Just to clear up some confusion with some readers of yesterday's camo post ("forested vales of eastern Afghanistan.-- lost ma (sic) right here..").

OK, so, maybe the word "vales" wasn't technically right since Afghanistan might not have limestone cliffs. But according to the definition online: "a long depression in the surface of the land that usually contains a river"...and forested? Well, I've seen several in my travels there.

I don't do this that often, but I just thought I had to use my bully pulpit this time to answer my detractors. Let the picture do the talking...

(Photo cutline: Soldiers navigate across a creek during a dismounted patrol in the Nerkh Valley, Afghanistan, June 4, 2009.)

-- Christian

The U.S. Air Force awarded Lockheed Martin a $23 million contract for 12 extended-range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM-ERs) despite ongoing questions about the reliability of the baseline model.

The contract includes the purchase of 12 JASSM-ERs, stealthy cruise missiles which are designed to travel up to 500 nautical miles to strike a ground target. Six will be used in developmental flight-tests and the remaining six are slated for operational testing, says Alan Jackson, JASSM program director for developer Lockheed Martin.

Meanwhile, the Air Force and Lockheed Martin are preparing for Lot 6 acceptance flight-tests; this will demonstrate the capability of the baseline JASSM, which is designed for a 200 nautical mile range. The tests are likely to take place in August. "If the next round of missiles do not perform well, then it will not be positive for the program," David Van Buren, acting assistant secretary of the Air Force, told reporters during a roundtable May 15.

Problems with missile reliability in previous lot acceptance tests have cast a pall over the program. Four of 10 missiles tested from Lot 5 in February failed to hit their targets. However, the problems with reliability began more than two years ago. Jackson says the company is committed to a 90 percent reliability rate no later than Lot 11.

The root cause of problems with Lot 5 missiles was found to be a cable harness, which has been redesigned. Jackson says the company is retrofitting the fix onto other Lot 5 missiles at Lockheed Martin's expense. This change was also built into the Lot 6 missiles on the production line.

Read the rest of this story from our Aviation Week friends at Military.com.

-- Christian

We're running a story this afternoon on Military.com that talks about language inserted into the late 2009 war supplemental bill by Jack Murtha calling on the Army to study whether the current "ArPat" digital all-in-one camo pattern is the best option for troops in Afghanistan.

According our reporter Bryan Mitchell, Murtha was jaw boning with some Ranger types who complained about how the ArpPat camo stood out like a sore thumb in the craggy hills and forested vales of eastern Afghanistan.

The move in Congress was prompted by Rep. John Murtha (D-Pa.), Chairman of the Defense Appropriations subcommittee, who said he was first made aware of the issue during a visit with a group of noncommissioned officer Rangers serving at Fort Benning, Ga.

Murtha queried Army leaders and learned the concern was not reserved to a handful of Georgia troops. Similar sentiments had been voiced throughout units with experience serving in Afghanistan.

"The reason is that the current uniform has been primarily designed for a desert combat, like in Iraq, and obviously the terrain is much different in Afghanistan," Murtha said in an e-mail to Military.com.

"I spoke to both General Casey and General Petraeus about the issue. They also have heard the same thing, said that the Army is looking into the situation, and that funding is available for new uniforms if the Army decides to go that route."

And I've heard the complaints as well. No one really understood why the Army picked the sort of old-school loden colored camo. Especially since the service had already developed the MultiCam pattern with Crye Precision and Natick.

And isn't that what it all boils down to? Everyone wants MultiCam. "Spec Ops guys get to wear it...why can't I?" I even scoped out some photos of Air Force PJs sporting MultiCam during a deployment to Djibouti. And practically every cover shot from our friends at Tactical-Life.com features a MultiCam clad "operator" firing the highest speed shorty carbine around.

Look, I like MultiCam like the rest of them. But I also understand why the Army did what it did. They spent millions of dollars and lots of time studying what would work best in a range of environments with an eye toward making the Soldier's loadout easier -- one functional combat uniform for a range of environments. MultiCam was tested alongside the current ArPat (I was at Army Times Co. when the service was deciding the pattern and was following it closely with my friend Matt Cox there) and several other options and the ArPat camo won out. It was new. It was revolutionary and it was unpopular. That's what makes me think it might have been the right choice.

But I'm willing to be convinced otherwise.

Also, we don't have a ton of cash lying around, and some in the Army argue that the service has spent billions fielding the new uniforms and other gear in the pattern. Unless it sticks out like a sore thumb, why spend millions more to inject another version? And keep in mind the flaming hoops the Army is being forced to jump through as a line inserted by one congressman forces them to evaluate all these uniform alternatives. Nothing's going to come of it, I guarantee you that. But Petraeus, Casey and Stevenson will have to placate the Democratic bull by saying "that's a very good idea. we'll spend time, money and resources looking into it for you, but we're still going to come up with the same answer..."

I liked the congressional intervention on the M4 carbine issue, but I don't see the sense in this one.

-- Christian

Japan is considering adding the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system as a third layer to its ballistic-missile defenses, according to an official leak evidently prompted by North Korea's July 4 tests of R-17 and Rodong rockets.

Three or four installations of the Lockheed Martin THAAD system could cover all of Japan, says the Mainichi newspaper in an unattributed report presumed to be based on government-leaked information.

THAAD's range is secret, but the Mainichi's sources say it can reach "more than 100 kilometers (60 miles)," compared with about 20 km for the Lockheed Martin PAC-3 system that Japan currently uses as the second of its two defense layers. The first is based on Raytheon SM-3 missiles loaded on four Kongou-class destroyers fitted with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system promulgated in the U.S. Navy.

North Korea tried a longer-ranged version of the old Soviet-era R-17 (Scud) missile on July 4, according to a South Korean report. The so-called Scud ER has a range of 1,000 km, enough to reach much of Japan, says the Chosun Ilbo newspaper, also close to government officials. That range is notably longer than the 750-800 km previously attributed to the Scud ER.

Three of the seven rockets that North Korea launched were Scud ERs, two were other R-17s and three were Rodongs, which are larger and longer-ranged than R-17s.

The importance of the 1,000-km range attributed to the Scud ER may be that such a rocket would be a much smaller and cheaper weapon with which to menace Japan than the Rodong would be. Most North Korean ballistic missiles are R-17 derivatives, reflecting their cheapness and the country's familiarity with making them.

The launches violated U.N. Security Council resolutions.

They also showed greater accuracy, according to the South Korean defense ministry. "We are aware that accuracy has been improved," says the ministry.

Previous launches had shown large errors, but "much improvement has been made this time in that regard," the ministry says.

Read the rest of this story, see how the Air Force is getting better eyes in space, see if the Pentagon's buying problems are ever going to get fixed and see if Brit engineering is all it's cracked up to be from our friends at Aviation Week, exclusively on Military.com.

-- Christian

An apology and explanation to Defense Tech readers...

For the last 48 hours, we have been experiencing a network breakdown due to a major electrical fire in downtown San Francisco where our servers are based. The fiber optic line was severed and therefore we were unable to post and edit content for Defense Tech or Military.com.

This shutdown unfortunately coincided with the July 4th holiday so the gruel has been relatively thin around these parts. And for that, I sincerely apologize.

We're back up to 100 percent and we'll be posting compelling content at our normal -- if not enhanced -- rate. I hope you understand that sometimes these contingencies pop up and you'll bear with us as we spool back up.

Thanks,

-- Christian

President Obama was in Russia discussing arms control. Administration officials expect tentative agreements soon; however, they could be disappointed if the subject of cyber weapons becomes part of the discussions. Many cyber intelligence analysts have speculated that these talks will be the first discussions to include talks about limiting cyber weapons. Russia has attempted multiple time in the past to get the United Nations to examine the possibility of developing international legal regimes restricting the development, production, and use of especially dangerous types of information weapons. So far, however, their draft proposals have been tabled and replaced with resolutions that addressed only information security. The current U.S. position on cyber weapons is on fostering international cooperation rather than trying to limit cyber weapons proliferation that is estimated at already encompassing some 150 countries and multiple criminal organizations not to mention terrorist groups.

INTEL: Sources report that in May of this year the Finish military established a cyber warfare unit.

Given that cyber weapons require no special or restricted materials, no large or unique production facilities, no significant financial backing and skills that are taught in tens of thousands of programming classes available around the world, how would you ever enforce a cyber weapons ban? Just look at the challenges U.N. WMD inspectors have trying to do their job. WMD development requires more infrastructure, more highly skilled technicians that are not in an abundant supply and much money to fund.

Contrasting the two, it would be an impossible task to verify a cyber weapons ban. What would you do about all the offensive cyber weapons that already exist? Many believe that a treaty without a means of verification is less than useless, it is dangerous.

-- Kevin Coleman

US arms obsolete, forces stretched thin, strategies outdated

Marines learn to think like Airmen, who learn to think like Marines

Army "Jedi Knight" critically wounded in our "safest infantry vehicle," driver falls.

Kiss intelligence goodbye

--John Noonan

June 17 (Bloomberg) -- Lockheed Martin Corp., the world’s largest defense company, may double sales of its new F-35 fighter jet in a surge of contracts that could squeeze competitors including Boeing Co. and Saab AB out of the market.

The U.S. and eight partner nations already plan to buy more than 3,000 of the warplanes, and with potential exports to countries including Israel, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Finland and Spain the total could “easily” reach 6,000, Brigadier General David Heinz, the top Pentagon official for the F-35, said today.

Boeing and Saab may come to view the Lockheed model as a “program killer,” said Douglas Royce, a market analyst at Forecast International in Newtown, Connecticut. The F-35 will control half the $17 billion warplane market by 2015, aviation consultants Teal Group estimate, bringing a level of dominance unmatched even by the company’s F-16 and threatening to eliminate other primary manufacturers from the industry.

Update: Chink in the armor? DoD Buzz reports that a major British think tank is urging the government to kill the program.

--John Noonan

Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control has won one of two awards from the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to study and design a Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM).

DARPA received nine proposals, and one more award is expected in the next 60 days, according to an agency official. Boeing, Raytheon and ATK also submitted proposals.

LRASM is an unconventional DARPA effort; the agency typically focuses on technology that is not readily in hand. However, the Navy requested DARPA's help in fielding LRASM in response to a need to protect ships in the Pacific against a perceived threat from an exotic anti-ship system in development in China. The goal of the program is to develop a weapon that can quickly transition into operational use by the Navy. LRASM must be mated with the Navy's Vertical Launch System, which is already installed on cruisers and destroyers in the fleet.

LRASM's standoff range requirement is designed to allow U.S. Navy ships to engage targets well outside their striking range. The weapon must operate with reduced dependence on intelligence sources, datalinks and Global Positioning System guidance. The missile also must employ survivability techniques to penetrate air defenses once it is well into its flight.

"Once the missile flies that far, it has a requirement to be able to independently detect and validate the target that it was shot at," said Rob McHenry, program manager in DARPA's Tactical Technology Office. "Once it finds that target, then it has to be able to penetrate the air defenses. The standard of maritime integrated air defenses has risen dramatically over the past few years," he said via a June podcast on the agency's Web site.

The U.S. Navy is currently lacking a "credible" anti-ship capability. Today's weapons rely heavily on proper intelligence preparation for a mission and offboard sensors or communications. LRASM is a "new level of capability organic to the weapon itself," McHenry said.

To achieve survivability, the missile must also be capable of maneuvering; this could require some advances in propulsion technology.

Read the rest of this story, a cool piece on robot refeuling, some intel on the JSF and Dreamliner and a puffy piece on a MV-22 rescue from our friends at Aviation Week, exclusively on Military.com.

-- Christian

Until recently, Afghanistan was called “The Forgotten War.” The dramatic domestic, regional, and international politics of the Iraq war largely eclipsed the fact that our people were fighting just as hard in Afghanistan. Although we’re paying attention to AfPak now, off the radar screen an important and related fight has been unfolding in the Philippines.

At the invitation of the Philippine government, the U.S. maintains about 600 troops, including Army Green Berets, Civil Affairs, and Military Information Support teams, Navy SEALS and Seabees, along with Air Force personnel and Marines. Our military forces are deployed in six locations: Zamboanga, Mindanao, Jolo, Basilan, Tawi Tawi, and a small number of liaison staff on Luzon. Their mission is to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines eliminate terrorist groups like Jemaah Islamiyah and the Abu Sayyaf Group and to prevent them from establishing safe havens from which to train other terrorists, both internal and external.

--John Noonan

Underway for two weeks now, North Korea's unimposing merchant ship Kang Nam 1 continues her mystery trip through the South China Sea at a sedate 10 knots. I expect this is for better fuel economy but not because her captain or Kim Jong Il want to be green. According to the Associated Press, anonymous U.S. intelligence sources said on Tuesday that she altered course back north and is now about 250 miles south of Hong Kong.

Kang Nam 1 is believed by some Western authorities to possibly be bound, or at least originally have been bound, for Myanmar with an export shipment of conventional arms -- maybe mortars, or perhaps missile parts. Herein lies the rub. After Kim's second-ever atom bomb test in May, the UN passed a resolution, binding on all member states, which gives the appearance of establishing a quarantine against maritime transport of arms or nuclear-related items for sale by the DPRK. But the resolution lacks teeth. If Kang Nam 1 can somehow make it to a friendly destination (Myanmar, or back to her starting point of Nampo, or somewhere else) without refueling in a third-party pro-UN port such as Singapore, nothing stands in her way.

A U.S. Navy spokesman indicated a lack of good data on both the ship's fuel mileage and the capacity of her fuel tanks, though presumably experts can make basic estimates. It's unclear to me from public accounts whether Kang Nam 1 was provided before departure with extra fuel, a large cache of which could simply take the form of fuel drums crammed into some of her holds. It's also unclear what might happen if she's met in international waters, in reasonably calm weather, by another North Korean-flagged ship, civilian or naval, that could conduct a primitive but effective underway replenishment. Kang Nam 1 has been trailed from beyond the horizon by a U.S. Navy destroyer, but the U.S. is proceeding very cautiously about making any sort of demand to board and inspect the cargo.

David Sanger of the New York Times suggests that Kang Nam 1's voyage might be a provocation designed to embarrass America. I'm inclined to agree. Sean McGuire of Reuters hints that increasing leaks of outside reality into North Korea could undermine the credibility of Kim's strident anti-U.S. rhetoric among his own people, weakening his power. To dramatically innoculate the populace against such "external disinformation" would give Kim ample motive to have set up Kang Nam 1 as bait in an elaborate propaganda trap.

If Kang Nam 1 needs and wants to refuel in Singapore or Hong Kong or wherever, and her cargo upon an inspection turns out to be harmless, Kim Jong Il has further "proof," for domestic consumption, of American persecution against the DPRK and its interests. Main elements of the USS Ronald Reagan carrier battle group docked last week in Singapore for leave and local volunteerism. What might appear as a not-coincidental show of American strength to Pyongyang, were Kang Nam 1 to try to sail right by through the Strait of Malacca without stopping, could be turned around by Kim into further proof of alleged American evil intent, thus doing more than merely salvaging face when his ship turned around. Pyongyang could cast their merchie as the intrepid underdog in a long-distance stand-off with the big, bad superpower's supercarrier, giving ship and crew a hero's welcome back home. If Kang Nam 1 somehow does make it to Myanmar -- assuming that's ever been her intended destination -- without triggering a UN third-party in-harbor inspection somewhere, Kim can whip up patriotic fervor about the technical ingenuity and self-sacrificing perseverance of his valiant merchant marine.

In extremis, say if an attempt to board by force to inspect on the high seas were made, the crew can scuttle Kang Nam 1 in deep water and take to their lifeboats. They could even set explosive charges on short timers before they abandon her. Ambiguity as to the real nature of her cargo would thus be preserved, and ambiguity would work entirely to Kim Jong Il's advantage.

-- Joe Buff

The withdrawal of American troops from Iraqi cities today marks a turning point for the war in Iraq, and leaves me with mixed feelings about the current situation and the war overall.

I see it as a success that the security situation has improved so much that US forces basically aren't needed to protect the urban populations anyway. Whether it was an arbitrary date or not, it sort of turned out to be an event-driven one -- at least in terms of security. I can't express the pride I feel for the sacrifice and adaptability of the troops who made this success possible.

I remember being at a small outpost on the outskirts of Balad in July of 2003. My photographer colleague and I hired two seats in a convoy of Suburbans heading out of Amman to a hotel in Baghdad, where we based ourselves for six weeks to cover the beginnings of the occupation.

We went on a raid one night out of the small base -- which had no electricity, no air conditioning, no refrigeration -- with a group from the 4th ID based on intel gained from a short trip into town by the company commander who slipped in with his translator (terp) wearing a dishdash and driving in a captured taxi cab. This was two months after the "mission accomplished" speech and I was amazed at the initiative of the troops there that early on.

I went to Sadr city then too. The fetid stench of sewage and rotten trash wafting into the gritty dust thrown up by the totally unarmored Humvee we were in. Kids threw rocks at us. "That means they like us," one Soldier told me. "I think...."

Then there was the victory lap with Marines in southern towns. The Shiite population there was overjoyed with the US victory and the overthrown Saddam. I was in a small camp in Diwaniyah when Udeh and Kuseh Hussein were killed. There was so much celebratory fire, a Marine standing post on a rooftop nearby was injured when a round came down out of the sky and hit him in the leg.

I remember standing on the street corner just outside what was still not yet called the Green Zone (the troops from the 2nd ACR called it the MOAC: mother of all checkpoints) at 9pm waiting for a driver from the AP to pick me and a couple colleagues up after a trip into the field. I didn't think for one second that something would happen to me at the time.

Then it all changed from hope to despair.

I returned to a very different Iraq in late 2005. For a month I cowered in the back of a Marine Humvee in Ramadi dodging IEDs on nightly patrols and raids. My first night there in early December, a coordinated IED attack maimed several Marines and killed two after they'd dismounted from a 7 ton truck to fix a Humvee disabled by a previous bomb. I went along on the QRF and watched as Marines picked up combat boots filled with severed feet and legs.

In Hit, we were in the boondocks for a month. The desert "ratlines" that funneled suicide bombers into Iraq from Syria. It was tense but quiet, until a group of insurgents tried to overrun the camp I was in guarded by a single platoon of Marines. We joked together that the Iraq war had turned into the war on drugs -- every time you grab an insurgent or uncover a (massive) weapons cache, there's three more that pop up right alongside it (or him). We were never going to win this war, we thought.

And then it all changed. I remember thinking to myself even after the first trip to Iraq that the main problem was the Iraqis themselves. They refused to act. They refused to reject being cooped in someone else's failing agenda (the islamists). They failed to stand up for themselves and confront the violence that no one wanted. Why weren't we guilting them into acting?

Then we did. There was a tipping point there. Not sure when, but something showed the community leaders there that throwing their lot in with AQ wasn't going to get them where they needed to go. The Iraqis didn't strike me as particularly radical people -- they weren't ripe for the Taliban or the Iranian mullahs. But something clearly convinced local leaders to side with the US and stand up against AQ. Whether it was the severed head of a cousin to Abdul-Satter Abu Risha delivered to his doorstep that did it or what, I don't know. But something tipped the balance.

Then it was hard fighting and close teaming and tough, thorough training that got the job done. The troops stuck to their guns. They refused to relent. They bit their tongues when they saw the Iraqi forces acting like idiots. They kept cajoling them into the fight. And they did it. As Steve Colbert said: "We won..."

I went back to the new Iraq in early 2008 and I was stunned. I was also bored. One month with combat units there -- Marines and Army -- and not a single raid. No incoming rockets. Not even a stray AK round from a Friday wedding party. Everything had changed.

And this is where we find ourselves today.

Am I nervous about how this is all going to shake out? Yes. But I'm confident that Iraq has passed the point of no return. I'm confident that they will not revert to the chaos and jihadist mayhem of 2006 and '07. DO they have "reconciliation?" No. But do we? Do they have a hydrocarbon law yet? No. But can you even conceive of how complex such a law would be? Could you see the US coming up with one? The only states in the region that have them are theocracies or kingdoms. No one voted on those.

But at the end of the day it's been a major triumph for our armed forces. Politicians in the US certainly didn't help much. The troops stuck to the guns, put their heads down and worked hard to make it a success. They didn't involve themselves in the debates -- there is no debate, right? You execute your orders and you do them decisively. The military did way more than they were trained to do. And they did it without complaint and with amazing skill and aptitude.

I am glad to have witnessed and been a part -- in a small way -- of this very unpopular war. It's when the chips are down; when nobody says you'll win; when all support has faded away where character is found. Those who fought, worked and died there had it. And we should be exceptionally proud of those who will never quite brush all that talcum sand out of their boots ever again.

-- Christian

The U.S. Navy plans to begin constructing two nuclear-propelled attack submarines (SSN) per year beginning next year -- Fiscal Year 2010. For the past decade the Congress has authorized SSNs at an average of one a year. However, in response to the Newport News/Northrop Grumman and Electric Boat/General Dynamics shipyards reducing construction costs for submarines of the Virginia (SSN 774) class to $2 billion per submarine in then-year (FY 2005) dollars, the Department of Defense and Congress have approved the doubled construction rate.

Now some in DoD and Congress are having second thoughts about the increased submarine building rate. The reason is primarily money. The cost in today's dollars for a Virginia-class SSN is closer to $2.5 billion per unit.

The Navy's annual shipbuilding budget from FY 2002 through 2009 averaged about $10 billion. The FY 2010 budget is about $12 billion. The Navy -- which currently has 283 active ships -- has a goal of 313 ships. Navy estimates of the shipbuilding funds needed to reach that goal have been steadily increasing over the past few years and is now about $16 billion per annum. However, the Congressional Research Service, General Accountability Office, and other, non-government institutions and individuals, estimate the cost at more than $20 billion per year and possibly as high as $24 billion. And, these numbers do not include the "mission packages" for littoral combat ships (LCS), the planned new class of strategic missile submarines (SSBN), and the proposed ballistic missile defense cruisers (CG(X)).

This analyst believes that with the current financial situation in the United States, the costs of the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts, the Navy and Air Force shortfalls in aircraft, and other factors will make shipbuilding budgets of more than $12 billion highly unlikely; probably less money will be available for that purpose. Will DoD and the Congress -- and even the non-nuclear segments of the Navy -- permit almost $5 billion per year, i.e., some 40 to possibly 50 percent of the annual shipbuilding budget, to be spent on two attack submarines?

Today the Navy has 53 attack submarines; a building rate of two per year would increase the number to about 60 "boats." A rate of 1-1/2 annually would mean 45 submarines, while one per year would lead to a 30-submarine force.

The situation is exacerbated as some observers are questioning the role of the attack submarine on the "war on terror" -- a component of what DoD calls "irregular warfare." While SSNs are useful for clandestine surveillance in forward areas, and possibly for tracking North Korean merchant ships, their role in irregular warfare is not clear. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has called for a military force structure that is 50 percent focused on conventional warfare, 10 percent focused on irregular warfare, and 40 percent focused on dual-use capabilities. The category -- or categories -- for attack submarines is not completely clear.

Thus, with the current fleet of 283 or even the planned 313 ships, how many attack submarines are needed is not completely clear.

Also, increasingly the U.S. Navy is operating in relatively shallow, coastal or littoral waters. While nuclear submarines can operate there, some believe that their efficiency is limited for several reasons, and their vulnerability is increased. There have been three collisions of U.S. nuclear submarines with surface ships in the Gulf of Oman/Strait of Hormuz area in the past couple of years. Are those submarines there to support irregular warfare -- U.S. participation in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?  Or are they to deter or fight Iranian aggression? If the latter, what is their contribution when significant U.S. surface and air forces are also in the area? What is their contribution to the new U.S. Africa Command?

The larger SSN building rate and force level may well be justified. But questions of future SSN roles as well as the fiscal implications should be addressed before the United States begins a two-per-year SSN program.

-- Norman Polmar

I know it's been out for a while, but I thought I'd give the recently released investigation report on the air strikes in Farah province Afghanistan a chop and post the entire report here.

You might remember this was the latest high-profile close air support strike on a village that allegedly killed as many as 140 civilians -- but probably killed more like 60 (still a WAY too high number) during a day-long battle in Farah province in May.

I'm not going to get into the whole idea of using CAS in villages against an enemy that may (or may not) be deliberately hiding amongst civilians, the perception versus reality arguments and any doctrinal issues. We can cover that at DoD Buzz and Military.com, but I have a purely defense tech-related issue I'd like to bring forward for you to consider as an outgrowth of the investigation's findings.

The report states that there were essentially two rounds of air strikes called in by a Marine Corps Special Operations team which was acting as a QRF for Afghan forces and their "coalition" trainers (it doesn't say where these trainers were from but they could have been other Marines or Brits) who came into contact with enemy forces around 3pm on May 4 during a patrol intended to secure a small village rumored to have been hassled by foreign Taliban.

The MarSoc bubbas took control of the CAS when they arrived on scene and talked in an escalation of force strike with four F/A-18Fs which popped flares, did a couple gun runs and eventually dropped some bombs on confirmed Taliban positions that the MarSoc commander observed and confirmed for each strike.

While the direct fire stopped for a while, the enemy was never completely suppressed. But the Hornets were running out of juice, so they had to RTB. In came our Soviet nuclear strike bomber to save the day.

Four hours later, as the Marines and Afghan forces were waiting for a medivac chopper and coming under intermittent fire from a nearby village, a B-1B Lancer called in on station. It dark by then and the B-1 spotted a group of military looking men walking toward the village to reinforce the enemy firing on the Marines and ANA. Of course, this was almost a mile away from the ground force commander, so he had to trust the B-1's thermals and used "a variety of real-time intelligence resources" which probably means he was listening to a radio scanner and having the jibberish translated to confirm that the group was coming in for the kill.

Farah Province Investigation

Of course they hid in two buildings.

Boom! Three 500 pounders on air burst fuses destroy a mosque and a shrine. No one in the air or on the ground has any idea who's taking shelter in the mosque and shrine aside from the Talibs.

Then the B-1 sees another group like the first one, tracks it for 20 minutes on the thermals moving toward the Marines' front line and rallying near another building outside the village. Threat=strike. Boom: two 500 pounders and two 2,000 pounders (which must have looked like a nuclear strike).

More than two hours after the B-1 came on station, and spotting a third group of tactically-moving personnel take shelter and another building, the Lancer drops its last 2,000 pounder, destroying the building and killing everyone inside.

Again, we can debate the policy and tactics of CAS and target ID in another forum, but what this incident tells me is that we absolutely need a counterinsurgency aircraft. The F-18s could ID the targets themselves and get low enough to do strafing runs, etc. But they couldn't stay very long and had to relinquish control to a strategic bomber sheep-dipped as a tactical support aircraft.

An A-10, or some other COIN aircraft would have done a much better job eliminating the enemy with graduated force and IDing the targets -- and staying on station. They can be cheap, easy to field at FOBs and convenient to maintain (especially prop-driven planes). And I got no problem with the armaments either. Give me some Hellfires and a couple chain guns, and I'll put your Talibs on the ground.

I hope that this incident arms those in the Air Force and Army to advocate for a "back to the future" focus on simpler, long-endurance, stick and rudder with a pair of binos CAS that is critical to keeping the population on our side in a conflict with an economy of force that demands a the careful use of precision airpower.

-- Christian

Last week Defense Secretary Robert Gates ordered U.S. Strategic Command (StratCom) to deliver a plan to stand-up a new command to oversee information technology security and attack – what would be known as "Cyber Command." This is in addition to President Obama's announcement last month that he will establish a new cyber security office at the White House. The historic event took place on Tuesday, June 22nd.

As one could imagine, this is no small task. StratCom has just a little over sixty days to accomplish this mission. The plan to create this new entity operating within the Department of Defense and lead by a 4-star general is due to the Defense Secretary by September 1st. According to Gates' timeline, Cyber Command is expected to be up and operational by October 1, 2009, and fully functional one year later. An internal memo from Gates to senior Pentagon officials stated that he intends to recommend that Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, the current director of the National Security Agency, take on the role as commander of the Cyber Command with the rank of a four-star general.

What this will actually cost is anyone’s guess. Current thinking is that the budget to just establish the new command through year's end could reach as high as $200 million. Longer term, the cost of cyber intelligence, defense and offensive capabilities are estimated to be around $55 billion annually. This will create our offensive cyber forces and capabilities and defend the over 100,000 DoD Networks and 5 million DoD computers against cyber attack. One might say it is just a drop in the bucket of a 2009 DoD budget that topped $515 billion.

The United States is not the only country making this move. The UK defense ministry announced plans to establish an office of cyber attack and defense but gave no hard date when it would be operational. Britain's GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters, their equivalent of the NSA) seems to be well underway in fully developing their cyber capabilities. In addition, the defense ministry of South Korea has also announced plans to establish a cyber command by 2012.

Internal cooperation is critical for cyber incident investigations and event attribution. As more and more countries establish a focal point for cyber defense, the greater the opportunity to conduct these investigations and accurately identify those behind cyber attacks.

-- Kevin Coleman