Even commentators who think Obama might overreach if he adopts this strategy too carelessly agree that the new-look Obama is all about being tough. Take David Gergen, for instance.

It is clear that he is consciously changing his leadership style heading into the next four years. Weeks before the November elections, his top advisers were signaling that he intended to be a different kind of president in his second term.

"Just watch," they said to me, in effect, "he will win re-election decisively and then he will throw down the gauntlet to the Republicans, insisting they raise taxes on the wealthy. Right on the edge of the fiscal cliff, he thinks Republicans will cave."

What's your Plan B, I asked. "We don't need a Plan B," they answered. "After the president hangs tough -- no more Mr. Nice Guy -- the other side will buckle." Sure enough, Republicans caved on taxes. Encouraged, Obama has since made clear he won't compromise with Republicans on the debt ceiling, either.

How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack Obama of the first administration might have approached the task by finding some Republicans to deal with and then start agreeing to some of their demands in hope that he would win some of their votes. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more schmoozing with lawmakers, too.

That's the old way. He has abandoned that...

Obama's only remaining option is to pulverize. Whether he succeeds in passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. Through a series of clarifying fights over controversial issues, he can force Republicans to either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or cause a rift in the party that will leave it, at least temporarily, in disarray.

Republicans seem to know they screwed up and are reluctantly retreating from use of the debt ceiling as a way to advance their aims. For the economy's sake, that's very good news. But let's be clear that the winner in the fight for public opinion was the team that showed flexibility and made the concession, not the team that refused to budge. Obama did what Dickerson says won't work. He gave ground to a Republican demand then finessed the GOP votes he needed--not through schmoozing, admittedly, but through pressure of public opinion.

(I note in passing that the White House is already signaling that it doesn't expect to get all of its supposedly ambitious gun-control legislation through Congress. Guess what. It's open to compromise--and I'm betting it's hoping that the GOP isn't. This would improve its chances of winning that fight too.)

What's new here, it seems to me, is mostly cosmetics--though I'm not saying that's unimportant. Obama has toughened up his presentation, but he still preferred the deal to going over the cliff. Crucially, most of the country felt exactly the same way. What's comical to me is how easily many Democrats have taken up the tough-new-Obama line. They might have decided to care about that tax threshold. They could have said, "Obama promised not to give way on taxes, then he did. He had the winning hand, and folded. Another climbdown, another needless compromise." Instead, they went with, "See what happens when you refuse to deal? You win!"

I urge the president to follow the same approach going forward. Be more pragmatic. Make tactical concessions on inessentials. Show the GOP, in contrast, to be rigid and dogmatic. That will get the public on your side and help you win. But just remember to keep saying how tough you've become, how it's new rules, you've learned from your first term, and the days of trying to compromise with extremists are over. The party will lap that up.

Why didn't we think of this before?

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act -- the principal statute under which Swartz was charged -- is a good example of Husak's point [about the government's expanding "power to arrest and prosecute nearly everyone"]. Enacted in the 1980s, before the Internet explosion, the statute makes a criminal of anyone who "intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access" and, in the process, obtains financial information, government information or "information from any protected computer."

What's wrong with this language? Consider: You're sitting in your office, when suddenly you remember that you forgot to pay your Visa bill. You take a moment to log on to your bank account, and you pay the bill. Then you go back to work. If your employer has a policy prohibiting personal use of office computers, then you have exceeded your authorized access; since you went to your bank website, you have obtained financial information.

Believe it or not, you're now a felon. The likelihood of prosecution might be small, but you've still committed a crime.

As Swartz's family said,

Aaron's death is not simply a personal tragedy. It is the product of a criminal justice system rife with intimidation and prosecutorial overreach. Decisions made by officials in the Massachusetts U.S. Attorney's office and at MIT contributed to his death. The US Attorney's office pursued an exceptionally harsh array of charges, carrying potentially over 30 years in prison, to punish an alleged crime that had no victims.

But here's the point: Under the present dispensation, they're actually rational. That's why Swartz's family is right to impugn the wider criminal-justice system.

By and large, American prosecutors no longer fight their cases at trial. The new dispensation is justice by plea bargain. The more savage the penalties prosecutors can threaten, the more likely the defendant (guilty or innocent) is to speed things along by pleading guilty and accepting a light penalty. According to the Wall Street Journal, Swartz was offered the choice of pleading guilty and going to jail for six to eight months, or else going to trial and taking his chances. The multiple counts and their absurdly savage sentences are best seen, just as the family said, as instruments of intimidation.

The prosecutor's bottom line, apparently, was that Swartz had to go to jail. In my conception of criminal justice, the prosecutor's role is to establish guilt, not pass sentence. Juries have already been substantially dispensed with in this country. (By substantially, I mean in 97 percent of cases.) If prosecutors are not only going to rule on guilt unilaterally but also, in effect, pass sentence as well, one wonders why we can't also dispense with judges.

In recent years, as the Wall Street Journal has documented in a disturbing series of articles, Congress has enabled prosecutorial intimidation by criminalizing ever more conduct, passing laws that provide for or require extreme sentences, and reducing the burden of proof (through expanded application of "strict liability", where lack of criminal intent is no defense).

"There is no one in the United States over the age of 18 who cannot be indicted for some federal crime," said John Baker, a retired Louisiana State University law professor... "That is not an exaggeration."

As a foreigner, I'm surprised that Americans aren't more alarmed by the workings of their criminal justice system. I don't know what ought to scare me more about living in the United States--that I might be the victim of a crime (which happens), or that this ferocious prosecutorial system might one day turn its wrath on me. I'd rather be mugged than threatened with years in jail for something I didn't even know was a crime. Is this justice system actually on my side? I'm by no means sure--an astounding state of affairs.

At a conference I attended recently, I vented my preoccupation with rogue prosecutors, an ever-proliferating criminal law and the vanishing rights of the accused on a fellow attendee--a lawyer and former prosecutor. When I'd said my piece she said, "But you have to remember that nearly all of the people who are prosecuted are guilty." For half a second I thought she was joking and I started to laugh. But she wasn't joking.

That posture is causing predictable dismay among British euro-skeptics, who just want out, and also among pro-EU types, who think it's insane even to raise the subject of bringing powers back from Brussels. We'll see what he says in the speech, but Cameron's basic approach seems right to me. Whether it makes sense for Britain to stay depends on where the EU is heading--on the terms of the partnership. If Britain and the others move sufficiently far apart on what the EU should be, then it would better for everybody if Britain negotiated a friendly exit. This possibility shouldn't be posed (or interpreted) as a threat, or an attempt at blackmail. And it certainly shouldn't be regarded as "unthinkable". On the contrary, it should be examined very carefully.

I chuckled to read about the Obama administration's thinking on the point. The US wants Britain to remain in the EU, according to an emissary in London, and here's why:

"We benefit when the EU is unified, speaking with a single voice, and focused on our shared interests around the world and in Europe," Philip Gordon said during a visit to London, adding: "We want to see a strong British voice in that European Union. That is in the American interest."

Gordon stressed that it was it was up to Britain to determine its European role but, in what appeared to be a clear reference to attempts to renegotiate UK membership with the EU, he said: "It would be fair to say that every hour at an EU summit spent debating the institutional makeup of the European Union is one less hour spent talking about how we can solve our common challenges of jobs, growth, and international peace around the world."

I think Britain should call on the US and its partners to start recasting NAFTA as a full monetary and political union. Be visionary, for heaven's sake. Put the Federal Reserve in Mexico City as a measure of good faith. Europe would benefit if North America were unified, speaking with a single voice, and focused on shared interests around the world and in the region. Also, it would be so much easier for Europe to deal with one government in North America instead of three.

What's that? It's not so simple? No, it isn't.

It had been on my reading list for my recent visit to China. I want to mention another book from that list--not as professionally relevant, as you might say, but a revelation in its own way and one I think any intelligent reader would love as much as I did. Dreaming in Chinese: Mandarin Lessons in Life, Love, and Language by Deborah Fallows.

Deborah as you may know is James Fallows's wife, and the book is a kind of memoir of her time in China with Jim when they moved to live and work there for three years a little while back. Jim's own two recent books on China, Postcards from Tomorrow Square and China Airborne are excellent too, as you might expect--but Deborah's book is intriguingly different. She's a skilled linguist and set out to learn Mandarin. It was a struggle, as was getting comfortable with Chinese manners, culture and ways of looking at the world. The book is about how those two things--her understanding of what seemed a very strange language and her understaidng of what seemed a very strange culture--came together.

As I tried to learn to speak Mandarin, I also learned about how the language works--its words, its sounds, its grammar and its history. I often found a connection between some point of the language--a particular word or the use of a phrase, for example--and how that point could elucidate something very "Chinese" I would encounter in my everyday life in China. The language helped me understand what I saw on the streets or on our travels around the country--how people made their livings, their habits, their behavior toward each other, how they dealt with adversity, and how they celebrated.

"The Lion-Eating Poem in the Stone Den" is the story of a poet (shi) names Shi who loves to eat lions (shi shi), goes to the market (shi) to buy ten (shi) of them, takes them home to eat (shi) and discovers they are made (shi) of stone (shi).

The book's as engaging a travel memoir as I can remember reading. I found it completely absorbing. And it was wonderful to have read it before my first visit to the country for quite some time, because it made many things intelligible that would otherwise have thrown me. Any armchair traveller will love it--and don't think of visiting China without reading it.

The two sides should agree at once to restore the pre-Bush tax rates for couples making more than $1 million a year -- pending a comprehensive tax reform that raises revenue mainly by capping deductions. Under this formula, each side gains something and loses something.

Democrats gain a more progressive tax code, but give ground on higher rates for couples making between $250,000 and $1 million. Republicans limit the scope of higher marginal rates and get the commitment to the base-broadening approach they say they favor, but concede higher rates right now for the very rich.

On public spending, neither side wants sequestration. The immediate fix is simply to lift the threat of it. The forward- looking commitment should abolish the recurring calamity of the debt-ceiling procedure -- and, ideally, set an adjustable cap on federal spending as a share of gross domestic product. What that number should be, how to adjust it according to demographic or other circumstances, and what to do if it's breached would have to be argued -- strenuously, no doubt -- next year.

The issue couldn't, and shouldn't, be settled once and for all. Mere convergence on the principle would be a notable, confidence-boosting achievement. In effect, it would be a promise to limit the scope of the fiscal wars -- a commitment to moderation.

The CRFB has some detailed analysis of the options for capping deductions: how to get more revenue and greater progressivity without raising rates. This should be part of the longer-term solution even if the details can't be settled in time for the short-term fix.

Could Obama agree to something less than restoring tax rates to their 2000 levels for incomes above $250,000, having promised so often not to give way on this again? Most of the country, I think, would be impressed if he did what I'm suggesting and proposed a higher threshold. And that would make it hard for the Republicans to say no. There must be a limit to how unreasonable they are willing to seem.

I'm unsure what the Democratic base would say, though. Some might declare victory; others might be inconsolable -- another humiliating and unnecessary climbdown. If I were Obama, I wouldn't care one way or the other. His days of needing those votes are over. In due course we'll see how much his election victory has weakened the GOP in Congress as compared with 2011-12, but it's not too soon to say this: Obama can disappoint the left of his party now as much as he likes.

Spirit of compromise:

With respect to the tax rates, I -- I just want to emphasize, I am open to new ideas. If the Republican counterparts, or some Democrats, have a great idea for us to raise revenue, maintain progressivity, make sure the middle class isn't getting hit, reduces our deficit, encourages growth, I'm not going to just slam the door in their face. I want to hear -- I want to hear ideas from everybody. [Emphasis added]

Well, two years ago [when all the Bush tax cuts were extended] the economy was in a different situation...

But what I said at the time is what I mean, which is this was a one-time proposition... [W]e cannot afford to extend the Bush tax cuts for the wealthy. What we can do is make sure that middle-class taxes don't go up...

If we get that in place, we are actually removing half of the fiscal cliff... And what we can then do is shape a process whereby we look at tax reform -- which I'm very eager to do...

So there is a package to be shaped... But what I'm not going to do is to extend Bush tax cuts for the wealthiest 2 percent that we can't afford and, according to economists, will have the least positive impact on our economy. [Emphasis added.]

In the worst case -- i.e., the outcome that a significant number of partisans on both sides are spoiling for -- neither side surrenders, the fiscal squeeze begins and the economy turns back down. Politically, the question is then who gets the blame. The Republicans, probably, as the Dems are betting -- but it's not certain.

Obama's right to say that voters elected him knowing that a rise in tax rates for households making $250,000 and above was a central part of his campaign. Actually, that's putting it too modestly: It was his only specific promise. So one can see why he's reluctant to give in. But a lot depends on how Republicans now play their hand. Suppose they agree to tax changes that give the White House significant revenue and shift more of the tax burden up the income distribution, without raising rates. If Obama refused to settle for that, he'd be insisting on an increase in the top marginal rate not to serve a substantive purpose but as an end in itself -- and at the cost of higher unemployment too. Not exactly statesmanlike. The blame in that case might well be shared around.

Obama may be calculating that Republicans lack the wit or self-discipline to make a strong offer of that sort (and he'd probably be right). Going over the cliff therefore inflicts the greater damage on the GOP. Of course, the means of hurting the enemy is to hurt the country, but politics is a tough business.

Naive question: In this scenario, which side is the hostage-taker?

And what on earth were they thinking? Talk about a blunder. Content is never king at these events: Success or failure is two-thirds stagecraft, and the Republicans had been doing pretty well, I thought. Actually, for a few moments, much better than pretty well. The testimonies from the retired firefighter and his wife and from one of Romney's former neighbors were quite something. Of course, what they said will need to be carefully fact-checked, but pending the outcome of that rigorously objective process I'd say those brief simple speeches (go to 1:38:00 in the video) were the most authentic and moving things I've ever heard emerge from an American political convention.

Deeply touching in themselves, they were also directly to the point -- who exactly is this guy Romney? They refuted the idea in which the Democrats are by now almost wholly invested, that Romney is a heartless self-serving capitalist monster.

It was GOP gold. I was thinking, rope-a-dope: How do the Democrats counter-punch this? All the convention planners had to do was follow it with Marco Rubio -- he didn't say much but he said it in a tremendously appealing way -- and then the nominee, who rose to the occasion with a pedestrian speech almost free of glitches. Instead, they gave us something else to write about. Forget the people vouching for Romney's humanity and generosity, moving the audience to tears, and telling the country something it ought to know. Let's concentrate instead on Clint Eastwood's ramblings to an empty chair. (He threw away the script, you say? Surprising! And then ran over his allotted time. By how many minutes was that? What's the state of his mental health more generally, do you know? I suppose you saw Ann Romney's expression as he spoke ... So much good stuff to discuss.)

Maybe the testimonies will make an impression anyway, but what an error to let Eastwood's squirm-inducing performance upstage them.

Rubio's quite something, by the way, isn't he. All that nonsense about the GOP's problem with Hispanics: He's most of the solution all by himself, standing right there. Like Obama, a twofer: excellent speaker, model ethnic-minority American. Yes, he'll be a hell of a presidential contender when the time comes -- and if the GOP manages what's left of the campaign the way they managed Romney's big night, he only has three years to wait.

The other day I said I thought Paul Ryan's convention speech was politics as usual--evasions and misdirections rather than outright lies. Once, I'd have said the same thing about Romney's speech too. I've changed my mind. I'm convinced that Republicans have crossed a line and are trashing the reputation politicians previously had for honesty and plain speaking. People are angry about this and I see now they're right to be. From here on it's zero tolerance for dishonesty wherever I see it. And I promise to amp up the indignation.

So I've got just one thing to say about Glenn Kessler. Fire his ass.

Of course I could criticize Kessler without calling him the filthy liar that he is. You know, exercise a little "restraint". On the one hand, on the other hand, all that crap. But leading scholars have taught us that in politics things aren't complicated, and when somebody builds a career on a lie, we need to say so. I try to be fair, God knows I try. Like Ezra Klein (what would we do without that impartial authority?) I strive to do justice to both sides. But here's the thing. At some point, you can be fair, or you can seem to be fair, but not both.

Kessler's foundational lie--the stinking lie on which his whole corrupt operation is based--is that he's "fact-checking". Untrue!

Last week the purported Fact Checker went so far as to pre-check the speech he thought Romney would probably give to the convention. Here he is, referencing a Romney ad:

"President Obama gutted welfare reform. My plan for a stronger middle class will put work back in welfare."

This highly inaccurate Four Pinocchio claim is at the center of what the Romney campaign considers its most effective ad. At issue is a memo issued in July by the Department of Health and Human Services, encouraging states to consider "new, more effective ways" of meeting employment goals. As part of that, the HHS Secretary would consider issuing waivers to states concerning worker participation targets.

The administration's move was a surprise, though it claims it reacted in response to requests from both Democratic and Republican governors. Even supporters suggest that the administration violated the spirit of the law, but no waivers have been issued and Obama has taken no action to weaken work requirements. Romney is asserting an extreme interpretation of what might happen under these rules.

Some of you may find that distinction hard to grasp. It's Two Spocks difficult. Paul Krugman helped me see that people are divided into three groups: the ones who know I'm right (I call these "excellent"), fools and knaves. Possibly, you're a fool, so let me spell it out for you. When a fact is wrong, it's not some number of Pinocchios, it's just wrong.

All you sniveling false-balance types, you know what you can do with your middle way. Mickey Kaus, screw your efforts to look at the welfare controversy more "carefully". Don't bore me with your "nuanced" examination of Kessler and his ilk. That's all beside the point.

All you need to know is this. Kessler's just another pundit. By calling himself The Fact-Checker he claims the superior authority derived from the special property of a fact--that it's capable of being simply true or false. To do this is a Very Great Lie. I'm not exaggerating when I say it violates every canon of civilization. Angry? You bet I'm angry. I'm crying tears of rage right now. We don't tolerate people who torture small children and we shouldn't tolerate atrocities like this. I can't think of a penalty too severe.

I know Kessler's a pretty good pundit--I never denied it. So what if he digs into things and his commentaries are smart. And I know calling him a brazen liar and wishing him to be set upon by ravening dogs isn't going to open any channels of communication between us. Good. That's just how I want it. You can be "civil" and have your nice debates, and that's all fine and dandy if you want to be a filthy traitor in the war of ideas. But when you engage with liars, you validate their lies--lies, lies, lies--and you're no better than they are.

Fire his ass.

Consider two statements: the Republicans' claim that the Affordable Care Act is a "government take-over" of health care, and the Democrats' claim that the GOP is proposing the "end of Medicare". Factcheck.org (let's give Kessler a pass this time) has ruled both these claims unacceptable: it calls the first a "tired old falsehood" and says the second is one of the worst "whoppers" of last year.

Both of the statements in question are exaggerations, and nobody needs Factcheck--"A Project of the Annenberg Public Policy Center", which sounds wonderfully authoritative--to point that out. Politicians exaggerate. It's what they do. But neither statement is simply false. Each expresses a defensible point of view.

At the very least, the Republicans want to change Medicare radically. A so-called Medicare option remains under their latest proposal, though its viability would be in doubt; and, yes, the existing program continues for those approaching retirement. Nonetheless, the plan is avowedly intended to end Medicare as we know it. That's the whole idea. It's absurd to dismiss what the Democrats said as a lie.

What about the idea that ACA is a "government takeover" of health care? Again, it's an obvious exaggeration. Again, it's intended to alarm. The reformed system, Democrats fairly point out, will still be mostly private: For good or ill, that was the point. But the reform does require a huge increase in government regulation. The combination of guaranteed issue and risk-adjustment will need to be minutely overseen, and this is where much of the unavoidable complexity of ACA resides. It surely isn't out of bounds to call a vast expansion of regulatory oversight a government take-over.

Both those ratings were false. That's just my opinion, I claim no special status for it, so you can feel free to take it or leave it.

Now, granted, the "fact-checkers" do a certain amount of analysis before arriving at their ratings. I've no objection to the analysis part. Done well, which it sometimes is, the analysis part is a valuable public service. The asinine ratings--whoppers, pants-on-fire, four Pinocchios--undo any benefit.

I say this for three reasons. First, and forgive me for dwelling on the point, the "fact-checking" conceit is false advertising. In the end, the "fact-checkers" are weighing arguments, not checking facts. That's commentary. Don't pretend to be doing something cleaner and more authoritative than plain old punditry.

Second, the focus on political slogans and rhetorical assertions is a distraction. Who cares whether "end of Medicare" or "government takeover" gets three or four Pinocchios? We should be discussing what's good and bad about ACA, how to improve it, whether and how to replace it, not obsessing over the "honesty" of either side's rhetorical flourishes. Politicians spin. Color me amazed.

Third, and most important, is a related point: This vogue for "fact-checking", far from raising the level of debate in this country, as it was presumably intended to do, is driving it down to new depths of infantilism. How do the "fact-checkers" get their page-views? By declaring statements of one side or the other illegitimate. That's the appetite they're feeding. Instead of saying, "You're mistaken and here's why," people who need no additional encouragement to be angry and unreasoning are empowered to say, like a petulant child, "Pants on fire, you're a liar."

What do you do if your opponent isn't just wrong, but is determined to lie and keep on lying? You ignore him, and talk among your friends. I'd say there was plenty of that even before the brave new "fact-checkers" came along, but for the sake of a dumb marketing gimmick--pants-on-fire, four Pinocchios--they're making things worse. Seething intolerance for the other side's point of view is the main thing wrong with American politics right now. The "fact-checkers" sure didn't start it, but they've made themselves part of the problem.

I enjoyed Tom Bevan's and Carl Cannon's thorough and persuasive account of the 21 things that decided the election in Obama's favor. A useful document. I'd be interested to read the article listing the 21 things that would have decided the election for Romney, had he won not all that many more votes in just the right places. I'm sure that piece was written and ready to go. Maybe I can prevail on Carl, a friend of mine from his National Journal days, to give me a look. Shame to waste it.

The big question of historical interpretation -- and I'm not sure of the answer -- is how much of a negative, if at all, the economy was for Obama. Democrats will want to believe, and hence will manage to believe, that it was a very big negative, so that what we've just seen is a victory against the odds and an amazing triumph (cyclically adjusted, as it were). From here, on this view, as the economy continues to recover, everything just gets easier for the Democrats and the GOP is done for. Republicans aren't in much of a position to disagree, much as they might want to. They've stressed the economy throughout, and it didn't work. All they've got left is to conclude it was all Romney's fault.

My guess is that the economy wasn't that much of a negative. Enough voters were smart enough to see that Obama inherited an exceptionally severe recession and that the struggles of the past four years weren't his fault. I also think Romney fought a mostly terrible campaign, following an orgiastically self-destructive season of GOP primaries. The party needs to ask itself whether it is now systematically incapable of producing attractive electable candidates. Taking these two things together, I think Obama should have won by a bigger margin. If you're a Democrat, look at it this way. The lower your opinion of the Republican offering this year, and the greater your contempt for the process that made Romney the nominee, the more disturbed you should be by Obama's relatively narrow margin of victory.

And then there's the House. This is something that I find endlessly perplexing about US politics. The country also elected a chamber of representatives yesterday, and unless I've misunderstood, its powers in shaping taxes and spending are at least equal to the president's. This chamber will continue to be run by a GOP majority--and nobody seems to care, or feel this lopsided and apparently irrational outcome is worth examining. I find the imbalance of attention paid in the US to the election of the president and the elections to Congress in presidential years completely mystifying. Nothing personal, but anyone would think the president was an elected monarch, and the House an assembly of courtiers...

In electing its supreme leader, at any rate, America chose well.

I enjoyed Tom Bevan's and Carl Cannon's thorough and persuasive account of the 21 things that decided the election in Obama's favor. A useful document. I'd be interested to read the article listing the 21 things that would have decided the election for Romney, had he won not all that many more votes in just the right places. I'm sure that piece was written and ready to go. Maybe I can prevail on Carl, a friend of mine from his National Journal days, to give me a look. Shame to waste it.

The big question of historical interpretation -- and I'm not sure of the answer -- is how much of a negative, if at all, the economy was for Obama. Democrats will want to believe, and hence will manage to believe, that it was a very big negative, so that what we've just seen is a victory against the odds and an amazing triumph (cyclically adjusted, as it were). From here, on this view, as the economy continues to recover, everything just gets easier for the Democrats and the GOP is done for. Republicans aren't in much of a position to disagree, much as they might want to. They've stressed the economy throughout, and it didn't work. All they've got left is to conclude it was all Romney's fault.

My guess is that the economy wasn't that much of a negative. Enough voters were smart enough to see that Obama inherited an exceptionally severe recession and that the struggles of the past four years weren't his fault. I also think Romney fought a mostly terrible campaign, following an orgiastically self-destructive season of GOP primaries. The party needs to ask itself whether it is now systematically incapable of producing attractive electable candidates. Taking these two things together, I think Obama should have won by a bigger margin. If you're a Democrat, look at it this way. The lower your opinion of the Republican offering this year, and the greater your contempt for the process that made Romney the nominee, the more disturbed you should be by Obama's relatively narrow margin of victory.

And then there's the House. This is something that I find endlessly perplexing about US politics. The country also elected a chamber of representatives yesterday, and unless I've misunderstood, its powers in shaping taxes and spending are at least equal to the president's. This chamber will continue to be run by a GOP majority--and nobody seems to care, or feel this lopsided and apparently irrational outcome is worth examining. I find the imbalance of attention paid in the US to the election of the president and the elections to Congress in presidential years completely mystifying. Nothing personal, but anyone would think the president was an elected monarch, and the House an assembly of courtiers...

In electing its supreme leader, at any rate, America chose well.

For the third time in the past four presidential elections, these divergent [Democratic and Republican] coalitions might prove almost identical in size. That means the outcome will likely alienate almost exactly half of us. (Emotions will spike further if the Electoral College winner loses the popular vote.) Theodore Roosevelt once said that as Americans, "our common interests are as broad as the continent." Yet Election Day may highlight more vividly our mountainous, and increasingly impenetrable, differences. The contrast between [Obama in] Cleveland and [Romney in] Canton last week reminds us how far the winner will need to stretch after this grueling campaign to govern as anything more than the president of half of America.

One point of clarification. In the columns I just mentioned, I criticize Obama's failure to seize the center ground of U.S. politics. This was partly a choice, in my view -- reflecting the fact that (unlike Bill Clinton) he's a progressive and not a centrist by instinct. But it was partly also a reaction to the determination of the GOP in Congress to defeat his every initiative. Ezra Klein says the Republicans' give-no-quarter strategy worked; similarly, E.J. Dionne says Democrats were more willing to compromise than the GOP. I agree with both points: When I criticize Obama, it's not because I think the GOP is blameless, but rather for the reverse: Obama failed to exploit the opportunity that the Republicans' intransigence afforded him.

Yes, his opponents were reckless and unreasonable. Yes, they were moving abruptly to the right. Tactically speaking, that was Obama's chance. But to make the most of it, he had to plant his flag in the center the GOP was vacating.

Instead, after Scott Brown, even after the midterms, he let Democrats in Congress get on with it and tacked left -- repeatedly casting his disagreement with the Republicans as a contest between his own (not especially popular) progressive vision and their militantly conservative vision, rather than between the commonsense pragmatism the country longs for and the other side's unreasoning extremism. That was the contrast he could and should have underscored. When I say he blew it, that's what I mean.

For the third time in the past four presidential elections, these divergent [Democratic and Republican] coalitions might prove almost identical in size. That means the outcome will likely alienate almost exactly half of us. (Emotions will spike further if the Electoral College winner loses the popular vote.) Theodore Roosevelt once said that as Americans, "our common interests are as broad as the continent." Yet Election Day may highlight more vividly our mountainous, and increasingly impenetrable, differences. The contrast between [Obama in] Cleveland and [Romney in] Canton last week reminds us how far the winner will need to stretch after this grueling campaign to govern as anything more than the president of half of America.

One point of clarification. In the columns I just mentioned, I criticize Obama's failure to seize the center ground of U.S. politics. This was partly a choice, in my view -- reflecting the fact that (unlike Bill Clinton) he's a progressive and not a centrist by instinct. But it was partly also a reaction to the determination of the GOP in Congress to defeat his every initiative. Ezra Klein says the Republicans' give-no-quarter strategy worked; similarly, E.J. Dionne says Democrats were more willing to compromise than the GOP. I agree with both points: When I criticize Obama, it's not because I think the GOP is blameless, but rather for the reverse: Obama failed to exploit the opportunity that the Republicans' intransigence afforded him.

Yes, his opponents were reckless and unreasonable. Yes, they were moving abruptly to the right. Tactically speaking, that was Obama's chance. But to make the most of it, he had to plant his flag in the center the GOP was vacating.

Instead, after Scott Brown, even after the midterms, he let Democrats in Congress get on with it and tacked left -- repeatedly casting his disagreement with the Republicans as a contest between his own (not especially popular) progressive vision and their militantly conservative vision, rather than between the commonsense pragmatism the country longs for and the other side's unreasoning extremism. That was the contrast he could and should have underscored. When I say he blew it, that's what I mean.

Fiscal policy started to achieve the opposite of what was intended in 2011, when deep consolidation measures were introduced in Portugal, Ireland and Greece - the three countries on bail-out programmes. Cumulative measures over the three-year period amount to close to 10% of GDP in Greece and Portugal and 8% in Ireland. Consolidation measures amounting to between 5% and 6% of GDP are planned in France, Italy, Spain and the UK, while only a modest adjustment is likely in Germany and Austria.

Our estimates are that in those normal times, fiscal consolidation would have reduced growth, but not by very much except in the bailout countries: the cumulative impact ranging from almost nothing in Germany to 8% in Greece and Portugal. The desired objective of reducing deficits and debt would have been achieved. But taking account of the current environment changes the picture dramatically: the hit to output in Germany is now 2%. In the UK it is 5%; and in Greece 13%. Still more shocking is the impact on debt-to-GDP ratios - the fiscal consolidation was supposed to improve fiscal sustainability; instead, it makes matters worse. And this isn't true just in extreme cases like Greece - fiscal consolidation across the EU has raised debt-to-GDP ratios in Germany and the UK as well. In both the UK and the euro area as a whole, the result of coordinated fiscal consolidation is a rise in the debt-GDP ratio of approximately five percentage points. For the UK, that means a debt-GDP ratio of close to 75% in 2013 instead of about 70%. We are not running to stand still; we are determinedly heading in the wrong direction.

Fiscal policy started to achieve the opposite of what was intended in 2011, when deep consolidation measures were introduced in Portugal, Ireland and Greece - the three countries on bail-out programmes. Cumulative measures over the three-year period amount to close to 10% of GDP in Greece and Portugal and 8% in Ireland. Consolidation measures amounting to between 5% and 6% of GDP are planned in France, Italy, Spain and the UK, while only a modest adjustment is likely in Germany and Austria.

Our estimates are that in those normal times, fiscal consolidation would have reduced growth, but not by very much except in the bailout countries: the cumulative impact ranging from almost nothing in Germany to 8% in Greece and Portugal. The desired objective of reducing deficits and debt would have been achieved. But taking account of the current environment changes the picture dramatically: the hit to output in Germany is now 2%. In the UK it is 5%; and in Greece 13%. Still more shocking is the impact on debt-to-GDP ratios - the fiscal consolidation was supposed to improve fiscal sustainability; instead, it makes matters worse. And this isn't true just in extreme cases like Greece - fiscal consolidation across the EU has raised debt-to-GDP ratios in Germany and the UK as well. In both the UK and the euro area as a whole, the result of coordinated fiscal consolidation is a rise in the debt-GDP ratio of approximately five percentage points. For the UK, that means a debt-GDP ratio of close to 75% in 2013 instead of about 70%. We are not running to stand still; we are determinedly heading in the wrong direction.

Certainly, the economy is a negative for the incumbent, but much less than generally supposed. Most voters understand all too well that the president inherited the worst recession since the 1930s, and that the recovery was going to be a long, hard haul. To be sure, they're asking whether his policies are helping, and they are far from convinced. They've noticed his silence on where his economic policies go from here. But the mere fact that the economy is weak wasn't fatal to Obama's prospects.

As for race, the fact that Obama is black has been more an asset than a liability and it remains so. There's racism in America, but there's also an immense desire to overcome it. The voters swinging back to Romney aren't racist, or they wouldn't have supported Obama in 2008. Remember the joyous inauguration of 2009. The political center of the country was thrilled and proud to have elected a black president: an exceptionally talented man, and the best possible salve for the nation's unhealed racial wounds.

Every voter who chose Obama in 2008 still wants him to succeed. But not all are convinced he can, and that's partly because he has stopped trying to be the president he said he'd be. The need to fix Washington, the need for a bridge-building, post-partisan presidency was uppermost in centrist voters' minds when they elected Obama, and he'd made that the core of his campaign. Washington is still broken -- more so than before -- and Obama is no longer even trying to mend it.

The paper recognizes that there might be an offsetting pro-black influence. It puts this at a little over 1 percent, with the effect working mainly through the votes of African-Americans. So the net cost of Obama's race, according to the paper, is a loss of 2 to 4 percent of the vote.

Why do I think this underestimates the offsetting positive effect of Obama's race? Here's what the paper says about white voters:

A variety of evidence suggest that few white voters swung, in the general election, for Obama due to his race. Only one percent of whites said that race made them much more likely to support Obama. In exit polls, 3.4 percent of whites did report both voting for Obama and that race was an important factor in their decision. But the overwhelming majority of these voters were liberal, repeat voters likely to have voted for a comparable white Democratic presidential candidate... Although social scientists strongly suspect that individuals may underreport racial animus, there is little reason to suspect underreporting of pro-black sentiment.

Certainly, the economy is a negative for the incumbent, but much less than generally supposed. Most voters understand all too well that the president inherited the worst recession since the 1930s, and that the recovery was going to be a long, hard haul. To be sure, they're asking whether his policies are helping, and they are far from convinced. They've noticed his silence on where his economic policies go from here. But the mere fact that the economy is weak wasn't fatal to Obama's prospects.

As for race, the fact that Obama is black has been more an asset than a liability and it remains so. There's racism in America, but there's also an immense desire to overcome it. The voters swinging back to Romney aren't racist, or they wouldn't have supported Obama in 2008. Remember the joyous inauguration of 2009. The political center of the country was thrilled and proud to have elected a black president: an exceptionally talented man, and the best possible salve for the nation's unhealed racial wounds.

Every voter who chose Obama in 2008 still wants him to succeed. But not all are convinced he can, and that's partly because he has stopped trying to be the president he said he'd be. The need to fix Washington, the need for a bridge-building, post-partisan presidency was uppermost in centrist voters' minds when they elected Obama, and he'd made that the core of his campaign. Washington is still broken -- more so than before -- and Obama is no longer even trying to mend it.

The paper recognizes that there might be an offsetting pro-black influence. It puts this at a little over 1 percent, with the effect working mainly through the votes of African-Americans. So the net cost of Obama's race, according to the paper, is a loss of 2 to 4 percent of the vote.

Why do I think this underestimates the offsetting positive effect of Obama's race? Here's what the paper says about white voters:

A variety of evidence suggest that few white voters swung, in the general election, for Obama due to his race. Only one percent of whites said that race made them much more likely to support Obama. In exit polls, 3.4 percent of whites did report both voting for Obama and that race was an important factor in their decision. But the overwhelming majority of these voters were liberal, repeat voters likely to have voted for a comparable white Democratic presidential candidate... Although social scientists strongly suspect that individuals may underreport racial animus, there is little reason to suspect underreporting of pro-black sentiment.

As in the second debate, Obama seemed the more articulate and assured of the two. He certainly had the better lines (horses and bayonets, etc). His comment about the importance of clarity--a bit rich, coming from him--skewered Romney pretty well and cleverly linked the prevailing Romnesia narrative to foreign policy. But neither man had much of substance to say. Obama described his successes to good effect, and Romney mostly chose not to quarrel with him. Both gave heavily padded statements of goals--peace, security, competitiveness, other brave ideas--but never really engaged on how those ambitions can best be realized. (The key, both men agreed, is strong but prudent leadership. No doubt.) I was surprised Romney didn't press harder on Syria. Too risky, he must have calculated. Above all he had to avoid the suspicion that he would take America into another inessential war.

On Romney's behalf you could say Obama came off as a little too hostile, maybe too interested in Romney's flip-flops and not enough in what he, Obama, intends to do. You could say Obama began with a bigger advantage than in the other debates, because foreign policy especially favors the incumbent, and that Romney nonetheless did what he mainly had to do: offer reassurance that he wasn't a bomb-happy war-monger and present himself as a plausible commander-in-chief.

In all, I'd say, a win for Obama, but not a consequential one. It's hard to avoid concluding that if Obama had performed this well in the Denver debate--the one that first gave wavering voters permission to think seriously about Romney--this election would be as good as over. But he didn't.

As in the second debate, Obama seemed the more articulate and assured of the two. He certainly had the better lines (horses and bayonets, etc). His comment about the importance of clarity--a bit rich, coming from him--skewered Romney pretty well and cleverly linked the prevailing Romnesia narrative to foreign policy. But neither man had much of substance to say. Obama described his successes to good effect, and Romney mostly chose not to quarrel with him. Both gave heavily padded statements of goals--peace, security, competitiveness, other brave ideas--but never really engaged on how those ambitions can best be realized. (The key, both men agreed, is strong but prudent leadership. No doubt.) I was surprised Romney didn't press harder on Syria. Too risky, he must have calculated. Above all he had to avoid the suspicion that he would take America into another inessential war.

On Romney's behalf you could say Obama came off as a little too hostile, maybe too interested in Romney's flip-flops and not enough in what he, Obama, intends to do. You could say Obama began with a bigger advantage than in the other debates, because foreign policy especially favors the incumbent, and that Romney nonetheless did what he mainly had to do: offer reassurance that he wasn't a bomb-happy war-monger and present himself as a plausible commander-in-chief.

In all, I'd say, a win for Obama, but not a consequential one. It's hard to avoid concluding that if Obama had performed this well in the Denver debate--the one that first gave wavering voters permission to think seriously about Romney--this election would be as good as over. But he didn't.