The explanation for this Swiss-cheese reasoning is obvious: It’s a logician’s version of reverse engineering, i.e. a post-hoc rationalization. Mr. York knows that he cannot defend race- or sex-based discrimination, so to save sexyism from moral disapproval, he must start with the conclusion that those practices are unacceptable and then invent some standard by which they are condemned while sexyism is permitted.

Mr. York gets so caught up in intellectual gymnastics, unfortunately, that he fails to recognize the real reason some bases of discrimination are acceptable while others are not. Simply put, particular hiring criteria are unjustifiable if they have a degrading effect on the human species. Those forms of discrimination that tend to reward virtue, to cultivate desirable qualities of character, and to encourage the best in humanity are morally proper; those forms that tend to debase and degrade, to bring out the worst in us, and to treat humans like objects or chattels are morally improper.

Race-based discrimination is not immoral for reasons of immutability or irrelevance — in pockets of the Deep South, having a black employee may well be highly relevant to a business’s ability to attract customers. Acts of racial discrimination are wrong because they degrade everyone involved, while lowering the condition of humanity writ large. We have decided, as a political and moral community, that judging one another according to skin color and assigning opportunities on that basis is not in keeping with our notions of the good society; and of course, this societal judgment is not born of speculation, but rooted in a long and ignominious history.  It is true that this history may not be as identifiably present with looks-based discrimination. But as Mr. Benavides points out, sexysim is a close cousin of racial discrimination: It objectifies and degrades in the very same way.

This is all to say that there is no convenient, ready-made formula — e.g. immutability + irrelevance = illegal — to determine what traits are and are not fair game in allocating scarce resources. It is rather a question that demands the type of collective introspection that the political process should be about. We must ask: Do we want to be a society with a caste of beautiful people and a caste of the aesthetically challenged?  Does this practice bring out the best in humanity or degrade and divide humanity? Does it encourage virtue or empty citizenship of moral meaning? My objection to Mr. York’s piece is not that he gets the answers to these questions wrong; the real problem is that he fails to grapple with them at all.

If I add -ism to an adjective that I don’t possess, why does that give me any grounds to claim a violation of my rights? Can I apply for a nuclear engineering position lacking all relevent skills and then claim competence-ism when I am denied the position? Every time a judgement is made, there is an -ism present. Just today I committed Wendy’s-ism when I intentionally drove past the McDonald’s drive thru. If I choose Han Solo over Lando Calrissian, there are several -isms implicit in my choice, the most obvious of which is Han-ism. Another -ism which might actually exist in my judgement is possession-of-the-millenium-falcon-ism, or has-good-smuggling-connections-ism.

It seems that the legitimacy of an -ism grievance, at least insofar as it deserves to be bandied about by legal scholars, depends soley upon its being asserted by a fellow human being. This in turn suggests that any assertion by any person has an equal legitimacy, again in the attenuated sense that it deserves valuable time spent in its consideration. This would seem to make my own Wendy’s-ism, the fanboy’s sexy-ism, and Rosa Park’s claim of racism to be initially equally legitimate. Only rationalism run amuck, completely unmoored from any metaphysical/moral foundation would end up in such a place. Can’t we just say that sexyism is retarded and move on?

York grudgingly admits he has been on the receiving end of sexyism. Sadly, his admission is entirely unmerited. I applaud his successes in life and would hold him up as an icon for every plain Jane (or James). Don’t worry, kids: your smarts will win in the end. Just ask Mr. York.

[I, on the other hand, must admit that I lead a life of sexyist privilege, hence the title of this piece. I mention this purely in the interest of full disclosure.]

But that’s precisely the problem: beauty or worse, sexiness, is deeply subjective, highly contextual, broadly cultural. A sexyist HR director at Hooters would show Liv Tyler the door, while I can’t remember seeing Pamela Anderson on the runways in Milan or Paris. The problem gets worse the farther you get from organizations with an explicitly beautiful bent (say, the fashion industry or the silver screen). What constitutes beautiful in a law firm? What constitutes a sexy travel agent?” What roles does sexyism play in DMV hiring? The answer to the last is clearly none…none whatsoever.

Take it out of the office, and the problem is hopeless: should we worry about sexyism in river rafting guides? Obviously, lives are at stake, and we want the most competent people guiding landlubbers down the Snake River. At the same time, my pasty, somewhat blubbery self doesn’t exactly project the hearty outdoorsman look that will instill confidence in my passengers. And when lives are at stake, trust may be of the utmost importance. Not only is it a different standard for every job, it’s useful (as York pointed out), and in some cases necessary.

Mr. Benavides makes some excellent points about the subjective nature of beauty, and how it can actually harm a workplace. On these purely consequentialist grounds he dubs it a civil right, and holds it impermissible. Mr. B seems to have forgotten that hiring decisions do not occur in a vacuum: companies overstocked with Bimbos with feel the wrath of the market. A firm of chesty lawyers may increase associate satisfaction rankings (or not, as Benavides points out), but it will be the first on the chopping block when a company has to cut its legal department. A team of sexy grocery store clerks is entertaining to muse upon, but all the Megan Foxes in the world won’t save a store with unstocked shelves.

In short, sexyism is perfectly legitimate in some cases, and unfortunately discriminatory in others. I am perfectly content letting the market weed out the latter.

I am for equality of the sexies.  I believe that unsexy or, to put it plainly, ‘ugly’ people can contribute just as much to society, if not more than anyone else.  After all, who’s to say what’s sexy and what’s not not.  And when do we set the standard for sexy?  If I originally granted you admission to my university because you were sexy, but later tire of your deep brown eyes and soft skin is it alright to just kick you out?  In fact I think one of the problems with the term sexyist is that what is at stake is not just ‘sexiness,’ but physical beauty, which at least to me are two different things.

When taken as a focus on physical beauty, sexyism turns out to have a lot in common with racism and sexism, two other fixations on the skin-deep.  Mr. York points out that racism or sexism are illegal because of two criterion: they are  1) unrelated to the job and 2) uncontrollable.  Mr. York argues that beautiful people make for a more pleasant work environment, making beauty relevant and passing the first criterion.  He also posits that people can control how beautiful they are, which passes the second.

However, in the sense that Mr. York discusses sexyism, racism and sexism are also related to the creation of a harmonious work environment.  No one can stop people from being individuality racist or sexist.  Even without these biases, however, one could argue for the benefits of a single-sex office full of only men or women who can talk as lewdly as they like or a monoracial office without racial or cultural misunderstandings.  The reason we strive against sexism and feminism- and now sexism – is because we believe there is no relation between sex, race, or beauty and how an individual carries out the tasks for which they have been employed.  If admitting people into a private institution or public place on the basis of how their presence affected the work environment were legal, then desegregation never would have occurred and Rosie never would have riveted.

This is not to say that we don’t want attractive people in our workplace.  Indeed physical beauty also fails Mr. York’s second criteria – it is unchangeable.  I’m not talking about plastic surgery . I’m talking about the eye of the beholder.   No matter how beautiful we think we are by any standard, a split-second judgment can label us “ugly.”  Beauty is so subjective that even within a ‘race’ or sex or sexual orientation there is no universal ‘beautiful.’  One need only to observe a group of high school boys comparing their idea of a hot 10 and mediocore 6.5 to to confirm this.

Attraction is another matter.  Physical attraction and charisma are valuable skills that should sought out and used as a basis for finding talent.  Working well with individuals, leading a team, communication skills, these are all manifestations of physical or mental attraction that are cultivated just as well – if not better – by the unsexy as the sexy. In fact promoting sexyism may prove especially harmful because we miss out on the talents that are only developed by living in a body that many do not consider beautiful.   As any pick-up artist would tell you, physical beauty has some allure, but its effect is negligible compared to a deep ‘inner game.’  Cary in Sex in the City implies as much when she proclaims, “ I never sleep with a man that’s too good-looking.  They’re never good in bed, because they never needed to be.”

Indeed, history is full of examples of not beautiful yet charismatic and powerful leaders. Certainly the quick-witted Abe Lincoln was no less effective  an  orator  for  his craggy features. And although we may not at first glance understand why FDR married her, Eleanor was a worthy spokesperson for many a noble cause.  An openly sexyist institution no only discourages the highly talented if lesss beautiful candidates, but may incentivize a braindrain, attracting those who focus on beauty at the expense of depth.   In South Korea, a mirror-laden society that openly practices sexyism, plastic surgery for graduating high school andcollege seniors is widespread, with half of women having received someform of plastic surgery and eight out of ten considering it.  Sexyism doesn’t even encourage health, but rather a slavish devotion to an unattainable ideal.

Even for the absolutely brazen sexyist set on hiring only perfect 10′s, a legal acknowledgement of sexiness-based discrimination would have to allow for  reverse sexyism. If it becomes alright to discriminate against those we find unattractive, what about keeping people who are too attractive out of the office: case in point Deborah Lorenzana, former Citibank employee, fired for being a ‘hottie.’  In Lorenzana’s case, despite being an excellent banker, her voluptuous figure made her employers uncomfortable enough to impose increasingly absurd clothing regulations upon her and give away clients to other employees.  In the sexyist world, they could have easily said that their idea of beauty was someone like Ms. Lorenzana’s flat-chested co-workers and fired her on the spot.   Saying yes to sexyism may very well eliminate some of the most attractive members of our workforce at the hands of jealous or immature co-workers.

On a final note, I would argue that even image dependent industries like fashion and entertainment regard sexyism as disadvantageous. Models are often chosen not for being ‘attractive,’ but for having an emaciated physique that may make clothes look a certain way and sell more muumuus.  Actors are chosen for certain traits beyond sexiness: there are some beautiful roles –the hero, the ingénue – but many more funny-looking, old, or uglyones.  Even in these industries, the standard is not ‘what do I think is beautiful,’  but ‘who is the best person for the job.’

Sexyism is perhaps more a part of human nature than racism or sexism.  But as much as we’re attracted to a pretty face, we also know that it’s not everything.  Now that sexyism has emerged to the forefront of the civil rights debate, it’s an opportunity to affirm what we knew all along: “Beauty is only skin deep.”

More recently, though, some would lead the campaign for equality in a new direction. Next on their agenda of wrongs to right is the long-existing but newly discovered bias in favor of attractive people. In particular, they challenge the propriety of factoring looks into hiring decisions. For the sake of simplicity, let’s call this form of discrimination “sexyism.”

In the minds of activists, sexyism, like any other prejudice, arbitrarily assigns greater value to people based on extraneous qualities. It debases and dehumanizes, objectifies and commoditizes. Because perceptions of physical beauty arise from cultural norms, sexyism can act as a proxy for other, more pernicious forms of discrimination, like racism or xenophobia. Sexyism also reinforces wealth disparities, since the poor usually subsist on inferior diets and can’t afford expensive dental work or gym memberships. And, since most employers are still men, sexyism is more likely to impact women than men.

Yet despite all this, I still believe sexyism to be acceptable. Certainly, there are major hurdles to legal enforcement—how, for example, do you determine whether an employer’s hiring practices produce a disparate impact on ugly people? Even assuming effective enforcement, though, sexyism is a justifiable bias, one that pays dividends to both individual businesses and society at large.

(I should note, in the interests of fairness, that as an attractive person, I benefit from sexyism myself. Nonetheless, I believe it to be objectively justified.)

Employment discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and sexuality is unjust for two reasons. First, these characteristics are uncontrollable and arbitrary; no one “chooses” to be black, or female, or gay (I’m avoiding the rare cases for now). Second, these traits, taken on their own, are irrelevant to job performance. Women accountants can account as well as their male counterparts; gay plumbers plumb as well as straight ones. To hold against a person a characteristic that is both immaterial and unchangeable simply doesn’t comport with common sense norms of fairness.

Notably, employment discrimination is permissible if only one of these factors is present. It may be beyond a worker’s control that he was born without arms, but an employer should be under no obligation to hire him as a typist. Wearing a green hat to work may make no impact on profits (it may even diminish them), but it is an employer’s prerogative to demand it of her workers. Beauty, however, is neither predetermined nor irrelevant.

First of all, physical attractiveness includes not only fixed factors, but malleable ones as well. In this respect, beauty resembles intellect. It involves an obvious genetic component—some people are just “born” attractive. But just as ambition and education can improve the mind, personal effort and prudent choices can enhance appearance.

But more importantly, beauty can contribute directly to both work quality and consumer preferences. Businesses spend countless dollars every year designing floor space, purchasing furniture, and perfecting decor in attempts to “beautify” the work environment. A pleasant work atmosphere improves employee morale and focus, while a properly decorated store attracts customers and signals a certain style (or lack thereof). In fact, the prominence of workspace beautification suggests it plays an important role in the success of a business; otherwise, we would expect the market to correct for such profligate expenditures.

Nothing suggests that human beauty cannot provide a similar effect. Talented and hard-working applicants may be drawn to a business environment where they will be surrounded by beautiful people. Corpulent coworkers exuding foul stenches, on the other hand, may diminish employee cohesion. An obese mouth-breather may not provide the “chic” Hollister is looking for, just as emaciated glitteratae may prove unconvincing purveyors of chili dogs.

Finally, it’s worth noting that people respond to incentives. Tax something, and you’ll get less of it; subsidize it, and you’ll get more of it. Insofar as physical appearance translates into better job prospects, we encourage people to improve their looks, thereby yielding positive externalities for the whole of society. In fact, given that a pleasant physique usually corresponds to a healthy lifestyle, the benefits extend beyond shallow appearances.

I sometimes wonder whether the frontiers of civil rights are ever expanding, or whether there is some limit to our zeal for equality. Whatever the answer to that question, resistance to sexyism is unwarranted.

I emphasize the disconnect between the descriptive statements Mr. York uses to set up this “incongruity” and his “answer” to turn his argument on itself and thereby to examine a more pressing incongruity, or rather illness, within the modern academy. Mr. York presents two claims: 1) that fields like literature or intellectual history will naturally rely on original texts and 2) that “the hard sciences” will eschew obsolete theories and antiquated historical sources. These claims are set against one another as the poles of an academic dilemma, the two extremes of which, it is supposed, that the “fields in between” must choose. It is to this choice that Mr. York speaks with his answer: If we purport to seek truth (presumably within these “in-between” disciplines), we should emphasize contemporary works and de-emphasize historical ones. First, I challenge Mr. York’s initial claims. Second, I suggest that the qualification of his answer (“to the extent they purport to seek ‘truth’”) indicates a fundamental oversimplification of the project of the academy itself.

As to the first point, Mr. York begins by presenting the case of two professors, one of physics the other of metaphysics. The professor of physics, if he were to assign Aristotle, would be a “laughingstock” whereas the same assignment, if made by the professor of metaphysics, would be “typical.” (I would say such an assignment would not be typical but rather laudable but I digress.) The difference between these two, the reader is meant to infer, is in the nature of the two professors’ respective disciplines. I would dig deeper here, however, and question whether Mr. York’s reductio is indeed sound. If the physics professor, charged with fostering and demonstrating the inquisitive mind so central to that discipline, were to assign Aristotle’s Physics to her students as a case study of the scientific method at work, she would surely only be a “laughingstock” to those members of her faculty or student body who could not see past the antiquity of the text to the quality of its content. Book 1, Part 1 of the Physics states, “When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained.” Has the modern study of Physics, with its search for ever more basic principles, particles and patterns, progressed beyond this formula in its path to “scientific knowledge”?

As to the second point, I take Mr. York’s argument to be misdirected but sound. Mr. York’s argument is misdirected in that it states that it is on the basis of the search for “truth” that texts such as the Physics should be de-emphasized. As is often the case, the use of a universal term (“truth”) here masks a dangerous oversimplification. In academic investigation, we strive for two useful goals (among others): the right answers and the right questions. The sign of a good academic is the ability to generate the right answers. The sign of a great thinker is the ability to generate the right questions. Yes, there are parts of ancient texts such as the Physics that should not be relied upon today. Aristotle’s descriptions of earthquakes being caused by underground winds should not be consulted by seismologists today. It is not, however, passages such as these that make classic texts such as this valuable today. Rather it is the questions he and other ancient thinkers pose, questions that plague us today, that justify these texts’ inclusion in the best Physics and Metaphysics courses today.

Mr. York’s argument is sound (begin my concurrence) in that it is precisely the sort of hollow, jargon-filled historicism he cites in his absurdist dialogues that makes many academics “laughingstocks” in the eyes of the public, the student body, and we members of the academy itself. Mr. York is correct. The modern academic’s penchant for “lionizing historical thinkers” is dangerous. And the blind citation of these thinkers’ ideas is bad reasoning and does indeed “squelch[] discourse”. (Though I think “because Will to Power/ressentiment/uebermensch” may be my new universal justification.)

At the heart of this problem is not, however, the historicism that Mr. York decries. It is instead the intellectual laziness that both Nietzsche and Derrida decried. I don’t dispute that “one need not even read Rawls to glean value from Nozick.” The latter’s libertarian framework is, indeed, an accomplishment in itself. Need one read Rawls (or Locke) to understand the strange irony of Nozick’s reliance on the Lockean Proviso to account for the reality of limited resources? Probably. Would a grad student’s arguments, if they relied on the buzzwords generated by Nozick, Derrida or Aristotle’s works rather than on an understanding of their work be laughably obtuse and counterproductive in academic conversation? Definitely.

Historicism is helpful. Placing authors in conversation with each other, with the each author’s lines of dialogue in historical order, can be useful for understanding the values, the context, the presuppositions and the fashions that are present in each text. The lionization of authors and the canonization of texts is not necessarily bad. The most prolific and influential of these authors or texts may warrant this treatment. It is when we forego critical engagement for memorization, when we forget that these authors were creatures of their time and begin to commit the “history-worship” decried by Mr. York that we become “laughingstock[s]“.

Mr. York may be correct. Many of the authors, texts, and indeed sections of texts that have previously been considered canonical may be cut from today’s curriculum. Whether it is because of a multiplication of canons, the increased demand for “useful” instruction or a robust set of contemporary examples, these texts may no longer be necessary for one to be a productive and conversant member of society. But let us not fall prey to the converse of Mr. York’s “history-worship”. The works of contemporary philosophers and political scientists are not necessarily superior based merely on their modernity. Although some texts must be sacrificed in the necessary abridgment that is a liberal arts education (or a human life) due to time and space constraints, let’s not toss out the baby because we don’t like reading the antiquated bathwater.

Because the classics have been drilled into us from an early age, we confuse their comfortable integration into our own lexicons with their utility.  Everyone before me read Plato.  In order not to sound like an idiot I must also read Plato or at least be able to feign knowledge of who he is and what he thought.  However, this excessively complicates learning in the social sciences and philosophy, which I would argue is more positive or logical /mathematical than historical. Students need practice reading difficult, messy -even ancient – texts and encountering primary sources.  But educators must be honest that texts that display the above characteristics are not the best for clearly and efficiently conveying theoretical knowledge in the social sciences- unless you have a mentor to slap you upside the head with a ruler everytime you doze off.

It is true as Mr. Renautus pointed out that  ignoring great ideas because they are no longer in vogue is dangerous.  A case in point is Marx, whose ideas most social scientists today would disagree with but continue to shape ideology around the world.  However, there is no need to slog through the biblical “Das Kapital” when a few quote-laden pages can introduce us to “economic determinism” or “class consciousness.”

We may scoff at jargon-ridden academic journals, but would anyone with only a “humanist” education purport to read a journal in mathematics or engineering without sufficient training.  Many not particularly arcane modern day authors in economics, psychology, and philosophy journals are quite difficult to read without a knowledge of mathematics, statistics and logic as well as some understanding of the context of the current debate.  This is because their disciplines have far developed in complexity beyond Freud, Adam Smith, and Plato, as we would hope after a few hundred years.  If we want to grill students we should be pushing them towards an understanding of these tools rather than those of another era.  The generalist, sprawling encounters with ideas of the classics are only adequate for introducing those unfamiliar with basic concepts.

But before running back to the past for an introduction, consider if discussing “The Matrix,” or “Pleasantville” or any other movie you may have already seen, will yield a less thought-provoking discussion than reading Plato’s myth of the cave.  Why use the obscure etmolygies of the Cratylus to discuss philosophy of language when the wordplay of Alice in Wonderland or Bugs Bunny really leads us to the same conclusions about the slippery nature of names and identity.  Who says learning can’t be fun?

A necessary preface: McArthur deserves praise for attempting to subject something so quotidian to a real analysis. It is often in the most prosaic daily actions that truths about our society are best expressed. And I’ll even agree with his argument this much: many actions, perhaps even holding the door, have an emptiness to them, a mechanical practice divorced from meaning.

Similarly, Benavides perfectly captures the quandary that faces any encounter with a stranger, particularly for the well-intentioned: how does one convey respect in such crude terms as the opening (or not) of a door? How do we genuinely indicate courtesy and not simply attempt to paint how we wish to be perceived on others?

Nonetheless, both of their arguments vividly highlight why we have norms and precisely why they are useful. McArthur and Benavides both struggle with how we should respond in the face of ignorance, and both fail mightily in their response; McArthur, by attempting to calculate what can’t be quantified, and Benavides, by ignoring the solution that society has crafted for his dilemma.

First, McArthur errs in attempting to quantify the utility of door-holding at all: except in fairly rare cases (holding the door for the patently infirm or the fellow with his arms full of groceries), how do we even talk about the “value” that is increasing or decreasing for either of the individuals involved?

McArthur’s own critique includes a hodgepodge of unquantifiable variables thrown together in a bizarre bouillabaisse. His recipe includes the exertion of door pulling, freedom from same, Goldilocks speed (neither too fast nor too slow, just the pace of your “life plan”), emotional discomfort generated by social compulsion, lost autonomy, the cost or threat of peer criticism, dull obedience…and that’s only two paragraphs! How on earth can McArthur begin to make any calculation of “utility,” when his formula contains an alphabet of unknowns?

This is precisely why norms are important: no man could be expected to be making that calculus in his head every time he approaches a door. It’s neither reasonable nor sane. Opening the door, like countless other social conventions, serves the purpose of lubricating social transactions by saying, a) here is the standard to expect, and b) yes, it’s the one where you at least try/pretend/feign/genuinely express concern for those around you.

The latter point brings us directly to Benavides’ “heart-wrenching” quandary.

He rightly points out the problem with applying a single standard of courtesy to the infinite variety of preferences of mankind. The economist Ludwig von Mises ties M and B’s problems together in this useful quote:

It is vain to speak of any calculation of values. Calculation is possible only with cardinal numbers. The difference between the valuation of two states of affairs is entirely psychical and personal. It is not open to any projection into the external world. It can be sensed only by the individual. It cannot be communicated or imparted to any fellow man.

How then are we to calculate a standard for door holding (eh, McArthur?), much less a system of common courtesy? For instance, how could Benavides ever anticipate that as I approach a pair of double doors, I enjoy nothing so much as to grab both handles and fling both open violently, striding through the vast opening (preferably with the sun silhouetting my entrance)? He can’t, nor can McArthur ever calculate the utility lost by the scrub who limply barely holds a single door from entirely closing. And with every waking moment, every interaction with another human being whose preferences he doesn’t know, every door he passes through in the company of other humans, he is the perpetrator of a thousand crimes, a Prince Asaka in whatever city he dares walk.

As K. Lear said, that way madness lies.

In fact, social customs emerged to solve the twin struggles with ignorance that McArthur and Benavides deplore and fear, respectively. Sure, they can become artificial things, hollow acts that no more represent the man than the clothes he wears. But that means nothing by itself, anymore than a belly ache doesn’t immediately reveal whether you are suffering from indigestion or stomach cancer?

More importantly, however, social norms can influence the actor, even if he is unwilling to admit as much. Just as smiling, even artificially, has been proven to lighten one’s mood, so too do habitual actions protect and inflame a spark of concern for the other. So, too, opening the door: even if you resent it, it sparks an internal conversation (perhaps mirroring this very debate), which will push you to find ways to more sincerely express your concern for others.

Just as laws legislating morality cannot cure the ills of a city (ask Augustus how that went) nor can we hope that adherence to custom will solve our problems. But abandoning the forms that cultivate a public-spirited citizenry is only to abandon ourselves to the disease of selfishness plaguing our interactions.

We shouldn’t study thinkers merely because they influenced others: true, although I think York exaggerates the point.  We shouldn’t lionize texts and thinkers without good reason, and we should never stop asking questions in this respect: true.  We shouldn’t speak of thinkers without understanding their arguments, and if their works don’t help in this respect we should stop reading them: true.  We should continue to seek the truth ourselves: true.  Yet none of these are arguments necessarily lead one to abandon the works in question.

The heart of the issue is whether or not these writings represent the best exposition of their position, and whether or not these ideas are worth studying.

For instance, “[r]eading Aristotle and Aquinas at the expense of Wittgenstein and Quine conveys the notion that, despite centuries of development, you really can’t improve on the originals.”  Are Wittgenstein and Quine a development of Aristotle and Aquinas?  This is an assumption sorely in need of proof.  In many respects these thinkers are in conflict with each other.  Does coming centuries after someone you reference and in some respects disagree with necessitate salutary development?  One can believe that we can and do progress in knowledge in philosophy and science and also reject the extreme version of this view: that whatever comes after is always somehow better.

Let’s take another example: “Let’s be frank: no one—no one—thinks we should adopt Plato’s Republic as a model for successful government. But the vast bulk of political theory courses preference the noocratic musings of Socrates to legitimate discussions of the philosophical underpinnings of our own liberal democratic society.”  Plato himself didn’t think the Republic was a model for successful government either.  But it remains one of the, if not the, best introduction to politics and the question of what is good and just that has ever been written.  This has been the judgment of educated people for thousands of years.  Practical minded educators seeking to make engineers and chemists might disagree, but this would require a proof that consists in more than simply pointing to our ability to transplant hearts and make nuclear bombs.  Plato helps one think through how such tools ought to be used and apportioned.

One reads Plato on democracy and forms of government and discovers principled and poignant arguments that radically challenge the assumptions of our time, helping us think through the most pressing issues we face today.  Thrasymachus’ argument that might makes right is used daily around the globe, as it always has been and will be, and is in fact the basis of the thought and action of many in and out of the academy who consider politics to be the mere manipulation of power.  I have met few undergrads who can give a coherent, rational argument against this horrendous view even if they are instinctively repulsed by it.  Why is this?  They are at a loss because they have been miseducated if they aren’t simply ignorant.  They have never experienced liberal education, and even if they have most programs are still neck deep in the mire of the same flawed historicism that York insightfully questions.  They were taught that we have generally got beyond all those older thinkers, who are rarely studied for what they actually argued in any serious manner.  Why bother?  After all, behold how many scholarly journals we have written full of articles that few people read!  Behold our complicated jargon!  Behold our technology!  Science!  Progress!  And  all too often a complete lack of actual argument that takes fundamental objections seriously.

Such serious challenges to the unquestioned assumptions of the historicism prevalent in the academy today can be found by reading many of these great works.  For their authors are seeking answers to the basic questions that humanity has asked throughout recorded history, and they do not simply assume that human nature progresses from age to age gathering up more and more wisdom.  Even those great thinkers who do hold a progressive sort of view will give serious arguments for the position, unlike many a more recent academic or lesser thinker who simply assumes the premise.

Plato is instantly accessible to decently educated undergrads, and he has been so for two thousand years.  Pick a scholarly article or book of philosophy today at random and the odds are it is a good deal more difficult to understand, and I would argue these modern works are often much less relevant to the serious questions which philosophy purports to answer.  Very often, such modern works that are considered to sit on the “cutting edge”  of what must be read, much like clothing fashions, are soon out of style and forgotten.  This is why hundreds and thousands of lesser figures who were very well regarded among experts in their day (even a generation ago) are now forgotten, while you can find Plato on the bookshelf of your local bookstore.  Even if you often have to go to the History section in order to find him.

All this talk of rational calculation of utility is, after all, a product of a thoroughly modern view of man as rational actor—a view that replaced both the ancient view of man as a product of the gods and the city and the Christian view of man as ensouled earthly likeness to the one God. It was the rationalism and un-theistic view of post-Enlightenment modernity that ushered in the possibility of approaching a question of common courtesy like holding open a door for one’s neighbor in the terms of behavioral social science.

Isn’t enduring some “disutility,” as Mr. McArthur puts it, a necessary condition of care for the whole? In other words, it is precisely the modern orientation towards autonomy and solipsistic utility-maximization that plagues us—and that plagues the analysis of “Open the Door Yourself.” Tocqueville was quite prescient in this regard, when he spoke of the retreat to our individual spheres of “private pleasure” in lieu of a more public-spirited republican engagement.

To speak of all rules (‘bureaucratic’ or otherwise) in terms of either good for the end they produce and rationally defensible, or observed out of mind-numbing obedience assumes without question the modern individualistic orientation. That is, it accepts unequivocally the triumph of man’s reason over all else and discounts the inherently messy relationship that must always exist between mores, rules, tradition, rationality, and civic virtue. Far from being a sign of the bureaucratization of modern life, the courtesy-as-social-norm displayed in door-holding is a sign of republican health, not malaise.