When Italy declared war on the Western allies, on June 10^th, 1940, neither Benito Mussolini nor most of the military leadership thought North Africa would become the main theatre of operations. The eyes were pointed at the developments on the continent and the Italian expectations (and hopes) were that of a short war where Italy could have collected some valuable spoils.

In the Italian colony of Libya, the Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air Force) was ordered to maintain a defensive stance against allied forces in Tunisia and Egypt. At the time of the declaration of war, Libya’s air forces were composed of 134 bombers (107 S.M. 79 and 27 S.M.81) and 66 fighters (around 50 CR.32 and 11CR.42). In addition, there were some reconnaissance and transport aircraft and the 50° Stormo Assalto (Land attack wing), equipped with Breda BA 65 and CA310B (around 50 aircraft, but sources are a bit unclear).

The main opponent of the Regia Aeronautica in the theatre was the Western Desert Air Force deployed in Egypt, which at the time consisted of roughly 40 Gloster Gladiator fighters, 70 Blenheim bombers plus a few dozen more outdated aircraft. Both opponents would soon see more reinforcements coming in the theatre.

The air war begins

The beginning of hostilities saw immediately a series of incursions from British bombers, the first one launched on the 11^th of June against the El Adem airfield (south-east of Tobruch) which managed to damage some Italian bombers on the ground. On this occasion, the CR.32 intercepted the attackers and managed to shoot down two bombers.

The day after, 27 CR.42 arrived in Libya from Italy to reinforce the ranks of the fighter force.  On the 14^th of June, Gloster Gladiators and CR.42 clashed for the first time over the Libyan desert while on the 19^th the Italian fighters met for the first time in combat one Hawker Hurricane, one of the first machines of this type sent to the theatre.

Figure 1 A Breda BA 65 under maintenance

On the 28^th of June, another bombing run was launched against the Tobruch airfields and at the end of the raid, amid smoke and confusion, the Italian AA land batteries mistakenly shot down the S.M. 79 carrying the Governor of Libya Marshal Italo Balbo, who was arriving in Tobruch.

With the capitulation of France, all the aircraft deployed in Western Libya (Triploitania) were progressively moved to the East (Cyrenaica). They were desperately needed because one relevant problem was becoming evident. The British land forces had begun to launch a series of incursions with small, motorized columns deep into Libyan territory. The Italian army was unable to counter these hit-and-run attacks because it lacked tanks, armored cars and sufficient motor transports. Thus, they continuously pressed the Air Force to intervene where needed.

This new task absorbed many resources and aircraft, augmenting the attrition level and not achieving that much, especially because purpose-built land attack aircraft were not available in large numbers. To this end, in July, 32 new Breda BA 88 land attack aircraft were sent to Libya but soon they proved to be useless, due to a series of design flaws and their insufficient engine power. After a brief operational activity, they were used as decoy targets around airfields.

Figure 2 A Breda BA 88 “Lince”

The months of July and August 1940 saw weekly air skirmishes between Italian and British fighters, usually in the context of respective escort/interception missions. The Regia Aeronautica, as mentioned before, was also absorbed by land surveillance and land attack duties.

In the meantime, the post held by Italo Balbo was assumed by Marshal Graziani who increasingly received pressures from Rome to launch an offensive towards Egypt, using the forces he had available. In Mussolini’s mind, this was to take place, at the latest, when German troops would have landed in Britain (as the Germans kept telling their allies that the invasion was imminent). Graziani, faced with the dire situation of his forces in Libya, managed to postpone the operation and receive some new reinforcements (like the 70 M11/39 tanks shipped in July).

Figure 3 a FIAT CR.42

The offensive was in the end launched in September, as he couldn’t fend off Rome’s pressuring requests and thus the Italian invasion of Egypt began. The Regia Aeronautica continued to carry out its tasks, with now additional missions over Egyptian territory. The offensive was short lived, as it stopped after a few days when the Italians reached Sidi El Barrani, at the extreme of the logistical capabilities of Graziani’s army. The months until December 1940, while relatively calm on the land front, saw the same level of air skirmishes as outlined before.

One big air clash took place on the 30^th of October 1940 when 26 S.M. 79 escorted by 37 CR.42 flew to attack an airfield near Marsa Matruh. They were intercepted by a mixed formation of Hurricanes and Gladiators. The British shot down 1 fighter, 2 bombers and heavily damaged other two. The Italians shot down 2 Hurricanes and 5 Gladiators.

Operation Compass

On the night of the 9th of December, under the command of General Richard O’Connor, the Western Desert Force (WDF) attacked.  The 7th armored and 4th Indian divisions passed through a gap between the camps of two Italian divisions and began ravaging the Italian front, held by non-mobile troops that could launch no or limited counterattacks. In the space of 5 days, the mobile British units had reached the border between Egypt and Libya and pushed through into the Italian colony.

Figure 4 Overview of the whole campaign December 1940-February 1941 (Source Military History Network)

At the beginning of the British offensive, the Italians in Libya could rely on a limited number of efficient aircraft, according to Marshal Graziani there were 45 bombers, 6 torpedo bombers, 12 land attack aircraft, 68 fighters and 4 transport aircraft. The units of the Regia Aeronautica relentlessly attacked when and where they could. The land attack aircraft like the Breda 65 or the CR.32 equipped with bombs flew numerous missions until exhaustion.

They did so facing increasing numbers of Hawker Hurricanes, against which only the CR.42 biplanes could be deployed.  The British fighter was superior in all respects, the only chance for the Italian biplanes was to engage in a close and manoeuvred fight where they could leverage on their superior manoeuvrability. It was the case of an encounter on the 14^th of December when 5 Hurricanes attacked 5 CR.42 in a very close fight and came out with their leader shot down and Italian fighters downed.

Epilogue, for now

The British offensive effectively expelled the Italians from Cyrenaica and the operations came to an end in early February, with the battle of Beda Fomm.  Already on the 6^th of January 1941, Graziani wrote to Mussolini that the Air Force in Libya was no more able to launch offensive operations due to the extreme exhaustion of its forces. It is estimated that during this time arc, the Italians had lost between 300 and 400 aircraft.

The Fight was over for now, but a new phase of the war in North Africa was about to begun. With the arrival of new Italian troops, the German Afrika Korps and the Luftwaffe (Fliegerführer Afrika), also new reinforcements for the Regia Aeronautica arrived, including new types of aircraft like the MC.200.

Sources

De Lorenzo, G., (1991), L’Aeronautica in guerra – 1° anno, pag. 85-132 in “L’Italia in Guerra” il primo anno -1940, Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare.

Galbiati, F. (2023). La caccia della Regia Aeronautica (1936-1943) Parte I, STORIA MILITARE

Sgarlato, N. (2000). La Regia Aeronautica nella II Guerra Mondiale. Delta Editrice.

Malizia, N. (2003). Il FIat C.R.42, l’ultimo biplano da caccia Italiano. Editrice Innocenti.

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The opposition against Pedestal saw the deployment of almost 800 Axis aircraft, beyond the Submarines and Motor torpedo boats, however, one very overlooked aspect of the event is that the Italian air force deployed some strange but innovative weapons that deserve some more attention.

The Motobomba FFF

During the 12^th of August 1942, the second day of attacks suffered by the Pedestal convoy, the Italian air force units deployed in Sardinia launched 3 waves of air strikes. In the first one, 10 S.M.84 bombers dropped their payload against the allied ships, which consisted of Motobombe FFF. This weapon was essentially an airborne torpedo, 500m in diameter and weighing 360kg, it was dropped from higher altitudes than standard torpedoes and utilized a parachute. Once in the water, the Motobomba would have started its course, which was not straight but spiraling. For roughly 30 minutes, the Motobomba was set run on this pattern, with the radius of the spiral increasing at each turn.

The idea behind this weapon was to hit ships in harbour or disrupting naval formation. Admiral Syfret, on board battleship Nelson, sighted these weapons coming down with their parachutes and thought they were naval mines. Later, the trails in the water were spotted and the convoy turned to the left, breaking the formation for a while. This favoured the next wave of Italian aircraft, comprising torpedo bombers and fighters, which attacked the convoy but achieved no great results.

Figure 1 A Motobomba FFF

This was the largest operational use of the Motobomba done by the Italian Air Force during WW2, however this was not their last deployment. The German Luftwaffe, which really liked the weapon, had placed an order for 2.000 Motobombe some years before. These were later used to launch air attacks against allied ships at anchor in Algerian ports and later also Italian ports, like the famous bombing of Bari in late 1943.

The ARP: the Italian drone

In July 1940, after observing the limits of level bombing against moving ships, Colonel Ferdinando Raffaelli of the Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air Force) sent a written proposal to the High Command explaining that it would certainly be possible to inflict serious losses on enemy convoys using unmanned aircraft which, guided by radio control, would have to crash into enemy ships, causing one or two huge bombs to explode on them.

The plane to be sacrificed (named A.R.P.) could be remotely controlled using radio impulses sent by the crew of another plane (P plane) who would have followed it at a safe distance.

Raffaelli’s idea received the approval of the air force and some resources were made available to develop the programme. Due to the inadequacy of the means available, it took almost two years to complete, and only at the end of May 1942 were the aircraft declared ready for use.

The occasion to deploy the ARP in combat came with the arrival of the Pedestal convoy in the waters south of Sardinia on the 12^th of August 1942.

The ARP (an S.M.79) took off from Sardinia with a human pilot who parachuted shortly afterward, and the P plane (CANT Z1007) assumed control of the ARP, which was painted in yellow to be better seen from a distance.

Figure 2 S.M.79, the model of aircraft used for the A.R.P.

Everything seemed to work well but at some point the P plane lost contact with the ARP, which failed to respond to the commands, probably due to an electrical failure of the radio apparatus. The mission was aborted, and the ARP crashed in Algeria.  The Italian drone never flew again.

The anti-ship bomb

The third and final innovative weapon deployed by the Italians during Operation Pedestal (perhaps the more conventional) was a special armor-piercing bomb, developed from the 15-inch shells fired by the Littorio class battleships. This bomb had far more potential than any other bomb previously used (also by dive bombers), weighing 630kg.

Figure 3 The 650 kg bomb ready to be loaded on the Reggiane RE.2001

These bombs were to be carried by two modified Reggiane Re2001 fighters that flew against the Pedestal convoy in the third Italian wave during the 12^th August, escorted by a dozen G.50 fighters.

The two Reggiane flew towards the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious and were not fired upon, probably the British spotters mistakenly took them as Hawker Hurricanes trying to land back on the carrier. The launched their bombs and one landed in water while the second landed on the flight deck but did not explode and rolled off into the sea. Most likely an issue with the fuses had prevented the detonation. Luckily for the two Reggiane, they managed to pull off before the anti-aircraft gun crews realized what was happening and that those were enemy planes.

Sources

Ciampaglia G., La sorprendente storia della motobomba FFF, in Rivista Italiana Difesa, luglio 1999

Fanni I., L’aereo Teleguidato A.R.P. Operazione Canarino

Gueli, M., (2021). Il Reggiane RE.2001, in STORIA MILITARE N.330, pag.4-12.

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Invading Malta in 1940

Why did the Italians not occupy Malta in the summer of 1940? This is a quite popular question that is mirrored by statements like “the Italians failed to occupy Malta early in the war when it was undefended”. Such arguments can be easily found in books and documentaries about Italian participation in WW2.

On the other side, there are no detailed analyses on the feasibility of such an operation in the English language, while more attention has been given to the planned invasion of 1942. In this article, I will try to dispel some myths and explain why the capture of Malta in the summer of 1940 was essentially impossible for the Italian armed forces.  

Prewar planning

Italian military planners had studied in the late 1930s the feasibility of transporting men and supplies to North Africa in the context of a war against France and the UK. The task was considered very difficult due to the balance of naval forces. Malta was identified as a huge potential threat to the Italian convoys, as a powerful surface force could be deployed there, together with numerous aircraft. The plan considered that an occupation of the island could solve the problem but acknowledged the difficulties of the operation, without going in much detail.

It was considered that a neutralization of the island through aerial bombardment was more convenient and less risky. After the outbreak of WW2, the Mediterranean fleet moved to Alexandria and no significant air units were placed in Malta. With the Italian entry into the war approaching, the Italian navy studied more in-depth the plan for the invasion of Malta. They concluded that it was a very risky endeavor with no great chances of success, and perhaps it was better to “let the war be decided elsewhere”. The following paragraphs will explain the elements that led the Italian planners to abandon the idea.

The terrain

Any tourist that has the luck to visit this lovely island of Malta, will not fail to notice that almost the entire coastline is characterized by rocky reefs and cliffs, with only a handful of small beaches. The terrain is rocky and hilly in the northwestern part of the island. The two locations more suitable for landing a seaborne invasion force are the beaches of St. Paul Bay and Mellieha Bay. The first one is roughly 300 meters long and less than 900m is the second.

If such an invasion force is to land on such beaches, it will have to face an upward rocky terrain, with subsequent ridges and being subject to artillery fire. In fact, some miles to the southeast, the invasion force would have faced the Victoria Line, a series of defensive emplacements built in the 19^th century. Surely obsolete for 20^th century standards, but quite effective to repel infantry equipped with light weapons. In addition to the Victoria Line, many pillboxes had been built in large numbers from 1935, all around the island but in particular in the northwestern part.

Figure 1 Malta in 1940

Figure 2 Defensive emplacements of the Victoria Line

Figure 3 One of the many pillboxes on the Island

Figure 4 A piece of the Southern coast

Last but not least, an invasion force landing in the above-mentioned Bays and marching southwest, would have found nothing to live from (water and food), and all the supplies should have been landed on the beaches.

The Defenders

Looking at the forces that defended Malta in June 1940, the sources consulted allowed me to estimate (downward) around 11.442 men defending the island. This number does not count the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force personnel. Looking at the units defending Malta (see Figure 5 for the details), there were 5 fully equipped battalions of the British (standing) Army. The infantry force was supplemented by the raising of the King’s Own Malta Regiment, on three battalions. There was the Royal Malta Artillery regiment (1702 men), who manned most of the AA batteries and three units of the (British) Royal Artillery, manning the heavy coastal batteries, the anti-tank guns and part of the AA batteries. To complement these forces, there were around 3.000 men of the Malta Defence Volunteer Force. These were civilians equipped with firearms and rarely uniforms, who provided anti-paratrooper and observation patrols.

Regarding the air defence, the myth of the three Gloster Gladiators “Faith”, “Hope” and “Charity” is, of course, a myth, these names were made up later. As Douglas Austin writes, “Twelve Fleet Air Arm Sea Gladiators had been left at Kalafrana in packing cases when the aircraft carrier, HMS Glorious, sailed for Norwegian waters. He obtained Admiral Cunningham’s permission to assemble six of these, while the other six were used for spare parts”. In late June, the island was reinforced by the arrival of the 830° squadron of the Fleet Air Arm, flying Swordfish torpedo bombers. 12 Hurricanes flying from Tunisia arrived a few days after the war declaration of Italy, however, these aircraft were destined for Alexandria and only one remained in Malta until the arrival of more modern fighters in August.

The coastal defense was provided by seven 9.2-inch guns and around twelve 6-inch guns, their disposition can be seen in Figure 1. The island was also surrounded by roughly 1.000 naval mines, many of them defending the most likely landing places, like St. Paul’s and Melieha Bays.

Figure 5 Strenght of the Malta garrison

The Italian forces

Facing an 11.000-12.000 strong garrison, any reasonable war plan for an invasion of Malta would have required the transport of an invasion force of at least double the size. Italian planners in spring 1940 estimated it in 40.000 men, a number which considered the inevitable losses incurred in such operation. The problem was that transporting and landing such an invasion force was a though job.

The Italian navy could rely on 5 vessels that could be used for landing operations, these were classified as “tankers” (Cisterne) and were the Adige and the 4 units of the Sesia class. They were characterized by a ramp at the end of the bow, a common trait of the late war landing crafts. These units could carry around 500 men each and a few vehicles and light artillery pieces. A simple calculus can suggest that, although fitting the role, they were not available in sufficient numbers for the supposed invasion of Malta.

Figure 6 The Scrivia (Sesia class) on the day of her launch

Figure 7 The Adige entering the “Mar Piccolo” in the base of Taranto

As was the case in all other nations, except for Japan, landing crafts were available (if existent) in few numbers, able to support small-scale operations of Marine infantry. In the Italian case, these 5 ships were able to carry the entire force of the San Marco Marine regiment.

The two battalions of the San Marco available in the summer of 1940 were certainly not sufficient to take Malta, and thus more men from the Army were required for the task. The Italian navy planners were aware of this and the only solution was the seizure of caiques and Bragozzi, wooden boats used mainly for fishing and light transport. It goes without saying that such fragile boats would have incurred heavy damages (and thus human casualties) even against light and heavy machine guns.

Figure 8 A militarized “Bragozzo” in 1941

Having said that, no army units were trained enough or at all for amphibious operations so everything would have been developed from scratch. In addition, only a handful of airborne troops were available at that time; the Libyan paratroopers also known as “Fanti dell’Aria”.

Besides all these issues, one should also consider the balance of naval forces in the region by the time of the entry into the war of Italy. The Regia Marina could rely only on two Cavour class battleships at the time, as the two Littorios and the two Duilio were under completion. Together with the heavy cruisers available, they would have escorted the invasion fleet, proceeding at very slow speed, a maximum 8-9 knots in the best case. Once the invasion had commenced, they would have faced the inevitable intervention of the Mediterranean fleet and the Marine Nationale. The two allied navies had a force of 9 battleships deployed in the Mediterranean, which could have arrived near Malta within 30-36 hours.  

This time frame was, beyond any reasonable doubt, insufficient for the invasion force (if it managed to land sufficient forces) to defeat Malta’s defenders. Thus, once the allied fleet had arrived, the Regia Marina would have fought a desperate fight against superior enemy forces or fled, abandoning the invasion force on the island without supplies.

The Italian declaration of war

It must be remembered that Mussolini decided to enter the European conflict with the belief that the war would have ended in the space of a few months. Everybody was well aware that the country and the armed forces were not ready for a prolonged war, but the fall of France and the reassurances of the Italian dictator to his military leaders about the limited duration of the war defeated any skepticism. Imagining a short war, with Malta just capable of defending but not attacking (as both the Royal Air Force and Navy had abandoned the Island), any idea for an invasion of Malta made little sense, especially given the risks inherent to the operation. In September it became clear that the War would have continued for a little longer but the season was now unfavorable for any invasion attempt (with all the other problems still standing). By the summer of 1941, the situation had drastically changed and the events took another course.

Sources

Mariano Gabriele (1990), Operazione C3, USMM

Philip Vella, Malta blitzed but not beaten

Tullio Marcon, La mancata invasione di Malta: https://caiscuola.cai.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/marcon.pdf

Douglas Austin (2001), The place of Malta in British Strategic policy 1925-1943: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1317691/1/271101.pdf

Gianluca Bertozzi, Il piano di invasione di Malta del 1940: https://www.ocean4future.org/savetheocean/archives/48699

The Malta Garrison: https://www.maltaramc.com/regsurg/rs1940_1949/rmo1940.html

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The Army was 227,000 men strong, placed under the command of the elderly General Italo Gariboldi, while General Messe later returned to Italy and participated to the Tunisian campaign. As for the air units, that had taken part in the operations until summer of 1942,  the 22nd Fighter Group, worn out by months of activity, was replaced by the 21st Fighter Group, flying on Macchi MC200 (made of four Squadriglie of 12 aircraft each). The 71st Aerial Observation Group flying on Caproni Ca311s (formed by the 38th and 116th Squadriglia) replaced the 61st.

Between August and December 1942, the 71st Group received 12 heavier twin-engine Fiat BR20M bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, while the 21st Fighter Group was supplemented with a handful of new and more modern aircraft: 12 Macchi MC202 fighters. Meanwhile, ARM.I.R. reached the middle course of the Don River, positioning itself defensively between the 2nd Hungarian Army (to the north) and the 3rd Romanian Army (to the south).

Figure 1 MC200 and MC202 fighters over an Italian airport in Russia covered by snow

In August, during a massive and prolonged attack by numerous Soviet infantry and armored divisions against ARM.I.R.’s lines, the entire Italian Air Corps was thrown into the battle to support the ground troops’ resistance. On August 6, the Fiat BR20Ms of the 38th Squadron of the 71st Aerial Observation Group carried out a first bombing mission east of the Don River, targeting concentrations of Soviet artillery and infantry. Similar actions were carried out by the Macchi MC200s (equipped with two 50-kilogram wing bombs) and even the small Ca311.

After two months of intense activity, the early Russian winter further worsened the conditions of the already strained Italian air units (especially the fighter units), which, despite achieving notable successes (not less than 30 enemy aircraft were shot down in combat), saw their ranks reduced to a minimum. However, thanks to the arrival in September of some additional Macchi MC202 fighters, the 21st Fighter Group regained some strength and began a series of low-altitude attacks against Russian positions east of the Don to harass the enemy positions, which at this time was beginning to amass huge numbers of men and tanks for their upcoming offensive.

Between mid-October and mid-November, all the Macchi MC200s and MC202s and the Fiat BR20s persisted in their low-altitude attacks, targeting mainly motorized columns and troop concentrations, despite heavy losses inflicted by Russian aviation and deadly anti-aircraft fire. The results obtained by the Italian pilots were positive compared to their small numbers, however they were insufficient to significantly weaken the powerful Soviet wa rmachine.

On December 11, after a devastating artillery preparatory fire, the Soviets went on the offensive with the support of 750 heavy T34 tanks. After a week of fierce fighting, the Russian divisions (supported by no less than 800 combat aircraft) broke through the central part of the ARM.I.R. front. With a gigantic pincer maneuver, the 6th Army and part of the 1st Army attempted to encircle the entire 8th Italian Army in a vast pocket.

Figure 2 A Ca 311 running a pre-warming procedure of its engines

The maneuver succeeded, but General Gariboldi tried to establish some rear defensive lines (mainly entrusted to the Alpine groups of the Julia, the Monte Cervino Battalion, and the Vicenza reserve division) to allow the bulk of the 8th Army to leave the right bank of the Don and its tributary Kalitva, retreating westward: the only possible maneuver since both the 2nd Hungarian Army and the 3rd Romanian Army had succumbed to Russian pressure. During those days, what remained of the Italian Air Corps in Russia exhausted all its energies in a nearly continuous series of low-altitude attacks against the Soviet armored and motorized units that were spreading into the 8th Army’s rear. With temperatures plummeting to 40-45 degrees below zero, with landing gear and weapon mounts frozen (at those temperatures, the lubricating oils supplied to the Regia hardened, turning into a sort of glue), the Macchis, Fiat BR20s, and Caproni Ca311s still took off from snow-covered fields under Russian fighter-bomber attacks to try to support the remaining Italian defensive positions. However, it was a futile and unequal struggle.

By the end of December 1942, the units had an average of no more than 50 operational aircraft daily, against an opponent capable of deploying no fewer than 400/500. The Macchi MC200 fighters, which, did not have an enclosed cockpit, forcing pilots to endure frightful temperatures in flight, strafed and bombed (always with the small and insufficient 50-kilogram bombs) the Russian columns, supported by the very few more modern MC202s, which were also tasked with facing the enemy fighters. The Russians threw hundreds of Yakovlev Yak-1, Yak-3, and Yak-9, Lavochkin LaGG-3 and LaGG-5, and Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-3 fighters into the fight, armed with heavy 12.7 mm machine guns and 20 mm cannons. The Russian air force also pounded the Italian rear and retreating columns with compact swarms of heavy assault aircraft and medium twin-engine bombers like the Ilyushin IL-2 “Shturmovik” and Petlyakov Pe-2.

Despite the overwhelming Russian superiority, the 21st Fighter Group’s pilots, thanks also to the tireless work of ground personnel, managed to keep a couple of squadrons operational, while the surviving Fiat BR20s and Capronis attempted with some isolated actions to bomb the Russian armored concentrations close to annihilating the besieged Italian units.

The few SM81 transport trimotors were tasked with providing minimal logistical support to our troops: a task carried out at the cost of heavy losses. But it is worth pausing here to highlight the often overlooked valuable role played by the Transport Group of the Italian Air Corps in Russia: a small unit that, despite great sacrifices, worked hard, despite enemy fighters, to support ARM.I.R. Between December 18 and 21, 1941, the SM81s distinguished themselves by evacuating the Kantemirova airfield, surrounded by Soviet armored troops, rescuing pilots, specialists, and over 70 severely wounded. Between late 1941 and early 1942, during the first great Russian winter offensive, the slow but robust Savoia Marchetti trimotors continued to supply food, medicine, and ammunition to the Italian front lines, losing at least six aircraft, three of which were shot down by Soviet anti-aircraft fire, and damaging the remaining ones.

The commander of the Italian Air Corps in Russia, General Enrico Pezzi, himself disappeared aboard one of the SM81s during a daring supply mission to a large isolated Italo-German unit. On December 29, 1942, in Tscerkow, 7,000 Italians and 4,000 Germans were trapped by a maneuver of Soviet armored units. Pezzi, did not hesitate and decided to personally participate in the rescue mission. On December 29, he took off from Woroscilovgrad with his trimotor, carrying Lieutenant Doctor Federico Bocchetti and pilots and specialists Romano Romanò, Giovanni Busacchi, Luigi Tomasi, Antonio Arcidiacono, Salvatore Caruso, and Alcibiade Bonazza. The aircraft, loaded with food and medicine, reached Tscerkow, then took off with several wounded to try to reach the rear lines but failed. General Pezzi’s SM81 disappeared into thin air, probably shot down by Russian fighters.

Figure 3 General Enrico Pezzi

After a long and arduous operational cycle, at the beginning of 1943, the last battered SM81 transports had to gradually retreat to less exposed fields to the final Russian offensive. They abandoned Stalino, one of the main rear bases along with other surviving units of the Italian Air Corps, and retreated in the Odessa airport, where they remained until March 1943. The last SM81s of the 246th Squadriglia returned to Italy only in May. The annihilation of the entire Italian Air Corps in Russia occurred, as we have seen, between December 1942 and January 1943, when the great Soviet advance and the general retreat of Hungarian, Italian, Romanian, and German forces coincided with the full force of the Russian air force.

The numerical comparison between the air units of the opposing sides on the Don front was overwhelmingly unfavorable. Against a Russian air army equipped with over 2,000 fighters, fighter-bombers, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft, the sparse Italian, German, Romanian, and Hungarian groups could muster only 300 operational aircraft, which were short of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts. This staggering disparity was primarily due to the Luftwaffe Command being forced to deploy nearly all its units to support Von Paulus’s 6th Army besieged at Stalingrad and Von Kleist’s army engaged further south in the Caucasus area between December 1942 and January 1943.

The last significant military action of the Italian Air Corps in Russia occurred on January 17, 1943, as the tragedy of the ARM.I.R. was nearing its end. On that day, a mixed formation of 25 MC200 and MC202 fighters from the 21st Group (which then had a total of only 30 MC200s and 9 MC202s) attacked a strong Soviet armored and motorized column, inflicting significant losses on the enemy. However, the lack of spare parts, fuel, lubricating oils, and ammunition forced the units to suspend activities and retreat to fields less exposed to the Soviet offensive. Between March and May of the same year, the remnants of the fighter units and the entire Italian Air Corps in Russia returned to Italy.

Sources

Grienti, V., Verde, P., (2024), La Regia Aeronautica nella Campagna di Russia (1941-1943)

Rosselli, A., Breve storia del Corpo Aereo Italiano in Russia 1941-1943

Malizia N., (1987) Ali sulla Steppa, la Regia Aeronautica nella Campagna di Russia

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In July 1941, the 61,700 officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the C.S.I.R. reached the Dnieper front after a long journey, where the Italian Expeditionary Corps was integrated into the German 11th Army. In August 1941, an air force of about 85 aircraft, including fighters, bombers, reconnaissance planes, and transports, was also transferred and stationed at several airfields west of the Dnieper. But let’s look in more detail at the composition, military strength, and operations conducted by the Italian Air Corps.

The C.S.I.R. Aviation Command was officially established on July 29 at Tudora, along the border separating the Soviet Union and Romania. On August 12, the 22nd Fighter Group, consisting of 51 Macchi MC200s (Squadrons 359, 362, 369, and 371), arrived from Italy at this airport. The interceptors were accompanied by two Savoia Marchetti SM81 three-engine transport and logistics support planes and three smaller Caproni Ca133 three-engine transport planes. Four days later, the 61st Air Observation Group, mounted on 32 Caproni Ca311 twin-engine planes and a large Savoia Marchetti SM82 three-engine transport and support plane, also landed at Tudora. The formation of the C.S.I.R. Air Corps was completed with the assignment of all the technical and military ground services necessary to ensure the operational readiness of the flight units. Specifically, six sections of heavy AA Breda 20-millimeter machine guns with personnel were assigned for airfield defense, along with a motor pool of about 300 vehicles of various types. Initially, the C.S.I.R. Aviation personnel comprised about 1,900 men (140 officers, 180 non-commissioned officers, and 1,500 soldiers, including specialists and government aviators), plus 90 specialized workers.

Figure 1 MC200 Saetta of the 22° group

After re-organizing the units and refurbishing and resupplying the aircraft, a first contingent of the Italian Air Corps was moved to the front line where, on August 11, the Italian troops had their first clashes with the Soviets. On August 27, the Macchi MC200s of the 22nd Group inaugurated their operational cycle by engaging in combat with several squadrons of Russian planes (Polikarpov I-16 fighters and Tupolev SB-2 “Katyusha” medium bombers). In the encounter, Italian pilots shot down six bombers and two enemy fighters without suffering any losses. At the end of August, following the breakthrough of the enemy front and the rapid advance eastward of German, Romanian, and Italian forces, the entire Italian Air Corps moved from Tudora to Krivoi Rog. In September, eight Savoia Marchetti SM81s from Italy arrived there, forming the 245th Transport Squadron along with the two three-engines already at the Russian airport. On September 22, after the intense battles fought by the C.S.I.R. in the Petrikovka area, the Italian units achieved a brilliant result by capturing Stalino, one of the most important urban and industrial centers in the Donetz Basin. A success that forced the 22nd Group and a reconnaissance squadron mounted on Caproni twin-engine planes to move again eastward to Zaporižžja on the left bank of the Dnieper.

Meanwhile, the early Russian autumn quickly turned into one of the harshest winters recorded in recent years. The violent rains, followed by snowstorms and a frighteningly rapid drop in temperatures (down to minus 30), severely tested not only the C.S.I.R., which was absolutely unprepared in terms of equipment to fight in these extreme conditions but also the personnel and equipment of the Italian Air Corps. Between October and November, they were engaged in continuous and feverish efforts to clear the snow-covered runways and to clean and repair the engines and onboard weapons damaged by ice and frequent Russian bomber raids.

On November 5, the new 246th Transport Squadron arrived from Italy at Stalino, followed four days later by the 371st Fighter Squadron at the same airport, strengthened at the end of December by a second Macchi MC200 interceptor unit. In early December, just before the major Russian winter counteroffensive, the C.S.I.R. still found the strength, despite heavy losses, to advance eastward, capturing the centres of Grossny and Sech Savielenka. But on Christmas Eve, the feared Soviet offensive was unleashed, forcing the German divisions of the Southern Army (which included the C.S.I.R.) to retreat from the large center of Rostov, which was occupied by the Russians.

Figure 2 Italian aircraft at Stalino in early 1942

The powerful Soviet manoeuvre, supported by numerous divisions with hundreds of T34 tanks, also forced the Italians, almost entirely lacking effective anti-tank weapons, to withdraw to more secure positions. The retreat was carried out with the air support of the ever-present Macchi MC200s, which repeatedly attacked the thick columns of Soviet infantry with their Breda Safat 12.7 machine guns and 50-kilogram wing bombs, also engaging in numerous dogfights with Russian fighters and medium bombers. In this regard, by the end of December, the exhausted Italian fighter units could claim the downing of 12 Soviet planes against the loss of only one Macchi.

After a relatively long period of partial inactivity (from December 1941 to January 1942, the harsh weather conditions, polar temperatures, excessive snowfall at airfields, and fuel shortages forced almost all Italian units to significantly reduce combat operations), on February 4, the fighter squadrons began to take off again for new and demanding interdiction, escort, and assault missions. On February 5, several dozen Macchi MC200s from the 22nd Group swooped down on the Soviet airfield at Kranyi Liman, thoroughly strafing and putting out of action at least 15 Russian fighters and medium bombers without suffering any losses. After this brilliant action, the Macchi returned to the attack, carrying out numerous strafing and bombing raids on enemy air installations between March and April, hitting the fields of Luskotova and Leninsklij Bomdardir.

Meanwhile, the Caproni Ca311 reconnaissance and light bombers were also employed in offensive actions in the enemy rear, culminating in the successful attack on March 22 against Russian motorized columns and troop concentrations. In the spring of 1942, realizing the excessive width of the front and the small number of air units supporting the C.S.I.R., the Regia Aeronautica decided to reinforce the Expeditionary Corps with new aircraft, fuel, and supplies from Italy and substantial contingents of pilots and specialists, anticipatingof the arrival of additional Italian divisions in Russia and the upcoming German summer offensive.

Sources

Grienti, V., Verde, P., (2024), La Regia Aeronautica nella Campagna di Russia (1941-1943)

Rosselli, A., Breve storia del Corpo Aereo Italiano in Russia 1941-1943

Malizia N., (1987) Ali sulla Steppa, la Regia Aeronautica nella Campagna di Russia

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An evolution of the interwar Italian light cruisers which gave birth to two ships that saw very active service in WW2

Design and appearance

The end of the 1920s and early 1930s saw the Regia Marina heavily involved in renovating its light cruiser force. The 4 units of the Giussano class were laid down in 1928, the two Cadorna in 1930, and the two new Montecuccoli in 1931. In preparation for the next naval program (1931-1932), the Navy Directorate for Naval Constructions commissioned the Ansaldo shipyard to design an improved version of the Montecuccoli class, which maintained the same armament, speed, range, but with improved protection.

Ansaldo quickly came up with a proposal that was deemed acceptable by the Regia Marina and thus two brand-new units were laid down in 1932, the Duca d’Aosta and the Eugenio di Savoia.

The new units were 4 meters longer and 1 meter wider than the previous Monteccuccoli class, the armament remained the same, 8x152mm guns (model 1929) in four twin turrets and 6x100mm guns in three twin mounts. The torpedo armament increased from two twin launchers to two triple launchers, one per side.

Horizontal protection increased from 30 mm to 35mm covering the central section of the citadel, while the cover on the external sides was 30mm thick. The vertical protection increased from 60mm (of the Montecuccoli) to 70mm, inside the hull there was an additional “anti-shrapnel” plate, 35mm thick in the central section, and 40mm thick plate beside the barbettes.  Protection around the main guns reached a maximum of 70mm and the conning tower a maximum of 100mm.

Calculations based on the level of protection suggested that these cruisers could absorb damage from 152mm AP shells if they did not close the distance below 13.000 meters, and below 15.000 meters if facing enemies armed with 203 mm guns.

Installed engine power increased by 4.000 HP but speed decreased by 0,5 knots (36,5), due to the increased protection.

At first sight, the Duca d’Aosta class looked very similar to the Montecuccoli class. A closer look would highlight some distinctive elements, the first one being the enclosed upper bridge on the conning tower and the same size as the two funnels, while the second funnel was smaller on the Montecuccoli class. The shape and number of windows on the upper bridge would also help to distinguish between the Duca d’Aosta and the Eugenio di Savoia.

Figure 1 Duca d’Aosta (left) and Muzio Attendolo (right)

Operational life

The two cruisers were launched in 1934-1935 and became operational in 1935-1936. They were actively used in activities of Naval diplomacy across the world. Both the Eugenio di Savoia and the Duca d’Aosta were employed in the activities in support of the nationalist Spanish forces and notably they took part in the bombardment of Valencia and Barcellona in February 1937.

The two cruisers formed the VII cruiser division, together with the Muzio Attendolo and Raimondo Montecuccoli. At the outbreak of WW2, the division was commanded by Admiral Sansonetti, and they sailed with the bulk of the Italian fleet in July 1940 that saw action in the Battle Off Calabria, but the VII did not see an active part in the clash.

The two cruisers later saw active duty in serving as indirect escorts to convoys bound for Libya, guarding against the intervention of enemy surface units. The Duca d’Aosta took part in operation M.42, which gave birth to the first battle of Sirte.

Thanks to their speed, the two cruisers were also employed to lay Sea mines in the central Mediterranean, being able to carry dozens of such devices in the stern area.

In June 1942, a large Allied effort to resupply Malta was launched, this took the shape of two twin operations named Harpoon and Vigorous. At that moment only the Montecuccoli and the Eugenio di Savoia formed the VII cruiser division, then commanded by Admiral Da Zara. Escorted by some destroyers, the division was tasked with intercepting the western enemy convoy in its final approach to Malta.  

In the early hours of the 15th of June, Da Zara’s warships intercepted them near the island of Pantelleria. The Italian destroyers Vivaldi and the slower Malocello attacked the merchant ships while the rest of Da Zara’s forces engaged the escort.

Figure 2 The Eugenio di Savoia at the battle of Pantelleria

Outgunned by the enemy, the British started to lay down smoke screens to protect the transport ships. They then headed southwards. However, the Italians managed to hit the cruiser Cairo and two British destroyers. The Vivaldi received a hit in the engine compartment and became immobilized. It was saved by the Malocello, which laid a smokescreen around the sistership and repealed the enemy attacks.

In the confusion of the battle, the merchant ships became distanced from the escort. Italian and German aircraft attacked them. The oil tanker Kentucky caught fire and was later finished off by the Montecuccoli. The merchant ships Burdwan and Chant also sank.

The combined firepower of Montecuccoli and Eugenio di Savoia crippled HMS Bedouin. An S.M.79 Torpedo Bomber finished her off.

After the battle, Hardy decided to continue his run to Malta with the surviving two merchant ships and escorts. Da Zara could not immediately pursue the enemy because of a minefield he had to circumvent. Only two transports arrived in Malta on 17 June 1942. A detailed account of the battle can be found here.

For the rest of the war against the Allies, the cruisers did not see any other relevant major engagement. In December 1942, the Eugenio di Savoia was damaged in the Allied bombardment of Naples, in that same action the cruiser Muzio Attendolo had been sunk. In August 1943, the Duca d’Aosta, together with the cruiser Garibaldi sailed to attempt the bombardment of Palermo (then in allied hands), but the sighting of superior enemy ships nearby, led Admiral Fioravanzo (the commander at sea) to abort the mission.

On the 9^th of September 1943, following the armistice with the allies, both the Eugenio and the Duca d’Aosta sailed with the bulk of the Italian fleet from La Spezia and during their voyage were attacked by German bombers, which sank battleship Roma. Admiral Romeo Oliva (on board the Eugenio di Savoia), assumed command of the fleet which later arrived in Malta.

Both ships served along the Allied navies in the so-called co-belligerent period, with the Duca d’Aosta being employed in the Atlantic Ocean.

After the end of the war, the peace treaty forced Italy to hand over the two ships as part of the war reparations. The Eugenio di Savoia was handed over to Greece and renamed Helli, while the Duca d’Aosta was taken by the Soviet Union and renamed Kerc. Both ships served for more than a decade after the end of the war, being finally demolished in 1973 and 1961. 

Sources

Cosentino, M. & De Toro A., (2023) Incrociatori leggeri classi “Montecuccoli” e “Duca d’Aosta”, Edizioni Storia Militare

Giorgerini, G., & Nani, A. (2017). Gli Incrociatori Italiani 1861-1975 (Ristampa IV edizione). Roma: USMM.

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Naval operations

On the 27th of October 1943, the cruisers Duca d’Aosta and Duca degli Abruzzi left Taranto for a deployment in the Southern Atlantic. They reached the base of Freetown on the 13th of November and they began a series of surveillance cruises to stop any German surface raider or blockade runners. Under the command of Admiral Biancheri, they remained in this post until March 1944 when they were ordered to return to Italy.

Back in the Mediterranean, Italian destroyers, torpedo boats and corvettes were constantly engaged in escorting convoys aimed at resupplying the allied forces in Italy and the civilian population. A total of 1.525 were escorted, also accounting for the transfer of 317.000 men (Allied troops and Italians).

Figure 1 Cruiser Duca degli Abruzzi

Smaller units like M.A.S. boats and submarines were relentlessly used to land commandos or observers behind the enemy lines for sabotage missions, establishing clandestine radio stations or linking up with resistance fighters.

In early 1944, American personnel were transported to the islands of the archipelago before the coast of Tuscany, they had to set observation posts to monitor the German coastal traffic aimed at reinforcing the troops fighting at Anzio against the allied beachhead.

Special naval operations were also carried out in cooperation with the Royal Navy, which were separately described in this article.

A small number of submarines operated with the American and British surface units in Anti Submarine Warfare training operations.

Ships to the USSR?

In March 1944 a BBC radio broadcast reported the alleged words of President Roosevelt that a share of the Italian fleet would have been transferred to the Soviet Union. This news came like a flash in the dark and many of the Allied officials liaising with the Italians saw this as completely unexpected. Admiral De Courten (Minister of the Navy) was determined to clear the doubts and uncertainties, he was also equally determined to order the scuttle of the fleet if the Allies would have followed this path.

Figure 2 Admiral De Courten

In the following days, new clarifications came from Churchill and Roosevelt, the latter explained that this unfortunate situation was due to a misunderstanding of his words from the journalists.

The British Admiral McGrigor wrote a letter to De Courten explaining that during the Theran conference, the Soviets had indeed claimed the right to obtain a portion of the Italian fleet as a war prize. For the moment, since the Italian navy was helping the US and British navy, the two Western powers would have transferred some of their naval units to the Soviets, to supplement their needs (like the Battleship Royal Sovereign and the cruiser Milwaukee).

 With this letter and official Allied reassurances, the Italian authorities were satisfied and an unnecessary crisis in the Western field was avoided.

The Resistance in Rome

After the armistice, thousands of men of the Italian armed forces remained scattered in the German-occupied territories. Soon they began to gather and set up groups of resistance fighters. On many occasions, they joined forces with civilians in partisan formations.

In Rome, men of the Italian navy under the leadership of Admiral Emilio Ferreri, formed a clandestine organization (Fronte Clandestino della Marina) that gathered between 200 and 300 men. They developed three types of activities:

Provide aid of any kind to their families and those of other former military personnel.

Plan and execute Sabotage and counter-sabotage missions.

Gather and provide intelligence to the allied forces (in particular the American 5th Army).

The intelligence activity was conducted by a small group of men led by Admiral Franco Maugeri, former head of the Secret Service of the Italian Navy. They set up clandestine radio posts and reported to the Americans any significant information regarding the movements of German troops. This stream of information was precious in the months of intense fighting in the Cassino area and at the Anzio beachhead.

In this period, they also managed to spy on the activities of Prince Borghese’s Xa M.A.S., launching attacks against the allied shipping near Anzio using small surface attack crafts.

The San Marco Regiment

The bulk of the Italian marines of the San Marco regiment had been lost with the surrender of Axis forces back in May 1943.

Only the newly forming “Caorle” battalion, the special NP battalion (paratroopers and swimmers) and a company guarding the Naval Staff HQ were available in Italy. After the armistice, these units were scattered or disbanded but most of the men managed to reach southern Italy and formed the basis for the reborn San Marco regiment.

Two new battalions were formed, bearing the historical names “Bafile” and “Grado“. These units joined the reformed forces of the Italian army that fought alongside the British and American armies along the peninsula.

Figure 3 Men of the San Marco Regiment at Cassino

Noteworthy, the San Marco regiment fought on the Cassino front in early 1944 while in 1945 it liberated Venice together with British commandos.

A few numbers

According to the official statistics, the personnel of the Italian navy suffered 4.766 killed, the Germans or Italian Fascists executed 431. During the co-belligerency period. 7.000 men of the Navy joined partisan formations and  846 of them perished.

Sources

Fioravanzo, G. (1971). La Marina dall’8 settembre 1943 alla fine del conflitto. USMM.

Pasqualini, M. G. (2023). 8 Settembre 1943-25 aprile 1945 – La Resistenza dei Militari Italiani: un lungo percorso sino alla vittoria finale.

USMM, a cura di M. Gabriele (1993), Le memorie dell’Ammiraglio De Courten, 1943-1946

USMM, a cura di G. Manzari (2015), La partecipazione della Marina alla guerra di liberazione (8 settembre 1943-15 settembre 1945)

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After the Allied landings of Operation Torch, the ports in French North Africa started to see an intense traffic of warships and merchant ships. At this point in the war, the only way the Italian navy could intervene and hit this traffic was to launch attacks with special naval assault crafts and men of the elite 10° M.A.S. flotilla (referred also as the X M.A.S.).

The submarine Ambra, under the command of Mario Arillo, was selected for the mission. The Ambra carried three human torpedoes (SLC 236-237-238) and 10 “Gamma men”, frogmen equipped with small explosive charges.

Figure 1 Commander Mario Arillo

The voyage

The Submarine Ambra set sail from La Spezia in the early afternoon of 4 December 1942, bound for Algiers, arriving in the area of operations on the evening of 7 December. However, the weather and sea conditions were prohibitive for the operation and the boat had to wait until December 10th. On the morning of the 11, following an improvement of the weather conditions, Ambra began the final approach towards Algiers submerged, to avoid minefields and the intense air-naval surveillance activity. Due to a failure in the hydrophone device, the boat had to proceed blindly. In the afternoon, the Ambra hit the seabed at a depth of 90 meters.

Figure 2 The submarine Ambra with the cylinders used to carry the human torpedoes

Commander Arillo then decided to crawl along the seabed at slow speed, hoping to climb up the coastline and begin the attack, for which he needed a depth of a maximum of 20 meters to release the «Gamma» and SLCs. After two and a half hours, the submarine finally stopped at 18 meters of depth. Two men were sent out to the surface to verify the situation, to communicate with the submarine they used a telephone connected via cable. They reported no ships on the horizon, nor they could distinguish the coastline. The two men got back to the submarine and the Ambra.

After resuming its blind approach until 9.45 pm when they finally arrived near the coast, a couple of kilometers from the port entrance, they also observed six merchant ships anchored nearby. It was time to launch the attack.

The attack

The human torpedo operators and the “gamma” men ventured outside the submarine and selected their targets. Once their mission was accomplished, they would have tried to get back to the submerged submarine, looking for Lieutenant Jacobacci, who was waiting for them on the surface, just above the submarine resting on the seabed.

The two men on the SLC 236  began their approach against an allied ship but their human torpedo suffered a breakdown and they aborted the attack. They tried to get back to the Ambra, picking on the way one of the Gamma men who failed to attack given the strong water currents. They could not locate Jacobacci, thus they sunk their SLC and reached the coast, where they were later captured by a French patrol.

The men on SLC 237 managed to plant a warhead under one merchant ship but failed to plant the second one. They also could not locate Jacobacci and then reached the coast, picking up other two Gamma men. They were captured later in the morning by a British patrol.

The SLC 238 also suffered from yet another failure, but the two operators managed to fix it and then planted their warheads under two distinct ships. While getting back towards the Ambra, they were spotted by a searchlight and subject to gunfire. After sinking their SLC, they too reached the coast and got captured.

As for the gamma men, three were unable to attack their targets due to the strong water currents and were picked up by the SLCs. At least other six men managed to plant their charges on two ships. What happened to the last gamma is quite uncertain. What is sure, is that all of them failed to locate Jacobacci and the Ambra and subsequently got captured after reaching the coastline.

Epilogue

Commander Arillo had the order to wait until 01:00 AM before withdrawing. Instead, he waited until 2:54 AM, hoping to recover at least some men of the attacking party. With no signs, Arillo decided to finally withdraw, and the Ambra remerged at 7:45 PM, after having spent 36 hours underwater. The submarine finally reached La Spezia a few days later.

Back in Algiers, a bunch of explosions crippled two ships, the Empire Centaur (7000 tons) and the Harmattan (6000 tons), while the other two were sunk, the Ocean Vanquisher (7000 tons) and the Berto (1500 tons).

The mission was considered a partial success, perhaps more was expected, since a total of 16 operators were deployed. In addition, all these highly trained men were lost. The malfunctions of the SLC were probably caused by the long and tumultuous navigation that the Ambra had to face.

Despite scoring damages and sinkings, this attack had achieved too little to influence the Allied operations in North Africa.

Sources

Bagnasco, E. (2015). I mezzi d’assalto Italiani 1940-1945 (Parte I).

Giorgerini, G. (2007). Attacco dal mare, storia dei mezzi d’assalto della marina italiana.

Mucedola, A. (2020) 11 dicembre 1942, l’azione di Algeri, published on Ocean4future

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In January 1942, when plans for the invasion of Malta (Operation C3) were beginning to take shape, the Italian Navy completely lacked ships and amphibious vehicles suitable for landing vehicles and armoured units on the beaches.

In order to save time, it was decided to adopt and produce an already existing German design, the landing craft known as MFP (Marine Faehr Prahm)-A. The shipyards of Palermo (Sicily) had already assembled a series of 15 MFP-A on behalf of the Kriegsmarine, thus the Italian authorities asked the Germans for the complete projects and additional components to assemble. After the Germans met these requests, small design changes were made, thus originating the Italian variant which was labelled MZ-A, commonly called “Motozzattere”.

Between MZ-A and MFP-A, the differences were limited to the engine system and armament. The Italian version mounted three, less powerful (150hp vs 390hp) diesel engines while the armament (lighter than the German counterparts) consisted of a 76mm and a 20mm gun, both for AA purposes.

The units, 47 meters long and 6.5 meters wide, displaced 174 tonnes and had a load capacity of 65 tonnes. The engine allowed a speed of 10 knots and a range of 1400 nautical miles. The crew consisted of 13 men, including officers.

The construction order was approved on the 13th of January 1942 for the first series of 50 motorboats (initially called “Bette M.Z.”), together with 100 much smaller landing boats (the M.L.), suitable for the transport and landing of a contingent of 25 soldiers.

The first series of MZs was then expanded to 65 units, numbered from MZ 701 to 765. The prime contractor was the CRDA shipyards of Monfalcone, responsible for the construction of 31 MZ-A.

Figure 1 Motozzattere under construction in Monfalcone

The first deliveries began in May 1942 and should have been completed by July, at the time of the scheduled Operation “C3”. However, Rommel’s dashing advance into Egypt induced the Axis powers to concentrate all available means in the North African sector, including all the Motozzattere and the personnel who were training for the invasion of Malta, like the paratroopers of the Folgore division.

The MZ-A were used to land tanks and supplies on the beaches of Marsa Matruh, an advanced supply base close to the Axis lines. These supplies would have been otherwise transported by land with greater time and difficulty.

At the end of July, the MZ began an incessant shuttle between Tobruk and Marsa Matruh, along a route 330 miles long, transporting tanks and all the material necessary for the operations. Although the modest size and low profile did not make them easy targets, losses, due both to air attacks and drifting mines, did not take long to occur. During the first month of continuous activity, 15 vessels out of 65 were lost.

In mid-September 1942, when the British decided to launch a commando raid against Tobruk, a few MZ-A were engaged in combat.

These units, moored in the waters of the port of Tobruk, were the first to thwart the enemy landing attempt during the night by firing their cannons at zero elevation. At dawn, they headed against the retreating British forces towards the open sea.

In this period, given the good results of the use of these vessels and also to replace the losses suffered, a second series of 40 units was ordered from the Italian shipyards. Following the British offensive in October 1942, the MZ were used to evacuate Navy materials and personnel from Marsa Matruh for a total of 1700 tons of materials and 2100 men and, when Libya was abandoned, the available MZ transported men and vehicles to Tunisia.

Figure 2 Motozzattere at Marsa Matruh

In August 1943, when the Axis forces evacuated Sicily, the surviving MZ, (around 50 units) allowed the transfer of around 62,000 men of the Italian contingent to Calabria.

As evidence of this activity, carried out under continuous enemy attacks,  13 units were lost during such operations, and their hulls were abandoned on the shores of the Strait of Messina.

Essentially all the remaining MZ were captured by the Germans after the armistice of the 8th of September 1943, when Italy signed the armistice with the Allies. Interesting to notice, for the Germans the MZs were an integral part of the numbering of their MFPs. In fact, the numbers from 700 to 800 of the MFP sequence were left available for the Italian MZs. When they captured the Italian units, they were simply renamed F-XXX maintaining the original number.

One MZ, the 737, which survived the war and later served in the post war Italian navy, is still existing today as a museum ship in Venice.

Sources

Giorgio Giorgerini, La Guerra Italiana sul mare: la marina tra vittoria e sconfitta 1940–1943, Edizione Mondadori (2001).

Erminio Bagnasco, In guerra sul mare, Vol. 3-4, (2012)

Marina Militare Italiana, Motozzattere da MZ 701 a MZ 731

Marina Militare Italiana, Le Motozzattere Italiane

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The Battle of Crete was a bloody military affair that saw on one side the massive deployment of German airborne troops and fierce resistance from British land and naval forces on the other side. However, it is often overlooked that Italian forces too participated in Operation “Merkur”.

Planning the invasion

The decision to invade Crete was taken in late April 1941, when Hitler tasked Goring and the Luftwaffe to capture the island in the fastest way possible, thus securing his southern flank before the start of Operation Barbarossa.

German plans did not involve the Italian forces, except for the reliance on the limited naval forces available in the Aegean, comprising a few torpedo boats and destroyers and M.A.S. boats. However, the naval aspect of the invasion was not certainly secondary. If the paratroopers in the first wave were meant to capture the airfields to facilitate the arrival by air transport of the German mountain troops, these forces had then the mission to capture anchorages, like Souda Bay, to allow the arrival of seaborne reinforcements and the heavy equipment.

The German navy commanders showed some scepticism regarding this bold plan conceived by the Luftwaffe but nevertheless complied with the plan requirements, hastily assembling a heterogeneous array of boats and caiques destined to transport troops and supplies to Crete.

The Italians remained unaware of the details of the planned invasion and only in mid-May did the Germans approach the Italian Navy to discuss the potential intervention of the fleet. Admiral Arturo Riccardi, chief of staff of the Italian navy, replied that in principle the fleet was available to intervene. However, he stressed that at the moment, the Mediterranean fleet could field 4 battleships armed with 15-inch guns while the Italians had only one (the Littorio), plus the rebuilt dreadnoughts Doria and Cesare mounting the 12.6-inch guns. The Duilio had rejoined the fleet after repairing the damage suffered in the Taranto raid but was still not fully operational. In addition, the Italian destroyers were already overstretched in their service duties, and supporting the landing operations in Crete would have meant the suspension of all the convoys to Libya, in a moment when Rommel was recapturing Cyrenaica. Last but not least, the losses incurred in such an unfavourable fight, would have heavily weakened (in Riccardi’s opinion) the ability of the Regia Marina to sustain a prolonged war in the Mediterranean.

These considerations, coupled with the fact that the details of the German plan were still unclear to the Italians, one week before the beginning of the Operation, help us to understand why the Italian battle fleet was not committed to the action.

The action of the Lupo

The battle of Crete began on the 20th of May 1941, with a heavy aerial bombardment of the Allied positions and the first airdrops of German paratroopers. The Mediterranean fleet was patrolling against seaborne landing forces with cruisers and destroyers, while the fleet core, with Admiral Cunningham’s battleship, was patrolling southwest of Crete in case of any unpleasant sortie of the Italian fleet.

The battle of Crete began on the 20th of May 1941, with a heavy aerial bombardment of the Allied positions and the first airdrops of German paratroopers. The Mediterranean fleet was patrolling against seaborne landing forces with cruisers and destroyers, while the fleet core, with Admiral Cunningham’s battleship, was patrolling southwest of Crete in case of any unpleasant sortie of the Italian fleet.

In the night between the 21st and 22nd of May 1941 the torpedo boat Lupo, commanded by Captain Francesco Mimbelli was escorting a group of 21 caiques transporting German troops destined to land on the shores of Crete, in the Maleme area.

At 22:33 the convoy sighted a ship steaming eastwards and crossing its route. The vessel sighted was the destroyer HMS Janus, part of Rear-Admiral Glennie’s squadron comprising the Cruisers Orion, Dido, Ajax, and the destroyers Hereward Hasty and Kimberley. Lupo sighted the larger British formation a few minutes later.

Figure 1 A paint from Rudold Claudus depicting the night action of the Lupo

Figure 1 A paint from Rudold Claudus depicting the night action of the Lupo

Realizing the dire situation, Captain Mimbelli signalled the caiques to invert their course and sail back to Greece while he attempted an audacious attack against the British formation to save the convoy. The Lupo sailed straight towards the enemy formation and then turned to port to launch two torpedoes on the starboard side. In the meantime, the British guns had opened fire against the charging Lupo.

The attack of the torpedo boat surely caught Glennie’s formation by surprise and caused disorientation among the British formation, which also incurred in friendly fire accidents. A few seconds after the torpedo launch, the crew of the Lupo sighted a large column of water on the side of a British cruiser, probably the Orion (1).  Amid the confusion, the Lupo managed to cross the British squadron, inflicting minor damages but also suffering 18 hits, 2 dead, and 26 wounded. Benefitting from the temporary disarray of Glennie’s formation, the Lupo managed to retreat.

In the course of the night, the British ships managed to intercept some of the caiques, sinking 7 of them and killing 297 Germans and 7 Italians. Hours later the Lupo came back to the site of the battle to save the survivors. For his action, Captain Mimbelli was awarded the Gold Medal for Military Valor while Lupo’s battle flag was decorated with the silver medal.

The action of the Sagittario

A second and larger convoy carrying German troops to Crete was en route on the night of the 22nd of May, but after the action of the Lupo, the German naval command recalled the convoy back. The formation consisted of 38 caiques escorted by the torpedo boat Sagittario, commanded by Captain Giuseppe Cigala Fulgosi.

Figure 2 A German sailor signaling to the Sagittario (AUSMM)

At 8.35 the convoy was sailing back when the Sagittario sighted British ships to the south, these were the cruisers Naiad, Calcutta, Perth, and Carlisle with the destroyers Kingston, Kandahar, and Nubian. Captain Cigala Fulgosi had begun laying a dense smoke screen to hide the retreating and slow-moving convoy.

At 9:01 the British formation, commanded by Admiral King, sighted the enemy and opened fire. The Sagittario became surrounded by the shell splashes and charged the British line firing with the forward 100mm gun. With the distance closing, at around 9:07 the Sagittario turned and launched two torpedoes. A few minutes later the crew erupted in screams of jubilee after observing two columns of water on the side of an enemy cruiser which soon abandoned the formation. This unit later proved to be HMS Naiad (2).

Figure 3 One of the caiques (motoveliero) part of the Sagittario convoy

The Sagittario and the British warships continued to exchange fire for the other 10 minutes, then the sighting of German bombers closing in most likely forced the British cruisers and destroyers to turn south and disengage.

The delaying action of the Sagittario had managed to save the convoy and Commander Cigala Fulgosi was awarded the Gold medal for military valour.

The Italian landings in Crete

On 26 May the German High Comand (OKW), following the request of Goering himself, formulated the “pressing” request to send a contingent of Italian troops to the eastern sector of the island, to relieve the pressure on the German forces on the opposite side of the island. On that same day, General Freyberg, commanding the Allied forces in Crete, told his superior that his position was no longer tenable. On the next day, General Wavell (Commander in Chief of the Middle East) and Churchill himself, authorized Freyberg to evacuate from Crete.

On the 27th of May, the Italian operation was put in motion from the island of Rhodes, with 2,600 men of the division “Regina”, which landed in the proximity of Sitia on the 28th, also bringing ashore some L3 tanks.

Figure 4 L3 tank landing on Crete

Figure 5 Italian soldiers and tanks landing on Crete

According to the historian Augusto De Toro, this sequence of facts can lead to a few conclusions. If the landing of the Italian forces in Eastern Crete, and their subsequent advance, took place when the fate of the battle was already sealed, The German request for help had occurred before the British decision to evacuate the island and, above all, when the Command of the 4th Luftflotte had not yet perceived the crisis of

British forces. The Battle had finally been won by the Axis forces, but the extremely bold German plan to quickly conquer Creete had caused high casualties and went close to disaster.

(1), (2) Enrico Cernuschi in “A colpi di Cannone” brings up the sources confirming the torpedo hits on the British cruisers.

Sources

Cimbolli Spagnesi, P., La conquista di Creta e il ruolo della baia di Suda, Bollettino d’archivio USSMM ottobre-dicembre 2021.

Cernuschi, E. (2023), A colpi di cannone Volume I. Supplemento alla Rivista Marittima.

De Toro, A. (2013), La partecipazione della Marina Italiana all’invasione di Creta nei documenti tedeschi. Bollettino d’Archivio USMM – Numero di Dicembre 2013.

Vagnini, A., Notizie sulle azioni navali della Seconda guerra mondiale. La Regia Marina e la battaglia per Creta, Bollettino d’archivio USMM, luglio-settembre 2021.

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