As regular readers will have noticed, ClimateInc is now dormant. I’ve learned that sustaining a blog individually is a lot of work, and a group effort is more feasible. I have now joined the editorial team of a new blog launched by our Organizations and Social Change group at UMass-Boston.This article is re-posted from there.

A milestone on the road to catastrophic climate change was reached last Thursday, May 9^th, when the Mauna Loa research center in Hawaii recorded atmospheric CO2 levels above 400 parts per million (ppm) for the first time. The level during pre-industrial times was around 280 ppm, and has been rising at an accelerating pace due to burning fossil fuels and clearing forests. For the last 400,000 years or so, CO2 levels have fluctuated between about 180 ppm, at the depths of ice ages, and 280 ppm during relatively short warm periods, or interglacials (see graphic). The last time CO2 levels reached 400 ppm was at least 3 million years ago, a much warmer world where sea levels were 60-80 feet higher.

Despite more than 20 years of accumulating evidence concerning the serious consequences of rising levels of CO2 and other greenhouse gases on the global climate, including rising sea levels, extreme temperatures, and more frequent floods and droughts, the organizational response has been dismally inadequate. Carbon markets have been widely embraced by many policymakers, academics, businesses, and even environmentalists as a way to put a price on carbon emissions, but these markets have clearly failed to address the issue. Carbon markets are complex political and legal constructions crafted to serve the interests of many actors, but they were deliberately designed not to disrupt our carbon intense economy and lifestyles.

Many have attributed the failure to address climate change to the vested interests and political power of the fossil fuel industry as well as the inertia of our complex fossil-fuel based society, with interlocking technologies, infrastructure, lifestyles, and corporate assets and competencies (See my earlier work on this here and here, and a recent introduction to an Organization Studies special issue on Climate Change and the Emergence of New Organizational Landscapes). Bill McKibben has written alarmingly about the 2795 Gigatons “of carbon already contained in the proven coal and oil and gas reserves of the fossil-fuel companies, and the countries (think Venezuela or Kuwait) that act like fossil-fuel companies. In short, it’s the fossil fuel we’re currently planning to burn.” This amount is five times more than we can realistically burn and hope to stay within the 2 degrees Celsius warming target, but McKibben points out that it is “economically above ground”, because it’s already figured into corporate share prices, credit ratings, and national budgets.

The 400 ppm threshold was reached just a few weeks after the European Union failed to agree on a plan to prop up the European Trading System (ETS), the world’s largest cap-and-trade market, prompting the price to collapse to under $4/ton. The recession and ensuing austerity has cut the EU’s appetite for subsidies for clean energy and shifted priorities. In the US, plans for a national cap-and-trade system failed in the Senate in 2010. Theda Skocpol, a political scientist at Harvard (fondly known here as UMass on the Charles) has recently attributed this failure to the collapse of political will after the recession, the resurgence of fossil fuel industry and Tea Party opposition to climate opposition, and strategic miscalculation by environmental groups who ignored the grassroots to focus their efforts on Washington DC elites.

In a similar vein, my own academic work has built on the work of Niccolò Machiavelli and Antonio Gramsci and developed the concept of ‘strategic power’, the ability to study a political arena and deploy resources in a way that integrates economic, cultural, and political forces to create real change. Unfortunately, groups funded by the fossil fuel industry, the Koch brothers, and other conservative billionaires have successfully exerted strategic power, exploiting the recession to lobby politicians, and organize and train anti-climate activists. Perhaps their biggest success has been to weave climate change into broader cultural-political themes dominant in the US, such as individualism and consumerism, fears of unemployment, suspicion of government and foreigners, hostility to taxes, and antagonism toward scientific, political, and financial elites (see my related 2009 blog piece).

Many of those concerned about climate change supported the development of carbon markets for strategic reasons, because they saw that carbon taxes and direct regulations were considered politically impossible. Drs. Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson, for example, in their 2010 book Climate Capitalism (see my review here), grudgingly embraced carbon markets, despite acknowledging their many flaws. They bring a political economy perspective to climate change; if we are to address climate change in a meaningful way within the necessary timescale, carbon capitalism is the only game in town that can galvanize a powerful network of actors with the potential to take serious action. They stress that carbon capitalism offers the opportunity to successfully mobilize the resources, energy, and political support of key sectors of business and finance, as well as policymakers. Carbon markets offer strategic flexibility for manufacturers, new market opportunities for traders and financial firms, and a source of capital for developing countries. A few key players, such as Cantor Fitzgerald and Deutsche Bank, were central figures in forging the carbon markets, and not surprisingly, they shaped the rules and processes to suit their capabilities and interests. Carbon markets are therefore political and institutional constructs, relying on a vast legal and accounting infrastructure to commoditize carbon: to establish property rights, count and certify tradable units, and to enable exchange across different jurisdictions and gases.

Dr. Janelle Knox-Hayes at Georgia Tech has spent the last couple of years studying the nascent carbon markets. The picture that emerges from her work is that these financial institutions are involved precisely because they see the opportunity to apply their financial expertise and institutional capacity to a new market. So these actors created carbon markets that look a lot like the markets for other financial instruments and commodities, complete with futures, options, and other derivatives. This is unsurprising, given what we know about how organizations build new institutions by adapting existing templates. These are the very same players who brought us sub-prime mortgages, collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps, and value-at-risk models. These were attractive because plain-vanilla mortgages had become simple commodities with very low profit margins, while the complexity of new derivatives enabled these companies to charge high fees for specialized products and the associated proprietary expertise and valuation techniques. The financial firms thus have a vested interest in market instruments that are complex, opaque, volatile, and hard to value. So there are legitimate grounds for concern that carbon markets were not designed to provide the clear and simple price signals needed to stimulate a broad transition to a low-carbon economy.

“Carbon markets have lost us more than 15 years in the battle against climate change”, according to Dr. Steffen Böhm in a recent piece in the Guardian. He points to three systemic failures that have plagued carbon markets. First, the Clean Development Mechanism that generates a high proportion of globally traded credits is so flawed that many, if not most, CDM projects do not pass the “additionality” test of reducing emissions relative to a hypothetical business-as-usual baseline, and certainly don’t reduce emissions in any absolute sense. Second, carbon markets are beset by corruption and lack of independent oversight. Third, they can promote environmentally questionable practices, such as burning rice husks to generate ‘renewable’ power and carbon credits, instead of their traditional use as fertilizer – therefore increasing the use of energy intense chemical fertilizers.

Carbon markets were not primarily designed to solve the climate crisis, but rather to gain political support from business, policymakers and civil society actors in a grand ‘carbon compromise’. Competitiveness concerns led policymakers to design carbon markets to be sufficiently flexible and with sufficient credits that carbon prices would not impinge too much on corporate product strategies. Policymakers could claim to be addressing the issue without affecting core business strategies. The (failed) proposals for federal cap-and-trade in the US, as well as the RGGI system that (barely) functions in 10 northeastern states, were designed to keep carbon prices well below the $30/ton level, a price that roughly translates into an increase of 30c/gallon of gasoline, and about 2.1c/kWh of electricity. Prices in the RGGI market have recently been under $3/ton of CO2. While some point to the low price as an optimistic sign that carbon emissions are in fact lower than expected, the emission reductions are only a temporary result of the recession. If business is to commit large scale resources to long-term investments in carbon reduction, then the carbon price signal has to be strong, consistent, and predictable. Markets are not magic mechanisms that solve all problems, but political and institutional constructions that serve particular interests. As atmospheric carbon surges past 400 ppm, it’s clear that carbon markets have failed us, and a new strategy is needed.

I recently released a study of innovation in energy efficiency project finance, the culmination of five years’ effort in over twenty global capitals on more than a hundred projects. The report describes successful pilots, lessons learned, and implications for a broad acceleration in energy efficiency investment worldwide. Significantly, the report confirms the recent emergence of a new Asian center of innovation in energy efficiency project finance. The paper, entitled Making Energy Efficiency Bankable: Lessons Learned from a Global Market Transformation Effort, is co-authored with Christopher Seeley of the William J. Clinton Foundation, and will be presented at the 2012 ACEEE Summer Conference on Energy Efficiency in Buildings

We know that the cleanest, safest, and least costly energy is the energy we don’t use. Analysts have concluded repeatedly that investment in conservation is perhaps the most cost-effective alternative source of energy. Yet, despite decades of progress in building technology, surveys of energy efficiency investment have shown it repeatedly falling short of rational expectations.

Not long ago, a DOE report noted that U.S. investment in energy efficiency was no more than the total of budgeted efficiency programs funded by consumer electricity surcharges. Another report estimated the impact of utility-sponsored efficiency programs to be less than one-half of 1% of total building energy use in the past 20 years. Significantly expanded authorizations now coming online might raise that amount to a little over three-quarters of 1% in the next decade. Apparently, there’s more to creating a market for energy efficiency than some new technology and economic pump priming. Based on recent experience, the answer may lie in everyday commercial practices – that is, contracting, underwriting, funding, and debt servicing associated with energy efficiency projects.

Question: What is the significance of innovation in energy efficiency project finance? Answer:

I=K_r +T_e +D_e

Innovation in building energy efficiency results from the interplay of Knowledge from research, Technology from engineering, and Delivery to market from enlightened entrepreneurship. A common problem arises when a promising idea reaches a stage known as the “Valley of Death” — that is, when the idea is not yet perceived as workable in practice or at scale and is therefore considered too risky by traditional investors (read building owners and real estate lenders in the case of energy efficiency). Crossing the valley requires some kind of convincing demonstration of economic feasibility which in turn requires financial resources, hence the dilemma.

With a sound knowledge base and considerable proven technology, energy efficiency nevertheless suffers from a delivery gap attributable to widespread perceptions of financial risk and uncertain performance. While a number of seemingly practical project finance prototypes exist, to date there has not been sufficient commercial-scale demonstration of those models to confirm their economic viability – that is, profitability at acceptable risk.

Under these circumstances, loan investors are deterred from providing capital, bank regulators are not supportive of the risk, and investment portfolio managers have little access to energy efficiency returns. If nothing changes, energy efficiency will remain stuck in the Valley of Death for a long time to come. What is required is a way to cross the valley and expand large-scale delivery of energy efficiency to the global marketplace.

In May 2007, former U.S. President Bill Clinton launched an ambitious energy efficiency best practices effort. The Energy Efficiency Building Retrofit Program explored ways to make efficiency retrofit projects more bankable with unsubsidized, commercial lending models applicable in a variety of countries and considerably more scalable globally than current regulated and legislated models tied to local jurisdictions. The author was one of the guiding lights of that program, and his report, in cooperation with Clinton Foundation colleague Christopher Seeley, describes the innovative pilots undertaken, lessons learned, and implications for a broad acceleration of energy efficiency investment worldwide. It also confirms the emergence of a new Asian center of innovation in energy efficiency project finance.

Between them, the authors delivered pro bono advisory services to building owners for five years in over twenty large cities worldwide, negotiating technical and financial performance terms on more than a hundred building retrofit projects. Their experience suggests that, when contracting and lending are properly coordinated and deployed, their model has the potential to transform the market for energy efficiency. Here are the model’s distinct aspects.

Energy performance lending

For mortgaged properties with limited refinancing options, a new form of collateral and underwriting process for energy efficiency projects. Common real estate lending practice complicates energy efficiency projects because it can be difficult to add debt without refinancing a property completely. As proponents of PACE finance (both residential and commercial) have learned, the rights of first mortgage holders cannot be easily ignored.

Energy performance lending uses underwriting criteria which lean on energy efficiency project cash flows to secure loans. An analogy is the way that a drilling project is secured using the expected cash flows from oil. When used in conjunction with an enhanced contracting model, projects underwritten in this way can coexist with senior debt without affecting prior security interests.

Managed utilities service agreements

For multi-tenanted buildings, a special entity structure that removes a significant decision hurdle by eliminating split incentives between owners and leaseholders. In many tenant occupied buildings, because of the way leases are written, owners lack proper incentives to make energy efficiency investments in common areas of their building. Managed utilities treats energy use as an outsourced service, transferring project debt to a special purpose entity and converting repayment obligations to operating expense passed through to tenants under the terms of their lease. Tenants are protected against rent increases by savings guarantees in the contract, and rents decline at the end of the performance period with ongoing savings to tenants.

Energy performance contracting

An enhanced design-build approach to contracting energy efficiency retrofit projects which is the sine qua non of energy performance lending, effectively turning energy savings guarantees into a true credit enhancement. Owing to the generally strong credit of governments and bank willingness to offer favorable terms for government debt, performance contracting thrives in the U.S. public sector, but not in commercial real estate or other parts of the world. The energy services industry concluded uniform contract terms with the Clinton Foundation, delivering more credible savings guarantees and making third-party financing more attractive.

Municipal leasing

For local governments, capital budget competition and concerns over limits on agency bonding capacity can constrain energy efficiency investment. Yet with its high transaction costs and inflexible terms, bonding is in some ways ill suited for naturally smaller energy efficiency retrofit projects unless implemented as part of a much larger capital project.

Fortunately, virtually any essential-use energy efficiency project can be financed using a municipal lease, usually at a cost comparable to bonding. Depending on the project, the total cost of lease financing is often not greater than bonding because slight cost-of-funds premiums are offset by lower transaction costs and by flexible takedown and payment terms. Legal opinion holds that leases are not normally subject to the same borrowing caps as bonding, and the absence of high transactions costs make smaller projects more attractive.

Tax-exempt equipment leasing

Nonprofit institutions in the U.S. are partnering with public finance agencies, outside accountants, and credit rating agencies to create a new class of energy efficiency projects not subject to normal borrowing limits or rating concerns. Institutions rely on state financing agencies for tax-exempt borrowing as states alone have the authority to issue tax-exempt bonds, and all states have at least one agency that can bond on behalf of tax-exempt institutions. However, institutional borrowing can be limited by an institution’s balance sheet and possibly their credit rating.

Institutions have begun using a tax-exempt project finance structure linked to a performance-based contract that qualifies for off-balance-sheet treatment. The bonding agency agrees to hold title to the project during the performance period. With constraints eliminated, institutions are freed to undertake energy efficiency projects based on their inherent economics rather than competing for limited capital funds.

Conclusion

Evidenced by successful prototypes and pilots in Asia, it appears energy efficiency can be financed independent of local regulatory regimes and special-purpose incentives. The twenty-first century requires more such models to meet the challenge of low-carbon economic development. It’s conceivable that innovation in project finance can do for building efficiency in the coming century what 30-year mortgages did for home ownership in the last.

The refereed research, entitled Making energy efficiency bankable: Lessons learned from a global market transformation effort, will be formally presented at the biennial conference of the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE) in August. Interested parties can download the paper for review beforehand or contact Milton Bevington (milton@mbpartners.org) for more information.

The speakers discussed the potential for green chemistry to make  production processes and final products safer in a variety of sectors, and to reduce waste and the use of toxic substances. At the same time, green chemistry can save companies money by reducing the need for costly chemicals, reagents and solvents, lowering insurance and legal costs, reducing waste disposal costs (which can exceed $5 per kg for some toxics), and saving energy. In the pharmaceutical industry, Buzz Cue noted that the ratio of waste to final product, called the E-factor could often reach 50 or 100. Applying green chemistry principles has the potential to cut this by a factor of 5 or 10. Pfizer has reduced the E-factor for Viagra from 108 to 8. Given that more than 1 billion kgs of pharmaceutical drugs are produced each year worldwide, the savings can quickly mount into the millions of dollars.

John Warner has developed a set of 12 principles that have become the cornerstone of green chemistry, and there are at least three common elements with the potential for substantial environmental benefits and cost savings: (1) simplifying the overall process, reducing the number of steps, and hence the need for solvents and reagents, and the attendant risks and energy use for heating and drying at each step (2) switching to safer processes and chemicals, frequently based on aqueous (water) solutions instead of organic chemicals (3) continuous process production with real time monitoring and control and (4) recycling chemicals used in the process.

The presentations and discussion got me thinking about the relationship between green chemistry and clean energy. There are some important similarities in the approaches:

1. It’s the economy, stupid! However important the health of the planet and our bodies are to us, the key to corporate adoption is making an effective business case. Advocates of clean energy and green chemistry have to demonstrate that investments meet the usual RoI hurdles (though they are frequently much less risky than investments in the core business, but that’s another story). For clean energy and green chemistry, there is plenty of low-hanging fruit, but cost is also a barrier for more systemic change.

2. Business model innovation is as important as technological innovation: The environmental benefits, and other co-benefits, need to be monetized, sometimes requiring creative business models. A lot can be done with existing technologies, but various market and non-market barriers exist, which business model innovation can help overcome.

3. The lean production principle: it’s usually cheaper, more reliable, and environmentally better to improve the core production process rather than add on “end of the pipe” solutions.

4.  Simplicity can require complexity: Einstein invested a lot of brains and sweat to arrive at E=MC². Simple, elegant solutions that save money and reduce environmental impacts are not always easy to find, and often require substantial investments of time and money in chemical science and process engineering.

5. Systemic perspectives: analyzing an entire production system from raw materials to disposal of final product, using life cycle analysis, can help identify ways to cut costs and reduce use (and waste) of energy, water and chemicals.

6. Don’t go it alone! The industry needs to collaborate to address some larger institutional and regulatory issues. FDA regulations, for example, can hinder process changes in the pharmaceutical industry, so the sector has formed a group to work with regulators. In a similar way, the clean energy sector has to work with regulators to facilitate distributed power (e.g. for net metering) and to establish standards and protocols, for example, for carbon measurement and for smart grid software.

Only one of the twelve principles of green chemistry is explicitly about energy efficiency, and it suggests that reactions be designed for ambient temperatures. The call for renewable feedstocks and to maximize atom efficiency also relate to energy use, but overall, the principles are mostly focused on questions of toxicity, hazards, and waste reduction. Given the energy intensity of the chemical sector, from the feedstocks to production, distribution, and waste disposal, waste reduction inherently saves substantial amounts of energy.

There is a lot of room, however, to explore the relationship between green chemistry and energy efficiency more closely. Energy use generates its own waste, of course, from particulates to carbon dioxide and SOx and NOx, but while these create environmental and public health issues, they are not considered particularly toxic, and are not the focus of green chemistry. Moreover, the chemical and pharmaceutical industries buy their energy-intense feedstock materials from other firms upstream on the value chain, over which they have little direct control. The larger companies could perhaps learn something from Walmart’s experiences in pressing suppliers and customers along the value chain for action.

Green chemistry could also learn a lesson from the energy arena about the potential for end use conservation and efficiency. The green chemistry principles seem to take final demand for products as given, rather than look for ways to reduce production. There has been increasing attention recently to the over-prescription of some types of drugs, and large quantities many drugs are discarded for various reasons. Chemicals used for agriculture could be reduced with organic and other alternative practices. The problem here is that while utilities are frequently given incentives for end-use energy reduction, most industries don’t see a good business model in reduced sales and production. One exception is Monsanto, which finds it profitable to sell GM seeds that are matched with lower volume but proprietary chemical pesticides and herbicides.

Green chemistry can also be used directly for clean energy purposes. My son’s first internship was in one of Professor John Warner’s labs at UMass-Boston, testing various kinds of non-silicon PV cells for their efficiency and longevity. Chemistry is also key to biofuels production, from algae to cellulosic ethanol, and to identifying catalysts for fuel cells. There is active investigation of direct air capture (DAC) of CO2 using chemical processes, though costs are currently prohibitive. For market reasons, the large pharmaceutical and chemical companies with substantial research budgets have not focused their attention and resources on applying green chemistry for clean energy and climate mitigation purposes, though this is huge potential in this area.

by David L. Levy

Despite the mounting evidence of severe climate change, there is a funding crisis for potential solutions. The Department of Energy released data at the beginning of November showing that global emissions of CO² rose 6% in 2010, despite the ongoing economic recession. This trajectory is higher than the worst case projections from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in it’s 2007 Fourth Assessement Report. The impacts are already being felt. A new IPCC report concludes that climate change is causing more extreme weather, especially heat waves, heavy precipitation, and coastal flooding (though the super-cautious IPCC hedged on hurricanes).

Yet November also witnessed setbacks for two key clean energy technologies. Beacon Power, a Boston-area developer of flywheel energy storage and power management systems for the grid, filed for bankruptcy the same week that the DoE released the grim emissions data. Just a few days later, the FutureGen 2.0 project, the leading US effort to develop commercial scale Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology, suffered a major setback when the Midwestern power company Ameren announced that it could not provide an old power plant for the project due to financial difficulties. (Update: While Ameren will no longer be financially involved in the project, they are currently negotiating how the power plant may still be utilized for the project).

One important lesson is that public policy must be based on a clear understanding of the challenges facing the clean energy sector and the impact of regulation and programs on investment decisions and corporate business models. In the absence of a global framework for regulating emissions, the future of the planet largely rests on choices by private firms and investors regarding which technologies to pursue and commercialize. The clean energy sector, however, faces a host of risks that make investors wary. The risk is not that climate change is going away as a long-term driver; the problem is that there are large market uncertainties regarding the future of regulation and subsidies, which technologies will emerge as large-scale, low-cost, low-carbon alternatives, how consumers will respond, and how competitors will react.

Despite the woeful underfunding of clean energy research in the US, there is still a plethora of exciting technologies being developed in the laboratories of universities, government centers, and the private sector. For more mature technologies, large subsidies are flowing to commercial installations of solar and wind, perhaps too large, according to a critical New York Times article last week. While these subsidies are reducing costs by accelerating the technologies down the learning and scale curves, they tend to reinforce the dominance of early, low-cost “winners” in the marketplace, and provide little help for less mature but promising emerging technologies, such as Solyndra’s CIGS thin film glass tubes. As a result, these subsidies also tend to suck in a lot of low-cost Chinese imports rather than stimulate US production or research.

A structural problem, as Daniel Goldman wrote in an earlier Climate Inc. post, is the proverbial “valley of death” between lab research and commercial production, where “neither government, venture capital firms nor capital markets have tended to bear the risks associated with providing equity capital, which can amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, for initial deployment of capital intensive new clean energy technologies at commercial scale – described here as “first project commercialization.”  The US venture capital model evolved primarily to support the emergence of the software industry, which has relatively low capital intensity, but there is not currently an adequate private (or public) sector solution for clean energy. It’s far too early to know whether, for example, flywheel technology is better than batteries or compressed gas for power storage – and maybe there is a role for each of them, to meet different needs in different locations. But a market-based system that relies on private sector funding is failing us if it cuts off development of promising technologies before they even reach commercial scale testing.

Beacon Power has not yet closed its doors, and is trying to continue operating under bankruptcy. Since the summer, it has been testing a 20-megawatt flywheel plant in Stephentown, N.Y., which can absorb and supply power from the grid very rapidly, and is therefore valuable in frequency regulation. Another installation is planned for Pennsylvania. The more intermittent wind and solar that is connected to the grid, the greater the need for short-term storage solutions. Flywheels are able to deal with rapid fluctuations and match supply and demand more effectively and reliably than batteries, such as those from A123, or gas-fired plants (while reducing emissions from rapid cycling of gas plants). A few of the the 200 flywheels in Stephentown have experienced problems, but the system has performed well overall.

Until recently, Beacon Power has not been able to monetize the full advantages of flywheel storage. It was only on October 20^th that the Federal Regulatory Energy Commission (FERC) approved a change in regulations that makes grid operators pay, not just for the amount of power in reserve, but also for its effectiveness in grid stabilization. According to Bloomberg, this could double Beacon Power’s revenue and make it easier to find financing. But the ruling, which has been in the works since February, was too late to keep Beacon solvent. If we are to rely on price and market mechanisms, we need to build them to serve the planet.

The lack of a clear regulatory framework has also hurt offshore wind power in the US. Even now that the 450 MW Cape Wind project is most likely moving ahead, the damage from more than a decade of delays and uncertainty, resulting in millions of dollars in costs and legal fees, have probably dampened investors’ enthusiasm. The latest delay stems from a court ruling that the FAA needs to take another look at aviation hazards. With further financing still required for the $2.6 billion project and the company still negotiating to sell half the power output, the future is not yet secure. Meanwhile, the European Wind Energy Association expects annual investments in the European offshore wind industry to triple to reach 10 billion Euros by 2020.

Given the urgency of the situation, public policy needs to shape the market context in order to steer private investment decisions. We are not heading in the right direction, however. In the short term, the ongoing recession appears to be diverting attention from the climate issue and draining government, business, and consumers of resources. A new Ernst and Young report estimates that the recession could lead governments to cut spending on climate change by tens of billions of dollars. It’s more important than ever to focus government resources, and commercialization of carbon-reducing technologies is a critical area. But in addition to financial support, the problems facing Beacon Power, FutureGen and Cape Wind highlight the importance of reducing regulatory uncertainty.

By David L. Levy

The Massachusetts Clean Energy Center released the 2011 Massachusetts Clean Energy Industry Report this month, just a few weeks after the failures of solar firms Solyndra and Evergreen triggered a fierce debate about the prospects for green jobs in the US and the wisdom of government investment in clean energy. The answer to this $64,000 question is 64,000 clean energy jobs in Massachusetts in 4,909 clean energy companies. While the precise jobs number depends on assumptions about definitions and the methodology used, this figure represents a 6.7% increase from July 2010 to July 2011, a period of stagnancy in the national employment situation (and employment growth in Massachusetts was a meager 1%). Moreover, respondents to the survey used for this study were optimistic about future growth, expecting employment to grow by 15.2% by July 2012. About 40% of employers expect to take on more clean energy workers in the coming year, while only 2% expect fewer.

One way to put these numbers in perspective is to compare them to the first effort to measure the clean energy sector in Massachusetts, in which I was a participant. Back in 2004, we arrived at the figure of 11,000 people in approximately 400 firms, and predicted that the sector could reach 20,000 employees by 2010 “if Massachusetts remains at the forefront in terms of both policy and technology in clean energy development”. Despite the deep recession, the clean energy sector has far exceeded these expectations. One thing that has not changed, however, is the political sensitivity of these numbers. Just last week, former Massachusetts governor and presidential candidate Mitt Romney called the promise of green jobs “illusory”. Back in 2004, our report was not published for several years, apparently because of pressure from local business associations who were worried that the numbers might lead to carbon regulation.

In 2004, we identified an incipient clean energy cluster in the state, comprising not just clean energy firms, but geographically concentrated networks of related businesses, such as specialized suppliers, consulting and professional services, and venture capital firms, and other organizations, including industry associations, universities, research centers and supportive government agencies. Clusters are characterized by a concentration of sector-specific skills and a rich network of connections among people and organizations. In the case of Massachusetts, these skills draw from the advanced electronics, IT, and specialized manufacturing sectors in the region. We observed, for example, that a significant number of ex-employees of Polaroid had brought their thin-film engineering expertise to bear in solar and fuel cell technologies. We also noted that the state has substantial expertise in power electronics, which comprises at least 25% of the renewable energy value chains. A hidden asset in the state is a strong network of clean energy enthusiasts spanning business, government and academia that lends coherence and a sense of mission to the cluster.

Aside from the headline numbers, the report highlights the diversity of sectors, activities, and skill levels associated with clean energy. This makes an accurate count difficult, but highlights the many ways that clean energy is affecting the economy and the  broad range of job market opportunities being created. Relatively few of these jobs are in manufacturing, while the vast majority are in sales, distribution, and installation, positions which are location-specific and immune to outsourcing. A substantial number are in highly skilled research and development, which are also likely to be geographically “sticky”.

The 2011 study defined a clean energy firm “as an employer engaged in whole, or in part, in providing goods and services related to renewable energy, energy efficiency, alternative transportation, and carbon management.” Similarly, clean energy workers are defined as “employees which spend at least a portion of their time supporting the clean energy aspects of their businesses”. The study burrowed deep into organizations to reveal clean energy-related activities that earlier reports have missed. While more than half the firms in the study derive at least 50% of their revenues from clean energy products and services, more than one-third of the organizations got less than 25% of their revenues from clean energy. About half the organizations contacted had 5 or fewer clean energy employees. This reflects a large number of small companies in the region, but also a lot of businesses and organizations that would not usually identify themselves with the clean energy sector, but have a few employees working on, for example, energy efficiency or clean energy research.

While solar is by far the largest technology focus of the renewable energy companies, there is a broad range of other technologies in the cluster. Since 2004, biofuels, geothermal, and hydropower have become more prominent, while fuel cell activity has declined, in relative terms. Among energy efficiency firms, the largest number are in HVAC and building controls, but smart grid and demand response have been growing recently.

Back in 2004, we noted that Massachusetts had great potential in power electronics, the hardware and software needed for energy measurement, management, storage, connection, control, and conversion. Aside from a few pure plays, like Beacon Power, it’s still unclear from this report how many companies are active in this part of the clean energy value chain. Some are probably captured in the energy storage, smart grid, and demand response categories under energy efficiency, but there could be more activity here as well as unrecognized potential. The report does mention some of the university community – it reports 326 researchers in the University of Massachusetts system (not including Dartmouth), and even 37 on my own campus, UMass-Boston.

The regional cluster contains a growing number of professional service firms, such as law, accountancy, finance, and consulting companies with staff devoted to clean energy related issues. The region is also home to a large environmental NGO community as well as numerous government agency employees working in the field. The report does not explicitly discuss these workers or organizations. Yet, combined with the administrative, professional, and managerial employees at the firms included in the report, this is an important group of jobs that many surveys have neglected.

The study notes that the clean energy sector demands advanced expertise and education, and that about 60% of firms report great or some difficulty in recruiting workers with adequate experience and technical skills. But employers are not necessarily looking for clean energy experts. Echoing what I’ve been hearing elsewhere, they want people who are highly skilled in their primary field, whether that’s sales, installation, engineering, or accounting, and with some knowledge of (and passion for!) clean energy. Which brings me to a shameless plug – our clean energy education programs at UMass-Boston, including certificates in Clean Energy and Sustainability and an MBA track in Environmental Management, are designed specifically to serve professionals who are strong in their primary field, and want to deepen their clean energy expertise.

Economic development and workforce development must be done together.  That was the primary recommendation of two research reports released last month.  It’s a common sense conclusion that has important implications for the clean energy industry and the education and training community in Massachusetts.

The first report, from the Aspen Institute’s Workforce Strategies Initiative, examined efforts to align economic and workforce development programs in Louisville, Kentucky; Cleveland, Ohio; and Southwestern Pennsylvania.   The resulting report (Where Labor Supply Meets Labor Demand: Connecting Workforce Development to Economic Development in Local Labor Markets) identifies four critical capacities that development programs need to align themselves with the changing requirements of local employers, including:

1. Industry expertise and credibility
2. Deep knowledge about the local labor pool
3. Ability to conduct local labor market research that is informed by both data and industry intelligence
4. Relationship building and maintenance

Although it might seem obvious that employers, economic development professionals and the workforce community would travel in close alignment with one another, the Aspen Institute report suggests that this is often not the case.  In fact, it’s quite common for the three groups to work parallel to, or even at odds with, the goals of those they are trying to support.   By developing and sharing the four capacities Aspen identified, workforce and economic development groups can better serve job-seekers, career changers, students, employers, tax payers and training institutions.

The need for close collaboration between economic and workforce development has been evident to leaders in the Massachusetts clean energy industry for a long time.  To assure continued alignment, a coalition of organizations sponsored a series of leadership “summit” meetings in 2010 and early 2011.  The summits were held at UMass Lowell, in New Bedford, and at UMass Amherst.

The Summit organizers included Massachusetts Clean Energy Center, New England Clean Energy Council, Skillworks, Garfield Foundation, and the UMass campuses in Lowell, Dartmouth, Amherst and Boston.   In addition to dozens of clean energy company executives, the events attracted representatives from local and state government agencies, colleges and universities, vocational training schools, apprenticeship programs, social justice advocacy groups, workforce investment boards, and labor unions.  Over 300 leaders registered for the summit meetings.

A summary of conclusions from the three Massachusetts summits was released last month under the title Supporting and Growing the Clean Energy Sector in Massachusetts: Clean Energy Industry Economic and Workforce Development Leadership Summits.

The comments and suggestions from the Bay State summit meetings clustered around seven common themes, including:

1. Growing the Demand
2. Policy and Vision
3. Education
4. Training and Workforce Development
5. Research and Development Support
6. Innovation and Finance: Building Businesses
7. Social Justice

Within each of these themes, the detailed recommendations mirrored the central conclusions of the Aspen Institute report.  The Summit participants zeroed in on the need for shared, accurate, and detailed labor market information focused on clearly defined clean energy industry sectors so that workforce programs closely match employer needs at the local level.

The Aspen Institute study and the Massachusetts clean energy summit report were also closely aligned in calling for strong, sustained, personal relationships between employers and the economic and workforce professionals charged with growing the economy and training people to land jobs in a difficult employment market.

The 4^th Clean Energy Connections Conference in Springfield, Mass. on Nov. 2 will give the state’s clean energy economic and workforce development community a chance to review the comments and suggestions made at the original summit meetings, assess progress and pitfalls over the last few months, and discuss plans for staying aligned in 2012 and beyond.

As the Aspen Institute report notes, the recent recession has resulted in austerity policies that will strike hard at public and private budgets.  This harsher environment is reducing the margin of error for economic and workforce development programs. Taxpayers, employers and government officials are shining a bright spotlight on expenditures aimed at job creation and job placement.  They are demanding clear and measurable results.

To produce these results, employers, economic development professionals, and the workforce development community will need to support each other, produce and share high quality information, and work together toward closely aligned goals and objectives.  Working on separate, uncoordinated tracks, is simply not an option.

The American Energy Innovation Council (AEIC) released a new report last week, Catalyzing American Ingenuity: The Role of Government in Energy Innovation, which makes the case that the US government should dramatically increase its investment in energy innovation in order to enhance US competitiveness, energy independence, and create affordable clean-energy alternatives. The AEIC doesn’t represent the clean energy industry; rather, it’s a small but highly influential group of CEOs (and a couple of former CEOs) from Lockheed Martin, Xerox, Kleiner Perkins, Microsoft, Dupont, GE, and Cummins. The AEIC report makes the historical observation that “From gas turbines to smart phones, medical imaging technologies to space flight, GPS to the internet, government funded innovation research has improved lives, created jobs, and supported more than a century of U.S. preeminence.”

The report documents the various market failures that impede private sector investments, such as the risky, long term nature of R&D, a lack of competition, and the difficulty in monetizing all the benefits of clean energy. The report highlights the inadequacy of US investment in relation to global competitors, such as China and Germany, and recommends support for “innovation hubs” that encourage “concentrated talent, the exchange of ideas, and the creation of new technologies and ventures” in regional business clusters.

The report was released the same week that California-based solar firm Solyndra filed for bankruptcy after receiving hundreds of millions of dollars in government assistance and loan guarantees, fueling a fierce debate about the wisdom of government investment in clean energy. This is not the place to discuss the details of the Solyndra case (see here, here and here), but it’s clear that much of the criticism stems from a larger, ideologically-motivated campaign against government support for clean energy, with strong links to the political forces against carbon regulation. While it’s true that Solyndra and Massachusetts-based Evergreen have filed for bankruptcy and many manufacturers have seen their profit margins eroded by intense competition, the industry as a whole is booming. The solar industry is the fastest growing sector in the country, with sales rising 67% in 2010, and the cost of panels has fallen by 80% since 2008.     

Despite efforts by Fox News and the Competitive Enterprise Institute to disparage renewables and even claim that solar “doesn’t work”, the recent bankruptcies are actually a sign of the industry’s success, bringing the typical transition to maturity, commoditization, and a shakeout of higher-cost producers. Commoditization and cost pressures are severe in the power sector where price is the primary driver, while branding and differentiation are relatively unimportant. Unsurprisingly, manufacturing is therefore shifting rapidly to lower cost locations, notably China. Yet employment in the US solar sector has still grown by 6.8% since August 2010 (net, after taking into account the recent failures) and the US enjoyed a $1.9 billion trade surplus in solar products in 2010.

The AEIC report is only the most recent attempt to raise the alarm regarding US prospects in clean energy. Countries are frequently framed as being in a “race” for a dominant position. The Breakthrough Institute, for example, attracted substantial publicity for a 2009 report titled: Rising Tigers, Sleeping Giant: Asian nations set to dominate the clean energy race by out-investing the United States. The Pew Trust followed in 2010 with a report titled Who’s winning the clean energy race?, and the headline conclusion that the US has fallen to “a distant third in the race for clean energy investment” was picked up by a multitude of news sites.

The notion of a clean energy “race” does have valid conceptual grounding in the idea of regional business clusters. Clusters are geographically concentrated networks of businesses and related institutions such as industry associations, universities, training institutes, and research centers. Clusters usually comprise a range of connected value chain activities, including specialized suppliers and engineering firms, venture capital, professional services, as well as sophisticated customers demanding the latest and best features. As a result, clusters are characterized by a concentration of sector-specific skills and a rich network of connections among people and organizations.

Clusters are attractive as foundations for a dynamic regional economy because they tend to generate high levels of innovation, investment, and incomes. All the firms in the cluster benefit from lower costs, better access to specialized inputs, and the latest information on market trends, production techniques, and technological developments. Importantly, clusters are resilient and enduring, as once they reach a critical mass, their competitive advantages encourage self-sustaining growth. Moreover, business activities are geographically “sticky” and so can resist pressures to outsource to lower cost locations. Clusters therefore enjoy first-mover advantages, as early successes, such as Denmark’s wind industry, become established and enjoy enduring advantages.

A cluster promotion strategy is gaining attention in policy circles. The recent Brookings Institute report on the US clean energy sector found a strong assocation between concentration of business activity in metropolitan areas and rates of growth. The report noted that “Not only are other nations bidding to secure global production and the jobs that come with it but the United States currently risks failing to exploit growing world demand.”. A key recommendation is that the “federal government should increase its investment in new regional innovation and industry cluster programs.”

It’s important to note, however, that the success of the solar industry and its transition to maturity is a result of global investment in R&D and manufacturing, including substantial government support in China and Europe. Rapidly falling solar energy costs create widespread benefits for buyers of solar panels, for energy consumers, and for those employed in the fast-growing industry (not to mention the environmental benefits!). Moreover, national and regional clean energy clusters are not separate racing teams, but are elements of a larger complex global industry with intertwined value chains. Recent academic work has demonstrated how successful business innovators are connected through “global pipelines” to international business networks. In clean energy, many firms operate right from the outset with global customers, suppliers, capital, and technology.

In this dynamic and high-risk environment, the failure of a Solyndra or the shift of some commodity manufacturing to China does not necessarily signal the loss of US competitiveness. As the global clean energy industry grows and matures, firms will reconfigure their global value chains, shifting activities across countries. The US is likely to specialize more in services, finance, and design than manufacturing. It’s still important to invest in creating vibrant clean energy clusters, but the benefits should not be measured in short-term events or narrow national terms. Indeed, it’s critical to understand the competitive basis of high value-added regional clusters in the context of global industries, and to develop collaborative strategies among business, universities, and governments to support their growth.

While public policy and the media tend to focus on technological innovation as the key to addressing climate change and boosting clean energy, business model innovation (BMI) offers a path to rapid deployment of existing technologies. The concept was popularized and given its current acronym by Mark Johnson, Clayton Christensen, and Henning Kagermann in their Dec. 2008 Harvard Business Review article “Reinventing Your Business Model.” They point out that “Low-cost U.S. airlines grew from a blip on the radar screen to 55% of the market value of all carriers. Fully 11 of the 27 companies born in the last quarter century that grew their way into the Fortune 500 in the past 10 years did so through business model innovation.”

The potential for BMI in the development of the cleantech sector is only just beginning to be appreciated. Rob Day, a partner with Black Coral Capital in Boston, recently wrote about a new wave of startups that run lean and require less capital to scale up, so are less likely to founder in the infamous Valley of Death: “Some of this next wave of startups will be hardware, but many will be software and/or services…  Business model innovation will often be stressed over technological innovation.  They will sometimes marry energy-related market opportunities with Web2.0 and social media business models and platforms.”

A closer look reveals that BMI holds particular promise for unlocking the potential of clean energy and promoting economic competitiveness, investment and employment in high-cost regions. In addition to helping keep startups lean and capital efficient, BMI can develop systemic solutions that overcome some of the many market failures and institutional barriers to energy efficiency and clean energy. McKinsey’s famous Marginal Abatement Curve heralds the good news that about one-third of needed emissions reductions appear to have positive ROI with current technologies. The bad news is that about one-third of needed emissions reductions appear to have positive ROI – yet the necessary investments are not happening, due to these many hurdles. As with Zipcar, BMI provides ways to monetize the ancillary benefits of cutting emissions, and create business models that focus on features that people are willing to pay for.

BMI-based cleantech businesses are also more likely to keep jobs in high wage regions such as the US Northeast and California. Clean energy manufacturing jobs have been moving astonishingly quickly to China, even while there is still rapid technological evolution. Evergreen Solar and A123 Batteries, both based here in Massachusetts, are cases in point. Business model innovation often focuses on software and services, developing strong relationships with customers and building on existing capabilities in the region, so jobs are more likely to stay local. These factors also help to create barriers to entry, protecting the business model. Zipcar’s network of parking spots, for example, negotiated over several years with hundreds of companies and local authorities, would not be easy to replicate.   

Better Place is a powerful example of how BMI can overcome systemic barriers to technology deployment. The company is developing a national replaceable battery infrastructure for pure electric vehicles in Israel, Denmark, and elsewhere that transforms the business model for car ownership and fuel supply. Consumers buy a car without the expensive batteries, then contract with Better Place for battery replacement as a service, which is done in just a few minutes at a network of service stations. This model overcomes the physical limitations of batteries, in terms of range and charging time, and dramatically reduces the cost of new cars for consumers. As with Zipcar, governments are willing to subsidize the operation because it contributes toward reducing congestion and greenhouse gas emissions – again, monetizing ancillary benefits.

Energy efficiency and smart grid provide many opportunities for BMI. EnerNOC’s core business model, for example, is demand response and energy management, using sophisticated software and remote monitoring and control. Enernoc links the utilities, who are willing to pay for energy efficiency and for peak-period demand reduction, to a network of customers. Energy service companies like Ameresco are increasingly offering turnkey projects and performance contracts that reduce risks, capital requirements, and uncertainty for customers. Similarly, companies like Nexamp, Tioga Energy and Borrego offer renewable power purchase agreements based on DBOOM services – a complete package where the company designs, builds, owns, operates and manages the renewable energy installation, while the customer only pays for power.

Not surprisingly, then, these BMI-based companies are among the fastest growing businesses in the cleantech sector. Kevin Doyle, a Principal of Green Economy and Co-Chair of the New England Clean Energy Council’s Workforce Development Group, has pointed to the large number employment opportunities at a range of cleantech companies, a number of which are in energy services and software. As a result, they are not just looking for engineers, but also for a range of business and professional skills and expertise – which highlights the purpose of our new clean energy programs at the University of Massachusetts, Boston!

By David L. Levy

Originally published in Transparency International’s Global Corruption Report 2010: Climate Change, and reprinted by permission. This report explores risks related to tackling climate change, from international policy-making to national level mitigation and adaptation strategies,   with a special focus on the forestry sector.

A global transition to a low-carbon economy requires the large scale mobilisation of financial, technological and organisational resources, many of which are concentrated in the hands of large multinational corporations. Of the US$500 billion in annual global investment needed over coming decades to keep warming within a 2⁰ C limit, more than 80% will have to come from private sources.[1]

Climate change presents a profound strategic challenge to business, however. Measures to control the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) most directly threaten sectors that produce and depend on fossil fuels, such as oil, power and transportation. Managers in energy-intensive industries, including cement, chemicals, paper and metals, have also been concerned  with the regulatory risk of higher costs for fuels and lower demand for energy-intensive products.

After years of hostility to any carbon regulation, government incentives, competitive pressures and non-governmental organisation (NGO) campaigns have led many firms in the last decade to craft business models that exploit potential market opportunities in low-carbon products and services. This shift in corporate political and market strategy has created a virtuous cycle, in which strengthened business coalitions have grown supportive of more stringent climate policy and widened the political space for action.

This cycle is fragile, however, and the momentum of this corporate conversion is already in danger of stalling. Climate change creates considerable competitive risk, as changes in prices, technologies and demand patterns disrupt traditional business models. Investing in new technologies can be a treacherous business. Automobile manufacturers, for example, find that they are dependent on existing infrastructure, creating barriers for electric vehicles, which require a network of charging stations. Multiple clean energy technologies are in competition, such as solar thermal versus photovoltaics, and ‘thin film’ versus ‘crystalline silicon’ solar cells, making it hard to pick winners.

Moreover, companies successful in one area of business cannot easily transition to new products and markets. Corporate managers know that the key lesson of business strategy is to stick to your ‘core competences’. Exxon lost money when it tried to diversify in the 1970s energy crisis,[2] and now understands that its expertise lies in geology, hydrocarbon chemistry, extraction and distribution. Rather than embrace radical change, it has enhanced its capacity in related low-carbon technologies. In 2009 Exxon announced a US$600 million algae biofuels project with a biotech company, and a US$41 billion acquisition of a major player in the shale gas sector.[3] These investments represent a better strategic fit than solar or wind, though they entail cross-industry partnerships to acquire external capabilities.

Similarly, oil and gas companies have befriended the coal industry as proponents of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology,[4] as the expertise to extract fluid fuels is closely related to that required to re-inject CO₂ underground. Although many of these emerging technologies will have to be proved to be environmentally safe and financially feasible, the model for cross-industry collaboration is strong, allowing companies to share risks, gain capabilities and shoulder the fixed costs of research and development.

Climate change presents a host of strategic uncertainties regarding the unfolding science, regulation, technological developments and competitor reactions. Thus, when British oil company BP committed itself to investing in solar and wind energy in 2000, it was competing in the same global oil market as Exxon, but perceived the risks very differently. BP plotted a strategy for a world in which mandatory emission controls appeared inevitable, carbon would carry a price tag, and consumers would demand low-emission products. A decade later, though, with growing regulatory uncertainty and its solar business far from profitable, BP has pulled back from its renewable energy investments, instead increasing its investments in Canadian oil sands.[5]

National and regional authorities have a vital role to play by implementing policies that provide incentives for positive corporate action. Bolstered by tax policies in Denmark and Israel, the company Better Place is developing a national replaceable battery infrastructure for pure electric vehicles that allows consumers to pay according to driving distance.[6] The Vélib bike rental system in Paris and the US-based Zipcar car rental firm similarly engage business and government in partnerships that transform markets and overcome systemic obstacles in infrastructure, scale and incentives.[7]

These initiatives move towards a service- rather than product-based business model. Moreover, they trigger competitive dynamics with far-reaching effects. Better Place has signed a deal with Renault–Nissan to supply the electric cars, and other car companies, fearful of falling behind, are accelerating their own plans for plug-in hybrids and pure electric vehicles.

Major companies in the US power sector have adopted a more proactive position on climate change in recent years. Duke Energy, Exelon and PG&E have joined initiatives led by the US Climate Action Partnership and the Pew Center on Global Climate Change that aim at emissions reductions by deploying renewables, boosting generation efficiency and implementing demand-side management (DSM) policies.[8] These companies might anticipate a future national cap-and-trade regime and carbon price, but they face more immediate and local pressures, notably escalating renewable or alternative energy portfolio standards in more than 30 US states.[9]

US states are also attempting to restructure power markets to provide incentives for energy efficiency. Most frequently, this takes the form of small ‘benefit charges’ being added to bills, which are used to subsidise consumer efficiency upgrades.[10] Several states are also examining California’s experience with rate decoupling, which rewards utilities with higher power prices for implementing energy efficiency and DSM measures.[11]

The lesson for public policy here is the importance of structuring incentives and managing expectations to shape business models and channel corporate resources in a positive rather than counterproductive way. In the face of global policy uncertainty, a key task is to maintain momentum by creating a predictable business and regulatory environment.

Business realises the dangers of the proliferation of multiple regulations, standards and carbon trading schemes, and large firms are joining groups that press for clear, predictable and coherent climate policy. In 2007 more than 60 of the world’s largest companies, including BP, Siemens, GE and Unilever, launched Combat Climate Change (3C), with the goal of developing ‘a worldwide policy framework to replace the Kyoto Protocol from 2013 and onwards’.  In the absence of an international treaty, the onus falls on the private sector, along with local and national governments, to seek novel business models that stimulate the transition to a low-carbon future.

[2] Wall Street Journal (US) ‘Exxon chief makes a cold calculation on global warming’, 15 June 2005.

[3] MarketWatch.com, ‘Exxon Mobil lays $600 million on the line for algae fuels’, 14 July 2009; CNNMoney.com, ‘Exxon to buy XTO in $41 billion deal’, 14 December 2009.

[4] See, for example, www.globalccsinstitute.com.

[5] BusinessGreen.com (UK), ‘BP shrugs off anti-tar sands shareholder resolution’, 16 April 2010.

[6] See Betterplace.com.

[7] NPR.org (US), ‘Paris’ popular bike program may inspire others’, 15 September, 2009; Government-fleet.com (US), ‘City of Baltimore launches car sharing program’, 1 July 2010.

[8] See www.us-cap.org/about-us/about-our-members and www.pewclimate.org/companies_leading_the_way_belc/company_profiles.

[9] Pew Center on Global Climate Change, ‘Climate Change 101: State Action’ (Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2009).

[10] Ibid.

[11] See Pew Center on Global Climate Change, ‘Decoupling in detail’, available at www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/decoupling_detail

The Boston University Pardee Center recently released this report on Governance for a Green Economy:

by David L. Levy

A global transition to a sustainable economy requires the large-scale mobilization of our financial, technological, and organizational resources. Climate change is one of the major concerns of this century, and it has been estimated that annual global investment of more than $500 billion will be needed over the coming decades to keep warming within a 2 degs. C limit. The vast scale of these investments and the need to integrate sustainable technologies, practices, and products across the supply chains of every economic sector highlight the importance of creating governance structures that will redirect corporate resources toward sustainability.

Growing concern about an international “governance deficit” has fuelled this embrace of private resources and capacity. It is important, however, to recognize that large companies are already, de facto, highly engaged in the fabric of global environmental governance systems in their roles as polluters, investors, suppliers, buyers, innovators, lobbyists, and marketers. Private decisions over products and processes, technologies and research, and distribution and sourcing have vast environmental consequences with wide societal ramifications and broad geographic reach.1

The Complexity of Carbon Lock-In

It is our current governance systems over energy and transportation that produce carbon lock-in, the “interlocking technological, institutional and social forces…that perpetuate fossil fuel-based infrastructures in spite of their known environmental externalities.”4 Lock-in is more than an economic and technological phenomenon. Institutions such as the mass media, unions, government agencies, and professional certification bodies generate standards, rules, norms, routines and cultural practices that stabilize the dominant technologies. The automobile, for example, is intimately connected to our patterns of work, leisure, and shopping. Organizations with vested interests associated with existing technologies, such as industry associations and unions, become powerful actors who perpetuate the status quo. An understanding of the complexity, interdependencies, and inertia of the current system highlights the challenges of a sustainability transition.

Against this background, what governance institutions and mechanisms could generate change? Here we must heed Machiavelli’s warning to avoid wishful thinking and start with the world as it is. It is pointless to preach to consumers to abandon their cars and plane travel, or to admonish companies to give priority to sustainability. Economic activity is deeply embedded in economic and social institutions, and companies are constrained by corporate governance, capital markets, competition, and the wider consumer culture. It is naïve to simply specify “ideal” governance institutions that would, for example, create a high global price for carbon, mandate clean production systems, and empower non-financial stakeholders. Meaningful change requires careful study of the contested terrain of corporate environmental practice and governance, and a long-term strategy to win new allies, reframe the issues, shift norms, realign economic incentives, and craft new rules and oversight mechanisms. What we need is a strategic approach to building governance for a green economy.  

From Regulatory to Radical: Four Approaches

Four governance mechanisms can potentially shift corporate behavior toward sustainability. First, regulation can direct companies to meet specific goals, such as renewables in the power sector, or fuel efficiency for vehicles. Second, economic incentives for sustainability can be structured through taxes, subsidies, or new financial instruments such as carbon markets. Third, public pressures can lead companies to shift their norms and practices, for example, by embracing information disclosure initiatives such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). The fourth and most radical approach is to restructure the foundations of corporate governance so that productive organizations internalize the drive to serve multiple stakeholders and goals, including the workforce, the community, and the environment.

Each of these approaches has possibilities and limitations. Regulation is the most traditional means of influencing corporate behavior, but it can face huge political hurdles, as illustrated by the current post-Kyoto climate regime quagmire and inaction in the U.S. Congress. Regulation not only generates corporate opposition but also frequently faces reluctance from politicians more concerned about competitiveness and employment than sustainability. Some have made a spirited argument for a Global Environmental Organization to overcome problems of collective action and coordinate national regulation, but others are wary of the centralization of unaccountable power.5 Providing economic incentives harnesses the private sector’s profit motive, but these incentives are often driven by political rather than environmental considerations, as in the case of ethanol subsidies. They can have unintended and perverse impacts, driving up the cost of food. They strain governmental budgets and are frequently opposed by vested interests.

The move toward social and environmental disclosure represents a form of informational governance or “civil regulation” that some herald as a new era of transparency, accountability, and stakeholder engagement.6 Critics have argued that disclosure is actually a privatized form of voluntary self-governance that protects against more onerous regulation and accomplishes little for sustainability or democratic ideals.7  Thee non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who promote initiatives such as CDP seek not only to change corporate practices but also to empower civil society actors as active partners in corporate decision-making.8 Simultaneously, business strives to promote a more corporate version of disclosure geared toward management of reputation, liability, energy costs, and investor relations.

These three mechanisms for promoting sustainability—regulation, economic incentives, and increased disclosure programs—leave intact the fundamental structures of corporate governance in which companies strive to maximize profits and are primarily accountable to capital markets. Any attempt to divert companies from this goal inevitably faces resistance, and companies are frequently able to thwart, weaken, or skirt regulation through the deployment of lawyers, lobbyists, and accountants.

Sustainability advocates enthusiastically make the “win-win” case that improving environmental disclosure and practice actually raises financial performance; indeed, the core strategy of GRI and CDP has been to enlist investors as key allies in creating a demand for disclosure. There is certainly some low-lying fruit in the energy area, but it takes considerable investment and creativity to find real win-win solutions, and they won’t fix all of the massive environmental externalities of our industrial system of production and mass consumption. Even when cost-effective solutions exist, they often face various behavioral and non-market barriers to large scale deployment.

The fourth and most radical approach is to reengineer structures of governance so that organizations internalize not just environmental costs but the sustainability mission itself. A variety of experiments are under way with organizational forms that attempt to combine the economic efficiency and market orientation of the private sector with the concern for social and environmental goals of not for- profit organizations. The Corporation 20/20 initiative has brought together a range of ideas about governance structures to promote a “Great Transition” to a more sustainable society. Marjorie Kelly of the Tellus Institute, cofounder of Corporation 20/20, has described a three-part typology of structures of “for-Benefit companies”: Stakeholder-Owned Companies, Mission-Controlled Companies, and Public-Private Hybrids. “The essential framework of such a company—its ownership, governance, capitalization, and compensation structures—is designed to support this dual mission.”9

The ambitious agenda of Corporation 20/20 hints at the hurdles it faces. Some of the organizations Kelly describes deliberately limit their dividends, profitability targets, and growth rates in order to address their goals. Building an economy based on such organizations would therefore require a revolution in capital markets. While some investment funds apply social screens, constraints on pursuit of returns are anathema to capital markets. Treating stakeholders, such as labor and environmental groups, as active participants in decisions rather than bothersome constituents to be consulted and managed, replaces shareholder supremacy with a more complex and multi-layered form of governance. The tea-party will not be happy.

A Strategic Shift is Necessary

Even if many more organizations become environmentally aware and follow best practice, there is no guarantee that the global economy would be sustainable at a planetary level. As John Ehrenfeld, sustainability scholar and current executive director of the International Society for Industrial Ecology, has described, sustainability is a systems-level phenomenon based on the balance of human activities and the earth’s natural processes.10 The sum total of global production and consumption, from cars and planes to food and energy, puts an intolerable strain on the earth’s capacity to provide fresh water and absorb carbon dioxide and other pollutants. This is becoming strikingly clear with the rapid industrialization of China, India, and Brazil.

Moreover, the redesign of our cities, transportation systems, and energy infrastructure requires such a massive scale of investment and regional planning that individual business organizations, however well intentioned, cannot meet the challenge. Given these challenges, we need to move aggressively, but pragmatically and strategically, on all these modes of governance to create pressures for change. We need sectoral, national, and global institutions, bringing together business, government and civil society, that can play a role in planning, coordinating, and financing the transition.

1 Levy, D. L. and P. J. Newell (eds.). 2005. The Business of Global Environmental Governance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

4 Unruh, G. C. 2000. Understanding carbon lock-in. Energy Policy, 28(12): 817-830.

5 Bierman, F. 2001. The emerging debate on the need for a World Environment Organization. Global Environmental Politics, 1(1): 45–55.

6 Florini, A. 2003. The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World. Washington D.C.: Island Press.

7 Gupta, A. 2008. Transparency Under Scrutiny: Information disclosure in global environmental governance. Global Environmental Politics, 8(2): 1–7.

8 Levy, D. L., H. S. Brown and M. de Jong. 2010. The Contested Politics of Corporate Governance: The Case of the Global Reporting Initiative. Business and Society, 49(1): 88–115.

9 White, A. (Ed). 2009. Paper Series on Restoring the Primacy of the Real Economy. Boston: Corporation 20/20, Tellus Institute, p.36. Available at http://tinyurl.com/restoringtheprimacy.

10 Ehrenfeld, J. 2009. Sustainability by Design. New Haven: Yale University Press.