Dreaming 5GW

Media Spectacles in Information Campaigns

Wed, 01 Jul 2009 12:55:28 -0600

  posted by Adam Elkus

Curtis highlighted my recent note on the Michael Jackson media spectacle and Iran. I agree very much with his characterization that "any info-war effort will need to be aware of the possibilities of an MJ-type black swan squashing that effort," despite the fact that the Iranian information campaign was not necessarily externally directed and thus wasn't substantially harmed by the MJ black swan.

I'd like to expand on this idea a bit in reference to the strategy of information campaigns. Media today is both incredibly pervasive and balkanized. Although big media outlets do still drive coverage, there is no hegemonic single "face of the news" like Walter Cronkite who holds the nation at rapt attention. You'd think, following the "Long Tail" rule, that this diffusion would lead to a diversity of both source and content that would resist the media spectacle. However, the diffusion in fact amplifies the effect of media spectacles. Twitter is a great example of this--during the Iran crisis one in four Iran-related Tweets was a Re-Tweet. So when there is a mega media spectacle you get the same story (albeit with some minor changes) from every single channel.

The Iranian protestors didn't suffer from this because their goal was to widen their own mobilization and flip regime elites. I'm not going to go as far to say that the international attention was completely meaningless--it severely unnerved the regime and gave the internal mobilization a kind of snowball effect. But if there were a significant US protest campaign going on that sought to influence a specifically national-level American center of gravity, something like the MJ death would have been a body blow.

There is more "bad" news. Black swans like the MJ event are as old as the proverbial Roman practice of "bread and circuses." But in recent years everyday events and people--provided that they are sensational or bizarre enough--can become media spectacles. The Californian "Octo-Mom," the messy end of reality TV stars John and Kate Gosselin's marriage, and the "missing white woman syndrome" all demonstrate the media's power and interest in turning ordinary life into cinematic spectacles that follow preset scripts.

Journalist Neil Gabler writes eloquently about this Hollywood-ization of everyday life in his book Life: The Movie, noting also that people come to identify celebrities' lives with their own and also identify their lives with those of celebrities. What this means is that everyday life, to many, has a more consciously cinematic quality than it did in the past. We come to see ourselves as the stars of our own private production, and increasingly expect to be famous.   What Gabler's book tells us about our age is that it is easier than ever for something to become a media spectacle.

For an information campaign planner looking to maximize public attention, both classic (megacelebrity troubles) and new (reality-TV, human interest stories) media spectacles are a critical problem. How are you going to keep people's interest in your cause when Brangelina are about to adopt another Third World baby?

The Situationists' answer was to try to shatter the "society of the spectacle" through attention-grabbing pranks, satires, and parodies of commercial content. The Culture Jam movement reconceived this idea with the metaphor of "jamming" the dominant cultural message by re-appropriating cultural objects and media sources. Both approaches are essentially tactical in that they seek to create attention for attention's sake. Worse, their method of doing so is to try to rage against the spectacle itself--a tactic as bizarre as shooting a handgun at an approaching stormcloud in order to keep dry.

A more productive course of action would be to ensure that your information campaign doesn't have a single point of failure. The difference between an epheremal flash mob and a long-term information campaign is that the latter can be restarted even after a momentary loss of attention. This requires centralized planning and vanguard leadership, elements that wiki and crowdsourcing boosters systematically undervalue. With a backup plan and strategic direction, "culture jams" and other attention-grabbing stunts and spectacles are not mere bids for attention but beachheads to build on--and can be effectively used to restart the movement's momentum after it has been lost.
Tagged: Iran (2), Michael Jackson (1), Twitter (1)

Comments: 5   (Last comment by Adam Elkus)

Principles of 5GW: Hands in the Field

Mon, 29 Jun 2009 19:44:03 -0600

posted by Curtis Gale Weeks

(This is part of a series of posts exploring what I consider to be the essential principles of 5GW.)

I. Hands in the Field

Early Mentions

I think that my earliest use of the phrase "hands in the field" in conjunction with the theory of 5GW may have been in a Q & A response to an early criticism of the theory of 5GW: "Where is the 'war' part?" (October 14, 2006):

If we really want to engage in 5GW, we shouldn't be talking about how 5GW is a manipulation of free will. We should be declaring that individual freedom is essential to victory.
No and yes. Do you want terrorists to have individual freedom? This talk of freedom -- platitudes, really -- may well be essential for 5GW, simply because a people that is being told, "We are manipulating you!" will prove less pliable. Make them believe they have absolute freedom to act: Yes, of course. Convince them they have the power to change the world...because changing the world will require a lot of hands in the field.

although the idea behind the phrase began to take form earlier.

Soon after, in a comment on the blog ZenPundit (13 November, 2006) I referenced an entry on my now-defunct blog Phatic Communion in which I'd found fault with President Bush's use of the terrorism threat. Regardless of the actual number of active anti-American terrorists roaming the world,

For each terrorist, there is at least one American standing in opposition.

The problem is: GWB's rhetoric has been disempowering individual Americans; whereas, in 5GW, you gain hands in the field by empowering your (perhaps unwitting) agents. And we will probably need to move into the next generation of warfare if we are going to win this Long War -- before our enemies do (as you have already pointed out.)

In other words, at the time I meant: no reason exists for believing Americans should live -- pragmatically -- in fear of the terrorists since -- pragmatically -- any given American could do what any given terrorist might do, or do better, and there are so many more Americans than there are anti-American terrorists. That was a rough statement of an idea I'd been trying to work into usefulness. This was a meme circulating at the time, particularly by critics of the GWB method of population mobilization. ("Shop and we won't drop!")

Subsequent discussions expanded the idea. At D5GW-contributor Dan tdaxp's blog, one commenter named Ron contributed a quote by T.E.Lawrence during a discussion of the OODA Loop (February 12, 2007):

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”

and I responded,

The quote from Lawrence is interesting. In fact, the idea can be used to better understand the 'hands in the field' dynamic of 5GW: Get others to do the work altering the perceptions in the necessary ways.

Under another tdaxp post, one exploring the issue of patriotism (March 15, 2007), I suggested that remaining patriotic in the jingoistic with-us-or-against-us manner would be ineffective for the 5GW operator, while incorporating two more ideas:

Now, of course you might say that we can love them while hating their nation, also while loving our own nation as patriots; but this in-depth loving that would seek to “embrace and extend” in order to co-opt so many hands in the field, working the system from multiple sides, might require that we embrace whatever national identity they have — even while we try to extend it into becoming something else.

I had been influenced by Dan's recent consideration of the "Embrace and Extend" tactic. (March 13, 2007) -- and by Thomas P.M. Barnett, too, who frequently uses the idea of "co-opting" to win.

The Inefficiency of One Hand Clapping

A recent series of posts helped to inspire me to begin this series on the principles of 5GW with Hands in the Field. In my first post on my new blog, I let off some steam concerning the "greening" of Twitter which is ostensibly meant to help the dissidents of Iran. I labeled the effort 4GW.

Two other bloggers have added to the consideration. In "Media Spectacles, Michael Jackson, and Iran," D5GW contributor Adam Elkus concludes that effective mobilization of the Iranian dissidents will depend much more on what happens in Iran and locally than on whether Americans are paying attention, and that any info-war effort will need to be aware of the possibilities of an MJ-type black swan squashing that effort. Joseph Fouche, meanwhile, goes into some depth to understand the power structure of the "Twitter War: Now With Tasty Frosting":

Twitter is a dimension of power characterized by low resistance and low persistence. It is a target of power primarily because it’s a medium of power through which a war of influence could be waged. It is not the goal. Control of Twitter does not bring you into the zone of realization. Twitter is only a medium of power, a zone of application. The target of power, the zone of realization, is any force sufficient to bring kinetic power to bear on the regime. That didn’t happen because the medium was mistaken for the target.

These considerations returned me to an exploration of 5GW which predates my use of the term "hands in the field" but nonetheless laid the groundwork for it. One of the seminal early considerations of 5GW, written by Dan tdaxp, introduced the idea of the importance of secrecy to a 5GW effort (indeed, this blog is named after that post), and that concept ultimately led me to write a series of posts in an effort to understand how, exactly, 5GW would be conducted. To summarize: 1) no war effort would be worth the effort if the world was not actually changed by it, 2) every change to the world is an actual, physical change or it is not a change whatsoever, and 3) every actual concrete effect is observable, if not directly then through a type of forensics, or indirectly; and so 4) this concept of "secrecy" in 5GW needed an update.

As a side note, yet a relevant example, Adam Elkus recently considered the Western impulse to love the SEI renegade -- just before squashing him. (RTJ) In other words, open and direct activity invites retaliation.

From that chain of thought, then, sprang many other implications, all of which led back to the idea of "hands in the field."

Indirection, for instance, or operating at several degrees away from final outcomes, would help maintain secrecy; multiple domains would need to be shaped to create 4th, 5th, etc., order effects. (Direct action is quite traceable.)

Such manipulation would require many actors; but many actors would not act, or would act contrary to the war effort, if they knew they were being manipulated. Thus, the 5GW effort would be strengthened via co-option: let self-interest motivate those being utilized as "hands in the field."

A winning 5GW would seek an outcome which is lasting, i.e. a strong and resilient system, and this would also require that those living within any newly created or newly modified system consciously or unconsciously continue to maintain that system -- rather than consciously or unconsciously form groups to bring it down. (They must remain the 5GW effort's "hands in the field".)

In one variation of the argument, even enemies would be made hands in the field via co-option, simply because wiping them out would be impossible and leaving them to run wild would threaten the 5GW effort.

One might then ask why those participating in the greening of Twitter are not, after all, conducting 5GW, since so many are participating.

Joseph Fouche answered that question well:

Khamenei, in the words of Zenpundit, is a political valet interested in this life. He is interested in concrete power. The opposition would only ever triumph if they attracted government elements who could present a sufficient physical counter-force to Khamenei’s forces. As of yet, that has not happened. Twitter War would have to…

* Trigger internal forces to side with the opposition.

Or.

* Trigger external forces to intervene on the side of the opposition.

…in order to actually reach the zone of realization with any impact.

Khamenei has to date been more focused on the physical, actual world plane than have the Twit supporters who have managed to garner support from other Twit greeners or, in the case of those dissidents in Iran, from other dissidents in Iran or sympathizers abroad. In other words, nothing has really changed. Greeners, whether Iranian or Western users of Twitter, were already opposed to the Iranian Regime.

As I expressed in Skirting the Metaverse, the changing of an icon to green may seem like a great action of support -- the beating of paths into highways in the field -- but it is more appropriately the sound of multiple people clapping one hand in the effort to increase the volume of their outrage. We should not presume to know all that is happening within Iran or in the West that will have an actual effect on the outcome -- I even mentioned a relatively ridiculous possible MJ-5GW-related interpretation of the Twitterverse -- and so I would admit the possibility that every Twit greener has been co-opted in some 5GW fashion. They would be the 5GW hands in the field, not the 5GW operators themselves, but only if the increase in volume/noise was the work -- action -- required by the 5GW operators.

While some thought has been given to the possibility of stand-alone superempowered actors conducting a type of destructive, system-perturbing 5GW, one is hard-pressed to define success on the basis of outcomes. System perturbation on the order of Armageddon (and some do like to see that far) would be psychopathy rather than a warfare effort; and anything less would invite extraordinary retribution upon the SEI actor or group.

For any warfare effort to be considered 5GW, the utilization of "hands in the field" -- i.e., massive co-option and not mere tribal bonding -- will be key.

Tagged: Hands in the Field (3), Principles of 5GW (2)

Comments: 2 (Last comment by Curtis Gale Weeks)

Principles of 5GW: Introduction

Mon, 29 Jun 2009 17:31:52 -0600

posted by Curtis Gale Weeks

Although I have been largely absent for very nearly a year (last post was July 1, 2008) I have occasionally alternately marveled and cringed at whatever 5GW-related blog posts, here at D5GW and elsewhere, I have happened to read in that time.

Admittedly, with respect to the content I cringed more often than I marveled, when I wasn't simply indifferent; but I did marvel at the expansion of the topic into new territories -- blogs and authors new to me have been addressing the subject in new ways. I eagerly await the publication of The Handbook of 5GW, which will include a handful of chapters written by people I had never known during my time blogging here and those years of 5GW discussion which occupied me before July 1, 2008.

In the last year, whenever "the blogging bug" would bite me (and this was a rarity), it was always an impulse to revisit the subject of 5GW via a dissemination of my own 5GW dream. That is, certain cringe-worthy implications in the works of others on the subject produced in me a desire to write back, "But...!" or "Why is [X] being totally forgotten/ignored?"

Typically I would have a very strong desire to begin a list of "principles of 5GW" which I think are essential to any discussion of the fifth ~~generation~~ gradient of warfare. In the last year, I fought the impulse and consoled my hurt daemon by shoring up a sense of curiosity: "What is this thing happening to the theory of 5GW, as it spreads?" It was a feeble consolation but it was enough. Until now.

In no particular order, then, I will begin my list with my next post, to be followed by additional posts outlining what I think are the essential principles of 5GW without which the discussion of 5GW theory can only flounder. I will return to edit this post with an outline and links to the others, as they are written.

-------

I. Principles of 5GW: Hands in the Field

Tagged: Principles of 5GW (2)

Comments: 1 (Last comment by Arherring)

XGW and Torture

Wed, 13 May 2009 11:01:31 -0600

posted by Arherring

Cross Posted at Red Herrings.

When considering the use of torture within the framework of XGW it becomes clear that torture has real utility at only three gradients of doctrine.

0GW Torture:

0GW - Confrontation and Conflict at its most basic level is an expression of natural selection. This genetic imperative is the principle behind any doctrine that is essentially the projection of Force for the survival of an individual organism.

When considering torture from the most basic, survival, level consideration of morality has no bearing upon the use of any method that ensures survival. The imperative is the continuation of the line, therefore, so long as the subject of the torture isn't of that line any method of information extraction is justified.

4GW Torture:

4GW - Fourth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of the attainment of a functional invulnerability that prevents the opponent from being able to orient upon a threat and creates a perception that saps the ability of the opponent to function effectively.

The use of torture at the fourth gradient is premised upon the creation of a sense of dread of the unknown in the minds of the opponent. Torture becomes a method not just of gathering information, but a weapon of fear. Used as an extreme, the opponent may have a fear of capture by the 4GW actor that prevents the opponent from orienting effectively, always considering most immediately the need to be able to escape rather than the most immediate method to execute their own doctrine. The morality of the use of torture at this gradient is ignored in the necessity of its utility to inspire fear.

5GW Torture:

5GW - Fifth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of manipulation of the context of the observations of an opponent in order to achieve a specific effect.

Torture at the fifth gradient takes on a different aspect from the use of torture at 0GW and 4GW. At those gradients the negative moral aspect of torture is either irrelevant or used to give torture utility. For 5GW the moral aspect of torture is the most important aspect. In most (if not all cases) 5GW is a warfare of competing ideas and ideals. At the fifth gradient the least desirable outcome is to have your ideology linked to an overwhelmingly negative meme like torture either through your own actions, or by the manipulation of an opponent that links torture to your ideology.

Do the Ends Justify the Means?

Calling it torture or "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" makes no difference, if a method is seen to be torture it carries a negative moral connotation. As it is argued above, for two of the three gradients this is either irrelevant or desirable, however, for 5GW the moral aspect is paramount. At the risk of editorializing, the United States of America is at its very core an expression of an ideology, an expression of connectivity and freedom and the ideal that all good things are possible with enough hard work and determination. As such, The United States of America in spreading that ideal must always approach any conflict or confrontation from the fifth gradient mind-set. Because of that, the USA must never engage in a method or doctrine that has a negative moral aspect, and must always guard against an opponent's attempt to manipulate the USA into a morally negative action, lest that negative meme be linked to the positive ideological foundation of the country.

For 5GW the means justify the end.

Tagged: 0GW (1), 4GW (20), 5GW (8), Torture (1), XGW (6)

Comments: 4 (Last comment by Arherring)

Swine Flu as System Perturbation

Mon, 27 Apr 2009 23:23:59 -0600

posted by Arherring

Cross-posted at Red Herrings

Rule Set - System Perturbation - New Rule Set

Going back to some of my very first considerations of Fifth Gradient Warfare (Fifth Generation Warfare at the time), this very simple three part progression is the main concept that informs the process of the directed manipulation of systems that is at the heart of 5GW. The attention that is being given to the Swine Flu outbreak offers a very good opportunity to explore the utility of this process.

The Bad:

The worst of all system perturbations is exemplified by the Black Swan scenario. This is a system perturbation that is completely unexpected and because there a no rule setsor few weak rule sets that have been established to deal with such situations, the chaos that is created is potentially massive. It may be so massive, in fact, that the system never recovers, that new rule sets aren't able to be created or are even weaker than before, making the system even more fragile. The H5N1 Bird Flu (or other pandemic illness) is sometimes talked about as such a system perturbation due to fears that no matter what preparations are made ahead of an outbreak, the health system will be quickly overwhelmed and cease to be effective regardless of the response. While the Swine Flu doesn't seem to be, at this point, as dangerous as Bird Flu, it is behaving in a manner that is consistent with how a Bird Flu type pandemic might begin.

The Not Quite as Bad:

While a Fifth Gradient actor might well engineer a Black Swan type system perturbation scenario in order to influence the creation of new rule sets, there is an alternate approach known as 'Boiling the Frog'. In this sort of scenario the system perturbation is very controlled in scope in order to place calculated stresses on a system. The point of this may be to cause a collapse of systems much like a Black Swan event, but it can also serve a different agenda that highlights the ability of Fifth Gradient doctrines to be used on multiple sides of a confrontation or conflict. In this kind of situation 5GW doctrine may be used in order to strengthen as much as weaken rule sets. Swine Flu offers an opportunity for this kind of 5GW manipulation.

Using Swine Flu to turn a Black Swan Grey:

Because Swine Flu appears to be very similar to Bird Flu yet, less dangerous (at least at this point), it offers a 5GW actor (who may have potentially created such as system perturbation or may merely seize the moment) the opportunity to stress and manipulate the infections disease response system in order to strengthen those parts of the system (rule sets) that are effective, eliminate or repair the parts of the system that are ineffective, and create new rule sets that cover situations that hadn't been considered before (for example, the most infectious part of the Swine Flu so far has been the uninformed panic it has inspired on users of Twitter. Filters for such occurrences are being created by the community and will doubtless come into use on Twitter and in other social networking platforms in future situations).

Consider the Anthrax letters that followed in the wake of September 11, 2001. While they were undoubtedly the work of a very angry and disturbed individual, the response they caused served more to strengthen the system than it did to permanently disrupt the system. Now mail is scanned for agents such as Anthrax and potential targets of such attacks are much more aware of the risks as well as the correct response to a potential attack. Additionally, law enforcement now has the experience of responding to such attacks and what is involved in tracking those who would perpetrate those sorts of attacks.

Swine Flu offers the potential for a similar sort of 'practice run' for an outbreak of pandemic influenza. The rule sets involved will now be subjected to real-life stresses that cannot be createdby any 'simulation' and will involve, by necessity, all aspects of the response system at the same time. Only at such times can the true strengths and vulnerabilities of the system be recognized.

Tagged: 5GW (8), Black Swan (7), Rule Sets (1), Swine Flu (1)

Comments: 3 (Last comment by moon)

Twitter as Distributed Cognition?

Mon, 20 Apr 2009 19:27:04 -0600

posted by Adam Elkus

I posted earlier on the idea of Twitter as a form of distributed cognition. But that might be too simplistic--and mechanistic--a look at the evolving medium. The idea of Twitter as a "mass mind" does not really make sense outside of the context of poetic metaphor. Rather, it makes more sense to think of Twitter as a social ecoystem.

Noam Cohen makes this point explicit in his review of a book on Wikipedia. He analogizes Wikipedia to a kind of rambling global city:

"Wikipedia can no more be completed than can New York City, which O. Henry predicted would be 'a great place if they ever finish it.' In fact, with its millions of visitors and hundreds of thousands of volunteers, its ever-expanding total of articles and languages spoken, Wikipedia may be the closest thing to a metropolis yet seen online. Like a city, Wikipedia is greater than the sum of its parts; for example, the random encounters there are often more compelling than the articles themselves. The search for information resembles a walk through an overbuilt quarter of an ancient capital. You circle around topics on a path that appears to be shifting. Ultimately the journey ends and you are not sure how you got there."

Twitter, unlike Wikipedia, is a lower-density medium intended for facilitating conversation. A global coffee shop, not a global city. But as anyone who has been to a bar can recall, even the smallest of establishments take on the quality of a miniature universe. I belong to a small Twitter circle (and blog circle) that focuses on the intersection of world politics, military affairs, and social media. Each person within that circle is a node that expands outwards in concentric circles.

There is a temptation to visualize social media as mass mind. But is each individual blogger or Twitterer merely a small part of a gigantic hive mind? Jaron Lanier attacks this kind of digital collectivism as "Digital Maoism," but it seems that the problem is empirical, not ideological, in nature. There's certainly a mass-mind aspect to viral campaigns and aggregator sites, but is something like Twitter really best described as a hive mind?

As Twitter grows it will become more important as a tool of strategic influence. If we view Twitter as a mass mind or a thought-system we may fall prey to the temptation to think that it, like a human mind, can be harnessed as a means of "reflexive control." In other words, a piano we can play to our tune. Twitter is better used as a mobilization tool for viral campaigns or a public relations rapid-response platform.

Comments: 4 (Last comment by purpleslog.wordpress.com)

Shades of 5GW in Shimon Naveh

Sat, 14 Feb 2009 11:48:28 -0600

posted by subadei

Read this article, via ubiwar, about Israeli strategist Shimon Naveh. Naveh is a fascinating individual. Patton-esque (if that wasn't a word it is now) in his free wheeling use of vulgarities and arrogance. That he bases his systems theory on Russian strategy and the writings of two French philosophers is an impressive example of outside the box thinking.

His concepts in practice (if the following quote from the article is any indication) look, in my humblest of opinions, to be (too quote M1 in some commentary here) "Turbo 3GW:"

"This space that you look at, this room that you look at, is nothing but your interpretation of it. Now, you can stretch the boundaries of your interpretation, but not in an unlimited fashion, after all, it must be bound by physics, as it contains buildings and alleys. The question is, how do you interpret the alley? Do you interpret the alley as a place, like every architect and every town planner does, to walk through, or do you interpret the alley as a place forbidden to walk through? This depends only on interpretation. We interpreted the alley as a place forbidden to walk through, and the door as a place forbidden to pass through, and the window as a place forbidden to look through, because a weapon awaits us in the alley, and a booby trap awaits us behind the doors. This is because the enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do not want to obey this interpretation and fall into his traps. Not only do I not want to fall into his traps, I want to surprise him! This is the essence of war. I need to win. I need to emerge from an unexpected place ... This is why we opted for the methodology of moving through walls ... Like a worm that eats its way forward, emerging at points and then disappearing."

But the spinning gears inside Naveh's head seem to be entertaining some rather 5GW-ish principles.

First of all, this war against the Palestinians has to lead to their liberation. Take the date of the end of Operation Defensive Shield, half a year after Defensive Shield, interpret it and go to a different place, switch the disk. It is completely clear to me that it has to lead to the liberation of the Palestinians, after the price is exacted. The second liberation is to create a prison and dismantle it, create a form of thinking and dismantle it: the idea of permanent change is liberation.

No doubt that this is, on it's surface, very kinetic. But the thought process that lies behind it is not to exact attrition upon or outmaneuver the adversary. It's to attack the adversary's very concept of who and what he's fighting and how and where he will fight him.

From a tactical standpoint this seems elementary. From a strategic standpoint, in which the classical concept of victory is reliant upon the state and presence (Machiavelli referred to the victorious prince living amongst the defeated populace as the best measure to seal and maintain victory; state and presence) it's abjectly foreign. That a war can be fought and won beyond the precepts of victory (see Hezbollah in 2006) is strikingly 5GW.
Thoughts?

(Crossposted at Soob)

Tagged: shimon naveh (1)

Comments: 3 (Last comment by Arherring)

The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and Confrontation

Mon, 26 Jan 2009 12:32:41 -0600

posted by Arherring

Cross posted at Red Herrings

The following is an attempt to categorize the principles behind the doctrines that comprise each gradient of the XGW framework. Please note that the XGW framework is not the Generations of Modern Warfare model described by Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton and Wilson in The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. The XGW framework is a descendant of that model and shares some characteristics such as the carryover of elements from one gradient to the next.

Other authors and thinkers whose ideas and concepts greatly contributed to this framework include, but are not limited to; Robert Leonhard, John Boyd, Thomas X. Hammes, Rupert Smith, Tom Barnett, Howard Bloom, Dan Abbot, Curtis Gale Weeks, ‘Purpleslog,’ and John Robb. I stand on the shoulders of giants.

Special thanks are owed to the commentators who through constructive argument and devil’s advocacy helped refine the framework into its current incarnation.

Introduction to the Framework

Premise of Conflict and Confrontation:

The XGW framework is based upon the concept of conflict and confrontation from General Rupert Smith’s The Utility of Force. The XGW framework addresses any instance where two or more actors come into conflict and/or confrontation be it physical, ideological or political.

Premise of Basic Principles:

Each gradient of XGW embodies the basic principle behind an expression of Force. This addresses not the ‘how’ but ‘why’ each gradient of doctrine functions as it does. Each gradient is intended to be broad and inclusive to account for all possible doctrines. The XGW framework is also intended to allow for new gradients to be created, accounting for doctrines that do not fit in any of the six existing gradients, 0GW through 5GW.

Kinetic and Non-kinetic Force:

The doctrines of the XGW framework embody expressions of Force both kinetic and non-kinetic In the XGW framework, kinetic Force has greater utility at lower gradients of the framework, and less utility at the higher gradients of the framework. This utility is mirrored by the utility of non-kinetic Force, which is lowest at the lower gradients of the framework and greatest at the highest gradients of the framework.

Technology:

Being premised upon base principles, the doctrines of the XGW gradients are effectively independent of technological innovation. In principle, a practitioner should be able to pursue any gradient of doctrine with any available technology.

Classification and Application:

The XGW framework is intended to have two separate but complimentary functions. The framework is first a guide to classify and understand the principle behind doctrines being employed by actors in any conflict or confrontation. Second, a practitioner should use the knowledge gained by this classification in order to devise doctrines that perform at a higher gradient than those being used by their opponent. This problem-solving process is expressed as x+1 where ‘x’ is the gradient of doctrine being used by an actor and ‘+1’ is the next higher gradient of doctrine. Each gradient of doctrine’+1’ possesses, in principle, an inherent advantage over doctrines of the previous gradient.

The XGW Framework

0 (Base) Gradient - Darwinian Warfare - 0GW

Confrontation and Conflict at its most basic level is an expression of natural selection. This genetic imperative is the principle behind any doctrine that is essentially the projection of Force for the survival of an individual organism.

Note: Howard Bloom argues in The Lucifer Principle that ideas/memes act in the same manner.

First Gradient - Cooperative Warfare - 1GW

Cooperative warfare doctrines are based upon the principle of creating organizations that require the individual to surrender control to the group in order to project Force to accomplish goals that are necessary to the survival of the group.

Second Gradient - Attrition Warfare - 2GW

The Principle behind attrition warfare describes doctrines that use the strength of the attacker to target the strength of the opponent.

Third Gradient - Maneuver Warfare - 3GW

Maneuver Warfare doctrines are based upon the principle of avoiding the strength of the opponent in order to attack the critical vulnerability of the opponent.

Note: The principles of 2GW and 3GW are informed mostly by the thinking of Col. Robert Leonhard’s books, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle, and The Principles of War for the Information Age. He bases these principles upon the concepts and writings of Sun-Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, John Boyd, William Lind, and B. H. Liddell-Hart, among others.

Fourth Gradient - Moral Warfare - 4GW

Fourth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of the attainment of a functional invulnerability that prevents the opponent from being able to orient upon a threat and creates a perception that saps the ability of the opponent to function effectively.

Fifth Gradient - Contextual Warfare - 5GW

Fifth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of manipulation of the context of the observations of an opponent in order to achieve a specific effect.

Tagged: xGW (30)

Recent Fifth Generation Warfare (5GW) Stuff on the Internet

Wed, 14 Jan 2009 05:49:24 -0600

posted by PurpleSlog

TDAXP is taking the lead with a souvenir edition of the Dreaming 5GW PoV on 5GW theory by calling for chapter ideas and submissions for a 5GW Book. This is a great idea (and overdue). I hope CGW can be coaxed into participating. MY suggestions are here.

Glenn Anderson has a posting on Making Meme Stick which is apropos to Memetic Engineering. He lays out a simple framework to follow.

FeralJundi.com has a posting "Building Snowmobiles: Fifth Generation Warfare Blogs". Welcome to the fun house FJ.

The Committee of Public Safety had a post entitled "The Tactical Loop", which while not about 5GW directly, may be of interest those people looking into 5GW.

Zen was the first place I saw it (and it has a good discussion) - LTC Coer has a 5GW article. Ubiware posts related to the Quantum Theory of War. Blosint comments on it here. TDAXP has also commented with "Redefining 5GW, again" in response to that Marine Corp Gazette article and Danger Room which has a good discussion. Especially noteworthy is Greg McDowall bringing up "fractal war" with "possibility of using elements of each generation, sort of like a grand strategic version of combined arms" which has me thinking, and Seerov (who should consider getting his own blog) with this great comment on why XGW and not Lind's GMW:

Perhaps the political goals shouldn’t matter in the classification? The tactics and strategy will determine what generation/gradient it is, regardless of political goals. I see no reason why a group can’t use 4GW and try to seize a State?

At the same time, its very unlikely that a non-State actor would use 1,2,or 3 GW, as most non-state actors don’t have the resources for this kind of war. So in determining whether a force is conducting 4GW or not, we should NOT focus on the end state, only on the methods.

Some of you may have read “Unrestricted Warfare.” Its a book dealing with China’s plan to use 4GW/5GW to “destroy the US.” The book lays out how a State can use 4GW/5GW (although they don’t call it 5WG, in fact I think this was before anyone coined the term GW?) to to win wars for the State.

So bottom line: Anyone can use any form/generation/gradient of war they believe will achieve them their goals. It doesn’t matter if they’re a State, or non-State. It doesn’t matter what their goals are. It only matters how they fight. This doesn’t mean we shouldn’t care what their gaols are, only that it doesn’t matter in determining what “generation/gradient their using.

So this is how we should think about a war:

1) Realize you’re in war (this is most difficult in 5GW). This may happen after an attack?

2) After determining that you’re in a war, take security measures so as to not take anymore damage.

3) Determine who and what your enemy is trying to accomplish.

4) Determine how they’re trying to accomplish their objectives. It is at this point when you determine what GW they’re using on you. They may be using a combination.

The US is good at beating actors who use 1,2,3 GW. We’re learning how to beat 4GW in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its important that we think about what people are calling “5GW” so that we recognize it, and understand how to beat it/defend against it.

And that’s where we’re at now.

Adam Elkus at Rethinking Security has two post of interest on 4GW/GMW and a little 5GW. In first The Crisis of 4GW he writes that future success 4GW and 5GW may be overstated:

A common definition of 5GW--as well as real world case studies--remains out of reach. And the price for moving towards a non-state paradigm of war has been the overestimation of the insurgent's power and an automatic assumption of the network's vitality against the hierarchy.
[...]
5GW is so vague that it may be impossible to salvage. That being said, there are elements from it that were certainly of theoretical value to conceptions of propaganda, politics, and future conflict that should not be thrown out with the bathwater.

Though Adam seems to have come out against 5GW Theory in the comments:

SE, this isn't a postmortem, just a recognition of a problem. It is, however, a postmortem of 5GW

Yikes. His second post is More thoughts on 4GW.

Phil at Amicable Collisions has a rich roundup called "A Generational Warfare Miscellany".

Sam at Seli briefly discusses 5GW as port of his post "Generation warfare a cohesive explanatory model":

Fifth generation warfare is about the melding of different aspects of DIME (within this discussion) within the society. When an adversary engages from fifth generation the military through civilian population can be very much the same. The DIME model overlaps more and more until it is nearly one overlapping set. That is an oversimplified explanation but is also why I chose to narrow the aspect of the differing generations. It depicts how that fifth generation of warfare begins to emerge into the spectrum regardless of whether it is high intensity conflict or low intensity conflict. That increasing overlap also means, if we accept the earlier point, information operations takes on enhanced roles within conflict fifth generation warfare. I am sure there are aspects that I am missing.

Arherring's comment on the Seli Post is noted as:

There are a few basic premises that I think have to be included in any framework that attempts to differentiate between methods/doctrines/types/generations/gradients of warfare.

1) There must be an internally consistent progression of effectiveness displayed in the framework. For every type of warfare there is at least one corresponding type of warfare that exists to offset it. It may not yet exist or yet have a theoretical definition, but it must be able to exist and be able to be expressed as a continuum in the framework.

2) The types of warfare must be able to be expressed on any type of battlefield.

(This is where I think your cyberwarfare should fit. Be it manuever or attrition of information the doctrines should apply even to electronic battlefields)

3) The framework must express an ability to both categorize types of warfare in order to determine the position of a type of warfare on a continuum, and suggest the appropriate response to a type of warfare by showing the counter to the type of warfare an opponent is employing.

4) Each type of warfare in the framework must be able to be clearly defined at each level of employment be it tactical, operational, strategic or grand strategic yet be consistent in the method in which it is employed. Also, different types of warfare must be able to co-exist at each of these levels.

The Generations of Modern Warfare (GMW) developed by Bill Lind does not meet any of these criteria. However, X Gradient Warfare (XGW) does and your excellent diagram could be a very convincing way of displaying an XGW-like framework.

I like your definition of Fifth Generation warfare and I agree that information operations will have a prominent role, indeed the key role in its application. It is the ability to present ideas in context to that is the heart of 5GW as I imagine it.

David Axe has an article on 5GW that is covered at Soob. I think this is the David Axe article. He seems to be implicitly defining 5GW as sort of Robb's Global Guerrillas concept. A good discussion follows at ZenPundit on why this isn't 5GW and on the whole meta-debate in general.

Coming Anarchy's Younghusband has a post on visualization of XGW as a step to eventually improve XGW. I like his idea of going back to Boyd's trio of Attrition Warfare, Maneuver Conflict, and Moral Conflict. The question is, can a visualization that includes room for 0GW and and 5GW (and perhaps other things not thought of yet) in that type of visualization?

The Committee of Public Safety also has some neat visualizations going.I really like the axis the information power vs Kinetic power axis as opposed to a Kinetics vs non-kinetic or kinetic vs. dispersed kinetics idea.

Crossed Crocodiles uses the term 5GW in the context of Somalia and the "vortex of violence". He seems to be equating 5GW with Nation-building or perhaps just as non-kinetic war.

I briefly blogged on Sharia Finance as a 5GW tactic. There have been a lot of posting on this.

In this draft post I try to re-tell post-cold war history as the history of three overlapping 5GW efforts and is partially responsible for how I consider the that the default American PoV has become a leftists PoV. I am still working on (I misplaced my handwritten notes).

Bob Morris of blog "Politics in the Zeroes" sticks his toe into the 5GW water with two posts.

Comments: 2 (Last comment by purpleslog.wordpress.com)

Building a framework: the premises

Sat, 10 Jan 2009 11:37:34 -0600

posted by Arherring

There are a few basic premises that should be included in any framework that attempts to differentiate between methods / doctrines / types / generations / gradients of warfare.

1) There must be an internally consistent progression of effectiveness displayed in the framework. For every type of warfare there is at least one corresponding type of warfare that exists to offset it. It may not yet exist or yet have a set theoretical definition, but it must be able to potentially exist and be able to be expressed on the continuum of warfare within the framework.

2) The types of warfare must be able to exist on any type of battlefield.

3) The framework must express an ability to categorize types of warfare in order to determine the position of a type of warfare on a continuum, and suggest the appropriate response to a type of warfare by showing on the continuum the counter to the type of warfare an opponent is employing.

4) Each type of warfare in the framework must be able to be clearly defined at each level of employment be it tactical, operational, strategic or grand strategic. Also, different types of warfare must be able to co-exist at each of these levels.

Tagged: XGW (6)

Comments: 5 (Last comment by purpleslog.wordpress.com)