Collection of Case Digests

THE UNATTENDED KILLINGS IN THE PHILIPPINES

2013-01-03T23:40:00.001-08:00

On of the most disturbing issues not carefully attended to is the killings of Filipinos upon their own. A man next door was shot at 1030am while I was getting ready for work. His house is next to mine. The neighbors appeared not shocked at all. They sat quietly on a porch staring at the dead body while police arrived. There was no remorse. There appears no ongoing investigation as if the police gave up because they could not find witness. The neighbor that saw him last had several different stories about how he saw him. But police has not pursued thourough investigation to put to rest that there isn't a killer that lives in this neighborhood.

It appears that killings go unresolved in a police statement simply because the ones who have the authority to pursue justice are the ones who allow it. If the killer knows that police will now stop to investigate, he will do this again. A killer has a criminal mind, he does not have to justify why he does, especially if someone paid him to do it.MURDERED

Unjustified killings? Is that what this country is about? The meaning of life, does anyone care at all?

Digested Case on Abortion G.R. No. L-4795 November 23, 1908

2012-09-27T02:25:00.002-07:00

Picture of an aborted fetus

G.R. No. L-4795 November 23, 1908

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIANO BOSTON, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: The accused in this case was convicted of the crime of abortion as define and penalized in paragraph 3 of article 410 of the Penal Code.
Here, the counsel for appellant interposed the defense that the evidence does not conclusively establish intention to abort in light of the absence of evidence in the record which would disclose the character and medicinal qualities of the option which the accused gave to the mother whose child was aborted. In fact, the evidence clearly showed the child was born three months in advance of the full period of gestation; that the appellant, either believing of pretending to believe that the child in the womb of the woman was a sort of a fish-demon (which he called a balat), gave to her a portion composed of herbs, for the purpose of her relieving her of this alleged fish-demon; that two hours thereafter she gave premature birth to a child, having been taken with the pains of child birth must immediately after drinking that herb potion given by her the appellant; that after the birth of the child the appellant, still believing or pretending to believe that the child was a fish-demon which had taken upon itself human form, with the permission and aid of the husband and the brother of the infant child, destroyed it by fire in order to prevent its doing the mischief which the appellant believed or affected to believe it was capable of doing.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal should be granted on grounds interposed by the defense?

HELD: No. The above facts constitute, prima facie proof of the intent of the accused in giving the herb potion to the mother of the child, and also of the further fact that the herb potion so administered to her was the cause of its premature birth. The defense wholly failed to rebut the prosecution testimony warranting conviction beyond reasonable doubt.The sentence imposed is in strict accord with the penalty provided by the code, and was affirmed with cost against the appellant.

Digested Criminal Law Cases on Murder and Vagrancy

2012-09-27T02:14:00.001-07:00

VAGRANCY

G.R. No. L-7529 November 19, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.VALERIANO MOLINA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

The appellant in this case was convicted of the crime of vagrancy as defined and penalized in Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission, and was sentenced to imprisonment for two months and the payment of the costs of the trial.
The evidence of record discloses that the defendant was discharged from Bilibid Prison some time during the month of March, 1910, after serving a short sentence for a violation of the Opium Law; that from that time until the date of his prosecution on this charge of vagrancy, he had been engaged in no legal occupation, and was without any apparent means of support other than that supplied him by his mother; that he is an able-bodied man of 33 years of age; that he habitually neglected to apply himself to any lawful calling, and that he spent his time in loitering about the streets and frequenting cockpits and places where games of various kinds were conducted and where gambling was carried on; that he had been once convicted of a violation of the provisions of the Opium Law, and that he had been twice convicted on a charge of playing monte (a prohibited gambling game) toward the latter part of the year 1910.
The accused, on his own behalf, testified that he was supported by his other, with whom he lived, and that he worked on her property. The evidence in this connection is not very satisfactory, but it seems clear that his mother is a woman of very small means, and that if she has any property at all, it is so small as to be wholly inadequate to furnish even a pretense of work for an able- bodied man. The accused, in explaining where he got the money to be at the cockpits, claimed that on various occasions his mother gave him small sums for that purpose, and that when he won he brought her the proceeds. These statements of the accused merely serve to confirm us in our opinion that the defendant was an idle, shiftless and worthless man who made no attempt to follow any legal calling, and whose habits of life were those of an immoral and dissolute good for nothing.
In the case of Gavin vs. The State (96 Miss., 377), the court said that:

In vagrancy, the offense consists in general worthlessness; that is to say, in being idle, and though able to work, refusing to do so, and living without labor, or on the charity of others.

This definition of the offense substantially corresponds with the definition of that class of vagrancy set forth in the first part of section 1 of the Philippine Vagrancy Act(Act No. 519), which provides that:

Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work, and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling . . . is a vagrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal to reverse conviction of the accued should be granted?

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court did not find that the claim by this able-bodied man, 33 years of age, that he was living on the charity of his mother, can be said to rebut the other evidence in the record which tended to disclose that he had no apparent means of support. He had no legal or moral claim upon his mother for support, and indeed, from the indications in the record as to the scanty means possessed by the mother, it would appear that it was his final duty to aid her rather than to call upon her for aid.
The judgment of conviction and the sentenced imposed by the trial court was affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

Murder

G.R. No. 182310 December 9, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JAN MICHAEL TAN and ARCHIE

FACTS:

After investigation of the prosecution, the above respondents became suspects in the the commission of parricide and two murders; their father, their step-mother and step sister.
Respondents Archie and Jan-Jan’s defense is alibi. They claimed that they were away when the crimes took place at the house. Based on Dr. Lebaquin’s forensic computation, however, the victims probably died at about midnight, more or less. The two were still at home when the killings happened.
RTC issued an order, directing the City Prosecutor’s Office to submit additional evidence in the case but the latter office asked for more time to comply.²⁸ Meanwhile, the DOJ issued a resolution dismissing respondents Archie and Jan-Jan’s petition for review.²⁹
After a new presiding judge, Judge Globert Justalero, took over the RTC, he issued an order on March 30, 2007 granting the prosecution’s request for additional time within which to comply with the court’s order of January 12, 2007.³⁰ On April 2, 2007 the prosecutor’s office filed its compliance and submitted its amended resolution in the case.³¹ The petitioners assailed this amended resolution and pointed out that the public prosecutor did not submit any additional evidence.Probable cause was found against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan this time and ordered the issuance of warrants for their arrest. The CA granted accused’s petition for certiorari and reversed all RTC’s decisions. After being denied the motion for consideration, the Public Prosecutor filed this instant petition. Here, admittedly, the evidence against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan is merely circumstantial. The prosecution evidence shows that they had motive in that they had been at odds with their father and stepmother. They had opportunity in that they were still probably home when the crime took place. Archie took two pairs of new gloves from his car late that evening. Cindy was apparently executed inside Archie’s room. The separate rooms of the two accused had, quite curiously, been wiped clean even of their own fingerprints. A trial, unlike preliminary investigations, could yield more evidence favorable to either side after the interrogations of the witnesses either on direct examination or on cross-examination. What is important is that there is some rational basis for going ahead with judicial inquiry into the case. This Court does not subscribe to the CA’s position that the prosecution had nothing to go on with.

The Issues Presented

ISSUE: Respondents Archie and Jan-Jan present the following issues for resolution by this Court:

a) Whether or not the CA erred in finding Judge Justalero gravely abused his discretion reversing his predecessor’s finding of no probable cause to the existence of probable cause

this is not the actual persons murdered in the case

HELD:

There was no grave abuse of the Trial Judge.The prosecution filed its compliance together with its amended resolution in the case. The judge considered the following factors: first, the DOJ’s denial of the appeal of the two accused and its finding that probable cause existed against them and, two, the local prosecutor’s submittal, if not of some new evidence, of additional arguments respecting the issue of probable cause. Grave abuse of discretion implies an irrational behavior. The reexamination was proper considering the said developments and the pending interlocutory orders. In finding of probable cause, it requires neither absolute certainty nor clear and convincing evidence of guilt. The test for issuing a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as the evidence shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court has sufficient ground to issue a warrant for his arrest.

In this case, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision dated December 19, 2007 and resolution dated March 25, 2008; reinstating and affirming the dection of the trial court.

COMPLEX AND SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE

2012-08-15T21:50:00.000-07:00

First under the RPC on complex crimes, component crimes are defined and penalized under separate and distinct articles and are committed under circumstances in article 48 of the same code…that is two or more grave or less grave felonies resulted from a single act, or one offense was necessary for committing the other offense.

Special complex crimes are component crimes constituting a single indivisible offese, and are penalized under one article of the RPC. For example article 294 provides for robbery with homicide as a single offense.

In the case of :

G.R. No. 192789 March 23, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
vs.
NGANO SUGAN, NGA BEN LATAM, FRANCING, GAGA LATAM, SALIGO KUYAN and KAMISON AKOY, Accused,
GAGA LATAM, SALIGO KUYAN and KAMISON AKOY, Appellants.

The Supreme Court stated that, "

the appellants and their companions clearly acted in conspiracy in committing the special complex crime charged. To recall, Gaga, Saligo, Ngano, Nga Ben and alias Francing entered Fortunato’s house, while Kamison and Cosme acted as lookouts. While his companions were robbing the house, Ngano brought Nestor outside and shot him. Reggie rushed to the scene, but Kamison and Cosme prevented him from entering the house by pointing a knife and a gun at him, respectively. Thereafter, all the seven (7) armed men fled together."

Also in In People v. Larrañaga,[41] the Court explained that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime:

This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes, the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by R.A. No. 7659."

Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime

A continuing crime also known as Delito Continuado is constituted by a series or overt acts committed by the offender in one place in vilation of a penal law such as Piracy which can vebgtin in our territorial jurisdiction and upon capture can end on the high seas. The entire acts are punished under the crime piracy.

Digested Case on PIRACY G. R. No. L-17958 People Vs. Lol lo and Saraw

2012-08-13T20:18:00.003-07:00

This is CASE ON PIRACY which was decided EN BANC by the Supreme Court

G. R. No. L-17958 February 27, 1922

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Plaintiff-Appellee ,

Vs.

LOL-LO AND SARAW,
Defendants-Appellants.

FACTS: This case is a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas,attending rape and murder.

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left of Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland.The second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape.

After Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands, they were arrested and were charged in the CFI with the crime of piracy. The counsel of record interposed a demurrer on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the CFI, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. The demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 942 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the elements of piracy exists?

HELD: The SC decided that in the present case, the facts were proven and not disputed and all of the elements of the crime of piracy were present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind which can be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Therefore it does not matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U. S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184).

ISSUE2: The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Articles 153 to 156 of the Penal Code?

"Art. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

"If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty or presidio mayor.

"Art. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:

"1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.

"2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.

"3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of the book.

"4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.

"5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.

"Art. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title as well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.

"Art. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such."

HELD: SC Decided that there was no doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.

It is also evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of Article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to Article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lol-lo [the accused who raped one of the women] but is not unanimous with regard to the defendant and appellant Saraw, since one member of the Court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the Judge of First Instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the cost of both instances.

CASE DIGEST ON ESPIONAGE-G.R. No. L-44

2012-08-13T19:21:00.001-07:00

G.R. No. L-44 September 13, 1945

LILY RAQUIZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
LT. COL. L.J. BRADFORD, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS: Petioners file for a writ of Habeas Corpus as they were held by Us military for acts of espionage claiming that they were "confined, restrained and deprived" of their liberty in the Correctional Institution for Women, petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link Infante.

Both respondents made returns of service attaching commitment emanating from the Headquarters and Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and the second from that of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. The returns, as well as from the arguments of counsel, was due to proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur regarding the arrest of petitioner Lily Raquiza who was arrested by the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment U.S. Sixth Army, and detained under Security Commitment Order No. being charged as follows:

Commitment Order. — The person named and described above is deemed a risk to the security of the U.S. Forces for the reasons set forth above. The commanding officer of any military stockade, jail, or comparable installation in which this person may be confined is authorized and directed to detain him in custody until released by competent military authority.

In said Schedule A the specific complaint or charge against complaint or charge against petitioner Lily Raquiza is "Espionage activity for Japanese."

As to petitioner Haydee Tee Han Kee, was arrested by the same for "Active collaboration with the enemy."With regard to petitioner Emma Link Infante, "Active collaboration with the Japanese." Her previous association with the enemy constituted a present security risk to the United States Armed Forces.

Specifically, the proclamation read:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

PROCLAMATION

PROVIDING FOR MILITARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN UPON THE APPREHENSION OF CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHO VOLUNTARILY HAVE GIVEN AID, COMFORT AND SUSTENANCE TO THE ENEMY.

WHEREAS evidence is before me that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS military necessity requires that such persons be enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army, United States Army, as Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific Area, hereby do publish and declare it to be my purpose to remove such persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war; whereafter I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases.

Done at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, in the field, this twenty-ninth day of December, 1944.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General of the Army
United States Army
Commander-in-Chief

ISSUE: Whether or not holding of the petitioners by reason of US Army, and its Intelligence Department investigation that petitioners are involved in espionage during occupation is valid notwithstanding that some of the petitioners are Filipino Citizens.

HELD: SC Held , there is no question that the power of the power of the Commander in Chief of the United States Army to issue the foregoing proclamation cannot be seriously questioned effects. Reason of the restraint of petitioners were upon two grave reasons, to wit, (1) that evidence was before him "that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the Government of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines;" and (2) that "military necessity requires that such persons be removed from any opportunity to threaten the security of our military forces or the success of our military operations." The exigencies of the military operations for the destruction or defeat the enemy did not permit of any other procedure. To deny such power or competency to determine the strength and sufficiency of such evidence would have been destructive of that military efficiency with which, in the interest of all the citizens of the Philippines themselves, not excluding the herein petitioners, the operations for their liberation had to be conducted. Has the war terminated within the meaning of that part of his proclamation wherein the Commander in Chief declared his purpose to hold such persons in restraint "for the duration of the war"? The Sc decided, it did not as there was no Presidential proclamation to that effect. The Court said in United States vs. Tubig (3 Phil., 244, 254), this Court said:

From that day the fighting continued, and the insurrection did not end officially until the President proclaimed it an end, July 4, 1902. It is necessary to refer to a public act of the Executive Department to fix the date of the closing of the war. (Freeborn vs. The Protector, 79 U.S., 700.)

The Sc dismissed the petition.

Article on the Concept of Remedial Law

2012-08-05T03:37:00.001-07:00

Dear Reader,

In the 2006 Bar Examination, it was asked, what is the concept of remedial law? Another way of understanding this question is basically knowing that it is simply asking its definition. When we read exams its important to take a step back and understand what it is asking. The answer to this is that remedial law is a branch of public law, which prescribes the procedural rules to be observed in litigation, whether the case be civil, criminal, or administrative, and in special proceedings, as well as the remedies or reliefs available of each case. The importance of remedial law is that it has a vital role in the administration of justice because it lies at the very core of procedural due process. What is procedural due process? Well this is a law that hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. You may be asking what does this mean? Well it contemplates an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered . Remedial law is also known as adjective law. It provides for means and ways that actions can be effectuated. In that sense, there is no vested rights and retroactive in its application. The body which is empowered to promulgate rules of procedure is the Supreme Court.

When we speak of procedural law, it means that this is the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for their disregard or infraction. What is important to consider is that If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right, then the rule deals merely with procedure (Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, Sept. 16, 1998). Another question that came up in the 2006 Bar examinations was how remedial law is implemented in our system of government. Well, since the Supreme Court has express powers as a judiciary to make the rules of procedure, obviously it would be implemented through the judicial system, its prosecutor service, or through quasi judicial agencies. Earlier it was mentioned that the Supreme Court has express powers to formulate rules of procedure. With this in mind, the same has limitations such that in making those rules, the rules must provide a simple and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, be uniform in all the courts of the same grade, and not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The Supreme Court may also amend or suspend the rules of procedure in the interest of justice.

The next topic will be on court and jurisdiction.

Case Digest on Rebellion

2012-08-02T20:33:00.000-07:00

G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of RTCof Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of RTCof Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charaged with rebellion complexed with murder ¹ with the RTCof Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the RTC of Makati.

On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and

(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.

The trial court issued an order denying the MFR for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment.

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following grounds, to wit:

I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion;

IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;

V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due process.

On May 20, 1990 we issued aTRO enjoining the respondents from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against Sneator Juan Ponce Enrile.

Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the above doctrine is applicable in the case at bar?

HELD: If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.

The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:

In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto ² (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.

In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:

This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.

In the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. ³ The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the RTCof Quezon City.

HELD: In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.

The intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.

The petition was granted . The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, RTCof Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.

2012-08-02T20:16:00.000-07:00

Digest Case on Treason

G.R. No. L-2317 December 12, 1951 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MARCELO GOROSPE, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:, The appellants was found guilty for treason on four counts. On Counts 2 and 3 sentenced to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal and to pay a fine of P1,000 and the costs. There is no finding or judgment on Counts 1 and 4 and these will be left out in this decision.

Evidence of the prosecutions provided that:

Count 2.—On the evening of December 10, 1944, the appellant, an Aringay, La Union, municipal policeman, summoned Cipriano Apolinar, Bruno Ronquillo, Severo Roldan and three other inhabitants to the town cemetary and commanded them to dig three graves, which they did in his presence. After the graves had been made, Liling Mapalo and Valeraino Parentela, also policeman, arrived with four prisoners whose hands were tied behind their backs. Apolinar, Ronquillo and Roldan were unable to recognize the prisoners except one, Dominador Dulay. The accused made each of two prisoners stand on the edge of each of two of the graves and the other two prisoners on the edge of the third grave; and, telling them they were guerillas, he stabbed them into the pits. Thereafter the graves were refilled with earth on defendant's orders.

Count 3.—On December 15, the same witnesses were gain ordered by the defendant to dig a grave at the cemetary, while Parental and Mapalo brought Federico Abellera, hands bound at the back, when the work had been finished. Like the first mentioned victims, Abellera was placed on his feet close to the grave, face forward, by the accused, with a sharp bolo and Abellera timbled into the hole. Seeing that Abellera was still alive, the appellant jumped after him and gave a finishing blow. Abellera, like those slain five days before, was suspected of being a guerilla.

Theses killings, testified to by the three eye-witnesses, constituted over acts. In addition to the grave diggers' testimony that Gorospe told the victims they were to be executed because they were guerillas, proof of adherence to the enemy, which is not comprehended by the two witness principle, was supplied by Federico Galano.

Galano swore that he was seized on December 6 by three policemen in barrio Sto. Rosario, Aringay, and taken to the municipal building, hence to the Japanese garrison located at the approach of the bridge. When the witness arrived with his captors in the garrison, Mariano Carreon and Guillermo Mabanta were already there as prisoners. The next day Dominador Dulay was brought in by a policeman and two civilians whom Galano did not know, and on the third day, Querubin Bautista and Gerson Amigo were added to the number of persons under arrest. These prisoners were maltreated by policemen from Agoo and also by Marcelo Gorospe. The accused beat them up because they would not admit that they were guerillas. Gorospe, according to Galano, told the prisoners: "You confess, I know that you are guerillas and you are the ones who killed Sevilla." Galano himself, he declared, was maltreated by Gorospe and several other policemen and by Japanese soldiers, charged with being in the underground movement.

The defendant's testimony,constituted general denial that he liquidated the guerilla suspects above mentioned. This denial squarely put in issue the prosecution witnesses' credibility.

The People's Court found beyond doubt that the defendant committed the acts narrated by the witnesses, and that the record discloses no circumstances of any weight which warrants reversal or modification of the lower court's finding. Defense counsel himself does not seem to dispute the truth of the accusation that the defendant slew Abellera, Dulay and three others. The so-called discrepancies and inconsistencies on which appellant's brief dwells, relate to what that Government witnesses said were Gorope's remarks to the deceased, namely, that they were guerillas; and it would seem that the point the defense wants to make is, not that the defendant did not the slaying but that the elements of treason have not been shown. If this is the underlying aim of the argument, the appellant does not stand to profit by the effort. Rather the contrary. Stripped of treasonable intention, the killings would be five plain murders for each of which three should be a separate penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused defendants should be granted a lesser sentence?

HELD” The Supreme Court was satisfied that as on the fact of killing, Galano told substantially the truth when he stated that the appellant frequented the Japanese garrison and had a part in rounding up the suspects, and that Gorospe maltreated them in the Japanese headquarters. This is the same with other witnesses' testimony that the defendant informed the prisoners that they were to be executed because of alleged subversive activities in which they had been engaged. That there is not sufficient evidence that those unfortunate men were in fact guerillas, as counsel stresses, is immaterail. In addressing the mitigating circumstances, it was found to be lack of instruction.

The defendant had finished third grade, and the fact that he was a regularly appointed member of the police force and that fact that of all the policemen who intervened in the arrest and execution of the five deceased he played the leading and most conspicious role, are eloquent refutation of the court's finding on the degree of the appellant's education and intelligence. The defendant's stoicism to our mind was not a manifestation of mental weakness or infirmity but rather of the strong will and cool head that he had demonstrated by his conduct. Did he not chide one of his fellow-policemen for his refusal or reluctance to act the part of executioner? And was it not be who recruited grave diggers and supervised their work besides performing the horrible business personality?

Here the Supreme Court asessed in the appealed decision is therefore too light. It should be reclusion perpetua, and this is the penalty, besides P1,000 fine, that is hereby imposed with costs.

Notes on General Principles on the Law on Public Officers

2012-07-30T05:48:00.002-07:00

Dear Law Reader,

Here are some general principles on Law on Public Officers

When we speak of public office, this means that this is an office which carries with it the right, duty which has been created and conferred by law upon an appointed or elected officer in order to exercise the functions of sovereign power of government for public service. The person who is either elected or appointed is called the public officer.

Under the Philippine Revised Penal Code, Art 203 states that a public officer is any person, who, by direct provision of law, popular election, or by appointment of competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions, in the government of the Philippines Islands, or shall perform in the said government or any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a public officer. However, in Sec 2 of Republic Act 3019, the term public officer includes elected or appointed officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether (career or non-career), or exempt from service, receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. For purpose of public office, it’s important to note that a Project Manager of a building construction project falls within the purview of a non-career service category under the law. Careful analysis of authority given is needed in order to properly determine whether one is a public officer. For example, if the National Internal Revenue Code provides for its Bureau to effecting distraint, this does not make one effecting distraint on property a public officer. So when you are reviewing, the safe way to distinguish whether one is a public officer is to go back to the definition and elements of public office.

The other important distinguishment in reference to this subject is the difference between an employee and an officer. Always remember that an officer’s authorized duty involves exercise of discretion while performing government functions.

The case of Laurel vs. Desierto GR NO 145368 distinguished the difference between office and employment in which the official, delegates to an individual or individuals (employees), such that the delegation is the officers exercise of function of government which is for public benefit.

SOURCE: OUTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW (PHILIPPINES)

Helpful information on Public International Law

2012-07-27T19:35:00.001-07:00

Dear Readers,

Here are some notes on Public International Law for your review which I was able to gather after taking up a class. I hope that this helps in increasing your knowledge of law.

What is Public International Law?

&nusp; This is the body of legal rules, which apply between sovereign states and such other entities as have been granted international personality.

Can you distinguish the difference between PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW and PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ?

Private International Law

(1.) Issued by a political superior for observance by those under its authority

(2.) Consists mainly of enactments from the lawmaking authority of each state

(3.) Regulates the relations of individuals among themselves or with their own states

(4.) Violations of municipal law are redressed through local administrative and judicial processes

(5.) Breaches of municipal law generally entail only individual responsibility

Public International Law

(1.) Is not imposed upon but simply adopted by states as a common rule of action among themselves.

(2.) Is derived not from any particular legislation but from such sources as international

customs, international conventions and the general principles of law

(3.) Applies to the relations inter se of states and other international persons

(4.) Questions of public international law are resolved through state-to-state transactions ranging from peaceful methods like negotiations and arbitration to the hostile arbitrate

due to force like war.

(5.) Responsibility for infractions of international law is usually collective in the sense that it attaches directly to the state and not to its nationals

A. DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION

Art. II, Sec. 2 1987 Phil. Constitution: The Philippines renounces war as an instrument

of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to thepolicy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,cooperation, and amity with all nations.

B. DOCTRINE OF TRANSFORMATION

-the generally accepted rules of international law are not per se binding uponthe state but must first be embodied in the legislation enacted by the lawmaking bodyand so ransformed into municipal law. Onlywhen so transformed will they become binding upon the state as part of its municipallaw.

C.PACTA SUNT SERVANDA

– in International law, treaties and executive agreements are equally bindingcommitments of the contracting states underthe maxim pacta sunt servanda. Every state has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties or other sources of international law, and it may notinvoke provisions in its constitution or its lawsas an excuse for failure to perform this duty.

Q: In case of irreconcilable conflict between a treaty and a municipal constitution, whichshould prevail?

1. From the viewpoint of the world, international law ought to prevail to avoid international embarrassment and to preventcharges of International deliquency. The State must accordingly update its municipalconstitution.

2 From the viewpoint of the State itself, it would seem that most constitutions (including our own) provide that a treaty may be declaredunconstitutional by a State’s own national

courts; though of course it should also be evident that the decision of a national court,

while binding on municipal authorities wouldhave NO international effect, for indeed it is a

settled principle of international law that a

sovereign cannot be permitted to set up itsmunicipal law against a claim founded on

international law.

What is the basis of international law?

A. Law of Nature-there is a natural and universal principle of right and wrong,independent of any mutual intercourse or compact.

B. Positivist Theory-the bindingforce of international law is derived from the agreement of sovereignstates to be bound by it. It is not alaw of subordination but of coordination.

C. Eclectic Theory-proposes that both the law of nature and the consent of States serve as basis of international law; to the effect that the system of international law isbased on the dictate of right reason as well as the practice of states.

What is the purpose of the observation of Public International Law?

States observed Public International Law because of the following:

First,belief in the reasonableness of the Law of Nations, second,fear of being unconventional , and third,,fear of reprisal from other states. Its functions are to:

A. the maintenance of international peace and order;

B. the protection of State rights and offundamental human rights thrusanctions, both peaceful and coercive;

C. the economic, social, cultural and technological development of states and such other entities as may be possessed of an international personality.

Q: If a Filipino acquires lawfully a parcel of private land and later becomes an American citizen, what happens to his ownership over the

land?

A: The person’s ownership over the landcontinues but the land, except in the caseof hereditary succession may be transferred only to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

What are the several sources of Public International Law?

Its primary sources are treaties, customart practices which has grown up between states and hascome to be accepted as binding bythe mere fact of persistent usage over a long period of time. general principles of law derived from the law of nature and are observed by the majority of states because they arebelieved to be good and just (e.g.prescription, estoppel, consent, res judicata and pacta sunt servanda).

Its secondary sources are decisions of international, tribunals and writings and teachings of most highly qualified publicists.

Here are some important terms to remember:

EX AEQUO ET BONO – this is the basis for a decision by an international tribunalon the grounds of justice and fairness.

•

ANGARY -the right of a belligerent state, in time of war, to make use of the property of neutral states, located withinthe territorial jurisdiction of the belligerent, upon payment of reasonableand just compensation.

•

BLOCKADE -the isolation by a warringnation of an enemy area (as a harbor) bytroops or warships to prevent passage ofpersons or supplies.

More to follow is information from subjects of International Community.

Source:Lectures

Special Proceeding Notes Rule 72-76

2012-07-18T17:25:00.002-07:00

Dear Readers,

Here are some info that would be helpful to you in special proceedings. Happy Reading.

NOTES :SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Rules 72 –

(1) Subject Matters of Special Proceedings: CATCH AGED SHARC

(a) Change of Name

(b) Adoption

(d) Constitution of Family Home

(e) Hospitalization of Insane Persons

(f) Absence and Death, Declaration of

(g) Guardianship and Custody of Children

(h) Escheat

(i) (Voluntary) Dissolution of Corporation

(j) Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons

(k) Habeas Corpus

(l) (Judicial) Approval of Voluntary Recognition of Minor Natural Children

(m) Rescission and Revocation of Adoption

(n) Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

(2) Special Proceedings is an application or proceeding to establish

a. the status or right of a party,

b. or a particular fact,

How is it commenced?

A special proceeding is commenced by an application, petition or special form of pleading as may be provided for by the particular rule or law.

I. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS (Rules 73 – 91)

Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons, Venue and Process (Rule 73)

Which court has jurisdiction if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien?

(1) The deceased will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the RTC in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of any province in which he had his estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts (Sec. 1).

Case Sample: John died leaving property in Laoag City. At the time of his death he was a resident living in Laoag City, although he is a citizen of Canada. After his death his wife moved to Pangasinan, and you are a lawyer of Pangasinan. Where would you file the case for Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person?

Answer: The case would then be filed in the RTC of Ilocos Norte, as a CFI to the exclusion of all other courts.

(2) Under RA 7691, the law expanding the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, MTC, MeTC and MCTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over probate proceedings, testate and intestate, where the value of the estate does not exceed P300,000 (outside Metro Manila) or where such estate does not exceed P400,000 (in Metro Manila).

Added Answer: So if the estate of John is worth P200K, this would be filed in the MTC of Laoag City.

QUESTION:

If the estate of a deceased falls within the Jurisdiction of the RTC, are their any limits?

(3) Yes, the jurisdiction of the RTC is limited to the settlement and adjudication of properties of the deceased and cannot extend to collateral matters.

Venue in judicial settlement of estate

WHEN THE DECEDENT IS A RESIDENT:

(1) The residence of the decedent at the time of his death is determinative of the venue of the proceeding. If he was a resident (inhabitant) of the Philippines, venue is laid exclusively in the province of his residence, the jurisdiction being vested in the Regional Trial Court thereof. Residence means his personal, actual, or physical habitation, his actual residence or place of abode.

WHEN THE DECEDENT IS A NON-RESIDENT

Daisy is a resident of Canada. At the time of her death in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte during a vacation, where she left some real estate property worth P100,000, her two children filed in the MTC for settlement of the estate. If you were the judge, how would you rule?

Answer: The case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The case should be filed in the RTC having jurisdiction over the property of the decedent whose estate is subject of the case, coupled with the fact that probate, testate and intestate proceedings are under the jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Rule 73 Section 1 of the Rules of Court.

(2) It is only where the decedent was a nonresident of the Philippines at the time of his death that venue lies in any province in which he had estate, and then CFI thereof first taking cognizance of the proceeding for settlement acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. The question of residence is determinative only of the venue and does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the institution of the proceeding in the province wherein the decedent neither had residence nor estate does not vitiate the action of the probate court.

The two children of Daisy file in separate RTC’s. Which case should prevail?

Answer: (3) Where the proceedings were instituted in two courts and the question of venue is seasonably raised, the court in which the proceeding was first filed has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the issue (De Borja vs. Tan, 97 Phil. 872).

Explain the extent of jurisdiction of Probate Court

(1) The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased person either summarily or through the process of administration. The RTC acting a s a probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent unless the claimant and all other parties have legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court. In that case, if the probate court allows the introduction of evidence on ownership it is for the sole purpose of determining whether the subject properties should be included in the inventory, which is within the probate court’s competence. The determination is only provisional subject to a proper action at the RTC in a separate action to resolve the title.

Janes mother left a will which was in probate which included in inventory, the investment properties. Janes half brother raised the question of ownership of the properties since these were properties of his their father prior to his marriage to Janes mother. Will the questions raised prosper?

Answer: The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills, the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of ownership is, as a rule, an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality (Intestate Estate of cxIsmael Reyes, Heirs of Reyes vs. Reyes, GR 139587, Nov. 2, 2000).

Case Digest: Criminal Law-Complex Crime

2012-06-24T00:57:00.001-07:00

G.R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988 –CASE OF COMPLEX CRIME

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FILOMENO SALUFRANIA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: On 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged before the CFI of Camarines Norte,with the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion. It was alleged that on the 3rd day of December, 1974, the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on his wife, MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA by then and there boxing and stranging her, causing upon her injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death; and by the same criminal act committed on the person of the wife of the accused, who was at the time 8 months pregnant, the accused caused the death of the unborn child,committing both crimes of PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL ABORTION as defined and punished under Art. 246 and Art. 256, paragraph I, of the Revised Penal Code.

At the trial court, Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., Pedro Salufrania testified that,he was called upon by the Municipal Judge of Talisay to examine the corpse of Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania that was exhumed from its grave in which the cause of death was cardiac arrest.

Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after conducting the post mortem examination, he issued a certification thereof (Exhibit "A"); that he issued a death certificate (Exhibit "B") for the deceased Marciano Abuyo-Salufrania, bearing the date of 5 December 1974, made on the basis of the information relayed by a certain Leonila Loma to his nurse before the burial, without mentioning the cause of death; that the cause of death, as cardiac arrest, was indicated on said death certificate only after the post mortem examination on 11 December 1974. The lower court allowed the son of the accused, Pedro Salufrania, The lower court stated that, by reason of interest and relationship, before Pedro Salufrania was allowed to testify against his father-accused Filomeno Salufrania, after careful examination by the prosecuting officer and the defense counsel under the careful supervision of the court a quo, to determine whether, at his age of 13 years old, he was already capable of receiving correct impressions of facts and of relating them truly and, also, whether he was compelled and/or threatened by anybody to testify against his father-accused.He stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his mother Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3 December 1974, he saw his father box his pregnant mother on the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her to death; that he saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot where she fell. His brother,Eduardo Abuyo and had refused and still refused to live with his father-accused, because the latter has threatened to kill him and his other brothers and sister should he reveal the true cause of his mother's death.The brother in law and sister of the deceased victim,Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the burial of Marciana Abuyo, the three (3) children of his deceased sisterrefused to go home with their father Filomeno Salufrania; that when asked why, his nephew Alex Salufraña told him that the real cause of death of their mother was not stomach ailment and headache, rather, she was boxed on the stomach and strangled to death by their father; that immediately after learning of the true cause of death of his sister, he brought the matter to the attention of the police authorities .

The CFI found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Marciano Abuyo in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. "For unselfish, valuable and exemplary service rendered by counsel de oficio, Atty. Marciano C. Dating, Jr., a compensation of P500.00 is hereby recommended for him subject to the availability of fund. Since the accused was sentenced to death, this becomes an automatic review before the Supreme Court.

The defense had for witnesses Geronimo Villan, Juanito Bragais, Angeles Liling Balce and the accused Filomeno Salufrania.Geronimo Villan testified that he was a neighbor of Filomeno Sulfrania whio tried to help him administer a native treatment around 6am in the morning of December 4, 1974, but she died around 7am. Witness Juanita Bragais testified that he was fetched by Felipe Salufrania, another son of Filomeno Salufrania Marciana Abuyo was already dead so he just helped Filomeno Salufrania in transferring the body of his wife to the house of the latter's brother-in—law.Angeles Liling Balce, who claimed to be a former resident she arrived in the house of Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning Marciana still in a coma lying on the lap of her husband who informed her that Marciana was suffering from an old stomach ailment. The accused admitted that he was that lawful husband of the deceased Marciana Abuyo; that he sent r Juanito Bragais but the latter was not able to cure his wife, that there was no quarrel between him and his wife that preceded the latter's death, and that during the lifetime of the deceased, they loved each other; that after her burial, his son Pedro Salufrania was taken by his brother-in-law Narciso Abuyo and since then, he was not able to talk to his son until during the trial; and that at the time of death of his wife, aside from the members of his family, Geronimo Villan Francisco Repuya and Liling Angeles Balce were also present.Appellant alleges that the trial court failed to determine the competence of Pedro Salufrania before he was allowed to testify. He also questions the competence of Dr. Dyquiangco as an expert witness, and alleges that the findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and the testimony of Pedro Salufrania do not tally. But this contention is without merit. The Court notes, first of all, that appellant did not even bother to discuss his defense in order to refute the massive evidence against him. This is tantamount to an admission that he could not adequately support his version of Marciana Abuyo's death.Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an abortion. In this contention, appellant is correct. He should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:

1. That there is a pregnant woman. 2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion. 3. That the violence is intentionally exerted. 4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in its ruling of complex crime with parricide and intentional abortion?

HELD: According to the Supreme Court,

“Trial judges are in the best position to ascertain the truth and detect falsehoods in the testimony of witnesses. This Court will normally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, in view of its advantage in observing first hand their demeanor in giving their testimony. Such rule applies in the present case.

The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion. The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that caused the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon his victim. It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the foetus in her womb. In this afternoon, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states that the accused should be punished with the penalty corresponding to the more serious came of parricide, to be imposed in its maximum period which is death. However, by reason of the 1987 Constitution which has abolished the death penalty, appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. “

In the present case, the Supreme Court modified, the judgment appealed from was AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of P12,000. 00 awarded to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is increased to P30,000.00 in line with the recent decisions of the Court. With costs.

SOURCE: Lawphil.net

Case Digest- Criminal Law-Habitual Delinquent

2012-06-23T23:54:00.002-07:00

G.R. No. 45141 September 15, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BIENVENIDO VENUS, defendant-appellant.

Jose F. Oreta for appellant.,Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for appellee.

FACTS: Prosecuting atty. of the CFi in Manila filed a case of robbery against defendant which such crime occurred in an inhabited house. It was alleged that defendant entered the house then occupied by Zoila de Talaban by breaking the door of said house which was secured by a padlock. Once inside took and carried away, with the intent of gain and without the consent of the owner, personal properties belonging to Zoila de Talaban of the total value of one hundred and eighty-eight and fifty centavos. It was also alleged that the said accused is a habitual delinquent, having previously been convicted by final judgment rendered by a competent court, once for the crime of attempted robbery in an inhabited house and once for theft, the date of his last conviction being November 14, 1934."

The accused pleaded guilty to the information and trial court rendered judgment imposing upon him an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from four months and one day of arresto mayor to three years, three months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the complaint Zoila de Talaban in the amount of P97.50, which represents the value of the personal properties not recovered from the accused, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, The articles recovered from the accused were ordered returned to the complainant. From this decision, the defendant has appealed to this court. The trial court, in imposing the prison sentence upon the defendant-appellant, took into account the aggravating circumstance of recidivism instead of what was alleged in the information. On the contrary, the Solicitor-General, however, recommends that the defendant-appellant be also adjudged a habitual delinquent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the Solicitor General is correct?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court Decided, the defendant and appellant in the case at bar can not be considered a habitual delinquent but only a recidivist. As the plea of guilty offsets the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the penalty provided for in article 299 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of robbery in an inhabited house by means of unlawful entry where the criminal is not armed and the value of the property stolen does not exceed 250 pesos, should be imposed in the medium degree in accordance with the provisions of article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (People vs. Co Pao [1934], 58 Phil., 545; People vs. Gayrama [1934], 60 Phil., 796), the principal penalty imposed by the court a quo was modified and instead the penalty of six months and one day to two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional, was imposed upon the defendant-appellant, Bienvenido Venus. With this only modification, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against the appellant in both instances.

Source: LAWPHIL.NET

Digest Case in Civil Procedure-Party In Interest

2012-06-14T23:22:00.000-07:00

G.R. No. 161065. April 15, 2005
EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO, CELSO D. GANGAN, PACASIO S. BANARIA, SOFRONIO B. URSAL, ALBERTO P. CRUZ, MARIA L. MATIB, RACHEL U. PACPACO, ANGELO G. SANCHEZ, and SHERWIN A. SIP-AN,　Petitioners,　
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, in his capacity as Chairman, Commission on Audit, HON. EMMANUEL M. DALMAN and HON. RAUL C. FLORES, in their capacities as Commissioners, Commission on Audit,Respondents.’s jurisdiction and justify the exercise of judicial power on his behalf.

FACTS:

This case was a petition for　certiorari　is the legality of a resolution No. of the Commission on Audit (COA) providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. The petitioners alleged therein that this Plan is intrinsically void for want of an enabling law which gives that COA to undertake the same and providing for the necessary standards, conditions, restrictions, limitations, guidelines, and parameters. Petitioners further alleged COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that petitioners have no legal standing to file the present petition since they have not shown "a personal stake in the outcome of the case" or an actual or potential injury that can be redressed by our favorable decision. In essence, it is alleged that the petitioners are not a party in interest, but the petitioners claim otherwise by reason that the matter is of public concern. The said Organizational Restructuring Plan is not just a mere reorganization but a revamp or overhaul of the COA, with a "spillover effect" upon its audit performance. This will have an impact upon the rest of the government bodies subject to its audit supervision, thus, should be treated as a matter of transcendental importance.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners have the legal standing to institute the instant petition.

HELD: The Supreme Court decided, NO.It stated that:

(Locus Standi)

There was no showing that they had any　direct and personal interest　in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. There was also of an admission that "they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the respondents" and "are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain." Hence, the petitioners do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit. This case was decided by the Supreme Court En Banc.He who is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and substantial has the standing to sue. A party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision in order to warrant an invocation of the court

A Digest of David Reyes vs. Jose Lim, G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003

2012-06-14T22:50:00.000-07:00

Facts: Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against respondents. The complaint alleged that Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land located along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City with a monthly rental of P35,000.
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property before the end of January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng and Harrison Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to Sell. It was also alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the P400,000 monthly penalty would have accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase price of P18,000,000.
Keng and Harrison Lumber denied that they connived with Lim to defraud Reyes, and that Reyes approved their request for an extension of time to vacate the Property due to their difficulty in finding a new location for their business. Harrison Lumber claimed that it had already started transferring some of its merchandise to its new business location in Malabon.
Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price. Lim requested a meeting with Reyes through the latter’s daughter on the signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment of the balance but Reyes kept postponing their meeting. Reyes offered to return the P10 million down payment to Lim because Reyes was having problems in removing the lessee from the Property. Lim rejected Reyes’ offer and proceeded to verify the status of Reyes’ title to the Property. Lim learned that Reyes had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation Lim denied conniving with Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes.Reyes filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint due to supervening facts. These included the filing by Lim of a complaint for estafa against Reyes as well as an action for specific performance and nullification of sale and title plus damages before another trial court. The trial court granted the motion.
In his Amended Answer Lim prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million down payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The trial court granted this motion.
Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the ground the Order practically granted the reliefs Lim prayed for in his Amended Answer. The trial court denied Reyes’ motion.
The trial court denied Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration. In the same order, the trial court directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down payment with the Clerk of Court.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and prayed that the orders of the trial court be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: Whether on not the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law on the matter?

Held: The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this was a case where there is hiatus in the law and in the Rules of Court. If this case was left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim. Here the court excercised equity jurisdiction.The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution so that substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.
The Supreme Court also state that rescission is possible only when the person demanding rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is restitution, that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante.
In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million down payment. The decision of the Court of Appeals.was affirmed.

Habeas Corpus Case Digest

2012-06-13T05:17:00.000-07:00

Case Digests

1. Habeas Corpus

CASE TITLE :G.R. No. 169482 January 29, 2008
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents.
FACTS: This is a petition for review ¹ of the resolutions February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of the C.A.where the petition for habeas corpus was denied.
The nephew of Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities filed for habeas corpus after demanding the return of Eufemia from her adopted daughters. The C.A. ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated February 2, 2005, the C.A. denied his petition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied.⁷ Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a court should limit itself to determining whether or not a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty and that there is no need to consider legal custody or custodial rights. Thus, a writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal custody of another. According to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before the court that will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty.
However, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia, not the other way around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other household needs.
Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner EDGARDO E. VELUZ was appointed as administrator of the properties of Eufemia and her deceased spouse. By this appointment, he took charge of collecting payments from tenants and transacted business with third persons for and in behalf of Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the late Maximo.Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory and return of the properties entrusted to petitioner. His failure to heed gave rise to a complaint of estafa. Consequently, and by reason of their mother’s deteriorating health, respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11, 2005. She willingly went with them. Petitioner failed to prove either his right to the custody of Eufemia or the illegality of respondents’ action.
ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus should be granted.
RULING: Petition Denied. – ApplicationL: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody.
According to the S.C., if the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed
In this case, the C.A. made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not.
Petition was DENIED.