The Diplomat of the Future

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Fri, 18 Jul 2008 02:03:00 +0000

THE EUROPEAN QUANDRY: A 'DILEMMA' OR A 'SOLUTION'?

"This agglomeration which was called and which still calls itself the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire".

Voltaire, 1756.

"It would be more sensible to put the Lisbon treaty on ice for several years, and try to rescue those parts that are important, uncontentious, and capable of being carried out without treaty amendment. That does not include creating a semi-permanent president of the European Council, but it does mean beefing up an EU diplomatic service, and giving more resources to the EU high representative for foreign affairs.

Europe does not need to turn the drama of the Irish No vote into a fully-fledged crisis of confidence. Everyone is fed up with negotiating new treaties. The priority should be to make the EU work better with practical policies - on energy security and climate change, for a start - with its present rules and 27 member states. The Nice treaty is not ideal, but losing Lisbon should not be seen as the end of the world". "Time to put the EU Treat on Ice", 14 June, in www.ft.com

The reference in the FT's leader to the 'gnashing of teeth', by European leaders both at the time and since, serves to sum up the bien-pensant feelings and views of
Europe's post-enlightenment, cosmopolitan elites, for whom the Irish vote, coming as it does on the heels of the similar 'non' votes by the French and Dutch a few years prior, was another slap in the face by the demos concerning the dream of their Europe. But, the focus on the immediate intricacies of the Irish vote, serves to merely highlight how irrelevant and unimportant, in true power political terms the
entire EU project has become in the past twenty-fiver years or so. It was possible, at one time, in the distant past in the sixties and the seventies to imagine that
a united Europe, would be, could be a machtstaat, `a la the USA (if perhaps not so
maladroit). No one today, or for many many years past has any such illusions. The EU of Messieurs Delors, Pool, Junker, et. al., is a union much more akin to Voltaire's Holy Roman Empire. It is neither one thing nor the other: neither an Empire, nor a nation-state, nor a traditional sovereign state, nor a 'power state', nor is it merely what it began life as: a free trade union. In short, the EU as it is currently constituted is incapable to fulfilling any recognized role and as a consequence, is completely unable to legitimate itself to the peoples of Europe, for whom the nation-state, traditionally constituted, represents the summit (such as it is) of political allegiance and loyalties. If people questioned the need to 'die for Danzig', in the summer of 1939, how much more so, do the peoples of Europe today, question the need to die for Brussels, with its army of bureaucrats and elected MEP's, who no one votes for and who more often than not, serve no one but themselves.
As some recent investigations into the finances of the members of Europe's supreme
legislature show.

Europe, had a chance to be united, in some normative sense circa 1914, under German hegemony. For good or for ill, it flubbed that chance. The rest of European history since are piecemeal and failed attempts to make up for the original failure. The EU is merely another failed attempt and nothing more.

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Tue, 10 Jun 2008 00:33:00 +0000

The United States & Turkmenistan: The 'Great Game' continues

"I think the fundamental issue of energy security is that you’re not dependant on any one route, on any one customer, or on any one investor. The market is the best guarantee of security, and having multiple export routes is the best guarantee of having access to the market. So, I think, in the end, what we talked about were prospects for exports in all directions, what are the prospects for some gas to go south. There is renewed interest, I know, in Pakistan, in the Trans-Afghan Pipeline. There is interest, obviously, in Europe in importing gas from Turkmenistan. We all know there are plans and programs to export gas to China and there are existing relations with Russia. So, having all these possibilities, I think, helps Turkmenistan have a secure set of markets, helps Turkmenistan get a good price for its gas everywhere it goes, and frankly helps the customers, too. Customers have more security because they have multiple routes to acquire gas. So energy security for Europe, for example, is important to us; it’s important to the Europeans. And that, again, is based on having multiple sources. So I think what’s good for the producers is actually good for the customers as well. So we were looking at all these things. The ultimate feasibility of these projects needs to be decided by companies and commercial considerations. Governments can look at what’s possible to facilitate, but, in the end, they have to be done by government…by commercial institutions, sorry.

QUESTION (in Russian): Ukrainform agency. You told that you discussed the human rights. So what particularly was discussed and do you see any improvements in this area?

"I think we’ve seen some improvements in terms of the ability to travel, ability to access the internet. They’ve let a lot of people out of jail. Some of them are people that were of concern. What we talked about is how to continue these kinds of changes, but also how to give the people of Turkmenistan more of a voice in their government – through elections, through powers of parliament – how to open up access to information, allow journalists to operate more freely: all these things that make for a modern information society, that allow people to participate in a modern economy".

United States Assistant Secretary of State for South & Central Asian Affairs, in Turkmenistan, 29 May 2008, in www.state.gov

According to some reports, and, it is clear from American Assistant Secretary of State Boucher's recent visit to the region, those (like myself) who declared last year that the 'Great Game' in Central Asia, was 'over' may perhaps have been premature. Contrary to my then surmise that Moskva was triumphant over the USA, EU and the China, in their combined competition over getting control of Central Asian energy, specifically oil and gas resources. And, the means of transporting them out of the region. As it did appear last year, when then Russian President, Vladimir Putin managed to get his Turkmen and Kazak counterparts, to sign accords which according to independent observers at that time, gave Moskva: "an unbreakable stranglehold over Central Asia's energy resources" (www.eurasianet.org).

Now according to some observers, it is Matushka Roissya who is on the defensive in the region, and, it is the USA and the EU which is on the diplomatic offensive (see in particular www.ft.com & "Western Diplomatic Offensive throws Russia on the defensive", in www.eurasianet.org) This alleged turn of events, begs two questions, which I would like to at the very least raise today, if not necessarily answer: a) is there an American, if not necessarily an EU offensive in the region?; b) and, if so, does such a maneuver by the USA make diplomatic and strategic sense?

On the first of the above questions the answer is quite evident: that contrary to most areas of the world, where the USA appears to be in a diplomatic holding pattern, Central Asia has seen in the last nine months, renewed energy and drive by official Washington. The negative side effects of the nearly destroyed relationship with Karimov regime in Uzbekistan in the region as a whole appears to be almost entirely gone. Quite clearly and indeed almost cynically so, Washington has decided it seems, that 'if you cannot beat them, join them'. Id est, that authoritarian regimes in the region are going to be around for awhile, and, there is no sense in trying to pretend otherwise. Hence the obviously empty platitudes issued by Mr. Boucher in the Turkmenistan capital less than two weeks ago about alleged 'improvements' in human rights. As well as similar noises elsewhere in the region. It now appears that for purposes of energetically trying to re-establish close ties with these rather nasty, brutish if not necessarily short (sorry Thomas Hobbes for that) dictatorships, the concepts in the air of 2004 and 2005 in American diplomacy, of the primacy of human rights over other policy considerations has evaporated into thin smoke. For Boucher, et. al., what now counts over almost every other consideration, is keeping the region's natural resources open to Western (aka American) control or at least access, rather than solely that of Moskva's Gazprom. As Boucher quite clearly stated a few months back:

"We are promoting multiple linkages to connect Central Asia to the world. Countries should never be left with only one option — one market, one trading partner, one vital infrastructure link. Central Asia is a landlocked region, far from major maritime trading routes. But it was once a crossroads of global trade and can be once again. Central Asia lies next door to some of the world’s most dynamic economic regions. The more options Central Asians have, the more choices they have, the more independence they have....Central Asia is clearly significant to our efforts to diversify energy supplies to Europe and the United States. We also consider the development and diversification of the Central Asian energy sector as a critical component in our broader strategy to create those multiple economic linkages that increase the independence of the Central Asian states and introduce market principles to the regional energy market. We are therefore working to facilitate multiple oil and gas export routes, including trans-Caspian routes, to increase the region’s stability and prosperity" (Richard Boucher, 8 April 2008, in www.state.gov.).

No one needed to be told of course, that the 'one option' mentioned by Boucher refers of course to Russia's current control of all of the energy transmission lines out of the region.

So, the question I believe can be answered in the affirmative: there is in fact an American diplomatic offensive in the region. Which leads immediately to the second question: does such a diplomatic offensive make sense? For some of course (Stephen Sestanovich, Zbignieuw Brzezinski, et cetera, et cetera), an anti-Russian diplomatic push, by the Bush regime is something overdue and long awaited. They say that only by throwing the American diplomatic weight on the scales, can Central Asia, throw-off the 'yoke' of Russian hegemony. To my mind, this is an absolutely wrong way of looking at this issue. To my mind a better manner of approaching this issue is the following: a) regardless of perhaps being able to obtain direct access to Central Asian energy resources, some day in the future (2010, 2015, 2020?) via a Caspian and other gas pipelines, the fact of the matter is the for the short-term (next five to ten years time), Russia will still continue to control almost all of the pipelines exiting the region to the West. Nothing can change that; b) even when the anointed day arrives when say the Caspian-Nabucco pipeline project will become a reality, and (say) Turkmenistan will be able to export a portion of its gas directly to the West, per se, the volume of gas being exported will be so low, as to not materially effect Gazprom's current market share in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. However much, many American diplomats would like to think otherwise; c) the costs involved in 'a' and 'b' above, are rather blithely ignored by our modern-day 'Great Game', strategists. What exactly are those costs you may wonder? They are as follows: Russian non-co-operation in dealing with Persia, in dealing with Afghanistan, among other things. Additionally, of course, such an overt American role, has the potential, to unnecessarily alienate diplomatically Matushka Roissya. All three issues have I would argue, a far higher importance than any hoped for gains to be obtained by the 'opening' Central Asia to American diplomatic influence. Finally, it is quite clear to me, if not necessarily to official Washington, that the real alternative to Russian 'hegemony' in Central Asia, is not some successful American project of Democratization and Western strategic alignments, but, in fact something infinitely worse, much, much worse than Russian influence, such as it is, but in fact, Chinese hegemony. A hegemony, which if it were to come about, would be infinitely more dangerous for Western interests and concerns than anything offered up by Moskva. Perhaps before Washington loses its head over its renewed interest in Central Asia, it will perhaps remember that salient fact. One only can hope so.

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Thu, 29 May 2008 22:57:00 +0000

SOLANA GOES TO TEHERAN: DIPLOMATIC PROSPECTS

"Mr. Solana proposed two different dates for his visit to Tehran that I am considering...I think he will pay a visit to Tehran soon....

"Solana has given us a message that he wants to travel to Iran to deliver the package and we have agreed to the principle of the visit".

Persian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki quoted on 29 May, by Agence France-Presse in www.afp.com

The timing of the EU's diplomatic dogsbody & foreign minister manque, Javier Solana, could not be better or more interesting: on the one hand, the regime in Teheran must by definition feel that recent events in the region have played into its hands to a degree: a) the tactical and political victory by Hezbollah in the latest round of Lebanese infighting; b) the survival and indeed more than survival of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip. Notwithstanding Israeli efforts to sabotage and indeed destroy it. On the other hand, the fact that its closest regional ally, Syria has decided to open talks with its (and Persia's) arch enemy Israel, must be worrying to the regime in Persia. Especially since it is quite clear that separating the two powers is one of the Israeli pre-conditions for the success of the talks. In addition, notwithstanding the fact that the high price of oil should be all reason give a marvelous fillip to the Persian economy, the Beirut Daily Star tells us today that due to sanctions imposed by the USA and its allies on the UN Security Council, the population of Persia can expect power cuts this summer. Another headline from Persia notes that six Revolutionary Guards were killed in fighting with Kurdish rebels. A reminder for those ignorant of the fact that only half of the population of the Persian, are in fact 'Persian' language speakers. The rest belonging to other groupings like the Kurds for example (for both headlines, see: www.dailystar.com.lb)

The long and the short of it is, that with things carefully balanced for the Persian regime, with both negative and positive elements, it could very well be that the authorities in Teheran will be open to a 'grand compromise', with the USA and its allies. Of course the USA will not agree to anything at this stage, but, it could very well be the case that the Bush regime, faute de mieux, will agree to accept any plausible agreement that Solana is able to cobble together at this stage on the nuclear issue. As David Albright's Institute for Science and International Security, latest report shows, there has been considerable progress in Teheran's quest for nuclear power (www.dailystar.com.lb). So the issue becomes, contra to those like ex-American Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton and his ilk, of not, 'appeasement' or Persian disarmament, and then hopefully 'regime change', in Teheran. Rather as a realistic and feasible proposition, something which any analyst of the region worth his salt will recognize immediately, negotiating some type of modus viviendi with the regime of Mullah's, and, by that means defuse the issue of Persian possession of nuclear weapons in the future. In return for which, by definition the West will indeed need to both forswear any idea of 'regime change', in Persia in the future (at least any which can be said to have been fostered by Western, outside assistance), and, to agree to recognize de facto, if not necessarily de jure, Persia's valid security interests in the region. Which of course, contrary to our neo-conservative ideologues, does not necessarily mean giving carte blanche to the Persians, but, simply an accommodation to regional realities. It is probably the case that we (meaning the West) are not yet ready for this type of grand compromise, but, hopefully in the future, either near or not so far, we will be. One can only hope so. Not that I for one, have any more sympathy for the regime of Mullah's than Ambassador Bolton does. I am one with him in hoping that the current regime in Teheran collapses completely. I am just of the opinion that based upon all the available evidence and logic available, that this hoped for utopia will not in fact occur anytime soon. Tant pis mais c'est la force de la chose. And, diplomacy means if nothing else accommodating oneself, even if only temporarily to inconvenient facts. A lesson which zealots like Ambassador Bolton, Mr. Elliott Abrams, et cetera, et cetera, appear to have failed yet to learn. Hopefully they will do so before it is too late. Based upon all the evidence, there is absolutely nothing to be gained for the West by waiting upon events in this matter.

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Thu, 22 May 2008 02:14:00 +0000

A BREAKTHROUGH ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS FRONT?

"Damascus,(SANA)- Syria and Israel have started off indirect peace talks under the patronage of Turkey…where both sides have expressed desire to conduct talks with good intention and have decided to pursue dialogue between them seriously and sustainably for the achievement of comprehensive peace in line with reference of Madrid Peace Conference.

The source added:" Syria highly appreciates in that connection the incessant efforts that have been exerted by Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan , and the role of Turkey for over a year .

It is noteworthy to say that President Bashar al-Assad told Qatari daily alWattan recently that the Turkish mediation which continued from April last year until April this year was led by Erdogan.

The president indicated that the talks will be indirect through the Turkish mediation which will convey the basic data for finding a common ground which will be the basis for initiating direct negotiations later.

"An Official Foreign Ministry Source: Syria and Israel Have Indirect Peace Talks Under Turkish Patronage". in www.sana.sy/eng

"Negotiations with Syria will not be easy and will not be simple, it may take a long time and it will involve concessions....After evaluating all the data and receiving the opinion of the defence establishment, I reached the conclusion that the chance [for success] is greater than the risk, and with this hope we are today getting on our way".
Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, speaking on the 21st of May, in www.haaretz.com.

As I have predicted here in the past couple of weeks, all of the balance of forces are in the direction of an Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations and eventually a 'deal'. A sort of 'peace of the strong'. Those voices who worried or better yet predicted the possibility of a Syrian-Israeli War coming about, were I thought than, and, even more so think now, entirely mistaken. Neither Damascus or Tel Aviv, have much to gain from any conflict. Both have much to gain diplomatically from a peace accord. In the case of Damascus: to regain the Golan, to come out of the American-sponsored, diplomatic ice-box, to join the rest of the Near Eastern region's economic upswing. In the case of Tel Aviv: to gain peace on its northern front, to reduce the number of its enemies by one (and indeed the most important one), to also clamp down permanently the Lebanese-Hezbollah front as well, to reduce the Persian-radical Shiite influence in the region and to furthermore isolate the regime in Teheran (for this motivation, see: "Israelis see Syria peace as way to curb Iran [Persia] influence", in www.afp.com.

Of course all of the above was foreseeable as far back as two years ago. Unfortunately the Bush regime, in the full flush of its 'pro-Democracy' blindness and hubris, deliberately chose to ignore those voices in Tel Aviv, pleading for an opportunity to pursue the diplomatic option vis-`a-vis Damascus. Now it would appear that the American 'veto', has been either broken or ignored by Olmert (for the breakdown of the American 'veto' power in the region, as least in part, see: "White House Policies crumble as US allies make peace moves in the region," in www.dailystar.com.lb). Whichever one it is, the timing could not be better, given the modus viviendi that was agreed to in Doha by the opposing parties in the Lebanon most recently. Of course no one should expect an immediate peace accord. Negotiations will be protracted and difficult. Indeed, I do not expect anything to be agreed at concretely until the arrival of the next American President in 2009. Then and only then, will a positively green light be given to Olmert, et. al., to arrive at an accord with the regime of Assad fils. Nothing of the sort can be expected from the current crew in Washington, DC. As was made quite clear from the press briefing at the State Department, where the entire matter was discussed through gritted teeth and the verbal equivalent of frowns (see: www.state.gov) . From the next administration, it is entirely possible, and, indeed probable that a peace deal between these two longstanding antagonists, will be welcomed. Indeed, one can well imagine on the White House lawn no less...

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Thu, 22 May 2008 00:16:00 +0000

THE DIALECTICS OF DEFEAT: THE LEBANESE DEBACLE APPRAISED, PART TWO

"The United States welcomes the agreement reached by Lebanese leaders in Doha, Qatar. We view this agreement as a positive step towards resolving the current crisis by electing a President, forming a new government, and addressing Lebanon’s electoral law, consistent with the Arab League initiative. The United States supports the government of Lebanon and its complete authority over the entire territory of the country.

The United States commends the efforts of the Arab League’s committee of Foreign Ministers, in particular the leadership of the Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, and Secretary General Amr Moussa.

We call upon all Lebanese leaders to implement this agreement in its entirety, in accordance with the Arab League initiative and in conformity with UN Security Council resolutions".
American Secretary of State Rice, 21st of May, in www.state.gov

"You must either conquer and rule, or serve and lose. Suffer or triumph, be the anvil or the hammer".
Wolfgang von Goethe

The news from Doha indicates that the prediction made here one week ago, that the March 14 coalition would eventually capitulate to the Persian-backed opposition, has come to pass. As per the Financial Times, the two sides, have come to an agreement, in the talks sponsored by the Arab League in which Hezbollah will be given veto power over the decisions inside the Lebanese Cabinet, as well as allowed to retain its weapons arsenal(see: www.ft.com). The only saving grace for the 14th of March coalition, is that permission has finally been given for General Michel Suleiman, the Army Commander to be finally elected President. General Suleiman while in origins a compromise candidate, is on the whole likely to be friendly, if not in an overt fashion to the 14th of March coalition, and, not an adherent of either Syria, or Hezbollah and its Persian backers. Overall, it is true to say that given the realities on the ground in the Lebanon since the failed Israeli War of 2006, no effort to rule the country without taking into account the power and influence of Hezbollah and its allies could have persisted for very long or successfully. The fact that the Siniora Cabinet managed to remain in office for almost twenty months after the end of the 2006 conflict remains in retrospect something close to miraculous. The agreement arrived at Doha reflects those underlying realities. To pretend that Lebanon could have remained firmly in the Western Camp, after what occurred and did not occur in the summer of 2006, is (in the words of Neville Chamberlain) 'the very mid-summer of madness'.

Need I or anyone else for that matter add, that outcome in Doha, represents a defeat, an unmitigated and absolute defeat for the Bush regime's diplomacy in the Lebanon for the last three years? The fact that both Secretary Rice and Assistant Secretary Welch attempted to put a positive face on this defeat does not obviate the reality of what has now occurred. The only saving grace perhaps is the knowledge that given the debacle of the Lebanon War of 2006, in the short to medium term, no other outcome could be expected.

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Fri, 16 May 2008 01:41:00 +0000

THE DIALECTICS OF DEFEAT: THE LEBANESE DEBACLE APPRAISED.

"Hezbollah continues to pose a challenge to the future of the Lebanese people in terms of realizing a broad-based, deep democracy that benefits all of the Lebanese people. You – we have seen over the past several days that Hezbollah is willing to kill Lebanese in the interest of their political agenda, which seems to have really no basis other than to try to expand their political power. It operates outside the political system in Lebanon.

And our view is, along with others, not only in the region, but around the world, is that we are going to continue to do what we can to strengthen this Lebanese Government that is democratically elected, that seeks only to govern on behalf of all the Lebanese people, to expand – extend its sovereignty over all of Lebanon, and to broaden and deepen Lebanese democracy, and to fiercely guard Lebanon’s sovereignty. It’s in – we believe in the Lebanese people’s interest, we believe it is in Lebanon’s interest. That is going to be a continuing challenge as long as you have groups like Hezbollah that are, at the very least, largely influenced, at the other end of the spectrum, controlled by parties outside of Lebanon: Iran and Syria.

So that is going to be a continuing – that is going to be a continuing challenge for the Lebanese people. It’s going to be a continuing challenge for those in the international system who have an interest in a more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Lebanon. So it remains our view that we are going to stand with those democratically elected leaders who continue to fight on behalf of Lebanese democracy.
QUESTION: Why isn’t this appeasement?"

State Department, Spokesman, Thomas McCormack, 15 April 2008 in www.state.gov

Yes, indeed! Well if not necessarily appeasement, then something along the lines of a de facto acknowledgement by the State Department and official Washington in general, that American policy for the last few years, since in fact 2005 and the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri by Syrian agents, of seeking a pro-Western, 'Democratic', Lebanon, is in shambles if not in fact completely destroyed. The American and Saudi, Egyptian, French backed Sinioria government, chose one week ago to directly challenge the Persia and Syrian backed Hezbollah movement, in the latter's de facto control of Beirut's airport. Hezbollah responded to this action, immediately and dramatically occupying much of west Beirut as well as parts of the Shouf mountain, near the capital. And, just as quickly the Sinioria government used the fitful intervention of the army to back-down completely in a face saving compromise. However much the Bush regime may talk of upholding Lebanese sovereignty and integrity, as well as praise itself for its program of arming the Lebanese Army, the fact of the matter is that the Lebanese Army was again revealed this past week to be a completely worthless instrument of American or for that fact, any other power's, policy. As several postings this week on Joshua Landis's always excellent, online journal, Syria Comment (www.Syriacomment.com) note, the debacle this past week, is a mirror image of past attempts by the USA, to directly (1983-1984) or indirectly (1957-1958, et passim) change Lebanon's place in the regional constellation of powers, in a pro-Western / pro-American direction. In many such instances, the USA would talk of using the Lebanese Army as a means of such a policy. And, just as often, the Lebanese Army has showed itself to be completely useless. If not worse. The upshot of last week's events shows that unless there is a drastic change in the correlation of forces on the ground in Lebanon, the stalemate between the Siniora government and its pro-Persian / pro-Syrian opponents will continue. And, however unfortunate it may be, there is not much that the USA can do about it. Call it appeasement if you like but that is the reality of the situation.

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Fri, 09 May 2008 00:58:00 +0000

THE MEDVEDEV INHERITANCE: DIPLOMATIC PROSPECTS

"Dmitry Medvedev was due on Wednesday to be inaugurated as Russia’s president in succession to Vladimir Putin, who will become prime minister. For the first time in Russia’s turbulent history, a leader in good health is peacefully handing over the keys of the Kremlin to a legally approved successor.

The symbolism should not hide the political reality – Mr Putin will remain Russia’s real ruler for some time to come. And the ex-KGB men he promoted will stay close to the seat of power.

However, if Mr Medvedev plays his cards well he may succeed in accumulating authority, given signs that Mr Putin may eventually wish to retire and that power in Russia gravitates around the Kremlin.

While both men have put continuity high on the agenda, they have also cast the new presidency as an opportunity for a change of emphasis. The argument is not without foundation – Mr Medvedev is the first leader since 1917 to come from outside the Communist party.

A lawyer, he has pledged to promote the rule of law. That promise should be welcome to the many Russians who suffer daily from abuses of power, including corruption and judicial malpractice. Not the least among them is Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the jailed oil baron, who was imprisoned on politically motivated fraud charges and now faces new allegations. Mr Medvedev must show that by upholding the rule of law he means to strengthen the rights of citizens and not simply to reinforce the rights of an over-mighty state, as Mr Putin has done.

Mr Putin and Mr Medvedev also seem to want to ease tensions with the west. Mr Putin has made efforts to settle disputes, including with the US over missile defence and with the European Union over Poland’s meat trade. The west should make the most of the opportunity – co-operation with Russia is important on issues including energy, global terrorism, the Middle East and Iran.

But western leaders should not be naive. What Russia does matters more than what Russia says. Even as it is making semi-friendly overtures to the west, it is protesting against Nato enlargement and raising pressure on Georgia, by increasing its troops in breakaway Abkhazia. The rhetoric in Moscow and Tbilisi is alarming. While both states claim they do not want war, the danger of blundering into one is growing.

The west must be firm – the sovereignty of the ex-Soviet Union states must be upheld, like the sovereignty of countries elsewhere. Mr Medvedev must show that, as a lawyer, he has as much respect for international as for domestic law".

"Seize the moment, talk to Medvedev", The Financial Times, 8 May 2008, Editorial in www.ft.com

"I expect the relations to shift slowly to where they used to be at 2001 to 2002, because they went too far downwards during the last six years. There’s a fundamental contradiction in Russian foreign policy toward the West generally, and the United States in particular. Strategically, the needs of Russia dictate a very close alliance with the West because we face the same fundamental security challenges of Islamic radicalism and a rising China. But at the same time there have been a lot of internal political impulses pushing the Kremlin to strained relations with the West.

First, there is the deep psychological setback of defeat in the Cold War and loss of superpower status suffered by the Russian political elite. Second, it’s been useful politically to portray the West as the enemy to justify outgoing President Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian regime. There are also the financial interests of the ruling group because they not only rule Russia; they also in effect “own” Russia, being de facto owners of the main oil and gas companies. They are interested in very high oil prices, so there is a tendency in Russian foreign policy to keep tensions high in the Middle East, and that’s especially clear in the case of Iran’s nuclear problem.

So it is inevitable that Russian foreign policy is contradictory and has a cyclic character. It seems to me that now we have reached the end of the latest negative confrontational cycle and there are the first indications of an upward tendency. Both during the recent ministers’ meeting in Moscow and during the Sochi summit [April 2008 meeting between Putin and Bush], Moscow was rather conciliatory. Earlier, the Kremlin had threatened to target its nuclear missiles on European cities and so on. But in Moscow and during Sochi, Putin went out of his way to emphasize that he believed that Russian concerns were understood by the United States and Americans were sincerely trying to assuage our concerns. There is now a tendency to reduce a bit the anti-Western posturing in government policy and propaganda".

Andrei Piontkovsky [Director of the Strategic Studies Center in Moskva], in www.cfr.org

There has indeed been a changing of the guard in Moskva. Putin has in accordance with the constitution of the Russian Federation, become the first Russian leader in history to serve out his term and see a peaceful transfer of power. Moving over to the premiership, and the head of the ruling party, Putin will of course for quite some time to come, be the primus inter pares in the duumvirate with Medvedev. However history shows that such arrangements (Marc Anthony and Octavian come to mind as does Tsars Pyotr I and his half-brother Ivan VI) rarely last very long, especially in Russia. So, assuming that within a not very long amount of time that Medvedev will be the senior partner in this modern day dvoetsarstvovanie, what can we expect from him diplomatically? And, how will Russian diplomacy change, both in content and in form from the Putin regime? Well first off, Medvedev is an entirely different animal than any Russian leader since 1917, if not since the great pre-war premier, P.A. Stolypin. In essence both men were not chinovnikii or appartchikii, but members of civil society, what in Russia is termed the 'intelligentsia' (in the original, 19th century Russian meaning of the word). As Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski has recently commented the mere fact that Medvedev is "the first Russian leader in my memory who doesn't come from the Communist Party or the security services" (see: "Medvedev Good for the West, says Poland," in www.ft.com), is a reason for welcoming him. Second, unlike Grazhdanin Putin, Medvedev does not appear to harbour any deep suspicions of the West, nor is he prone to have any nostalgia for the now defunct Sovietskaya Vlast. Something that Putin and many members of his entourage still suffer from. In short, with Medvedev the outside world is now dealing with the future not the past of Russian foreign policy.

What however it may well be asked is the 'future of Russian foreign policy'? I would argue that it will consist of a the following points, points strongly held and not liable to be easily given up or away: upholding, in a non-belligerent, if at times perhaps annoying fashion, Russian prestige and Russian's position in the world. The days when Russia could simply be presented with faite accompli's, by the Americans as was the case in the Yeltsin regime is long past. Similarly, you can count on Russia upholding the power and the prestige of institutions like the United Nations, which it is a member. The same can be said for the Middle East Quartet, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Council of Europe. Similarly do not expect Moskva to be inclined to smile warmly upon any unilateral American proposals `a la the Iraq War in the future. Russia's opposition in 2003, was of course opportunistic, but, it also derived from a calculated stance that to give legitimacy to any American, unilateral power plays could very well be a harbinger of a similar type of maneuver against Russia itself. In short, expect to see a continuation of Putin's multi-lateral, anti-hegemonic diplomatic card, vis-`a-vis the Americans. Other points that one can foresee Medvedev pursuing are: attempting to reinsert itself diplomatically, using the oil and gas card, into the Balkans. Similarly, Medvedev's Russia will try to maintain as much influence as possible in both Ukraine, and, in Belarus. With it not impossible to foresee the time when, in the case of the latter country, when the Lukashenko regime implodes that Moskva may finally chose to reunite with the now isolated country rather than allowing it to 'fall' into the 'Western Camp'. Vis-`a-vis the European Union, it is likely the relations will veer from cordial and correct, to warm and friendly. Depending upon both the issues and which particular group of countries that one is talking of. With the warmest relations being with Germany, France and Italia. Relations being colder with Poland, the Baltic Countries and the UK as well. It would not be unlikely that Medvedev will follow Putin's practice of attempting, to play the jeu of divida et impera with the EU as a whole. Towards the Americans, Russia's relations will again veer: from difficult if not a bit frosty, to at times perhaps lukewarm and correct. Do not expect much in the way of any real closeness or improvements to the Russian-American relationship anytime soon. There is simply not enough similarity of interests, either diplomatic or economic for the Americans to be willing to treat Moskva in a more equal or at the very least a more quid pro quo fashion. The usual American habit of asking Russia for concessions, gratis, is all too likely to set to continue. And, it does not matter in the least if the President is a Republican or a Democrat. A liberal or a Conservative. The underlying mentality, of the makers of American foreign policy is the same towards Moskva: demand the world, and, pay nothing for it. Parque ils travailler pour le Roi de Prusse!

To sum up: the watchword as the Putin Regime gives way to the Medvedev Regime is: continuity of purpose and the underlying focus of Russian foreign policy, with discontinuity as per the manner in which policy is presented to the outside world. I do not anticipate any of the diplomatic maladroit antics that Putin has cared to indulge in the past few years. The infamous speech at the Security Conference at Munich, a few years back being the ne plus ultra. I expect that Medvedev will allow his capable Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov to manage more of Russian foreign policy and to present a more friendly and negotiable visage to the world. In short, I agree with those who argue that the coming of the new Russian President is a cause, if not necessarily for joy than certainly for quiet appreciation that there are new possibilities available, both in Russia domestically and for Russia abroad.

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Thu, 08 May 2008 00:06:00 +0000

MILITARY INNOCENT ABROAD: GENERAL SANCHEZ IN IRAQ

"WAR IS TOO SERIOUS A MATTER TO ENTRUST TO MILITARY MEN". George Clemenceau.

"THE SWORD IS THE AXIS OF THE WORLD AND ITS POWER IS ABSOLUTE" . Charles de Gaulle.

"WE FAILED AS AN ARMY TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION IN IMMEDIATE, POST-WAR [CIRCA MAY 2003] IRAQ". General Ricardo Sanchez.

Tonight, General Ricardo Sanchez, C-in-C of coalition forces in Iraq from June 2003 to June 2004, spoke to the members of the Oxonian Society in the ornate and august ballroom of the 3 West Club in mid-town Manhattan. The now retired General is peddling his recently published book, "Wiser in Battle: A Soldier's Story" to the public. Treated to a warm and respectful applause both before and after his talk, General Sanchez, speaking with his native South Texas drawl, offered up a curious defence of his conduct as Allied Commander in chief in Iraq during the initial period of the insurgency, after the defeat of Saddam Hussein's conventional forces in March-April of 2003. Rather than pleading 'mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa', Sanchez in the time honored fashion of the American military hierarchy during the Vietnam War, choose to blame official Washington for the Iraq debacle. Among the more interesting if not very informative or original comments of Sanchez on his time in Baghdad were: American forces were, 'not trained for urban warfare', which they soon had to face; that there was both at his (Corp commander) level and higher in the military hierarchy, no real planning for the post-conventional phase of military operations in Iraq. As per Sanchez, in comments which have been endorsed elsewhere, by the time that he took over the command in Baghdad, all planning in Washington at the time was for withdrawing forces and just leaving a skelton force. However, Sanchez did not offer up any defence of his own (mis)-conduct in the summer of 2003 in not seriously revamping occupation forces so that they could tackle successfully the growing insurgency on the ground from the Sunni insurgents. Nor did he offer any but the weakest defence, in essence again blaming the Rumsfeld Department of Defence and the CIA, for the abuses that lead to the Abu Ghraib Scandal. Notwithstanding the fact that much of the subsequent research has shown that General Sanchez appears to have been singularly incompetent in not exercising the proper supervision of the military prison system in Iraq. In his other remarks, Sanchez blames the then American proconsul in Baghdad, Ambassador Jerry Bremer for the political mistakes (such as de-ba'athization), which helped to make the Iraqi insurgency ever more popular & powerful. He also blames official Washington for the start and stop military offensive in Fallejua in the early Spring of 2004. The General finished his remarks by arguing that Iraq and the Iraq War, was a 'vital national interest', both for 'moral and legal' reasons.

What is one to make of the above performance? One is tempted to recall Clemenceau's comments at the top of this posting, and add to them that soldier's, especially American soldiers should be prevented from thinking too hard...Certainly General Sanchez both at the time and listening to him tonight, appears to have been singularly over his head and out of his depth as C-in-C of American forces in Iraq. No doubt this was partly due to the fact that unlike say the British Army, with such recent commanders as Field-Marshal Lord Carver (Winchester), Sir Mike Jackson (Stamford), Sir Rupert Smith (Haileybury) and Sir Richard Dannatt (Felsted), all from the Upper or Upper-middle classes, the American officer corp is rife with individuals for whom the military is merely a ladder of social advancement and mobility. Consequently, the current C-in-C, General Petraeus notwithstanding, the level of intellectual and tactical sophistication and leadership, to be found in much of the American military hierarchy leaves a great deal to be desired. It is not surprising therefore that Sanchez himself did not go to West Point, nor did he graduate from the Army War College or the General Staff College. No doubt General Sanchez is on a personal level a most humble and agreeable chap. Probably the type of fellow that many of his fellow Americans would like to have a glass of beer with. Unfortunately, it is precisely this, 'hail fellow well met' category of military leadership which was singularly inappropriate in the crucial time that Sanchez was in command in Iraq. A time which in retrospect will never come again in terms of offering up the possibility of preventing the subsequent debacle that has become Iraq for the United States. Among others who we have to thank for this state of affairs is General Sanchez.

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Thu, 24 Apr 2008 23:46:00 +0000

GOOD NEWS ON THE GOLAN FRONT? SYRIAN-ISRAELI PEACE FEELERS AND WHAT THEY MEAN

"Israel has reportedly offered to withdraw from the Golan Heights, the territory conquered by its forces in the 1967 war, in return for full peace with Syria.

The offer was disclosed yesterday by Buthaina -Shaaban, a Syrian cabinet minister, who said the deal was floated by Ehud Olmert, Israel's prime minister, in talks with the Turkish -government. She told al-Jazeera, the Arabic news channel: "Olmert is ready for peace with Syria on the grounds of international conditions, on the grounds of the return of the Golan Heights in full to Syria."

Crucially, the Syrian claims were not denied by the Israeli government. Mr Olmert's spokesman dec-lined to comment directly but said: "The Israeli government's position was always clear and has been reiterated on many occasions. Israel seeks peace with Syria. Israel is interested in peace with Syria. The Syrians understand what Israeli expectations are, and Israel understands what the Syrian expectations are."

Israel has long demanded that Syria cut its ties with two of the Jewish state's most committed and potent enemies: Hizbollah, the -Lebanese Shia group, and Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist group. The country's armed forces fought a war against Hizbollah as recently as 2006 and it continues to trade almost daily attacks with Hamas, which took control of the Gaza Strip last year.

Israel believes that Damascus not only provides political cover for the two groups - Hamas's leader is based in the Syrian capital - but also supplies arms and gives training to the fighters of Hamas and Hizbollah.

But, with the likelihood of a peace agreement with the Palestinians this year receding, Mr Olmert might find it useful to test the waters of a Syrian deal.

There have been reports in recent weeks of secret talks, although Syria has always said negotiations must be public. Damascus insists that Israel should agree to a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights as a condition for negotiations.

US-brokered talks between the sides on the return of the Heights broke down in 2000. The US has not encouraged a renewal of talks, seeking instead to isolate Syria".
"Israel hints at Golan deal for Syrian Peace", The Financial Times, 24 April 2008, in www.ft.com

The report in today's FT, could also been seen in much of the quality international press, including AFP, Haaretz, the New York Times, Bloomberg, the BBC, as well as the Beirut Daily Star. What exactly does it mean? Especially since such a short time earlier, we were all treated to stories about the possibility of an outbreak of a new war between Syria and Israel. Well first of all, we can now, all of us, throw safely into the rubbish bin, precisely those stories (I of course threw them into the rubbish bin, quite awhile ago...). Second, the reports are I would venture 'real', in the sense that Israeli PM Olmert is in fact considering the possibility of seriously pursuing peace negotiations with Damascus. Of course, this option has been mulled over by various, admittedly marginal elements in the Israeli establishment, since the debacle of the Lebanon War of the summer of 2006. Until now, the quite evident, de facto 'verbotem', on any such talks by the Bush Regime, made any realistic possibility of such talks commencing, much less going somewhere a nullity. Now however, either because of the difficulties that Tel Aviv is experiencing on other fronts, such as the Gaza Strip, as well as the deadlock over negotiations with PA President Abbas, or, because time is running out for the American Administration, Olmert, et. al., appear to be more inclined to allow for public discussion of the idea of a peace transaction with Syria. Something which was, even six months ago, quite impossible due to Washington's obtuseness. However, while this public 'pour parler' is of course an improvement on the prior situation, will it in fact result in anything of a concrete nature occurring in the near future? Unfortunately, that is highly unlikely. It is quite impossible that Olmert will be willing to completely break ranks with the Americans and open up discussion with the Assad Regime seul. And, as the American academic and Syrian expert, Joshua Landis, notes in quoting an unnamed expert, any peace deal between the two parties would require American support, both diplomatic, and, more importantly from the Israeli perspective financial. Perhaps up to twenty billion dollars (see: www.syriacomment.com). Of course, some American ideologues of the 'neo-conservative' variety will argue against any such agreement, for two reasons: one) the terms that Damascus is offering are illusory; two) that the Assad Regime is 'illegitimate', and, should not be offered support, even indirectly by the Israelis or the Americans. The logic of either objection to my mind is rather nonsensical: a) we will never know how illusory is Damascus's terms are, except if we engage the same in real pour parlers, and, then find out! b) the regime of Assad Fils, is no more and certainly no less, 'legitimate', 'Democratic',than say the neighboring regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, most of the Gulf States, much less Iraq...Except of course that women can drive and vote in Syria, and Christians can freely and safely go to church and wear crosses, which is not something that can be said about say, Saudi Arabia....This is not of course to make Assad Fils, into a icon of freedom and Democracy. It is evidently the case that he is neither of these things. However, the point is quite simple and to my mind self-evident (not unfortunately so in official Washington): diplomatically speaking there is not much in the way of low hanging fruit in the Near East at the moment. Syria is the only possible exception to this. To not at the very least, attempt to in effect 'turn' Syria, from its alliances with Persia, Hezbollah and Hamas, in return for the Golan Heights, is the very mid-summer of madness. Unfortunately it would appear to be the case that is what will in fact happen once again. Due mostly to American closemindedness and stupidity.

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Tue, 22 Apr 2008 22:07:00 +0000

EX-PRESIDENT CARTER, ISRAEL AND DEALING WITH HAMAS

"Jimmy Carter, the former US president attempting to broker an understanding between Israel and Hamas, said on Monday the Islamist Palestinian group stood ready to accept the Jewish state as a “neighbour” and would back a peace deal under certain conditions.

Mr Carter said: “I met with Hamas leaders from the West Bank, Gaza and Damascus. They said that they would accept a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders if approved by Palestinians – a departure from long-standing Hamas doctrine that refused to recognise two states.”

In a statement released shortly after his speech in Jerusalem, Hamas neither confirmed nor denied his claims. However, it did adopt a broadly conciliatory tone, expressing support for a referendum on a peace agreement and promising “flexibility” and the willingness to take “the necessary steps”.

Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip and has claimed responsibility for a string of recent attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians, did not say what those steps were.

Khaled Meshal, the Hamas leader, said in Damascus that it would accept the establishment of a Palestinian state on land occupied by Israel in the 1967 war but would not recognise the Jewish state. He raised the prospect of a “a truce of 10 years as a proof of recognition” should Israel withdraw to the 1967 borders.

Mr Carter has been criticised by Israeli and US politicians for meeting senior Hamas officials, including Mr Meshal, who lives in exile in Damascus. While the former president has stressed he is not engaged in an official diplomatic effort, he has urged Israel and the US to end their boycott of Hamas.

“He [Mr Carter] made this trip on his own initiative,” said Tom Casey, a US State Department spokesman. “We counselled him against engaging with Hamas, in keeping with long-standing US policy. They still refuse to acknowledge or recognise any of the basic Quartet principles . . . The bottom line is Hamas still believes in the destruction of the state of Israel.”

Mr Carter said he knew the meetings would be “viewed negatively in some quarters”, but insisted it was a mistake to isolate Hamas and Syria. “We believe the problem is not that we met them but that the US and Israeli governments will not meet. This unwillingness to talk makes peace harder to achieve,” he said.

The winner of the Nobel peace prize then cited a passage agreed with Hamas: “If [Palestinian Authority] President [Mahmoud] Abbas succeeds in negotiating a final status agreement with Israel, Hamas will accept the decision made by the Palestinian people and their will through a referendum . . . even if Hamas is opposed to the agreement'".

"Hamas would accept Israel, says Carter", 21 April 2008, in www.ft.com

"The extreme reactions prompted by former US President Jimmy Carter's attempt to engage Hamas can be difficult to reconcile with objective reality, especially if one wants to avoid extending parallels to their seemingly obvious but necessarily ersatz conclusions. What players on both sides of the divide have in common, though, is a mindset that, to say the least, does not lend itself to rational discussion.

One on side there are voices like that of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who, unable to credibly pretend that Hamas does not exist, rejects any form of negotiations with the group until it renounces most of the bargaining chips it holds. The one it has not been asked to forego, its mandate as the freely and fairly elected majority party in the Palestinian legislature, was devalued by US sanctions the moment it was acquired and then rendered null and void by infighting with the US-backed Fatah faction that led to Prime Minister Ismail Haniyya's being deposed by President Mahmoud Abbas. As for the argument that Hamas is a "terrorist" organization, it is important to recall, too, that the original icon of Palestinian resistance to occupation, Yasser Arafat, was long dismissed in identical terms....

None of this is to equate the State Department with Al-Qaeda or either with other entities pursuing separate agendas that are just as disruptive. All of it, however, illustrates how vulnerable this part of the world is to black-and-white positions that allow no room for practical considerations. Political Islam, for instance, is not going away, so those uncomfortable with the phenomenon have a vested interest in helping relatively pragmatic groups like Hamas - and Lebanon's own Hizbullah, for that matter - to feel more at home in the democratic tent. This will not be accomplished by conspiring to disqualify their very pertinent - and significantly representative - policy positions on capricious and/or specious grounds that only discredit the very concept of what is trying to sell itself as participatory democracy".

"Some Mindsets are more conducive to useful discussions than others", Daily Star,
22 April 2008, in www.dailystar.com.lb

It would be kinderspielen, to merely get up on a soapbox and criticize former American President Carter, for being some type of 'moral idiot'. Although to be honest, that is what he does come across on my occasions. And, most especially in the current case of the conflict between Israel and Hamas. The fact is that left to its own devices, Hamas would be quite content to rain bombs and kill innocents on the Israeli side of the border in pursuit of its 'ultimate' goal of regaining all of 'historical' Palestine. And, just as obvious is the fact that Hamas is not in the least position to do any such thing. What it is capable of doing is: a) launching rockets on those portions of Israel which lie adjacent to the Gaza Strip, doing damage to Israeli property and very very occasionally killing some poor innocent; b)killing and or capturing, when possible, Israeli troops guarding the border, or attempting some mission inside Gaza proper. Perhaps up to ten Israeli troops have been killed in this fashion in the past six months, and, of course one Israeli soldier remains a prisoner of Hamas since June of 2006; c) and, by virtue of 'a' and 'b' above, trying to make it all but impossible for Palestinian President Abbas, to negotiate some type of modus vivendi agreement with Israel, which might, just might, against all of the many odds (much of which are Israeli or American in nature), result in a serious push for a peace agreement. Both in terms of Palestinian opinion in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as the wider Near Eastern and Arab popular opinion.

With all of the above being said and understood, it also has to be equally realised that the pre-existing American and Israel policy to: i) ignore Hamas as it did not exist; ii) attempt to actively undermine and in effect overthrow Hamas by a policy of economic sanctions and strangulation, id est., allowing almost no food supplies and other trade from other the Israeli or Egyptian sides of the border so that the population of the Gaza Strip will naturally blame Hamas and consequently, thus effect its overthrow from within. This was and is (nominally) still is American policy even prior to the coup d'etat that brought Hamas to power in the Gaza Strip. The fact that the chosen weapons for the success of this policy: economic sanctions, and, before that, Fatah loyalists in the Gaza Strip, did not work or co-operate has not made much of an impact on official Washington's view of things. In the case of Israel, there appears to be a two opposing states of mind as to how to deal with Hamas: one) overthrow it via economic sanctions, and, if that fails, to use overwhelming military force to retaliate for Hamas pinprick attacks; two) negotiate some type of modus vivendi with it, at least to prevent matters from getting out of hand. Especially, since no Israeli leader of any strip, regards going back into the Gaza Strip as an occupation force as anything other than a pure nightmare. However much it might at first resolve the matter of the rockets being launched on Israeli towns and villages bordering Hamas.

Into this impass, comes Mr. Carter. He goes to the area and secures a statement from the Hamas leadership in exile, that they are flexible and willing to negotiate with the Jewish State, as well as to abide by any Palestinian referendum on a final status peace deal. The issue is not whether Hamas is likely or agreeable characters. They are all disgusting characters, and, in a more sensible world, would merit like all Islamic fanatics, many many years as galley slaves under the lash. However we do not inhabit an 'sensible world'. Consequently, we must endeavor to negotiate plausible agreements with such individuals. Who at least nominally are no more blood thirsty than say the IRA. An organization that the American government was quite willing to treat with kid gloves for over twenty-five years when it suited it to do so. Again, in an ideal world, Israel would simply march into Gaza, destroy its existing infastructure and quickly withdraw. However as the Israeli government knows quite well, and, hence the reason for its relative inaction over the last two years, the situation in Gaza does not allow for it to perform such a quick and clean operation.
Would that it could. However it cannot. Consequently, Mr. Carter, that 'moral idiot', is correct in stating that:

"'We believe the problem is not that we met them but that the US and Israeli governments will not meet. This unwillingness to talk makes peace harder to achieve'".

Just so. And, the sooner that both Tel Aviv and Washington as well as the EU get this point down the better for all concerned. Because, amici, like it or not, Hamas is not going to be disappearing anytime soon.

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Mon, 21 Apr 2008 22:35:00 +0000

THE PLACE OF TIBET IN CHINESE GRAND STRATEGY

"We see Beijing struggling to maintain control over China. Its vast security apparatus and interlocking economic system are intended to achieve that. We see Beijing building coastal defenses in the Pacific, including missiles that can reach deep into the Pacific, in the long run trying to force the U.S. Navy on the defensive. And we see Beijing working to retain control over two key regions: Xinjiang and Tibet....

Now look at Tibet on the population density and terrain maps. On the terrain map one sees the high mountain passes of the Himalayas. Running from the Hindu Kush on the border with Pakistan to the Myanmar border, small groups can traverse this terrain, but no major army is going to thrust across this border in either direction. Supplying a major force through these mountains is impossible. From a military point of view, it is a solid wall.

Note that running along the frontier directly south of this border is one of the largest population concentrations in the world. If China were to withdraw from Tibet, and there were no military hindrance to population movement, Beijing fears this population could migrate into Tibet. If there were such a migration, Tibet could turn into an extension of India and, over time, become a potential beachhead for Indian power. If that were to happen, India’s strategic frontier would directly abut Sichuan and Yunnan — the Chinese heartland.

The Chinese have a fundamental national interest in retaining Tibet, because Tibet is the Chinese anchor in the Himalayas. If that were open, or if Xinjiang became independent, the vast buffers between China and the rest of Eurasia would break down. The Chinese can’t predict the evolution of Indian, Islamic or Russian power in such a circumstance, and they certainly don’t intend to find out. They will hold both of these provinces, particularly Tibet.

The Chinese note that the Dalai Lama has been in India ever since China invaded Tibet. The Chinese regard him as an Indian puppet. They see the latest unrest in Tibet as instigated by the Indian government, which uses the Dalai Lama to try to destabilize the Chinese hold on Tibet and open the door to Indian expansion. To put it differently, their view is that the Indians could shut the Dalai Lama down if they wanted to, and that they don’t signals Indian complicity.

It should be added that the Chinese see the American hand behind this as well. Apart from public statements of support, the Americans and Indians have formed a strategic partnership since 2001. The Chinese view the United States — which is primarily focused on the Islamic world — as encouraging India and the Dalai Lama to probe the Chinese, partly to embarrass them over the Olympics and partly to increase the stress on the central government. The central government is stretched in maintaining Chinese security as the Olympics approach. The Chinese are distracted. Beijing also notes the similarities between what is happening in Tibet and the “color” revolutions the United States supported and helped stimulate in the former Soviet Union.

It is critical to understand that whatever the issues might be to the West, the Chinese see Tibet as a matter of fundamental national security, and they view pro-Tibetan agitation in the West as an attempt to strike at the heart of Chinese national security. The Chinese are therefore trapped. They are staging the Olympics in order to demonstrate Chinese cohesion and progress. But they must hold on to Tibet for national security reasons, and therefore their public relations strategy is collapsing. Neither India nor the United States is particularly upset that the Europeans are thinking about canceling attendance at various ceremonies".
"Chinese Geopolitics and the Significance of Tibet", by Dr. George Friedman, 15 April 2008, in www.stratfor.com.

The riots and violence in Tibet over the past two months, have again reminded the world of the ongoing PRC grande projet of turning the 'province' and the neighboring 'province' of Xianjiang into bastions of Han Chinese hegemony. A projet which has roots going way back into the Manchu Dynasty in the early 18th century. With the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty at the beginning of the 20th century (1911), both of these enormous territories were lost to the power holders in Peking. In a classical example of the Rankean idea of 'Der Primat der Aussenpolitk', the fact is that all Han Chinese authorities since, whether neo-Monarchist (Yuan Shikai), Republican (Chiang Kai-shek) or Communist (Mao to the present leadership), were and are adamantly determined to either regain or keep their hold on Tibet, come what may. As Dr. Friedman correctly notes, regardless of any protests by the West, or conversely any public relations embarrassments to the PRC's 'coming out' party, at this summer's Olympics, Peking's main goal is to retain its grip on both provinces.

Given the above circumstances what is the best line for the West, and in particular the USA to take? I submit that the only intelligent line is one of 'ethical realism' (all due acknowledgement to Anatol Lieven of course for coining this phrase). Of course in the absence of the self-destruction of Communist rule, both territories will remain part of the PRC. Of that there is no question. However, just as the West, kept ties to the dissident movements in the 'People's Democracy's' of Central and Eastern Europe, so too must the West make sure to retain contact with, and, even if need be sub rosa support for those groups currently in and outside of Tibet who are struggling, albeit peacefully against Han Chinese oppression. The 'pay-off', for such support may be years, indeed many, many years in the offing. Perhaps the 'pay-off' will never come at all. I for my own part, will agree that the PRC is very much an economic dynamo, and, on the surface at any rate highly unlikely to collapse anytime or significantly reform itself anytime soon. However notwithstanding this fact, it is very much the case that the PRC, is full of contradictions, both economic and political. And, just as in the case of Sovietskaya Vlast, such contradictions can indeed bring about the downfall of the entire regime (or should we say, allowed the existing elites to prepare the way for the same and profit from doing so), so similarly in the case of the PRC, it is not impossible to imagine that the regime in Peking, will under the force of circumstances, and pressures brought about my its own programme of 'modernization from above', will eventually encompass its own ruin. Which one can only say again and again: pire ca va, mieux c'est.

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Fri, 18 Apr 2008 00:18:00 +0000

NEO-CONSERVATIVE BLUSTER OR FAR-SIGHTED ANALYSIS? A LOOK AT THE CHENEY DOD PLANNING DOCTRINE OF 1992

"It is improbable that a global conventional challenge to U.S. and Western security will reemerge from the Eurasian heartland for many years to come. Even in the highly unlikely event that some future leadership in the former Soviet Union adopted strategic aims of recovering the lost empire or otherwise threatened global interests, the loss of Warsaw Pact allies and the subsequent and continuing dissolution of military capability would make any hope of success require several years or more of strategic and doctrinal re-orientation and force regeneration and redeployment, which in turn could only happen after a lengthy political realignment and re-orientation to authoritarian and aggressive political and economic control. Furthermore, any such political upheaval in or among the states of the former U.S.S.R. would be much more likely to issue in internal or localized hostilities, rather than a concerted strategic effort to marshal capabilities for external expansionism -- the ability to project power beyond their borders.
There are other potential nations or coalitions that could, in the further future, develop strategic aims and a defense posture of region-wide or global domination. Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor. But because we no longer face either a global threat or a hostile, non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests, we have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs -- as long as we are prepared to reconstitute additional forces should the need to counter a global threat re-emerge. . . .

With the demise of a global military threat to U.S. interests, regional military threats, including possible conflicts arising in and from the territory of the former Soviet Union, will be of primary concern to the U.S. in the future. These threats are likely to arise in regions critical to the security of the U.S. and its allies, including Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and the territory of the former Soviet Union. We also have important interests at stake in Latin America, Oceania, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In both cases, the U. S. will be concerned with preventing the domination of key regions by a hostile power. . . .

The former Soviet state achieved global reach and power by consolidating control over the resources in the territory of the former U.S.S.R. The best means of assuring that no hostile power is able to consolidate control over the resources within the former Soviet Union is to support its successor states (especially Russia and Ukraine) in their efforts to become peaceful democracies with market-based economies. A democratic partnership with Russia and the other republics would be the best possible outcome for the United States. At the same time, we must also hedge against the possibility that democracy will fail, with the potential that an authoritarian regime bent on regenerating aggressive military power could emerge in Russia, or that similar regimes in other successor republics could lead to spreading conflict within the former U.S.S.R. or Eastern Europe.

For the immediate future, key U.S. concerns will be the ability of Russia and the other republics to demilitarize their societies, convert their military industries to civilian production, eliminate or, in the case of Russia, radically reduce their nuclear weapons inventory, maintain firm command and control over nuclear weapons, and prevent leakage of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries.
NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence and participation in European security affairs. While the United States supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the alliance's integrated command structure.

However, the U.S. must keep in mind the long history of conflict between the states of Eastern Europe, as well as the potential for conflict between the states of Eastern Europe and those of the former Soviet Union. . . ."

Department of Defence document titled: "F[iscal] Y[ear] 94-99 Defence Planning Guidance", dated 18 February 1992 in www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv

Much ink has been spilled by those who claim that the cabal of neo-conservatives who came to power back in 2001, on Bush the Younger's coatails, were adherents to a radically new school of American diplomacy and policy. We are told that Wolfowitz, Feith, Libby, et. al., were a group whose vision of American diplomacy was out of keeping with the historic traditions of American diplomacy of the 20th century. As per Messieurs Holbrooke, Talbott and Nye, the neo-conservative emphasis on unilateralism and American strategic supremacy emerged like Athena, ex nihilo out of Zeus's head. The Clinton Administration, we are told did not have any such ambitions nor did it indulge in any such behavior. Is this in fact true? And, if it is not, what can we imagine will be the elements of continuity, rather than discontinuity for the future of American diplomacy as the Bush regime, rides off into the Texas sunset (good riddance to bad rubbish!)?

First, as the above quotes from then Secretary of Defence, Cheney's own officials show, there was a measured sense of triumph as the twin victories in the Cold War and the First Persian Gulf war began to sink in. In essence, as the some of the memorandums, recently declassified by the National Security Archive make quite clear, American hegemony in the military and the diplomatic fields as far as the eye can see, was accurately predicted. The disintegration of the former Sovietskaya Vlast, meant that there was no, other Great Power worthy of the name, who was in the position to threaten the physical survival of the United States. Nor that of any of its major allies in Western Europe and Japan. The threat however illusory that Western Europe would be overrun by Soviet tank armies, was over, finis.

Second, the 'threat perception', had by the time that this memorandum was written, changed from threats to American allies in Western Europe, to threats by regional powers, in the Third World. With the recent attempt by Iraq's Saddam Hussein to achieve a mini-hegemony in the Persian Gulf being a sort of template for what might be in the offing. With perhaps the key sentence in the entire memorandum, and, one which received a great deal of negative publicity when it was leaked to the New York Times a short time after this memorandum was sent round for comments throughout the DOD bureaucracy being:

"Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential global competitor".

Id est, it was seen and it became, de facto American policy in the Clinton years, and, is now de jure policy in the Bush the Younger years, for the USA to actively prevent its global hegemony from being challenged by any power, or coalition of powers. Once, one takes away the smog of political invective, it becomes quite clear that per se, there is nothing extraordinary about the above sentence. Any hegemon, if it had both the means and the will, would behave in absolutely the same fashion. Does anyone doubt for a second, that Sovietskaya Vlast, if it had won the Cold War, would not have smothered in blood, any challengers to its recently won hegemony? The question answers itself...

What this means, for American policy going forward is that notwithstanding the noises being made by partisans of all three American Presidential candidates: the senior Senator from Arizona, the junior Senators from Illinois and New York, whichever one climbs the greasy pole to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, will in fact, behave in exactly the same fashion, as foreseen by Cheney et. al., back in 1992. The only difference, yes, the only difference, but a key one, is that one hopes (perhaps or should one say most likely hope of a forlorn variety) that under the new dispensation, American hegemony, will be: a) exercised infinitely more intelligently; b) exercised in a less heavy-handed and overly militarized fashion. In short American diplomacy will return to the 'traditions', if one may characterize it as such, of Bush the Elder, and his Secretary of State, James A. Baker III. Let us be clear: these gentlemen, were not saints. Nor were for that matter, such paragons of mid-20th century American diplomacy, such as Dean Acheson, George Marshall, Robert Lovett, and George Kennna. All of these men, were cold eyed, practitioners of grossmachtpolitik. They all of course were for the most part, when it suited them, and, the USA, adherents of multi-lateralism, not because per se, they had some ideological belief in the same, but, by virtue of the fact, that the USA was not then in the position to exercise a unilateral hegemony, which did become practical, circa 1991. What these august gentleman, would have done if they have had the opportunity to so exercise such power, we can make a stab at, but, will never know for certain. Although, historians such as the American academic Melvin Leffler, would argue and did argue back 1991 that this first generation of American policymakers in the era of the Cold War, in fact sought what Leffler called: 'a preponderance of power'. In short hegemony of a sort, as far back as 1950. So to expect anything less, from the current and future cadres of American policymakers is a completely illusory. And, however much one may have hoped `a la former French President Charles De Gaulle, for the European Union, to have become a competitor to the United States, the evolution of that body and of the states that form it, make that a forlorn hope indeed. And, as for the PRC and India, well the less said the better. Both in terms of the quality of any such rise to power, and, of the likelihood. So amici, even if you do not like American hegemony, and, wish for its demise, please forget it and get used to it. Calls or predictions of its demise are greatly exaggerated indeed. At least for the next twenty years if not longer.

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Thu, 10 Apr 2008 01:11:00 +0000

ANOTHER 'KREIG-IN-SIGHT' CRISIS IN THE OFFING?

"No one of these things, by itself, is of very great interest. And taken together they do not provide the means for a clear forecast. Nevertheless, a series of rather ordinary events, taken together, can constitute something significant. Tensions in the Middle East are moving well beyond the normal point, and given everything that is happening, events are moving to a point where someone is likely to take military action. Whether Hezbollah will carry out a retaliatory strike or Israel a pre-emptive strike in Lebanon, or whether the Israelis’ real target is Iran, tensions systematically have been ratcheted up to the point where we, in our simple way, are beginning to wonder whether something has to give.

All together, these events are fairly extraordinary. Ignoring all rhetoric — and the Israelis have gone out of their way to say that they are not looking for a fight — it would seem that each side, but particularly the Americans and Israelis, have gone out of their way to signal that they are expecting conflict. The Syrians have also signaled that they expect conflict, and Hezbollah always claims there is about to be conflict.

What is missing is this: who will fight whom, and why, and why now. The simple explanation is that Israel wants a second round with Hezbollah. But while that might be true, it doesn’t explain everything else that has happened. Most important, it doesn’t explain the simultaneous revelations about the bombing of Syria. It also doesn’t explain the U.S. naval deployment. Is the United States about to get involved in a war with Hezbollah, a war that the Israelis should handle themselves? Are the Israelis going to topple Syrian President Bashar al Assad — and then wind up with a Sunni government, or worse, an Israeli occupation of Syria? None of that makes a lot of sense".

George Friedman, "A Mystery in the Middle East", 9 April, in www.stratfor.com.

"Two important headlines appeared in the official Syrian press last Thursday. A day after the big scare that engulfed the Israeli media, which reported on the possibility of war with Syria, the calling up of armored divisions and the movement of large military units that could not be explained, Bashar Assad had different worries: He issued an important decree on the supervision of construction irregularities in Syria.

Another report dealt with the great success of the Arab League summit in Damascus. Editorials in Syria discussed peace between Israel and the Palestinians, U.S. policy in the Middle East, and the need for an Arab embargo on Israel, which is not willing to adopt the Arab peace initiative. War between Syria and Israel? An Israeli attack on Syria? Readiness for a conflagration this summer? Not a word.

In Israel, on the other hand, there was fear and trepidation. Once more the magic word is whispered: miscalculation. In other words, if Assad doesn't comprehend Israel's moves, or Israel fails to understand Assad's moves, or Hezbollah does not understand Israel's intent, suddenly a shot is fired, a shell, a counteraction, and suddenly, with no intention, there is a regional war. So the generals and political advisers are rushing to calm things down, rushed messages are issued to and from Damascus: Everything to make it clear that there is no - definitely no - room for worries. Maybe it will be a different war, but not one of miscalculation. Not this time.

The question isn't whether Syria is sufficiently strong to embark on a war with Israel, or whether Israel is prepared to respond, because Syria had gone to wars with Israel when it seemed it was not ready for them. And Israel, too, went to war a year and a half ago when it was not prepared. Israel's deterrent force also is not enough, because if Syria had really moved divisions to the border, that would have signaled that Israel's deterrent strength does not have an effect on it.

The point is the ease with which the mercury rises in the war thermometer between the two countries; even worse is the absence of a real mechanism for preventing such a miscalculation. The reason for this lies in the Israeli paradox that stems from a serious absence of common sense. It argues that as long as Syria is very weak it poses no threat, so there is no need to make peace with it. But if Syria is really a threat and is planning war, what is the meaning of the panic that miscalculation may lead to war? The other side of that paradox states that only when Syria is powerful and threatening is it worthwhile to make peace....

The result is that Israel is seeking an appropriate tactical return for peace with Syria. Peace in and of itself is simply not "worth it." Peace with an Arab state that also affects Hezbollah, controls events in Lebanon, has close ties with Iran and close allies like Turkey, is party to the Arab initiative and will announce in advance any military maneuver it plans to carry out, and would invite Israeli observers - peace with such a state is considered by Israel as an empty peace.

Israel first wants a strategic change in the Middle East - that Iran breaks ties with Syria, that the Hamas leadership is evicted from Damascus, and that Hassan Nasrallah converts to Judaism. Only then will it "grant" Syria peace. Peace with Syria according to Israel needs to be a not-very-significant by-product, instead of the means by which strategic change is brought about".

Zvi Bar'el, "Ready for everything except peace,"
in www.syriacomment.com

As students of European diplomacy in the 19th century know quite well, the 'war-in-sight' crisis, was a diplomatic event which occurred in 1875. In which a perceived threat of war by Germany on France, mistakenly lead to a real diplomatic crisis. Which was (understandably enough) soon smoothed over by Bismark. In the case of the Near East at the moment, the question is whether prognosises such as made by Dr. Friedman in his weekly column, in the American online journal, Stratfor.com have any degree of validity. Is there a danger of war between Syria and Israel? Or alternatively is there a danger of a rematch between Tel Aviv and Hezbollah? On both counts, I foresee, little likelihood of any real armed conflict occurring. The reasons for which are purely internal to all three parties: der primat der Innenpolitik. The primacy of internal politics. In the case of Israel: the government of Omert is weak, and growing weaker by the day. It lacks the legitimacy to go to war, especially considering the fiasco of the Lebanon War of 2006. It is in essence a government just waiting to be kicked out. And, it also lacks the energy and the determination (genius and dynamism if you like) exhibited by Israeli leaders thirty, forty or fifty years ago, to take any perceived threats by the throat and throttle them. The Israel which was capable of doing that, is dead, completely passed away.

In the case of Damascus, the above circumstances are equally if not more strongly present: the Assad regime is completely incapable of taking any bold steps which might have the end result of a defeat on the battlefield, and, thus quite soon leading to the toppling of the regime from within by the Islamic opposition. One of the reasons, no doubt that Tel Aviv has never exhibited any enthusiasm about the American policy of 'overthrow' vis-`a-vis Damascus, that our neo-conservative ideologues in the USA are so fond of. As the widely acclaimed American academic and Syrian-watcher, Joshua Landis has noted, the current priority of the regime is Damascus is survival: pur et simple. Everything else is secondary. Of course, if the opportunity were to present itself, for Syria to regain the Golan Heights, gratis, of course Assad would jump at the chance. But, unfortunately, there is scant signs that Tel Aviv is interested in so assisting Assad in that way. At least not yet. The upshot here is that the situation is the same as in Tel Aviv: peace, if not at any price, than pax plus ultra. And, most definitely not bellum plus ultra.

The only party which might have a rationale to go to war, or to at least play a jeu which might have the end result of an armed conflict occurring is Hezbollah. The conflict between Hezbollah and its allies, and, the pro-Western, pro-Saudi, 14th of March Coalition government grinds on. Now it has run for almost fifteen months. With no sign of an early termination. With a deadlock between the two sides, and, with Hezbollah's laurels that it earned in the war of 2006, now tarnished by these domestic quarrels within Lebanon proper, it could be argued that Hezbollah might, just might, seek to again earn the political triumph that it earned in both Lebanon proper and in the wider Arab world by again staging a conflict with Israel. Especially if the regime of Mullah's in Persia were to agree to provide support for such a venture. The only problem with this analysis, is that with the NATO force south of the Litani River, it would be highly difficult for Hezbollah to restage its opening moves of 2006 again. At the very least, Hezbollah would have to stage attacks on the European-NATO forces and kick them out, prior to staging any attacks on Israel proper. So far, remarkably so in fact, Hezbollah has left the peace keeping forces in the South of Lebanon completely alone. Unless that were to change, I cannot see any likelihood of Hezbollah wanting to re-start any conflict with Tel Aviv anytime soon.

In short, it is my considered judgment that the overall situation is not yet, I repeat yet, properly prepared for a military conflict between these three powers. None of them, have in reality embarked on any of the opening actions or moves which would make the possibilities of military action plausible or likely. Until that does occur, I suggest that unlike say in 1875, the current, mini-'kreig-in-sight' crisis is a non-crisis and a non-event. Which considering everything else going on in the Near East is a very good thing indeed.

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Wed, 09 Apr 2008 00:23:00 +0000

THE SOCHI SUMMIT: WHAT WERE THE RESULTS?

"We agree that the foundation for the U.S. and Russian relationship should be based on the core principles of friendship, cooperation, openness, and predictability. The strength and stability of this foundation will rest on expanding the network of ties between our governments and our peoples and on the positive examples we set for our societies and for the world as we confront new and emerging threats to global security together as partners. We will strive to identify areas of positive cooperation where our interests coincide, and pursue joint projects and actions that will bring our countries closer together, while minimizing the strain on our partnership where our interests diverge. Going forward, we intend to deepen our cooperation wherever possible, while taking further, even more far-reaching steps, to demonstrate our joint leadership in addressing new challenges to global peace and security in accordance with the principles of international law, taking into consideration the role of the United Nations.In pursuit of these goals, the United States and the Russian Federation will consult closely on the development of initiatives that will serve our common interests.

Promoting Security

We acknowledge that today's security environment is fundamentally different than during the Cold War. We must move beyond past strategic principles, which focused on the prospect of mutual annihilation, and focus on the very real dangers that confront both our nations. These include especially the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Reflecting the changed nature of our strategic relationship, we will take steps together to counter these new and emerging challenges.

Post-START:

We have reiterated our intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible level consistent with our national security requirements and alliance commitments.

Substantial reductions of strategic offensive forces have been carried out under the START Treaty, which served as a key instrument in this context. The Moscow Treaty was an additional important step and remains in effect. We will continue development of a legally binding post-START arrangement.

We are fully committed to the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and consider the arrangement we are pursuing to be a further step in implementing our commitments under Article VI of the Treaty.

Missile Defense:

We discussed the issue of missile defense. Both sides expressed their interest in creating a system for responding to potential missile threats in which Russia and the United States and Europe will participate as equal partners.

The Russian side has made clear that it does not agree with the decision to establish sites in Poland and the Czech Republic and reiterated its proposed alternative. Yet, it appreciates the measures that the U.S. has proposed and declared that if agreed and implemented such measures will be important and useful in assuaging Russian concerns.

We agreed to intensify our dialogue after Sochi on issues concerning MD cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally".
"U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration", 6 April 2008, in www.state.gov.

The meeting at Sochi was, the de facto the second act, of the NATO summit at Bucharest. In that summit, is is self-evident from much of the commentary both in the USA and in Europe, that there was in effect a climb-down by the Americans and their Central European allies to Moskva's perceived veto of MAP status for Ukraine and Georgia (on the European press reaction from Russia and Ukraine to Paris, see: "European media split over NATO," in www.bbc.co.uk. See also: "Check out Triaging NATO:Mr. Bush [The Younger] goes to Bucharest," in www.cdi.org). This climb down, by the USA was only partially made up for, by the European allies' endorsement, of the American missile defence shield concept for Poland the Czech Republic. With some vague language thrown in that in future years, the allies would consider extending the idea to all members of the alliance. This sop was not to the liking of Moskva, however much that it was in fact merely a 'sop'to the Americans.

From Bucharest, Bush and Putin went to the Russian resort on the Black Sea, Sochi and, for the final time held discussions on the nature of the Russo-American relationship. What did they come up with? It would be uncharitable and perhaps inaccurate to say that they merely (in the words of Bismarck) were 'papering over the cracks'. But au fond, that is what they were doing. Neither gentleman has either the time (Putin) nor the political will (Bush), to remake the relationship. That is something for their successors to do, or not. What however they were able to do, and, perhaps that is all that can be asked of them at this date, is to leave off, to part, on friendly and agreeable terms. With perhaps, yes perhaps, the language concerning "intensify[ing] our dialogue after Sochi on issues concerning MD cooperation," being a harbinger of possible future, co-operation on this rather difficult, if just the same, illusory issue. At the very worse, the meeting at Sochi, allows both men to part as, if not necessarily as 'partners,' than certainly not as enemies or rivals either. Given the rhetoric which both sides, have indulged in during the last fourteen months, that is perhaps the best that the two sides can come up with at the present time. And, diplomatically speaking that is no more than what we can reasonably expect. Diplomacy being, again in the words of Bismark, 'the art of the possible'.

noreply@blogger.com (Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D) — Fri, 04 Apr 2008 01:09:00 +0000

WHOM OVER WHO? WHO WON AND WHO LOST AT THE NATO SUMMIT IN BUCHAREST

"QUESTION: Is there anything you might want to say about the decision of NATO member-states not to offer membership action plan for Georgia and Ukraine? Can you understand the decision as a Russian veto?

MR. CASEY: So certainly, no one should treat this as a rejection of Ukrainian or Georgian aspirations to join NATO. And we think it is a very positive statement on the part of the alliance that it does indicate that these two countries can and will be able to become members at an appropriate time. Certainly, there were differences and they’ve been well-discussed among NATO member-states as to whether now was the right moment to begin a membership action plan [MAP] with both those countries. But I do expect and it’s, again, indicated in the communiqué that between now and December, there will be an intensified series of discussions and dialogue between NATO and Georgia and Ukraine. And we certainly hope to see the kind of additional progress made that will respond to some of the concerns that allies expressed. And to get to your direct question, no, those concerns were not about Russia. Russia does not have veto over NATO options or NATO actions. And that’s clear, not only for Russia, but for any other country that is not a member-state".
State Department Spokesman, Thomas Casey, 3 April 2008, in www.state.gov

"Le sommet de l'Otan de Bucarest est celui des adieux aux alliés pour George W. Bush. Si le président américain veut bien dresser un bilan sincère de son action, il constatera qu'il laisse une Alliance atlantique affaiblie, militairement en difficulté en Afghanistan, politiquement divisée face à une Russie plus agressive, et toujours aussi hésitante sur ses missions, son rayon d'action et sa raison d'être au XXIe siècle.

Au-delà des communiqués glorifiant des compromis laborieux, le sommet, suivi, vendredi, par un dialogue sans précédent avec Vladimir Poutine, met en lumière l'absence de «leadership» américain dans le monde en cette fin d'un cycle marqué par la guerre en Irak et la crise transatlantique qu'elle a déclenchée. C'est un triste résultat pour une présidence placée d'emblée sous le signe de l'usage de la force au service d'une idéologie conquérante.

En ce qui concerne les relations avec la Russie, l'absence de direction est patente. La question de l'adhésion de l'Ukraine et de la Géorgie à l'Otan le montre. Malgré la campagne tardive menée par George W. Bush, les alliés ont étalé leurs divisions sur la place publique. Le problème de fond n'est pas de savoir si ces deux pays méritent ou non d'appartenir à l'Alliance atlantique. La réponse serait évidemment oui. Le problème est de définir une politique cohérente à l'égard de la Russie. Est-elle un partenaire, un adversaire ou un peu des deux ? Les alliés sont-ils capables d'avoir une position commune à l'égard de Moscou ? Ce n'est manifestement pas le cas. George W. Bush prêche dans le désert et ne rallie que les Polonais, Baltes et autres convaincus. Pour un débat de fond, il faudra attendre la relève à la Maison-Blanche.

Les Européens ne vont pas hypothéquer l'avenir. Angela Merkel est tout occupée à gérer sa coalition avec les sociaux-démocrates et cherche à passer le cap des élections de 2009. Nicolas Sarkozy a de la sympathie pour la Géorgie et pour l'Ukraine. Mais il a le regard fixé sur sa présidence de l'Union européenne et n'a aucun intérêt à susciter une nouvelle querelle avec la chancelière. Le moment viendra pour lui d'ouvrir le débat sur les vraies questions, touchant, par exemple, à la défense européenne et à la coopération nécessaire entre l'UE et l'Otan, ou encore à la politique énergétique à suivre en Europe".
Pierre Rousselin, 3rd of April 2008 "l'Adieu aux allies de George Bush", in www.lefigaro.fr

Obviously, the piteous wording of the American State Department spokesman: "Russia does not have a veto option over NATO options or NATO actions", has no basis in reality. Of course, the decision of the NATO allies, in not giving either Ukraine or Georgia MAP status, the stepping stones to NATO membership, was a result of Moskva's quite loud and persistent objections. Everyone, who was at Bucharest knows that quite well. We all have read the reports and the statements, official and unofficial of both Deutsch Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier, that neither Kiev or Tbilisi were ripe for being put on the path of NATO membership. The same statements, made more audibly also came from French Prime Minister Fillon in recent days (for German objections see: "Extraneous considerations block Georgian and Ukrainian maps at the NATO Summit," in www.jamestown.org & for French objections, see www.ft.com). Notwithstanding the recent American push to reward both powers MAP status, neither Berlin or Paris saw fit to completely alienate Moskva by agreeing with the USA on this objective. The only fig leaf that the USA did obtain from its allies in order to not make completely overt its diplomatic defeat on the issue was the promise that the alliance would look anew at the decision in December of this year. However this was little more than a polite facing saving for the Americans, with both German and French diplomats noting that: "it was inconceivable that MAP could be offered to both states this year" (see: "US seeks to console Ukraine and Georgia," in www.ft.com). Insofar as blocking MAP status from both countries was Moskva's primary goal at this summit, it can be said to have been a clear victory for Russian diplomacy. Albeit of a negative variety.

On the subject of missile defence, the Americans to a limited degree, managed to recoup their position somewhat by getting their NATO allies to agree unanimously that their proposed missile defence scheme for Poland the Czech Republic were in the interest of the alliance as a whole and even mouth words to the effect that an expansion of any such system was to be: "an integral part of any future NATO wide missile defence architecture" (For the official communique from the Summit, see:www.nato.int). With words of advice to Russia that it should: "take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals". Words which Moskva might or might not choose to take seriously. However notwithstanding this show of allied, even German support on a project that has occupied American diplomats for upwards of two years now, overall the NATO Summit cannot be by any means, be seen as a triumph of American diplomacy. Indeed, it would be accurate to say that 'on points', the Americans came out the losers vis`-a-vis Moskva. Whether one wishes or agrees to attribute that diplomatic defeat as Rousselin does to the "l'absence de 'leadership' Americain dan le monde", due to the Iraq debacle and a 'crise transatlantique,' is not entirely clear. One can argue the matter both ways, and, no doubt I and others will in the near future, attempt to do so. However let me finish this appraisal of the Summit by noting that in true opera bouffe fashion, the 'real' victor of the Summit was of course Athens, who was able, against the combined opposition of all it's partners to veto the proposed membership in the alliance of Macedonia, due of course to its name...Si non `e vero `e ben trovato.