Chicken in Kiev

Past articles: Right to be rememberd

2015-06-26T12:18:00.002+03:00

In response to google's interpretation of the EU's 'right to be forgotten' legislation, I claim the 'right to be remembered'. A link to some at least some of my past articles:

The Quiet Elections
New Eastern Europe 26th September 2014

Crimea:What Comes After Non-Recognition?
New Eastern Europe 28th May 2014

The Counterintuitive Dynamics of the EU-Ukraine Relationship Euroscope (Sussex European Institute) Autumn 2011 p53

Has Change in Power Panicked European Union Into Action
Kyiv Post 11th March 2010

The principles of free speech vs the monuments against it

2015-04-22T15:01:00.000+03:00

Ukraine's anti-communist law should be rewritten, but not scrapped

The recently published open letter on Ukraine’s ‘anti-communist law’ has weighed into a heavily emotive debate. We could consider the law from the point of view of the ammunition it will give Ukraine’s critics, but I do not think this should be a key consideration. If their use of the repeal of Ukraine’s regional languages law (which never happened) is anything to go by, the trolls at 55 Savushkina street will have this woven into their technical tasks for the next few months, irrespective of whether it is ever signed into law. Russia has dictated Ukraine’s affairs quite enough, one would think.

There are some points on which this letter hits the nail on the head. Where was the rigorous political debate in the Rada on such potentially divisive issues? Also, that the law creates a vaguely defined offence of denying the legitimacy of Ukraine’s struggle for independence in the twentieth century. Vaguely defined laws on which individuals could be arbitrarily lynched are a post-Soviet model of justice which surely has no place in today’s Ukraine. The offence of denying the criminal character of the entire Soviet regime from start to finish is also fraught with risks, although I think the examples given of potential offenders amount to mere thought experiments. This poor quality of legislative practice shows that Ukraine still lacks a culture of constitutionalism, and President Poroshenko should indeed send lawmakers back to the drawing board to pass a better law which better addresses these concerns. But the essence of what Ukraine is attempting to do here must not be discounted.

I first moved to Kiev in 2006, living first near Arsenalna, then Nyvky out in the suburbs, both on the metro system. Using the metro regularly there brings you face to face with the Soviet legacy, from small hammer and sickles in metal grills to the garish representation of Lenin and his sayings at Teatralna. I always hated it, and I also hated the seeming indifference of most locals to it. Even amongst the more active, nobody really raised this issue. The moderator of one pro Ukrainian language Facebook page was more concerned with a small Russian language sign at Palats Sportu station (only retained as it was part of the station’s original design) than de-Sovietisation. For me the latter was far more important.

The Lenin menagerie at Teatralna was finally removed last year, and I was overjoyed on a visit back to Kiev to see it gone. Perversely, it is this exact display which is pictured atop the open letter itself on the Krytyka webpage. It’s common for western visitors to Eastern Europe to wonder why countries in the region saw the need to rip up their communist monuments. After all, it’s part of their history, they say. But as we all know, history is written by the victors, and in 1922, after a civil war which ravaged Ukraine, that’s what the Bolsheviks were. This regime not only built its own monuments but destroyed royalist monuments, churches etc. and, ultimately, their monuments were designed as symbols of central power, prescribed history, control and obedience. How can a country build a democratic mindset with monuments glorifying totalitarianism everywhere?

So in many ways the gist of the law is actually correct. Retaining Soviet detritus has been too costly to Ukraine's societal development, and people’s indifference unhealthy. The law also bans Nazi symbols. Again, the law should bear in mind Ukraine’s needs, not Russia’s, and I think there’s a much more searching debate to be had about what’s acceptable and what isn’t. To me, the black and red flag should be permissible, Wolfsangels and other SS symbols etc. should not be. It's difficult to apply a consistent standard across both the Nazi and Soviet periods as they are so vastly different in scope.

The most important desired outcome is freedom for independent historians, academics and journalists. Remember, by the way, that it was Yanukovych who closed the KGB archives in 2010, aiding the mythologisation process in Western Ukraine, boosting the Svoboda party and creating a foil for the pro-Russian ‘anti-fascist’ constructs that the Party of Regions was using. When you have Ukraine sympathisers writing things like "so it is estalished fact that the UPA slaughtered tens of thousands of Poles? I don't think so" (some here in Warsaw can tell you they lost family members at the hands of the Ukrainian insurgents), you realise the importance of the work of these historians.

Holodomor remembrance is a good example of the power of education. Not so many years ago the average Ukrainian knew little in concrete terms about what had happened to their country in the 1930s. The bringing to light of historical evidence has brought about the right kind of response, one of reverence and remembrance in which all public figures participate (leaving aside the more specific question of genocide). The fear of the mythologising of history in Ukraine, as in Russia, is a legitimate one. Ukraine shouldn't follow Russia down the path of pseudo-history.

Is there an alternative to smashing or bulldozing Lenin statues and other monuments? Perhaps. Hungary's Statue Park is an example Ukraine could follow. What they do in former East Germany with Karl Marx in Chemnitz (complete with giant winter scarf!) is a perfectly sensible thing to do in the context of the free world safely inside the EU and NATO. But in Ukraine the monuments underline a medieval understanding of power which makes them much more problematic to retain. Another risk is that Soviet monuments can be reactivated as symbols by subversives or invaders. The reconstruction of a Lenin monument in occupied East Ukraine reminds us of their value to the opponents of a free Ukraine.

Perhaps the most damning criticism that could be made of the law is that it is in a way a cop out. If Communism was so bad, when will Ukraine act on lustration for the crimes of the Soviet period (not to mention for the Kuchma and Yanukovych eras)? The open letter is a thoughtful contribution to this difficult discussion. Although signed by one or two dubious figures it is also signed by many more respected and knowledgeable academics with Ukraine’s best interests at heart.

The debate about de-Sovietisation must by necessity move into controversial territory. Should it be only street names such as Lenina or Kominterna which should be changed? Should street names such as Heroiv Stalingrada (Heroes of Stalingrad) be changed purely because they contain, and indirectly venerate, the name of one responsible for the deaths of millions of Ukrainians (I’d like to see it renamed Heroes of Donetsk Airport instead)? The argument the open letter makes is for inclusivity of those across Ukraine, but surely, as someone has suggested, that inclusivity could be found in countless numbers of local figures worth celebrating. Monuments and street names to those who weren't Ukrainian & killed Ukrainians is inclusivity Ukraine can do without.

Anti-trolling guide

2014-11-28T12:49:00.000+02:00

Be aware that message boards are swarming with pro-Kremlin contributors, very likely paid in organised trolling operations. They will spread disinformation which denies the following facts:

-Russia has invaded Ukraine using undeclared, hybrid war

-Ukraine was peaceful for 23 years before this operation began-repeat:there was no war, regardless of whether there was a pro-western or pro-Russian government.

-a majority across Ukraine supported Ukraine's independence and unity before the invasion (now even more do!). This majority includes millions of Russian-speakers who do not want Putin's 'protection'.

-Russia staged a 'referendum at gunpoint' in Crimea, and similar 'elections' recently in Donbas and Luhansk. These lack any democratic legtimacy whatsoever (in any case, what sense is there in a vote to join a country that's not a democracy?)

-since the annexation, Crimean Tatar activists have been tortured and sometimes killed, the Crimean Tatar leader has been exiled from his homeland, and Russians there have even held Nazi-style book burnings of Ukrainian books.

-Euromaidan was, over a period of several weeks, a peaceful demonstration which did, at its fringes, turn violent (long after Yanukovych had already resorted to violence). The protests were visibly home grown-you only had to visit the makeshift camp to see that there was no sophisticated CIA covert op at work.

-America, far from promoting 'regime change' in Ukraine, has pursued over several years an appeasement policy towards Russia, including the 'reset' policy, scrapping the missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, and failing to respond robustly to the Russian aggression on Georgian territory in 2008 that untimately lead to the Russia-Georgia war. The EU has done little to encourage Ukraine's European ambitions since the Orange Revolution in 2004, refusing to consider any prospect of EU membership for Ukraine, so the idea that Ukraine's revolution was a 'western-backed coup' doesn't stack up.

-Ukraine's coup was in 2010. Although, President Yanukovych was democratically elected, he proceeded to unconstitutionally take control of Ukraine's parliament by paying deputies to switch sides, and taking control of other state organs such as the Constitutional Court and judiciary in general (hence the Tymoshenko imprisonment). By late 2013, Ukraine's political system had been thoroughly hollowed out and there was little democracy left to speak of.

-It was Yanukovych who started killing his own citizens by shooting 100 dead on Instytutska St. in February this year. There's is a body of evidence that Russia was directly involved in it. A visit to Instytutska St. and a quick inspection of the bullet holes shows that the shots were fired from government buildings. Putin also is responsible for the deaths of his own Russian citizens on Ukrainian soil-estimates of Russian military casualties in Russia's hybrid war on Ukraine number in excess of 4000.

-If Russia left now, the war ends. Simple as that.

Not to say that the Ukrainians are angels. We all know about the record of corruption over Ukraine's 23 year history but, unlike in Russia, Ukrainian society is taking action to at least try to do something about it. The far right in Ukraine is vocal but small, as evidenced by the recent elections which saw barely half a dozen far right deputies elected to parliament, a lot less than in many European countries at the moment. The issue of civilian casualties must be discussed, but put in the context that Russia's proxies position themselves in residential areas precisely to paint this picture. As stated, if Russia pulls the plug on this operation, the fighting will soon stop.

If most of the comments down here aren't worth reading, these examples might give you an idea why:

Fake Ukrainian news sites are being run out of the same office as where the Russians who flood comments section work.

http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/11/19/fake-ukrainian-news-websites-run-by-russian-troll-army-offshoots/

Someone in Russian Foreign Ministry spends his time editing Wikipedia articles about Eastern Ukraine

https://twitter.com/vorobyov/status/534727608475594752/photo/1

Monday last week French paper Le Figaro declined to publish the results of a survey on whether to deliver the Mistral ships to Russia, citing massive automated trolling originating in Russia. Number for yes rose from 60% to 78% overnight...

http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2014/11/17/01003-20141117ARTFIG00218-pourquoi-nous-n-avons-pas-publie-les-resultats-de-notre-derniere-question-du-jour.php

The Quiet Elections

2014-09-26T18:32:00.001+03:00

Published in New Eastern Europe 26th September 2014

http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1340-the-quiet-elections

As winter approaches, Ukraine moves to plug its democratic legitimacy gap.

You could forgive the residents of Kiev for having other things on their minds besides the upcoming elections to the Verkhovna Rada. With gas deliveries from Russia having long halted, many Kievans have been living without hot water for the past couple of months as the country tries to fill its gas storage facilities. The annual switching on of the central communal heating system has been delayed two weeks to the beginning of November. Gazprom has reduced its gas deliveries to those countries providing a potential lifeline to Ukraine via a reverse flow, Poland and Slovakia. A Russian government advisor, Sergey Markov, has even predicted that Ukraine’s government will collapse in the winter. As with the prophecies of Ukraine’s descent into “civil war”, Russian predictions are often statements of intent. Ukraine’s government needs to be in the best shape possible if Russia is going to attempt to freeze them out, so questions about its legitimacy matter.

Ukraine is also a country at war. From the mobile mechanisms that enable donations to the Ukrainian army to the men standing on the road collecting money to relentlessly paint the country’s railings and street furniture yellow and blue in defiance of the would-be occupiers, the war is ever present. Where you might have expected to see early discussion about the upcoming elections, TV news reports have unsurprisingly been dominated by the daily national and personal tragedies of the conflict. This has led some commentators to question the wisdom of holding a vote in such circumstances. The presidential elections also took place in a similar situation with election coverage slotted in between the latest news about the Anti-Terror Operation.

President Petro Poroshenko’s strong mandate from this election and his growing reputation with the West have put him in a strong position, although it is bound to have diminished somewhat following the toxic, but perhaps unavoidable, Minsk agreement and the delay to the EU-Ukraine trade agreement (what was simultaneously “signed” September 16th in Kiev and Strasbourg was in fact only around one-fifth of the original Association Agreement text). Beyond the presidency, Ukraine’s democratic credentials don’t look so clever. Ukrainian society has had a new injection of civic activism and engagement, but this is not reflected in the country’s parliament. Unsuspecting politicians may now find themselves being “caught” by journalists in interviews or thrown into skips, but their existence in parliament is not so different as to what it was before.

This situation goes back to the real coup d’etat of Ukrainian politics, the parliamentary coup of 2010, where the Constitutional Court, which had previously ruled otherwise, ruled that deputies were free to move between parliamentary factions. Whilst this is entirely acceptable in constituency-based systems like the UK, Ukraine’s deputies had been elected on a closed list system, so changing factions was like your vote growing legs and walking away from you, and hence Yanukovych induced deputies from the Orange parties of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko to form a loyalist parliament on which to build his power vertical. The turncoat deputies were dubbed “tushki”, or animal carcasses.

The victory of the EuroMaidan might have ushered in a new era of openness and civic engagement but, as Yanukovych fled the country, something not very dissimilar took place in the current parliament. As the emergency government formed around Prime Minister Aresiny Yatsenyuk and Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov, deputies, particularly those from the Party of Regions, hurried to either join the new bloc or become independent. Thus, whilst Poroshenko is the legitimately elected President, the parliament we see today is in fact little more than a group of “reverse tushki”. So whilst the new government is clearly no “junta”, it certainly has a democratic legitimacy problem that successful parliamentary elections are absolutely vital to solve.

The current parliament has also inherited its predecessor’s poor standards of parliamentary procedure. The practice of piano player voting, where deputies push the voting buttons of their missing colleagues, still continues. The recent vote on the ceasefire law was held in a closed session and rumours abound that the screen that shows the voting results might even have been tampered with. Perhaps there is an argument that in the time of war certain measures must be pushed through (many democracies experience a temporary democratic deficit in times of war), but such actions are unlikely to give Ukraine’s democracy a clean bill of health.

In addition to the oncoming freeze and parliament’s democratic inadequacies, Poroshenko must be aware that his initial popularity can quickly nosedive in Ukraine. The support for Yushchenko had all but evaporated within six months as president. Therefore, Poroshenko must see the need to use what momentum he still has as quickly as possible. Current polls back his bloc to do well, despite recent controversial decisions.

There are some ways in which the elections will not be a departure from the Yanukovych era. They will be held under the same election law as the 2012 poll, a mixture of party list and geographical constituency mandates that was designed to skew the vote in Yanukovych’s favour. Clearly, elections for the electoral districts in the occupied territories will not take place, meaning out of 450 seats, 15-20 will be empty. In one sense, maintaining those “empty chairs” would be a powerful symbol that these regions remain, in the sense of international law, part of Ukraine. Ukraine must feel a duty to continue to represent those regions in some way. This is perhaps reflected in the fact that Mustafa Dzhemilev, exiled head of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, itself now facing the prospect of exile, is on Poroshenko’s electoral list.

As in the previous elections, oligarchic clans are still likely to figure prominently, but this time different clans stand to benefit. Whereas at previous elections the Donbas clan came to the fore, they are now variously exiled or in the quagmire of the Russian-sponsored breakaway entity now being established there, although some are rumoured to be funding the Party of Development which is emerging from the ruins of the Party of Regions. It will be fascinating to see the extent to which Russian aggression and occupation have sliced through Ukraine’s traditional pro-western/pro-Russian cleavage. In the new parliament, Poroshenko and Dnipropetrovsk-based Ihor Kolomoyskyi look like the potential big winners. Parties and party groupings continue to be fluid even with just a month left to go. Vitali Klitschko’s UDAR has merged into Poroshenko’s group of pragmatists, whilst others collect around Oleh Lyashko’s Radical Party or the slowly climbing People’s Front, Yatsenyuk’s new party. Figures from Ukraine’s past have apparently been manoeuvring themselves onto party lists by various means, but this will be a gamble, assuming the vote is substantially free and fair. Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna party may conceivably even struggle to enter parliament.

Each western-leaning party will also have a handful of Maidan activists towards the top of its lists who may or may not turn out to be capable politicians, but should at least look on parliament’s procedural deficiencies in a new light. However, despite a myriad of options on the ballot paper, the party system arguably still will not be offering choices that truly reflect voters’ needs and preferences. Large shares of the vote at the previous election for the far right Svoboda and the first banned, now unbanned, Communists alarmed observers in 2012, but suggest that for many Ukrainians ideology is important, just as for other Europeans. The persistence of so-called “virtual parties” built around clans or individuals does little address this need.

It seems that Ukrainians continue to misguidedly seek the “good politician”, whereas evidence of the reform process across Central Eastern Europe tells us that in most cases it is the political system, not the quality of its politicians that is the decisive factor in reform-making, specifically the parliamentary system of the government. If Ukraine is to truly succeed, its political system needs to be a radical departure from anything seen thus far in the post-Soviet space.

As things stand, expect a quiet election as Ukrainians continue to fight and die for their country and for Ukraine’s political system to take incremental steps forward, if they can survive the winter.

Debunking so-called 'stop the war' coalition's '5 facts'

2014-08-30T22:18:00.002+03:00

This is a brief response to debunk the '5 facts' article the so-called 'stop the war' coalition posted today. Although it barely dignifies a response, I feel duty-bound.

For the record, I opposed the 2003 Iraq invasion and supported the work they did then, but if Putin succeeds, with the help of poorly informed UK citizens susceptible to Russia's propaganda machine, we'll end up with war that makes Iraq 2003 look like a playground fight.

Point 1: Countries joined NATO of their own accord. Why were countries like Poland & the Baltics so keen to join? Because they understand Russia much better than you do

Point 2:How can an organisation that purports to be left wing prop up Russian ethno-nationalist arguments? People in Ukraine are from a variety of backgrounds but want to be Ukrainian-ethnicity is not the issue. A great many Russian-speakers living in Ukraine don't want to live in a dictatorship like Russia or Belarus.

Point 3:The EU's Association Agreement was a 'do minimum' option by Brussels,who for 10 years offered Ukraine virtually nothing.

Point 4:more than half a million protested in Maidan entirely peacefully.Plenty of people wanted to see Yanukovych go, not just far right fringe. What you don't realise is that the 'coup' was Yanukovych's. Upon seizing power in 2010 he illegally took control of parliament & gutted the country's institutions

Point 5:How do you account for 23 years of peace in Ukraine that were only broken 'coincidentally' with the arrival of Russian fighters & arms?

So basically, the '5 facts' don't stack up.

P.S. The article references another article by Stephen Cohen, who some may not be aware is a notorious Putin apologist, irrespective of people killed or planes shot down etc.

Crimea adds to reasons for nations to skip 2018 & 2022 World Cups

2014-08-06T16:25:00.000+03:00

With FIFA credibility at rock bottom, Russia and Qatar both morally untenable, and that winter World Cup, should our nations even go to 2018 & 2022? And what's Crimea got to do with it?

FIFA knows it's virtually impossible to boycott a World Cup, unless you're a housewife who goes to one of those World Cup matinée showings at the local cinema. Despite a barrage of criticism of FIFA's shady goings on, Gary Lineker most recently getting in on the act, FIFA, rather like Vladimir Putin, look set to carry on regardless.

There were already many large clouds gathering over FIFA before this summer. As John Oliver's first class putdown of FIFA on the eve of this year's tournament basically said, if you're a football fan it's in a way better not to know. Brazil 2014 was, on the pitch, a resounding success, with some compelling games. Off it, the picture didn't look so clever. Many Brazilians had put the boot in on the project long before their team's infamous 7-1 defeat.

The FIFA bribery scandal is covered elsewhere by those that know far more about it than me, but suffice it to say that, if Qatar is guilty of giving bribes to get the 2022 World Cup, and not forgetting that Russia was awarded the 2018 World Cup at the exact same FIFA Congress in 2010, some further dots may need to be joined up there. Franz Beckenbauer's suspension for not complying with FIFA's internal investigation has something of the air of a Putin-style scapegoating of some low-ranking official.

The Qatar decision has brought with it all manner of strife. At present FIFA appears to be procrastinating over whether to upset Europe's clubs and associations and their calendars by holding a winter World Cup, or whether to chance the fate of millionaire footballers in the summer desert temperatures, which seems increasingly unlikely. Again, many are doing a far better job than me highlighting the dreadful human rights situation in the country and the horrendous working conditions of the migrant workers who are building the facilities.

There was already a lobby against the holding of the 2018 World Cup in Russia which had been exponentially growing with Russia's annexation of Crimea and its instigation of terrorism and armed insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, added to the remnants of the anti-Sochi campaign appalled by Russia's gay rights situation. Then, with the shooting down of MH17, citizens and families of nationals from Holland, Australia, Malaysia and the UK were suddenly thrust into the world Ukrainians have been living in since November last year, and Chechens very much longer. All of a sudden politicians from those countries were talking tough about taking the World Cup away from Russia. Who's to say if they will keep it up?

Russia 2018 also faces practical problems. Visiting teams basing themselves in Crimea looks a non-starter as non-recognition policy is already beginning to restrict the ability of airlines to fly there. Russia itself is already starting to turn the screw on World Cup sponsor McDonald's (even Coca Cola is not safe, not to mention iPhones and iPads). Russia is busy banning products and this is likely to push up prices. Airlines may not be able to fly over Siberia to get to the tournament. After Euromaidan, political change in Russia is also not out of the question. Somebody somewhere in FIFA must be a bit jittery about all this, but publicly there seems little concern.

Many believe that there is about as much chance of FIFA moving the 2018 or 2022 World Cups as there is of Formula 1 missing out Bahrain or Sochi from its race calendar. At least F1 chief Bernie Ecclestone is blunt, if morally bankrupt, on human rights issues affecting host countries, whilst FIFA loftily proclaims that the World Cup can 'bring positive change'. If that's the kind of 'positive change' the Sochi Winter Olympics brought, then sorry, we don't want it.

So, think about this, in particular if you are, for example, the English FA. You have already been deprived of hosting a World Cup in what was quite possibly a corrupt voting process, and your leagues and clubs are not happy at all about the impending 2022 winter World Cup. FIFA has taken hold of world football when in fact it is the national leagues and the Champions' League which are the sport's bread and butter. Couldn't the various associations quite easily get together and pledge to run a rival competition for 2018 & 2022?

I would personally be more than happy to see Europe's great sides (Germany, Holland etc.) take a decision for the greater good of football and humanity, and simply decide not to send their teams to either of these World Cups (I'd also like to see the USA, Australia and England do the same, but if it was only those 3 most would assume they just hadn't qualified). The English FA seem more worried about demolishing the English lower leagues with Premier League B teams than whether or not the World Cup will be played in climatic or political conditions safe for their players. As with all things it seems, Germany is the key. If the defending champions didn't show up, what sort of World Cup would that be? Kazakhstan v Vietnam anyone?

Doubting even that as the force to topple FIFA's falkekirche, what about the law? Is there a legal basis to at least get Russia stripped of the 2018 World Cup and hope the corruption issues are exposed in time to spare us a World Cup under the blankets in 2022? The answer may lie in Crimea.

Crimea: What happened to FIFA and UEFA's own rules?

Whilst not the most illustrious footballing outpost, the Russian-occupied Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea is another moral test case for both FIFA and European football governing body UEFA. That's because, a few years ago both organisations made some rules, which they enforced too.

As recently as 2010, France was threatened over what FIFA calls political interference in football. Some countries, such as Brunei and Kenya, have even had their football associations and national teams suspended over it. Presumably hosting a World Cup under such circumstances would be out of the question. Early reports after Crimea annexation, regarding Tavriya Simferopol in particular, suggested that, until the UN rules that Crimea is part of Russia, the clubs would prefer to stay in the Ukrainian league. However, one of the earliest voices, back in late March when the dust was still settling, to claim that Crimean teams would be playing in the Russian league was Russia's Sports Minister, Vitaly Mukto (FIFA later claimed they had given no such consent). A FIFA letter as recently as early June seemed to confirm what we all know-Crimean football is Ukrainian football. The clubs were affiliated to the Ukrainian FA, so their fate was none of Russia's business.

The solution has in fact been to unceremoniously kill off two football clubs, Tavriya Simferopol and FK Sevastopol, and place three new entities into the Russian 2nd division, created under 'Russian law'. What 'Russian law' means in a territory not internationally recognised as Russia is an open question. As Russia is not a democracy, we will probably never know precisely what forces were brought to bear, but it looks as if political interference, which has pervaded every aspect of life in Crimea since March, looks highly likely.

For some, the issue has been kicked into the long grass by the fact that whilst Tavriya played in European competition as recently as 2010, the peninsula's fans are now unlikely to see European football there for the foreseeable future, but this is not just about which country the team represents in European competition. If the move is allowed to stand, what will be the fallout for football in general?

That's where UEFA comes in. When Evian were promoted to the French top division, and lacking the facilities to match, they more than once sought to play home games just across the border at the much flashier Stade de Genève in Geneva, a request which UEFA denied in 2013 on the following very clear basis:

"Though sympathetic to the predicament of the club, Platini pointed out UEFA regulations do not allow clubs to play their games in national competitions outside the confines of their country's borders."

So that seems very clear. Even if one is sympathetic to Russia's wishes (and, by the way, none of us are), rules are rules. Crimea is not internationally recognised as part of Russia and UEFA is an international organisation.

Of course there are exceptions that every football anorak knows. Teams from Lichtenstein and San Marino play in neighbours' national leagues, Berwick Rangers are based in England but play in the Scottish league, and most notably, Swansea City play in the English Premier League with a handful of clubs scattered further down the English football pyramid. However, that's no justification for the Russian league's move. First of all, such a move was never made unilaterally by a single association. In fact, what was once perhaps unfairly dubbed the Comical League of Wales (Konica the unfortunate inaugural sponsor) came into being over strained relations over the very issues of where teams from a particular country play, and the possible knock-on threat to Wales's national side. All but four of the Welsh clubs in the English league were ordered to join the Welsh league, and many played in exile in England as the dispute rumbled on.

In the end it was recognised that Cardiff, Swansea and Wrexham would be cutting their own throats giving up playing in the English league to play in basically a semi-professional league, rather like Tavriya and Sevastopol will be doing playing 'Torpedo Armavir' and 'Mashuk-KMV' instead of Dynamo Kiev and Shakhtar Donetsk, not to mention the 12 hour wait for the ferry from Kerch. I bet their fans are really excited. Many fans, most notably Tavriya's ultras (who were loyal backers of the Euromaidan protests) have no desire to watch Russian lower league football.

Alas there's not much optimism that UEFA will take a principled stance on Crimea either, particularly being that the Russian government's energy arm Gazprom sponsors its flagship Champions' League. And there we all were wondering why Gazprom would bother sponsoring the Champions' League. Isn't that clever? Match ticket €40. Replica shirt €60. Cutting off Ukraine's gas in winter? Priceless.

Will the Ukrainian FA challenge it? They should. Gibraltar took their case for FIFA/UEFA membership to the Court of Arbitration for Sport where they finally got justice. Kosovo are still battling for full FIFA membership. These things take time. They are not simply decided unilaterally by a single national football association under political coercion.

Current situation in Luhansk

2014-08-04T12:55:00.004+03:00

From a friend who has close family in the area:

What they don't talk about on BBC: Lugansk (my hometown in the east of Ukraine) is now fully blocked by pro-Russian terrorists. There's currently no electricity or running water supply, no Internet, mobile or landline connection. People are completely cut off from the rest of the world. Those who try to leave through the so-called green corridor, risk being shot by the terrorists, vehicles are often confiscated and volunteers are kidnapped. Food and water supplies are scarce. Shelling doesn't cease throughout the day, people are too afraid to go outside and often spend days hiding in air raid shelters. Those with serious health problems are dying because they can't get medication. And it's just one town in Eastern Ukraine. Now, what is it but Russia-orchestrated genocide of the 21st century?

Україна потребує парламентську систему

2014-07-24T19:39:00.003+03:00

Нова політична система України повинна бути найрадикальнішою з усіх на пострадянському просторі. Україна сьогодні – це чистий аркуш паперу і тепер вона не повинна прагнути побудувати чиюсь утопію. На сьогоднішній день, активність та компроміс являються основними ключами від виживання країни та її майбутнього добробуту.

І найпершим завданням має бути розуміння того, що політика більше не може бути пов’язана із позицією особистості у ній. Пострадянський рефлекс наслідування сильного духом лідера має катастрофічний вплив на всі регіони країни. Прийшов час кинути виклик Євразійському міфу, який наголошує на те, що ми всі різні. Цей міф вже коштував багатьом людям у Євразії їх життя і свобод.

Україна повинна прийняти абсолютну парламентську систему правління, якою користується більшість країн Європи. Президент повинен бути залишений тільки із правом на вето та з правом на призначення нових виборів. Сильний прем'єр-міністр може перейняти "президентський стиль" ведення політики, як наприклад, Маргарет Тетчер або Тоні Блер, але зверніть увагу на передачу влади від Тетчер у 1990 році. Знана у світі як "залізна леді", в той час коли вона втратила підтримку своєї партії, її політична сила зникла за лічені години. Існує і об’єктивне підтвердження тому, що парламентські системи, які при необхідності враховують більш широкий спектр зацікавлених сторін, мають кращі показники досягнення реформ.

Система функціонування партій також потребує реформи. Україна повинна викрити “віртуальні партії”, які функціонують виключно навколо особистостей і їх бізнес-інтересів і носять певний ідеологічний характер. Маємо працювати і з тими представниками політичних угрупувань, переконання яких, можливо, не повністю узгоджується із нашими переконаннями, адже партія представляє собою коаліцію з різнобічними інтересами.

Мати парламентську систему правління також означає підпорядкування правилам цієї системи. Не має проявитися жодної толерантності щодо «гри на фортепіано на Майдані», насильств в тюрмах, блокування трибуни спікера, або будь-яких інших подібних заходів. Можливо, Верховна Рада має відігравати роль рефері по відношенню до депутат атів, що порушили протокол. В іншому випадку, спокуса зрізати кути буде дуже сильною, і ми досить ясно бачимо цей результат зараз.

Для того щоб зберегти єдність України, ми маємо замислитися над тим як задіяти усіх і кожного у політичному процесі. Ось де виникає дилема. Сьогодні є вкрай необхідно створити нові основні політичні норми на Україні і це безпосередньо стосується прийняття нової Конституції України. Якщо ми споглянемо на те, яким чином Янукович вніс дестабілізацію в конституційні структури України в 2010 році, вагомий аргумент підпадає на підтримку нових законів у першу чергу, але беззаперечно для легітимності таких дій, вся країна має бути задіяна.

І олігархи відіграють тут свою роль . Вони можуть продовжувати грати активну і впливову роль, так само, як,наприклад, республіканці роблять в Америці. Тим не менш, беручи до уваги цілеспрямованість країни вони повинні визнати, що їх найвпливовіший час вже проминув. Це означає, що ЄС має змогу зіграти ключову роль. Михайло Саакашвілі говорив про те, як непередбачувана загроза санкцій стала переломним моментом для багатьох прихильників Януковича. І якщо загроза санкцій від ЕС стосувалася економічних та політичних зловживань в більш поширених випадках до яких часто прибігають олігархи, то в такий спосіб було б можливим зменшити надмірні повноваження бізнес еліт України . Значно ускладнює цю ситуацію роль олігархів, які попри всі негаразди та невдачі попередньої влади не зупинили її підтримку, навіть у той час коли ситуація різко погіршилася. Важко оцінити виняткову впливовість олігархів в політичному житті країни, в подальшому може виявитися і те, що їх впливовість стане неминучою.

Для того, щоб зауважити на всі відмінності регіонів України необхідно багато часу. На сьогодні Україні не вистачає політичної зрілості для федералізму. Проте в питаннях, що стосуються мовних прав, таке втручання може нести логічний характер, що дозволить деяку свободу на місцевому рівні. Наприклад у Франції, мови меншин можна побачити на дорожніх знаках,вони фінансуються за допомогою місцевих муніципалітетів, але національна мова має також бути відображена на дорожніх знаках (і місцевий муніципалітет платить і за це). Це насправді може стати чудовою рисою розвитку місцевої демократії. Відповідальність за святкування історичних подій, будь то 9 травня, або ж день українського повстанського руху, повинні також здійснюватися на місцевому рівні, адже на національному рівні ці питання виявилися занадто розбіжними. Такі емоційні питання більше не повинні бути пропагандистськими запалами або інструменти для політиків впливу в країні.

У відносинах з Росією довіра буде зменшуватися з кожним роком і Україна має захистити себе. В найближчому часі всі переговори на вищому рівні між Україною і Росією мають здійснюватися на терені третьої країни-посередника,а також дотримуватися дипломатичних норм. Ми не маємо допустити перенесення дипломатичних відносин у площину таємних зустрічей та залякувань, як це можна прослідити на прикладі відносин між Януковичем та Путіним. Необхідно докласти багато зусиль для того,щоб відносини між Україною та Росією стали прозорими. Ступінь саботажу зі сторони Росії щодо управління внутрішніми справами України протягом останніх кількох років очевидне. Більше дискусій мають проводитися серед публічного загалу, а також піддаватися детальній критиці.

Україна повинна продовжувати наполегливо працювати, що також підтверджує і те, що насправді, багато з українських установ вже і роблять. Зважаючи на всі події в новій історії України, українці тепер розуміють, що майбутнє залежить від них. ЄС має бути прийнято в якості гаранта європейського майбутнього України, але українці не може повністю покладатися на це об’єднання держав.

Джонатан Хiбберд раніше був відвідуючим професором програми європейських досліджень в Києво-Могилянській академії і проживав в Україні протягом шести років. Зараз живе у Варшаві, але продовжує співпрацювати з науково-дослідницьким інститутом зовнішньої політики Дипломатичної академії України. Отримав ступінь Магістра Університета Сассекса у Великобританії. Спеціалізується на українських відносин з ЄС і НАТО.

What Comes after Non-Recognition?

2014-05-29T00:39:00.000+03:00

Published in New Eastern Europe on 28th May 2014

http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1234-what-comes-after-non-recognition

After the election of a new president with a clear democratic mandate, there is much talk of Ukraine turning a corner, despite the turmoil in the east of the country. Indeed, the focus is now largely on those regions and whether they can remain a part of Ukraine, as well as the challenge of keeping the country from the edge of the economic precipice.

In the case of Crimea, two months since Russia’s annexation of the peninsula, there appears a widespread acceptance of the “facts on the ground” of Russian rule. The issue is already fading into the background amid fears of an even worse outcome.

In just over one month’s time, however, Europe will remember the 40th anniversary of an event which it has never accepted – the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots at the time feared coming under the rule of the Greek military junta. Russian speaking Crimeans, in contrast, were under no real threat and Moscow’s attempt to characterise the Kyiv authorities itself as a junta now look all the more absurd in the aftermath of the democratic election.

A new Northern Cyprus?

Northern Cyprus has many of the same “facts on the ground” – Turkish military bases, a language and culture distinct from the Greek-speaking south and an independent Republic of Northern Cyprus which was declared in 1983 and whose flag is ubiquitous, even from across the UN line of control. But in fact in 2004, 30 years after the Turkish intervention, Turkish Cypriots voted for a union with the Greek Cypriots in the south. Although this deal was rebuffed by the people of the south, it would have meant the wilful abandonment of the separatist project there, a paradigm shift from 30 years earlier.

To some extent therefore, the international policy of non-recognition of Northern Cyprus might be considered a success. To this day, the state of Northern Cyprus does not appear on maps and the serious prospect of international recognition of its statehood appears dead. This non-recognition manifests itself in a number of ways. Airlines are not permitted to fly to Northern Cyprus without touching down in Turkey first and major airlines do not fly there at all. Northern Cyprus passports are not recognised by any country other than Turkey, meaning that many Turkish Cypriots in fact travel on passports issued by the Republic of Cyprus. There is no official sporting recognition of the territory.

In Crimea’s case, the dust has yet to fully settle. The narrative in Moscow is of grand ceremonies and triumphalism. The head of Burger King in Russia jumped the gun by announcing they would expand into Crimea at some point, his enthusiasm most likely tempered by the head office in the United States. In sport, the Russian Football Federation has already proposed to hold this year’s Russian Super Cup in Simferopol and one of the peninsula’s two Ukrainian football league teams, FK Sevastopol, talks brazenly about switching from the Ukrainian to the Russian league. National Geographic and Google have already roused anger for showing the region as Russian territory, or disputed.

Day-to-day life tells a different story, as empty supermarket shelves, almost reminiscent of the Soviet era, and eight-hour-long queues for cash machines testify. Life for the indigenous Tatars looks to be getting progressively worse as the ban on the recent commemoration of their 1944 deportation by Stalin illustrates. The exiled Mustafa Dzhemilev, former head of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis and a figurehead for the Tatar community, already looks like a kind of Dalai Lama figure. Meanwhile plans are afoot to confiscate Tatar property in prime locations. The issue of flights in and out of the territory remains unsettled. Ukrainian Railways however, far from halting train services to the peninsula, recently started taking advanced payment for the summer season.

What should non-recognition entail?

If Ukraine and the international community are serious about upholding the non-recognition of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation, serious thought needs to be given as to how this will be done in practice or it will have little meaning and Russia will be emboldened to take similar action elsewhere. Crimea may appear a lost cause now, but looking to a future post-Putin epoch, the situation could be very different. Non-recognition policy is by its nature a tricky and inconsistent area as the balance between damaging the occupier and risking harming those occupied is difficult to strike.

We need only look at the Baltic states as an example. Forty years after their occupation by the Soviet Union, few were anticipating their independence. In this case, as countries rather than just regions, the trappings of the state were an important manifestation of non-recognition. As Baltic analyst Mel Huang explains, the United States maintained this policy throughout, continuing to fly their flags in the State Department and keeping legations open. Upon their regaining independence, the United Kingdom was able to return the gold reserves to Estonia which had been shipped out as a contingency in the late 1930s. Others dropped the ball, handing to the Soviet Union gold reserves and keys to their embassies. The newly independent states in the 1990s received compensation or return of property from some, but from others nothing.

Although state symbols don’t apply in the case of Crimea, President-elect Petro Poroshenko’s proposed Ministry for Crimean Affairs might perform a function akin to a government in exile. With the situation continuing to deteriorate for the Tatars, Ukraine should be ready to provide the means for the continuation of Tatar civil society. If the Tatar council, the Mejlis, becomes unable to function, Ukraine should be ready to host a Mejlis in exile. Ukraine should also think more broadly about how to ensure Crimeans (as well as eastern Ukrainians) maintain a stake in Ukraine’s political life. One way to do this would be to continue to maintain a proportion of seats in the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s Parliament) as constituency mandates, representing all the internationally recognised regions of Ukraine.

Ukraine will undoubtedly continue to pursue a ruling on the Crimea annexation from the International Court of Justice. In the Northern Cyprus case, according to Ilke Gürdal of the Eastern Mediterranean University, the UN’s 1984 denouncement of its declaration of independence in 1983 seemed to make things worse for Northern Cyprus. The trade blockade of the territory intensified in its aftermath, thus dealing a blow to the separatist project at an early stage. The Crimea case may face fundamental difficulties as neither Russia nor Ukraine recognises the ICJ on a standing basis and Russia is unlikely to agree to the second mechanism of a case-by-case basis. Ukraine may decide to recognise its universal jurisdiction in the near future and, as Crimea is still theoretically Ukraine, this may be enough for the case to be heard.

The symbolic importance of sport should also not be underestimated. The move of Crimea’s two Ukrainian league teams to the Russian league should not be permitted by UEFA and FIFA (although in practice it may be sneaked through during this summer’s World Cup). This may be a vain hope. Gazprom sponsors UEFA’s lucrative Champions League whilst FIFA has not entertained talk of stripping Russia of the right to host the 2018 World Cup. At the very least Crimean venues should not be used as host cities or training bases at the tournament. It takes the action of individual member countries to make a fuss, much as, for example, Spain did in preventing Gibraltar’s accession to UEFA for many years.

What is the endgame?

Whether or not we ever see Crimea fully reincorporated into Ukraine, Ukraine is the lynchpin of a legitimate solution. Whether Crimea is part of Russia or Ukraine, the region must have genuine autonomy. The region’s autonomy within Ukraine failed to deliver this. The use of Ukrainian on official signage belied the region’s special status, whilst the Crimean Tatar language was rarely to be seen. In the Russian case, as the Russian Federation is a federation in name only, there is little hope or evidence that Crimea will achieve true autonomy that takes into account the diversity of the region. The closure of Ukrainian language schools there is not a good start. Another option in the long term could even be independence, a scenario in which the different ethnic groups would be required to work together. As in Northern Cyprus, Crimea now faces having to confront the issue of property restitution down the line (on top of the fact that the Tatars have still not been properly compensated for their 1944 expulsion).

If Ukraine is to ever regain the territory, much will depend on what it does now, the success of its reform programme and the ability to build a viable economy and investment climate. The capacity of Ukrainians to build a successful country might weaken the will of Crimeans to remain a part of Russia. If the EU follows through and grants visa free travel to Ukrainians, as it has now done for Moldova, the idea of holding a Russian passport rather than a Ukrainian one begins to lose its appeal. For Crimea, it might be the beginning of a long road back.

Jonathan Hibberd, based in Warsaw, is an alumni of Sussex European Institute in the UK and works part time with the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Ukraine, having previously lectured in European Studies at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

Ukraine voters can put Ukraine on the path to democratic legitimacy

2014-05-24T17:59:00.000+03:00

Ukraine's presidential election is the first step to solving its government's legitimacy problem

It has not been an easy start for Ukraine's new authorities, who have had to deal with annexation, armed insurgency, rescuing the national economy from the precipice and organising a presidential election no less. A baptism of fire by anyone's standards. The annexation of Crimea came when the new incumbents had barely sat at their desks. The violent provocations in the east and south of the country are unprecedented in Ukraine's 23 years of independence, whilst Russia has a 23 year track record of violence in the Caucasus and terrorism in its cities. Draw your own conclusions about where this outbreak of 'civil war' in Ukraine has in fact come from.

To add to that, the current authorities have absurdly and maliciously been labeled a 'junta' by pro-Moscow tweeters and bloggers scratching around for a smear term (the only true junta that has ever existed in Eastern Europe was the early 80s junta in Poland, which was backed by the USSR), part of a well worn tradition of concept stretching by Russia. Kiev is not a 'junta' any more than Greenpeace activists are 'pirates' or 'hooligans', or indeed gay rights campaigners 'propagandists'. Despite this however, it is true enough to say that the government since its traumatic beginnings has lacked true democratic legitimacy, and therefore Sunday's presidential elections are the crucial first step in solving a legitimacy problem with Ukraine's governance which in fact goes back to 2010.

When Viktor Yanukovych was elected President in early 2010, parliament was still under the mandate of the 'orange parties' of Prime Minister Tymoshenko and former President Yushchenko. What then followed was a spectacular capitulation of the whole constitutional order. The Constitutional Court, re-stuffed with judges loyal to Yanukovych, ruled that parliamentary deputies could now switch sides, the problem being that, with Ukraine's closed list electoral system, this is tantamount to your vote growing legs and walking away from you. The defectors were dubbed 'tushki', a term meaning animal corpse. The standard of parliamentarianism thereafter soon became abysmal, with 'piano playing' (deputies pressing the voting buttons of absent members), as in the Russian Duma, becoming standard practice, and even savage beatings meted out to Yanukovych opponents. Votes were sometimes registered for MPs who were not even in the country at the time. The 2012 parliamentary elections followed electoral reforms designed to favour the President's Party of Regions. The introduction of a proportion of constituency MPs favoured the ruling parties, and electoral commissions were staffed by personnel from these same ruling parties. Unlike the previous three national elections (two parliamentary, one presidential, the election was not judged internationally to have been free and fair.

Fast forward to February this year, and whilst the voice of the people was finally being heard, the speed with which MPs hurriedly switched sides again following Yanukovych's exit in February was, constitutionally speaking, little better than the 'tushki' of four years earlier. Just as in 2010 a 'winner takes all' mentality saw now vulnerable deputies scrambling to save their careers and positions. There was of course a huge difference however. The new authorities from the outset took power on the promise of elections. We must remember that if not for Euromaidan, Ukraine might now have been looking ahead to years or decades without such free elections, the situation which predominates in the countries of the Customs Union that Yanukovych would have taken them into, Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan

What must follow these elections is constitutional reform that will guard against the monopolisation and abuse of power of the past several years. Ukraine should adopt a parliamentary system, the kind which has lead successful reforms in the likes of Poland or Czech Republic, and resist the urge to revert to the presidential model which has in contrast failed its citizens so miserably in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine must also figure out how it manages its multiculturalism without allowing the country to disintegrate. There is scope for delegating local language and schooling policy to muncipal level, as well as the dvisive issue of historical commemorations, but Ukraine lacks the political maturity for full blown federalism, so this should wait for now. Fears about Ukraine becoming a series of fiefdoms under that scenario are well founded.

It is also a sobering reality that they will have to face their challenges largely without the backing of the international community. Whilst the European Union has rightly put on the table a deal to allow Ukraine to access the internal market, there is plenty from member states to suggest that the EU's backing can't be relied upon, owing to the EU member states' deep ties to Russia. Whether it be German industry, French warships, Spanish ports or London's financial sector, there is little suggest that these countries will do very much to support the freedom of Ukrainians. Ukraine's road ahead looks a lonely one. The new President will need all the collective wisdom he can muster.

The presidential election must be followed as soon as possible by a parliamentary one. A proportion of constituency mandates must be maintained to represent occupied Crimea and the districts currently ravaged by the Russian-sponsored insurgency. The new parliament must adhere to new standards of parliamentarianism so that the abuses of the past four years cannot be repeated. If it does this, the legitimacy problem can finally be consigned to history.

Europe's New Northern Cyprus?

2014-03-19T17:08:00.000+02:00

Non-recognition of Crimea's status as part of Russia must be more than just words

If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's a duck. Western leaders have all been quick to proclaim non-recognition of Russia's annexation of Crimea. Yet just days after what could only very charitably be called a referendum on Crimea joining Russia (including a creditable 123% vote in favour in Simferopol and minus any option to remain in the country it has existed in for the past two decades) it seems the world is grudgingly accepting the inevitable, having offered only meagre sanctions, and apparently relieved that Russia appears to have settled for 'only Crimea'. If they're not careful their 'no business as usual' mantra will soon sound as tired and hollow as their 'red lines'.

In truth, Russia would probably have annexed it or set up a breakaway state there along with Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the early '90s had it not massively underestimated Ukraine's divergent political direction from that of Russia. It's difficult to see whether this will fulfil Putin's aim of bringing Ukraine as a whole 'back into the fold'; the two countries now have different sides of a historical grievance to rally around.

In the here and now, clearly the most immediate pressing concern is Ukraine's isolated military units in the peninsula. Whilst both their fortitude and restraint are commendable, there is no international military backing for them whatsoever, and if more of their lives are to be spared, it seems inevitable they will have to withdraw.

Then we must consider the issue of status. There is little prospect of a treaty or formal agreement here. Making any such agreement with Russia would be a catch 22, as making any new agreement would involve formally tearing up a previous one (the 1994 Budapest Memorandum). In so doing, what possible validity could a new agreement have if it could be torn up so easily? Therefore non-recognition seems the only way forward.

For this non-recognition to make any sense however we need to figure out what non-recognition will mean in practice. Non-recognition is absolutely right, but the problem is that if Crimea is treated as a part of the Russian Federation it basically will be. So the wherewithal of non-recognition and how it could work needs to be figured out quite quickly. As an example, Northern Cyprus is never shown on basic maps as anything other than part of the Republic of Cyprus, and this has never lapsed in 40 years. There was for a long time even a trade ban on the export of Northern Cyprus products, abolished only in 2003. Here Greece was the force to push this forward. Ukraine will be in a stronger position to push once the DCFTA with the EU is up and running.

As regards measures on the ground, non-recognition might involve cutting transport links. It seems to me that it would be adding insult to injury to allow Russian Railways to continue to operate trains to Crimea, merely 'transiting' Ukraine proper, and this is an obvious means of sanctioning the tourism industry there. There is a case for cutting rail links between Crimea and mainland Ukraine altogether in fact. In the case of Northern Cyprus, only flights from Turkey can fly into the territory. The same blockade might be enacted by the international community here. Alternative connections could be built up via, for example, Odessa.

Energy and water are also key issues. Many have pointed out that, with the ability to cut off the peninsula's water and electricity, Kiev has a potential card to play. If the prospect of a gas cut off rears its head once more, this is obviously an option. There will have to be some restraint however. A closure of the border similar to the closure the Spanish inflicted on Gibraltar for many years would only hurt families on both sides.

There should be vigorous public campaigns against organisations endorsing the change. For example, early rumours that National Geographic is to change its map may be the start of a capitulation that must be resisted through any means available. Disregarding all other arguments, it can simply be pointed out that no major power has recognised the occupation and that the case is yet to go before the International Court of Justice.

Sport is also a factor. UEFA could play a useful role in non-recognition of Crimea's Russian status. Tavriya Simferopol and FK Sevastopol currently play in the Ukrainian Premier League and should continue to do so, and UEFA has the power to make such decisions. In in albeit more innocuous example, France's Evian TG FC were refused permission to play home games across the Swiss border in Geneva as it was in another state. On this basis UEFA should refuse to allow any teams from Crimea to participate in the Russian league structure, and threaten trouble if they do, with Russia's participation in the 2014 and hosting of the 2018 tournament potentially at risk. FIFA has always taken a hard line on political interference in the running of football (at least with African countries) so it should be difficult for Russia to force UEFA's or FIFA's hand.

Finally, there is the question of the endgame. Even the most optimistic would be hard pressed to think that Crimea will ever truly return to Ukrainian rule. Whilst before the Russian intervention it seems there wasn't a majority in favour of Russian rule, it will be equally difficult several years down the line to expect a majority to be in favour of Ukrainian rule. But it is reasonable to hope for a more legitimate settlement in Crimea in future. Little will be possible without democracy, and with Putin's situation apparently strengthened, there is little hope for the time being, but this illustrates the need for non-recognition to be maintained, for decades if need be, as with Northern Cyprus.

What Crimeans need to realise is that the dismantling of the Ukrainian letters on the front of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea represents, in effect, the dismantling of autonomy. The Russian Federation is a federation in name only, and Putin has progressively abolished autonomy across the country during his rule. A once ambitious plan for Kaliningrad, for example, to be a 'Baltic Republic' using both the rouble and the Euro and forming a gateway to the EU was, with Putin's accession to power, promptly shelved. Look at Kaliningrad now-a neglected backwater from which Russians flock across the border to shop at cheaper Polish supermarkets. Crimea is also, for now, doomed to become such a backwater, and they will see that last week's fake foray into democracy bears little relation to the future, where elections will offer no genuine choice and factual information, from a media which has moved from bias to full on North Korea style propaganda, will be scarce.

In a post-Putin scenario however, the issue will almost certainly be revisited. It could be argued that, in a democratised Russia, if given true autonomy, with full language rights for minorities, there would be little reason to complain about Russian rule. If Tatar, for example, appeared on bilingual street signs alongside Russian, few could complain. Another proposal might be independence, and a parallel might be drawn with Slovakia, where a 10% Hungarian minority, despite many tensions, ensures that the rights of minorities are addressed. An independent Crimea would have a 15% Tatar minority and a significant Ukrainian population, so in a democratic scenario, the communities would each have to be taken seriously. If by then however the non-recognition policy has lapsed, that opportunity will be lost.

Remember that after three decades of occupation, the Turkish population of Northern Cyprus in 2004 actually voted in favour of reunion with the south. Many of them have taken Republic of Cyprus citizenship (not surprisingly as this is also EU citizenship). Ukraine should consider changing the law to allow dual citizenship for all those in Crimea who wish to remain Ukrainian (it would also be in the wider interests of a country which has consistently lost citizens since 1991). A lot depends on the capacity of Ukrainians to build a successful country that will weaken the will of Crimeans to keep it in Putin's prison. If the EU follows through and grants visa free travel to Ukrainians, as it will do for Moldovans this May, the idea of having a 'Russkiy pasport' already begins to lose its appeal. For Crimea, it might be the beginning of a long road back.

Identity stretching in Eastern Ukraine

2014-03-03T15:24:00.001+02:00

So, if the Russian flag kindly raised on Kharkiv's city hall by a young man from Moscow means anything, Eastern Ukrainians are all now 'Russians', and those bad people in Kiev are 'Ukrainians'. Hang on. A 'pro-Russian' government has only just been ousted, one member of which, the hated education minister Tabachnyk, had a strong view on 'Ukrainians'. For him, the easterners are the real 'Ukrainians', whilst the Western Ukrainians are not Ukrainians at all, but 'Galicians'.

One wonders what Eastern Ukrainians really think of this sudden makeover of their identities. Even the oligarchs have made great play of Eastern Ukrainians being 'Ukrainians'. Two of Ukraine's group games at Euro 2012 were staged in Donetsk, most likely at the behest of the Donbas Arena's owner, Rinat Akhmetov. Clearly people in the east feel closer to Russia than other Ukrainians, but that's still some way off being Russian. How will they adjust to their sudden new identities? Most likely, being habitually ruled by fear, they continue to superficially go about their daily lives and conform to prescribed behaviour from whoever seems to be in charge.

How to hurt Putin

2014-03-03T15:07:00.000+02:00

Sign the Association Agreement

The best thing the EU could do is get Acting President Turchynov on a plane to Brussels as soon as possible and sign the Association Agreement. The EU has shown itself over the past 3 months to be an utterly incompetent foreign policy actor. The extra powers won at Lisbon look ill-deserved, the posts of Foreign Policy Representative and EU President worthy of abolition at the next treaty change. However, the EU still has a massive tool at its disposal. The whole point of the Kremlin’s crusade all along has been to prevent the signing of the AA and to ensure Ukraine was on the path to the Eurasian Union, so signing the agreement would be a blow to Putin in no uncertain terms. It might even stabilise the situation across Ukraine and give opponents of the occupiers in Crimea a concrete reason to hang on to their Ukrainian passports. The Kremlin delights in knowing the west will never act so quickly and decisively. Oh that we could.

Close the Bosphorous to Russian shipping

Turkey has a role to play here, and a right to do so on a number of counts. Firstly, the Crimean Tatars, whose future inside a Russia with an awful minority rights record looks potentially appalling, are the Turks’ ethnic kin (as place names such as Kazantip or Bağçasaray bear clear testament to), so arguably Turkey has a moral obligation here, and the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey itself would support this. Turkey's media is already claiming, rather in the way that Spain does with Gibraltar, that if Crimea breaks away, it should legally revert to Turkish rule. Although that's practically impossible, it does help to legtimise Turkish involvement. Secondly, Putin’s support for Assad has had direct consequences for Turkey, bringing with it massive refugee problems. Thirdly, Russia’s asserting itself on the Black Sea has major implications for the Black Sea security situation. Turkey should close off the Bosphorous to Russian shipping and insist on a place at the table if there is mediation. Or at the very least, Russian ships passing through the straits (there have been two in recent days) ought to be 'escorted' by their Turkish counterparts. One of two warships dispatched to the fringe of the region would also concentrate minds in Moscow. Erdoğan would probably appreciate a distraction from domestic issues, including a corruption probe. They might not have a spotless record themselves on human rights, but at the moment Ukraine should take all the help it can get.

Sanctions

An obvious one, but it took a very long time indeed and many deaths before it really looked like becoming a reality for the orchestrators of the violent crackdown in Kiev. It has been claimed however, by Mikhail Saakashvili for example, that it was the crystalising of the threat of sanctions that finally lead to the collapse of Yanukovych's house of cards. Sanctions against Russian officials might also try the patience of many of Putin's backers. There is also the potential for broader economic sanctions, and with the Russian economy now on the ropes, their impact might be felt quickly.

Україна потребує парламентську систему

2014-03-01T16:46:00.000+02:00

Нова політична система України повинна бути найрадикальнішою з усіх на пострадянському просторі.

Варшава, 26 лютого 2014

Це не вперше коли Українці прагнуть змін. Лише дев’ять років тому, здавалося, що країна обрала напрямок змін і сподівання при цьому були високі. Цього разу існують застереження та пам’ятка про те, що вартість теперішніх змін є набагато вищою. Холодний прийом звільненої Тимошенко є найбільш ясним свідченням щирого бажання українського народу “навести лад у хаті”. Українці принаймні знають до чого вони прагнуть. Але не варто забувати і про те, що травневі вибори вже не за горами і хтось має виконувати роль “капітана корабля”, незважаючи на власну недосконалість. Україна сьогодні – це чистий аркуш паперу і тепер вона не повинна прагнути побудувати чиюсь утопію. На сьогоднішній день, активність та компроміс являються основними ключами від виживання країни та її майбутнього добробуту.

Одне з основних завдань на сьогодні полягає у формуванні культури конституціоналізму. Теперішня влада зазнала легітимної кризи. Капітуляція попередніх влад та їх голосування в переважній кількості щодо прийняття нових законів призвело до неочікуваного зворотного ефекту феномена "тушек" 2010 року. Відносини між депутатами та їх виборчими мандатами є нестабільні, беручи до уваги, що парламентські вибори 2012 року були проведені із недотриманням мінімальних демократичних стандартів. Якщо б міжнародна неурядова організація Freedom House дала Україні оцінку ступеня демократичних свобод, на сьогоднішній день, країна не оцінювалася би як вільна. Очевидно, що всі ці майбутні зміни залежать від виборів в травні цього року.

Система функціонування партій також потребує реформи. Україна повинна викрити “віртуальні партії”, які функціонують виключно навколо особистостей і їх бізнес-інтересів і носять певний ідеологічний характер. Значний відсоток виборчих голосів на останніх виборах отримали ліві радикали («Комуністична партія України») радикали-націоналісти («Свобода») ,що нажаль підтверджує факт, що принаймні чверть українських виборців вирішили голосувати віддаючи перевагу ідеологічними переконаннями. Ми повинні дати виборцям із помірно центристських та правоцентристських політичних партій право на голос також. Маємо працювати і з тими представниками політичних угрупувань, переконання яких, можливо, не повністю узгоджується із нашими переконаннями, адже партія представляє собою коаліцію з різнобічними інтересами.

Мати парламентську систему правління також означає підпорядкування правилам цієї системи. Після травневих виборів 2014 не має проявитися жодної толерантності щодо «гри на фортепіано на Майдані», насильств в тюрмах, блокування трибуни спікера, або будь-яких інших подібних заходів. Можливо, Верховна Рада має відігравати роль рефері по відношенню до депутат атів, що порушили протокол. В іншому випадку, спокуса зрізати кути буде дуже сильною, і ми досить ясно бачимо цей результат зараз.

Для того щоб зберегти єдність України, ми маємо замислитися над тим як задіяти усіх і кожного у політичному процесі. Ось де виникає дилема. Сьогодні є вкрай необхідно створити нові основні політичні норми на Україні і це безпосередньо стосується прийняття нової Конституції України. Міністр закордонних справ Росії закликає до прийняття нової Конституції лише після виборів, яка має бути ухвалена на референдумі. Ця думка представляє собою логічне втілення, але є проблема. Якщо ми споглянемо на те, яким чином Янукович вніс дестабілізацію в конституційні структури України в 2010 році, вагомий аргумент підпадає на підтримку нових законів у першу чергу, але беззаперечно для легітимності таких дій, вся країна має бути задіяна.

І олігархи відіграють тут свою роль . Вони можуть продовжувати грати активну і впливову роль, так само, як,наприклад, республіканці роблять в Америці. Тим не менш, беручи до уваги цілеспрямованість країни вони повинні визнати, що їх найвпливовіший час вже проминув. Це означає, що ЄС має змогу зіграти ключову роль. Михайло Саакашвілі нещодавно говорив про те, як непередбачувана загроза санкцій стала переломним моментом для багатьох прихильників Януковича. І якщо загроза санкцій від ЕС стосувалася економічних та політичних зловживань в більш поширених випадках до яких часто прибігають олігархи, то в такий спосіб було б можливим зменшити надмірні повноваження бізнес еліт України . Значно ускладнює цю ситуацію роль олігархів, які попри всі негаразди та невдачі попередньої влади не зупинили її підтримку, навіть у той час коли ситуація різко погіршилася. Важко оцінити виняткову впливовість олігархів в політичному житті країни, в подальшому може виявитися і те, що їх впливовість стане неминучою.

Для того, щоб зауважити на всі відмінності регіонів України необхідно багато часу. На сьогодні Україні не вистачає політичної зрілості для федералізму, що може спровокувати зовнішнє втручання у вразливі для країни регіони, як ситуація в Криму нам про це і засвідчила. Проте в питаннях, що стосуються мовних прав, таке втручання може нести логічний характер, що дозволить деяку свободу на місцевому рівні. Наприклад у Франції, мови меншин можна побачити на дорожніх знаках,вони фінансуються за допомогою місцевих муніципалітетів, але національна мова має також бути відображена на дорожніх знаках (і місцевий муніципалітет платить і за це). Це насправді може стати чудовою рисою розвитку місцевої демократії. Відповідальність за святкування історичних подій, будь то 9 травня, або ж день українського повстанського руху, повинні також здійснюватися на місцевому рівні, адже на національному рівні ці питання виявилися занадто розбіжними. Такі емоційні питання більше не повинні бути пропагандистськими запалами або інструменти для політиків впливу в країні.

Деякі з найвагоміших питань все ще залишаються без відповідей. Найбільш важливою є загроза, що стосується робочих місць у Східній Україні, яка відтепер становить торгову блокаду Путіна. Яким чином ми можемо пояснити людям, що це не привід, щоб підтримувати вступ України до Митного союзу, або ж протистояння проти демократії? Швидше, факт того, що Путін використовує їх робочі місця як політичний інструмент, має стати чинником загального обурення, і населення Східної України має бути більш невдоволеним щодо цього, ніж будь-хто. Передбачуване зростання цін на газ також викликає занепокоєння, хоча заздалегідь передбачуваний план щодо зворотного потоку газу зі Словаччини майже не має перешкод.

Ступінь саботажу зі сторони Росії щодо управління внутрішніми справами України протягом останніх кількох років очевидне. Більше дискусій мають проводитися серед публічного загалу, а також піддаватися детальній критиці.

Україна повинна продовжувати наполегливо працювати, що також підтверджує і те, що насправді, багато з українських установ вже і роблять. У сфері оборони, що рідко згадується, навіть за часи президентства Януковича, країна концентрувала свої сили на співпраці з НАТО в багатьох областях. На сьогоднішній день імовірність переходу до професійної армії є великою. Політика Європейської інтеграції після трьох місяців перерви може бути поновлена і за наявності політичної волі ‘з верхівок’ технічна частина операції має досягти найкращих результатів.

Зважаючи на всі події в новій історії України, українці тепер розуміють, що майбутнє залежить від них. ЄС має бути прийнято в якості гаранта європейського майбутнього України, але українці не може повністю покладатися на це об’єднання держав. Слідуючи логіці коментарів Саакашвілі, якби ЄС діяли раніше в умовах кризи, 100 українців залишилося б в живих сьогодні.

Джонатан Хiбберд раніше був відвідуючим професором програми європейських досліджень в Києво-Могилянській академії і проживав в Україні протягом шести років. Зараз живе у Варшаві, але продовжує співпрацювати з науково-дослідницьким інститутом зовнішньої політики Дипломатичної академії України. Отримав ступінь Магістра Університета Сассекса у Великобританії. Спеціалізується на українських відносин з ЄС і НАТО.

Україна потребує парламентську систему

2014-03-01T02:16:00.002+02:00

Система функціонування партій також потребує реформи. Україна повинна викрити “віртуальні партії”, які функціонують виключно навколо особистостей і їх бізнес-інтересів і носять певний ідеологічний характер. Значний відсоток виборчих голосів на останніх виборах отримали ліві радикали («Комуністична партія України») радикали-націоналісти («Свобода») ,що нажаль підтверджує факт, що принаймні чверть українських виборців вирішили голосувати віддаючи перевагу ідеологічними переконаннями. Ми повинні дати виборцям із помірно центристських та правоцентристських політичних партій право на голос також. Маємо працювати і з тими представниками політичних угрупувань, переконання яких, можливо, не повністю узгоджується із нашими переконаннями, адже партія представляє собою коаліцію з різнобічними інтересами.

Для того щоб зберегти єдність України, ми маємо замислитися над тим як задіяти усіх і кожного у політичному процесі. Ось де виникає дилема. Сьогодні є вкрай необхідно створити нові основні політичні норми на Україні і це безпосередньо стосується прийняття нової Конституції України. Міністр закордонних справ Росії закликає до прийняття нової Конституції лише після виборів, яка має бути ухвалена на референдумі. Ця думка представляє собою логічне втілення, але є проблема. Якщо ми споглянемо на те, яким чином Янукович вніс дестабілізацію в конституційні структури України в 2010 році, вагомий аргумент підпадає на підтримку нових законів у першу чергу, але беззаперечно для легітимності таких дій, вся країна має бути задіяна.

І олігархи відіграють тут свою роль . Вони можуть продовжувати грати активну і впливову роль, так само, як,наприклад, республіканці роблять в Америці. Тим не менш, беручи до уваги цілеспрямованість країни вони повинні визнати, що їх найвпливовіший час вже проминув. Це означає, що ЄС має змогу зіграти ключову роль. Михайло Саакашвілі нещодавно говорив про те, як непередбачувана загроза санкцій стала переломним моментом для багатьох прихильників Януковича. І якщо загроза санкцій від ЕС стосувалася економічних та політичних зловживань в більш поширених випадках до яких часто прибігають олігархи, то в такий спосіб було б можливим зменшити надмірні повноваження бізнес еліт України . Значно ускладнює цю ситуацію роль олігархів, які попри всі негаразди та невдачі попередньої влади не зупинили її підтримку, навіть у той час коли ситуація різко погіршилася. Важко оцінити виняткову впливовість олігархів в політичному житті країни, в подальшому може виявитися і те, що їх впливовість стане неминучою.

Parliamentary or bust

2014-02-26T13:16:00.004+02:00

Ukraine’s new political system must be a radical departure from anything seen in the post-Soviet space

It’s not new for Ukrainians to want change. Just 9 years ago, it seemed the country was embarking on a change of direction and hopes were high. This time there is caution, and remembrance that the cost this time was far higher. The frosty reception Tymoshenko has received following her release is the clearest indication of a wholehearted desire to ‘clean house’. Ukrainians at least know what they don’t want. But May’s elections will come soon and somebody needs to be steering the ship, however imperfect. Ukraine has before it a fresh sheet of paper, but it cannot aspire to build anyone’s utopia. Inclusivity and compromise are now the keys to the country’s survival and future prosperity.

One massive challenge is to engender a culture of constitutionalism. The current authorities face a legitimacy crisis. The capitulation of the previous authorities and their voting in significant numbers for new laws has created a disconcerting reverse of the ‘tushki’ phenomenon of 2010. The relationship between deputies and their electoral mandates is now tenuous, not forgetting that the parliamentary elections of 2012 were held to poor democratic standards. If Freedom House were to assess the country today, it would not be classed as free. It obviously all depends now on the coming May elections.

The first lesson that has to be learned is that politics can’t be any more about the personalities. The post-Soviet reflex of looking to a ‘strong leader’ has had disastrous results across the region for all to see. It’s time to challenge the Eurasian myth that ‘we are different’. This myth has already cost too many people in Eurasia their lives and freedoms.

Ukraine has to adopt a wholly parliamentary system of government of the type found across most of Europe. The President should be left only with the power of veto and to call new elections. A strong Prime Minister can adopt a ‘presidential style’, like Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair, but note Thatcher’s political demise in 1990. She was the ‘iron lady’, but when she lost the support of her party the power drained out of her overnight. It has been objectively shown that parliamentary systems, which have to by necessity take account of a wider range of stakeholders, have a better record of achieving reforms.

The party system needs reform too. Ukraine must ditch the ‘virtual parties’ which revolve solely around personalities and business interests, and embrace ideology. The high percentage of votes at the last election for the far left (Communists) and far right (Svoboda), although perhaps regrettable, told us that at least a quarter of Ukrainian voters chose to vote along ideological lines. We need to give the more moderate centre left and centre right populations that voice too. We will have to work with those who we may not totally agree with, but a party is a coalition of interests.

To have a parliamentary system also means adherence to parliamentary rules. Post-May 2014 there should be zero tolerance of ‘piano playing’, violence in the chamber, blocking the rostrum, or any such activities. Perhaps the Verkhovna Rada needs to be ‘refereed’, with deputies suspended for some time for breaches of protocol. Otherwise, the temptation to cut corners will be very acute, and we see clearly now the result.

To preserve the unity of Ukraine, we must think about how to bring all into the political process. There is a dilemma here. There is an imperative to establish new ground rules for politics in Ukraine, and that means a new constitution. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is calling for the new constitution to be established only after elections, and for it to be subject to a referendum. That might sound reasonable enough, but there is a problem. If we look at how Yanukovych was able to take a wrecking ball to Ukraine’s constitutional structure in 2010, there is a strong argument for having the new rules in place first, but of course to have legitimacy, the whole country must be involved.

The oligarchs have a role to play here. They can continue to play a strong and influential role, just as wealthy backers of, for example, the Republicans do in America. However, in terms of the country’s assets they have to accept that their cup run is over. The EU could play a pivotal role here. Mikhael Saakashvili spoke recently about how the concrete threat of sanctions was a tipping point for many of Yanukovych’s supporters to pull the plug. If that threat hung over economic and political abuses more generally, this would limit the business elite to a role which was powerful but not excessive. What complicates this is the role of those oligarchs who failed to withdraw backing from the previous regime even as the situation deteriorated. It is more difficult to make a moral case for their continued involvement in the country’s politics, although we may find that it’s unavoidable.

How to accommodate the country’s regional differences needs much thought. At this time Ukraine lacks the political maturity for federalism, which would also leave parts of the country too vulnerable to outside interference. However, in issues such as language rights, it may make sense to allow some discretion at local level. In France, for example, minority languages can appear on street signs at the behest of local municipalities as long as the national language is also displayed (and the local municipality pays for it). This might actually be a good exercise in local democracy. Responsibility for celebrations of historical events, whether it be 9 May or the Ukrainian insurgency, should also be managed at local level, as nationally these issues have proved too divisive. Such emotive issues should not be propagandist fodder or tools for the country’s politicians any longer.

Some of the biggest issues still remain unanswered. Most significant is the threat to jobs in Eastern Ukraine from Putin’s now inevitable trade blockade. How do we explain to these people that this is not a reason to support Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union, or to oppose democracy? Rather, it is an outrage that Putin is so content to exploit their jobs as a political tool, and they should be more angry about this than anyone. The impending gas price hikes are also a concern, although contingency plans such as reverse flow from Slovakia ought to now face fewer obstacles.

In dealings with Russia trust will be at an all time low, and Ukraine needs to protect itself. For the foreseeable future all high level talks between Ukraine and Russia should be hosted by a third country and adhere to diplomatic norms. We must not allow the degeneration into secret meetings and bullying that Putin-Yanukovych relations became. Plenty of work is needed into how to make Russia-Ukraine relations more transparent. The extent of Russian sabotage in Ukraine’s internal governance over the past several years is plain to see. More discussions need to be on the record and subjected to the greatest scrutiny.

Ukraine also needs to continue much of the patient hard work that in fact many of its institutions have already been doing. In the sphere of defence, it is rarely mentioned that the country, even under Yanukovych, was forming ever greater co-operation with NATO in many areas, and the previously announced transition to a professional army will probably now come to pass. European integration policy will also be salvageable after its 3 month hiatus, and with political will from the top the technical work will be able to proceed all the better.

Despite this, Ukrainians now realise that the future depends on them. The EU would be greatly welcomed as a guarantor to Ukraine’s European future, but it cannot be wholly relied upon. Following the logic of Saakashvili’s comments, had they acted earlier in the crisis, 100 more Ukrainians might still be alive today.

EU-Ukraine: EU should act unilaterally on visas

2014-01-31T15:26:00.002+02:00

The EU must reach out to citizens unilaterally on visas and travel, rather than engaging with Ukraine's incompetent and feckless officials.

After a distressing few weeks in Ukraine, the river Bug seems now to undoubtedly mark the boundary of free and unfree Europe. Somehow the visa free travel regime for EU and and other western visitors to come to Ukraine has survived up until now, but lawmakers are now looking at how to place restrictions on foreigners entering the country. They advocate a fee for entry (such as countries like Egypt currently operate) but, most scarily, a requirement that the person travelling can demonstrate funds of 400 Euros for each day of their stay, so a 10 day visit to Kiev would necessitate the traveller having a spare 4000 Euros idling away in the bank, clearly prohibitive to many potential visitors. Meanwhile, the EU-Ukraine visa dialogue still mumbles on about Ukraine and other EU eastern neighbours fulfiling 'conditions' and 'requiremements', when it's obvious that this doesn't achieve results.

The proposed restrictions are most likely aimed at disrupting small time activists, quite often ordinary westerners who are drawn to the protest movement and wish to offer moral support, evidenced by the various national flags which have shown up at Kiev's City Hall or on the famous Maidan tree. Many such people would be instantly priced out of coming to Ukraine. It would also be a kind of populist measure. Many Ukrainians would feel little sympathy for roeigners having to jump through hoops as they routinely have to do, but the reality of course is just people choosing not to come. It's already hardly a mecca for tourism, or on many people's bucket list. For Poles it could be quite traumatic, as even school study trips to 'Lwów' would be effectively thwarted. For Hungarians, links with relatives in Zakarpattia would suffer. The potential effect on families if implemented (and enforced of course) could be devastating.

What's clear is that Ukraine's authrities have no interest whatsoever in their citizens, and in small (non-oligarchic) businesses. Casualties would be potential visitors to Lviv, touted in recent times as the next big tourism destination. It would deal a significant blow to other types of tourism too. The marriage agencies of Odesa or Yalta would be hit hard. It's also the authorities 'being clever' by trying not to untick any boxes in efforts for Ukrainians to gain visa free travel, but clealy it's not clever at all. It would do nothing to enhance trust and dialogue with the EU, already at rock bottom.

The EU needs to fundamentally rethink the rules of doing business in this area. In my view, the problem is not necessarily visas, but the short duration of visas, the requirement to have different types of visa for different types of trips and the humiliating nature of gaining such visas. I would propose 5 year all-purpose, multi-entry visas, possibly biometric ones, a kind of 'Euro Visa' which could then be used in EU/EEA passport queues. This would effectively give most of the benefits of visa free travel, but would give states the option of withdrawing the privilege to those who overstay or work illegally. It is also something that the EU could do unilaterally, without waiting for some distant age where the Ukrainian authorities have suddenly become competent and started caring about their citizens. The same should be extended to all the EU's eastern neighbours, including Russia and Belarus, without consultation with their authorities.

Travel is the single most powerful tool the EU has to change hearts and minds. The popularity of travel for Russian citizens form Kaliningrad to Poland, for example, will help in the long term to underme the societal myths of Eurasianism there. This is an important part of the EU staying relevant and exporting its values, at a time when it is more urgently needed than ever.

Europe's Tiananmen Must be Stopped

2014-01-23T14:09:00.001+02:00

Some thoughts on the Ukraine crisis that I'm not hearing addressed elsewhere.

This is serious

The clearing of Maidan would be Europe's Tiananmen Square. Europe will bear responsibility for not preventing it.

The fall of Kiev's Lenin monument, just like the fall of Budapest's Stalin statue in 1956, may not be the harbinger of victory. The Tiananmen Square protests lasted 7 weeks, with students occupying the square as Kiev's activists do now. The appearance of military vehicles on Kiev's streets evoked memories of the man who famously blocked a tank in the protests. Tens of people died in the resulting crackdown. I don't think Europe realises that they might be about to watch something similar happening on their watch. Yanukovych has already shown he is willing to militarise the city with snipers, live bullets and combat vehicles. It's uncomfortable. We wish it weren't true, but it is. Europe regrets Yugoslavia. That conflict led to a sense of moral responsibility to bring the Western Balkans into the EU accession process, but the same moral responsibility did not extend to post Orange Revolution Ukraine. That now looks like a colossal mistake. Do we want 20 years on to create more regrets for ourselves?

Sideline the EU

Calling on the EU to help has exhausted itself. The focus needs to switch to governments of European countries instead.

Successive European treaties and treaty negotiations have long advocated greater powers, with Europe still haunted by its lack of capacity to act in Yugoslavia. Politicians spoke of European armies. These efforts finally culminated in the post of Foreign Policy Representative being created, the 'single telephone number' (in Ashton's case only until 8pm of course). The Ukraine crisis in fact shows that the EU had no business asking for greater competence in foreign policy at Lisbon. Although foreign policy competence of technically speaking ‘remains with member states’, even the pretention of EU foreign policy seems to be a pointless folly. In actual fact, it means people ‘calling on the EU’, which suits the interests of disinterested, toothless, or Russia-friendly governments, providing them with a screen for member states to hide behind. I'm beginning to think the EU should abandon its grand ambitions and revert to a looser trade pact (or be replaced by something else). Greater intergration seems to actually render it impotent altogether. And its not the fault of enlargement-some of the most vocal countries on the crisis are the newer members (e.g. Poland). It is only with a push from a Merkel, Hollande, or a Cameron that we might see the EU initiate sanctions, so it’s them that we should be holding to account for doing or not doing so.

Russian involvement

Claims of Russian Federation personnel on Kiev’s streets, if true, urgently need to be substantiated.

We seem to know very little indeed of Russia’s direct involvement in the events in Kiev. Publicly they ‘watch with concern’, and simultaneously speak to world media about the crisis whilst their own tv channels variously downplay or grossly twist the truth of what’s happening in Kiev. Knowing from the debacle in November that set this whole thing in motion that Russia-Ukraine relations are totally untransparent, and that Yanukovych is inevitably getting desperate, it’s inconceivable that Russia is not involved in it somewhere. It might be intelligence support, assistance with cyber attacks. Who knows? I am only speculating. Most worrying are suggestions that some of the ‘Berkut’ (‘special assignment’ police forces) on the streets of Kiev are in fact Russian Berkut in Ukraine uniforms. One estimate on twiiter claimed that 8000 had been counted, but that Ukraine’s total number of Berkut amounts to only around 4000. Much earlier on, observers pointed out that Russian-speaking Berkut struggled to communicate with Ukrainian-speaking activists, difficult to account for as even Russian speakers in Ukraine are exposed to Ukrainian on a daily basis. It's entirely fair to say that it's unlikely to be true. However, such reports, if true, need to be substantiated urgently, as it would have massive implications. If Euromaidan was to be cleared by 4000 in fact Russian Berkut, it’s tantamount to sending tanks into Kiev by stealth.

The Sochi Factor

Sochi 2014 gives Ukraine another 2 weeks’ grace

A window of opportunity exists now to solve the Ukraine crisis without direct Russian involvement, as Russia will never embark on a ‘Georgia 2008’ whilst its pet prestige project Sochi 2014, and associated global charm offensive, is taking place. It should be clear that Russia’s prisoner releases were, as Pussy Riot wasted no time in telling us, a publicity stunt. Many less high profile prisoners in Russia have been less fortunate, and perhaps the Russian authorities couldn’t quite hang on in letting on that Khodorkovsky will still need to be neutralized as a force, most likely unable to return. Once Sochi finishes, the gloves will be off once more. The last thing we want is Russian ‘peacekeepers’ in Ukraine. Time is short.

The Scots, the Catalans, the Ukrainians and the Normans

2014-01-06T17:05:00.002+02:00

Russian thinking on Ukraine, and itself, is swimming against the tide

You're in a city where the signs are in one language, although many of the inhabitants speak another, the dominant but related language of a major power. One could be thinking of Catalan in Barcelona, or in fact Ukrainian in Kiev. I once really upset a lady from Western Ukraine by making this comparison. To her, Catalonia is only a region of a country, whereas Ukraine most certainly isn't, so the parallel seemed to her belittling. Some Catalans might well see the connection straight away however, as something approaching a majority there now talk of independence from their dominant 'neighbour'.

Such analogies are never perfect, but that hasn't stopped Russia making them publicly in its pursuit of Ukraine. The Russian Ambassador to France sat them down and patiently explained that Ukraine to Russia is like Normandy is to France-essentially inseparable. This analogy is facile though (and even if accepted, it doesn't begin to explain Russia's similar attitude to Georgia, Armenia or Moldova). I would suggest two more suitable ones, and in fact 2014 looks like being an important year for those nations in the shadow of their bigger relative, and the comparisons show just how far off the pace the Russian view is.

For the record, I personally feel more English than British (St. George's should be a public holiday and Anglo-Saxon history taught in schools), but I also feel European (EU freedom of movement is a good thing all round, including Poles, Romanians and Bulgarians), so I don't know whose agenda I'm serving here as neither UKIP nor the liberals would want me I expect. I'm also suspicious of countries that were artificial constructs-they never seem to last. Take Yugoslavia, Czechoslvakia or the USSR. Maybe even the UK? Unlike many academics, I don't consider the nations of Western and Eastern Europe to be intrinsically different. I'm sure, as I'm not from Russia I don't know much, but correct me if any of the dates are wrong.

Scotland & Britain

The Act of Union between England and Scotland in 1707 took place just two years before Mazepa's last stand against the Russians at Poltava in 1709, so the England-Scotland and Russia-Ukraine unions have both basically existed for 300 years. As the Russians talk about 'Little Russia', the British establishment (which included Scots too by the way) promoted the idea that England would now be 'South Britain', Scotland 'North Britain' and (perhaps most optimistically) Ireland 'West Britain', although needless to say it didn't stick.

Scotland can claim two native languages. One, Gaelic, is enjoying a notable revival, now as visible on 'Welcome to Scotland' signs as "Croeso i Cymru' is in Wales. The other however, Scots, a close relative to English, is perhaps more pertinent to our loose analogy. Like Ukrainian, it has often been dismissed as a dialect of its dominant neighbour, but linguistic experts consider it a language; It has vocabulary which, in some instances, is more recognisible to, say, Norwegians than English (it also, like Ukrainian, once spread deeper into its neighbour's territory). Scots is somehow less prominent though. Like, say, Swiss German, it is rarely visible in its written form.

It used to be said that only around 25% of Scots favoured full independence, and discussion tended to revolve around North Sea oil revenues. Then came devolution, including tax raising powers, and then a Scottish National Party minority government, culminating in next September's 2014 referendum on independence. Support for breaking away is now put at a third of the population and there is a big difference between being asked a theoretical question and a real question.

Of course there is a strategy, official or otherwise, in London to try to keep the Scottish on board. Slightly echoing the situation with Ukraine, pessimism is the tool of choice here too, that Scotland variously 'wouldn't survive' and 'needs Britain'. One of the failures so far of the 'yes' campaign is to move the debate out of these narrow economic arguments which are basically about short term considerations and often based on assumptions. The debate should surely be about how Scottish people view themselves and their future, and the emotive aspect, that of cultural identity and what Scottish people feel that they are is at least as important as hospital prescriptions.

Nonetheless, you can't fault London in the sense that the issue will be decided by a referendum to the people in Scotland. Once upon a time there was a referendum on Ukrainian independence from the USSR, in fact in 1990, in which each region voted for Ukraine's independence, even the Donbas and Crimea. So if the Scots vote yes in 2014, following Russia's example, a bit of arm twisting in 20 years' time should put to rights any aberration in the Scottish vote.

Catalonia & Spain

Iberia was overrun by the Moors while Kievan Rus was ransacked by Mongol hordes (the Arab cultural influence on Castillians is as true as the Asian influence on the Russians, but, unlike the Russian 'Eurasians', the Spanish are Europeans, and don't claim to be 'Eurafricans', 'Eurarabs' or any such nonsense). One country to emerge from the reconquista was Catalonia. Its incorporation into Spain (and France) again takes place during the 17th-18th centuries with the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 coming just five years after Bohdan Khmelnytsky gave the Russians the car keys at Pereyeslav in 1654 (rather like Yanukovych has just done). Portugal could conceivably have ended up in exacty the same position (one school of thought is that Catalonia moved first, allowing Portugal to break free).

The comparison to be made between Catalan/Spanish and Ukrainian/Russian seems to me a striking one. Both languages punch below their weight; Ukrainian is Europe's 8th most spoken language while Catalan has more speakers than many of the EU's member states. The Russification of Ukraine in the Russian Empire/USSR and imposition of Castillian by Franco, changing Catalan names and place names to Spanish ones, is a familiar story for Ukrainians and Catalans alike. That strange feeling of seeing one language written on the city's street signs but hearing another more commonly spoken on the streets is common both to Kiev and Barcelona. The temptation to mix with a language that is closely related is also acute; in Ukraine that is the 'surzhik' of Russian and Ukrainian and in Catalonia the tendency to come out with Spanish words in a Catalan way rather than pure Catalan (Ukrainians might think of Prime Minister Azarov here).

In terms of an aim of independence, Catalonia on one level seems to have the furthest to go here. Madrid simply says a referendum on independence is 'illegal' but how long does an argument of that sort sit with the basics of democratic legitimacy? It's interesting to observe Catalonia's politicians appealing to the EU on this issue. As with Ukraine, the EU may not have the will or tools to assist meaningfully there either. Spain fears losing a prosperous province and the re-emergence of the Basque problem, but if Scotland and Catalonia show something that Northern Ireland and the Basque Country don't, it's that democratic means can slowly but surely nudge you closer towards your aims.

Catalans, whatever the situation, are, unlike Ukrainians and Russians, completely free to protest and express their views. Catalonia also continues to enjoy real autonomy. Had such autonomy been given to Ukraine in a hypothetical democratising 1980s USSR, perhaps Russia and Ukraine would have stayed together after all, but it's too late, Russia too autocratic, to hope to achieve this kind of outcome now. 2014 won't yield a referendum there but the zeitgeist may mean Catalonia moving closer in that direction, and it's difficult to ignore the zeitgeist.

France & Normandy?

Just to be charitable, I will entertain the Russian Ambassador's analogy a little longer. Normandy was incorporated into France in 1204 (about half a century after the founding of Moscow). The country of France itself had come into being barely 300 years earlier.

Linguistically, Normandy speaks French, and spoke French even as an independent kingdom. Norman French was even the language of royalty and administration in England for hundreds of years follwing the Norman Conquest. So where is the 19th century Norman equivalent of Taras Shevchenko writing his poems in the Norman language? Where is the national awakening? Most crucially, where is the independence movement? Need I go on?

For a better analogy however, France offers several. Look at Corsica, incorporated in 1768, and still restive. The supposedly irrefutable Russian claim to Crimea goes back to its annexation by Russia around the same time, in 1783. Western Savoy was first conquered by Napoleon in 1792, and finally cemented as a part of France in 1860. A Russian contemporary of Nice might be Sochi, founded by Russian imperial expansion in 1838 (but, unlike Nice, consolidated by the ethnic cleansing of the local Circassian population in the mid 19th century).

France in fact has 8 histrical linguistic minorities (Alsatian, Flemish, Breton, Walloon, Corsican, Catalan, Basque and Occitan) as well as numerous dialects and patois. A really interesting case would be the southern third of France, the Occitan territory. This historically spoke the 'langue d'Oc', a language more akin to Catalan. Had history developed differently, who knows if that would have become France's Ukraine?

The Russian Ambassador might have been on safer ground talking about Kievan Rus and the continuity of 'Rasiya' from 'Rus', but then you'd have to ask why France doesn't claim Franconia in Southern Germany? Best keep it simple I suppose. Imagine France bullying Belgium into accepting a role as its vassal state, installing a Francophone government with scant regard for the rights of Dutch speakers, maybe even a Flemish-hating education minister and you're somewhere closer to the mark. After all, the coal mines and steel mills of the industrial south are where the wealth is, and that's the future, surely? Sounds like the 19th century though, right?

European integration, but not as we know it

2013-09-30T12:43:00.002+03:00

As recently as a few months ago, the prospects for Ukraine’s European ambitions looked unpromising to say the least, but it seems a few months is a long time in geopolitics, and Russian pressure has decisively shifted the landscape, seemingly providing an engine and impetus on the EU and Ukrainian side to get the deal done. In attempting to satisfy the EU’s requirements for signing the Association Agreement, slated for November’s Eastern Partnership Summit, Ukraine’s parliament has been pushing through relevant legislation with impressive speed. The laws however are not short on Party of Regions-friendly appendages to keep the troops happy. The authorities are also employing the security service, the SBU, to harass the communists for their anti-EU advertisements. Ukraine’s brand of European integration is not exactly out of the textbook of Schuman or Adenauer.

Internal sabotage by pro-Moscow figures in Ukraine’s government has long been cited as one of the biggest single risks to Ukraine signing the agreement, so pushing through the necessary laws has required a high level of party discipline in the Party of Regions, exemplified in the recent defrocking of deputy Igor Markov, an individual with pro-Moscow sympathies who has even been described as a Ukrainophobe politician, after being found guilty of election irregularities. The removal of his mandate will have sent a very clear message to any other would be dissenters in the party, the point being that a) being out of the Verkhovna Rada deprives individuals of abundant opportunities for personal enrichment and a degree of personal protection b) voting irregularities of one sort or another could most likely be dredged up in a great many voting precincts in the country, giving the party considerable available leverage if needed.

It is this culture of rank and file discipline that has been key in allowing the Donbas clan to establish their power base in Ukraine thus far, so it shouldn’t be a surprise that they are able to turn the screw in this way, albeit in the name of an unlikely cause. Such methods understandably have their detractors, but one such detractor has been none other than the supposed red line in the EU-Ukraine deal, imprisoned former PM Yulia Tymoshenko, who went as far as to describe Markov glowingly as “a new young, energetic, charismatic, ideological leader of the pro-Russian citizens of Ukraine”. If Brussels truly has decided to realpolitik with Ukraine, surely such a statement is somewhat unhelpful.

Tymoshenko’s and her party’s statements in support of Markov may actually reflect a fear that Tymoshenko’s makeweight status may be put aside in the context of the wider geopolitical interest (although Tymoshenko has previously urged the EU not to withhold signing the agreement on her account). Already, EU figures are talking of demanding ‘progress’ with the Tymoshenko situation, which may be Brussels giving itself some elbow room come November, and to paraphrase European Parliament member Hannes Swoboda, if Ukraine returns to the Russian sphere what leverage will the EU have to resolve Tymoshenko’s situation then? About as much as it has on Khodorkovsky, Magnitsky or Pussy Riot, to be frank. It also reminds us that parochialism is never far from the minds of Ukraine’s politicians, the whole reason Tymoshenko is behind bars in the first place.

As for Russia, the Association Agreement would be an unusual setback for a country currently emboldened on the world stage. Russia’s sway on Syria, the arrest of Greenpeace activists for ‘piracy’, persistence with homophobic laws against boycott threats for Sochi 2014, and military aggravation of the Baltic States, Finland and Sweden could all be seen as manifestations of Russian confidence. However, at the same time, Russia may overreach itself, and is prone to mistakes.

Medvedev stated Russia’s ‘all or nothing’ position on Ukraine’s integration with east and west (although Yanukovych’s suggested ‘3+1’ co-operation with the Customs Union always sounded like a ‘thanks but no thanks’). Perhaps Russia would have been better biding its time and letting Ukraine drift a little longer. Instead, Russia’s concerted pressure has very rapidly created an imperative for the EU and Ukraine to sign. In its customs blockades, it also managed to step on the toes of every major player in the Ukrainian oligarchy, uniting them like never before, and even the natural sympathy for Russia of the population in Eastern and Southern Ukraine has been significantly eroded. One leading commentator has gone as far was to describe their actions as ‘nation building’ for Ukraine. And Russia ought to be careful not to make things even worse for itself; threats last week to dismember Ukraine could conceivably reverse Ukraine’s decision to no longer pursue NATO membership.

Russia’s information war also looks increasingly ham-fisted. Russian presidential advisor Sergei Glazyev is clutching at non-existent straws by suggesting Ukrainian officials ‘don’t know what they’re signing because they can’t speak English’ and talking generally of Ukraine’s actions as ‘suicidal’. One should not underestimate Russia’s leverage however, even within the EU itself. The apparent reluctance of Slovakia to export gas to Ukraine to neuter the tried and tested gas cut off threat* may be such an example, and the Kremlin may still have other cards to play. One can’t rule at a last minute wet fish capitulation by the Ukrainians, but again Russia’s potential to offer any carrot is limited. When Yanukovych extended the Black Sea Fleet lease in early 2010 he was promised cheaper gas, but more than three years on it is clear to see that the Black Sea Fleet concession yielded nothing, and Russia in fact looks with disdain on such bargains with its near neighbours. Against such a background, why would Ukraine make a similar deal?

If the Association Agreement is signed and eventually takes Ukraine on a path to free trade and democracy, Yanukovych’s methods seem an odd way to get there, but a look at history shows that the EU is no stranger to pragmatism. Italy was included in the original 6 amid fears of the strength of the communists there, Spain and Portugal against a fear of democratic backsliding, Greece to prevent either the return of military rule or absorption into the Soviet bloc (and going on to effectively waste over 3 decades of membership), and the Baltic States despite reluctance in the early ‘90s in some quarters. If Ukraine not only signs the agreements, but is able to comply with its conditions, the ends may have more than justified the means.

* - it would be interesting to know whether Russia diversifying gas transit away from Ukraine and via the Nord Stream pipeline and Belarus (whose gas transit system was finally surrendered to Moscow) and lower transit volumes through Ukraine has inadvertently given Ukraine a freer hand in the technicalities of reversing the gas flow etc. Quite possibly it has.

The neurotic side of Ukrainian patriotism

2013-05-04T19:16:00.000+03:00

This is probably hardly worth commenting on, but I nonetheless felt that I had to get it off my chest, and after all what are blogs for?

On 26th April the world, or part of it anyway, rightly chose to remember the Chernobyl catastrophe which, whilst on the territory of what is now Ukraine, contaminated a swathe of Belarus, parts of Russia and places as far away as Anglesey, North Wales. It is in Ukraine that the catastrophe is most poignantly remembered. It doesn't help that in Belarus President Lukashenka has taken a policy of ambivalence towards the disaster. It must be remembered, along with other pivotal catastrophes that have shaped Ukraine as it is today.

However, one Ukrainian language page took its tribute to the absurd extent of claiming that Chernobyl was 'another stage of ethnic genocide against the Ukrainian people'. I considered letting this go, but clearly to claim any such thing is a travesty and grossly insulting to all those who've suffered, as the radioactive cloud knew no borders. Power stations of the very same type existed throughout the USSR, and one still operates close to Moscow itself. I've written on this blog before about the importance of remembering both the Holodomor and the 'shot renaissance' and the strong case for considering these genocidal acts, but to see a seamless link between this and Chernobyl invites that dreaded word pathological. It's actually a hideous comparison if you think about it, to somehow compare the engineers whose mistake lead to atomic meltdown to Stalin. How will Ukrainians be taken seriously if those that claim to represent Ukrainian patriotism come out with such careless and neurotic nonsense, well meaning or otherwise. It also doesn't help if, when pointing this out, one is simply dismissed as 'idiotic'. These things matter. Just witness what happens when the next western media outlet calls Auschwitz a 'Polish death camp'.

That same page a few weeks earlier carried a picture of one of the signs at Palats Sportu metro station which, as a complete anomaly on the Kiev metro which now exclusively uses Ukrainian, retains a single sign using the Russian name Dvarets Sporta. The fact is that, when the station was built, the policy of the Kiev metro was bilingualism, so signs in the same style can be found also in Ukrainian, and this is little more than a quirky survivor of its age and an attempt at something like art deco style. The said page seemed to be calling for its destruction irrespective of all other considerations, and most of the comments were vitriolic in condemning this poor little sign. Of course most Kievans aren't too bothered about it. What about all the Soviet symbols still to be found on numerous metro stations there? Isn't removing those a more noble cause than picking on a single sign in Russian?

Ukrainian is and should be Ukraine's national language, and with at least, for argument's sake, 25m odd first language speakers, more than many other national languages in Europe, it is not small beer. I personally prefer to use Ukrainian in the shops and cafes in Kiev and normally encounter no prejudice doing so.

What worries me is that if the Ukrainian language cause is dominated by nutjobs like this, the real cause of the Ukrainian language won't be taken seriously. Rather like those Kyiv campaigners who think that the best way to protect a language is to preach to the mother tongue speakers of another language about what words they should use. Some Ukrainian patriots clearly desire an eradication of other languages from Ukraine which is no better than the desire of others to marginalise Ukrainian. At this rate you have to wonder if the careless 'genocide' label might be applied in the other direction. Good intentions, but careless words.

Cyprus and the UK - time to collect foreign rents?

2013-03-20T18:44:00.000+02:00

Parochialism in the public debates in both Cyprus and the UK risks letting rich foreigners off the hook

What do Cyprus's apparently defeated bank levy proposal and the UK opposition's also defeated proposal for a 'mansion tax' have in common? Although on markedly different levels, both proposals very quickly met opposition on the grounds of hardship. In the Cypriot case that is perhaps more obvious or direct, but the mansion tax too it is claimed could lead to personal hardship for some individuals. Whilst Cypriots threatened to bulldoze their banks over the bank levy, a Radio 5 live phone in a couple of weeks ago was dominated by the hardship theme. What the two proposals also have in common is the dilemna now facing governments who, in different respects, have become attractive havens for money and investments from wealthy individuals in foreign climbs.

40% is the key figure. It is the percentage both of Cyprus bank deposits held by Russians and, coincidentally, of new properties built in London which are snapped up by foreign investors, often with no intention of living in them, so actually further exacerbating the UK housing shortage. Wealthy individuals from countries where investments are less straightforward have chosen both of these countries in their different ways for essentially similar reasons of security and future stability for their gains. This has enormous benefit if you are a Cypriot bank or a UK construction firm, but it has issues too; in Cyprus we end up with a top heavy banking sector in a tiny country, and in the UK we could say that these property investors are not paying their way for the privilege of buying the nation's leaseholds and freeholds.

The common denominator in both cases is that attempts to get these sometimes shady investors to pay into the countries from which they benefit get muffled in debates which focus on the hardships of the locals. We shouldn't belittle that. In both cases a suggested solution has been a higher threshold. Not many with savings of €100 000 or higher or with a house worth, say, £5 million or more, are going to be worrying about where their next meal is coming from (some of thee properties invested in are worth more than fifty times the 2 million threshold!). There is a reality that a pensioner who's saved all their life to have a few thousand in the bank, or a homeowner who is (only in a sense) a victim of rocketing property prices and the considerable expense and taxation associated with running a large home would suffer personal trauma under the original proposals, but the other reality, of wealthy foreign citizens who take advantage without taking responsibility, must not be ignored.

Of course there is a problem. As the Cyprus proposal shows, a more obviously targeted proposal risks making relations problematic with the governments of countries where politics, business and goodness knows what else are seamlessly intertwined, and there is no taboo about making such issues political. However, there is a deep need to reframe the debate, to educate people about the perhaps uncomfortable truth about the ways in which their countries have changed, and why it is only fair and reasonable that these people be taxed. Otherwise, we really are hurting the little guy, our ordinary citizens, whilst the big guy (crooked businessmen, even criminals) continues to fatten himself abroad unimpeded, much as he has quite likely already done back home.

Of course the governments of free democracies, in states with free media, must listen to their citizens, but it would be a pity if, whilst having those values, we decide simply to give a free ride to dodgy individuals from the countries to our east where the media is muzzled and national parliaments are little more than corrupt dysfunctional rubber stamp institutions devoid of such social conscience. Not to mention the real little guys, millions living in poverty because of corruption, criminality and stolen state assets that have enriched many of these individuals. Surely its only right that these investors pay their way somewhere along the line.

EU-Ukraine: He who has ears, let him hear.

2013-02-08T18:03:00.001+02:00

Yanukovych's conduct may actually be making it easier for the EU to talk of eventual membership

The word füle translates into Hungarian as 'ears', and EU Commissioner on Enlargement and the Eastern Partnership Štefan Füle is clearly hoping that someone on Bankova is finally going to start listening. In his speech to the Verkhovna Rada, Füle pulled few punches (metaphorically speaking it must be said) as to the EU's misgivings with the current goings on in Ukraine, now laying into the regime publicly over unconstitutional proxy voting ('piano playing'), procurement law and other areas, rather than allowing the selective justice issue to be the sole broken record.

If his words to parliament were scathing, those to staff and students on a visit to Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kiev's fiercely independent liberal university (on whose European Studies course I had the good fortune to be a lecturer) seem to have been rather more encouraging. There is now a clearer acknowledgement of the status of the Eastern Partnership countries as potential applicants under Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty, that any European country can apply for membership, if it meets the criteria, and a clear differentiation now being made between the eastern and southern neighbourhoods in this respect.

The pressure on Ukraine to 'make a choice' between Russia's Customs Union and the EU's free trade deal is mounting from both sides. Having gone as far as concluding the agreement, one senses the EU would like to close the deal. Ukraine's civil servants are resigned to the prospect of intense trade pressure from Russia if progress with this continues, most likely across many areas. Arguably, with the $7bn gas bill, it has already started. What doesn't help Russia's case is that you can never be sure that it won't behave in such ways even if Ukraine were to enter the CU. A track record of such behaviour hardly builds trust. Ukrainian officials hope that Russia's excesses might be limited by it having joined the WTO.

Another theme running heavily through this process now is conditionality. Indeed, Füle has now given Ukraine 19 key indicators that it needs to work on. The chances of Ukraine satisfying 19 separate concerns looks pretty low. That's a lot more than satisfying the vague 'back of an envelope' Copenhagen Criteria that the 2004 and 2007 entrants needed to meet, and which Yushchenko and Tymoshenko at least had half-convincing pretences of attaining. The everyday reality of Ukrainian political life is clearly a million miles away from any such criteria. Yanukovych's primary policy seems to be keeping Tymoshenko behind bars, and there is no sign whatsoever of this abating. Recent news continues the trend, with concerns now spreading, for example, over internet freedom. If Ukraine's governance, rule of law, and overall behaviour are more akin to those in the CU, reason follows that they will find it very difficult not to end up there. With that in mind, it is paradoxically easier for the EU to talk about eventual membership. For years the EU entertained the idea of Turkey joining simply on the assumption that Greece would always obstruct it, hence the awkward situation since Greece changed its mind.

In a sense, the EU can almost rely on Ukraine to fail for now, but in the long term the suggestion is that successful implementation of the DCFTA might yield a membership perspective. For those that joined during the previous decade the Association Agreements already contained this membership perspective, and successful fulfilment brought candidate status, so this mechanism basically builds in an extra stage, a longer road which is perhaps in everybody's best interests. As long as the door can be opened for trade, and for Ukrainians to travel, other matters are less imperative. The EU needs to itself recover, and for the Polands and Spains of this world to develop to potentially join the net contributors that would help to pay for further enlargement; clearly a long way off. However, it would be in the interests of all the stakeholders in Ukraine's future to finally start listening.

Is there a European alternative to the Brussels project?

2013-01-23T16:02:00.000+02:00

An 'outer ring' of European states could pursue looser integration and have collective clout

If the UK is truly heading towards an 'in or out' referendum on EU membership, thoughts must be turning quickly towards what alternative model the UK-Europe relationship might follow. The options are not straightforward.

One common retort from British Eurosceptics is 'look at Norway', but that option is not as great as it may look at first glance. A Norwegian local politician I met a couple of years back lamented her country's unwillingness to join the EU, saying that Norway has to implement 95% of EU legislation, with a 0% say about what goes into it. They do have control over their fishing industry, but many aspects of their lives come under the remit of EU directives that no Norwegian had a hand in drafting. Iceland also has this deal but has now decided to seek full EU membership instead.

Very few who truly understand the issues think that Britain can simply have no form of economic integration with the EU, and even Nigel Farage's language has become more nuanced during his time in Brussels. If Britain, for example, was to leave the EU, but desire to continue to participate in the single market, it would have to accept something similar to the EEA deal. Switzerland, on the other hand, has a series of bilateral opt-ins and opt-outs of EU policies, but on many issues it is captive to the regime that surrounds it.

'Tory Euroscepticism' may be the driving force behind Cameron's decision, but British Eurosceptics are not a homogeneous group. There are the rabid 'bent banana' Eurosceptics who ignore the geographical reality of where our island sits, and for whom there is no distinction between EU migrant workers and illegal immigrants from elsewhere in the world, and who conveniently ignore the hundreds of thousands of Brits residing in other EU states. There are still some with delusions about the UK's potential global role, or farcical ideas that Americans, Australians or Indians would be 'delighted' to open up to preferential economic agreements with the UK. There is the frequently-coined argument that when Britain voted in the 1970's it voted to join an economic union, not a political one, but a look at the founding treaties of the EU makes clear that it was all along a politically-coloured project.

Then there are quite reasonable arguments made about the democratic deficit in the EU's institutions. There is also the technical constitutional argument, which relatively few mention but which holds some water, about the incompatibility of the EU's system with the British system, that the British constitutional principle that 'no parliament can bind its successor' is broken by the signing of European treaties. That explains how figures on the left such as Tony Benn came to be part of British Euroscepticism.

So Britain, Norway, and Switzerland might all have reasons to be less than satisfied with their position, but they are not alone in feeling that their deals with Brussels are in some way unsatisfactory. Across Europe, on the eastern frontier, we have Turkey, the candidate country which may never join, which so far has only a customs agreement with the EU which is of limited value. Then there is Ukraine, which may or may not one day get round to signing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade agreement with the EU, but whose problems with democracy and the rule of law may leave it self-excluded. Georgia, Moldova and Armenia are all in the process of agreeing similar free trade deals with Europe, and the DCFTA model may be what Turkey eventually has to settle for, if it doesn't decide that a sub-optimal relationship with Europe does not outweigh the benefits of a multi-vector trade policy, given its geographical position and robust pre-crisis economic growth.

During European debates in the UK, going back to the 1990's, the phrase 'two-speed Europe' frequently came up, implying that France, Germany, Benelux, Spain, Italy etc. could push ahead with closer integration whilst, for example, Britain and the Nordic countries could take a slower approach. Only in one sense has this clearly manifested itself, but notably, in the EU states that did not choose to adopt the Euro. One might also sense that one or two newer EU members, longer term, might not desire the closest level of integration with other member states. Would Poland, for example, ever really want to end up in political union with Germany?

So, if Britain is twitchy, Norway disadvantaged, Turkey rejected and Ukraine self-excluded, not to mention Switzerland and Iceland in Europe but not the EU, should these countries think about getting together in some kind of trade organisation, which could collectively lobby Brussels? If the EU had a rival club of 8-10 countries with which it had to agree single market conditions, might those countries together have real influence? In the longer term, such a consortium might be able to get Israel or Russia/Belarus/Kazakhstan on board (in a post-Putin epoch) and then you are talking about a rival group with tremendous clout. After all, if all these countries are either unhappy being under the EU's thumb, or given the cold shoulder by it, doesn't it make sense to look at other options? A looser organisation might also be able to more effectively involve Europe's southern neighbourhood.

There would be nothing to stop the group of non-EU members here (to list, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro) to sit down and discuss common interests and possible future co-operation. This is admittedly just an idea and hasn't been fully thought through, but perhaps not all roads in Europe lead to Brussels (?).

I'll freely admit that this is a rehash of a 2011 article on the same blog. The relevance of the issue persists.

Ukraine's ideology problem

2013-01-23T14:47:00.001+02:00

The rise of Svoboda, though regrettable, can't be viewed out of context

At the start of the year, probably in a slow week for news, the BBC finally got wind of the right wing phenomenon that is Svoboda. Its report was not very different to similar previous reports on other right wing groups, such as Hungary’s Jobbik. After all, in 2012 the BBC had already put lots of effort into telling us about the kinds of attitudes that apparently only exist in Eastern Europe. Ritualistic activities make the best footage, and it’s not difficult to get some quotes from a party member sounding forth reprehensible views, most worryingly the abhorrent and baffling anti-semitism that pre-occupies right wing groups across Central and Eastern Europe, long after the Jewish communities in these countries were savagely almost completely extinguished. There are certainly things to worry about, not least the unchecked veneration of the controversial Stepan Bandera, but reports about the right wing resurgence ignore the wider context of Ukraine’s political landscape at their peril.

Take history, for example. It was the Party of Regions, not Svoboda, which closed access to the SBU archives that had been open during the Yushchenko era. At that time the authorities also handed control of the country’s National Institute of Memory to the Communist Party. Since then it has aggressively pushed the Soviet-era narrative of World War II in schools and in the gaudy Victory Day celebrations. Against this background of limiting rational and impartial historical research and promoting national myths, it is not difficult to see how Svoboda now has fertile ground to promote the Bandera narrative. Contrast this with the breakthrough over the past few years in Holodomor remembrance which means that even pro-Russian politicians are seen at the memorials on remembrance day. The airing of historical evidence has doubtless helped enormously in making this possible, and superseded the heated debate over whether it should be classed as genocide.

The authorities and those that came before them have also laid fertile ground in a host of other ways. A push for what might be termed as ‘Galician nationalism’ epitomised by the vindictive Education Minister, was soundly rejected by Ukrainians at the polls. Svoboda’s strong showing in Kiev oblast shows that any kind of Galician nationalism, or an attempt to put a wedge between Western and Central Ukraine, is a non-starter, and doesn’t even depend on voters being Russian or Ukrainian-speaking. Don’t forget that Galicia (Halychyna) in fact also extends into Poland (Galicja) and the concept is of little relevance to modern Ukrainians, many of whom clearly value national unity.

Svoboda was heavily implicated in the recent fighting in the Verkhovna Rada, and Udar rightly praised for standing back, but let us not forget that it is not Svoboda that created Ukraine’s parliamentary thugocracy, as some nasty beatings in the previous parliament illustrate. Ukraine’s lack of proper parliamentarianism goes back a long time. Support for banning multiple-voting (‘piano playing’) by MPs is an easy gold sticker for Svoboda. The European Parliament’s plea to the other opposition parties not to co-operate with Svoboda seems like a non-starter when crucial votes on such issues could make all the difference, and with such disregard across the board for constitutional principles. It is also inconsistent with previous cases within the EU, such as in Slovakia when Robert Fico’s Smer party went into coalition with the anti-Hungarian Slovak National Party (whose leader proclaimed his wish to roll tanks into Budapest). Shouldn’t the European Parliament have taken a similar stance then?

The success of Svoboda, and the Communists, also point to a need in Ukrainian politics to return to ideology. The personality parties of the last 20 years have done little to enable debate about the best course the country should take, and the affinities the major parties have claimed along ideological lines with the groupings of the European Parliament have ranged from tenuous to bogus. The re-emergence of the left and the right ought to concentrate the minds of those in the centre, particularly if ideology now counts for at least 1 in 4 of the country’s voters. Ukraine must take more steps towards functioning parliamentarianism rather than strong presidentialism, as studies have proved that the former model is more effective at enabling reform than the latter, much as this is counter-intuitive to many in the former USSR.

Svoboda may also be addressing another major gap in the country’s political life, that of civic activism, appearing keen to get involved in issues ranging from shale gas to industrial relations. This is a glaring gap that the major parties have left to be exploited. A Kiev friend tells of how, shortly after the Orange Revolution, her mother, a private medical practitioner and educated woman, called in at the offices of the Tymoshenko bloc asking how she could meaningfully contribute to the party’s work; the answer was that she could if she wished distribute leaflets and that no other service was required as the aim was simply to gain and retain power. It’s not difficult to see how Svoboda’s involvement in issues that matter to people, even if opportunistic, would resonate. Ukrainians occasionally show a penchant for direct action, blocking a railway line at Kharkiv or breaking down fences around beaches in Crimea. If Svoboda can tap into those grievances, they’ll be onto a winner.

However, a note of caution against becoming a Svoboda apologist. A student of mine here in Warsaw puts it in succinct terms; “my grandfather’s family was killed by Bandera”. The black marks against Svoboda are black indeed.