p>Let’s look at an example:</p>



<p>SCA flags a critical CVE in a transitive dependency. On its own, it looks urgent. But SAST scan shows no code path that calls the affected function, and runtime signals confirm the component isn&#8217;t loaded in production. Three scanners, three separate alerts – but when correlated, the actual risk is low. Meanwhile, a medium-severity SAST finding in an internet-facing API that handles PII, is reachable, and is exercised in production traffic. That “medium” instantly becomes the top priority.</p>



<p>That’s why correlation matters. It stitches together findings across code, dependencies, infrastructure, containers, and runtime environments – transforming disconnected alerts into a single, unified view of actual risk.</p>



<p><em>Without it, everything becomes noise.</em></p>



<p>The correlation of findings across SAST, SCA, IaC, API testing, runtime signals, container scans, and CI/CD metadata helps teams determine:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>When multiple alerts represent the same issue</li>



<li>Whether vulnerabilities propagate across microservices</li>



<li>If issues exist in deployed, production-facing assets</li>



<li>Which components introduce actual operational risk</li>



<li>True root causes that need to be fixed</li>
</ul>



<p>Correlation turns noise into intelligent, actionable signals. Instead of dozens of fragmented alerts, teams receive a single, contextualized insight that reflects the complete picture. This unified code‑to‑cloud intelligence closes visibility gaps,&nbsp;eliminates&nbsp;redundant triage, and enables smarter prioritization for faster, more efficient remediation.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading article-anchor" id="article-anchor-4">
<strong>Turning Contextual Insights&nbsp;Into&nbsp;Actionable Remediation</strong>&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Insight alone doesn’t reduce risk, action does. Risk reduction requires turning signals into a fast, confident remediation. A vulnerability isn’t neutralized just because it’s been detected. It’s only eliminated when developers understand why it matters, where it originates, and how to fix it without wading through logs or deciphering cryptic scanner output.</p>



<p>This is where contextual risk intelligence stops being just a risk scoring exercise and becomes a practical remediation engine. When you combine exploitability, reachability, and cross‑scanner correlation, you give developers something they rarely get: findings they can trust. Instead of another generic “critical” label, they get true prioritization – and a clear explanation of why the issue is important, the exact code path, and where to remediate. And that clarity transforms how teams work.</p>



<p>Delivering these insights directly in the IDE is what makes them actionable. There’s no tool sprawl or no context switching. Developers don’t need to jump between dashboards or triage queues because the context comes to them, showing them precisely which part of the code needs attention.</p>



<p>Your AppSec stack doesn’t need more scanners or stricter thresholds, it just needs contextual intelligence. Contextual risk scoring cuts through the noise to surface genuine threats to your code. And when that intelligence reaches developers where they work, directly in their workflow, remediation becomes fast, confident, and focused.</p>



<p>The most effective teams aren&#8217;t the ones processing every alert, they’re the ones with enough context to confidently deprioritize most of them. When everything is labelled “critical,” protecting against true vulnerabilities requires the ability to actually distinguish real risk from noise.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
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