Diplomatic and Military History Book Reviews (and weekly Rowbot Radio)

Rowbot Radio 34

2010-11-02T04:53:00.000-07:00

Rowbot Radio 34

Rowbot Radio 33

2010-10-25T05:39:00.001-07:00

Rowbot Radio 33

Rowbot Radio 32

2010-10-18T05:37:00.000-07:00

Rowbot Radio 32

Rowbot Radio 31

2010-10-11T05:35:00.001-07:00

Rowbot Radio 31

Rowbot Radio 30

2010-10-04T05:38:00.001-07:00

Rowbot Radio 30

Rowbot Radio 29

2010-09-27T05:50:00.001-07:00

Rowbot Radio 29

Rowbot Radio 28

2010-09-20T05:33:00.000-07:00

Rowbot Radio 28

Rowbot Radio 27

2010-09-13T05:49:00.000-07:00

Rowbot Radio 27

Rowbot Radio 26

2010-09-06T05:51:00.000-07:00

Rowbot Radio 26

Rowbot Radio 25

2010-08-30T05:28:00.000-07:00

Rowbot Radio 25. You can actually hear me talk, as I guest host this episode.

Rowbot Radio Episode 24

2010-08-16T05:55:00.000-07:00

Rowbot Radio 24.

Rowbot Radio 23

2010-08-02T05:41:00.001-07:00

Rowbot Radio 23

Reaction to Dan Haren Trade

2010-07-26T05:42:00.001-07:00

Reaction to Dan Haren Trade

Rowbot Radio 22

2010-07-26T05:41:00.000-07:00

Rowbot Radio 22

Rowbot Radio 21

2010-07-19T05:28:00.001-07:00

Rowbot Radio 21

Rowbot Radio 20

2010-07-12T05:39:00.001-07:00

Rowbot Radio 20

Rowbot Radio 19

2010-06-29T08:58:00.000-07:00

Rowbot Radio 19

Rowbot Radio 18

2010-06-21T06:05:00.000-07:00

Rowbot Radio 18

Rowbot Radio 17

2010-06-14T05:38:00.000-07:00

Rowbot Radio 17

Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947

2010-06-07T06:27:00.000-07:00

Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947 by D.M. Giangreco (Naval Institute Press, 2009).

Was the invasion of Japan a viable alternative to the use of the atomic bomb? Both The Invasion of Japan and Hell to Pay seek to answer this question.

While Skates believed that an invasion would have resulted in acceptable casualty levels, Giangreco comes to a much different conclusion. Giangreco charges most revisionist historians with only taking a cursory look at the plans and statements of those involved with the invasion.

Operations Olympic and Coronet would have been costly endeavors had the United States undertaken them. Giangreco comes to this conclusion by looking at the full scope of sources available on the planned invasion. Most historians, Giangreco charges, tend to believe that Army Chief of Staff George Marshall had an accurate idea as to how many casualties to expect. Those numbers were low, which is what allows Skates to conclude that the invasion was reasonable. However, Giangreco concentrates on a 1945 note from former President Hoover to Harry Truman over how many casualties to expect in an invasion of Japan: as high as one million. As Giangreco notes, Hoover had sources inside the Pentagon who likely fed the numbers to him on an invasion sometime in the previous two years.

Giangreco also covers the Japanese Ketsu-go plans to defend the Home Islands. The Japanese planned to defend their home to the last person. The terrain also proved advantageous to the Japanese because of the caves, cliffs, and mountains that would have been hell on the Allies. The kamikaze planes would have severely hurt the Allied landings as there would have been no Allied picket ships to take the brunt of the attacks. The supposed lack of Japanese oil was a myth as reports demonstrate that reserves were ample.

Giangreco details how the invasion of Kyushu and Honshu would go as planned, which is one of the greatest strengths of this work. If you want to know how the invasion was planned, the chapters on this offer a great deal of information for war gamers and what-if questions. Expected casualties were appallingly high in these invasion plans.

The atomic bomb, then, was necessary because the United States and Japan were on a course of annihilation. Pondering Giangreco’s work, the reader gains the sense that Marshall’s conservative estimates were too low and that the numbers Hoover had were much more likely. The Japanese would have fought to the bitter end. Ultimately, the atomic bomb (which men such as Marshall eventually viewed as a possible tactical weapon during the invasion) brought an end to the war because the Japanese emperor Hirohito understood that if the war persisted the literal annihilation of his people would come as a result. There would be hell to pay for both sides.

Rowbot Radio 16

2010-05-31T06:12:00.000-07:00

Rowbot Radio 16

Rowbot Radio #15

2010-05-24T06:27:00.001-07:00

Rowbot Radio 15

Rowbot Radio 14

2010-05-17T05:48:00.001-07:00

Rowbot Radio 14

Rowbot Radio 13

2010-05-10T04:02:00.001-07:00

Rowbot Radio 13

Rowbot Radio 12

2010-05-09T12:39:00.001-07:00

Rowbot Radio 12