Archive Fire

London 1927 / 2010

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Wed, 22 May 2013 23:03:00 +0000

In 1927, pioneering filmmaker Claude Friese-Greene produced "The Open Road", a journey through Britain filmed with a specially-devised colour film process. The film has been computer enhanced by the British Film Institute.

The video below is an attempt to recreate the London scenes from the film as they appear in 2010:

via patcalutube

How To Destroy Angels: Welcome Oblivion (Full Album)

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Tue, 21 May 2013 05:26:00 +0000

Apology, Context, Use – or, how being a jerk can teach us about words

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Fri, 03 May 2013 22:37:00 +0000

I have some apologizing to do. It is true. I used the word ‘cunt’ rather randomly to refer to a man who I believe to be cranky and petty on the internets. Now before anyone starts to sling arrows at my misfortunate choice of pejoratives, let me say that I fully understand the history and volatility associated with this ‘term’. Only in a culture which underappreciates the feminine and institutionally oppresses its females (not to mention all the gender blends in between) in favor of males is such a word deployed. Does this word evince an underlying hatred or resentment for women percolating under the course skin of Western society? Perhaps. Quite simply and without qualification I apologize for using such a word. The word is disgusting and nothing good can from its use.

Yet, despite accusations to the contrary, I do not believe that I am misogynist in any stable sense of the term. I was raised by a single mother who I witnessed first-hand struggle with discrimination, and I am raising two daughters of my own – one of which already self-identifies as a feminist – both of which I often coach on dealing with patriarchy directly. I fully support women's rights and follow the their lead in all things having to do with improving their lot in all cultures. I certainly hold no ill-will against women, nor do I hate vaginas generally speaking. So then why did I use the word? What was my reasoning? In retrospect I think it was quite simply an absence of reasoning. I chose that word for its vulgarity and impact without the sensitivity to historical-cultural context I would normally want to cultivate and advocate. In short, i wasn’t thinking. I was purposely being aggressive and offensive (an “asshat” as my intended target so astutely observed).

Now all this leads me to reflect on two things: 1) like any other human on this planet I am capable of stupid behavior and expressions socially gleaned, and 2) just how much words are artifacts that can and do get used in ways not originally intended for via misappropriated denotation. Words and concepts get deployed and redeployed in various ways and for various purposes creating alternative contexts of utterance and reference. There are no stable assoications. Hence the type of ‘random mutation’ we witness with all languages. Mutant sentences as speech-acts and sequential strings of words and associative meanings can and do arise. Pace Derrida.

When I called the person a "cunt" my intention was to point out this person’s (self-admitted) tendency towards rudeness, pettiness and condescension, completely unrelated to its association with the female body. This much should have been obvious as the person in question is male. By choosing such a vulgar and alarming word I meant to covey an intense distaste for the manner in which this person tends to communicate. Regardless, using that word in such a manner failed to deliver any intention I may have had. What I meant was not what I said.

So my question is this: if my intention was not to attack any particular female (or females in general), but to simply signify strongly my aversion, should such intentions excuse or at least explain this unfortunate choice of words? Or is my word choice so inappropriate and culturally toxic that intention matters little? Let me know what YOU think dear readers...

My original statement is included below.

S.C Hickman on Hope and the Dystopic Impulse

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Thu, 02 May 2013 18:10:00 +0000

The brilliant and always concise S.C Hickman has another insight-full post up at Noir Realism in which he writes:

The breakup of the Platonist view of reality and discourse that has, as Wittgenstein suggested, held us ‘captive’ within a Cartesian/Lockean picture that seeks both an objective essence and a cohesive, coherent, self has been replaced in our time by a “Darwinian account of human beings as animals doing their best to cope with the environment – doing their best to develop tools which will enable them to enjoy more pleasure and less pain (p. xxiii, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope).” Among those tools is language, words, which are no longer seen as ‘representations’ of an objective truth/reality, but as tools by which the human animal negotiates the complex horizon of social relations. Rorty sees this break with the idea that reality can be ‘represented’ as abandoning the correspondence ‘theory of truth’, which means that we no longer need to insist that truth, like reality is one and seamless.

The post-nihilist impulse unabashedly rejects discourses motivated by sentimental allusions to universals. The advent of hypermediation via communication and digital technologies has combined with what Ray Brassier has called "the negative consummation of the enlightenment", as well as the ever-expanding assaults on the living flesh and ecological stability of humans everywhere to create a crisis of legitimacy for every existing linguistic and normative institution on the planet. We do not inhabit a modern or even ‘postmodern’ world, we subsist in an advanced industrial calamity. The future of our species will depend entirely upon the willingness of people to abandon our previous and varied delusions for intensely reflective strategies of praxis and collective habitation. We have to design new delusions for vastly more pragmatic ecologies. The all too human project of becoming, being and coping-with happens between and often beyond both hope and despair.

Read the rest of Hickman’s post: HERE

Coexistence and the Work of Revolution

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Thu, 18 Apr 2013 18:35:00 +0000

In “A Practical Utopian’s Guide to the Coming Collapse”, anthropologist David Graeber asks an extremely important question:

What is a revolution? We used to think we knew. Revolutions were seizures of power by popular forces aiming to transform the very nature of the political, social, and economic system in the country in which the revolution took place, usually according to some visionary dream of a just society. Nowadays, we live in an age when, if rebel armies do come sweeping into a city, or mass uprisings overthrow a dictator, it’s unlikely to have any such implications; when profound social transformation does occur—as with, say, the rise of feminism—it’s likely to take an entirely different form. It’s not that revolutionary dreams aren’t out there. But contemporary revolutionaries rarely think they can bring them into being by some modern-day equivalent of storming the Bastille.

What is revolution? This might be the core political question of our time. In contemporary conditions where all hitherto categorical distinctions (between nature and culture, subject and object, etc.) and conventional boundaries (between human bodies and machines, between nation-states and corporations) are bleeding into each other or melting away, what resources are we to call upon in order to begin forging more humane and positive political commitments? The very context of our lives and social actions has never been so ambiguous and massively distributed, and yet so manipulated, managed and massaged. Where do we begin?

In The Phenomenology of Perception Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote:

“In all revolutions there are members of the privileged class who make common cause with the revolutionaries, and members of the oppressed class who remain faithful to the privileged. And every nation has its traitors. This is because the nation and class are neither versions of fate which hold the individual in subjection from the outside nor values which he posits from within. They are modes of co-existence which are a call upon him. Under conditions of calm, the nation and the class are there as stimuli to which I respond only absent-mindedly or confusedly; they are merely latent. A revolutionary situation, or one of national danger, transforms those pre-conscious relationships with class and nation, hitherto merely lived through, into the definite taking of a stand; the tacit commitment becomes explicit. But it appears to itself as anterior to decision.” (p.423)

Here Merleau-Ponty accepts the conditions in which political bodies are both determined and self-determining, however haphazardly such agency might seem. It is the gathering up, positioning and self-organizing power of individuals in situ - the ‘taking a stand’ in the world – that links their imaginations and motivations to lived contexts and affords them the opportunity to transform pre-reflective conditionings into explicit revolutionary commitments. In this sense, the work of being and becoming human is always a revolutionary act in that what is latent or merely possible in us, and circulating throughout our dynamic modes of existence, is always in the process of being expressed and assembled. The very act of becoming and being human contributes the co-invention of worlds. And so political situations are always ecological and cosmological.

Transcorporeal politics, then, is fundamentally about developing, tinkering with and contesting distributed modes of generation wherein social assemblages and agentic bodies of all ontic varieties are engaged and politicized at the different levels of material and expressive organization appropriate to their functioning. Each complex matrix of possibility is a composite of material flows, associations and proximities affording different political moves, tactics and forms which includes but are never limited to symbolic representation and discursive exchanges. We always co-determine our world with other humans and non-humans (and in-humans) through reciprocal but often uneven exchanges of properties, powers and capacities – setting the very conditions for what then becomes possible. And within this simultaneously wild and contingent field of compound possibility what we do, as one kind of being among others, affects the capacities and sustain-ability of a myriad of other entities, communities and tangible networks. The work of the revolutionary thus becomes the engagement of whole worlds: an ecological praxis enriched through sapient and sensitive explorations which flow into deliberational alterings of the very modes of our relative becoming. Revolution is co-evolution always and forever.

[[ hat tip to Adam Robbert and Jeremy Trombley on the Graeber piece ]]

Manuel DeLanda - Deleuze and the Use of the Genetic Algorithm in Architecture

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Sat, 06 Apr 2013 05:44:00 +0000

April 9, 2004, 'Art and Technology Lecture Series'

at Columbia University:

Manuel DeLanda (b. in Mexico City, 1952) is a philosopher, media artist, programmer and software designer. After studying art in the 1970s, he became known as an independent filmmaker making underground 8mm and 16mm films inspired by critical theory and philosophy. In the 1980s, DeLanda focused on programing, writing computer software, and computer art. After being introduced to the work of Gilles Deleuze, he saw new creative potential in philosophical texts, becoming one of the representatives of the 'new materialism'.

Manuel De Landa is the Gilles Deleuze Chair of Contemporary Philosophy and Science at the European Graduate School EGS, and former Adjunct Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation at Columbia University (New York). He is the author of War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (1991), A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (1997), Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (2002), A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (2006), Deleuze: History and Science (2010), and Philosophy & Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason (2011)

Politicizing the Real: Borromean Critical Theory and Material Phenomenology

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Wed, 03 Apr 2013 04:47:00 +0000

Below is Levi Bryant's recent lecture at York University in Toronto talking about onto-cartography and what he has been calling 'Borromean Critical Theory'. My comments follow.

I have been a supporter of Levi Bryant's work for years. I certainly have moments when I grumble about this or that technical-theoretical issue but in the main I'm fascinated by how Levi's framework balances a consideration of the substantial existence of assemblages or units ("objects") with an appreciation for the complex subsistence of things, as they partake of and interface with a wider field of materials, forces and processes. Levi's recent turn to "machines" as a technical concept designed to code the compositional activity or powers of things offers a refreshing Deleuzean option for moving beyond the false antagonisms of those who privilege objects over process, or visa versa.

In the lecture above Levi re-works Lacan's borromean knot formulation to tease apart three distinct but interacting ontological registers which - when appropriately mapped and respected on their own terms and for how they contribute the fabric of the world - call for a more inclusive critical and political theory. Note that Levi deviates from Lacan's own usage of the three registers by recoding 'the Real' with a more materialist and naturalist resonance.

As Levi has written previously:

The three orders are phenomenology (or the Imaginary), semiotics (or the Symbolic), and the material (or the Real). Phenomenology or the Imaginary investigates the lived experience of human and nonhuman entities such as bats, octopi, computers, queer bodies, and so on. It investigates the openness, through channels, of various beings to a broader world. Semiotics explores various structures of coding where they exist. Materialism and naturalism (the Real) investigates the features of materiality and how they influence assemblages (natural geography, physics, neurology, the speed at which communications can travel, the calories needed to live and work, and so on)...

With Borromean Critical Theory we thus get three reductions (in the Husserlian sense), because certain things can only be understood within each of the three orders. With the Imaginary we get the “phenomenological reduction” which consists in observing the observer, or how particular entities such as tardigrades, wolves, rocks, and satellites encounter the world about them. With the Symbolic we get the “semiotic reduction” which attends to how discourse, narrative, language, signs, and the signifier structure the world. Here we bracket the referent (the Real) and the lived (the Imaginary), and instead just attend to the diacritics of language in parsing the world. Finally, we get a “naturalistic reduction” in the domain of the Real that brackets meaning and the signifier (the Symbolic) and lived experience (the Imaginary), instead adopting what Husserl called the “natural attitude” and attending to the constraints of chemistry, physics, neurology, physiology, natural geography, and so on. There are certain things that can only be understood and know within the natural attitude, which is why we must here bracket lived experience and semiotic analysis. Paradoxically, we today live in a theoretical context where we need the resources to return to the natural attitude to discern the power that materiality exerts on life. [source]

To relate Levi's project here to some of my recent posts I suggest that discerning differences between 'the Symbolic' and 'the Real' is roughly equivalent to my proposed separation between epistemic relations (semiotic activity) and structural relations (material-energetics). Corresponding to the mode of openness that humans are there we experience a structural presentness between things prior to their being inscribed in epistemological regimes of truth. As complex assemblages with emergent capacities our mode of openness is both bodily (structural/corporeal) and reflective (epistemic), but never entirely one or the other.

Where things get tricky in the translation between Levi's model and my own distinctions here is where each of us might suggest phenomenal experience or 'the Imaginal' fits in. To do justice to this topic I would need a separate and much longer post, but in general I will suggest that 'subjectivity' or human experience is wholly Real: which is to say, material and therefore does not require 'its' own register. Our situated animal experience is generated from the sensual-material opening of our bodies among other bodies, and as an activity-in-the-world without ontological remainder.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, among others, was rather clear about the fundamental corporeal nature of subjectivity. In The Phenomenology of Perception he wrote, "the body is our general medium for having a world" (p.169). Worlds open up viz. bodies. And this sensual-tangible horizon is entirely of the material-energetic plane of existence. When we perceive and experience the world we do so as sensitive-coping bodies vulnerable to being affected and able to affect the Real precisely because we partake in the consistency of structure and force that is matter-energy. We are experientially open to the world as Real because we are of it:

"Nothing determines me from outside, not because nothing acts upon me, but, on the contrary, because I am from the start outside myself and open to the world. We are true through and through, and have with us, by the mere fact of belonging to the world, and not merely being in the world in the way that things are, all that we need to transcend ourselves" (p.153).

And as Evan Thompson (2011) notes:

"Merleau-Ponty rejects the idea that conscious experiences are interior states of the mind or brain that stand as causal or epiphenomenal intermediaries between sensory inputs and motor outputs. Consciousness is rather a form or structure of comportment, a perceptual and motor attunement of the whole animal to its world. In our human case, this attunement is primarily to an environment of meaningful symbols and the intentional actions of others." [source]

Comportment is how we take a stance in the world as structured beings among actual assemblages and material flows. Merleau-Ponty borrows the notion of comportment from Martin Heidegger, who wrote:

Comportment stands open to beings. Every open relatedness is a comportment. Man’s open stance varies depending on the kind of beings and the way of comportment. All working and achieving, all action and calculation, keep within an open region within which beings, with regard to what they are and how they are, can properly take their stand… (Essence of Truth)

And this experiential-bodily comportment is entirely of the order of the Real (material-energetic), just as 'consciousness' is nothing other than the dynamic expression of vibrant materials in action and milieu.

For me the point at which Levi's Borromean framework breaks down is precisely where subjectivity as phenomenal experience is abstracted from our fundamental way of being-open-in-the-world, of being sensitive material-energetic systems. As interesting as a neo-Lacanian ontology is for all sorts of projects (as Levi demonstrates above) I believe bracketing out the phenomenological from the material is a fatal mistake. It is fatal in two senses: first, it reinforces an explanatory gap between 'consciousness' [sentience] and materiality that evokes and supports all sorts Cartesian conceptual dead-ends and confusions about how embodied experience, intentionality and animal judgement emerge and operate in the world; and secondly, it generates all sorts of epistemological problems in terms of how we might traverse registers and gain access to the Real (issues of knowability).

In short, I think there are pragmatically more productive ways to conceive of the existence and relationship between the material-structural, semiotic-epistemic and human sentience that do not reinforce traditional metaphysical dualisms that produce their own philosophical impasses. Instead I propose a deflationary view of hominid phenomenology where 'the clearing' (or emptiness) that is situated biological perceptual awareness can be understood as an immanent feature of the Real, and radically open to the affective forces of elemental life. We need to re-cognize the sensitivity, sense-ability and sense-making nature of flesh beyond the binary of subject and object in order to become more fully conscious of the practical consequences of embodiment and our lived situations. Our practices, sciences and politics are now demanding of us something other than traditional categories.

What I find most intriguing in the quote above is Levi's claim that we now require the conceptual resources to "return to the natural attitude" which takes materiality seriously. I obviously believe this to be true, and attempting to understand and track why this is so continues to be a major pre-occupation. In a world where the ecological degradation of all systems capable of sustaining human life is accelerating, becoming and being more sensitive and responsive to our own materiality and the transcorporeality of the conditions of our existence is vital. We must become better at sensing, relating, coding and communicating about 'the Real', material-energetic tangible structureality of things if we are to be capable of coping, adapting and changing our relationships, politics and socioeconomic systems and arrangements within the current and ever shifting planetary (dis)order.

“From the vantage point of a philosophy of immanence set in a sensibility of care for this world, a pressing need today is to negotiate deep, multidimensional pluralism within and across territorial regimes” (William Connolly 2011: 83).

So while I have some reservation of the Borromean ontology Levi is working with here, I welcome his exploration of any discursive move that respects both the phenomenological and semiotic aspects of contemporary existence while also strongly emphasizing the need for critical reflection on how we understand and more importantly interface with the non-linguistic, non-conceptual potency of matter-energy at both personal and political levels.

Dance As A Way Of Knowing - Alva Noë

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Mon, 01 Apr 2013 19:31:00 +0000

"The world is its best representation." - Rodney Brooks

Alva Noë is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. The main focus of his work is the theory of perception and consciousness. 'Externalism' about cognition and mental content is a pervasive theme in his work. In addition to these problems in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, he interested in phenomenology, the theory of art, Wittgenstein, and the origins of analytic philosophy. He is the author of the books Varieties of Presence (2012), Out of Our Heads (2009) and Action In Perception (2004).

I highly recommend all Noë's work as it mixes an exquisite blend of scientific rigor with highly sophisticated philosophical consideration. Noë argues that the way we frame the question of consciousness - the notions of 'mind', 'meaning' and neural substrates - muddles our understanding of what is basically an activity generated in the "complex causal dynamic interaction between brains, bodies and environments". Noë work shows how sentient agents are never self-contained units of awareness but rather open living systems which only ever enact conscious experience in conjunction with the affording dynamic circumstances in which they exist. This understanding of sentience has major implications for how we conceptualize the autonomy of agents and challenges the basis of contemporary politics and social design.

Noë from 'Home Sweet Home: Finding Ourselves', NPR, May 28, 2011:

“Consciousness isn’t something that happens; it is something we do or make. And like everything else that we do, it depends both on the way we are constituted — on our brains and bodies — but also on the world around us.

Looking for consciousness in the brain is like looking for dance in the legs. (…)

Both Cartesian dualism, with its insistence that the mind is separate from the body, and the contemporary dogma that that the thing inside us that thinks and feels is the brain, share a common premise: that there is a thing inside that thinks and feels and decides and is conscious. It is this assumption, shared by dualist and most neuroscientists alike, that really holds us captive. (…)

There is as of yet no consensus on what a science of human or animal experience should even look like. I propose that what limits us, and what limits our science, is a dual misunderstanding. The first I have already indicated: we suppose that mind is in the head. No, we need to get out of our heads to understand the workings of the mind, to look at the way the animal is closely coupled to and involved with its environment. (…)

We confuse the fabulous success of modern physics with grounds for believing that we live in the world that physics describes. And then we are confronted with the fact that the world of the physicist is a world devoid of colors and sounds and textures and odors and all the other qualities that fill up our experience. This tends to throw us back on our brains again: if the world isn’t really the way we experience it as being, then our experience must be something we confabulate, or that our brains confabulate for us. Back to the Cartesian capsule! (…)

The basic laws of physics that support life are well understood; but this does not imply that we understand, in the terms of physics, how there is life!

The thing is: we do not live in the world of physics. If that were so, then there would be no biology at all. No, humans and other animals live in niches. They, or rather, we, occupy landscapes of values — worlds made up not of quantum lattice structures, but of opportunities and obstacles, affordances and hinderances. Life, including our experiential lives, happen not in clouds of atoms, but on level ground, with others, surrounded by hiding places, food, friends and enemies.

It is there, where we find ourselves, that we find the stage of our active lives and our active experience. We actually have the resources we need to understand ourselves. It is two dogmas of now antiquated modern science — that mind is in the head, and that the world is devoid of meaning unless we, or our brains, give it meaning — that creates the illusion — a meta-cognitive illusion! — that there is a hard problem of consciousness we are unable to solve.”

Sonorous Beings

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Tue, 26 Mar 2013 19:31:00 +0000

Maurice Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible (1969) :

“In a sense, if we were to make completely explicit the architectonics of the human body, its ontological framework, and how it sees itself and hears itself, we would see that the structure of its mute world is such that all the possibilities of language are already given in it. Already our existence as seers (that is, we said, as beings who turn the world back upon itself and who pass over to the other side, and who catch sight of one another, who see one another with eyes) and especially our existence as sonorous beings for others and for ourselves contain everything required for there to be speech from the one to the other, speech about the world. And, in a sense, to understand a phrase is nothing else than to fully welcome it in its sonorous being, or, as we put it so well, to hear what it says (l'entendre). The meaning is not on the phrase like the butter on the bread, like a second layer of “copy reality” spread over the sound: it is the totality of what is said, the integral of all the differentiations of the verbal chain; it is given with the words for those who have ears to hear” (p.155).

The articulations of the flesh are primitive expressions inflected by emergent dynamical-structures. The elements speak through our gestures and intentions. "Once a body-world relationship is recognized, there is a ramification of my body and a ramification of the world and a correspondence between its inside and my outside, between my inside and its outside" (pg.136). We dance the world as Being.

Michel Foucault on Truth and Subjectivity

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Sat, 23 Mar 2013 00:30:00 +0000

On October 20 and 21, 1980, Michel Foucault presented the Howison Lectures in philosophy at UC Berkeley. The subject for his talks was "truth and subjectivity":

LISTEN TO MORE: HERE

We Are Bodies: Contra Husserl

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Tue, 19 Mar 2013 20:38:00 +0000

Husserl’s “veritable abyss” is a temporal illusion of ocular sensitivity and factical depth. Reality is In-der-Welt-sein (etre au monde) without ontological remainder - and the origins of ontography are in thinking just how this is so. It is about the sensitive recursions of reflective corporeal bodies.

From Carman & Hansen’s introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty:

I am constantly told that everything I enjoy about Merleau-Ponty's work can be found in Husserl, but I have never found this to actually be the case. The ideas I find most interesting in Merleau-Ponty's books often seem more like subtle departures from his predecessor than the mere reframing of old phenomenological questions.

The terminological boxes into which we press the history of philosophy often obscure deep and important differences among major figures supposedly belonging to a single school of thought. One such disparity within the phenomenological movement, often overlooked but by no means invisible, separates Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception from the Husserlian program that initially inspired it. For Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology amounts to a radical, if discreet, departure not only from Husserl’s theory of intentionality generally, but more specifically from his account of the intentional constitution of the body and its role in perceptual experience (Carman 1999: 205).

For example, in his posthumous works Husserl mentions the role of the body in perception, but the body inevitably appears as a kind of ‘phenomenological anomaly’ (Carman 1999: 206) where the body is neither internal to my consciousness nor external to me in the environment, but is “a thing ‘inserted’ between the rest of the material world and the ‘subjective’ sphere” (Ideas II, 161).

Yet in Merleau-Ponty – and from what I can discern in my own phenomenological practice – we find that it is precisely the body which anchors us in the world opening up the possibility of perspective and thus allowing for the very real actuality of self-affective states and material orientation. At no point is our body merely a thing observed, inserted between our experience (cogito) and the world, but is instead an ever-present nexus of auto-affective activity and tangibility. The sensitive and sustaining materiality of the body is the very source of our reflective activity.

As Carman suggests:

Unlike Husserl, but like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty looks beyond the subject/object divide to try to gain insight into the concrete structures of worldly experience. But whereas Heidegger does little more than mention the problem ofembodiment in passing, Merleau-Ponty bases his entire phenomenological project on an account of bodily intentionality and the challenge it poses to any adequate concept of mind. Embodiment thus has a philosophical significance for Merleau-Ponty that it could not have for Husserl (1999: 206).

Taking the problem of embodiment and corporeality seriously entails a radical reassessment of the very conceptual distinctions on which Husserl’s fame rests. Indeed, “the distinction between subject and object is blurred in my body (and no doubt the distinction between noesis and noema as well?)” (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 167). Our bodies do not appear to us through some kind of pure ideation where we might then take ownership, our bodies are always present as the constitutive matrix from which our ideas begin to cohere and take structure. Which is to say, 'we' do not have bodies, rather we are bodies: “we are in the world through our body, and insofar as we perceive the world with our body” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 206).

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Fri, 15 Mar 2013 21:56:00 +0000

Brené Brown - The Price of Invulnerability

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Mon, 11 Mar 2013 21:30:00 +0000

From TEDx:

Synopsis: In our anxious world, we often protect ourselves by closing off parts of our lives that leave us feeling most vulnerable. Yet invulnerability has a price. When we knowingly or unknowingly numb ourselves to what we sense threatens us, we sacrifice an essential tool for navigating uncertain times -- joy. This talk by Brené Brown will explore how and why fear and collective scarcity has profoundly dangerous consequences on how we live, love, parent, work and engage in relationships -- and how simple acts can restore our sense of purpose and meaning:

Dr. Brené Brown is a research professor at the University of Houston Graduate College of Social Work where she has spent a lifetime studying courage, shame, authenticity, wholeheartedness and vulnerability. She is the Behavioral Health Scholar-in-Residence at the Council on Alcohol and Drugs and has written several books on her research.

Brené Brown - The Power of Vulnerability

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Mon, 11 Mar 2013 20:30:00 +0000

Dr. Brené Brown is a researcher professor at the University of Houston, Graduate College of Social Work, where she has spent the past ten years studying a concept that she calls Wholeheartedness, posing the questions: How do we engage in our lives from a place of authenticity and worthiness? How do we cultivate the courage, compassion, and connection that we need to embrace our imperfections and to recognize that we are enough -- that we are worthy of love, belonging and joy?

Below is her talk at TEDxHouston on wholeheartedness and vulnerability:

Theorizing Vulnerability

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Fri, 08 Mar 2013 22:10:00 +0000

“We inhabit a time when things have become more fragile and urgently in need of delicate tending. At the same time, a large section of the populace is belligerently opposed to recognition of this condition. It is a time when militant pressure to engage the fragility of things must be joined to acknowledgment of the limited ability of the human estate to master the world. It is thus a paradoxical time.” - William E. Connolly

Vulnerability is a ubiquitous characteristic positioning us in relation to each other, the state, the earth and the whole of existence. I argue that ecological vulnerabilities, corporeal vulnerabilities, existential vulnerabilities, and sociocultural vulnerabilities are different manifestations of a fundamental ontological vulnerability intrinsic to reality.
All existences and objects are exposed and mingle with innumerable elements and essences, all of which combine, dissipate, re-combine, and affect other bodies in ways that can be only imperfectly or partially foreseen or forestalled. Bodies are fundamentally worldly: open and extended outwards in order to sustain and nourish themsleves. Our bodies are intrinsically processual: capable of touching and being touched by other bodies and things, exposed to possibilities we can neither completely enumerate nor fully articulate.

In her 2004 book Precarious Life, Judith Butler wrote:

"The body implies mortality, vulnerability, agency: the skin and the flesh expose us to the gaze of others, but also to touch, and to violence, and bodies put us at risk of becoming the agency and instrument of all these as well. Although we struggle for rights over our own bodies, the very bodies for which we struggle are not quite ever only our own. The body has its invariably public dimension. Constituted as a social phenomenon in the public sphere, my body is and is not mine. Given over from the start to the world of others, it bears their imprint, is formed within the crucible of social life; only later, and with some uncertainty, do I lay claim to my body as my own, if, in fact, I ever do. Indeed, if I deny that prior to the formation of my “will,” my body related me to others whom I did not choose to have in proximity to myself, if I build a notion of “autonomy” on the basis of the denial of this sphere of a primary and unwilled physical proximity with others, then am I denying the social conditions of my embodiment in the name of autonomy?" (p.26)

In this sense, my body is ontologically sense-able and therefore response-able to so many other entities (both human and nonhuman) and, perhaps more disturbingly, perpetually open to the precariousness and wildness of being as such. A basic acknowledgment and exploration of this fundamental openness can generate all kinds of social, ethical and existential considerations and conversations regarding human beings. As Merleau-Ponty reminded us, “the world is not what I think, but what I live through” (Phenomenology of Perception, p. xvi-xvii ).

Judith Butler again:

"Mindfulness of this vulnerability can become the basis of claims for non-military political solutions, just as denial of this vulnerability through a fantasy of mastery (an institutionalized fantasy of mastery) can fuel the instruments of war. We cannot, however, will away this vulnerability. We must attend to it, even abide by it, as we begin to think about what politics might be implied by staying with the thought of corporeal vulnerability itself, a situation in which we can be vanquished or lose others. Is there something to be learned about the geopolitical distribution of corporeal vulnerability from our own brief and devastating exposure to this condition? (Ibid., p.29)

As an important and productive bridging concept between disciplines, theorizing vulnerability in all its onto-specific manifestations is at the core of what I term applied ontography. Applied ontography as I practice it seeks nuanced, non-dogmatic and pragmatic understandings of the dependencies, individuations, interdependencies, flow patterns, meshworks, connections, boundary limits, causal networks, assemblages and material potencies from which our lives and social institutions emerge. Such provisional understandings are then put to use through direct engagements with the practical and political projects of everyday hominid life. To be sure, the resulting heuristics, working models and tentative frameworks are only the expressive/epistemic dimension of these practical (infra-structural) engagements at work in the world - to be used, revised and refigured in relation to specific contexts of application.

In the introduction to Frames of War (2010), Butler wrote:

"I want to argue that if we are to make broader social and political claims about rights of protection and entitlements to persistence and flourishing, we will first have to be supported by a new bodily ontology, one that implies the rethinking of precariousness, vulnerability, injurability, interdependency, exposure, bodily persistence, desire, work, and the claims of language and social belonging. To refer to “ontology” in this regard is not to lay claim to a description of fundamental structures of being that are distinct from any and all social and political organization. On the contrary, none of these terms exist outside of their political organization and interpretation. The “being” of the body to which this ontology refers is one that is always given over to others, to norms, to social and political organizations that have developed historically in order to maximize precariousness for some and minimize precariousness for others. It is not possible first to define the ontology of the body and then to refer to the social significations the body assumes. Rather, to be a body is to be exposed to social crafting and form, and that is what makes the ontology of the body a social ontology." (pp. 2-3)

In the video below participants in The Scholar and Feminist Conference 2012: "Vulnerability: The Human and the Humanities," directly address issues of vulnerability in ways that highlight the importance recognizing vulnerability as a universal characteristic of the world we inhabit. The video features brief but fascinating presentations from eminent academics in a variety of fields, and includes a interesting panel discussion with Martha Albertson Fineman, Ewa Plonowska Ziarek, Colin Dayan, Ilaria Vanni, and moderator Elizabeth Castelli. Each participant discusses the political and practical implications of recognizing and better theorizing vulnerability at multiple scales in the context of their unique projects and research.

This event took place on March 3, 2012 at Barnard College:

In The Autonomy Myth (2005), Martha Fineman discusses the “universal, constant and complex” nature of vulnerability and interdependency at the level of health-care and politics, showing how the metaphysics/ideology of the so-called ‘autonomous liberal subject’ is a (mis)leading assumption at the heart of most dehumanizing Western capitalist cultural activities.

Here is Judith Butler again, from Precarious Life (2004):

"One insight that injury affords is that there are others out there on whom my life depends, people I do not know and may never know. This fundamental dependency on anonymous others is not a condition that I can will away. No security measure will foreclose this dependency; no violent act of sovereignty will rid the world of this fact. What this means, concretely, will vary across the globe. There are ways of distributing vulnerability, differential forms of allocation that make some populations more subject to arbitrary violence than others. But in that order of things, it would not be possible to maintain that the US has greater security problems than some of the more contested and vulnerable nations and peoples of the world. To be injured means that one has the chance to reflect upon injury, to find out the mechanisms of its distribution, to find out who else suffers from permeable borders, unexpected violence, dispossession, and fear, and in what ways. If national sovereignty is challenged, that does not mean it must be shored up at all costs, if that results in suspending civil liberties and suppressing political dissent. Rather, the dislocation from First World privilege, however temporary, offers a chance to start to imagine a world in which that violence might be minimized, in which an inevitable interdependency becomes acknowledged as the basis for global political community. I confess to not knowing how to theorize that interdependency. I would suggest, however, that both our political and ethical responsibilities are rooted in the recognition that radical forms of self-sufficiency and unbridled sovereignty are, by definition, disrupted by the larger global processes of which they are a part, that no final control can be secured, and that final control is not, cannot be, an ultimate value." (pp. xii-xiii)

"[T]here is a more general conception of the human with which I am trying to work here, one in which we are, from the start, given over to the other, one in which we are, from the start, even prior to individuation itself and, by virtue of bodily requirements, given over to some set of primary others: this conception means that we are vulnerable to those we are too young to know and to judge and, hence, vulnerable to violence; but also vulnerable to another range of touch, a range that includes the eradication of our being at the one end, and the physical support for our lives at the other.

Although I am insisting on referring to a common human vulnerability, one that emerges with life itself, I also insist that we cannot recover the source of this vulnerability: it precedes the formation of “I.” This is a condition, a condition of being laid bare from the start and with which we cannot argue. I mean, we can argue with it, but we are perhaps foolish, if not dangerous, when we do." (Ibid., p.31)

Tahltan Nation Continues to Inspire

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Wed, 06 Mar 2013 20:55:00 +0000

From Tahltan Central Council:

TORONTO - The Tahltan Nation of northern B.C. (Canada) [was] honoured [yesterday] in Toronto with a national "Top 10" environmental achievement award for the recent permanent protection of the "Sacred Headwaters" from natural gas development.

The Tides Canada award will be an emotional victory, because it comes at a time when new coal mining projects are also being proposed for the exact same region, and are stirring worries. "Shell Oil may be gone from our traditional lands, but new coal mining proposals are a major concern too," says Annita McPhee, President of Tahltan Central Council.

Last December, Tahltan Central Council, Shell Canada, and the B.C. government announced the end to natural-gas exploration in the Klappan region of northwest B.C. Shell voluntarily gave up its tenure for the area.

It marked the end of years of negotiations, and a difficult struggle that included protests, road blocks, and elders being arrested.

The next steps for the Sacred Headwaters, says McPhee, will be engaging constructively with the coal mining companies. She says she is guided by elders who say economic development must be done sustainably, without poisoning the sacred waterways that are home to wild salmon and moose.

"Our concern is, mining companies are proposing to build right in the headwaters. They want to put their tailing ponds right where our people have one of our hunting camps." "We are not against economic development. We just believe the benefits should far outweigh the impacts." Off limits, she says are certain ecologically and culturally sensitive zones in the Klappan.

McPhee received the award last night on behalf of the Tahltan Nation at the Arta Gallery in Toronto. The Tides Canada award will be shared with Shell Canada, Forest Ethics, Skeena Watershed Conservation Coalition, and the B.C. government.

The Tahltans still must live and struggle with copper and gold mines that are seeking to expand and intensify within Tahltan traditional lands.

Tim Morton on Withdrawal?

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Fri, 01 Mar 2013 18:05:00 +0000

In relation to my recent obsessing on issues of withdrawal in object-oriented ontologies André Ling of Intra-Being is wondering if I'm getting it all wrong about Tim Morton's notion of causality (here). As André writes, "just wondering where Morton says that objects do not encounter each other and have real effects upon each other?"

I think André’s question is a good one. Although I have enormous respect for Tim Morton’s project and general trajectory, I’m not sure I can answer André question precisely if only because I often find myself quite confused by Tim’s version of ‘withdrawal’ (see here). In fact I’m feeling like I’d be groping in the dark even discussing Tim’s position on this issue at all. I still need to read his latest book. But for the sake of exploration let me try to articulate a few ideas with regards to André‘s challenge.

The initial problem I run in to is that just when I think Tim is talking about direct causality and how things have deep impacts on other things, in a more or less scientific sense, he shifts and starts talking about causation as primarily “aesthetic” – in the sense that all things only ever encounter the “qualities” of other things, and not the “essence” of the thing-themselves. I don’t understand how he can split these aspects without suggesting that rocks encounter other rocks phenomenologically? How exactly does a hammer absolutely withdraw from a nail viz. the nail only ever encountering the hammer’s qualities? Where are those floating “qualities” registered if not in the “mind” of the nail? And why is all of this not still direct? The enactment of 'quality' is particular to entities with the capacity for phenomenal experience. What are the mechanisms involved in hammer phenomenology? If someone could answer those questions I would be in their debt.

As just one example take the following from chapter one of Realist Magic:

“Withdrawn doesn’t mean hard to find or even impossible to find yet still capable of being visualized or mapped or plotted. Withdrawn doesn’t mean spatially, or materially or temporally hidden yet capable of being found, if only in theory. Withdrawn means beyond any kind of access, any kind of perception or map or plot or test or extrapolation.” (Morton 2013)

Beyond any kind of access? Herein lies multiple dilemmas I believe.

With regards to those types of beings who are capable of recursive-reflection ('phenomenal experience') I completely agree that our knowledge of things-in-themselves withdraws. Concepts are never adequate to the things they attempt signify, and knowledge itself is slippery, undecidable and constructed. Our ‘understandings’ of things – our synthetic conceptualizations (manifest images) – are entirely abstract. So I agree with Tim fully in this regard, and I quite enjoy his comments on global warming and how humans are perceiving (or not perceiving) and coping (or not coping) with it and other hyperobjects. But as my last post (here) tries to parse out, there is an important difference that needs theorizing between thinking, coding and knowing about something epistemically and being directly affected by or affecting the substantial capacities of actual material assemblages structurally.

As a bit of an aside about 'structural access/relation', I should mention the work done by Ladyman and Ross (2009) in this regard. As Ladyman and Ross forcefully argue there are "real patterns" that have access to us, intervene upon and sometimes afford our powers of operation, and of which we are forced to work with (adapt/cope) in ways in excess of our representations of them. “From the metaphysical point of view, what exists are just real patterns” (p.121). And these real patters are invariant forces that directly impinge upon the being of other 'individuals' as patterned activities. “Individual things, then, are constructs built for second-best tracking of real patterns” (p.242), or “epistemological book-keeping devices” (p. 240). A key theme in their work is the dismissal of ‘neo-scholastic’ metaphysics and the promotion of ‘naturalised metaphysics’.

So I think it is important to think about just how assemblages (objects) not only have have access to each other's substantial being, but how the operational efficacy of things is interdependent upon multi-modal access between and among a multitude of materials and complexes, creating distributed fields of affordances and possibility. Reality is a mingled and uncanny mesh.

But to return to the point, although I don’t think Morton ever says that things don’t effect each other – at least he never explicitly says this - I wonder if his expressed adherence to Harman’s ontology doesn’t somehow lead to some serious contradictions in this regard? My working thesis is that I either don’t understand Morton’s approach well enough yet (very probable) or there are some unacknowledged contradictions and logical problems within the discourse. And I just want us to be clear about what we are being asked to assume in order to integrate an ontology of withdrawal with claims (coming from science and Tim himself) that humans have enough access to the world to know something about how the world actually works (realism?) to exist effectively within it.

On Being and Coping - Part 1: Ontic Relation and Object Access

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Wed, 27 Feb 2013 18:17:00 +0000

“Sensing is not ruled by the ‘I think’ which, according to Kant, must accompany all apperception. In sensing, nothing is apperceived. The sensing being, the animal, does not confront its world as a thinking being, but is, rather, related to it simply in uniting and separating.” (Erwin Straus, The Primary World of Senses: A Vindication of Sensory Experience, trans. Jacob Needleman, 1963: 197)

“Language scatters the totality of all that touches us most closely even while it arranges it in order. Through language, we can never grasp what matters to us for it eludes us in the form of interdependent propositions, and no central whole to which each of these can be referred ever appears” (Bataille, Eroticism, 1986: 274).

"You already know enough. So do I. It is not knowledge we lack. What is missing is the courage to understand what we know and to draw conclusions." (Lindqvist, Exterminate All the Brutes, 2007: 1)

Arran James has responded (here) to my last post (here) with a generous exploration of the thesis that ‘absolute withdrawal’ is a feature of epistemic relations (hermeneutics) only and not of structural relations (material affectivity) of objects generally. In short, objects are absolutely autonomous of our conception of them. Objects are never equivalent to our perceptions, interpretations, or stories. Yet, however accurate such a claim may be, it also remains the case that many objects can and do encounter – affect, influence, absorb, activate, dissolve, empower, etc., – each other directly in structurally efficacious ways beyond or at least ‘below’ conceptuality. This is the crux of my divergence with object-oriented ontologies (OOO) [see here for more detail].

Now one might be inclined to wonder if I am setting up a kind of unnecessary dualism here by distinguishing between structural encounters and epistemic encounters? That is a fair question. To be sure, I am supporting a kind of weak version of the classical distinction between "the sensible" and "the intelligible". But I am NOT suggesting that ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are different substances. They are not. What I am suggesting is that there are different kinds of interactions taking place at different levels of complex materiality (strata). Which is to say material affectivity and structural relation occur at different levels and in different ways than epistemic relations that are often independent of processes of apprehension, signification and "translation".

Without a doubt embodied cognition (which in my usage includes both emotion and logical operations, in mingling proportions as per neuro-anatomy) involves recursion and includes projective subjectivity (‘qualia’) – what I refer to as the phastasmic character of experience, and what Lacan refers to as 'the imaginal’ – not present in less complex objects. Not all material assemblages/structures are capable of mental operations (“mind”) because cognitive activities/powers involve distinctly emergent capacities irreducible to less complex physical processes. Such recursive-phantasmic capabilities (powers) are specific to entities with central nervous systems, and are what affords animals an emergent capacaity for iconic/symbolic signification and epistemic memory. And he biological capacities for recursion, memory, signification and synthetic apprehension (or animal coding) are precisely what allows for what I refer to above as epistemic relations. We experience and imagine; we sense and we code. It is the activity of signifying, apprehending and relating to the world via epistemic coding which remains ‘absolutely withdrawn’ from other entities.

So I certainly agree with Heidegger, Harman, Morton and others when they suggest that objects are never equivalent to our animal interpretations and conceptions. The crucial point with regard to my disagreement with OOO is that embodied human thought as an onto-specific capacity is deployed and operates differently in the world than how, say, dynamite works in relation granite. Non-signifying objects (such as dynamite) often interact with other objects (like granite) in ways that make a structural difference to their material composition below the level of explicit cognitive acts. There are different kinds of entities which enfold different levels of organization, activity and relation, and these differences make all the difference. [see here for more detail]

By this I do not suggest some sort of naïve ‘billiard-ball’ causation where pure substances rub up against each other, but rather that certain types of assemblages/objects relate in ways that directly influence the operational character or functional arrangement (structure) of others through the exchange of information and energy. Causality is never simple or unmediated but always complex and precarious. And so the sorts of interactions (events) that take place between entities are entirely contingent upon the kinds of entities involved - relative to their material and onto-specific capacities. ‘Withdrawal’ at a non-cognitive and pre-reflective level of materiality is then an issue of structural access via complexity (or ‘depth’) and material composition as opposed to an issue of epistemic access within representational thought.

I must admit at this point that my awareness of the problematics of epistemic access/relation is precisely why I enjoy Tim Morton’s project as much as I do. Tim is brilliant at pointing out the alienation, epistemic problems and associated existential anxieties generated by the inability of humans to come to grips with the gap between our apprehension/interpretations and the things-in-themselves (cf. Derrida on undecidability). Morton’s “dark ecology” offers a way forward to begin to thematize (rationalize?) this epistemic gap while simultaneously and perhaps paradoxically activating an uncanny appreciation for the structural intimacy of the world, or of what he calls ‘the Mesh’. I will certainly have much more to say in the coming months about the possibilities Tim is setting forth in his recent work, but I just wanted to acknowledge here the profound influence Tim’s work continues to have on me in this regard.

With that said, let me return to some of the wonderful points Arran brings up in his post. Arran writes:

Michael rejects the idea that objects are absolutely withdrawn from one. Instead, Michael suggests that all objects are ontically open to one another in such a way as to establish an ‘intimacy’. This would also be the grounds of possibility for the intelligibility of alterity: how could we speak of alterity if things never encountered one another at all? The point is that if objects were absolutely withdrawn they would recede from any point of access whatsoever. In such a world no thing could ever be touched, held, burnt, used, left, ignored, known etc.

I don’t know if I have ever stated it quite that way but Arran is correct, I maintain that some kind of access, namely structural access/relation, is required as “the grounds of possibility for the intelligibility of alterity”. This doesn’t mean that we can come to total knowledge of any particular entities, because, as I argue above, epistemic closure is impossible, but that through the various structural (complex and multi-leveled) relations with things we can at the very least gain some intimacy with them by phantasizing symbolically and communicating with each other about them. Without structural access/relation alterity would be unintelligibility and epistemic coding impossible.

This is precisely where my pragmatic commitments come to the fore. If humans can only have structural access to things-in-themselves, and only ever fashion approximate knowledge of objects and assemblages through signification practices and epistemic phantasies, then what actually matters is how we pragmatically act, react and cope in the world in relation to them. Insert all the references to Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’ and ‘family resemblances’, Rorty’s ‘ironism’, and/or any other post-critical concessions you want right here. The bottom-line is that immanent structural – or perhaps infrastructural – relations have traceable consequences via the onto-specific powers or potencies (or what Bryant refers to as ‘pluri-potencies’) of things at a pre-reflective level of direct material-energetic affectivity. And the distal stories (narratives, ontologies, etc.) we tell ourselves about these consequential interactions – however poetic or meaning-full, or instrumental (useful) they may be – are basically coping mechanisms to help us make our way in the wild world as fully enfleshed beings-in-the-world.

In a passionate and radically illustrative passage Arran writes:

Absolute withdrawal is a thesis of absolute autonomy of every substance from every other substance to the point where all and every thing vanishes. But that isn’t the world we live in. We live in a world of violence and suffering, of bullets and bombs, of fast food and big screen TVs, of kissing lovers, and 4 year old boys who refuse to let you write blog posts. We live in a world where we’ve gathered a fair bit of knowledge. Hard knowledge garnered from natural science. In other words, it seems that the claim that objects are absolutely withdrawn is false.

As a psychiatric nurse I know that such a claim is false. I use drugs synthesised by psychopharmacologists that, once injected into the flesh, directly do things to the patient’s nervous system. Conversation and phenomenographic accounts of patient experience also relate how this can profoundly alter the way patients couple to their environments. This leads to the enaction of profoundly different worlds. Thinking on such an example is illustrative. I can only do my job because people have had direct if partial access to things. I can only do my job because other things have direct access to still more things. The generation of and radical difference between my experience of an episode of medication administration and my patient’s is only possible because of the specific ways in which we and the things involved in that situation are open to each other. That openness constitutes the kind of intimacy that provides us with experiential evidence of the impossibility of absolute withdrawal. Instead, situations or worlds are produced by the unique ensemble of interoperating operations of uniquely relating substances.

There is no way I could provide a better account than Arran has above. I believe ontographic rigor insists that we respect the power and interdependencies of the things-themselves. When we respect the things-in-themselves we give to them what is theirs but not more: we respect their contingent existence and finitude, and we acknowledge their ontic particularity and irreducible complexity, but we also appreciate their dependencies and the affordances they require to exist. So in this context anthropomorphizing the cosmos by projecting cognitive capacities onto pre-cognitive processes is a failure of ontographic imagination. We simply should not insist that every entity operates according to our all too human metaphysical proclivities. Instead, hominid ontography insists that we attempt to code our formal relations with entities in ways most consistent with what each thing or assemblage can do structurally via their powers and capacities, and with the networks or ecologies which support and co-enact them.

[[ to be continued ]]

Ecologies of Imaginal Space

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Tue, 26 Feb 2013 21:34:00 +0000

"If there is any hope for the world at all, it does not live in climate-change conference rooms or in cities with tall buildings. It lives low down on the ground, with its arms around the people who go to battle every day to protect their forests, their mountains and their rivers because they know that the forests, the mountains and the rivers protect them.

The first step toward re-imagining a world gone terribly wrong would be to stop the annihilation of those who have a different imagination – an imagination that is outside of capitalism as well as communism. An imagination which has an altogether different understanding of what constitutes happiness and fulfillment.

To gain this philosophical space, it is necessary to concede some physical space for the survival of those who may look like the keepers of our past but who may really be the guides to our future. To do this, we have to ask our rulers: Can you leave the waters in the rivers, the trees in the forest? Can you leave the bauxite in the mountain? If they say they cannot, then perhaps they should stop preaching morality to the victims of their wars." [source]
-- Arundhati Roy

“This is not about getting back to nature.
It is about understanding we’ve never left.”
-- Sierra Club poster

Differing Objects: Formally Ungraspable, Ontologically Vulnerable?

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Sun, 24 Feb 2013 20:32:00 +0000

Over at Attempts at Living blogger extraordinaire and fellow post-nihilist pragmatist Arran briefly mentions the strong affinities between Tim Morton’s ‘realist magic’ and the work of Jean Baudrillard via the following two quotes.

Morton:

“An object is not an illusion. But it is not a non-illusion. Much more threatening than either is what is the case, namely an object that is utterly real, essentially itself, whose very reality is formally ungraspable. No hidden trapdoors, just a mask with some feathers whose mystery is out in front of itself, in your face. A miracle. Realist magic. This all means that the skills of the literary critic and the architect, the painter and the actor, the furniture maker and the composer, the musician and the software designer can be brought to bear on the workings of causality.” [Realist Magic 2013]

And Baudrillard:

“Objects are such that, in themselves, their disappearance changes them. It is in this sense that they deceive us, that they generate illusion. But it is in this sense too that they are faithful to themselves, and we must be faithful to them: in their minute detail, in their exact figuration, in the sensuous illusion of their appearance and connectedness. For illusion is not the opposite of reality, but another more subtle reality which enwraps the former kind in the sign of its disappearance.” [in 'Photographies']

Both theorists posit an absolute absence (withdrawal or disappearance) of giveness in human perception, and both gentlemen suggest we stop bitching about this absence and start attended more to the miraculous illusions they cast out. For Morton the ‘ungraspability’ of things is a feature of the causal structure of reality, whereas for Baudrillard the reality of illusion is simply part and parcel with what reality has generally and ultimately become.

What both men don’t seem to consider, however, is the ontic difference that makes a difference between epistemic relation (conceptual or formal grasp-ability) and structural relation (physical or material grasp-ability). Not all relations, encounters and contacts are enacted viz. the 'withdrawl' of formal accountability or the disappearance of unmediated sign connection. Some interactions are more direct and consequential, at least in terms of structural composition and operational efficacy. This ontologically vulnerability is prior to the kind of thetic coding, logico-linguistic recursion, or formal iconic representations that are at the core of the types of interpretation or “translation” OOO rightfully argues is inadequate for the total comprehension of things. Without a fundamental ontic openness and affective potency intimacy is impossible, and alterity is ineffectual and incomprehensible.

Instead, I argue human cognition and signification is a relatively unique complex and emergent affair, and perhaps should not be taken as the quintessential kind of relation in the cosmos. Nonhuman objects are often co-determining assemblies (ecologically embedded, indebted and enacted) interfacing in non-reflexive, non-thetic, non-psychological ways governed by their material and operational structures and capacities. To reduce the particularity of object-encounters, or to project some sort of anthropomorphic specular theory of reflexive distance onto objects universally, is to be ontographically unfaithful to the contingent nature of things.

I think the easy descent into panpsychism (or rather pan-epistemology, as the onto-theologizing of representational cognition) that certain strains of object-orientation seem to require is a major flaw of an otherwise fascinating philosophical adventure. [also see here]

UPDATE: In the comment section of a great post on Laruelle and Luhmann Levi Bryant had this to say:

What I call “alien phenomenology”, following Ian Bogost, is an analysis of how beings, both human and non-human, correlate to the world around them, e.g., how does a bat experience the world? On the other hand, I take it that the various forms of OOO are pan-correlationisms. What does that mean? Harman, Morton, Bogost, and myself all argue that no entity has access to any other entity; though we argue this in different ways. Rather, each entity distorts other entities in relating to them. Seen within this framework, the claim is not so much that correlationism is false, as that it is wrong to claim that there’s something unique about the human correlation. This is what pan-correlationism means: that there is as much a correlationist structure with how the cat or computer relates to the world about it, as the human.

There are, I think, two key points here. First, we must take care never to reduce entities to their correlations. In relating to my cat, I no doubt reduce/distort it in a number of ways, but my cat can’t be reduced to how it is given to me or what it is for me. Second, we must attend to the frame of reference in which claims are being made about another thing or observe the observer. Which observer are we talking about? Jonah? A scientific institution? Insurance companies? Cats? Etc.

Wouldn't these “pan-correlationisms” found at the core of the various forms of OOO also be considered to be variants of panpsychism (or pan-epistemology)? If all objects have a 'alien phenomenology' and all encounters are ‘translations’ then do all object interactions have some sort of processual mind-like quality to them? This seems to me to be universalizing cognitive experience such that all reality operates hermeneutically. And pushed far enough I believe pan-correlationism would lead strait to Idealism. Am I missing something here?

Perspective, Plurality and Pragmatism?

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Thu, 21 Feb 2013 20:36:00 +0000

In this age of dissolution – a general unweaving of the fabric of life and certainty – there is an increasing need to design radically new sensitivities and complex relations. In short, we must voluntary evolve more adaptive ecologies of being, knowing and acting. But what resources will be afforded? What types of cartographies will be required to navigate this hyper-present? And where shall we begin?

My answer to the crucial question of origins lies somewhere between radical phenomenological practice and post-formal constructive logic - or, rather, in their collision. We must start from our animal experience and then extrapolate the contours of an immanent, impinging and impending ecology, context or wilderness of Being, upon which the drama of our phantasies must be written. The clamor of human and nonhuman agents, actants and assemblages must then be dealt with pragmatically and in earnest lest we fail to adapt and then perish.

Rosenthal, Sandra B. (2005) ‘The Ontological Grounding of Diversity: A Pragmatic Overview’. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Volume 19, Number 2, pp. 107-119:

The uprootedness of experience from its ontological embeddedness in a natural world is at the core of much contemporary philosophy, which, like pragmatism, aims to reject foundationalism in all its forms: positions that all hold, in varying ways, that there is a bedrock basis on which to build an edifice of knowledge, something objective that justifies rational arguments concerning what is the single best position for making available or picturing the structure of reality as it exists independently of our various contextually set inquiries. There can be no nonperspectival framework within which differences—social, moral, scientific, etc., can be evaluated and resolved. These positions may, like pragmatism, focus on the pluralistic, contextualistic ways of dealing with life, on the role of novelty and diversity, on a turn away from abstract reason to imagination, feeling, and practice, and on the need to solve the concrete problems of political, social, and moral life. However, pragmatism, in rejecting foundationalism and its respective philosophic baggage, does not embrace the alternative of antifoundationalism or its equivalent dressed up in new linguistic garb. Rather, it rethinks the nature of foundations, standing the tradition on its head, so to speak, and this rethinking incorporates the ontological grounding of diversity.

This rethinking, which incorporates the essentially perspectival nature of experience and knowledge, goes hand in hand with pragmatism's radical rejection of the spectator theory of knowledge. All knowledge and experience are infused with interpretive aspects, funded with past experience. And all interpretation stems from a perspective, a point of view. Knowledge is not a copy of anything pregiven, but involves a creative organization of experience that directs the way we focus on experience and is tested by its workability in directing the ongoing course of future activities. In this way, experience and knowledge are at once experimental and perspectival in providing a workable organization of problematical or potentially problematical situations. Not only are perspectives real within our environment, but without them there is no environment.

Further, our worldly environment incorporates a perspectival pluralism, for diverse groups or diverse individuals bring diverse perspectives in the organization of experience. The universe exists independent of our intentional activity, but our worldly environment is inseparable from our meaning or intending it in certain ways, and these ways are inherently pluralistic. However, such pluralism, when properly understood, should not lead to the view that varying groups are enclosed within self-contained, myopic, limiting frameworks or points of view, cutting off the possibility of rational dialogue, for two reasons. First, perspectives by their very nature are not self-enclosed, but open onto a community perspective, and second, perspectival pluralism provides the very matrix for rational dialogue and ongoing development. And it is within the core of human selfhood that the primordial ontological embeddedness of diversity within the very nature of, indeed as constitutive of, human experience can be found.

For pragmatism, mind, thinking, and selfhood are emergent levels of activity of ontologically "thick" organisms within nature. Meaning emerges in the interactions among conscious organisms, in the adjustments and coordinations needed for cooperative action in the social context. In communicative interaction, individuals take the perspective of the other in the development of their conduct, and in this way there develops the common content that provides community of meaning and the social matrix for the emergence of self-consciousness. In incorporating the perspective of the other, the self comes to incorporate the standards and authority of the group; there is a passive dimension to the self Mead calls the "me." Yet, the individual responds as a unique center of activity; there is a creative dimension to the self, the "I" (Rosenthal 2005:107).

Questions? Suggestions? Concerns?

Things Will Not Be So Easy

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Tue, 19 Feb 2013 21:54:00 +0000

I truly enjoy how hollywood makes profit by projecting the fears of its own established cultural elites. I don't even mind when such profits are made by making a caricature of the very real and raw impulses motivating many of us who are increasingly organizing to confront those elites - impulses rooted in an organic sense of complete disgust with a mainstream that is fundamentally a manufactured pseudo-civilization with corporate oligarchs and govern-mental disfunction firmly at its core.

I just watched the following trailer for the new film "The East": "a story centered on contract worker who is tasked with infiltrating an anarchist group, only to find herself falling for its leader." The film features actors Ellen Page, Alexander Skarsgård and Brit Marling, and directed by Zal Batmanglij. The film premiered at the 2013 Sundance Film Festival on January 20, 2013.

The film's co-writer and star Brit Marling said the following in relation to the film: "Multinational corporations are outside of the purview of any nation-state. These are the entities that are shaping and running the world... The modern anarchy movement is about rebelling against the corporate structure."

Check it out:

Any comments?

#darkestbeforethestorm

Realist Magic

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Fri, 15 Feb 2013 03:47:00 +0000

I have a hard time understanding Tim Morton's notion of 'withdrawal' - suspecting somewhere subconsciously that his version is radically different than what Graham Harman proposes - but I certainly am intrigued. With the open access publication of his latest jazz-tinged literary artifact, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (html version found here) I hope to finally dive deep enough into the object-oriented aspects of Morton's thought to get some sort of grasp on what he trying to do.

Here is a particularly meaty chunk from chapter one of the new book:

Imagine the cinder block all on its ownsome. A scandalous thought perhaps, maybe even impossible to think. The block is not just a blank lump waiting to be filled in by some “higher” object (overmining). The block is not a blob of something bigger or an assemblage of tinier things (undermining). The block is not made real by some medium (the “middle object”). The block is itself. It is specific. It is unique. We might as well think it as a specific, unique real thing. The block already has qualities, such as front, back, and so on. Yet these qualities are only ever aesthetic appearances, no matter whether there is any other “observer” around to see. Yet these appearances are real aspects of the block: it isn’t a pyramid, and it doesn’t have a swan’s neck. The object itself is riven from the inside between its essence and its appearance. This can’t simply mean that the cinder block is a lump of substance that has a certain shape and color and that those are its accidents. We have already ruled that out. It must mean that in itself the block (essence) is also a non-block (appearance).

The conclusion seems magical, but it’s a very ordinary kind of magic. It requires no special features, no supervenient soul or mind or animating force of any kind. It requires that our cinder block have no hidden material squirreled away inside it, no extra folds or hidden pockets of any kind. It only requires that the block exist. There is a block, whose essence is withdrawn. Withdrawn doesn’t mean hard to find or even impossible to find yet still capable of being visualized or mapped or plotted. Withdrawn doesn’t mean spatially, or materially or temporally hidden yet capable of being found, if only in theory. Withdrawn means beyond any kind of access, any kind of perception or map or plot or test or extrapolation. You could explode a thousand nuclear bombs and you would not reveal the secret essence of the cinder block. You could plot the position and momentum of every single particle in the block (assuming you could get around Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle) and you wouldn’t discover the withdrawn essence of the block. Ten of the world’s greatest playwrights and film directors (let’s say Sophocles, Shakespeare, Garcia Lorca, Samuel Beckett, Akira Kurosawa and David Lynch just for starters) could write horrifying, profound tragedies and comedies and action movies about the block and still no one would be closer to knowing the essence of the block.

Something tells me if I can understand the passage above I might just be able to pick up what Tim is putting down...

Forget Baudrillard?

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Thu, 14 Feb 2013 02:22:00 +0000

“The secret of theory is that truth doesn’t exist. You can’t confront it in any way. The only thing you can do is play with some kind of provocative logic. Truth constitutes a space that can no longer be occupied. The whole strategy is, indeed, not to occupy it, but to work around it so that others come to occupy it. It means creating a void so that others will fall into it.”

- Jean Baudrillard, Forget Baudrillard (interview with Sylvère Lotringer, 1977)

Only A Matter of Time

noreply@blogger.com (michael-) — Tue, 29 Jan 2013 01:57:00 +0000

“Wisdom is the power to put our time and our knowledge to the proper use.” - Thomas J. Watson

Time just isn't what it used to be. It goes without typing that I have been neglecting this little corner of the interwebs for some time now. Silence has replaced the ramblings, and little has been offered in terms of engagement with other bloggers. So it has been, and so it goes. Yet I can hardly offer anything resembling an apology for such neglect. Over the last 12 months my personal life has never been richer or more intense. I have learned much and laughed more – which, most situations being considered, is justification enough for any such absence. I now know just how easy it can be to ignore ‘cyberspace’ in favor of the exquisite moments, challenges and pains afforded in meat-space. The Real intervenes in so many interesting and significant ways.

pre-fight Dec 2012

I won't bore readers with too much detail of what amounts to fairly conventional existence, but I will confess that in 2012 I radically altered my lifestyle and decreased the amount of paid employment I was involved with in order to reset and refocus on family, my own health and personal development. I began to work less, play more, and improved all of my significant relationships by changing how I expended my energies, and by completely reorganizing my diet and daily activities. This past year was indeed a major turning point in my life.

Among the many changes was, as many of you may know, a return to combat sports. In my early thirties I had moved away from high level training and competition as my vocation/career and family life evolved (see here for more detail). But in the past year I returned to full-time training in martial-arts and have competed and won a muay thai (มวยไทย) kickboxing championship and fought and won in front of large crowds at several local mixed martial-arts (MMA) events. At 37 years old I never could have imagined I would fight at such a high level again, let alone winning championships and garnering the attention of the sports community.

The decision to return to combat sports was without a doubt the major catalyst for so many other changes in my life: entailing a dramatic shift in my sleeping patterns, diet and the amount of exercise I engaged in – all of which has positively impacted my ability to be a husband, father, friend and citizen. The only major downside of this reprioritization has been a severe decrease in attention to more intellectual pursuits, including reading and writing blogs. Pretty much all I have been able to keep up with is twitter (which I do enjoy), and these interactions more often only lead to rather superficial exchanges on ideas and arguments. This low grade engagement with academics and theoreticians has been the most disappointing side-effect of my new lifestyle.

During this quasi-hiatus from all things philosophical/theoretic I have continued to read widely, and have been working in isolation to refine many of my thoughts on a variety of issues. Some of this new ‘work’ has led me in unexpected directions, much of which I hope to share on this site in the near future.

I also began reading more fiction (classics and notable contemporary novels, as well as a considerable amount of graphic novels and science fiction) as a way to ‘come down’ after particularly intense training sessions – which is something I almost never allowed myself the opportunity for prior to this past year. I had always preferred my fiction via film and 'serious' comics, but I am coming around to the reality that novels and invented worlds have as much to teach me as speculative theory or dry academic factoids.

All these confessions and banalities are simply to say that without further pomp or circumstance I intend to shift gears and return to regular blogging. At this point my intention is to just start posting again. I figure I don’t need to be overly meditative or precise with my blogging, but rather I just need to start writing and sharing stuff. So I’m not sure just how much substance the next few posts will have, or if they will only amount to short commentaries, or sharing resources, or become promissory notes to the many friends and acquaintances who I already owe responses. But my hope is if I can begin to develop the habit of posting regularly it will only be a matter of time before I post something worth talking about.