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	Comments for Think Defence	</title>
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	<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk</link>
	<description>UK Defence and Security</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 13:26:42 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		Comment on Multi Role Armoured Vehicle (MRAV) by Erik Gunnarsson		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/multi-role-armoured-vehicle-mrav-boxer/#comment-449351</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Erik Gunnarsson]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 13:26:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=72588#comment-449351</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Very good material !Can you please sign your articles by  name and date so we can refer to you properly in academic publication. I m now quoting this article.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Very good material !Can you please sign your articles by  name and date so we can refer to you properly in academic publication. I m now quoting this article.</p>
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		Comment on Small Scale Demountable Payload Handling by Mark Ellis		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2021/08/small-scale-demountable-payload-handling/#comment-449089</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Ellis]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 12:11:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?p=53120#comment-449089</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[An interesting read, thanks. Hadn&#039;t realised that DROPS racks fit inside ISO containers]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An interesting read, thanks. Hadn&#039;t realised that DROPS racks fit inside ISO containers</p>
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		Comment on Alvis Stalwart Amphibious Load Carrier by X		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/alvis-stalwart-amphibious-load-carrier/#comment-448904</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[X]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Apr 2026 15:42:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=71463#comment-448904</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[You really need a &#039;finds&#039; open thread as I have said more than once TD.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJgzdhVeq2g]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You really need a &#039;finds&#039; open thread as I have said more than once TD.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJgzdhVeq2g" rel="nofollow ugc">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJgzdhVeq2g</a></p>
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		Comment on Swingfire ATGW by Harold Smith		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/swingfire-missile/#comment-448854</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Harold Smith]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 11:12:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=71329#comment-448854</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[There were also proposals for Swingfire on the Saracen APC and the M-47 and Centurion tanks.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There were also proposals for Swingfire on the Saracen APC and the M-47 and Centurion tanks.</p>
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		Comment on Replacing the Quad Bike ATV — Requirements by David G		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2025/04/replacing-the-quad-bike-atv-requirements/#comment-448725</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[David G]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 07:27:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?p=70001#comment-448725</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Thank you for sharing this interesting article. Would be keen to have an initially online chat about the way forward, as we may have something appropriate in development, that is practical, stealthy, capital cost effective, scaling for potentially growing markets, in both defence and agriculture. kind regards, David G.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thank you for sharing this interesting article. Would be keen to have an initially online chat about the way forward, as we may have something appropriate in development, that is practical, stealthy, capital cost effective, scaling for potentially growing markets, in both defence and agriculture. kind regards, David G.</p>
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		Comment on Resupply Reduction — Introduction by Stedfast VI		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2025/09/resupply-reduction-introduction/#comment-448513</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stedfast VI]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 15:47:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?p=70909#comment-448513</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[not  quite  related  but  well worth a  read:
https://cove.army.gov.au/article/german-tank-maintenance-world-war-ii-history-challenges-adaptations-and-lessons

I am sure  you  will  like  the  Strabokran moving gantry

Would  be  interesting to hear  what  the Ukrainian maintainers  have to  do  for the Abrams]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>not  quite  related  but  well worth a  read:<br />
<a href="https://cove.army.gov.au/article/german-tank-maintenance-world-war-ii-history-challenges-adaptations-and-lessons" rel="nofollow ugc">https://cove.army.gov.au/article/german-tank-maintenance-world-war-ii-history-challenges-adaptations-and-lessons</a></p>
<p>I am sure  you  will  like  the  Strabokran moving gantry</p>
<p>Would  be  interesting to hear  what  the Ukrainian maintainers  have to  do  for the Abrams</p>
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		Comment on Leadership and Retention — Part 2 by Gresley&#039;s Ghost		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2025/09/leadership-and-retention-part-2/#comment-448379</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gresley&#039;s Ghost]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2026 17:18:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?p=70893#comment-448379</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[I recently heard a comment by a very senior member of a large UK organisation &#034;Organisational Culture is determined entirely by the worst behaviour senior leadership is prepared to tolerate&#034; and I think this is a very apt observation in this case.

I&#039;d also dispute that D&#038;I is to blame for this sort of moral cowardice in Naval leadership. D&#038;I is about recruiting the best people for the job, whoever they are, and retaining those people, whoever they are. The subsidised boarding school places for forces children, allowing parents to more easily serve overseas is an example of D&#038;I. D&#038;I says &#034;This behaviour drives talented and dedicated young ratings and officers away from the service; Write them up.&#034;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I recently heard a comment by a very senior member of a large UK organisation &#034;Organisational Culture is determined entirely by the worst behaviour senior leadership is prepared to tolerate&#034; and I think this is a very apt observation in this case.</p>
<p>I&#039;d also dispute that D&amp;I is to blame for this sort of moral cowardice in Naval leadership. D&amp;I is about recruiting the best people for the job, whoever they are, and retaining those people, whoever they are. The subsidised boarding school places for forces children, allowing parents to more easily serve overseas is an example of D&amp;I. D&amp;I says &#034;This behaviour drives talented and dedicated young ratings and officers away from the service; Write them up.&#034;</p>
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		Comment on Light Mobility Vehicle (LMV) — Comment and Proposal by Stephen Whittle		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2025/04/light-mobility-vehicle-lmv-comment-and-proposal/#comment-448364</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Whittle]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 22 Mar 2026 12:38:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?p=69877#comment-448364</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Thank you again for your thoughts on an increasinlgy complax programme. My own thoughts or opinions are that British Army should be looking at a van solution like the previously mentioned Iveco Defence MUV/Daily. It comes in a wide veriety of versions ranging from short wheel base to long wheel base 4x4 and even a 6x6 variant all with an exellent support intrastructure.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thank you again for your thoughts on an increasinlgy complax programme. My own thoughts or opinions are that British Army should be looking at a van solution like the previously mentioned Iveco Defence MUV/Daily. It comes in a wide veriety of versions ranging from short wheel base to long wheel base 4&#215;4 and even a 6&#215;6 variant all with an exellent support intrastructure.</p>
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		Comment on Starstreak HVM (High-Velocity Missile) by Jack		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/starstreak-high-velocity-missile/#comment-448266</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jack]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 17:00:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=71635#comment-448266</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[You state for the HVM Starstreak that it has a “0.9 kg blast fragmentation warhead” however i believe this is fhe weight of the dart in itself not the weight of the actual central war head or explosive mass, and that minues the clutch, guidance systems, all of that and taking into account wall thickness, its about 100-150g.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You state for the HVM Starstreak that it has a “0.9 kg blast fragmentation warhead” however i believe this is fhe weight of the dart in itself not the weight of the actual central war head or explosive mass, and that minues the clutch, guidance systems, all of that and taking into account wall thickness, its about 100-150g.</p>
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		Comment on Ajax &#8211; History by X		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/ajax-history/#comment-448108</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[X]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2026 14:34:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=73507#comment-448108</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[As I have said here before (and elsewhere) my concern isn&#039;t recce. The arguments against Ajax for that role are evident even before you take into consideration drones.   My concern is that Army lacks a cavalry vehicle.  MBT&#039;s are for fighting other MBT&#039;s, mostly.  Where is the vehicle for screens?  Covering breaking from contact?  Exploitation? And all those other tasks...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As I have said here before (and elsewhere) my concern isn&#039;t recce. The arguments against Ajax for that role are evident even before you take into consideration drones.   My concern is that Army lacks a cavalry vehicle.  MBT&#039;s are for fighting other MBT&#039;s, mostly.  Where is the vehicle for screens?  Covering breaking from contact?  Exploitation? And all those other tasks&#8230;</p>
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		Comment on Ajax &#8211; History by The Big Ginge		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/ajax-history/#comment-447938</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Big Ginge]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2026 16:49:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=73507#comment-447938</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[TD as usual a comprehensive explanation. What I can never get over having followed the machinations of the MoD and Armed Forces for over 15yrs is how they keep making the same mistakes. It&#039;s not just Ajax, you could write this about Nimrod, CR2/3, Warrior, T45, T23/26 Frigate Gap, F35/Typhoon lack of numbers, Medium Helicopter etc etc. 

It is not just one individual or even one service. It is clear there is a complete lack of Strategic Thinking in procurement and operational level. We have to look at both the Civil Servant and Senior Leadership training that is happening in Defence sphere. We have to decouple agreeing with Politicians to getting Lordships and K&#039;s. You should have to show you have actually achieved something to get those accolades.

As to this problem. There is a simple solution (If not already sold) there are 98 M10 booker vehicles sitting in the Desert in the USA. Based on the Ascod design (Appreciate not identical). Buy them and this then gives time to take back the problematic vehicles and re-engineer them. In fact in the modern world where we only have 150 CR3&#039;s I would suggest asking GDLS to make another 100 and integrate them long term into a mixed CR3/M10 tank fleet as at 48T at Theatre Entry Level either Ajax or M10 (For God Sake change the name) is in effect a tank. I would even go as far since the turret ring is built for it get Rheinmetall to retrofit a 120mm turret on them. Plus all should be fitted with APS. Then turn the 295 Ajax variants into IFV&#039;s to replace the Warrior Debacle. 

But that would take a lot of humble pie eating something the MoD and Army don&#039;t seem capable of.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>TD as usual a comprehensive explanation. What I can never get over having followed the machinations of the MoD and Armed Forces for over 15yrs is how they keep making the same mistakes. It&#039;s not just Ajax, you could write this about Nimrod, CR2/3, Warrior, T45, T23/26 Frigate Gap, F35/Typhoon lack of numbers, Medium Helicopter etc etc. </p>
<p>It is not just one individual or even one service. It is clear there is a complete lack of Strategic Thinking in procurement and operational level. We have to look at both the Civil Servant and Senior Leadership training that is happening in Defence sphere. We have to decouple agreeing with Politicians to getting Lordships and K&#039;s. You should have to show you have actually achieved something to get those accolades.</p>
<p>As to this problem. There is a simple solution (If not already sold) there are 98 M10 booker vehicles sitting in the Desert in the USA. Based on the Ascod design (Appreciate not identical). Buy them and this then gives time to take back the problematic vehicles and re-engineer them. In fact in the modern world where we only have 150 CR3&#039;s I would suggest asking GDLS to make another 100 and integrate them long term into a mixed CR3/M10 tank fleet as at 48T at Theatre Entry Level either Ajax or M10 (For God Sake change the name) is in effect a tank. I would even go as far since the turret ring is built for it get Rheinmetall to retrofit a 120mm turret on them. Plus all should be fitted with APS. Then turn the 295 Ajax variants into IFV&#039;s to replace the Warrior Debacle. </p>
<p>But that would take a lot of humble pie eating something the MoD and Army don&#039;t seem capable of.</p>
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		<title>
		Comment on Ajax &#8211; History by Richard		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/ajax-history/#comment-447813</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Richard]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Feb 2026 12:56:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=73507#comment-447813</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This has the makings of a compelling book.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This has the makings of a compelling book.</p>
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		Comment on Mastiff by Tom		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/mastiff/#comment-447763</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tom]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Feb 2026 16:21:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=73385#comment-447763</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Why are we disposing of a perfectly good vehicle? What are they planning on replacing this with?]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why are we disposing of a perfectly good vehicle? What are they planning on replacing this with?</p>
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		Comment on Ajax &#8211; History by Robert Blair		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/ajax-history/#comment-447734</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Blair]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 22:21:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=73507#comment-447734</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[A good article, thank you. It shows that this program will not, for some considerable time (2028), deliver a deployable mix of operational vehicles (across all types) that meets the needs of a battlegroup, let alone a brigade. 131 (in drops 0-2) of the 580+ ordered vehicle are not operationally deployable at all - even though they equip front line units, what are these units to use if they have to go on operations? Soldier confidence must be close to or at the point where they will never trust the vehicle. The only answer is to start again, or replace with a version of CV90 - built in the UK or otherwise. As we read this article the Chancellor has the additional funds in hands right now.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A good article, thank you. It shows that this program will not, for some considerable time (2028), deliver a deployable mix of operational vehicles (across all types) that meets the needs of a battlegroup, let alone a brigade. 131 (in drops 0-2) of the 580+ ordered vehicle are not operationally deployable at all &#8211; even though they equip front line units, what are these units to use if they have to go on operations? Soldier confidence must be close to or at the point where they will never trust the vehicle. The only answer is to start again, or replace with a version of CV90 &#8211; built in the UK or otherwise. As we read this article the Chancellor has the additional funds in hands right now.</p>
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		Comment on Ajax &#8211; History by Ron Smith		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/ajax-history/#comment-447733</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ron Smith]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 20:34:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=73507#comment-447733</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Fascinating to read this unhappy saga. I worked on TRACER and FRES SV for BAE Systems and subsequently supported Hagglunds in other vehicle bids. I always thought that CV90 was a decent no nonsense platform. I am not prepared to comment further. It seems that Ajax has come seriously unstuck and one suspects that there is no easy path forward from this point.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Fascinating to read this unhappy saga. I worked on TRACER and FRES SV for BAE Systems and subsequently supported Hagglunds in other vehicle bids. I always thought that CV90 was a decent no nonsense platform. I am not prepared to comment further. It seems that Ajax has come seriously unstuck and one suspects that there is no easy path forward from this point.</p>
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		Comment on Ajax &#8211; History by Ian		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/ajax-history/#comment-447730</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ian]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 16:09:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=73507#comment-447730</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Excellent overview TD. Really interesting how at every stage of the project MoD/HMG have gone against common sense decisions and against sovereign capability. Why appoint LM a US company that has skin in the game to eliminate a British company offering a standardised solution? 

This reeks of institutional collusion and corruption. Since Ajax contract was placed, BAE have fielded multiple new versions of CV90 without any issues. 

If Ajax continues which the CGS insists it will??? The army will be stuck with an unreliable platform with  multiple ongoing problems which will never be solved. 

Through life costs will be massive, there will be no exports or further work for Merthyr which will close anyway unless HMG are stupid enough to continue placing more vehicle contract to a US company that has over promised and underdelivered on every contract it has ever received]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Excellent overview TD. Really interesting how at every stage of the project MoD/HMG have gone against common sense decisions and against sovereign capability. Why appoint LM a US company that has skin in the game to eliminate a British company offering a standardised solution? </p>
<p>This reeks of institutional collusion and corruption. Since Ajax contract was placed, BAE have fielded multiple new versions of CV90 without any issues. </p>
<p>If Ajax continues which the CGS insists it will??? The army will be stuck with an unreliable platform with  multiple ongoing problems which will never be solved. </p>
<p>Through life costs will be massive, there will be no exports or further work for Merthyr which will close anyway unless HMG are stupid enough to continue placing more vehicle contract to a US company that has over promised and underdelivered on every contract it has ever received</p>
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		Comment on ASTER Surface to Air Missile (Sea Viper) by Hugo		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/aster-surface-to-air-missile-sea-viper/#comment-447460</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hugo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 2026 22:11:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=71361#comment-447460</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Very intresting thread, would note thought that theyve been unable to physically quad pack camm into Slyver VLS of any size and that based on recent comments from greece and designs of ships using both MDCN and Aster, that A70 VLS cannot carry aster missiles, as on several occasions A70 has been replaced with A50 to increase the number of Asters a ship has.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Very intresting thread, would note thought that theyve been unable to physically quad pack camm into Slyver VLS of any size and that based on recent comments from greece and designs of ships using both MDCN and Aster, that A70 VLS cannot carry aster missiles, as on several occasions A70 has been replaced with A50 to increase the number of Asters a ship has.</p>
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		Comment on Warrior-45mm-CTAS by informatika		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/warrior-45mm-ctas/#comment-447359</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[informatika]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2026 12:42:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Warrior-45mm-CTAS.jpg#comment-447359</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Reaally interesting piece about the CTAS history especially seeing how the concept started at 45 mm and evolved into the 40 mm system most people now associate with Ajax and other platforms. Given that the Warrior CSP with CTAS was cancelled in 2021, I’m curious about what enthusiasts think should happen with the already-procured weapons: should they be retrofitted into another turret like on Boxer, or preserved for historical reference? It seems a shame to let that technology just sit unused after such a long development journey.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Reaally interesting piece about the CTAS history especially seeing how the concept started at 45 mm and evolved into the 40 mm system most people now associate with Ajax and other platforms. Given that the Warrior CSP with CTAS was cancelled in 2021, I’m curious about what enthusiasts think should happen with the already-procured weapons: should they be retrofitted into another turret like on Boxer, or preserved for historical reference? It seems a shame to let that technology just sit unused after such a long development journey.</p>
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		Comment on Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER) by X		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/tactical-reconnaissance-armoured-combat-equipment-requirement-tracer/#comment-447000</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[X]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Jan 2026 00:59:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=72429#comment-447000</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&#034;30 Ajax Light/Infantry Tank Regiment&#034;

May I humbly suggest something like the old US cavalry orbat which mixed tanks and IFV&#039;s?  Apparently there 105mm ASCOD version?

For reconnaissance I would use Stormer.  A troop being two &#039;gun carriers&#039; with a drone carrier and a comms / network vehicle.

The gap we have and something nobody seems to care is about is we have nothing for the other cavalry tasks beyond recce.  Tanks are for fighting tanks.  What about:
screens 
advance and rear guard
counter recce
deception
anti-airborne
flank protection
rear area and supply route security
raids
pursuit
seize and hold
recce strike
delaying action
liaison
traffic regulation
escort
communications (dispatches) 
Where is the vehicle and formation for all that little lot?]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#034;30 Ajax Light/Infantry Tank Regiment&#034;</p>
<p>May I humbly suggest something like the old US cavalry orbat which mixed tanks and IFV&#039;s?  Apparently there 105mm ASCOD version?</p>
<p>For reconnaissance I would use Stormer.  A troop being two &#039;gun carriers&#039; with a drone carrier and a comms / network vehicle.</p>
<p>The gap we have and something nobody seems to care is about is we have nothing for the other cavalry tasks beyond recce.  Tanks are for fighting tanks.  What about:<br />
screens<br />
advance and rear guard<br />
counter recce<br />
deception<br />
anti-airborne<br />
flank protection<br />
rear area and supply route security<br />
raids<br />
pursuit<br />
seize and hold<br />
recce strike<br />
delaying action<br />
liaison<br />
traffic regulation<br />
escort<br />
communications (dispatches)<br />
Where is the vehicle and formation for all that little lot?</p>
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		Comment on Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER) by The Big Ginge		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/tactical-reconnaissance-armoured-combat-equipment-requirement-tracer/#comment-446783</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Big Ginge]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Jan 2026 15:17:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=72429#comment-446783</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Having re-read the article and the two comments above it does make you wonder, if Ajax being the end of a 20yr plus timeline on protected reconnaissance has it just been overtaken by technology. That with the advent of drones actually trying to observe using a 48T Tank probably isn&#039;t the way to go ?

My own view is in view of the size of Ajax maybe we look towards it more as a light tank option. 

Build out 3 Brigades of Armoured Infantry based on 30 Tank, CR3 Regiment, Supported by 30 Ajax Light/Infantry Tank Regiment. We have seen in Ukraine the effectiveness of even 30mm guns at taking out Russian Armour, with some research maybe the ammunition can become more deadly against armoured targets, but the reality is for infantry close support the Ajax probably is enough ? 

I would appreciate those with expert knowledge&#039;s view. As it would appear if it had a Trophy Style defensive suite to be more than capable of surviving in a tank on tank scenario. I think its too late to give them 105mm guns like the M10, but lets use a 48T vehicle in the formation &#038; for the purpose it can achieve rather than deluding ourselves this big monster of a Vehicle can do silent reconnaissance.  

You then move the reconnaissance element over to vehicles equipped with drones and other systems using lighter vehicles (6x6 or highly armoured 4x4) and remote control vehicles using the regimental manpower of the those  equipped with Jackal. Transferring Jackal into the light deployable regiments such as the RM &#038; Para&#039;s where their open cabs is an advantage and a 12.7mm machine gun is punch enough. Transferring the Viking Armoured Vehicles to a medium Regiment in the British Army dedicated to supporting the High North, probably with the 4th Ajax Regiment attached . 

Like I say not perfect, but we all know that 150 CR3&#039;s isn&#039;t enough and maybe pairing them with 150 Ajax vehicles, ultimately at 48T they are a Tank so use them like one.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Having re-read the article and the two comments above it does make you wonder, if Ajax being the end of a 20yr plus timeline on protected reconnaissance has it just been overtaken by technology. That with the advent of drones actually trying to observe using a 48T Tank probably isn&#039;t the way to go ?</p>
<p>My own view is in view of the size of Ajax maybe we look towards it more as a light tank option. </p>
<p>Build out 3 Brigades of Armoured Infantry based on 30 Tank, CR3 Regiment, Supported by 30 Ajax Light/Infantry Tank Regiment. We have seen in Ukraine the effectiveness of even 30mm guns at taking out Russian Armour, with some research maybe the ammunition can become more deadly against armoured targets, but the reality is for infantry close support the Ajax probably is enough ? </p>
<p>I would appreciate those with expert knowledge&#039;s view. As it would appear if it had a Trophy Style defensive suite to be more than capable of surviving in a tank on tank scenario. I think its too late to give them 105mm guns like the M10, but lets use a 48T vehicle in the formation &amp; for the purpose it can achieve rather than deluding ourselves this big monster of a Vehicle can do silent reconnaissance.  </p>
<p>You then move the reconnaissance element over to vehicles equipped with drones and other systems using lighter vehicles (6&#215;6 or highly armoured 4&#215;4) and remote control vehicles using the regimental manpower of the those  equipped with Jackal. Transferring Jackal into the light deployable regiments such as the RM &amp; Para&#039;s where their open cabs is an advantage and a 12.7mm machine gun is punch enough. Transferring the Viking Armoured Vehicles to a medium Regiment in the British Army dedicated to supporting the High North, probably with the 4th Ajax Regiment attached . </p>
<p>Like I say not perfect, but we all know that 150 CR3&#039;s isn&#039;t enough and maybe pairing them with 150 Ajax vehicles, ultimately at 48T they are a Tank so use them like one.</p>
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		Comment on Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER) by X		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/tactical-reconnaissance-armoured-combat-equipment-requirement-tracer/#comment-446756</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[X]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2026 14:59:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=72429#comment-446756</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[TD will remember frequenter commentator on his old site James who was an officer in the Hussars......

I remember his favourite recce vehicle was his mountain bike.

 Apparently Ajax has the same pressure signature as Chally 2.  What I am expecting is Ajax to be purchased but suffering from that complaint often suffered by RN and RAF,   FFBNW.   I am expecting large and EMPTY vehicles to reach the regiments not the full cream as promised version.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>TD will remember frequenter commentator on his old site James who was an officer in the Hussars&#8230;&#8230;</p>
<p>I remember his favourite recce vehicle was his mountain bike.</p>
<p> Apparently Ajax has the same pressure signature as Chally 2.  What I am expecting is Ajax to be purchased but suffering from that complaint often suffered by RN and RAF,   FFBNW.   I am expecting large and EMPTY vehicles to reach the regiments not the full cream as promised version.</p>
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		Comment on Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER) by Alan Gray		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/docs/tactical-reconnaissance-armoured-combat-equipment-requirement-tracer/#comment-446671</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alan Gray]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Jan 2026 18:29:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?post_type=docs&#038;p=72429#comment-446671</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[I drove a Scorpion in 1972 - an experience I never forgot. The CVRT fleet was a highly successful successor to its equally, for its time, highly successful wheeled predecessor, the Ferret/Saladin/ Saracen wheeled recce fleet and of all its variants. Years later, as a DRA/DERA/DSTL scientist rather than a Gunner, I was deeply involved in TRACER, particularly on the sensor side. My main comment on your excellent and accurate article was that many lessons from the TRACER project were certainly learned but almost certainly deliberately never applied in Ajax. As a result, it is equally certain that this resulted in the appalling failure of that wretched project. Ajax &#034;scout&#034;, a vehicle bigger in all dimensions than a Sherman tank (and almost certainly as noisy), under-armed compared with its potential opposition, failing to meet the &#034;all-weather&#034; surveillance requirement and managed in the worst possible way is a testament to procurement failure greater than that of NIMWACS and SA 80! I could say much, much more!]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I drove a Scorpion in 1972 &#8211; an experience I never forgot. The CVRT fleet was a highly successful successor to its equally, for its time, highly successful wheeled predecessor, the Ferret/Saladin/ Saracen wheeled recce fleet and of all its variants. Years later, as a DRA/DERA/DSTL scientist rather than a Gunner, I was deeply involved in TRACER, particularly on the sensor side. My main comment on your excellent and accurate article was that many lessons from the TRACER project were certainly learned but almost certainly deliberately never applied in Ajax. As a result, it is equally certain that this resulted in the appalling failure of that wretched project. Ajax &#034;scout&#034;, a vehicle bigger in all dimensions than a Sherman tank (and almost certainly as noisy), under-armed compared with its potential opposition, failing to meet the &#034;all-weather&#034; surveillance requirement and managed in the worst possible way is a testament to procurement failure greater than that of NIMWACS and SA 80! I could say much, much more!</p>
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		Comment on Euclid’s Army, Think Defence and the Book “What I wrote.” by Sven Ortmann		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2025/11/euclids-army-think-defence/#comment-446131</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sven Ortmann]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Dec 2025 09:57:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?p=71187#comment-446131</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[I&#039;ve read to chapter 10 so far. It&#039;s a book about the craft of European-style land warfare.

There are some minor quibbles, but so far the by far weakest (IMO bad) chapter was the one about air defence. The other chapters lack a certain comprehensiveness, but don&#039;t lack much in agreeability.

Reconnaissance is a rather blind spot. It&#039;s included in the later offence chapter, but Wilf appears to omit too much about reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance in mobile warfare including when your overall posture is rather defensive. Suppose the enemy successfully advances with fast-moving forces and the situation becomes chaotic/fluid, all plans are obsolete. Reconnaissance becomes all-important and counterreconnassance becomes a hugely important force protection and countermobility activity.

Another thing I&#039;m missing so far is the aspect of adversarial relationship. We counter what&#039;s theirs, they counter what&#039;s ours. The adversarial relationship evolves rapidly in tactics and equipment. Wilf rather conveys a conservative attitude by mentioning mostly things that have been true and steady for a long time. Think about the FPV electronic warfare spiral in Ukraine - jammers and datalinks getting devalued within months. Luttwak had a great insight about this and I believe those who want to understand warfare should understand such adversarial spirals with great clarity.

Overall, it&#039;s a worthwhile books to read (so far).]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ve read to chapter 10 so far. It&#8217;s a book about the craft of European-style land warfare.</p>
<p>There are some minor quibbles, but so far the by far weakest (IMO bad) chapter was the one about air defence. The other chapters lack a certain comprehensiveness, but don&#8217;t lack much in agreeability.</p>
<p>Reconnaissance is a rather blind spot. It&#8217;s included in the later offence chapter, but Wilf appears to omit too much about reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance in mobile warfare including when your overall posture is rather defensive. Suppose the enemy successfully advances with fast-moving forces and the situation becomes chaotic/fluid, all plans are obsolete. Reconnaissance becomes all-important and counterreconnassance becomes a hugely important force protection and countermobility activity.</p>
<p>Another thing I&#8217;m missing so far is the aspect of adversarial relationship. We counter what&#8217;s theirs, they counter what&#8217;s ours. The adversarial relationship evolves rapidly in tactics and equipment. Wilf rather conveys a conservative attitude by mentioning mostly things that have been true and steady for a long time. Think about the FPV electronic warfare spiral in Ukraine &#8211; jammers and datalinks getting devalued within months. Luttwak had a great insight about this and I believe those who want to understand warfare should understand such adversarial spirals with great clarity.</p>
<p>Overall, it&#8217;s a worthwhile books to read (so far).</p>
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		<title>
		Comment on Euclid’s Army, Think Defence and the Book “What I wrote.” by Ulrich Reinhardt		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2025/11/euclids-army-think-defence/#comment-446032</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ulrich Reinhardt]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 07 Dec 2025 07:38:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?p=71187#comment-446032</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Bought the book. Good, kleen, understandable soldierly language. Definitive one of the better books on this topic available. I do not agree on all opinions (for example i regrad parachute troops as an anachronism etc), so the book is overall not about a revolution in military affairs, but simply about war craft, about how to conduct modern war from a craftsmanship perspective  Moreover  the book is more useful i think for the british army than for example for the polish or german armies. But you can clearly see and read many useful thoughts and the enormous practical experience of the author. A very good read for every soldier !]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bought the book. Good, kleen, understandable soldierly language. Definitive one of the better books on this topic available. I do not agree on all opinions (for example i regrad parachute troops as an anachronism etc), so the book is overall not about a revolution in military affairs, but simply about war craft, about how to conduct modern war from a craftsmanship perspective  Moreover  the book is more useful i think for the british army than for example for the polish or german armies. But you can clearly see and read many useful thoughts and the enormous practical experience of the author. A very good read for every soldier !</p>
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		Comment on Euclid’s Army, Think Defence and the Book “What I wrote.” by X		</title>
		<link>http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2025/11/euclids-army-think-defence/#comment-445942</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[X]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Dec 2025 13:56:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?p=71187#comment-445942</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[I remember on the old TD blog my ideas often being met with, &#039;But we don&#039;t do that...........&#039;  to which I would reply, &#039;The site is called Think Defence not  Accept What We Do Now Is The Best Way Defence&#039;..........

You are not the only person who thinks outside of the box on these matters...........Normalcy bias is everywhere because most are average thinkers who think average thoughts that are not unique.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I remember on the old TD blog my ideas often being met with, &#8216;But we don&#8217;t do that&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;..&#8217;  to which I would reply, &#8216;The site is called Think Defence not  Accept What We Do Now Is The Best Way Defence&#8217;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;.</p>
<p>You are not the only person who thinks outside of the box on these matters&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;..Normalcy bias is everywhere because most are average thinkers who think average thoughts that are not unique.</p>
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