China is drawing up a blueprint for sweeping reforms aimed at averting an economic crisis, sources with close ties to the leadership say.

The reforms are aimed at revitalising the world's second-largest economy amid deepening fears about a trend of rising corruption, wasteful investment and local government debt.

Liu He, who leads the party's Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs, has been given the task of preparing a seven-point blueprint for the Third Plenum of the 18th Communist Party Congress, which is due in about October, according to a source with close ties to several members of the Politburo Standing Committee.

If Chinese leaders do choose the third plenum as the place to announce new reforms, it will be because it is pregnant with political symbolism: it was at another third plenum, in 1978, that Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China's market reforms, won consensus around the vision that set China on its course to becoming the world's second-largest economy.

Sometimes, history resonates with itself. In 1969, as the Communist Party was preparing for the Ninth Party Congress, Lin Biao put forward the view that the process of continuous revolution should be stopped, and the Party should turn its attention instead to ways to develop productivity. If Mao had been receptive to this idea, then maybe Lin Biao would have gone on to become the next Deng Xiaoping.

But the opposite occurred, because the suggestion angered Mao deeply, causing the rift between them. Fast forward to 1978, and the Third Plenum, where Deng Xiaoping thought the same thing, that the continuous process of revolution should be stopped, and that the whole Party should turn its attention to building a modern China. Luckily, Hua Guofeng wasn't Mao, and fortunately he accepted Deng's suggestion.

Hua and Deng agreed ahead of the Third Plenum that it would look forwards rather than backwards and avoid getting tangled up in "problems left over by history." (By this, they meant that it wouldn't concern itself with debating the issue of all the trumped-up or mistaken political charges against people.) They decided that what was needed was "unity to face the future."

As 2012 draws to a close, China has achieved its twin objectives: ensuring its second peaceful political transition since 1949 and piloting the economy to a soft landing. But what defined the year was the rise of one princeling and the fall of another. What they had in common were powerful political families that propelled their careers, yet the contrast of their eventual fates couldn't have been starker. Xi Jinping, snubbed for the Time "Person of the Year", captured the highest office in the most important developing country in the world. Bo Xilai, on the other hand, crashed and burned into an ignominious anonymity.

In mid-February, as then-Vice President Xi swung through Washington and Iowa so Americans could take stock of the presumed heir to the imperial Chinese throne, the Bo drama unraveled back home. A week earlier, Bo's close confidante and police chief Wang Lijun's attempted defection to the US consulate ricocheted from Chongqing to Beijing and quickly around the world. The rest, as they say, is history.

The Bo saga was perhaps the most sensational political crisis out of China since 1989. But unlike then, media had changed dramatically. Tiananmen Square protests arguably allowed a relatively young CNN to prove the viability and appeal of its 24-hour news cycle. More than two decades later, the Bo scandal demonstrated both social media's impact and deficiency, as a confusing mixture of uncorroborated rumors and facts spun a complex web of speculation and truth. For foreign journalists, however, this was a once-in-a-generation story that led to some of the best mainstream China coverage in my lifetime.

Ultimately, the downfall of one princeling did not lead to the sort of large scale instability that China has prevented for 23 years. But Bo's episode was perhaps one of the most significant cautionary tales for a Communist Party that has, in some regards, lost its way. It hit at two of the fundamental sources of the ruling party's staying power: its credibility and governance capacity. The party's proven record as competent steward of the economy shifted to whether it could regain the confidence of its own people and whether the exposure of corruption at the epitome of power means the party is still entitled to its governing mandate.

It is this political problem to which the victorious princeling must now shoulder and address. Indeed, Xi has already shown an awareness of the serious setback his party suffered. And such awareness has likely led to his recent articulations of a "Chinese Dream" and the adoption of China revival rhetoric soon after he entered office. The flurry of stylistic and behavior changes from the top is intended to re-brand the party and reestablish some semblance of "virtuous" leadership. Rhetoric, however, brings the particular risk of raising expectations and a deeper and more profound cycle of cynicism when those expectations are not met within a reasonable amount of time. Just ask the man of the year himself Barack Obama, who has dealt with bouts of optimism and disillusion.

But if campaigning is poetry and governing is prose, then now that Xi has "campaigned" in Guangdong, he must follow up with the prosaic execution of change. For the new Chinese administration, re-winning the hearts and minds of its own people will be the political exigency in 2013.

The "Great Unveiling" of the new Chinese leadership took place as expected on November 15, and the post-mortem judgment was virtually unanimous that the final line-up reflected a "conservative" leadership stacked with more sexagenarians than what many had hoped. And as such, hopes of fundamental reforms have been dashed for now (see here, here, and here). Although the conservative vs. reformer framework always struck me as a false dichotomy, I will leave the elaboration of that subject for another time. Instead, I think the conclusion of the party congress contained three surprises, and left many questions, that are worth pondering.

Surprise 1: Jiang Zemin's return. Even though "retired" President Jiang was reportedly terminally ill several years ago, he re-inserted himself vigorously into the personnel decisions at the 11th hour. The spritely 86-year-old hardly appeared like someone who had been on his death bed, charging around the Chinese capital with a mission. Indeed, at least three of the seven members on the 18th Politburo Standing Committee turned out to be Jiang's proteges, while outgoing President Hu Jintao was only able to get one true protege, Li Keqiang, into the ruling body.

I assume now that the transition is complete, Jiang will again fade into the shadows, having accomplished what was likely his political swan song. Jiang's high-profile outing, and his ostensible success in reprising his role as a powerful patron of top personnel, seem to reinforce the prevailing view that Hu has been a weak leader. Or at the very least, he wasn't as capable politically to maneuver around the institutional interests or Jiang's continued hold on aspects of political power to achieve his objectives. Some have even interpreted Hu's reign as merely riding the wave of policy dividends and economic inertia that Deng Xiaoping and then Jiang Zemin had already unleashed.

Surprise 2: The "Hu legacy." Speculation was rife that Hu would maintain his grip on the Chinese military just as Jiang did after he formally stepped down. Yet Hu ceded the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC) to new President Xi Jinping immediately, a move that took many by surprise.

One explanation for Hu simultaneously relinquishing his posts at the party and the military is that he had already stuffed the CMC with enough allies that he felt less compelled to stay. Yet this would contradict the "Hu is weak" argument if he had enough clout to influence PLA personnel decisions. Might Hu's unexpected action be a subtle revenge move against Jiang? That is, Hu's clean break can be viewed as an attempt to institutionalize the transition process, in direct contrast to Jiang's arbitrary interpretation of procedural norms and conventions by willfully extending his longevity in the seat of power and repeated interventions in personnel. In fact, as John Garnaut reports in the Sydney Morning Herald:

The security officials wanted to know about the origins of Ji [Pomin]'s animosity towards Jiang and Ji did not let them down. In Ji's view, Jiang had made China virtually ungovernable by refusing to cede full authority to his successor, Hu Jintao, in 2002.

He told me -- perhaps with some bravado -- he spent three hours lecturing his captors on how Jiang had derailed China's efforts to institutionalise its leadership successions and had paralysed China's political process, while they dutifully took notes.

Surprise 3: Xi's likeability. Xi's first outing as the new face of China was widely applauded as positive. Perhaps it was the baritone voice or the body language suggesting a man more comfortable in his own skin, I was struck by the positive reception to Xi both within China and among foreign observers who watched. To be fair, it didn't take much for Xi to exceed what were already abysmal expectations from a public accustomed to Hu's colorlessness for a decade. Xi didn't need soaring rhetoric to impress -- moving from a robot to a human was sufficiently distinctive. What's more, Xi's capable command of proper Mandarin, unlike Hu's Anhui-dialect laced Mandarin, did not escape notice among Chinese netizens -- many of whom are of the generation in which standard Mandarin became the social norm. Without even trying, Xi projected an image, by virtue of his Mandarin skills, of a politician who is cross-generational.

Yet there seemed to be more than simply the contrast between the new leader and the one of yesteryear that impressed the Chinese public. Many noticed that not only did Xi begin his inaugural speech with an apology for the leadership's tardiness (they were 45 minutes late arriving on stage), he also specifically thanked journalists for their hard work. Whether sincere or not, in an environment in which journalists and the Communist Party do not have the best of relationships -- since the latter relishes obstructing the work of the former -- Xi's comments was a kind gesture at the very least. Even more, his speech was not larded with turgid party-speak that usually obfuscates more than it clarifies -- the Deng Xiaoping theory, three represents, and scientific outlook development that Hu was so fond of never appeared in Xi's address. Chinese weibo users clearly noticed too. Courtesy of Helen Gao again, here's a particularly popular insta-assessment from a Chinese writer Yang Hengjun: 

杨恒均的微博: 评习总讲话：一，使用了一些不常在这种场合使用的语气词，亲切；二，一上来就说"让大家久等"，并抱歉，三，多次提到带领党与人民、中华民族，国家、共同富裕之路，一次提到"特色"，牛！四，讲话强调了从严治党。五，"人民"出现频率超高，远高于"党"。六，强调中外互相了解，并作为结束语。

Indeed, segments of his speech even echoed recognizable elements in a stump speech during a U.S. election, particularly as he ticked off what Chinese people want: education, stable job, good income, reliable social security, better health-care services ... and to have a better life for ourselves and our children. Nowhere was economic growth mentioned. Another Chinese netizen with the weibo handle "pretending to be in New York" agreed with Xi's characterization:

假装在纽约：其实大多数人没有太高的奢望，想要的不过是正常的生活----打车时车窗能正常摇开，上网时网站能正常打开，能正常买到菜刀不用实名登记，正常下馆子不用担心地沟油，正常买得起房子，能正常呼吸未被重污染的干净空气......今天听了一个还算正常的发言，于是有了一些正常的期待

In fact, when comparing Xi's speech from that of Hu 10 years ago (right column below), the annotated version above pointed out differences. Clearly, Xi had omitted virtually all theoretical jargon that appeared in the third paragraph of the Hu speech, instead refocusing on people and alluding to the party's internal problems.

(Story continues below)

 

Without a doubt, Xi's first public appearance instantaneously boosted his likeability -- that perennially important trait U.S. presidential aspirants assiduously develop. It is of course easy to dismiss all of this as style over substance. But I wouldn't underestimate just how much Xi's likeability will matter to his domestic constituency in terms of governance and how the image of China may change under the princeling president who one could conceivably have a beer with.

The conclusion of the party congress' opening ceremony and Hu Jintao's keynote speech is followed by days of breakout sessions among the provincial congresses and their delegates. Theoretically, it is a period during which every provincial delegate is supposed to studiously review Hu's speech and learn the key concepts. But in reality, these are occasions for schmoozing and to take stock of several rising stars in the Communist Party firmament, some of whom will soon earn the rarified status of a Politburo or standing committee member.

First, pre-congress speculation that the Communist Party is prepared to throw Mao Zedong under the bus seems to be just that -- speculation. Not only did Hu's speech invoke the Great Helmsman again, a high-level official at the influential state think tank Chinese Academy of Social Sciences did not mince words when he publicly stated that "Mao Zedong thought will always be the ideological guidance of the party. His place in history is firmly enshrined in the party's constitution." 

Mao may live on existentially, but the Chinese are more lost than ever on the path forward. Even Hu himself seems rather puzzled -- spouting the line, "we will neither walk down the close, rigid old path, nor will we change banners and walk down a crooked path" -- that either left many mocking it or scratching their heads. Call it triangulation Chinese style, which recalls Deng Xiaoping's formulation that the party can't move too far left or too far right, and must find its own middle way. It seemed a spirited defense of Deng's defining pragmatism that called for "crossing the river by grasping for stones," a reference that many Chinese Web users picked up. In short, Hu's position is that he has no position. After a decade in power, Hu merely repackages the ideas of the last century for a country that no longer resembles its former self. No wonder many Chinese bemoan the dearth of visionaries in China's political class -- Deng was China's Steve Jobs and Hu is his Tim Cook.

Beyond the art of wringing meaning out of indecipherable political language, the Guangdong provincial congress received more attention than others from Hong Kong and Western media. That's because everyone wanted to get impressions of Wang Yang, the party secretary of Guangdong who may or may not get the promotion into the standing committee. The secretary has captured unusual attention.

Wang is viewed as the newest torchbearer in a long list of Chinese reformers that includes Zhao Ziyang and Zhu Rongji -- both of whom governed crucial coastal provinces. And Wang himself is reputed to be more "Western" in his political personality, not least because he has let his hair grey naturally rather than suppress age with CCP-certified hair dye. Perhaps going grey is the preferred signal from one reformer to another on where they stand. Here is former Premier Zhu Rongji at the congress, evidently not shy about his silver locks:

Even Wang's style is reportedly straight-forward and frank. According to Malcolm Moore of Britain's The Telegraph, who had been live-tweeting the Guangdong delegate meeting, Wang had a sarcastic wit about him. When one effusive delegate proclaimed that he was so excited to be at the party congress, Wang quipped that perhaps it would help if he sat down. At times, Moore described Wang as outright bored as delegates droned on. Wang even effectively parried tough questions with a practiced fluency that suggests he's not the robotic automaton when it comes to press conferences. For instance, when a reporter from Japan's NHK asked him about Sino-Japan relations, he first dodged a direct answer by saying the foreign ministry has issued formal statements nearly every single day, and that should be referred to as the official position. Then he followed up with this:

The Chinese and Japanese people have a long history of friendship [...] for instance, Japan was influenced by Han culture and many friendly Japanese visitors came to China. And Sun Yat-sen, who is from Guangdong, received a lot of support from his Japanese friends during the most challenging times of his revolution. I believe, if the Japanese government can approach the Sino-Japan dispute in the right way, a return to Sino-Japan friendliness is well worth it.

This is a man who clearly understands that his province depends overwhelmingly on foreign investment, including Japanese auto manufacturing plants. His response was measured, while still subtly put the blame on the Japanese government to align with what the Beijing mandarins want to hear.

Wang represents a younger generation of Chinese politicians who are perhaps more comfortable in their own skin and less concerned about political orthodoxy and ideological rigidity. For Wang, it may simply be the Guangdong influence, which always seemed to have tilted closer to the "Hong Kong way" than the "Beijing way." Yet most of the younger cohort, including Wang, will likely have to wait their turn to reach the top of the political hierarchy.

A truck drives into a shipping container area at Qingdao port in Qingdao / Reuters

On justifying Beijing's decision to enter the WTO

Over the last few days, a number of cadres have expressed their concern on how we will protect ourselves in the WTO. And because some of you wanted to emphasize the gravity of the issue, there seems to be some exaggeration as well. Of course, taking the issue seriously is necessary. On the other hand, there has been far less concrete discussion on how WTO entry will benefit us. In other words, the discussion has primarily revolved around "defense", with little attention paid to "offense"--much more talk on how to adapt to the challenge rather than how to leverage it as an opportunity. This is why you are likely to conclude that with so much unanticipated trouble, was it worth it to join the WTO? If that was indeed the case, then we wouldn't have negotiated over this for 15 years.

We began in 1986, when we restored our status as party to GATT...In 1993, President Jiang Zemin launched official direct talks with President Clinton in Seattle, based on three principles. Last year (2001), we finally acceded to the WTO. This move is directly linked to our reform and opening up process and the growing strength of our economy. During the 1980s, our economy was still relatively weak and lacked a solid regulatory framework. Under those conditions, we would have incurred losses if we joined GATT...Over the next 15 years, we increasingly recognized the importance and necessity of entering the WTO. This is because opening up to foreign investment and trade and cooperation are more and more important to our economic development. Right now, export performance has a huge impact on the national economy. If exporters were to decline by 10% in a year, it would lead to a reduction in GDP growth of 2 percentage points. Moreover, if we don't join the WTO, we would have no recourse against other countries' trade sanctions or discrimination. After we've joined, China must be given "most favored nation" status. Once we have MFN status, it gives us equal treatment as other countries. At the same time, we can use WTO mechanisms to resolve trade disputes and sue other countries. We may not win every time, but at least we have a place to bring cases.

Something that left a deep impression on me was last year's trade battles over agricultural exports to Japan. At the time, we weren't in the WTO yet. Japan first dramatically raised import tariffs on Chinese onion and mushroom exports. That made it impossible for our exporters, and Shandong farmers were watching their onions rot in their fields. We felt the Japanese action violated WTO rules, and so we reciprocated by slapping tariffs on imports of Japanese cars, mobile phones, and air conditioners. Our onions weren't worth a lot of money, but their cars were much more valuable. We negotiated over this issue 19 times, and we would not back down. Ultimately, Japan finally abolished their tariffs. Once they cancelled, we slashed ours too. If they didn't, we wouldn't have removed ours either. And so, after entering the WTO, we're no longer easy to bully around. Not only have we always been tough to manipulate on the political front, now no one can bully us on the economic front...So what we should be saying is that WTO entry has put us in a position of proactive "offense" rather than the usual reactive "defense" posture...If it's merely all sorts of trouble after WTO entry, then why bother with it in the first place? Why not just seal ourselves off just like before, to protect us. This way we can certainly protect ourselves, but it also means we cannot develop. If much of our system does not undergo appropriate reforms, then we cannot adapt to the globalization wave; our industry will forever be "iron rice bowls" that are protected by the state and cannot compete globally...

On bilateral maneuvering with Russia under WTO

...We have to take advantage of the WTO opportunity to advance our "go out" strategy and expand our exports. I saw a recent report from the Ministry of Foreign Trade that argued that because Russia's economy was drastically weakened by the Asian Financial Crisis, it had a negative attitude on acceding to the WTO. And thirty-two countries have already proposed to engage in bilateral discussion with the Russians on WTO accession. Russia is a large potential market for us, so the relevant agencies must be prepared to begin bilateral talks with Moscow to secure provisions in our interests. We have to research the Russian market and market entry strategies. When I visited Moscow, I spoke at the embassy and used the slogan "March toward Russia". Because Russia's market is not liberalized, our exports are very attractive to them. Normal China-Russian trade is about $10 billion, not insubstantial. But outside of "normal" trade, there is a lot of border trade and nebulous trade activities that are probably worth another $10 billion, totaling $20 billion. This kind of profiteering trade along borders can be beneficial for those Russian residents who live along the border. But a number of products are shoddy, ruining our reputation...

...Trade with Russia is very much in our interest, and there should be no worry that it can't pay for the exports. Although it doesn't have large volumes of forex reserves--perhaps about $38 billion--Russia has oil, timber, all the commodities we lack. Our West-East pipeline has a distance issue, our northeast oil resources will gradually be depleted, and importing Middle East oil requires a long and arduous sea journey. We need to consider our long-term oil reserves and supplies, perhaps from Russia and Kazakhstan. Our policy to conserve domestic forestry is predicated on  receiving reliable supplies from Russia and Southeast Asia. Or else how can we possibly meet domestic timber demand?...

On spreading the risks of an export model

From a long-term perspective, we must not put all our eggs in one basket, tying our fate to the US and EU markets. Right now the US, EU, and Japan represent a disproportionate amount of our exports, a serious problem down the line. Last year our bilateral deficit with the US was $83 billion according to the Americans, but only $28 billion according to our own calculations. If you include processing trade, the figure may rise to $50 billion. With Japan, we only have a $2 billion deficit and a $5-$8 billion deficit with the EU. We have a trade surplus of $22 billion with Taiwan and another several billions in surplus with Southeast Asia. Last year we had $11 billion trade surplus with South Korea, as we imported large volumes of their cars, steel products, machinery, and chemical products. We also have deficits with Latin America and Africa, since they don't sell much to us. If we do not open new markets, and only rely on the US and EU, it will prove to be very dangerous...

On tapping the Indian market and protectionism

I visited India this year as well and sent another message of "marching toward the Indian market". India is clearly a huge market with 1 billion people, but really is quite poor. They don't seem to understand China and were under the impression that we are as poor as them. During an enterprise conference in Mumbai, one of the businessman said "I find it very strange that when I visited China just a few years ago, your mobile phone and fixed line phone subscribers didn't even hit 100 million. I can't believe you are developing so rapidly right now." I replied that China already has 350 million subscribers, surpassing the United States! Our consumer white goods and textiles should find much appeal in the Indian market. 

However, there's a strong sense of protectionism in India. For instance, the vehicle that picked me up at the airport was an Indian-made "Beatle", which was incredibly cramped for two people. I didn't think India was that poor! That's just the way they are, only use domestically made cars in India, high degree of protectionism...On the latest trip to India, I had my colleagues conduct an informal market survey. They found that consumer appliances like TVs, air conditioners, and refrigerators are about 3-5 times more expensive than our exports of the same products. So we certainly have a cost advantage. They can protect themselves, but we can also find a way to break into their market. Bangalore is known as the "Indian Silicon Valley," so when I went there I told the official, we will provide you with all the necessary parts for consumer appliances and you just need to assemble it in a factory here. We will set up a 50-50 JV, and the products you assemble with our parts will sell for 50%-66% cheaper. That way, Indian consumers can afford to buy the products, it will improve their lives and increase job creation. The Indian official replied that it was a great solution. 

On systemic reforms to take advantage of new markets

To enter markets like Russia, India, and others, we must usher in systemic and regulatory change and encourage private sector participation. A number of private enterprises are extremely nimble and risk tolerant. Huawei is one of those companies. It has advance technologies, decent scale, and already has operations in both India and Russia. A group of risk takers is exactly what we need to dive deeply into those markets. Recently, our ambassador in Afghanistan reported that he's receiving numerous calls and inquiries about whether it's possible to do business in the country. Whether the country is stable and safe. The relevant agencies should be facilitating this "go out" process to encourage these companies. Last year, we decided to build a trade center in Moscow to showcase China. In the trade center, there are distributors, retailers, product displays, and all sorts of consulting services, making Chinese businesses operate more efficiently in Russia. In terms of India, we need to strive for a solution to break down their protectionism and sell in that market. 

A perplexing problem now is that many of our companies lack strategic foresight. They are myopic and are content with making a quick buck, which only taints China's reputation. The relevant departments should not only continue to ensure the quality of products, but also persuade these entrepreneurs to settle on a long-term vision. Without a brand and after-sale services, it is impossible to become dominant in a market. So after joining the WTO, we should use our position to compete in the global market and expand market share, this is the fundamental purpose of acceding to the WTO...

...I hope after this session is over, everyone should not merely examine how to protect ourselves, but more importantly, should research how to "go out", quickly familiarize with the "rules of the game", study other countries' laws, and take various actions to "go out". The "go out" strategy should first and foremost rely on product quality and cannot depend solely on cost...The thing that worries me the most isn't our ability to compete or volatility in our economy but rather our product quality. Many of our companies have not made "quality" their lifeline, but continue to rely on price and volume to compete. If this mentality is perpetuated, then our country has no future.

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Brash, chain-smoking, and attitude-laden, Liu the entrepreneur has got all the instantly recognizable characteristics of the "every street vendor" who hawks his wares in Beijing. But he is a risk-taker. Having uprooted his family and purchased several plots of farmland, he has tied his family's fate to Zambia. Clearly relishing the freedom that comes with being his own boss, he waxes about capitalist enterprise and free competition -- with an indiscernable Chinese dialect -- at the local chicken market in a monologue that would make Milton Friedman giddy with pride. 

An unapologetically capitalist Chinese farmer planting his roots in Zambia is not the western press' usual image of Chinese machinery constructing stadiums and roads in a nameless African country. That's where Mr. Li the project manager comes in, a man who puts the call of duty above virtually all else. His family in Zambia consists of two cats and his Chinese work crew. He deflects loneliness by consuming himself in the road project. The road, literally and metaphorically, is the path toward development, according to Mr. Li, who seems to earnestly believe it. Infrastructure will integrate markets and bring prosperity to impoverished towns -- that's how China did it, and so can Zambia. The local Zambian official seems to agree with that assessment and invites the "light-skinned brother" to meet President Sata. 

When China Met Africa is one of the few documentaries without voiceover commentary. The directors explained, "It was important that the film had no commentary because we wanted the audience to have the opportunity to interpret this story for themselves. This would be the first time western audiences would see grassroots interaction of China and Africa in this way." Indeed, the characters' own voices effectively and effortlessly carry the film. And the emphasis on individuals and individual agency is a hallmark of the filmmakers, whose other credits include Black Gold and Kurdish Blogger.      

The Francis brothers, whose own educational pedigrees are well suited for this film, also manage to send a political message without politicizing -- no easy feat. Other than the opening scene of President Hu Jintao hosting China's largest Africa summit in 2006, the politics of this sometimes uneasy relationship hardly surface in the film. The exceptions are when Minister Mutati speaks, for example when he compares western companies to the Chinese:

When I sit with investors from the Western world they do a PowerPoint presentation about projections, cash-flows, profit and loss accounts, income statements, balance sheets, risk assessments and all these flamboyant graphs. I've never seen those with the Chinese. They probably do them on their own, but when they come here, they just ask me what are the incentives? Where is a piece of land where we should go and begin to work?

Laoxushiping: Watching the 18th PC live on TV, and seeing so many energetic-looking leaders with sleek, dark hair sitting on the stage strategizing China's future, how could I not be confident?

Cangxindege: Using imported hair product, consuming special food and breathing filtered air, they are elite human beings indeed! I am absolutely confident.

Now that the U.S. election is behind us, time to turn to the next most important political transition in years: the Chinese Communist Party's 18th Congress. Seventeen congresses have gone by and hardly anyone has paid much attention, including most Chinese themselves. This time is a little different.

Socialism with Chinese characteristics is the banner of contemporary China's progress, and is also the banner under which a united Communist Party and nation strive for. We must unwaveringly maintain socialism with Chinese characteristics, based on the important thought guidance of Deng Xiaoping theory and Three Represents and the thorough implementation of the Scientific Development Concept. We must firmly grasp our work and the urgency of execution, so that over the next five years, we can decisively plant the foundations for realizing our objective of comprehensively building a moderately well-off society by 2020; and that by mid-century, we will have fully achieved socialist modernization. 

We must unwaveringly walk the correct path that has long been paved by the Communist Party and Chinese people through practical experience, no matter the fear of risks and no matter the temptation to stray. Thought liberalization remains the ultimate powerful intellectual weapon that promotes the party's and the people's unfinished enterprise. Reform and opening up has always been, and continues to be, the powerful driving force for the development of the party and Chinese people. We must unwaveringly push forward reform and opening up, never becoming rigid, never stagnant. Unite all strength that can be united, muster all positive factors that can be mustered, and brim with confidence to overcome all challenges and risks in the road ahead. 

May Confucius bless you, and bless the People's Republic of China. 

Now that the U.S. election is behind us, time to turn to the next most important political transition in years: the Chinese Communist Party's 18th Congress. Seventeen congresses have gone by and hardly anyone has paid much attention, including most Chinese themselves. This time is a little different.

Socialism with Chinese characteristics is the banner of contemporary China's progress, and is also the banner under which a united Communist Party and nation strive for. We must unwaveringly maintain socialism with Chinese characteristics, based on the important thought guidance of Deng Xiaoping theory and Three Represents and the thorough implementation of the Scientific Development Concept. We must firmly grasp our work and the urgency of execution, so that over the next five years, we can decisively plant the foundations for realizing our objective of comprehensively building a moderately well-off society by 2020; and that by mid-century, we will have fully achieved socialist modernization. 

We must unwaveringly walk the correct path that has long been paved by the Communist Party and Chinese people through practical experience, no matter the fear of risks and no matter the temptation to stray. Thought liberalization remains the ultimate powerful intellectual weapon that promotes the party's and the people's unfinished enterprise. Reform and opening up has always been, and continues to be, the powerful driving force for the development of the party and Chinese people. We must unwaveringly push forward reform and opening up, never becoming rigid, never stagnant. Unite all strength that can be united, muster all positive factors that can be mustered, and brim with confidence to overcome all challenges and risks in the road ahead. 

May Confucius bless you, and bless the People's Republic of China. 

Although the worst of tensions between China and Japan seem to be behind us for now, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands fracas continues to rock the two countries' relations with no easy solution in sight. I happened to be in Beijing for a conference during that mid-September week in which protests and violence across China crescendoed (surprisingly, the Chinese hosts did not cancel the meetings), and the ugliness of Chinese nationalism was on full display. It was the week that included September 18, an infamous date seared into most Chinese memories as the day that Japan invaded Manchuria 81 years ago. To be frank, as the date approached, I had some personal trepidations because I am often mistaken for Japanese in China.

But the dramatic few days of nationalistic outbursts gave way to calmer temperaments with a sort of efficiency that led many to believe the government orchestrated the protests. I'd quibble with that characterization because much of the nationalism, even if it wasn't manifested violently, was genuine and potentially dangerous. In retrospect, I thought sharing several pictures and stories, including a bizarre incident that involved me personally, can provide a fuller range of Chinese nationalism.

An ostensible Chinese flag decal is slapped over the Toyota logo, even though the car was manufactured in southern China. But what struck me was the large bumper sticker with white characters stretched across the bumper. It says: "The owner of this vehicle bought it before Japan's base crimes. But from now on, will boycott Japanese products!" In other words, this was a plea to not smash his car by appealing to righteous patriotism -- we can protest the Japanese but still protect our property! Such pragmatic patriotism was common among the Chinese middle class, many of whom were unnerved by scenes of store burnings and topsy turvy Japanese cars in the street. By then, even the official CCTV has changed its tune. In virtually every newscast I saw, the message was uniformly "rational patriotism" (理性的爱国), a clear reflection of the fear at the top that these demonstrations may spin out of control.

In one instance, it did almost spiral out of control, when anti-Japanese sentiment was momentarily redirected to the United States. The now well-known incident of a protest mob attacking Ambassador Gary Locke's car as it was pulling out of the embassy (see video below):

Although the worst of tensions between China and Japan seem to be behind us for now, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands fracas continues to rock the two countries' relations with no easy solution in sight. I happened to be in Beijing for a conference during that mid-September week in which protests and violence across China crescendoed (surprisingly, the Chinese hosts did not cancel the meetings), and the ugliness of Chinese nationalism was on full display. It was the week that included September 18, an infamous date seared into most Chinese memories as the day that Japan invaded Manchuria 81 years ago. To be frank, as the date approached, I had some personal trepidations because I am often mistaken for Japanese in China.

But the dramatic few days of nationalistic outbursts gave way to calmer temperaments with a sort of efficiency that led many to believe the government orchestrated the protests. I'd quibble with that characterization because much of the nationalism, even if it wasn't manifested violently, was genuine and potentially dangerous. In retrospect, I thought sharing several pictures and stories, including a bizarre incident that involved me personally, can provide a fuller range of Chinese nationalism.

An ostensible Chinese flag decal is slapped over the Toyota logo, even though the car was manufactured in southern China. But what struck me was the large bumper sticker with white characters stretched across the bumper. It says: "The owner of this vehicle bought it before Japan's base crimes. But from now on, will boycott Japanese products!" In other words, this was a plea to not smash his car by appealing to righteous patriotism -- we can protest the Japanese but still protect our property! Such pragmatic patriotism was common among the Chinese middle class, many of whom were unnerved by scenes of store burnings and topsy turvy Japanese cars in the street. By then, even the official CCTV has changed its tune. In virtually every newscast I saw, the message was uniformly "rational patriotism" (理性的爱国), a clear reflection of the fear at the top that these demonstrations may spin out of control.

In one instance, it did almost spiral out of control, when anti-Japanese sentiment was momentarily redirected to the United States. The now well-known incident of a protest mob attacking Ambassador Gary Locke's car as it was pulling out of the embassy (see video below):

Although the worst of tensions between China and Japan seem to be behind us for now, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands fracas continues to rock the two countries' relations with no easy solution in sight. I happened to be in Beijing for a conference during that mid-September week in which protests and violence across China crescendoed (surprisingly, the Chinese hosts did not cancel the meetings), and the ugliness of Chinese nationalism was on full display. It was the week that included September 18, an infamous date seared into most Chinese memories as the day that Japan invaded Manchuria 81 years ago. To be frank, as the date approached, I had some personal trepidations because I am often mistaken for Japanese in China.

But the dramatic few days of nationalistic outbursts gave way to calmer temperaments with a sort of efficiency that led many to believe the government orchestrated the protests. I'd quibble with that characterization because much of the nationalism, even if it wasn't manifested violently, was genuine and potentially dangerous. In retrospect, I thought sharing several pictures and stories, including a bizarre incident that involved me personally, can provide a fuller range of Chinese nationalism.

An ostensible Chinese flag decal is slapped over the Toyota logo, even though the car was manufactured in southern China. But what struck me was the large bumper sticker with white characters stretched across the bumper. It says: "The owner of this vehicle bought it before Japan's base crimes. But from now on, will boycott Japanese products!" In other words, this was a plea to not smash his car by appealing to righteous patriotism -- we can protest the Japanese but still protect our property! Such pragmatic patriotism was common among the Chinese middle class, many of whom were unnerved by scenes of store burnings and topsy turvy Japanese cars in the street. By then, even the official CCTV has changed its tune. In virtually every newscast I saw, the message was uniformly "rational patriotism" (理性的爱国), a clear reflection of the fear at the top that these demonstrations may spin out of control.

In one instance, it did almost spiral out of control, when anti-Japanese sentiment was momentarily redirected to the United States. The now well-known incident of a protest mob attacking Ambassador Gary Locke's car as it was pulling out of the embassy (see video below):

Now that the London Olympics have come to a close, it is time to reflect on another aspect of China's role in the games. No, not the medals that Chinese athletes hauled home (second place in the world with 88, a lucky number!), nor the potential U.S.-China rivalry at the games. Let's instead reflect on how the China that never even got close to the games is the one that London could not have functioned without.

Yes, I'm talking about China's manufacturing sector. That's the part of China that apparently inspired populist outrage among some members of Congress over U.S. Olympian uniforms that were made in China. It was a rare occasion in which Democrats found common-ground with Fox News on manufactured patriotism. Or if you're Peter Navarro, you'd probably just call it "Death By China." Far from death by a thousand Chinese widgets, it turns out the London Olympiad would've barely survived without them -- it wouldn't have had fireworks, the soccer field would've been incomplete, and referees would've had to officiate in their underwear. Courtesy of the fantastic Ministry of Tofu, via Sina, here's an infographic compilation of what Chinese products made their way to London:

Now that the London Olympics have come to a close, it is time to reflect on another aspect of China's role in the games. No, not the medals that Chinese athletes hauled home (second place in the world with 88, a lucky number!), nor the potential U.S.-China rivalry at the games. Let's instead reflect on how the China that never even got close to the games is the one that London could not have functioned without.

Yes, I'm talking about China's manufacturing sector. That's the part of China that apparently inspired populist outrage among some members of Congress over U.S. Olympian uniforms that were made in China. It was a rare occasion in which Democrats found common-ground with Fox News on manufactured patriotism. Or if you're Peter Navarro, you'd probably just call it "Death By China." Far from death by a thousand Chinese widgets, it turns out the London Olympiad would've barely survived without them -- it wouldn't have had fireworks, the soccer field would've been incomplete, and referees would've had to officiate in their underwear. Courtesy of the fantastic Ministry of Tofu, via Sina, here's an infographic compilation of what Chinese products made their way to London:

Energy security is a big concern for both the United States and China, though the latter typically sees it as a supply side issue: secure as much as possible to fill what it sees as endless future demand. For the U.S., having tied much of its energy fate to the Middle East for the last several decades, energy security meant building robust military capabilities to defend its interests and maintain open sea lanes for trade. The Chinese, of course, also depended on the U.S. provision of security as its energy imports from the Arab world expanded dramatically.

But the prevailing dynamic is changing rapidly, and it seems to be unnerving Beijing. Here is why (h/t to Alexis Madrigal's post):




This graphic, from the latest Energy Information Administration (EIA) report, shows the tremendous growth of natural gas in U.S. electricity generation. This has come at the expense of coal and oil-fired power. Natural gas consumption has increased since about 2005, as petroleum declined from a historic high of over 20 percent to nearly zero percent of generating electricity. Oil is being written out of power generation. The EIA provides this explanation:

Beginning in 2005, natural gas production from domestic shale gas formations began to rapidly increase, which has led to a relatively sustained period of low natural gas prices. Natural gas spot prices at the Henry Hub averaged $7.70 per million Btu during the first quarter of 2006. After a brief spike in 2008, natural gas prices quickly tumbled to a low of about $3.20 per million Btu by the third quarter of 2009. In 2010, prices averaged a little more than $4.00 per million Btu. A continued decline in natural gas prices during 2011 and the early part of 2012 has further encouraged power plant operators to use combined‐cycle units to fulfill baseload power demand, displacing some coal generation. Between 2005 and 2010, the average capacity factor for natural gas combined‐cycle units running during off‐peak hours (between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.) rose from 26 percent to 32 percent (EIA, 2011). 

We understand that the United States' presence and influence in the Middle East is a key factor behind that region's stability, but China is the single greatest purchaser of Middle Eastern oil. The major reason that the United States is seeking energy self-sufficiency is its desire to reduce or even end imports of Middle Eastern oil...

...Nor do we wish to see the United States completely withdraw from the Middle East. We really don't want to see the Americans "transform" the Middle East or allow the region to fall into disorder once they are no longer reliant upon its petroleum. China has but little influence on the Middle East and even less power to control the region, but we need its oil, and we need a stable Middle East.

The discoveries of American shale gas, Canadian oil sand and Brazilian oil beneath salt beds has made the Americas into the "new Middle East" of the 21st century. In the foreseeable future, it is entirely possible for North and South America to become energy self-sufficient. In other words, the Middle East will no longer be an indispensable source of oil to the United States...  

Energy security is a big concern for both the United States and China, though the latter typically sees it as a supply side issue: secure as much as possible to fill what it sees as endless future demand. For the U.S., having tied much of its energy fate to the Middle East for the last several decades, energy security meant building robust military capabilities to defend its interests and maintain open sea lanes for trade. The Chinese, of course, also depended on the U.S. provision of security as its energy imports from the Arab world expanded dramatically.

But the prevailing dynamic is changing rapidly, and it seems to be unnerving Beijing. Here is why (h/t to Alexis Madrigal's post):




This graphic, from the latest Energy Information Administration (EIA) report, shows the tremendous growth of natural gas in U.S. electricity generation. This has come at the expense of coal and oil-fired power. Natural gas consumption has increased since about 2005, as petroleum declined from a historic high of over 20 percent to nearly zero percent of generating electricity. Oil is being written out of power generation. The EIA provides this explanation:

Beginning in 2005, natural gas production from domestic shale gas formations began to rapidly increase, which has led to a relatively sustained period of low natural gas prices. Natural gas spot prices at the Henry Hub averaged $7.70 per million Btu during the first quarter of 2006. After a brief spike in 2008, natural gas prices quickly tumbled to a low of about $3.20 per million Btu by the third quarter of 2009. In 2010, prices averaged a little more than $4.00 per million Btu. A continued decline in natural gas prices during 2011 and the early part of 2012 has further encouraged power plant operators to use combined‐cycle units to fulfill baseload power demand, displacing some coal generation. Between 2005 and 2010, the average capacity factor for natural gas combined‐cycle units running during off‐peak hours (between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.) rose from 26 percent to 32 percent (EIA, 2011). 

We understand that the United States' presence and influence in the Middle East is a key factor behind that region's stability, but China is the single greatest purchaser of Middle Eastern oil. The major reason that the United States is seeking energy self-sufficiency is its desire to reduce or even end imports of Middle Eastern oil...

...Nor do we wish to see the United States completely withdraw from the Middle East. We really don't want to see the Americans "transform" the Middle East or allow the region to fall into disorder once they are no longer reliant upon its petroleum. China has but little influence on the Middle East and even less power to control the region, but we need its oil, and we need a stable Middle East.

The discoveries of American shale gas, Canadian oil sand and Brazilian oil beneath salt beds has made the Americas into the "new Middle East" of the 21st century. In the foreseeable future, it is entirely possible for North and South America to become energy self-sufficient. In other words, the Middle East will no longer be an indispensable source of oil to the United States...  

Energy security is a big concern for both the United States and China, though the latter typically sees it as a supply side issue: secure as much as possible to fill what it sees as endless future demand. For the U.S., having tied much of its energy fate to the Middle East for the last several decades, energy security meant building robust military capabilities to defend its interests and maintain open sea lanes for trade. The Chinese, of course, also depended on the U.S. provision of security as its energy imports from the Arab world expanded dramatically.

But the prevailing dynamic is changing rapidly, and it seems to be unnerving Beijing. Here is why (h/t to Alexis Madrigal's post):




This graphic, from the latest Energy Information Administration (EIA) report, shows the tremendous growth of natural gas in U.S. electricity generation. This has come at the expense of coal and oil-fired power. Natural gas consumption has increased since about 2005, as petroleum declined from a historic high of over 20 percent to nearly zero percent of generating electricity. Oil is being written out of power generation. The EIA provides this explanation:

Beginning in 2005, natural gas production from domestic shale gas formations began to rapidly increase, which has led to a relatively sustained period of low natural gas prices. Natural gas spot prices at the Henry Hub averaged $7.70 per million Btu during the first quarter of 2006. After a brief spike in 2008, natural gas prices quickly tumbled to a low of about $3.20 per million Btu by the third quarter of 2009. In 2010, prices averaged a little more than $4.00 per million Btu. A continued decline in natural gas prices during 2011 and the early part of 2012 has further encouraged power plant operators to use combined‐cycle units to fulfill baseload power demand, displacing some coal generation. Between 2005 and 2010, the average capacity factor for natural gas combined‐cycle units running during off‐peak hours (between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.) rose from 26 percent to 32 percent (EIA, 2011). 

We understand that the United States' presence and influence in the Middle East is a key factor behind that region's stability, but China is the single greatest purchaser of Middle Eastern oil. The major reason that the United States is seeking energy self-sufficiency is its desire to reduce or even end imports of Middle Eastern oil...

...Nor do we wish to see the United States completely withdraw from the Middle East. We really don't want to see the Americans "transform" the Middle East or allow the region to fall into disorder once they are no longer reliant upon its petroleum. China has but little influence on the Middle East and even less power to control the region, but we need its oil, and we need a stable Middle East.

The discoveries of American shale gas, Canadian oil sand and Brazilian oil beneath salt beds has made the Americas into the "new Middle East" of the 21st century. In the foreseeable future, it is entirely possible for North and South America to become energy self-sufficient. In other words, the Middle East will no longer be an indispensable source of oil to the United States...  

Perception matters in international diplomacy, and even more so for the U.S.-China relationship. There are vast differences in political systems and institutions, social norms, historical and cultural legacies, and the ever-present information asymmetry. Mutual perceptions can get easily skewed, with real repercussions for policy. Though the U.S.-China relationship has proven surprisingly resilient, it is also colored by an unspoken unease, especially among elites in both countries. A recent paper from Ken Lieberthal of Brookings and Wang Jisi of Beijing University finds mutual distrust of long-term intentions, which they argue has serious and worsening implications. Some of that distrust is surely a result of perceptual dissonance, which can be reinforced and perpetuated over time through, for examples, domestic media, personal anecdotes, or bad experiences during visits.

Several polls have gauged American and Chinese attitudes recently, the latest from the Committee of 100, which has conducted such a survey since 1994. It's long and detailed, so here are a few key excerpts a few of the findings:

• American policy toward china: The American public believes the U.S. accepts China's status as a rising power and wants a collaborative relationship by a widening 3 to 1 margin in contrast to 2 to 1 in 2007. American elites concur by an even wider margin. The Chinese public by a 2 to 1 margin believes the US is trying to prevent China from becoming a great power. Chinese elites, divided on this issue, are leaning more toward Chinese public perceptions.

• U.S.-China relations trends: Almost half of the American public and elites believe there is no change in U.S.-China relations. The remaining half is divided almost evenly between improved and worse relations. Half of the Chinese public is unsure or believes there is no change, with the other half also evenly split between improving and getting worse. Although more Chinese elites tend to believe relations are improving, the proportion of Chinese elites who perceive worsening U.S.-China relations rose from 3% to 22%, compared to 2007.
• Who to blame for worsening relations: Half of the American public who see worsening relations blames the U.S. government. Half of the American elites fault the Chinese government. Two out of three Chinese public attribute worsening relations to the U.S. government. Half of Chinese business leaders blame the U.S. government, while half of Chinese opinion leaders blame both governments.

One stat that struck me was the gap between Chinese elites' opinion of the U.S. and that of the Chinese public (see below). About 94 percent of Chinese opinion leaders hold favorable view of U.S., compared to just 60 percent among the general public.

My first thought was that perhaps stronger nationalism among the Chinese public could explain the discrepancy. One of the heads of the survey project, Frank Wu, who's also chancellor and dean of the University of California Hastings Law School, agreed that nationalism is a good explanatory factor, also citing Chinese opinion leaders' higher degrees of exposure to the United States. Another co-chair of the survey, Jeremy Wu, a statistician at George Washington University, provided another thought:

The Chinese opinion leaders are more dominant in male representation than the general public (65% vs 51%), have more education (95% vs 7% college graduates or higher), are less religious (88% vs 74% with no religious beliefs), differ in occupations (selected university and research experts, journalists and editors, non-governmental organizations, and professionals vs all occupations), differ in location (3 major cities in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou vs almost entire China), have more Communist Party members (44% vs 5% party members), and have higher monthly income. Although nationalism may be a factor, the observed differences in opinion are more likely due to these differences in demographics.

The survey also found that 55 percent of Americans hold favorable impressions of China. This figure is much higher than in either the Gallup poll or the ABC News/WashPost poll conducted earlier in 2012. Those showed 42 and 37 percent favorable opinions of China, respectively. Particularly interesting is the time series data from the ABC poll, showing that American public opinion of China stood at a high of 80 percent in spring of 1989, just before the Tienanmen Square episode, plummeting to 39 percent a year later. Curiously, the latest 37 percent favorability rating is even lower than during Tiananmen.    





So why the wide gap in American public impressions of China across the surveys? Methodological and sampling differences is one obvious explanation. Jeremy Wu offers another:

Due to the differences in random sampling, questions, timing, and other non-sampling factors, these four surveys may not be directly comparable. For example, the Gallup question appears to deviate from the C100, Pew, and ABC/WP questions. The C100, Pew, and ABC/WP questions are similar; Pew has a much higher (20%) unexplained response compared to 8% in C100. The ABC/Washington Post Poll has the following comment in its report:

"While challenges in the relationship are significant, there's a chance that a generational change could be in the offing: Young adults, age 18-29, hold far more positive views of China, rating it favorably rather than unfavorably by a 2-1 margin. Among their elders, that's reversed."

Since all 4 surveys cover cell phone users who tend to be younger than the general population, it is likely that some of the variation may be attributed to the weighting approach used. This is an area that none of the 4 surveys have provided a sufficiently clear and transparent explanation for objective analysis. If some clarity about the weighting methods can be provided and analyzed, we may have a much better understanding in comparing the survey results.

Finally, although the White House's China policy over the last several administrations has reflected a basic bipartisan consensus, the ABC survey results indicate that opinions of China seem ideologically partisan. Those identifying as Republicans appear to have a far less favorable opinion of China than do Democrats. And a much higher percentage of self-identified Republicans/conservatives hold a negative opinion of China. Ironically, this seems at odds with the oft-cited (though hardly proven) notion that the Chinese prefer Republican administrations.   

   


What to make of all of this? A simple and preliminary conclusion is that Americans and Chinese, in general, view each other somewhere along the spectrum between friend and foe. Even as both seek greater collaboration, they also seem discomfited by one other. If we average the favorability ratings across the three surveys, then less than half of Americans have favorable impressions of China.  

Is this attributable to the rise of China as a decisive new challenger to the United States? Or the sense that China is "stealing" American jobs and bending the rules of commerce? Or that China continues to spurn democracy and human rights after decades of economic liberalization? I don't have the answers, but it's important that they're found. If we want to sustain and improve one of the most important bilateral relationships in the 21st century, first we've got to understand one another.

Perception matters in international diplomacy, and even more so for the U.S.-China relationship. There are vast differences in political systems and institutions, social norms, historical and cultural legacies, and the ever-present information asymmetry. Mutual perceptions can get easily skewed, with real repercussions for policy. Though the U.S.-China relationship has proven surprisingly resilient, it is also colored by an unspoken unease, especially among elites in both countries. A recent paper from Ken Lieberthal of Brookings and Wang Jisi of Beijing University finds mutual distrust of long-term intentions, which they argue has serious and worsening implications. Some of that distrust is surely a result of perceptual dissonance, which can be reinforced and perpetuated over time through, for examples, domestic media, personal anecdotes, or bad experiences during visits.

Several polls have gauged American and Chinese attitudes recently, the latest from the Committee of 100, which has conducted such a survey since 1994. It's long and detailed, so here are a few key excerpts a few of the findings:

• American policy toward china: The American public believes the U.S. accepts China's status as a rising power and wants a collaborative relationship by a widening 3 to 1 margin in contrast to 2 to 1 in 2007. American elites concur by an even wider margin. The Chinese public by a 2 to 1 margin believes the US is trying to prevent China from becoming a great power. Chinese elites, divided on this issue, are leaning more toward Chinese public perceptions.

• U.S.-China relations trends: Almost half of the American public and elites believe there is no change in U.S.-China relations. The remaining half is divided almost evenly between improved and worse relations. Half of the Chinese public is unsure or believes there is no change, with the other half also evenly split between improving and getting worse. Although more Chinese elites tend to believe relations are improving, the proportion of Chinese elites who perceive worsening U.S.-China relations rose from 3% to 22%, compared to 2007.
• Who to blame for worsening relations: Half of the American public who see worsening relations blames the U.S. government. Half of the American elites fault the Chinese government. Two out of three Chinese public attribute worsening relations to the U.S. government. Half of Chinese business leaders blame the U.S. government, while half of Chinese opinion leaders blame both governments.

One stat that struck me was the gap between Chinese elites' opinion of the U.S. and that of the Chinese public (see below). About 94 percent of Chinese opinion leaders hold favorable view of U.S., compared to just 60 percent among the general public.

My first thought was that perhaps stronger nationalism among the Chinese public could explain the discrepancy. One of the heads of the survey project, Frank Wu, who's also chancellor and dean of the University of California Hastings Law School, agreed that nationalism is a good explanatory factor, also citing Chinese opinion leaders' higher degrees of exposure to the United States. Another co-chair of the survey, Jeremy Wu, a statistician at George Washington University, provided another thought:

The Chinese opinion leaders are more dominant in male representation than the general public (65% vs 51%), have more education (95% vs 7% college graduates or higher), are less religious (88% vs 74% with no religious beliefs), differ in occupations (selected university and research experts, journalists and editors, non-governmental organizations, and professionals vs all occupations), differ in location (3 major cities in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou vs almost entire China), have more Communist Party members (44% vs 5% party members), and have higher monthly income. Although nationalism may be a factor, the observed differences in opinion are more likely due to these differences in demographics.

The survey also found that 55 percent of Americans hold favorable impressions of China. This figure is much higher than in either the Gallup poll or the ABC News/WashPost poll conducted earlier in 2012. Those showed 42 and 37 percent favorable opinions of China, respectively. Particularly interesting is the time series data from the ABC poll, showing that American public opinion of China stood at a high of 80 percent in spring of 1989, just before the Tienanmen Square episode, plummeting to 39 percent a year later. Curiously, the latest 37 percent favorability rating is even lower than during Tiananmen.    





So why the wide gap in American public impressions of China across the surveys? Methodological and sampling differences is one obvious explanation. Jeremy Wu offers another:

Due to the differences in random sampling, questions, timing, and other non-sampling factors, these four surveys may not be directly comparable. For example, the Gallup question appears to deviate from the C100, Pew, and ABC/WP questions. The C100, Pew, and ABC/WP questions are similar; Pew has a much higher (20%) unexplained response compared to 8% in C100. The ABC/Washington Post Poll has the following comment in its report:

"While challenges in the relationship are significant, there's a chance that a generational change could be in the offing: Young adults, age 18-29, hold far more positive views of China, rating it favorably rather than unfavorably by a 2-1 margin. Among their elders, that's reversed."

Since all 4 surveys cover cell phone users who tend to be younger than the general population, it is likely that some of the variation may be attributed to the weighting approach used. This is an area that none of the 4 surveys have provided a sufficiently clear and transparent explanation for objective analysis. If some clarity about the weighting methods can be provided and analyzed, we may have a much better understanding in comparing the survey results.

Finally, although the White House's China policy over the last several administrations has reflected a basic bipartisan consensus, the ABC survey results indicate that opinions of China seem ideologically partisan. Those identifying as Republicans appear to have a far less favorable opinion of China than do Democrats. And a much higher percentage of self-identified Republicans/conservatives hold a negative opinion of China. Ironically, this seems at odds with the oft-cited (though hardly proven) notion that the Chinese prefer Republican administrations.   

   


What to make of all of this? A simple and preliminary conclusion is that Americans and Chinese, in general, view each other somewhere along the spectrum between friend and foe. Even as both seek greater collaboration, they also seem discomfited by one other. If we average the favorability ratings across the three surveys, then less than half of Americans have favorable impressions of China.  

Is this attributable to the rise of China as a decisive new challenger to the United States? Or the sense that China is "stealing" American jobs and bending the rules of commerce? Or that China continues to spurn democracy and human rights after decades of economic liberalization? I don't have the answers, but it's important that they're found. If we want to sustain and improve one of the most important bilateral relationships in the 21st century, first we've got to understand one another.

In any given week, China is capable of dazzling the world with its achievements while simultaneously undermining such progress by disappointing its own people. This was that kind of a week. 

By all accounts, it has been an historic week for China, laden with several firsts. Not only did Beijing successfully complete its first manned space docking mission, the mission carried along the first Chinese female astronaut Liu Yang, a veteran air force pilot. For a Communist Party that has always held grandiose technological ambitions, this was an indisputable triumph. And it did so by reflecting the Maoist ideal of gender equality captured in the commonly recited phrase "women hold up half the sky." For President Hu Jintao, whose decadal reign saw a less harmonious society, he can at least claim credit for having engineered a "Kennedy moment" by decisively taking China into the majestic heavenly ether. It is true, however, that the moon-shot plan was hatched under the previous administration, but the space program's repeated successes registered under Hu's watch will surely define a central part of his political legacy.

Although China is a latecomer to the space game by about 40 years, the sense of rapturous wonder that once captivated Apollo mission audiences in the U.S. is palpable among the Chinese public today. The official press, predictably, issued paean after paean about the momentous launch. And like all initiatives grand in scale, its success serves as an occasion to rally around the flag and inspire patriotism. (Not to mention the effusive praise of the Communist Party's achievement conveniently takes the political transition and Bo Xilai off the front pages, for a while at least.) There is reason for China to be proud of the accomplishment precisely because the program, unlike the high-speed rail, was approached methodically and has a proven track record of success. Evan Osnos of the New Yorker puts it thusly

Over the last decade, China has moved with purpose, putting its first person into space, completing an inaugural spacewalk, and launching two lunar orbiters. But it is not doing anything rash; the pace, four missions in four years, is a stately one. "China's careful, sustainable approach cannot be compared to some early Soviet 'firsts,' which took safety shortcuts in order to achieve politically-timed space spectaculars,"accordingto Andrew Erickson, of the U.S. Naval War College. "By working on its own terms, on its own time, Beijing is building for the future."

As the Chinese public and outside world marveled at the Shenzhou-9 liftoff -- inevitably inviting comparisons to the declining U.S. space program -- pride evaporated and gave way to the old cynicism as revelations within China came to light. It turns out that the astronauts have been feted with organic food from an exclusive farm that boasts free-range chickens and "sleek and glossy haired" cows that are hormone free, according to the Chinese newspaper Beijing News.

The exclusivity of said farm (pictured above) is not surprising. In fact, they are quite common. That is, if you are fortunate enough to be counted among the elites and officialdom who have access to such gourmet feasts. As Barbara Demick of the LA Times reported on this phenomenon last year:

At a glance, it is clear this is no run-of-the-mill farm: A 6-foot spiked fence hems the meticulously planted vegetables and security guards control a cantilevered gate that glides open only to select cars.

"It is for officials only. They produce organic vegetables, peppers, onions, beans, cauliflowers, but they don't sell to the public," said Li Xiuqin, 68, a lifelong Shunyi village resident who lives directly across the street from the farm but has never been inside. "Ordinary people can't go in there."

So much for a classless, egalitarian society -- only astronauts and cadres can avail themselves of secretive supplies of natural, wholesome food. But what's supplied to ordinary Chinese? Tainted milk and irradiated pork. It is precisely this sort of privilege, entitlement, and social stratification that rile the Chinese public. And with the middle class' growing anxiety over rampant food safety violations, the "organic astronaut farm" story took on added salience, especially when juxtaposed against the splashy and expensive space program. Why not spend the money on fixing the food supply? From infant milk powder to the aptly named "gutter oil," the credibility of authentic and unadulterated food is in shambles. There is reason to believe that the reality may be much worse than what has already been exposed, so claims Caixin magazine. There is simply too much opacity to grasp the true extent of the problem. Meanwhile, mainland mothers can trek to Hong Kong to buy legitimate infant formula, which many Hong Kong vendors seem to deliberately display in front of the store to attract mainland buyers.

For a country rightfully proud of its preeminent food culture -- a major source of its soft power -- these gastronomic malfeasance are socially and politically damaging. Of course food scandals and contamination aren't unique to China, but the potential scale and rampant violations put China in a different category. It is ironic that for a government perennially preoccupied with the ability to feed 1.3 billion mouths, it has made eating a riskier proposition. Eating holds a unique position in the Chinese psyche -- not least because many Chinese still recall a period of mass starvation. And so as a matter of public policy, the government's credibility on food is no trivial matter. At this point, it is not earning much credibility on this issue.

The Communist Party may have decisively taken China into the 21st century space age this week, but on the home front, its crumbling food system seems to resemble the age that Upton Sinclair documented at the beginning of the last century. How can a country that is poised to build a space station still tolerate a broken food system? That is a question many Chinese are asking these days.

In any given week, China is capable of dazzling the world with its achievements while simultaneously undermining such progress by disappointing its own people. This was that kind of a week. 

By all accounts, it has been an historic week for China, laden with several firsts. Not only did Beijing successfully complete its first manned space docking mission, the mission carried along the first Chinese female astronaut Liu Yang, a veteran air force pilot. For a Communist Party that has always held grandiose technological ambitions, this was an indisputable triumph. And it did so by reflecting the Maoist ideal of gender equality captured in the commonly recited phrase "women hold up half the sky." For President Hu Jintao, whose decadal reign saw a less harmonious society, he can at least claim credit for having engineered a "Kennedy moment" by decisively taking China into the majestic heavenly ether. It is true, however, that the moon-shot plan was hatched under the previous administration, but the space program's repeated successes registered under Hu's watch will surely define a central part of his political legacy.

Although China is a latecomer to the space game by about 40 years, the sense of rapturous wonder that once captivated Apollo mission audiences in the U.S. is palpable among the Chinese public today. The official press, predictably, issued paean after paean about the momentous launch. And like all initiatives grand in scale, its success serves as an occasion to rally around the flag and inspire patriotism. (Not to mention the effusive praise of the Communist Party's achievement conveniently takes the political transition and Bo Xilai off the front pages, for a while at least.) There is reason for China to be proud of the accomplishment precisely because the program, unlike the high-speed rail, was approached methodically and has a proven track record of success. Evan Osnos of the New Yorker puts it thusly

Over the last decade, China has moved with purpose, putting its first person into space, completing an inaugural spacewalk, and launching two lunar orbiters. But it is not doing anything rash; the pace, four missions in four years, is a stately one. "China's careful, sustainable approach cannot be compared to some early Soviet 'firsts,' which took safety shortcuts in order to achieve politically-timed space spectaculars,"accordingto Andrew Erickson, of the U.S. Naval War College. "By working on its own terms, on its own time, Beijing is building for the future."

As the Chinese public and outside world marveled at the Shenzhou-9 liftoff -- inevitably inviting comparisons to the declining U.S. space program -- pride evaporated and gave way to the old cynicism as revelations within China came to light. It turns out that the astronauts have been feted with organic food from an exclusive farm that boasts free-range chickens and "sleek and glossy haired" cows that are hormone free, according to the Chinese newspaper Beijing News.

The exclusivity of said farm (pictured above) is not surprising. In fact, they are quite common. That is, if you are fortunate enough to be counted among the elites and officialdom who have access to such gourmet feasts. As Barbara Demick of the LA Times reported on this phenomenon last year:

At a glance, it is clear this is no run-of-the-mill farm: A 6-foot spiked fence hems the meticulously planted vegetables and security guards control a cantilevered gate that glides open only to select cars.

"It is for officials only. They produce organic vegetables, peppers, onions, beans, cauliflowers, but they don't sell to the public," said Li Xiuqin, 68, a lifelong Shunyi village resident who lives directly across the street from the farm but has never been inside. "Ordinary people can't go in there."

So much for a classless, egalitarian society -- only astronauts and cadres can avail themselves of secretive supplies of natural, wholesome food. But what's supplied to ordinary Chinese? Tainted milk and irradiated pork. It is precisely this sort of privilege, entitlement, and social stratification that rile the Chinese public. And with the middle class' growing anxiety over rampant food safety violations, the "organic astronaut farm" story took on added salience, especially when juxtaposed against the splashy and expensive space program. Why not spend the money on fixing the food supply? From infant milk powder to the aptly named "gutter oil," the credibility of authentic and unadulterated food is in shambles. There is reason to believe that the reality may be much worse than what has already been exposed, so claims Caixin magazine. There is simply too much opacity to grasp the true extent of the problem. Meanwhile, mainland mothers can trek to Hong Kong to buy legitimate infant formula, which many Hong Kong vendors seem to deliberately display in front of the store to attract mainland buyers.

For a country rightfully proud of its preeminent food culture -- a major source of its soft power -- these gastronomic malfeasance are socially and politically damaging. Of course food scandals and contamination aren't unique to China, but the potential scale and rampant violations put China in a different category. It is ironic that for a government perennially preoccupied with the ability to feed 1.3 billion mouths, it has made eating a riskier proposition. Eating holds a unique position in the Chinese psyche -- not least because many Chinese still recall a period of mass starvation. And so as a matter of public policy, the government's credibility on food is no trivial matter. At this point, it is not earning much credibility on this issue.

The Communist Party may have decisively taken China into the 21st century space age this week, but on the home front, its crumbling food system seems to resemble the age that Upton Sinclair documented at the beginning of the last century. How can a country that is poised to build a space station still tolerate a broken food system? That is a question many Chinese are asking these days.