Divrei Chaim

can angels eat meat that's not really meat?

2009-11-10T09:00:00.004-05:00

Rashi explains based on the gemara (Baba Metziya 86) that although angels cannot eat, the angels who came to Avraham pretended to eat so as to not deviate from the normal practice of the community. The lesson for us is to blend in when blending in is appropriate. However, Tosfos on that sugya quotes the Midrash that contrary to the gemara's assumption, the angels did in fact eat. It is hard to say that there is a machlokes in "metziyus" whether angels can or cannot eat, so there must be some other explanation of what the underlying issue here is. I once tried to explain the gemara's position based on the view that the angels came on Pesach and matzah was served. The process of making matzah, turning raw wheat into a finished baked product, represents the sanctification of the physical world, a process angels are removed from and incapable of engaging in. Rav Shteinman in his Ayeles haShachar explains the two views as disagreeing over whether an angel can adopt a physical body for the purpose of fulfilling a mission or not. I'm not sure how much this adds to our understanding of the issue, as it begs the follow up question of why an angel can or cannot an angel appear in physical form -- in other words, the basis for that dispute -- which seems to bring us full circle back to where we started.

My wife's grandfather, R' Dov Yehudah Shochet, apparently (the return letter is published, but not the letter he sent) suggested in a different context that the machlokes Rishonim whether angels have a body or not (which I am not familiar with) can be explained as being no machlokes at all because it all depends on what the meaning of the word "body" is. Yes, angels have a body if you mean some type of spiritual envelope for their presence, but no, angels do not have a body if you mean a physical form. The Lubavitcher Rebbe replied to this letter with proof from the Rambam that no body means no body, i.e. no form whatsoever. Perhaps this machlokes is reflected in the differing views of the gemara and Midrash.

The Rishonim and Achronim discuss how Avraham could have served milk and meat to his guests when Chazal tell us that he obeyed the entire Torah even before it was given. The Da'as Zekeinim answers simply that the milk was served first followed by the meat. There are numerous other creative answers. Malbi"M writes that the cow served was no ordinary cow, but was an animal created through kabbalistic means using sefer yetzirah. Proof comes from the pasuk itself -- "es habakar asher asah," the cow which was made, not just prepared. The assumption is that this type of cow is not really meat and can be eaten together with milk. When discussing this at home the suggestion came up that these different views may help explain the difference between the gemara and Midrash (this is obviously speculative). If the meat served was physical beef, as the Da'as Zekeinim understood, then it is no wonder angels could not eat it, but if the beef was mystical beef created with the sefer yetzira, perhaps this type of food might be on the menu even of an angel.

On a final tangential note, the Malbi"m's assumption that meat created miraculously does not have the properties of what we call meat reminded me of a famous kashe of R' Chaim Brisker. The Beis Yosef asks why we celebrate Chanukah for eight days when there was enough oil for one day. One answer is that the jug of oil miraculously refilled itself each day, including the first, upon being emptied. R' Chaim questions why this miraculously created oil was acceptable for use in the menorah when the Torah demands that specifically olive oil be used. Miracle oil may look, taste, and feel like olive oil, but it did not come from olives! I saw another blogger discuss this recently and will leave you with the link and something to mull over as we get closer to Chanukah.

chinuch for chessed

2009-11-09T09:31:00.002-05:00

Rashi writes that Avraham fulfilled the mitzvah of chinuch by giving Yishmael the job of preparing the meat for this guests who arrived (18:7). The Minchas Chinuch (264) questions whether chinuch applies only to a mitzvah chiyuvis, e.g. tefillin, lulav, which the child will inevitably be bound to perform when he becomes an adult, or does it also apply to mitzvos like aveilus, which may a person may never have to observe in his lifetime. Rav Shteinman in his Ayeles haShachar uses this aRashi as a source to prove that chinuch applies even to a non-chiyuvis mitzvah. I’m a bit surprised. Why is chessed defined as non-chiyuvis because guests and people in need don't show up every day and may not show up at all? Instead of looking at chessed as being reactive, shouldn't we be proactive and seek out opportunities to do kindness?

Another point to consider is that Rabeinu Manoch (Hil. Shvisas Asor 2:10) suggests based on the wording of the Rambam that in addition to how to perform specific mitzvos, chincuh also encompases a more general obligation to see that a child grows into a Torah observant Jew. Perhaps when Rashi refers to chinuch he means it in this global sense of inculcating Yismael with the value system which Avraham lived by.

Aside from the chinuch of Yishmael, there is an interesting Seforno that suggests that the environment of Avraham's home already impacted Yitzchak. Why did these angels need to visit when Avraham had already been told by Hashem that he would have children? The Seforno answers that they came to tell Sarah the good news so that she would also be happy and give thanks to Hashem, "k'dei she'yehiyeh ha'obar shaleim", so that the child would be "complete." It's not just the mother's mood, the feeling of simcha, which would contribute to Yitzchak's sheleimus, but it is Sarah's giving thanks to Hashem which would spiritually set the tone for his future.

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth (II)

2009-11-06T09:32:00.004-05:00

This post is a continuation of what we started yesterday. What really drove my thinking about the Rashi of Hashem changing the story for the sake of shalom bayis is the following gemara and the Maharl's spin on it. The gemara (San. 97) tells the story of a certain person, R’ Tovus, or according to others, R’ Tovyomi, who declared that no matter how much money he was offered he would not tell a lie. Once upon a time he discovered a town called Keshot (coincidentally, the Aramaic word for truth) in which no one died before their time. Attracted to the town, he married a wife from there and settled down and had two children. Unfortunately the end of the story is not so nice. A neighbor stopped in one day and asked for R’ Tovus/Tovyomi’s wife, who at that moment was washing her hair. Not wanting to speak with a lack of tzniyus and say his was in the shower, R’ Tovus/Tovymi instead said she was not home. Immediately thereafter his two children died, and when the town leaders discovered the cause they asked him to leave the town to remove untruthfulness from their midst.

Maharal calles this gemara “kasha me’od” and discusses it at length. There seems to be a relationship between the name of the town, which means truth, and the behavior of the town’s residents, who all told the truth. But if being in the town influenced its residents to always speak the truth, “hamakom goreim”, why was Rav Tovus/Tovyomi not influenced in the same way to only speak truth? And if the town’s name and character had no influence, isn’t it odd that all the residents, without a single exception, always told the truth?

The Maharal explains that Keshot is not a physical place, but rather is a spiritual accomplishment, a madreiga, which a person can reach. In the place called Keshot no one dies because, as we discussed yesterday, truth is the only thing which is eternal – 2+2 was 4 long before we were here and will continue to be four a million years from now. If you attain the degree of spiritual perfection called Keshot, you gain eternity.

R’ Tovus/TovYomi sacrificed that madreiga of keshot for the sake of the competing value of tzniyus. Undoubtedly this was the right thing to do, but doing the right thing does not absolve one from suffering whatever costs and consequences may result. 2+2 cannot equal 5 even for a good purpose, and though he may have spoken a white lie for good reason, R’ Tovus/TovYomi suffered the consequence of falsehood.

The Maharal has much more to say about this gemara, but enough for now. Compare this gemara to the Rashi in Parshas vaYeira about Hashem changing the story for the sake of Avraham and Sarah’s shalom bayis. B’shlama with respect to Rav Tovus/TovYomi, he reached a madreiga and then fell from that madreiga, albeit for a good purpose. But how is it possible to speak of Hashem kavyachol falling in madreiga? – the words don’t even make sense. So what’s going on here?

Here are two ideas I had:

1) Yesterday I quoted the gemara that Hashem's "chosam", his seal, is truth. When is the seal placed on a letter? After it is complete and all written, ready to be posted for delivery. Sometimes it is only after all the facts are in, after we see the full picture with all the details in context, that things which looked questionable turn out to be closer to the truth than we might have thought.

Did Sarah mean to disparage her husband Avraham? I don't think so. I think a comment posted yesterday headed down this road. Sarah's words did not produce a disruption of shalom bayis. To repeat those words to Avraham and produce an effect never intended may capture her quote word for word more truthfully than if those words were omitted, but in context will produce a false outcome that is a greater distortion of the truth.

2) Before a child is born a bas kol declares, "Bas ploni l'ploni," and I assume that a bas kol declared that Sarah was meant to be the soulmate for Avraham Avinu. A person has the right to exercise his/her bechira and choose whomever he/she wants as a mate irrespective of what the bas kol declares, but that does not change the fact that his/her soul might have been meant in truth for someone else (see here for more on this).

Sarah may have inadvertently chosen the wrong words, harmful words, but that is between her and Avraham. Those words exist only k'lapei her personal bechira and can be measured only based on their effect in this world, which in this case was nothing. However, k'lapei shemaya, in the world where the words of "bas Ploni l'Ploni" reverberate for all eternity, the truth is that the neshoma of Sarah is meant to be united in perfect harmony with the neshoma of Avraham. K'lapei shemaya any disruption of that harmony is sheker, falsehood, and cannot be uttered by Hashem.

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth

2009-11-05T11:19:00.003-05:00

Before we get to an interesting Rashi in this week’s parsha and what I think it means, we need a little background about the midah of emes. Chazal tell us (Shabbos 55) that “chosamo shel Hasem emes,” G-d’s seal is truth. Why is G-d’s seal (whatever that means) truth and not some other trait like kindness, justice, mercy, etc.? Maharal explains (Nesivos Olam, Nesiv haEmes ch. 1) that the midah of truth is unique because there is only one truth under any and all circumstances. 2+2 cannot truthfully not equal 4 – that must be the answer – but there are an infinite number of possible wrong answers. Like truth, G-d’s existence is unwavering. G-d is one, while there are an infinite number of things that might be not-G-d; G-d’s existence must be and always will be.

No creation shows the same similarity to the trait of truth. The very possibility of any creation not existing or ceasing to exist marks it as qualitatively different from 2+2=4, which must be so and always will be so. Therefore, we ascribe the trait of truth in its purest form to G-d alone (see also Kuntres Emunah u’Bitachon 1:9 printed in Chazon Ish Taharos [it is omitted from the small edition] for his comparison between G-d's existence and “muskalos” [a priori truths]).

The Midrash (B”R 8:5) describes a tremendous debate which took place in Heaven over the question of whether or not to create man. Truth objected to the creation of man, and as a result G-d cast it out of Heaven. R’ Nachum Ziv (Kitvei HaSaba m’Kelm v’Talmidav, vol 1) writes that truth must be thrown into this world -- this is not its natural environment. A trait that is so special that only it can be used as G-d’s seal is too spiritually pristine for our world and does not fit in.

Getting to our parsha: When Sarah laughs at the possibility of her having a child in old age, she also remarks on her husband Avraham’s old age. However, when G-d tells Avraham what happened, he omits any mention of Sarah’s comment about him. Rashi explains that we see that a little “white lie”, a deviation from the exact truth, is permitted for the sake of peace. Rather than tell Avraham that Sarah doubted that he could have children, Hashem presented her remarks as only doubts about her own ability to conceive, preserving the "shalom bayis" of Avraham's household.

Question: if it will make peace between two accountants, can 2+2 suddenly equal 5? Of course not. So how can G-d, whose seal is truth precisely because truth is eternal, unchanging, "muchrach" and without substitute, just as G-d is, utter what is not the truth? It's a contradiction in terms to speak of G-d and falsehood in the same sentence. So how does this work? I'm deliberately dividing this into a few posts because: 1) you may not like one part (I'm not sure I like my setup of the kashe, but the hesber will be nice, I hope!) and still take something away from the rest; 2) I'm still working through where I am going. Stay tuned...

the fate of Sdom and the cost of lost opportunity

2009-11-03T10:19:00.003-05:00

When Avraham begs G-d to save the city of Sdom and the vicinity if forty or even thirty people can be found, G-d responds, “Lo e’eseh” -- I shall do nothing to the city if that many righteous people are found. However, when Avraham begs G-d to save the city if just twenty or ten people can be found, G-d responds, “Lo ashchis” – I shall not destroy the city on their behalf, but the city will still suffer some punishment. With so few righteous people present, the city cannot get off scott-free.

Why then, asks the Meshech Chochma, does G-d respond to Avraham’s plea to save the city for forty-five righteous people by saying, “Lo ashchis”, I shall not destroy the city, implying that the city will still be punished? If for forty or even thirty righteous people G-d would withhold all punishment from the city, then certainly if forty-five righteous people were present no punishment at all should be administered?!

The Mishna In Pirkei Avos tells us that there are two aspects to G-d’s judgment: “din" and "cheshbon”. The Vilna Gaon explains that “din” is judgment and punishment for a wrongful act. “Cheshbon”, calculation, means making an assessment of the lost opportunity to do good that came as a result of sin.

The Meshech Chochma applies this distinction here. Avraham first asked G-d to spare Sdom if fifty righteous people could be found, ten righteous people in each city. When that failed, Avraham asked that the cities be spared if only nine righteous were found in each, forty-five in total. Imagine having nine righteous people in a city -- if only one person would step forward to do good, there would be a full minyan of good people! What a lost opportunity! With only seven or eight righteous people, each individual could say that one more or less good person would make little difference. But once a city has nine, all it takes is one more to make a qualitative difference.

While the “din” of a having forty-five righteous people may warrant less severity than a city of only forty or thirty righteous people, the “cheshbon” of lost opportunity cries out for an even harsher punishment. Therefore, G-d promised only to spare the cities from destruction if forty-five righteous people were present, but not to excuse the cities completely.

With this conceptual background other details of the story of Sdom fit into place as well. It's not by chance that the destruction of Sdom takes place immediatly after their appointment of Lot as judge. By placing a relatively honest person in a position of leadership and still failing to make any change, the cheshbon of lost opportunity sealed the city's fate. And it's no wonder that the Malachim come to the city even before G-d begins deliberating Sdom's fate and hearing Avraham's plea on their behalf (as noted by the Shem m'Shmuel). The Angels were a burst of spiritual energy that entered the city. Had Sdom been receptive to the presence of Angelic visitors, this moment might have been a turning point for good. The squandering away of this precious last opportunity for change was yet another factor in sealing Sdom's fate.

support local institutions first

2009-11-03T09:07:00.003-05:00

The 5Towns this past week and upcoming week seems to be playing host to an influx of Rebbes of a variety of stripes and flavors, among them the Toldos Avraham Yitzchok. No matter what the hashkafa of the R' Ahrele descendents or other visitors, I don't believe withholding funds from a soup kitchen or a hungry family is right -- we can discuss our hashkafic differences after first making sure everyone has dinner on the table and a roof over their head. But I do think the invitations which bring these travelling circuses to town are wrong.

We have hungry people even in the 5Towns, the land of rich and plenty. There is a Tomchei Shabbos that does a weekly route and always can use volunteers and funds. We have people suffering unemployment who are in danger of losing their homes and we have yeshivos which have lost the tuition $ and support these families provided in the past. I am sure the TA"Y kollelim (5, according to the color brochure mailed to my home) are wonderful mosdos, but what of the community yeshivos in the 5Towns and Far Rockway that desperately need support and funding? I'm not talking about institutions which are ivory towers for scholars, but yeshivos which provide a direct benefit to the community. Sha'ar Yoshuv runs dozens of shiurim a week in their community learning center, all free of charge; Yeshiva of Far Rockway is a community school with bochrim mainly from Far Rockaway and the 5T; Yeshiva Gedola of the 5 Towns is currently housed in a storefront for lack of a building and also opens its doors and offers shiurim and chavrusa programs every night. Why write a check to a kollel in Mea Shearim when the yeshivos and schools (and I can't list them all) right in your own backyard need help? What about "aniyei ircha", "achicha ha'evyon"?

Why is this encouraged? The answer is simple: because the "leaders" and Rabbis involved believe the pocketbook will never run dry, the pie will always expand to accommodate another shul, another yeshiva, another kollel. Of course, that is simply not true, and the struggle the community schools have to simply make payroll (and I am not exaggerating) as funds are drained off elsewhere is the net result.

Community leadership is not a democracy, and he who pays the piper calls the tune, so unforunately the car we are all in together will keep picking up steam as we approach the cliff ever faster.

removing the "dust on the feet"

2009-11-02T10:23:00.004-05:00

Rashi writes that Avraham, not knowing his guests were angels, asked them to wash their feet before entering his home lest they be pagans who worshipped this dust and would bring their idolatry into his home. It could be that the Torah (or more accurately, Rashi) simply means to underscore the degree to which Avraham distanced himself from idolatry, but (as my son’s Rebbe asked yesterday) why mention specifically the detail of “worshipping dust of the feet”?

We find another reference to dust in Parshas vaYishlach in the context of Ya’akov’s battle with the angel of Eisav, where the Torah uses the expression, “vaYe’avek ish imo.” Chazal see a hint in this expression to the dust of their feet rising to the Heavenly throne. Again, why call our attention specifically to the rising dust in the context of this conflict?

Ya’akov’s battle occurs when he is left alone, “vaYivaser Ya’akov levado.” Rashi (based on Chazal) writes that Ya’akov was alone because he had returned for the little vessels which had been left behind. The Ohev Yisrael explains that every tzadik and every person has moments of gadlus hamochin and katnus hamochin. At times we feel inspired, alive, confident, we relish our avodas Hashem and learning; at times we may become small minded, depressed, out outlook narrow, or vision diminished. The Torah uses the term Yisrael when it wants to reference the former state; it uses the term Ya’akov when it wants to reference the latter state. It was the little vessels, the smallness of vision and outlook, which brought Ya’akov (as opposed to Yisrael) back and left him feeling alone and abandoned. In some sense the battle with the angel of Eisav is a battle to elevate this smallmindedness, this lack of vision and inspiration. Ya’akov was able to lift himself out of katnus hamochin, to worship Hashem not only when he was at the height and pinnacle of inspiration, when he head was into it, as we say, but even from the lowest depths of his consciousness, even the dust of his feet, his katnus hamochin, was elevated to the Heavenly throne.

The Maor v’Shemesh is medayek in the Torah’s use of the expression “mincha” instead of “matanah” to describe the gifts sent by Ya’akov to Eisav. “Mincha” has the same gematreiya value as avak, dust (=103). To overcome Eisav, to even dream of transforming Eisav to good, would require elevating the lowest levels of creation, the dust, the darkest katnus hamochin. (Update: My wife made the following suggestion: "mincha" is associated with Yitzchak, who Chazal tell us instituted that tefilah. Perhaps Ya'akov was trying to remind Eisav that they both shared a relationship with their father Yitzchak and in his honor a fight should be avoided.)

I heard once from R’ Naftali Jeger, Rosh Yeshiva of Sha’ar Yoshuv, in the name of R’ Tzadok (which I have not been able to track down) that this is the meaning of the Mishna in Brachos which tells us that we may not enter the Har haBayis with dust on our feet. The Mikdash is not a place for katnus hamochin! And with this in mind we can perhaps gain an appreciation for the description of so many aveiros as avak – avak lashon hara, avak shevi’is, avak ribis. These sins come about because we are dragged down in our avodah and wallow in the dust, unable to raise our spirits.

The Ohev Yisrael explains that this the meaning of Avraham’s request to remove the avak, the dust of the feet, before entering his tent. Avraham asked his guests to leave behind their katnus hamochin, their small minded vision of the world, and elevate themselves by joining him in his avodah.

(Side note: for two interesting thoughts on last week's parsha, see my wife's posts here and here.)

reciting oseh ma'aseh braishis on yam hamelach

2009-10-30T08:59:00.005-04:00

I happened to be looking at R' Shteineman's sefer Ayelet haShachar, so a few parsha ideas from there:

A mussar idea: Rashi quotes the Midrash which explains “hanefesh asher asu b’Charan” as referring to converts which Avraham and Sarah attracted. Earlier in the week I saw that R’ Aviner discusses what happened to these people. He suggests that they were not geirei tzedek, as no such concept existed before matan Torah (I’m surprised he writes this so unequivocally; see Brisker Rav al haTorah, P’ Bo), but were geirei toshav who later became the chassidei umos ha’olam. He does not quote the Meshech Chocma (21:33) who also deals with this issue and writes, based on Midrash, that these converts eventually reverted to their idolatry.

R’ Shteineman notes that rather than view the time and energy Avraham expended on being makreiv these people as wasted effort because of the the lack of long-term results (at least acc. to Meshech Chochma), the Torah credits Avraham for what he accomplished. He quotes R' Yisrael Salanter and the Brisker Rav as teaching that our goal should be to simply do what is right; what the ultimate results will be, what dividends our efforts will pay, is b'yad Hashem and not our concern.

A halachic idea: Rashi writes (14:3) that the Yam haMelach during Avraham's time was not a sea, but was dry land. The gemara (Baba Basra 74b), however, writes that when Hashem created the world he made the Yam of Sdom, which is Yam haMelach, as one of the seven seas which surround Eretz Yisrael. Was it a sea from the time of creation or did it become a sea later? A simple answer is that a small sea existed from the time of creation, but expanded later in history.

This actually has a halachic nafka minah which R' Shteineman quotes from R' Elyashiv. The bracha of "oseh ma'aseh braishis" can only be recited on something created during ma'aseh braishis. Since we don't know what part of Yam haMelach was created originally and which part of the sea was a later addition, R' Elyashiv holds that the bracha can only be recited if the entire sea can be seen at one time. R' Shteineman is not convinced. Perhaps the majority of the sea existed from creation and only a small part was added later -- based on rov one should be able to recite the bracha on any part of the sea. My 2 cents: since we don't know the percentage, i.e. did rov exist from the time of creation, shouldn't we say safeik brachos l'hakeil and follow R' Elyashiv's guideline?

tefilas tashlumin

2009-10-29T10:00:00.005-04:00

A few days ago one of my daughters asked me an interesting question. She had inadvertently forgotten to daven mincha, it was already after shkiya, and she wanted to know what to do.

A bit of background: my daughters do not ordinarily daven ma'ariv, nor does my wife. Although some Rishonim (e.g. R' Yonah) write that women should daven three times a day, the Mishna Berurah and many other poskim do not quote this view. The difference between ma'ariv and other tefilos stems from the fact that the gemara labels ma'ariv as reshus (Brachos 26), as opposed to shacharis and mincha, which are obligatory. Whether reshus means ma'ariv is not required at all or it simply means that ma'ariv can be deferred when faced with other obligations (as Tosfos writes), the bottom line is that it is a lesser obligation. Despite this theoretical distinction, in practice men always daven ma'ariv, in effect accepting it as obligatory. Women, however, have never adopted the practice of always davening ma'ariv, and for them it remains a reshus but not an obligation.

The one exception my wife and others make to this rule is that she davens ma'ariv on Fri. night and Erev Yom Tov. There is a complex reason why this makes sense (R' Ya'akov Emden and the Sha'arei Tshuvah quote this view), but for the sake of simplicity let me just explain what may be a side benefit of this practice. According to some poskim a man fulfills his mitzvah d'oraysa of kiddush in his davening; the kiddush recited over wine at the meal is only derabbanan. The Dagul m'Revava famously asks: how can a man who has already fulfilled his mitzvah d'oraysa of kiddush be motzi his wife at the meal when she has not? If one's wife has also already davened ma'ariv that question is rendered moot.

Getting back to our story, the halacha is that if a tefilah is missed it can be made up by davening an extra shmoneh esrei during the immediately following prayer period. For example, if you miss shacharis, you would daven a double shmonei esrei at mincha, the first being tefilas mincha, the second being a tashlumin make-up for shacharis. What should a women do if she missed mincha but does not ordinarily daven ma'ariv, the prayer period which immediately follows?

The Halichos Beisa writes (ch 6.) that in this case, even a woman who ordinarily does not daven ma'ariv should daven and add the tashlumin for mincha (which is what I told my daughter to do). What I found interesting is his proof. Poskim write that if a woman is running late on Friday and candlelighting time is approaching it is better for her to light candles than to daven mincha because she can always make up mincha later with tashlumin after ma'ariv -- QED that there is tashlumin for mincha at ma'ariv. I am not sure why this case is the paradigm for what to do when mincha is missed on Sunday or any other day. Perhaps only on Friday night when even many women who otherwise do not daven ma'ariv do so is there the possibility of tashlumin, but on other nights, where ma'ariv is ordinarily skipped, there is no tashlumin. The logic behind the Halichos Beisa's conclusion seems to be that since ma'ariv can be davened on any night, the possibility of doing so (even though one treats it as an obligation only on Erev Shabbos) is what allows for tashlumin.

One additional important point that I think my wife has brought up on her blog -- reshus means optional, not prohibited. Oftentimes a shul will hold a shiur open to men and women that is preceded by ma'ariv or followed by ma'ariv, and while the men daven, the women will slip out or stand in the back talking. Certainly if you are already in shul and have the opportunity to daven in a tzibur, to deliberately stand aside and engage in other activity instead of davening seems strange. Why not take advantage of the opportunity for avodas Hashem?

I don't know anything about the author of Halichos Beisa, but I wonder if he, like me, has more daughters than sons and therefore spent time working through these issues. I try to make time to learn the sefer with one of my daughters on Shabbos and aside from her gain in knowledge and I have found more often than not that I walk away with an interesting mareh makom or chiddush as well.

educational ideals and aspirations

2009-10-28T11:58:00.017-04:00

Before we can figure out how to build an education system or assess whether an educational system meets the goals and ideals we aspire to as Torah observant Jews, we must first ask ourselves what those goals and ideals are. Note the important word in that sentence: ideals. Yes, ideals do matter, even if we often fall short of them, because of the other important word in that sentence: aspire. It is the sheifa l'gadlus, the aspiration to ideals, which tells much about what a person considers serious and important and defines the direction of his life. When a kid plays baseball, he imagines himself becoming the next Derek Jeter -- he doesn't aspire to becoming the next 40 year old overweight guy in the Sunday breakfast league. When a kid starts to learn Torah, he should similarly imagine himself becoming the next Rav Soloveitchik, the next R' Ahron Kotler, and put in hours trying to make that dream come true -- not aspire to becoming a 40 year old ba'al habayis who can barely kvetch through daf yomi with the Artsroll. At some point in life a person matures and is forced to realize he is not Derek Jeter and maybe becoming a lawyer rather than count on playing shortstop for the Yankees is not a bad idea. And at some point down the road most talmidim will realize they are not R' Ahron Kotler or the Rav and they too will need to make concessions to reality as well. But those decisions can come long after elementary school, even after high school.

So what are the big dreams we should to inspire students to think about? Should we inspire them to go figure out a cure for cancer, perform some valuable social service that can help the needy, improve the world in some other way? All those are important goals, but they are secondary and far less important than the one goal for which a Jew was created.

The Rambam asks in his introduction to Peirush haMishnayos: "Why is man here; for what was he created?" The Rambam answers that mank was created for one purpose alone -- to imbue his soul with the wisdom of G-d. All other wisdom is valuable only to the extent that it enables man to draw closer to that singular goal. The Rambam continues that even if a person lived a holy life of a nazir, perfecting his nature and character, performing mitzvos, avoiding sin and temptation, he would still be imperfect so far as he did not devote himself to attaining the knowledge of G-d.

R' Chaim Volozhiner writes in his Nefesh haChaim (4:30):
"The Torah further surpasses with its illumination and holiness all mitzvos combined. That is, even if a person were to fulfill all 613 commandments with true perfection as required, meticulous in every detail, with proper pure intention, so that every limb and fiber of that person's being becomes a chariot upon which may rest the tremendous sanctity of all those mitzvos, nonetheless, there is no comparison at all between the light and holiness of mitzvos and the light and holiness of Torah which manifests itself upon a person who studies it properly. The root of holiness [of Torah] comes from a much higher source than the root of holiness and great light of even all the mitzvos combined."

This same idea is already found in a Mishna everybody knows and says every day: "...v'Talmud Torah k'neged kulam." Our primary goal in life, the goal which is more important than even other religious achievements and certainly more important than secular studies and achievements, is the study of Torah.

If our educational philosophy is to be molded by the Rambam, certainly a thinker who many champion as their guide in other areas, or R' Chaim Volozhiner, as Volozhin is the mother of all modern yeshivos, or any of the many seforim which echo these ideas, then we obviously need to aspire to become masters of Torah wisdom and knowledge. It makes no sense to aspire to and idealize the baker who provides bread for the talmid chacham, or the carpenter who builds his house, or even the doctor who heals his ills instead of idealizing and aspiring to be the talmid chacham himself!

The education that would lead to the goal of gadlus in Torah, namely intensive immersion in learning for the majority of the day every day, is certainly not for everyone. The world will have its bakers and carpenters, its investment bankers and lawyers, and we need educational institutions that will give everyone some connection to Torah and a love of learning. Just because you can't be Derek Jeter is no reason to give up baseball, and just because you are not the Rav or R' Ahron Kotler is no reason not to learn. Aderaba, within your own limits learn and support learning. But the pragmatic concession to reality does not mean we should make a philosophical concession and idealize the investment banker or scientiest as spiritually equivalent to someone tucked away in a beis medrash pouring over the words of R' Akiva Eiger and the Ketzos. We all can't be sitting over a gemara all day, but we all can admire those who do and aspire to come closer to that goal.

engaging in secular pursuits: "yatzo v'shov" of the raven

2009-10-25T13:49:00.006-04:00

Would you play a game of Russian roulette with a gun that has four chambers, one of which is loaded? What if we agreed that if you survive, you get a million dollars -- would you now be willing to play? 75% chance of a million bucks vs. 25% chance of certain death... I know what you're thinking: "Do I feel lucky?"

I think most people would agree that relative to the potential fatal consequences of losing, 25% is a pretty high risk to take, no matter what the potential rewards.

A local Jewish newspaper ran an editorial last week criticizing the choice many make to attend secular college. The challenges posed by the environment of a secular college, both ideological and in terms of shmiras mitzvos, present a danger for Jewish youth, especially for those who dorm. According to some studies as many as 25% of those who attend such colleges leave the fold. This week came the predictable letters to the editor in response justifying that choice. Here are some snippits with my reaction:

"I think most people, would look at a seventy-five percent retention rate and be overjoyed."

I guess some people just always see the glass as half-full, but is 1 in 4 Jews leaving the fold really something to be "overjoyed" over?

"...That is almost certainly more a product of an inferior elementary and secondary education than the result of the permissive atmosphere that sometimes prevails during college."

First of all, who cares what the cause is -- bottom line is that a 25% attrition rate is unacceptable. But let's grant the letter writer's assumption -- Dear principals of HALB, HAFTR, HANC, etc., what does a 25% attrition rate tell us about the state of modern orthodox elementary and secondary education which encourages and condones choices that lead to these abysmal statistics?

"Then there were some famous rabbis who studied before the war at the University of Berlin — Rabbi Soloveitchik, Rav Hutner and others."

And your child is the next R' Soloveitchik? And U. of Penn is just like Berlin before the war?
Does the letter writer really think R' Hutner would condone dorming at a secular college? And might it not be a good idea to first emulate the learning of R' Soloveitchik and R' Hutner and then have a debate about secular college?

"Finally, there is a growing fundamentalism and conformity in the Jewish colleges, which does not encourage intellectual growth."

Indeed, your child may go to yeshiva and be brainwashed to learn Torah, be more shomeir mitzvos, and have lots of yiras shamayim. Better to take that 25% chance of his/her becoming an apikores than chas v'shalom risk him/her becoming a chareidi.

For some people, there is no question that secular college offers an advantage that YU or Touro do not. If your heart is set on a career in engineering or science and were accepted to MIT, you would be setting yourself up for disappointment if you turn that offer down and pursue some lesser educational option alongside yeshiva. But by the same token, one is setting oneself up for religious failure if one thinks that study at secular university can be grafted onto avodas Hashem without sacrifice and challenge. Relishing the situation and portraying it as somehow superior to full immersion in a Torah environment is naive and misguided. And truth be told, it's not just the university, but the secular workplace as well which poses challenges, and it requires constant reinforcement of Torah values to emerge spiritually unscathed from the daily grind.

The Noam Elimelech uses the image of the yonah and the raven from Parshas Noach to reflect upon two different types of personalities. The yonah emerges into the world, "v'lo matzah manoach l'kaf raglah," and it finds no resting place. These are people who simply disdain all that the physical world offers and want no part of it, but that is certainly not the path for the masses.

The raven is called an "orev," a name which shares the same root as "ta'aroves," a mixture. Most of us lead a life where we try to balance a mixture of different interests and responsibilities, some secular, some religious. The raven emerges and travels "vayeitzei yatzo v'shov," darting away from the ark but then returning, constantly repeating the cycle again and again. For those who choose to engage in the secular, the key to spiritual survival is to emulate this process -- engaging in the secular world, be it for the sake of work or education, as required, but then immediatly returning to the safe haven of the ark.

the nature of chiyuvei shemira

2009-10-22T11:02:00.005-04:00

We have not done any lomdus in the past week, so time to make up for it. My son is learning Bava Kamma in 10th grade and asked the following kashe, which I thought was pretty amazing, but I'm obviously biased : ) He pointed out that R' Elchanan in Koveitz Shiurim Pesachim #17 discusses how to understand the nature of the chiyuvim on shomrim when things go wrong, e.g. an item is lost or stolen -- Is the penalty of payment a result of the Torah imposing a punishment or obligation to make restitution on the shomer, or is the restitution a function of the agreement between the shomer and the mafkid, similar to a contractual obligation?

Without going through R' Elchanan's discussion, one can at least prove that a sho'el is obligated to make restititution by virtue of his agreement with the mafkid. The halacha is that a shoel must always return or pay for the object he borrows, even if the object is lost or destroyed by accident (with the exception of accidental breakage that occurs during normal usage). Yet, Tosfos (Bava Kama 27b d"h u"Shmuel [however, see Ramban, B.M. 82 who disagrees]) holds that a person is not liable for damages (nezek) that occur in a completely accidental mishap -- the Torah never imposes a penalty in cases of oness gamur. Why then is a shoel obligated to pay in a case of oness gamur? The answer must be that even though the Torah does not obligate payment, the shoel assumed that added liability by virtue of agreeing to the terms of shei'lah with the mafkid.

Here's the catch: Bava Kama (4b) quotes a barysa in the name of R' Oshiya that lists 13 avos nezikin, counting among them the four shomrim. Each shomer is counted as a separate av l'nezikin because each has a unique halachic set of rules that govern the shomer's obligation to make restitution for theft or damage. But wait a minute, said my son -- a shoel is unique only in that he pays even in cases of ones, which no other shomeir must do. The reason a sho'el pays in cases of ones has nothing to do with the halachos of nezikin imposed by the Torah -- his obligation stems from his kabalas achrayus, his self-imposed agreement with the mafkid! Why then does this count as a separate category of av nezikin?

I don't feel so bad for being stumped because his rebbe was also stumped. We will see if he comes up with anything.

was Chavah told not to eat the eitz hada'as?

2009-10-21T13:29:00.003-04:00

I’ve suddenly gotten busy, so less time to post. The Chizkuni quotes a Midrash which we don’t have: R’ Yehoshua was asked how we know Chavah was commanded not to eat the eitz hada’as. (The prohibition against eating the eitz hada’as in ch. 2 is actually written before Chavah is built from Adam.) When I presented this question to a few people, their response was that the command not to eat was not given to man, Adam in the particular, but to mankind (the actually pasuk refers to ha-Adam). Interestingly, this is not the Midrash’s answer.

The first answer given by the Midrash is that Chavah was built from a side/rib of Adam. The command not to partake of the eitz hada’as applied to every limb and organ of Adam, even those parts of him that were now part of Chavah. R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz quotes this answer in his Sichos Mussar and elaborates on this idea of being mekadesh every part of one’s being.

R’ Chaim does not quote the Midrash’s second answer, which I found even more interesting. The Midrash says that since Chavah responded to the snake by saying that she could not eat from the eitz hada’as, she could in fact not eat from it.

Some people I quoted this to reacted by taking the Midrash to mean that since Chavah acknowledged the prohibition, there must be some source for it, e.g. the command was given to mankind, or maybe m’sevara it made sense. But if that were the case, if the Midrash is just telling us a siman that there was an issur, then ikar chaseir min hasefer – why not tell us the source for that issur? Why give us a proof that there was an issur, which was never in doubt, instead of telling us directly what the source of that issur was, which was the question raised?

It sounds to me like the Midrash is telling us that it was Chavah’s acceptance of the issur of eating eitz hada’as, irrespective of whether she was commanded not to do so, which bound her to not eat. By way of analogy, perhaps the issur could be compared to a neder. What emerges from this approach is a different spin entirely on Chavah’s sin. It was not eating per se which was wrong (as she had never been told not to eat!), but rather what was wrong was that by eating she engaged in hypocrisy – on the one hand, she verbally accepted the prohibition as binding upon herself, while on the other hand she acted as if she was free to do as she pleased.

breaking plate at tena'im

2009-10-19T16:54:00.003-04:00

My wife was wondering why mothers/mothers-in-law are given the job of breaking a plate at the signing of tena'im. I don't know an answer -- If you do, please reply to her query here. (Note: the question is not why a plate; the question is why this task is given to the women.)

our right to Eretz Yisrael and kiddush hachodesh

2009-10-19T14:29:00.003-04:00

The first Rashi’s on chumash asks why the Torah begins with the story of creation instead of with the first mitzvah of kiddush hachodesh. Rashi answers that the story of creation serves to justify our right to Eretz Yisrael. Since G-d is the Creator, he has right of eminent domain and can award land to whomever he chooses. Last week I presented Rashi’s answer as a negation or retraction of his hava amina – the pragmatic need to justify our right to Eretz Yisrael forces us to abandon the logical starting point of Kiddush hachodesh in deference to the priority of answering our critics.

The Kli Chemdah does not see Rashi's answer as a retraction of his hava amina. His approach is build around the view of Ramban, who writes (VaYikra 18) that the Torah is ideally meant to be fulfilled only in Eretz Yisrael. The observance of mitzvos outside of Eretz Yisrael is just practice until we can achieve that ideal goal. Ramban later in Sefer Braishis writes that Ya’akov Avinu married two sisters contrary to Torah law because at that time he was residing outside Eretz Yisrael where the obligation to perform mitzvos is not in full force.

Why does the Torah not start with the details of the first mitzvah, kiddush hachodesh? Because the observance of mitzvos in an ideal sense is only in Eretz Yisrael, and therefore, before we can even begin to speak of any mitzvos, we must first explain our claim to Eretz Yisrael.

I would like to add something to this Kli Chemdah. The Rambam writes that Kiddush hachodesh must be done by the beis din hagadol in Eretz Yisrael (see mitzvos aseh 153 in SH”M). The cheshbon, the calculation that we rely on to determine when to make rosh chodesh and leap years, is not what effects kiddush hachodesh – the cheshbon just serves to reveal (giluy milsa) of what beis din has been mekadesh. The Rambam adds that if theoretically there were no Jews living in Eretz Yisrael (an occurance G-d would never allow to happen), there would be no mechanism for kiddush hachodesh to occur.

How can there be kiddush hachodesh in Eretz Yisrael today without a functioning beis din? R’ Soloveitchik explained (see the essay in Koveitz Shiurei Torah) that beis din hagadol served two functions: 1) they were the supreme judicial body; 2) they served as the representatives of the community of klal yisrael. The power of kiddush hachodesh is invested not in the judicial role of beis din, but in their role as representatives. Today, when we lack their representative role, it is the behavior of the tzibur itself, the observance of the community of Jewish people residing in Eretz Yisrael, which establishes Rosh Chodesh.

Based on this, perhaps one could suggest that Rashi introduces our claim to Eretz Yisrael not just because mitzvah observance in general ideally must take place in the context of Eretz Yisrael, but specifically because the mitzvah of kiddush hachodesh, the first mitzvah of the Torah, the mitzvah which Rashi thought should open the Torah, is possible to fulfill only given the presence of the Jewish people to Eretz Yisrael.

eating from the eitz hada'as -- an aveira lishma

2009-10-16T08:33:00.003-04:00

The Meshech Chochma explains that the argument of the snake was far more subtle than simply telling Chavah to ignore G-d’s command to abstain from eating the eitz hada'as. The snake acknowledged that G-d had indeed commanded not to eat the fruit, but explained to Chavah that the reason for the prohibition is because eating the fruit would bring one to tremendous closeness with G-d -- this is the “knowledge” that would be gleaned by eating. Why then did G-d say that one who eats would die? Death, explained the snake, was not a punishment, but a consequence of the knowledge attained. It is impossible to remain involved in the temporal needs and occupations of this world and at the same time achieve the degree of spiritual ecstasy promised by eating the forbidden fruit. Therefore, one who eats must be prepared to die -- the path to spirituality demands complete surrender of existance in this world. Eating would be an aveira lishma!

The pasuk, "Lo mos temusun...," should be read as follows: "Lo!" -- No, the prohibition and punishment are not as you understand. "Mos temusun" -- Indeed, you shall certainly die if you eat from the tree, but not as a punishment, but rather, "Ki b’yom achalchem mimenu v’nifkechu eineichem" -- Because by eating your eyes shall be opened to spiritual wonder and you will no longer belong chained to mere physical existance.

After Adam and Chavah ate, they were forced to hide from G-d’s presence. Consuming the fruit produced the opposite effect they had hoped for -- they found themselves distanced from G-d, less spiritual beings than they had been earlier. G-d challenged them, “Have you eaten from the tree which I commanded not to eat from?” The pasuk repeats the command "lo tochal mimenu" to reinforce that Hashem expected obedience to the simple meaning of His words -- "Don't eat." All the philosophical justifications and elaborate explanations for why circumventing that command might be a good idea just confused and obfuscated what should have been simple.

meshech chochma on why kayin's offering was rejected

2009-10-15T13:01:00.003-04:00

Why was Kayin's korban rejected? The Meshech Chohcma explains that in Sefer VaYikra the Torah prohibits bringing date honey as an offering (2:11-12). Not only is date honey not acceptable, but no fruit is acceptable as a korban. Therefore, Kayin's korban from his crops was rejected, while Hevel's offering of animals from his flock was accepted.

The Meshech Chochma offers an insightful rationale for this halacha. Items which are acceptable as sacrifices all share the common denominator of requiring an investment of human effort in their production. Wheat is turned into flour before being used for menachos or baked into lechem hapanim; grapes are processed and turned into wine before being offered as nesachim; an animal is only acceptable as a sacrifice after it is eight days old because only after eight days does it require the farmers care. When one of these items is offered, the farmer makes a sacrifice not only of the object itself, but also sacrifices the labor and effort that he invested in producing the offering. Since fruits naturally ripen on the tree without any need for human intervention, their sacrifice does not demonstrate that same dedication of human effort. Therefore, they are unacceptable as a korban.

why include the story of creation

2009-10-14T10:18:00.004-04:00

Rashi opens his commentary with the question of why the Torah concerns itself with the story of creation – why not begin with the first mitzvah, as ostensibly Torah is a book devoted to a discussion of mitzvos, not history or science. Ramban takes issue with Rashi’s question and argues that without the story of creation is essential to establish our faith in G-d as Creator.

One could explain the machlokes as a dispute over what the text of Torah shebk’sav should incorporate. Rashi might agree that belief in G-d as creator is an essential component of faith, but might see that belief as something which should or could be transmitted through tradition or torah sheba’al peh without necessitating a parsha in chumash. (I think it goes without saying that Rashi does not deny that belief in G-d as Creator is necessary; the mitzvah of Shabbos, among others, is stripped of meaning without that.) Read in this light, Rashi’s conclusion that the parsha is included as a means of justifying the Jewish people’s claim to Eretz Yisrael by virtue of its being gifted to them by G-d, the Creator, is not a philosophical justification for the parsha, but is simply an acceptance of the need for pragmatic public relations.

The Sefas Emes (5636) offers a more philosophical analysis of the machlokes in which he takes a different approach to the Midrashic lesson we learned yesterday about G-d’s offering Torah to Eisav and Yishmael and their rejecting it. Torah exists and can be read on many levels, from being a mystical code which consist completely of G-d’s name, as Ramban writes in his introduction, down to a practical manual that addresses the most mundane details of life. This is the meaning of the Midrash that G-d offered the Torah to Eisav and Yishmael – He created a Torah which can be understood not just by the most exalted saints, but which can even speak to an Eisav or a Yishmael on their level. While R’ Bloch focused on the rejection of Torah by the nations as evidence of its incompatibility with all else except the Jewish soul, Sefas Emes focuses on the hava amina of it being offered to others as a sign of Torah’s universal message.

Using this Midrash as background, Sefas Emes explains the difference between Rashi and Ramban by invoking a dichotomy he discusses in many places – emes vs. emunah, faith vs. truth. Faith is only needed in the absence of certainty or truth, and vice versa, truth, certain knowledge precludes the need for faith.

Rashi is not just addressing the narrow issue of what belongs in the text, but is begging the broader philosophical question posed by Ramban’s premise– why indeed is there a need for a parsha teaching “emunah” in G-d as creator? For the Jewish heart, G-d being the Creator and master of the universe is a truism, emes, and not merely the subject of faith.

Rashi’s answer is that that G-d did not only give us a Torah which presupposes the certainties of knowledge in the Jewish heart; He gave us the same Torah which He had offered to Eisav and Yishmael, a Torah which addresses even those for whom the truth is unclear. This is the meaning of the pasuk in Tehillim which refers to our receiving the “nachalas goyim,” the portion offered to the non-Jews. Existentially, the Jewish heart is predisposed to acknwoledge the emes of ratzon Hashem, but to serve as the conduit of the dvar Hashem to an imperfect world that does not always see the truth, we were given a Torah with teachings of emunah.

neshomos suited for Torah

2009-10-12T09:37:00.004-04:00

Dashening the pasuk "Hashem m'Seir ba...." Chazal explain that Hashem went to Eisav and Yishmael and the other nations and offered them the Torah before giving it to the Jewish people. Each nation asked what was in the Torah before answering. When Eisav heard the Torah prohibits murder, they declined to accept it, as they could not imagine life without murder. After hearing the prohibitions of theft, of arayot, etc. nation after nation declined the Torah, each unable to fathom life without the particular slice of immorality that characterized their society. Only the Jewish people accepted Torah unconditionally, without even asking what it contained.

Of course G-d did not literally go nation to nation and consulting their Prime Minister or President as to whether they wanted the Torah. What the Midrash means, as the Maharal explains in Tiferes Yisrael, is that every nation of the world has ingrained in its neshoma some trait that is antithetical to a Torah lifestyle, be it murder, robbery, immorality. Only the Jewish people have the neshomos able to absorb the dvar Hashem in its totality.

Among the published correspondence (that I mentioned here) of my wife's grandfather, R' Dov Yehudah Shochet, is a tshuvah to him from R' Avraham Bloch, R"M of Telz, and his response regarding whether one may teach a Torah or Bible class to a non-Jewish audience. Chazal learn (Chagiga 13) from the pasuk, "Magid devarav l'Ya'akov..." that in addition to the prohibition of a non-Jew learning Torah there is a seperate prohibition against us teaching them Torah. R' Bloch interestingly suggests (without referencing this Maharal) that the reason behind this issur is this incompatibility between the neshoma of a non-Jew and words of Torah.

Interesting aside #1: R' Bloch proves from the fact (B.K. 92) that Avraham assumed the Plishtim were immoral because they first questioned him about his wife rather than offering food and lodging that there is a chiyuv even for non-Jews to learn those parts of Torah that teach midos and derech eretz. The kal v'chomer to what we should be learning and teaching is obvious.

Interesting aside #2: The teshuvah from R' Bloch opens with a mazal tov to RDYS on the birth of a girl (if I figured out the dates right, that newborn would be my MIL!) and a bracha l'gadla l'chupah u'lma'asim tovim. He then adds that perhaps he should use the nusach of the bracha l'gadla l'Torah l'chupah u'lama'asim tovim as in the climate of the times it is impossible to raise a bas Yisrael without giving her an appropriate Torah chinuch. The kal v'chomer to our times is obvious here as well.

simchas torah and what made Moshe unique

2009-10-09T15:31:00.004-04:00

The Torah ends by referring to Moshe’s greatness in performing “signs and wonders”. Ramban asks what was unique about Moshe in this regard that deserves to be singled out for praise – many other prophets also performed miracles and wonders for the Jewish people?

It is the Tiferes Shlomo (Radomsker) that clued me in to look at the end of the last pasuk in the Torah for an answer, but I am going to take a slightly different approach than he does. A thought experiment: Imagine if you could transport a nuclear reactor back in time to the Middle Ages and teach people how to harness its power and maintain it. Even with the mechanical knowledge of how to keep the reactor working, the people would undoubtedly view the whole production of energy as a miracle. Fast forward to 2009 and the perception of the reactor being a miracle vanishes. What’s the difference? The answer is that we not only know how to keep a reactor running, but also understand the theory behind how it works. Atomic reactions obey certain laws that have been discovered and explained. It’s not a miracle – that’s how the universe works.

To go a step beyond the Ramban, the magicians of Egypt could also perform “miracles” and suspected Moshe of being no different in ability than them. Why indeed was Moshe different? I think the answer goes beyond distinctions about the scale of the miracles or the size of the audience who witnessed them and relates to our example of the reactor. Other prophets, magicians, and the like performed miracles by becoming the channel for or channeling forces they could not understand and could not control into this world. They were “mechanics” or instruments in the hands of G-d. What made Moshe different was that he performed miracles “l’einei Bnei Yisrael,” as the last pasuk in the Torah tells us. It is the sages and scholars who are usually referred to as the “eini ha’eidah” because wisdom gives one the ability to discern what others miss. Moshe gave us not only miracles, but he gave us the context of a blueprint to the spiritual "laws" and theory that explained those miracles and made them possible.

R’ Chanina ben Dosa did not consider lighting a lamp filled with vinegar to be miraculous – “He who said oil should burn can also say vinegar should burn.” It’s only magical and miraculous if you don’t understand that there are spiritual laws just as there are physical laws and those laws can produce wonderful results.

The Minchas Chinuch famously asks why a person who violates a Torah law is not also inherently in violation of the prohibition against disobeying a prophet. This gets to the heart of why Moshe was unique. A prophet or miracle worker can describe the “what” of their experience and record it in a book of nevuah. The book of Moshe's deeds and prophecy is called Torah, not nevuah, because only Moshe explained the “why” and “how” and left a system that can be studied and used by all future generations.

Unlike other religious groups which change or collapse with the death of their central charismatic leader, the Jewish people were able to smoothly transition from Moshe to Yehoshua. Everything Moshe did was “l’einei Bnei Yisrael,” it fit into a system of thought and ideas that could live on beyond his personality and deeds.

The obsession with magical remedies and cults of personality in our times needs no elaboration. Simchas Torah reminds us that miracles and great leaders are valuable only to the degree that they help illuminate “einei Bnei Yisrael”, expanding our minds with a greater appreciation for Torah as a system of laws and values that we can study and live by. It is those laws and values that should capture our attention.

the lesson learned from the history of Dan

2009-10-09T10:42:00.002-04:00

Moshe Rabeinu was shown all of Eretz Yisrael before his death, right up until the border of Dan (34:1). Rashi explains that Moshe was shown the people of Dan engaged in idol worship, but was also shown the rise of Shimshon who would redeem them. Why did G-d spoil Moshe’s final moments by showing him the Jewish people’s fall to idolatry? Why could He not allow Moshe to revel in the success and hopeful future of the Jewish people without burdening him with an image of their failure?

The Shem m’Shmuel answers that these two images – the idolatry of Dan and the rise of Shimshon from Dan – are not two separate visions, but go hand in hand. Hashem revealed to Moshe that even when the Jewish people fall to greatest depths, they can give rise to a Shimshon, a shofet so great that Ya’akov Avinu saw in him the potential to be Moshiach. Moshe now knew that his death and the inevitable retreat from the glorious heights attained by the “dor de’ah” would not lead to permanent downfall.

why no bracha on sukkah on shmini atzeres

2009-10-08T17:11:00.003-04:00

Rav Kasher has a beautiful overview of the Rogatchover’s thought in the intro. to the Devarim volume of the Rogatchover al haTorah where he presents some of the classic chilukim and conceptual constructs of the Rogatchover and gives examples of sugyos where these ideas can be applied. It is similar in content to the amazing Mefa’aneyach Tzefunos. One of the topics he addresses is why we sit in the sukkah on Shmini Atzeres but do not recite a bracha, unlike other mitzvos performed because of sfeika d’yoma which do warrant a bracha. According to the Rogatchover (into p. 22), dinim d’oraysa tell us about the halachic nature of reality, i.e. they are dinim in the cheftza; dinim d’rebbanan impose legal obligations on the gavra (see post here). The chachamim can impose a chovas hagavra to sit in a sukkah on shmini atzeres, but cannot create a halachic cheftza of sukkah once sukkos has ended. Without a cheftza shel sukkah, no bracha can be recited. (See this post where we discussed a similar distinction of the Rogatchover between eating in the sukkah as as a kiyum of defining the cheftza shel sukkah as a makom dirah vs. the chovas hagavra to perform the act of eating only while in a sukkah.)

I heard a different answer to this question in the name of R’ Soloveitchik that also uses a classic Rogatchover-ish sevara. When two halachic categories overlap, the result can be either a harkavah shechnit, e.g. the two categories co-exist side by side, or a harkavah mizgit, i.e. the two categories combine and form a new synthesis. For example: the halachic status of a chatzi eved chatzi ben chorin might be the same as the full status of eved and ben chorin overlapping and co-existing, or might be a completely new status that is a synthesis of both elements (see Avi Ezri, Hil. Pesachim). Another example: bein hashemashos may reflect overlapping states of day and night, or might be a new time status that contains elements of both day and night (see Shiurim l'Zecher Aba Mari). R’ Yosef Engel in Beis haOtzar similarly discusses whether yamim tovim which overlap with Shabbos have two seperate two kedushos hayom which co-exist, or whether there is a categorically new kedushas hayom formed from the combination of both. R' Soloveitchik applied this same chakirah to Shmini Atzeres, which is both a holiday in its own right as well as an extension of sukkos because of sfeika d’yoma. Instead of viewing those two identities as co-existing side by side, a harkavah shichnit, R’ Soloveitchik viewed them as combining to form a new unique halachic identity. This new synthesis kedushas hayom is not the same as the normal kedushas hayom of sukkos and therefore does not obligate reciting a bracha on sukkah.

temporary ownership - kinyan l'zman

2009-10-08T11:11:00.003-04:00

On the first day of Sukkos you need to own a lulav to be yotzei ("lachem"). You can't borrow a lulav, but you can accept someone else's as a matanah, a gift. The giver has a right to stipulate that the lulav must be returned, a matanah al menas l'hachzir. The Rosh writes that to satisfy this condition the borrower must be makneh the lulav back to the original owner with a formal kinyan (which is why this would not work with a child, who has no right to be makneh things). As we once discussed, the Ketzos (241) disagrees and says a matanah al menas l'hachzir works so long as the object is returned, even without a formal kinyan. According to the Ketzos, matanah al menas l'hachzir is a "kinyan l'zman", a form of temporary ownership in effect for a specific duration of time., e.g. so long as it takes to perform the mitzvah of netilas lulav Once the time is up, the original owner automatically resumes control without a formal kinyan being required. At the heart of the dispute is the following question: is temporary ownership sufficient to satisfy the requirement of “lachem”?

Last post we discussed the case of stolen schach that m’derabbanan is considered part of the sukkah for the duration of sukkos (i.e. the thief has no obligation to dismantle the sukkah and return the stolen goods), but after sukkos, once the sukkah is dismantled anyway, must be returned. The Avnei Miluim (28:53) offers this case as proof that he is right -- ownership of the schach even for the limited duration of a week is considered sufficient to fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah even according to those Tana’im who require "lachem" md’oraysa for sukkah.

Is this proof really ironclad? My son suggested that one can distinguish between these cases. In the case of matanah al menas l’hachzir of lulav, it is the choice by the owner to grant temporary ownership instead of full ownership which is seen by the Rosh as limiting the kinyan, diminishing “lachem”. In the case of the stolen goods, the kinyan lasts only for a week not because of any choice by the owner or recipient, but simply because the chachamim re-imposed the obligation to return the goods after the sukkah was dismantled. (R’ Scheinberg draws a similar distinction in Mishmeres Chaim vol. II.)

does a kinyan derabbanan have a chalos d'oraysa? - stolen schach

2009-10-08T09:14:00.006-04:00

Before R"H a fellow blogger bemoaned the lack of attention paid to the Ketzos these days, as bnei torah spend more time delving into the brisker lomdus of the great roshei yeshivos rather than reading classics. Maybe we should devote more time in the coming year to the Ketzos, Shmaytza, and Avnei Miluim... this sukkos piece is a good place to start, as it is two parter; you get twice the lomdus for the same mareh mekomos.

There is a mitzvah to return stolen goods. If you steal a beam and use it in your home, the chachamim made a special takanah as an incentive to tshuvah and allow you to pay for the beam rather than force you to dismantle your home to return it. What if the stolen beam was used in a sukkah? The gemara says that for the duration of sukkos the beam is considered owned by the thief -- he is obligated to repay the original owner, but we do not force the dismantling of the sukkah any more than we would force the dismantling of a home. However, once sukkos is over and the sukkah is dismantled anyway, the original beam must be returned.

Yesterday we discussed whether a kinyan derabbanan has a chalos d'oraysa (parenthetically, someone asked a great kashe in the comments that is worth taking a look at). The Sha'ar haMelech suggests that this case of the stolen beam can help us resolve that issue. Min haTorah the stolen beam is not owner by the thief -- it should be returned. It is only the takanah derabbanan that allows the thief to keep it. QED: by virtue of a takanah derabbanan we have a chalos of a sukkah that is kosher min hatorah!

The Avnei Miluim (28:33) rejects this proof. There is a basic difference between a stolen lulav (for example) and a stolen sukkah (actually, stolen schach). A stolen lulav is pasul because the Torah requires ownership of the lulav as a condition of fulfilling the mitzvah; a thief is not the lulav's true owner. A stolen sukkah is pasul not because the Torah requires ownership of a sukkah -- the reason a stolen sukkah is pasul is simply because stolen goods are unacceptable for a mitzvah purpose (mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira). A kinyan derabbanan may not have a chalos d'oraysa in the sense of being "yours" from a Torah perspective, but a kinyan derabbanan is certainly sufficient to remove the label of "stolen goods" from the object. Think about it this way: if you make a kinyan derabbanan on an item without a kinyan min haTorah, whether or not the object is truly "yours", it is inconceivable that min haTorah you should be considered a thief!

The Avnei Miluim uses this same case as proof in a different controversy - stay tuned for part II.

do kinyanei derabbanan have a chalos d'oraysa?

2009-10-07T10:13:00.004-04:00

Does a kinyan derabbanan create a status of ownership on a d'oraysa level? This question is debated by the classical Achronim and comes into play on sukkos where the first day requires ownership of lulav and esrog to fulfill the requirement of "lachem". (We once discussed a proof of the Ketzos to resolve this question.)

Perhaps this question is at the heart of the machlokes Rambam and Ran regarding the gemara's warning (Sukkah 46) not to give a lulav and esrog to a child on the first day of sukkos before fulfilling one's own mitzvah. The gemara explains that a child can be koneh the 4 minim, but cannot be makneh the items back. Ran writes that the gemara must be speaking only of a very young child, because the Chachamim made a takanah that slightly older children (p'eutos) can buy and sell things, otherwise sending a child to the grocery story to buy something would be impossible. The Rambam, however, does not draw any distinction.

Apparently the Ran understood that the takanah empowering children to buy and sell is sufficient to allow them to be makneh the lulav back so its owner fulfills "lachem" on a d'oraysa level. The Rambam, however, did not think a kinyan derabbanan has any validity on a d'oraysa level.

The problem with such an approach is that there seem to be many proofs that the Chachamim can through hefker beis din make takanos that have a chalos d'oraysa. A few sugyos in shas (e.g. Kesubos 3) refer to the ability of the Chachamim to annul a marriage by declaring the kesef kiddushin ownerless. Clearly the women effected by such a takanah is not merely no longer married on a derabbanan level!

R' Shlomo Eiger's suggests (Shu"t RAK"E 221) that Chazal may be able to effect removal of ownership on a d'oraysa level, but cannot effect a transfer of ownership to a new party.

The Telzers (both R' Shimon Shkop and R' Y. L. Bloch) reject this distinction. Hefker without the ability to transfer ownership is an incomplete hefker because it has no effect on anyone other than the original owner. (This question fits well with R' Shimon's rejection of the Ketzos' model of hefker that we discussed back here.) R' Yosef Leib concludes that even the Rambam accepts the idea that a takanah derabbanan can effect a chalos d'oraysa in monetary matters. Where the Rambam and Ran differ is regarding the scope of this rule. According to the Ran, once the cat is out of the bag and there exists a takanah to allow children to shop in a grocery store, the same takanah has a chalos d'oraysa with respect to lulav. The Rambam disagrees and argues that the chalos d'oraysa is limited in scope to the narrow context that motivated the takanah's original creation. (Very Telzerish sevara -- the "sibah" is the geder hadin.) In the case of kesef kiddushin, the marriage is annuled; in the case of minor's kinyanim, only with respect to shopping is there a chalos d'oraysa to the kinyan. However, consequences that are a byproduct of the original takanah, e.g. now the child who can go shopping can also return a lulav, are not included in the scope of the chalos d'oraysa.

R' Bloch and R' Shimon's point relates more globally to how dinim derabbanan function. As opposed to dinim d'oraysa that say something inherent and intrinsic about a person or an object, dinim derabbanan just serve a functional need, but do not change the legal status or nature of things. This is a powerful sevara that explains many other ideas.... maybe more another time.