<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' xmlns:blogger='http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008' xmlns:georss='http://www.georss.org/georss' xmlns:gd="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005" xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463</id><updated>2024-12-19T04:22:14.354+01:00</updated><category term="Recommended Reading"/><category term="AAR"/><category term="Scenario Design"/><category term="Campaign Series Middle East"/><category term="Campaign Series East Front II"/><category term="Tutorial | CSME"/><category term="Campaign Series Vietnam"/><category term="Decisive Campaigns"/><category term="American Revolution"/><category term="CS Legion"/><category term="Campaign Series West Front"/><category term="Humour"/><category term="JTCS Rsing Sun"/><title type='text'>Campaign Series | Steel Panthers - Hauptkampflinie</title><subtitle type='html'>Everything about Tactical Wargaming at its finest | Campaign Series | WinSPWW2 | WinSPMBT | Scenario Design | AAR | Military History&#xa;&#xa;&#xa; </subtitle><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default?redirect=false'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/'/><link rel='hub' href='http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/'/><link rel='next' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default?start-index=26&amp;max-results=25&amp;redirect=false'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>243</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>25</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-1397367295254283864</id><published>2022-12-15T16:13:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2022-12-15T16:13:15.737+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Wargaming in Military Education for Army Officers and Officer Cadets</title><content type='html'>&lt;p style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: right;&quot;&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: left;&quot;&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d1/MCWC-wargame-Lacey-13-cropped.png&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;A wargame at the US Marine Corps War College (April 2019).&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;504&quot; data-original-width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;202&quot; src=&quot;https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d1/MCWC-wargame-Lacey-13-cropped.png&quot; title=&quot;A wargame at the US Marine Corps War College (April 2019).&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;Wargaming has been part of military curricula for about 200 years since the introduction of Kriegsspiel, but it is still something of an art form. This&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href=&quot;https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/86127641/2018_Elg_Johan_1275392_ethesis.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;thesis&lt;/a&gt;,&amp;nbsp;by Johan Elg,&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;attempts to theorise the practice of military educational wargaming, and specifically to explore why such wargaming takes the form it does. The thesis is limited to army educational wargaming for officers and officer cadets. Wargaming for analytical purposes, and political and strategic gaming, are excluded. Instead, the focus is on army educational wargaming at the tactical level, which is arguably more comparable between countries. The research method combines an exploratory approach influenced by grounded theory with a comparative case study approach encompassing three successive levels of army officer education in five countries: Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/1397367295254283864/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/1397367295254283864?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/1397367295254283864'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/1397367295254283864'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2022/12/wargaming-in-military-education-for.html' title='Wargaming in Military Education for Army Officers and Officer Cadets'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>London, UK</georss:featurename><georss:point>51.5072178 -0.1275862</georss:point><georss:box>23.196983963821154 -35.2838362 79.817451636178845 35.0286638</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-8518650863551404364</id><published>2022-11-26T21:39:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2022-11-26T21:40:47.569+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II | Prewar to March 1943</title><content type='html'>&lt;p style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: left;&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://media.moddb.com/cache/images/groups/1/5/4293/thumb_620x2000/tumblr_mdhkd8QPOV1r3eyedo1_1280.jpg&quot; style=&quot;clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;German Pak position during the Battle of Kursk, Eastern Front, 1943&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;373&quot; data-original-width=&quot;620&quot; height=&quot;193&quot; src=&quot;https://media.moddb.com/cache/images/groups/1/5/4293/thumb_620x2000/tumblr_mdhkd8QPOV1r3eyedo1_1280.jpg&quot; title=&quot;German Pak position during the Battle of Kursk, Eastern Front, 1943&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;In &lt;a href=&quot;https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA187901.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;this&lt;/a&gt; Research Survey, Major Timothy A. Wray provides an excellent survey of the intricacies of
employing defensive tactics against a powerful opponent. Using after-action reports, unit war diaries, and other primary materials, Major Wray analyzes the doctrine and tactics that the Germans used on the Eastern Front during World War II.
At the end of World War I, the Germans adopted the elastic defense in depth and continued to use it
as their basic doctrine through the end of World War II. However, because of limitations caused by difficult
terrain, severe weather, manpower and supply shortages, Soviet tactics, and Hitler&#39;s order to stand fast,
German commanders were unable to implement the Elastic Defense in its true form.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/8518650863551404364/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/8518650863551404364?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/8518650863551404364'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/8518650863551404364'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2022/11/standing-fast-german-defensive-doctrine.html' title='Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II | Prewar to March 1943'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Kursk, Kursk Oblast, Russia</georss:featurename><georss:point>51.7482395 36.1947023</georss:point><georss:box>23.438005663821151 1.038452300000003 80.058473336178849 71.3509523</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-3645205360664106068</id><published>2022-11-19T11:28:00.001+01:00</published><updated>2022-11-19T11:28:50.537+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Struggling against Inferiority: German Army Policy, 1890-1914</title><content type='html'>&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3b/Julius_von_Verdy_du_Vernois.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;Julius von Verdy du Vernois&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;800&quot; data-original-width=&quot;643&quot; height=&quot;320&quot; src=&quot;https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3b/Julius_von_Verdy_du_Vernois.jpg&quot; title=&quot;Julius von Verdy du Vernois, Prussian Minister of War&quot; width=&quot;257&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;This &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.academia.edu/11327585/Struggling_against_Inferiority_German_Army_Policy_1890_1914&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;thesis &lt;/a&gt;by&amp;nbsp;Gavin J. Wiens offers us some insights about the diplomatic and geographic circumstances confronting Germany before the First 
World War and the maintenance of a large standing army. In 1890 
the Prussian Minister of War, Julius von Verdy du Vernois, introduced a long-term 
program of army expansion intended to increase the number of active formations and 
provide all able-bodied German males with military training. Whereas considerable 
political and social obstacles, together with the inauguration of a naval construction 
program in 1898 precluded its completion, the possibility of a two-front war thereafter 
ensured that the &quot;realization of compulsory military service&quot; remained the fundamental 
objective of the General Staff. Not even the return of budgetary preference to the army 
following the second Moroccan crisis in 1911 and the subsequent approval of substantial 
army bills in 1912-13 diminished the intense pressure for a large-scale increase in the 
peacetime-strength and the implementation of the core principles of the &quot;Verdy Plan.&quot;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/3645205360664106068/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/3645205360664106068?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/3645205360664106068'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/3645205360664106068'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2022/11/struggling-against-inferiority-german.html' title='Struggling against Inferiority: German Army Policy, 1890-1914'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-4818735963025885203</id><published>2022-05-06T14:34:00.006+02:00</published><updated>2022-05-06T14:37:09.649+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>The Operational Leadership of Helmuth von Moltke</title><content type='html'>&lt;blockquote style=&quot;border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/715sLwMZngL._AC_SY741_.jpg&quot; style=&quot;clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;A portrait of Helmuth von Moltke&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;741&quot; data-original-width=&quot;523&quot; height=&quot;320&quot; src=&quot;https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/715sLwMZngL._AC_SY741_.jpg&quot; title=&quot;Helmuth von Moltke, in full Helmuth Karl Bernhard, Count (graf) von Moltke, (born October 26, 1800, Parchim, Mecklenburg [Germany]—died April 24, 1891, Berlin, Germany), chief of the Prussian and German General Staff (1858–88) and the architect of the victories over Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1871).&quot; width=&quot;226&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;blockquote style=&quot;border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;p style=&quot;text-align: left;&quot;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;A &lt;a href=&quot;https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA283481.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;paper&lt;/a&gt; by Gary J. Ohis
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps Reserve | &quot;Understanding operational leadership is an important aspect of officer professionalism in the modern American military. By studying the evolution of this concept we can better comprehend its role in the current defense environment, and gain some insights into how it can be applied. Helmuth von Moltke is the prototype model for modern operational leadership. He provides a superb example in both his writings and in his actual application of the military arts.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;a name=&#39;more&#39;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;To understand Moltke&#39;s contribution, it is necessary to first understand the times in which he practiced his art. The Napoleonic era and its aftermath set the stage for Motlke&#39;s role in nineteenth century warfare. The events of the Napoleonic era resulted in a series,, of reforms in Prussia including the development of the General Staff system from which Moltke built an effective military machine. His mastery of planning, staff development, mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and the implementation of technology helped to make the Prussian (and later the German) army the master of Europe. He applied his talents, in conjunction with Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, to defeat Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-71. Moltke was a student and admirer of Clausewitz, but did not always follow his prescriptions. Moltke was a master of military efficiency and ranks among the great captains of all time. His greatness resulted primarily from superior management skills which he applied to military strategy and operations in a manner never surpassed before or since.&quot;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/4818735963025885203/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/4818735963025885203?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/4818735963025885203'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/4818735963025885203'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2022/05/the-operational-leadership-of-helmuth.html' title='The Operational Leadership of Helmuth von Moltke'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-3260411758879428371</id><published>2022-02-06T15:15:00.003+01:00</published><updated>2022-02-06T15:16:26.695+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>The collapse of the German army in the East in the  summer of 1944</title><content type='html'>&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://miro.medium.com/max/1400/0*_PAlQVrfSEErjIYa.jpg&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://miro.medium.com/max/1400/0*_PAlQVrfSEErjIYa.jpg&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;Soviet Infantry charging on a field during 1944&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;450&quot; data-original-width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;180&quot; src=&quot;https://miro.medium.com/max/1400/0*_PAlQVrfSEErjIYa.jpg&quot; title=&quot;Soviet Infantry charging on a field during 1944&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;is a &lt;a href=&quot;https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5309&amp;amp;context=open_access_etds&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;two&lt;/a&gt; volume &lt;a href=&quot;https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5310&amp;amp;context=open_access_etds&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;publication&lt;/a&gt;, b&lt;i&gt;y Stephen Ariel Veal 
Portland State University. &quot;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;text-align: left;&quot;&gt;The collapse of the German Army in the East in the Summer of 1944 is analyzed and determined to be the result of the following specific factors: German intelligence failures; German defensive doctrine; loss of German air superiority; Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union; German mobile reserves committed in the West; Soviet numerical superiority; and Soviet offensive doctrine and tactics. The collapse of Army Group Center, the destruction of the XIII Army Corps, and the collapse of Army Group South Ukraine in Romania during the Summer of 1944 are examined in detail. The significance of the collapse of the German Army in the East is compared to events occurring on the Anglo-American fronts and the German losses on both theaters of military operations are compared. The Soviet contributions to the defeat of the German Army during the Summer of 1944 are examined and the views of Soviet historiography and American historiography compared.&quot;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: left;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/3260411758879428371/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/3260411758879428371?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/3260411758879428371'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/3260411758879428371'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2022/02/the-collapse-of-german-army-in-east-in.html' title='The collapse of the German army in the East in the  summer of 1944'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Belarus</georss:featurename><georss:point>53.709807 27.953389</georss:point><georss:box>25.399573163821152 -7.2028609999999986 82.02004083617885 63.109639</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-2286720553572975479</id><published>2021-12-14T16:19:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2021-12-14T16:19:03.225+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>German Special Operations in the 1944 Ardennes Offensive</title><content type='html'>&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://cdn.britannica.com/00/207100-050-A9BBB413/German-soldiers-Battle-Bulge-December-1945-World-War-II.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;German soldiers file past a burning American half-track.&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;635&quot; data-original-width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;254&quot; src=&quot;https://cdn.britannica.com/00/207100-050-A9BBB413/German-soldiers-Battle-Bulge-December-1945-World-War-II.jpg&quot; title=&quot;German soldiers file past a burning American half-track.&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;by Major Jeffrey Jarkowsky, US&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;text-align: left;&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;Army&amp;nbsp;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;text-align: left;&quot;&gt;is a &lt;a href=&quot;https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA284495.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;historical analysis&lt;/a&gt; of the German special operations conducted in
support of their overall Ardennes offensive. It focuses on the two major special
operations of the German offensive, Operations &quot;Greif&quot; and &quot;Stoesser.&quot; Operation
Greif was the German attempt to infiltrate a commando unit behind American lines
disguised as American soldiers. Operation Stoesser, the last German airborne
operation of the war, was designed to secure a key cross-roads behind American
lines.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;text-align: left;&quot;&gt;These special operations failed because of faulty planning, inadequate
preparation, and a lack of coordination between the special and conventional
forces. These problems, exacerbated by a lack of preparation time, resulted in a
pair of ad-hoc units that were unable to accomplish their primary missions,
although the operations were characterized by boldness, initiative, and
improvisation. This study also examines the strategic setting, planning,
preparatiors, and conduct of these operations, as well as their impact on the
overall campaign. This study also examines the key lessons-learned that can be
derived from both operations. Lastly, the study explores the implications of
these lessons for the U.S. military of today.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/2286720553572975479'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/2286720553572975479'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2021/12/german-special-operations-in-1944.html' title='German Special Operations in the 1944 Ardennes Offensive'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><georss:featurename>Ardennes, Belgium</georss:featurename><georss:point>49.7624642 4.6285053</georss:point><georss:box>21.452230363821151 -30.5277447 78.072698036178849 39.7847553</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-14800347672349310</id><published>2020-11-10T17:32:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2020-11-10T17:32:31.991+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>The lost partnership | Military cooperation of the Reichswehr and the US Army 1918-1933</title><content type='html'>&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;Army officials of the German Reichswehr visiting West Point military academy: on the right General Werner von Blomberg, on the left Colonel Erich Kuehlenthal inspecting the lined up cadets.&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;446&quot; data-original-width=&quot;612&quot; height=&quot;233&quot; src=&quot;https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjXuW7mzXAslAs-NojV5RZBhkxeo7ggzRI7_1pp6b_rh0G7QMyBi1m3gUPE9sdwKzmyfPJL6CkcN4uRnLYtYXmn81MuwP1OzZf4EzSZ1mry2XimyUC5p-cPw-4-ti1OTMTVcoCzJZvuIll7/w320-h233/gettyimages-1207382841-612x612.jpg&quot; title=&quot;Army officials of the German Reichswehr visiting West Point military academy: on the right General Werner von Blomberg, on the left Colonel Erich Kuehlenthal inspecting the lined up cadets.&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;„We needed to face the task to be able to provide the missing weapons latest at the start of an armed conflict. Similar to the US Army, which during peace times was little more powerful than our Reichswehr, had planned for a case of emergency based on the experience during the world war I in 1917. My journey to the US as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in 1927 provided very good insights for our needs.” This is how General Wilhelm Heye described his visit to the US and started a chapter of relations of the Reichswehr to a foreign force which has not been paid much attention to date. While the secret connections of the Reichswehr to the Red Army have been met with broad scientific interest and were subject of widespread investigation, the collaboration with the U.S. Army has so far not been in the focus of historical research. The missions between 1922 and 1933 of almost 30 officers, including well-known names such as Wilhelm Speidel, Werner von Blomberg and Walter Warlimont, are therefore almost completely unknown. | A &lt;a href=&quot;https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/opus4-ubp/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/47927/file/froehlich_magisterarbeit.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Master Thesis&lt;/a&gt; by&amp;nbsp;Paul Fröhlich (in German).&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/14800347672349310/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/14800347672349310?isPopup=true' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/14800347672349310'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/14800347672349310'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2020/11/the-lost-partnership-military.html' title='The lost partnership | Military cooperation of the Reichswehr and the US Army 1918-1933'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjXuW7mzXAslAs-NojV5RZBhkxeo7ggzRI7_1pp6b_rh0G7QMyBi1m3gUPE9sdwKzmyfPJL6CkcN4uRnLYtYXmn81MuwP1OzZf4EzSZ1mry2XimyUC5p-cPw-4-ti1OTMTVcoCzJZvuIll7/s72-w320-h233-c/gettyimages-1207382841-612x612.jpg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>1</thr:total><georss:featurename>West Point, NY, USA</georss:featurename><georss:point>41.3914827 -73.955972100000011</georss:point><georss:box>13.083358960173189 -109.10945942471467 69.699606439826809 -38.80248477528535</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-31809330118087929</id><published>2020-10-25T20:50:00.004+01:00</published><updated>2020-10-25T20:55:13.668+01:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Jomini and the Ardennes: An Analysis of Lines of Operation and Decisive Points</title><content type='html'>&lt;p style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: right;&quot;&gt;&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: left;&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://cdn.britannica.com/55/205655-050-EC2F514B/German-troops-advance-Battle-Bulge-December-17-1944-World-War-II.jpg&quot; style=&quot;clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;Königstiger of KG Peiper with mounted Grenadiers.&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;648&quot; data-original-width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;256&quot; src=&quot;https://cdn.britannica.com/55/205655-050-EC2F514B/German-troops-advance-Battle-Bulge-December-17-1944-World-War-II.jpg&quot; title=&quot;Königstiger of KG Peiper with mounted Grenadiers.&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;This &lt;a href=&quot;https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a194738.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;paper&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;i&gt;by MAJ Thomas M. McGinnis, USA&lt;/i&gt;,&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;examines the applicability of the theories of the 19th Century military theorist, Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, to modern 20th Century mid-to high-intensity conflict. To do this it briefly reviews the core of Jomin&#39; most famous work, The Art of War. It then tests two key Jominian concepts, lines of operation and decisive points against the reality of a major 20th Century operation, the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944.&amp;nbsp;The study first sets the strategic and operational setting then traces&amp;nbsp;the general conduct of the operation from the corps and army perspective.&amp;nbsp;The first phase studied is the German offensive and American defensive from&amp;nbsp;16 December to 26 December 1944. The second is the American offensive and&amp;nbsp;German defensive from 22 December 1944 to 28 January 1945.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/31809330118087929/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/31809330118087929?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/31809330118087929'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/31809330118087929'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2020/10/jomini-and-ardennes-analysis-of-lines.html' title='Jomini and the Ardennes: An Analysis of Lines of Operation and Decisive Points'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Ardennes, France</georss:featurename><georss:point>49.7624642 4.6285053</georss:point><georss:box>26.899208324861437 -30.52498202471466 72.62572007513856 39.781992624714661</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-679316759459946176</id><published>2019-10-16T20:42:00.002+02:00</published><updated>2019-10-16T20:44:39.116+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>The Campaign in Lorraine | Arracourt, September 1944</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.warlordgames.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Sherman-76-Arracourt-600x327.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em; text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;GIs in front of a Sherman tank awaiting a German counter-attack&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;327&quot; data-original-width=&quot;600&quot; height=&quot;172&quot; src=&quot;https://www.warlordgames.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Sherman-76-Arracourt-600x327.jpg&quot; title=&quot;GIs in front of a Sherman tank awaiting a German counter-attack&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
This battle &lt;a href=&quot;https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/b067783.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;study&lt;/a&gt;,&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;i&gt;by&amp;nbsp;Richard H. Barnes, MAJ, US Field Artillery,&lt;/i&gt;&amp;nbsp;&quot;...investigates operational and tactical considerations of the
battles of Arracourt, which took place in September 1944 as the 4th Armored
Division of Patton&#39;s Third Army clashed with the Fifth German Panzer Army in the French province of Lorraine on the U.S. drive to the German West Wall.
By examining detailed German and American unit histories, logs, and
summaries, as well as personal papers, this study illuminates differences and
similarities in reporting the U.S. penetration from the Nancy Bridgehead to
Arracourt, the German offensive at Luneville as a prelude to Arracourt,
and the two German offensives at Arracourt, as the Fifth Panzer Army attempted
to link up with a German unit cut off at Nancy. Arracourt exemplifies penetration and mobile defense and illustrates
the demand for good intelligence and flexible command and control. It
shows the inherent risks of piecemeal commitment of reserves, the need for
timely orders and good logistical support, as well as the tactical advantages.&quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/679316759459946176/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/679316759459946176?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/679316759459946176'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/679316759459946176'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/10/the-campaign-in-lorraine-arracourt.html' title='The Campaign in Lorraine | Arracourt, September 1944'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Arracourt, Lorraine</georss:featurename><georss:point>48.821074050420918 5.7889853274314191</georss:point><georss:box>48.486486550420921 5.1435503274314192 49.155661550420916 6.4344203274314191</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-4979542572503530913</id><published>2019-10-04T15:18:00.000+02:00</published><updated>2019-10-04T15:18:11.005+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>The Campaign of 1777 | Examination of a Turning Point using DIME</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://66.media.tumblr.com/3c5d553e1aa861f561f3995b37e7d9ba/tumblr_inline_nvpapj1xjN1qb51b9_500.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;The battle of Germantown - October 4, 1777&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;348&quot; data-original-width=&quot;500&quot; height=&quot;222&quot; src=&quot;https://66.media.tumblr.com/3c5d553e1aa861f561f3995b37e7d9ba/tumblr_inline_nvpapj1xjN1qb51b9_500.jpg&quot; title=&quot;The battle of Germantown - October 4, 1777&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
... is a &lt;a href=&quot;https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a512992.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Master Thesis&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;i&gt;by Jason W. Torgerson, MAJ, US Army. &lt;/i&gt;Abstract: &quot;This historical assessment of the American Revolution evaluates the significance of the Campaign of 1777. More
specifically, this thesis examines whether the Campaign of 1777 was a turning point in the American Revolution.
Each of the four elements of National Power: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME); are used
in order to determine whether there was a perceptible increase or decrease in power. The European balance of
power dictated the effectiveness of diplomacy...&quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/4979542572503530913/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/4979542572503530913?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/4979542572503530913'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/4979542572503530913'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/10/the-campaign-of-1777-examination-of.html' title='The Campaign of 1777 | Examination of a Turning Point using DIME'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>British Colonies in America</georss:featurename><georss:point>40.91290957081079 -76.569226541924536</georss:point><georss:box>37.88297357081079 -81.732707041924542 43.942845570810789 -71.40574604192453</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-575269944601306032</id><published>2019-09-16T16:14:00.000+02:00</published><updated>2019-09-16T16:15:54.221+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Operation &#39;Market Garden&#39;: Case Study </title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://europeremembers.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/sl004_american-paras-land-near-groesbeek-during-operation-market-garden.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;American paratroopers land near Groesbeek during Operation Market Garden.&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;469&quot; data-original-width=&quot;625&quot; height=&quot;240&quot; src=&quot;https://europeremembers.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/sl004_american-paras-land-near-groesbeek-during-operation-market-garden.jpg&quot; title=&quot;American paratroopers land near Groesbeek during Operation Market Garden.&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
...&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href=&quot;https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a500814.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;for Analyzing Senior Leader Responsibilities&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;i&gt;by&amp;nbsp;Elizabeth A. Coble, LTC. &lt;/i&gt;Abstract:&amp;nbsp;With German forces on the run following the Allied success at Normandy and the breakout and pursuit across France, Allied
forces were staged to enter Germany in late summer 1944. Both Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley clamored to
be given the priority of effort. General Eisenhower chose Montgomery’s Operation &lt;b&gt;MARKET GARDEN&lt;/b&gt; as the plan for action. It
called for airborne forces to open the route for a ground force to move more than sixty miles up a single road, ending up north
of the Rhine River near Arnhem, Netherlands. By accomplishing this task, the German Ruhr industrial heartland would be
within easy grasp. But the operation failed. The ground force did not make it to the last bridge; it was six more months before
Allied forces crossed the Lower Rhine River near Arnhem. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a name=&#39;more&#39;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Between 17 and 26 September 1944, there were 17,000 Allied
casualties including eighty percent of the 1st Airborne Division (UK). Did senior Allied leaders do enough to resolve issues
raised before the operation began? Should it even have been conducted at all? This paper uses primary sources, including
diaries, memoirs, and autobiographies, and unit reports, to examine what role senior leaders played in the failure of the
operation.&quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/575269944601306032/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/575269944601306032?isPopup=true' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/575269944601306032'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/575269944601306032'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/09/operation-market-garden-case-study.html' title='Operation &#39;Market Garden&#39;: Case Study '/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total><georss:featurename>Nijmegen, Netherlands</georss:featurename><georss:point>51.8448837 5.84282810000002</georss:point><georss:box>51.687928199999995 5.52011060000002 52.0018392 6.1655456000000193</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-6629126253151311069</id><published>2019-09-15T16:12:00.001+02:00</published><updated>2019-09-15T16:12:29.654+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Different Opportunities, Different Outcomes – Civil War and Rebel Groups in Angola and Mozambique</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://i.pinimg.com/originals/fc/a0/ea/fca0eaa084487a6e7320b9b6d87e4848.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;Portuguese Mercenaries and FNLA troops after the abortive attack on Luanda.&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;424&quot; data-original-width=&quot;640&quot; height=&quot;212&quot; src=&quot;https://i.pinimg.com/originals/fc/a0/ea/fca0eaa084487a6e7320b9b6d87e4848.jpg&quot; title=&quot;Portuguese Mercenaries and FNLA troops after the abortive attack on Luanda.&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
This &lt;a href=&quot;https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71734602.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;study&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;i&gt;by Ana&amp;nbsp;Leão,&lt;/i&gt;&amp;nbsp;&quot;... explores the development and dynamics of non-state actors in Angola and Mozambique and so contributes to the ongoing debate at the German Development Institute
on the issue of non-state (armed) groups and governance impact on development conditions.
The study discusses the effect of various dimensions on the historical process of the two
countries from the perspective of the rebel movements: the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola’s case and the National Resistance of Mozambique
(RENAMO) in Mozambique’s. The analysis focuses on two dimensions: geography and
endowments.&quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/6629126253151311069/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/6629126253151311069?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/6629126253151311069'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/6629126253151311069'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/09/different-opportunities-different.html' title='Different Opportunities, Different Outcomes – Civil War and Rebel Groups in Angola and Mozambique'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Angola</georss:featurename><georss:point>-11.202692 17.873886999999968</georss:point><georss:box>-26.956810500000003 -2.7800345000000313 4.5514265 38.527808499999963</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-244213806707543990</id><published>2019-09-09T14:28:00.000+02:00</published><updated>2019-09-09T14:28:21.542+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Victories are not Enough: Limitations of the German Way of War</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://66.media.tumblr.com/79d0e5e9f5b6fea401d38790eae83e3e/tumblr_msha9zmgNh1r4yioeo1_1280.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;General Reille delivering Napoleon III&#39;s letter of surrender to King William I at the Battle of Sedan on 1 September 1870.&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;488&quot; data-original-width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;195&quot; src=&quot;https://66.media.tumblr.com/79d0e5e9f5b6fea401d38790eae83e3e/tumblr_msha9zmgNh1r4yioeo1_1280.jpg&quot; title=&quot;General Reille delivering Napoleon III&#39;s letter of surrender to King William I at the Battle of Sedan on 1 September 1870.&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
Abstract: &quot;Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and
the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war,
specifically as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging
that Germany—and before that nation came into existence, Prussia—
produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German
way of war must not be ignored.
 Even the casual observers should have noted that, despite the
military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the
20th century. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/20749/Victories%20are%20not%20Enough.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;This Letort Paper&lt;/a&gt;, authored &lt;i&gt;by Dr. Samuel J. Newland&lt;/i&gt;,
explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military
reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals.&amp;nbsp; He
emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance,
and victories in the field can easily be squandered if a nation has
failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them.
This failure, which led to Germany’s defeat in these wars, should not
be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century.&quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/244213806707543990/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/244213806707543990?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/244213806707543990'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/244213806707543990'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/09/victories-are-not-enough-limitations-of.html' title='Victories are not Enough: Limitations of the German Way of War'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Germany</georss:featurename><georss:point>49.141548321125043 11.376056181680951</georss:point><georss:box>25.213803821125044 -29.931786318319048 73.069292821125046 52.683898681680951</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-4071966941893330589</id><published>2019-09-05T13:09:00.001+02:00</published><updated>2019-09-05T13:10:00.852+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Scenario Design"/><title type='text'>Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.allworldwars.com/image/039/SmallUnitsRussia03.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;German Infantry patrol returning with prisoners and wounded comrades.&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; src=&quot;http://www.allworldwars.com/image/039/SmallUnitsRussia03.jpg&quot; data-original-height=&quot;405&quot; data-original-width=&quot;750&quot; height=&quot;172&quot; title=&quot;German Infantry patrol returning with prisoners and wounded comrades.&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;span style=&quot;background-color: white; font-size: 14px;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-family: inherit;&quot;&gt;&quot;This &lt;a href=&quot;https://history.army.mil/html/books/104/104-22-1/CMH_Pub_104-22-1.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;publication&lt;/a&gt; was prepared by a number of German officers after the end of World War II. There were a number of these publications, many of which are in publication in the German Report Series by Naval and Military Press. They are all of significant importance in understanding the way in which the war was fought, particularly on the eastern front. This particular publication is perhaps the best known of all the German Report Series, and deals with combat at battalion, company, platoon and even individual level. It is full of small actions that are not reported anywhere else, and the whole book is well illustrated with a series of maps showing the situation of the units and the actions described in such detail.&quot;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/4071966941893330589/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/4071966941893330589?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/4071966941893330589'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/4071966941893330589'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/09/small-unit-actions-during-german.html' title='Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Soviet Union</georss:featurename><georss:point>53.185993128142542 34.286801646678327</georss:point><georss:box>30.910152128142542 -7.0210408533216722 75.461834128142542 75.59464414667832</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-6672996803237617721</id><published>2019-09-02T16:17:00.000+02:00</published><updated>2019-09-02T16:18:08.955+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>A Hopeless Struggle: The Austro-Hungarian Army and total war, 1914-1918</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhy8pDwSbAMJgrTB80y51TsRG6a7oUDVE-w1Om1f5K4cVQdbzIBJROP_a00jhf6LvA0o9rsQwUB4oSztEOKlJQJRvOhpSIb4JSt_vSmVg_0WjkdSX2i1nUCTJXglOw2XOiFPQDH4sRTj6Vi/s1600/austro+4.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;Austrian-Hungarian troops storm &amp;amp; capture an artillery position of the enemy.&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;546&quot; data-original-width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;218&quot; src=&quot;https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhy8pDwSbAMJgrTB80y51TsRG6a7oUDVE-w1Om1f5K4cVQdbzIBJROP_a00jhf6LvA0o9rsQwUB4oSztEOKlJQJRvOhpSIb4JSt_vSmVg_0WjkdSX2i1nUCTJXglOw2XOiFPQDH4sRTj6Vi/s320/austro+4.jpg&quot; title=&quot;Austrian-Hungarian troops storm &amp;amp; capture an artillery position of the enemy.&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
This &lt;a href=&quot;https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/7006/1/fulltext.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;dissertation&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;i&gt;by J.R. Schindler,&lt;/i&gt;&amp;nbsp;&quot;... is an institutional study of the Austro-Hungarian Army during the First World War. It analyzes the operations of five infantry divisions, fighting on several different fronts, to reach conclusions about the wartime performance of the multinational Habsburg Army. The dissertation focusses on both tactical and socioethnic aspects&amp;nbsp;of battlefield effectiveness. It is therefore a novel approach, combining operational and social history -&amp;nbsp;This dissertation contradicts the prevailing historical perception that the wartime Austro-Hungarian Army was crippled by the nationalities issue. Instead, this revisionist work suggests that purely military shortcomings, principally poor high level leadership and a lack of industrial capacity, were the main causes of Habsburg defeat, and that the army actually performed respectably throughout the First World War despite its inherent weaknesses.&quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/6672996803237617721/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/6672996803237617721?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/6672996803237617721'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/6672996803237617721'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/09/a-hopeless-struggle-austro-hungarian.html' title='A Hopeless Struggle: The Austro-Hungarian Army and total war, 1914-1918'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhy8pDwSbAMJgrTB80y51TsRG6a7oUDVE-w1Om1f5K4cVQdbzIBJROP_a00jhf6LvA0o9rsQwUB4oSztEOKlJQJRvOhpSIb4JSt_vSmVg_0WjkdSX2i1nUCTJXglOw2XOiFPQDH4sRTj6Vi/s72-c/austro+4.jpg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Serbia &amp;amp; Galicia</georss:featurename><georss:point>44.99103640571316 20.246793848785387</georss:point><georss:box>39.611972905713159 9.9198333487853869 50.370099905713161 30.573754348785386</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-3198940826868230124</id><published>2019-08-29T10:52:00.001+02:00</published><updated>2019-08-29T10:52:11.422+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://cdn10.picryl.com/photo/1986/02/22/a-member-of-the-32nd-separate-infantry-brigade-mechanized-wisconsin-army-national-e18b9a-1600.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;A member of the 32nd Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Wisconsin Army National Guard, plots positions on a wall map in the tactical operations center during Exercise REFORGER &#39;86&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;534&quot; data-original-width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;213&quot; src=&quot;https://cdn10.picryl.com/photo/1986/02/22/a-member-of-the-32nd-separate-infantry-brigade-mechanized-wisconsin-army-national-e18b9a-1600.jpg&quot; title=&quot;A member of the 32nd Separate Infantry Brigade plots positions on a wall map in the TOC&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
This is a &lt;a href=&quot;http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/165109/1/165109.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;collection of articles&lt;/a&gt;, published &lt;i&gt;by the&amp;nbsp;NATO Defense College. &lt;/i&gt;Foreword: &quot;NATO’s defence and deterrence posture is the product of our 29
nations’ capabilities, resolve, and messaging. While our forces are mostly
developed and owned by the nations, our credibility lies in our collective
ability to combine our efforts across different domains: in command
and control, capability development, partnerships, sustainment, human
capital, and in training and exercises. Exercises are indeed a critically
important piece of this equation: they prepare our troops, allow us to
experiment new concepts, doctrine, and capabilities, convey a strategic
message to potential opponents, and contribute to our lessons learned
process...&quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/3198940826868230124/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/3198940826868230124?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/3198940826868230124'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/3198940826868230124'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/08/military-exercises-political-messaging.html' title='Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Europe</georss:featurename><georss:point>48.994337033084804 10.654138996718757</georss:point><georss:box>24.792788033084804 -30.652797003281243 73.1958860330848 51.961074996718757</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-4473509466862995600</id><published>2019-08-22T14:20:00.002+02:00</published><updated>2019-08-22T16:25:21.837+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Ma guerre d&#39;Algérie 1958-1960</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.slate.fr/sites/default/files/styles/1060x523/public/alg-59-335-r100.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;Operation Binoculars, in Kabylia, under the command of General Challe, in the forest of Akfadou. August 1959&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;395&quot; data-original-width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;157&quot; src=&quot;https://www.slate.fr/sites/default/files/styles/1060x523/public/alg-59-335-r100.jpg&quot; title=&quot;French Soldiers in Kabylia, August 1959.&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
This publication is an interesting war diary, with pictures taken by the author &amp;amp; his comrades, in two parts, &lt;i&gt;by Guy Amand.&lt;/i&gt;&amp;nbsp;Amand served as a regular soldier with the&amp;nbsp;Commando Parachutiste de l&#39;Air 10/541 from 1958 - 1962 in Algeria. &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.commando-air.com/attachments/File/MA_GUERRE_D_ALGERIE_AU_CPA_10_tome_1.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Part-One&lt;/a&gt; | &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.commando-air.com/attachments/File/MA_GUERRE_D_ALGERIE_tome_2.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Part-Two&lt;/a&gt;. I can also recommend the book &quot;A Savage War of Peace&quot;, by&amp;nbsp;Alistair Horne, in order to understand the struggle &amp;amp; de-colonisation in Algeria.&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/4473509466862995600/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/4473509466862995600?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/4473509466862995600'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/4473509466862995600'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/08/ma-guerre-dalgerie-1958-1960.html' title='Ma guerre d&#39;Algérie 1958-1960'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Algeria</georss:featurename><georss:point>33.732085944868132 2.3757723143264684</georss:point><georss:box>20.828658444868132 -18.278149185673531 46.635513444868131 23.029693814326468</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-1510761718969431636</id><published>2019-08-15T12:19:00.001+02:00</published><updated>2019-08-15T12:19:39.569+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Operation Dragoon: The Race Up the Rhone</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://static.timesofisrael.com/www/uploads/2019/08/AP_440816011-e1565836665710-640x400.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;Allied troops wade through the water from a landing ship on an unidentified beach, east of Toulon&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;400&quot; data-original-width=&quot;640&quot; height=&quot;200&quot; src=&quot;https://static.timesofisrael.com/www/uploads/2019/08/AP_440816011-e1565836665710-640x400.jpg&quot; title=&quot;Allied troops wade through the water from a landing ship on an unidentified beach, east of Toulon.&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
A &lt;a href=&quot;https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1022205.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;monograph&lt;/a&gt; &lt;i&gt;by Michael T. Quigley, MAJ,&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;United States Army. &lt;/i&gt;Abstract: &quot;While much has been written and learned from Operation Overlord and the invasion of Normandy, military leaders have largely ignored Operation
Dragoon and the lessons it provides for future military operations. As the US Army enters into a period of declining resources and missions focused
on worldwide employment of its combat power, Operation Dragoon provides a historical example for future forced entry operations over foreign
shores in a resource and time constrained environment. Although set against the backdrop of the vast industrial capabilities of the US during World
War II, Dragoon lacked resources, support, and time to plan the operation. These factors are all pertinent to today&#39;s US Army planners and
commanders. As one of the most successful campaigns in World War II, modem military officers should be familiar with the exploits of the US
Seventh Army and its French allies.&quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/1510761718969431636/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/1510761718969431636?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/1510761718969431636'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/1510761718969431636'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/08/operation-dragoon-race-up-rhone.html' title='Operation Dragoon: The Race Up the Rhone'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Southern France</georss:featurename><georss:point>43.795811575202954 5.0276436672678528</georss:point><georss:box>40.837378075202956 -0.13583683273214753 46.754245075202952 10.191124167267853</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-5776326768890922431</id><published>2019-08-14T13:31:00.001+02:00</published><updated>2019-08-14T13:31:23.629+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>German Defense Tactics against Russian Breakthroughs | A Historical Study</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://alchetron.com/cdn/battle-of-the-dnieper-e0a74727-bfec-4dd4-8ceb-9ed49c6b1d1-resize-750.jpeg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;A group of German Grenadiers in front of disabled Soviet Tanks | Eastern Front, 1943&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;416&quot; data-original-width=&quot;570&quot; height=&quot;233&quot; src=&quot;https://alchetron.com/cdn/battle-of-the-dnieper-e0a74727-bfec-4dd4-8ceb-9ed49c6b1d1-resize-750.jpeg&quot; title=&quot;German Grenadiers on the Easter Front, 1943.&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
The &lt;a href=&quot;https://history.army.mil/html/books/104/104-14-1/cmhPub_104-14-1.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;publication&lt;/a&gt;, from the Center of Military History
United States Army
·Washington, D.C., sheds some light on the way how the German defence tactics against Soviet breakthroughs evolved on the Eastern Front. &quot;This study was prepared by a group of former German generals and general staff officers. ... The principal author, who by the end of the war had attained the rank of general (Generaloberst), served on the Eastern Front throughout the Russian campaign and the subsequent retreat into tho plains of northern Germany. He was successively commander of an Infantry Brigade, a Panzer Division (November 1941 to February 1943), and two different Corps in the Battles for Kharkov and Belgorod.&quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/5776326768890922431/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/5776326768890922431?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/5776326768890922431'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/5776326768890922431'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/08/german-defense-tactics-against-russian.html' title='German Defense Tactics against Russian Breakthroughs | A Historical Study'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Soviet Union</georss:featurename><georss:point>52.0879608794343 39.458564020978429</georss:point><georss:box>46.9933138794343 29.13160352097843 57.1826078794343 49.785524520978427</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-3057623819041900643</id><published>2019-07-19T12:41:00.001+02:00</published><updated>2019-07-19T12:41:37.118+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Dien Bien Phu Myths | 5th Edition</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://image.vietnamnews.vn/uploadvnnews/Storage/Images/2014/4/30/chienthang.jpeg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;Viet Minh soldiers on top of General De Castries bunker in Dien Bien Phu&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;315&quot; data-original-width=&quot;450&quot; height=&quot;224&quot; src=&quot;https://image.vietnamnews.vn/uploadvnnews/Storage/Images/2014/4/30/chienthang.jpeg&quot; title=&quot;Viet Minh soldiers on top of General De Castries bunker in Dien Bien Phu&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
&quot;Historian Bernard Fall, still a leading authority on the French Indochina War even 70 years later, wrote about this pervading myth in his work, &lt;b&gt;Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu&lt;/b&gt;, effectively riposting any claims to the contrary through French Legionary archives and personal interviews.&quot; The following &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dropbox.com/s/pas3fdkbahpsad5/Dien%20Bien%20Phu%20Myths.pdf?dl=0&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;article&lt;/a&gt;, originally published in the UNRV Ancient Roman Empire Forums by User Sassinid Azatan, debunks the ten most common myths about the last major battle in French Indochina.&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/3057623819041900643/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/3057623819041900643?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/3057623819041900643'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/3057623819041900643'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/07/dien-bien-phu-myths-5th-edition.html' title='Dien Bien Phu Myths | 5th Edition'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Dien Bien Phu, Indochina</georss:featurename><georss:point>18.607878818863082 103.06519638230134</georss:point><georss:box>14.747223818863082 97.901715882301332 22.468533818863083 108.22867688230134</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-589892616381353428</id><published>2019-07-11T18:06:00.002+02:00</published><updated>2021-10-09T12:39:10.745+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Rethinking Counterinsurgency | A Case Study of Boko Haram in Nigeria</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://pbs.twimg.com/media/D0LZwA0WkAAjLmb?format=jpg&amp;amp;name=4096x4096&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;A Nigerian soldier carries his teammate during a casualty evacuation training exercise at Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso February 21 during #Flintlock19&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;533&quot; data-original-width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;213&quot; src=&quot;https://pbs.twimg.com/media/D0LZwA0WkAAjLmb.jpg&quot; title=&quot;A Nigerian soldier carries his teammate during a casualty evacuation training exercise&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
A &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/pdf/case-studies/Samson_Eyituoyo_Liolio_-_Rethinking_Counterinsurgency.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;thesis&lt;/a&gt; submitted &lt;i&gt;by
Samson Eyituoyo Liolio, Nigeria. &lt;/i&gt;Abstract: &quot;The issue of Boko Haram in Nigeria has become a threat to both internal and international
security with ever-growing violence and attacks on security forces, civilians, churches, media
houses as well as international bodies such as the United Nations. With the increased
numbers of cadres, improved and sophisticated weaponry, suicide bombing and well organised guerrilla tactics, Boko Haram’s challenge to the Nigerian state now also stretches
across the entire 36 states of Nigeria, thus affecting its economic and social-political growth.
With an aim of finding a solution that could lead to success in fending off the Boko Haram
insurgency, this thesis explores the economic and political-cum-military forces at play
between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram. It tries to investigate the apparatus of
counterinsurgency earlier employed by the Nigerian state, thus also seeking to explain the
possible counterproductive result or failure of counterinsurgency.&quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/589892616381353428/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/589892616381353428?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/589892616381353428'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/589892616381353428'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/07/rethinking-counterinsurgency-case-study.html' title='Rethinking Counterinsurgency | A Case Study of Boko Haram in Nigeria'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Nigeria</georss:featurename><georss:point>9.0078665488328742 8.0913451510945151</georss:point><georss:box>1.041171048832874 -2.2356153489054851 16.974562048832873 18.418305651094514</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-5668068907098195956</id><published>2019-07-10T13:49:00.002+02:00</published><updated>2019-07-10T13:49:31.040+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Operation Husky - The Campaign in Sicily</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://i.pinimg.com/originals/f3/5b/0f/f35b0f3c4777ded2d67c109a51e570bd.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;: American troops place steel matting over the sandy beach near Scoglitti to provide traction for heavy vehicles.&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;577&quot; data-original-width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;230&quot; src=&quot;https://i.pinimg.com/originals/f3/5b/0f/f35b0f3c4777ded2d67c109a51e570bd.jpg&quot; title=&quot;Operation Husky | The Sicily Landings 9 - 10 July 1943&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
This is a &lt;a href=&quot;https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a251393.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;case study&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;i&gt;by&amp;nbsp;Jon M. Swanson, LTC, USAF. &lt;/i&gt;Abstract: &quot;The Allied decision to invade Sicily following the successful operation in North Africa was crucial to the conduct of World War II. The commitment of such a large force to&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
continued operations in the Mediterranean theater meant that the cross-channel invasion from Great Britain into northwest Europe would have to be delayed. If Sicily was chosen as the next step, it would come at the expense of other options favored by many political and military leaders.The American military commanders strongly favored a cross-channel invasion at the earliest possible opportunity. This meant that this invasion force would be the first priority for troops, shipping and equipment. On the other hand, the British favored an indirect approach that would see a major effort continue in the Mediterranean.&quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/5668068907098195956/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/5668068907098195956?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/5668068907098195956'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/5668068907098195956'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/07/operation-husky-campaign-in-sicily.html' title='Operation Husky - The Campaign in Sicily'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Sicily, Italy</georss:featurename><georss:point>37.378351519090529 14.586318828857657</georss:point><georss:box>34.087548519090532 9.4228383288576563 40.669154519090526 19.749799328857655</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-7247077642639248553</id><published>2019-07-09T15:11:00.001+02:00</published><updated>2019-07-25T16:52:53.927+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Counterinsurgency - The Hogard Doctrine</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.revueconflits.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/jacques-hogard.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;Jacques Hogard, théoricien méconnu de la contre-insurrection&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;450&quot; data-original-width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;180&quot; src=&quot;https://www.revueconflits.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/jacques-hogard.jpg&quot; title=&quot;Jacques Hogard, théoricien méconnu de la contre-insurrection&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;An interesting &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.guerredefrance.fr/Documents/HOGARDDOCTRINE.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;publication&lt;/a&gt; (in French) about a perhaps underrated (or forgotten?!) French COIN expert - &quot;The concept of subversive warfare has
once again come to resemble the one
that had been paradoxically advocated
by many leaders of the 18th century: to
defeat the enemy without fighting,” according to
&lt;a href=&quot;https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Hogard_(g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral)&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Jacques Hogard&lt;/a&gt;. This French military officer belongs
to the generation of lieutenants and captains who
had fought against the already well-established phenomenon that reached its climax during the Cold
War and has since been, in his words, “adopted by
all modern barbarians.” To his credit, he reviewed the
subject coldly and in its entirety, in order to better
defeat it.&quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/7247077642639248553/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/7247077642639248553?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/7247077642639248553'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/7247077642639248553'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/07/counterinsurgency-hogard-doctrine.html' title='Counterinsurgency - The Hogard Doctrine'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Indochina</georss:featurename><georss:point>14.097639947048835 107.69465226831085</georss:point><georss:box>6.2333719470488349 97.367691768310848 21.961907947048836 118.02161276831085</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-4449125532150085096</id><published>2019-07-08T13:40:00.002+02:00</published><updated>2019-07-08T13:41:21.215+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>Quo vadis Deutsche Marine?</title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://miro.medium.com/max/707/1*xVt9SSxHo946-fV3-xe2cg.jpeg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;F125-frigate under construction&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;432&quot; data-original-width=&quot;640&quot; height=&quot;216&quot; src=&quot;https://miro.medium.com/max/707/1*xVt9SSxHo946-fV3-xe2cg.jpeg&quot; title=&quot;F125-frigate under construction&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
This &lt;a href=&quot;https://medium.com/@AlexLuck9/quo-vadis-deutsche-marine-2a4115533028&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;article&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;i&gt;by &lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://twitter.com/AlexLuck9&quot; style=&quot;font-style: italic;&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Alex L&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-style: italic;&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://twitter.com/AlexLuck9&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;uck&lt;/a&gt;&lt;u&gt;,&lt;/u&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&amp;nbsp;gives us an overview about the current procurement situation of the German Navy (Bundesmarine). &quot;On 17th June the German Navy reached a milestone by finally commissioning the first of their new F125-frigates, formally known as the Baden-Wuerttemberg-class. In some regards these ships set a new standard for Germany. &quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/4449125532150085096/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/4449125532150085096?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/4449125532150085096'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/4449125532150085096'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/07/quo-vadis-deutsche-marine.html' title='Quo vadis Deutsche Marine?'/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Kiel, Germany</georss:featurename><georss:point>51.471418554873551 10.809822978802231</georss:point><georss:box>46.258332554873554 0.48286247880223065 56.684504554873548 21.136783478802229</georss:box></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6697528802514704463.post-4454698994671245074</id><published>2019-07-06T19:30:00.001+02:00</published><updated>2019-07-06T19:30:41.442+02:00</updated><category scheme="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#" term="Recommended Reading"/><title type='text'>A Review of Algerian War of National Liberation </title><content type='html'>&lt;div class=&quot;separator&quot; style=&quot;clear: both; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://truthout.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-535820471-1200x805.jpg&quot; imageanchor=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;&quot;&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;F.L.N. (National Liberation Front) soldiers, 1954-1962, during the Algerian War of Independence&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; data-original-height=&quot;537&quot; data-original-width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;214&quot; src=&quot;https://truthout.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-535820471-1200x805.jpg&quot; title=&quot;F.L.N. (National Liberation Front) soldiers&quot; width=&quot;320&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;
Using the U.S. Army’s
Current Counterinsurgency Doctrine, is a &lt;a href=&quot;https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/ksil50.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;publication&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;i&gt;by&amp;nbsp;Karl Goetzke, COL, US Army. &lt;/i&gt;&quot;The Algerian War of National Liberation is a classic counter-insurgency operation. A
rebellion arising from within the Algerian population was transformed into an insurgency by the
incorporation of an armed political campaign. Underlying this rebellion were socio-economic
factors that typically galvanize any political campaign (e.g., distribution of wealth, participation in
political intercourse). The catalyst for rebellion and resistance was a popular desire to end the
French occupation of Algeria. While the indigenous population of Algeria was overwhelmingly
Islamic, religious ideology was not a primary mobilizing factor behind the rebellion, unlike the
current insurgencies faced in the War on Terrorism.&quot;&lt;/div&gt;
</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/feeds/4454698994671245074/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/6697528802514704463/4454698994671245074?isPopup=true' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/4454698994671245074'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6697528802514704463/posts/default/4454698994671245074'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hauptkampflinie.blogspot.com/2019/07/a-review-of-algerian-war-of-national.html' title='A Review of Algerian War of National Liberation '/><author><name>Oberst Wilhelm Klink</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/14364017133648858622</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='https://img1.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total><georss:featurename>Algeria</georss:featurename><georss:point>31.644441433827193 3.9625575010726379</georss:point><georss:box>18.017416933827192 -16.691363998927361 45.271465933827194 24.616479001072637</georss:box></entry></feed>