Dreaming 5GW

OST + EBOv2 + Engaging Emergence, Pt. 2

Sun, 20 Sep 2009 18:45:03 -0600

posted by Curtis Gale Weeks

OST

In my last post, I explored the idea of EBOv2 after having introduced it as one of the key "principles" of 5GW. I suggested three interrelating limitations or "stumbling-blocks" to conducting the more expansive and inclusive form of EBO, summarizing these stumbling-blocks as issues relating to scope.

I also suggested Open Space Technology as a possible guide for handling these issues of scope as they relate to conducting 5GW. I have previously written about OST here (in 2007, when I first learned of it) and here (after learning of Peggy Holman's latest endeavor exploring the idea of "engaging emergence"), although I have not gone into much detail.
In trying to isolate the primary mechanism of OST, it will be important to distinguish between Open Space Technology and what has been called Open Source Technology -- although anyone familiar with both may find much overlap.

Where open source technology has as its primary mechanism the availability of information or, in the instances where the idea is used relating to warfare, to goods as well as information (information being a good, although including also innovative technology made available to all),
open space technology has as its primary mechanism the space in which co-operative endeavors may occur toward a common purpose.

I.e., with open source technology, technology (including information) is openly accessible and individuals may access it without ever directly communicating or interacting with one another, using that technology in their own disparate pursuits. The technology in the phrase open space technology is that very space, or the context in which individual pursuits and motivations may be explored freely, but ultimately complimentarily, in pursuit of a shared goal.

In "A brief guide to Open Space Technology," Doug Reeler of the Community Development Resource Association summarizes the general idea behind OST:

Open Space operates on the principle that to gain maximum contribution and commitment, people must be given the free space and time to deal with issues that they feel passionate about and with people who wish to be there with them.

In writing about Fifth Gradient Warfare, I have often stressed the idea, making it a key principle, that "hands in the field" will be necessary for conducting 5GW. Many reasons exist for this decision to label that principle as key. If 5GW is to remain "secret", a key aspect usually assumed to be necessary, then anyone conducting 5GW must not operate directly when shaping the context by which others orient in relation to, and act upon, their environments; indeed they, the hands, will be doing most of this work. If 5GW is to be broad-spectrum, shaping a whole system through many domains, a mere handful of individuals or organizations will not be able to do all the work, requiring mass co-option instead for accomplishing these things. Since others will be shaping the context themselves, or doing the work, we must assume that self-interest will remain a primary motivator -- this, also, will obscure the 5GW facilitators, because anyone forced to act in a certain way or against their own self-interest will not only become suspicious but will likely begin to operate against the 5GW plan.

In order to create this Open Space in which individuals may freely operate, OST utilizes 4 principles, 1 law (more of an uber-principle), and 2 key ideas relating to all 5. These are the general requirements for the possibility of self-organization, the overall mechanism behind the idea of OST.

Here are the 4 principles; but keep in mind what Doug Reeler succinctly and brilliantly stated in his essay as the purpose of these principles,

These are largely philosophical (and quite amusing for most), but are important to clear away preconceptions and any commitments to particular outcomes, apart from those inherently in the major theme. It focuses responsibility on the people attending for the process and the outcomes.

"Whenever it starts is the right time."

In other words, no strict deadlines or time lines -- which would set undue limitations on the actions and interactions of the participants as well as on the emergence of self-organization. As the Wikipedia article states it, this principle "clarifies the lack of any given schedule or structure and emphasizes creativity and innovation."

With reference to 5GW: The time scales involved for shaping large systems may be correspondingly large...or even small. For any given emergence in the system, i.e. an emergence occurring as a result of shifting contexts within any number of domains, no specific time line may be apparent beforehand. This allows the possibility of creative adaptation, not only within any given domain and for any given individual, but also for those who have initiated the 5GW. Additionally, the decision to act is not motivated by the pressures of an arbitrary time line, but is instead motivated by an individual's recognition of a matter of self-interest needing to be addressed.

"Whoever comes is the right people."

Although OST meetings have an overarching purpose or theme which might not have been set beforehand by all the participants, invitations are handed out before the meeting and only those who have some reason for going (whatever the reason) are the ones who show up. I.e., these are the people who have a stake in the proceedings. This means that everyone who shows up will be the right people -- because they have a) a motivation for being there, and b) are therefore likely to act upon the theme in any case with or without the meeting's occurrence. This principle, stated at the beginning of OST meetings, also acts as assurance that any given participant has value with respect to the proceedings -- additionally, that every participant is also responsible for the process and the outcome.

With reference to 5GW: Since 5GW will be focused on whole systems, anyone within those systems will be the right people. I.e., anyone with a stake in the outcome will be working toward an outcome, whether that is the outcome the initiators of 5GW desire or not. This requires the acknowledgment by those initiating 5GW of these stakes and an acceptance of the "hands in the field" who are likely to affect the system (whether within a particular domain or from without; i.e. the whole system.) Stating the principle at the initiation will not be so important, because anyone with a stake in the outcome will self-select anyway, per their own self-interests and to the degree that they see themselves in relation to any given system or domain.

"Whatever happens is the only thing that could have."

Per Wikipedia: "this tells the attendees to pay attention to events of the moment, instead of worrying about what could possibly happen." I would add, "or what could have happened in an alternate universe or past." In other words, this principle forces an acknowledgment of the chaotic process of self-organization. Given the fact that only those with a stake in the proceedings are acting upon the proceedings, and that these are individuals who would have been working upon the theme with or without the meeting in any case, then whatever happens during the course of the meeting would likely have happened anyway in one form or another. This forces the participants to acknowledge diversity of opinions and diversity of motivations and "diversity of innovations" borne of the individuality and unique perspectives of the participants.

With reference to 5GW: For the 5GW initiators, this principle would serve as a forward-progressing motivator. Whatever events occur through the process of emergence, as domains and systems -- contexts -- shift, are a natural result of what has gone before; thus, instead of worrying about what might have been, the 5GW initiators have an opportunity for creative adaptation to the unfolding events. For the multitude of hands-in-the-field, this will primarily be an issue of education: or, an awareness of the intricacies of inter-domain causes and effects. While secrecy has been stressed as a requirement for the 5GW initiators, all occurrences within the field of battle will need to be made clear. I.e., people do not act upon their environments, as a consequence of context, unless they see that context. The degree to which they need to see the reality of the situation will not be as important as their ability to develop an understanding and acknowledgment of the context for themselves. This will prevent the kind of nihilistic, wanton uber-destruction promoted in Global Guerrilla theory, or Joker theory, and keep hands in the field moving forward to accomplish their own self interests and definite goals.

"When it’s over it’s over."

Wikipedia: "encourages the participants not to waste time, but to move on to something else when the fruitful discussion ends." Whenever a stumbling-block occurs, which limits forward movement, or else when a participant has gained everything he can gain from a present interaction, he's encouraged to move on to something else. OST meetings, after their initiation, involve multiple parallel discussions around various topics or issues relating to the primary theme or goal. Personal responsibility and personal motivation, in order to be fully addressed, require the freedom to move on to a different topic or discussion. No one can be locked into an unfruitful discussion.

With reference to 5GW: For the initiator of 5GW, this principle would encourage a broad-spectrum view of the system. When some domains, although altered, reach a state of stability or inertia, other domains nonetheless exist in which the initiator of 5GW may operate. In other words, 5GW is not a "one-track pony." (Sorry, couldn't resist.) For the hands in the field, this principle will involve issues of mobility, which is one reason I am so enthusiastic about Thomas P. M. Barnett's writings, since nearly everything he writes involves a consideration about how mobility must be improved -- and indeed, is being improved -- for people around the world. However, regardless of that ideal, most hands in the field already have other opportunities for mobility, at the level of social groups, friendship groups, scholastic groups, or internet groups already. Self-interest will dictate needs for mobility which most people will recognize as available, even if on a small scale; in a 5GW operation, perturbations of one sort or another (from global to quite local) will bring to the fore this need to expand reach or increase the availability of sources for inspiration or potential areas of improvement. The central point of this principle, from a 5GW approach, is to avoid creating quicksand or stumbling-blocks for hands in the field and to encourage an awareness of opportunities for forward movement.

The one "Law" of OST is "The Law of Two Feet":

If at any time during our time together you find yourself in any situation where you are neither learning nor contributing, use your two feet. Go to some other place where you may learn and contribute. (Wikipedia)

This relates directly to the 4 principles already outlined. It is a "law" insofar as it sets the primary requirement for any self-organizing social system:

Without this mobility and freedom to follow self-interest, hierarchical controls set in and would have an undue effect on shaping an outcome toward, if not a single predetermined outcome, then a multitude of disparate, non-complementary outcomes which might in fact continue to work at cross-purposes and produce ongoing, never-ending conflict. I.e., limitations on initial conditions in the form of command and control will produce limited outcomes, or a type of atrophy, unable to address the full system.

It is assumed, then, that a self-organizing social system will find long term stability ultimately as a result of having these minor conflicts occur as a part of the process of organization; as these conflicts are worked out in a non-rigid, open space, they are more likely to produce a system which addresses the individual self-interests of the participants. (Indeed, Peggy Holman, referenced earlier, has said that conflict is necessary for a successful OST meeting.)

This law of OST then presupposes the existence of two types of actor, The Bumblebee and The Butterfly, for those who use the Law of Two Feet to withdraw from a present interaction.

The Bumblebee is a cross-fertilizer, moving from one group to another as individual interactions in groups become unproductive.

The Butterfly may not stay in any group for long but flits about the groups not a part of them, perhaps going to an outer hall or to a coffee table, where other Butterflies might chance to go, and spontaneous conversations concerning the main theme may occur, producing innovations or breakthroughs which are ultimately taken back to a group.

From a 5GW perspective, Bumblebees are likely to be prominent hands-in-the-field who operate in multiple domains -- or else, quite possibly also 5GW initiators who are able to cross-pollinate in a manner which will keep groups on-track toward accomplishing the primary 5GW goal. (It is likely that subtle pollination may occur in relative secrecy if these Initiator Bumblebees do not stay for long in any given group, or perhaps if they are not seen as Bumblebees because members of groups do not see them interacting with other groups.)

5GW Butterflies are likely to be a bit of a problem for 5GW planners, because much of what they do will remain beyond the bounds of primary activities. There exists the possibility of a corruption of memes, for instance, or a development of unforeseen memes, in a memetic style of 5GW operation, between these chance meetings of Butterflies. Nonetheless, following the principle of "Whatever happens is the only thing that could have," 5GW initiators should be able to adapt creatively. It may also be that the 5GW planners will themselves be Butterflies, as they meet to discuss what they have discovered or observed from the various "meetings" occurring within the battlespace.

Conclusion:

There will be other considerations arising from a consideration of Open Space Technology & 5GW, perhaps useful and perhaps not useful, depending upon what aspects of OST are studied. For instance, Doug Reeler, in his concluding thoughts to his essay, mentions this:

Tobin Quereau, in an email to me, has suggested that Open Space is a process that is "open to what emerges from the group rather than attempting to shape the group effort into an outcome that is predetermined...that validates the notion of a systemic "field" of knowledge, energy, and insight which can be accessed when the conditions are appropriate." These "conditions" are, I would argue, contained in a participative culture that is created in the design and the early unfolding of Open Space. I say early unfolding because responsibility for the process is handed over by the facilitator usually within the first hour of Open Space after which s/he has a very small role to play until the final symbolic convening.

Because it is a process of unfolding rather than a top-down process of guiding, how can any singular "5GW Plan" be operationalized via an OST approach? Nonetheless, the distinction between Open Space Technology and Open Source Technology, as described above, does point at how OST may be used to create an order rather than let chaos reign supreme (as "open source war" proponents often predict.) I.e., taken on the whole, everyone is already a member of a system, the global system, which, as it "shrinks" or becomes interconnected, already suggests on overriding Theme: How do we all get along?

We can already see intimations of OST in the interconnections present in the world. The most obvious case would be the World Wide Web: from forum sites to blogs to the central nodes of major corporations and news sites on the WWW, we can see people being Bumblebees or Butterflies, and there is great movement between sites, or cross-pollination. If I don't like one community, I can move to another for a time or I can create my own. If I need to find more productive inspiration, I can go to Wikipedia or some other site with more information than any I am now exploring. Behind the very ideas of Democracy, Free Trade, and Capitalism rests this idea of Open Space; even if some would limit these, nonetheless many of the conversations about how we should limit these are occurring on the more open WWW.

Much of the freedom to innovate and freedom to act and explore presupposed by Open Space comes from the very anonymity possible on the Web -- however, the concurrent requirement of OST is that individuals should be made aware that they are responsible for outcomes.

What should become clear: The scope of the battlespace is increasing daily, and the scope of operations must also increase. In face of this complexity, we should recognize the fact that self-organization is already occurring. The question for those who would conduct 5GW is simply, What can be done to promote the most positive outcome?
Tagged: EBO (6), Hands in the Field (6), Open Source (10), Open Space Technology (4), Peggy Holman (2)

OST + EBOv2 + Engaging Emergence

Sun, 13 Sep 2009 16:15:54 -0600

posted by Curtis Gale Weeks

EBOv2

Previously in writing about EBOv2 (or, "Evolved EBO" as I quickly labeled it then), I noted that effects-based operations should be expanded to include two areas of observation when determining operations:

In general “effects-based” has two components:

“It is thus about producing desired futures.” I.e., operations should be focused on pre-determined ultimate effects. Our activities are therefore determined by those effects, or based upon those effects we are seeking.
“[T]hose engaging in effects-based operations must continuously adapt plans, rules, and assumptions to existing reality.” In other words, whatever effects actually occur within the world — as opposed to the pre-determined effects we have chosen — will shape our activities; our future activities will be based upon those effects.

One might summarize to say that, for successful adaptive operations, we must not only have a willingness to observe all that is occurring within our sphere of activity, but we must also have a clear primary goal. In fact, we might go so far as to include a consideration of the OODA loop and say that the process of adaptation in EBOv2 is a conscious re-Orientation -- as opposed to an unconscious or subconscious re-Orientation. Unconscious or subconscious re-Orientation occurs when either a) sight of the primary goal has been lost, b) the primary goal is, for whatever reasons, in the process of being altered (or is fluid), and/or c) the primary goal itself is unconscious or subconscious and not understood or apparent to the actor. Of these, "c" may lead to a positive outcome with respect to the goal for any given action; but for ongoing and extended operations, "c" is more likely to devolve to either "a" or "b" over time than remain a useful guide.

The great stumbling-block for those who would conduct EBOv2 (and for that matter, those who have attempted plain old EBO) results from three different but interrelated conditions:

The setting of sights too low, with limited reach, when deciding a primary goal.
The inability to define, and thus observe and successfully act upon, an accurate sphere of activity.
The existence of others acting within the world who are themselves observing the world at large and setting their own sights on desired futures.

These conditions occur together. A limited concept of the accurate sphere of activity reduces one's sights to accomplishing merely immediate objectives, never mind the fact that others operating in that limited sphere may be looking outside that sphere of activity for materiel and/or political/ideological support.

Furthermore, those others affecting the battlefield may not actually be within that limited sphere, at least not in a way that will be greatly affected by the limited application of EBO. Exterior allies of the interior target may affect anything from the supplying of that target (in the case of materiel) to the global marketplace (economic or ideological) upon which the practitioner of EBO depends. The application of a limited EBO, in an attempt to accomplish a limited goal, may begin to resemble, for lack of a better description, "pissing into the wind."

Finally, the practitioner of limited EBO, through a lack of foresight, may ignore others outside that sphere who could help accomplish even those limited objectives in a lasting manner by helping to achieve more significant objectives not within the limited EBO. Thomas Barnett points at an example of this when he laments that "The Leviathan is screwed." In that case, the Leviathan -- the military arm -- attempted to also be the SysAdmin -- or, nation-builder, ignoring the level of support from without, some of it coming within also, that would be required. (This, incidentally, may be an example of "b" above, or of a shifting, fluid primary objective, since the great effort at SysAdmin was not a part of the major planning for the initial operations.) Another example, or at least allegory: short-term gains led our marketplace into the thickets of recession, with the only apparent solution as viewed by those in command being the expansion of the sphere of activity of governments around the world, whether through stimulus packages or bail-outs or broader regulation, often acting in unison. (Regardless of efficacy or wisdom for any of these responses, these show the sudden realization that an expansion of the sphere of activity would be required.)

To sum: Without a primary objective that is broad enough, and which takes into account all the domains or battlespaces and actors who may affect that objective, EBO becomes too limited to be of much use and in fact may become counterproductive.

The stumbling-block, in short, is an issue of scope -- with the attending issue of complexity. In my next post, I'll look at the idea of Open Space Technology as a guide for how we may approach and overcome that stumbling-block.

Tagged: Complexity (5), EBO (6), Open Space Technology (4), Stumblingblock (2)

Engaging Emergence

Thu, 27 Aug 2009 23:50:59 -0600

posted by Curtis Gale Weeks

Watch Engaging Emergence in Educational & How-To | View More Free Videos Online at Veoh.com

Peggy Holman, co-author of The Change Handbook, discusses "Engaging Emergence". (Be aware there is a 30-sec commercial at the beginning of this video, and then again 1/3 and again 2/3 of the way through this, if you watch it at Veoh.)

A few interesting ideas/phrases used:

"Change with no one in charge."
"Whole Systems change."
"Be compassionate about disruption."

Peggy Holman also spoke with this host about Open Space Technology, a subject I briefly addressed long ago and, rather unfortunately, never revisited until now. Although not quite as interesting as the video above, nonetheless there are many great ideas which should relate to 5GW; in fact, the very framework of the concept behind OST may prove quite valuable.

Watch Open Space Technology in Activism & Non-Profit | View More Free Videos Online at Veoh.com

For a much simplified and shorter explanation of OST, you can watch this video on YouTube.

I'll be back with more ideas about these in a newer post.

UPDATE: Peggy Holman's book proposal for Engaging Emergence at her blog: http://patternsofchange.wordpress.com/2009/07/22/book-proposal/

Tagged: EBO (6), Emergence (1), Hands in the Field (6), Open Space Technology (4), Peggy Holman (2)

Comments: 3 (Last comment by Curtis Gale Weeks)

Principles of 5GW: Evolved EBO

Sun, 09 Aug 2009 21:03:05 -0600

posted by Curtis Gale Weeks

(This is part of a series of posts exploring what I consider to be the essential principles of 5GW.)

Preliminary: EBO?

Writing in Effects-based operations: A New Operational Model?¹, April 2002, then-LTC Allen Batschelet examined three differing concepts of EBO currently circulating. Aspects of each may appear much like the concept of 5GW often discussed here:

From a White Paper appearing in October 2001, issued by J9 Joint Forces Command, Batschelet extracts the theory that EBO focuses on final outcomes, first as a goal but second as data points for assessing actual ongoing operations; additionally, multiple domains will affect final outcomes and thus multiple actors -- not merely within the military -- will be required:

According to J9, effects-based operations are “a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and non-military capabilities at all levels of conflict.” Furthermore, an “effect” is the physical, functional, or psychological outcome, event, or consequence that results from specific military or non-military actions. The defining elements in the J9 description include emphasis on effects-based operations as a process, beginning with developing knowledge of the adversary, viewed as a complex adaptive system, the environment, and U.S. capabilities. Knowledge of the enemy will enable the commander to determine the effects he needs to achieve to convince or compel the enemy to change his behavior. The commander’s intent plays a central, critical role, in the determination and explicit linking of tactical actions to operational objectives and desired strategic outcomes. Execution of the plan follows, the aim or task being the use of all applicable and available capabilities, including diplomatic, information, military and economic.

The purpose then is to create a coordinated and synergistic operation that will produce the desired effects. Continuous assessment must measure and evaluate the impact of the desired effects. Assessment includes, determining if military actions achieved the desired effects, produced unintended effects, the overall impact of the effort, and if tactical actions contributed to achievement of the desired outcome. Finally, continuous assessment of the enemy, U.S. military and political actions as well as the friendly situation will enable the commander to adjust his course of action to reach his desired endstate efficiently and rapidly.

Following this broad outline, Batschelet then considers a type of EBO conceived as a destruction-based EBO by Air Force Major General David Deptula, albeit one more focused on destroying an enemy's support systems rather than on destroying the enemy himself:

He asserts that the conduct of warfare has changed from campaigns designed to achieve objectives through sequential attack, to what he describes as, parallel warfare, or simultaneous attack against all the enemy’s vital systems. In Deptula’s concept, prosecuting parallel warfare requires precision weapons, the ability to suppress enemy air defenses, and an operational concept that focuses principally on effects rather than only on aggregate destruction to achieve military objectives....he argues that the present focus is on physical target destruction with little concern for the outcome. This focus on destruction comes from two traditional concepts of war, he argues, annihilation and attrition....

Deptula advances an alternative concept of warfare based on control—the idea that an enemy organization’s ability to operate as desired is ultimately more important than destruction of its military forces. He views destruction as a means to achieve control over an enemy. Destruction then should aim at achieving effects on enemy systems, not necessarily at destroying the system, but preventing its intended use as the adversary desires....he asserts that effects-based operations will achieve desired effects through the successful application of force to gain control of systems on which the enemy relies.

For his third example, Batschelet summarizes a study by the Institute for Defense Analyses:

It begins by arguing that effects-based operations rest on an explicit linking of actions to desired strategic outcomes. It is thus about producing desired futures. Moreover, effects-based thinking must under grid the concept by providing a focus on the entire continuum (peace, pre-conflict, conflict, and post conflict), and not just on conflict. Understanding how to think in this manner enables effects-based operations. This study also emphasizes the need to understand and model an adversary as a complex, adaptive system driven by complex human interactions, rather than just collections of physical targets. Therefore, one should be able to focus operations more coherently. Furthermore, effects-based operations have seven attributes: the need to focus on decision superiority, applicability in peace and war (full-spectrum operations); a focus beyond direct, immediate first-order effects; an understanding of the adversary’s systems; the ability of disciplined adaptation, the application of the elements of national power; and the ability of decision-making to adapt rules and assumptions to reality...Of note, this study places great importance on communications between decision makers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and underlines the criticality of “commander’s intent” for ensuring focused efforts and effects. Finally, this work offers that those engaging in effects-based operations must continuously adapt plans, rules, and assumptions to existing reality, in other words, effects based-thinking and operations help the commander to fight the enemy and not the plan.

I would note:

The first and third examples do not greatly differ, unless one takes from the third a strong focus on being able to create a solid and, one must assume, strict structure for Command and Control within the operation, which the first does not strongly emphasize (in these abstracts.) Shane Deichman has previously questioned the need for C^2 organizational capability for waging 5GW.
The second, Air Force Major General David Deptula's conceptualization, has become the dominant definition of EBO, at least as the term is commonly utilized in blogospheric debate. It is also the least like descriptions of 5GW included on D5GW, of the three descriptions, although it is the most like description of 5GW as propounded by John Robb of Global Guerrillas fame.
Batschelet in the remainder of his paper concludes that Deptula's conceptualization of EBO is too narrow -- "creating effects solely with fires" -- but cannot be excluded from a working concept of EBO, and he does not reject the notion of a strong and what he would call effective C^2. Indeed, he uses the rest of the paper to suggest methods -- from training of military personnel at all levels, to creating a working taxonomy of EBO to be used by all involved, to combining different organizations into one functional and effective organizational structure -- for improving C^2. These methods skirt the idea of a multi-domain approach by suggesting that officers become proficient in understanding non-military sciences such as those relating to culture and economics; but they maintain and reinforce the idea that EBO must be a top-down endeavor with strong C^2.

EBO Evolved

The arguments against EBO are really arguments against limited deployment of EBO.²

This is not the first time I have addressed the subject of EBO on D5GW. In that previous blog post, I spent most of my time 1) arguing the above against the predominant Deptula concept of EBO and 2) arguing that all warfare, being effects-based in a literal sense, is EBO but that one crucial aspect of conflict is often overlooked: the fact that cause-effect considerations typically used by those deploying EBO do not take into consideration previous and other present causes and effects which have shaped or are shaping an enemy's world view. In other words, the limitation of EBO as currently conceived rests not only in its refusal to observe causes other than its own (that is, the actions of those conducting the EBO), but also, relatedly, in its refusal to expand operations beyond its own generalized sphere of activity.

The first limitation can be best observed in the Deptula concept for EBO, as described above; the second limitation can be best observed in the other two concepts for EBO, and in Batschelet's exploration, as described above. However, all of the above are limited in both ways.

I have recently been revisiting the subject of a Revised OODA^{3, 4}, which might help to clarify the limitations of EBO as it has been conducted and/or conceived to this point. (In any case, as with here, my old exploration of EBO was also part of a consideration of the Revised OODA.)

First, without diminishing John Boyd's original concept for the OODA -- which I have found to be very useful indeed -- we can use his diagram as a metaphorical guide to understanding the old EBO limitations:

The diagram is very individual-centric. While "Outside Information" and "Unfolding Interaction With Environment", etc., are included, the diagram focuses on an individual's processes and processing of that information. Indeed, his unfolding interaction is shown to lead directly from his action and back into his own observation: a kind of ego-centric loop. From looking at the diagram we may say that, obviously, other influences exist in the world, but these influences are given short shrift. Batschelet's exploration of EBO, whether in exploring his three examples or in his own conclusions, stresses the iterative process of EBO, including this diagram:

More than Boyd's OODA Loop, but similarly, this diagram shows the C^2-centric conceptualization for EBO. One does continue to asses the general environment and act accordingly, but the overriding focus is on 1) one's own observation of the environment, 2) one's own activity planned as a result of that observation and 3) the effects of one's own activity upon that environment, for 4) further developing one's own EBO operation. Generously speaking, we might add the enemy's OODA process into the standard EBO operations when we conduct those operations -- we are "attacking the enemy's OODA" -- but this too runs into the limitation of presuming that the enemy is only focused on our activity when he decides his own actions in any conflict; and this only serves to focus our attention back into a self-reinforcing loop/EBO plan.

Strictly speaking, multiple EBO operations, beyond our own and beyond our enemy's, will be occurring in the course of any conflict.

Of preeminent importance, the truly dynamic state of the World must be expressed in any diagram we would use for understanding and conducting EBO. This includes not only an explicit inclusion of the larger sphere of activity -- the entire World -- but also an explicit consideration for the abstract processing we and our enemies use when we observe that environment. A reworking of the OODA becomes necessary:

Here we have a Concrete OODA and an Abstract OODA. Importantly, actions within the world -- i.e., in this case, EBO activities -- change the physical world, and it is this larger environment we and our enemies observe. In other words, no change in the environment is observed purely but is observed within the context of everything else occurring in that environment. Additionally, any observations of the environment are further diluted by previous "Mental Constructs" -- past experiences, ideologies, etc. -- which have been the results of activities occurring long before the current EBO operation and indeed before anything else presently occurring within the environment. (A more detailed explanation of the Revised OODA can be found on-site.)

In consideration of multiple EBO's occurring, we can show multiple OODA loops:

This merely shows multiple individuals observing a common environment and acting upon that environment, but importantly with different observational niches. With respect to EBO operations, the overlap and lack of overlap in observational niches may represent a break in the self-reinforcing, self-looping OODA/EBO which is often implied in standard definitions of EBO. In other words, our enemies will be reacting to other changes in the environment than we have caused. In addition, the formation of understandings of that environment will therefore include these other observations mixed with previous understanding of the environment unrelated to EBO activities:

The strict C^2 might be represented as a "common understanding" held by the force conducting EBO; certainly, this seems to have been a very large focus for Batschelet, when he stressed the importance of disseminating not only the general concept of EBO among the armed forces but also a) the need for an organization within which multiple organizations might unify their approach and b) processes for communicating existing circumstances to those in command and in turn communicating the directives of those in command back to the soldiers on the ground. This strict C^2 might be diagrammed within the Revised OODA Loop as being an "aligned abstract" which would shape common activities affecting the battlefield in common ways toward a specific purpose:

-- unfortunately, those activities must compete within the World with other activities of other forces, and our enemies would be viewing our changes to the environment in context with those other changes not of our doing.

But let's skip ahead to the Evolved EBO.

The very general concept as expressed in Batschelet's first and third examples was not far wrong. In general "effects-based" has two components:

"It is thus about producing desired futures." I.e., operations should be focused on pre-determined ultimate effects. Our activities are therefore determined by those effects, or based upon those effects we are seeking.
"[T]hose engaging in effects-based operations must continuously adapt plans, rules, and assumptions to existing reality." In other words, whatever effects actually occur within the world -- as opposed to the pre-determined effects we have chosen -- will shape our activities; our future activities will be based upon those effects.

Critically, we must begin to recognize that the effects upon which we base our actions will therefore be two-fold. Yes, an ultimate goal must shape what we do (#1), but also we must observe the effects presently occurring within the world and base our activities on those (#2) -- but not only on our own activity-causing effects. This seems utterly obvious and even facetious on the surface, but unfortunately most standard concepts of EBO fail to consider the scope implied in any commingling of those two concepts of "effects-based." Perhaps this failure is due to institutional inertia or the ever-common, and not relegated to the military, egocentricity of world views and motivations. Understandably, as we can see in Batschelet's paper, the effort of operationalizing EBO within a subset of society -- i.e., the military -- automatically 1) reduces the scope because 2) the sphere of activity is prescribed and expansions of the sphere of activity are in fact proscribed for the military.

Indeed, the sphere of activity is automatically limited for any group or individual, due to limited powers and limited observational capabilities. Some 5GW theorists, like John Robb, propose the utility of grand-scale system perturbation as a means of circumventing restrictions; a grand attack might in itself create ripple effects across a broad spectrum of domains. Unfortunately, a single origin, combined with the ripple effect, will lead to unintended consequences -- which, strictly speaking, means that such an action would not be effectively effects-based in and of itself even if one intended effect occurs. The iterative aspect of EBO, or of observing the effects of one's own activities and the activities of others, and then revising future activities based on those, would be moot if a grand system perturbation on the scale of an Armageddon were the method of choice; on the other hand, smaller perturbations, if they allowed further activity, might be effectively used in EBO.

Evolved EBO will require the recognition of a greater sphere of activity and greater numbers of actors than old school EBO recognized. Multiple domains and multifarious actors and organizations continue to affect the World, and will continue to affect the World, which in turn affects the world views and thus future activities of both our allies and enemies, and our actions will need to be based on these facts and their effects as well as an ultimate, sought-for effect. The inability of any one organization or group of individuals to operate directly across all spheres of activity will require the utilization of "hands in the field" and mass co-option for addressing those effects and shaping them, directing them.

For any warfare effort to be considered 5GW, the utilization of "Evolved EBO" — i.e., multi-directional, broad-spectrum and adaptive operations directed toward a single ultimate effect — will be key.

I. Introduction
II. Principles of 5GW: Hands in the Field
III. Principles of 5GW: Evolved EBO

---------

¹ Effects-based operations: A New Operational Model?, 09 April 2002.

² from EBO is Everything in War -- Almost, Dreaming 5GW, 07 Oct 2006.

³ OODA Reminder Post, Le Grande Bombaste, 3 Aug 2009.

⁴ Social OODA Loop, Le Grande Bombaste, 7 Aug 2009.

Tagged: Co-optation (9), EBO (6), Hands in the Field (6), OODA (15), Principles of 5GW (3), Revised OODA (6)

5GW: Alignments

Wed, 29 Jul 2009 08:34:46 -0600

posted by Curtis Gale Weeks

Recent discussion concerning the idea of "The Puppet Master" under an old D5GW thread has brought a question to my mind.

Adam Elkus used two statements, one in the post and another in a comment, that struck me as being very important for understanding 4GW:

Driven by nationalism and religion, they wage a public war directed towards various audiences.

Most groups taking arms against the state do so publicly because they see themselves as waging public struggles for public interests.

In many ways, these ideas remind me of a previous attempt I once made for understanding 4GW, in which I linked American political processes to 4GW.
The concept of "The Puppet Master" automatically brings questions about control and manipulation. Although I think we can agree that every "G" of xGW seeks to manipulate opponents via a manipulation of the environment, and that the manner of manipulation in 1GW, 2GW, and 3GW, are distinctive for each of those lower grades of warfare and fairly easy to establish, the question of distinguishing between 4GW manipulation and 5GW manipulation has not yet been fully resolved.

Adam's two considerations, above, have clarified at least one thing for me. In attacking the moral/morale qualifications of opponents and stirring moral/morale qualifications in would-be allies (puppets all), the 4GW force seeks to push others into a realignment. In the case of would-be allies, the 4GW force wishes for them to align themselves with the 4GW force, whether they offer material support or merely ideological and moral support. In the case of foes, the 4GW force seeks to break up old material and ideological/moral alignments; i.e., the foes of the 4GW force, having their morale sapped, would indeed become puppets but puppets whose strings are snapped, unable to do anything for lack of morale and moral justification. Both allies and foes of the 4GW force are pushed into an alignment w/ the 4GW force's goals. This is why something I've always seen in the 4GW paradigm, but have been unable to adequately express, came into focus when reading Adam's thoughts: though individual operators within the 4GW force may be hidden or secret, the 4GW activities and, generally, the 4GW plan is always in the open: "they wage a public war directed towards various audiences." The audience is forced into some relation, some alignment, with the 4GW force.

Such a consideration obviously brings up a very big question with respect to 5GW operations. If 5GW is to be largely secret, then any realignments will not be in direct response to the 5GW force. The world might be a stage with everyone on Earth in the audience, but the audience is not reacting to the 5GW force nor consciously aligning itself with or against that force. Therefore, any realignments -- and, "changing the world" is a process of realignment and the only purpose of war -- must have other foci.

I have previously mentioned my belief that 5GW may utilize existing 4GW and 3GW forces, at least initially. So we might guess that these forces -- "prawns" ¹ -- may be temporary foci. The 4GW puppetry described above might enable the 5GW operators to cause some necessary realignments, that is (which, for the time being at least, will also fit the needs of that 4GW force being so used.) However, one can easily imagine the precarious situation of a 5GW operation forced to utilize multiple 4GW and 3GW forces in this manner. Add to these considerations the possible utility of using celebrities, various homegrown political parties, economic realities, even novels and movies, as various surrogate foci, and the process of realignment grows complex indeed.

So I have a new but not altogether clear "dream" of the 5GW difference, when I consider 5GW as opposed to 4GW manipulation. The 4GW paradigm indeed seems much like an attempt at Puppet Mastery, with the 4GW force as quite-visible string-holder being the center of gravity; this center is the primary cause of the realignment which occurs in 4GW-style warfare. 5GW seems to be more of a balancing act, in which a great many foci are utilized in an effort to create a stabilized but new realignment for a given system: a balancing act, or a system of hard-coded checks and balances. The checks and balances realign with each other as the 5GW effort unfolds.

¹ "prawn" = "proxy + pawn"
Tagged: 4GW (21), Politics (9), Puppet Master (5)

Comments: 2 (Last comment by Curtis Gale Weeks)

5GW Operation Notes: Who What Where When Why How

Sat, 25 Jul 2009 23:45:06 -0600

posted by PurpleSlog

Here some notes to help me clarify my own thinking. The notes may be useful to others as well.

As always, I appreciate any comments, questions, corrections, additions…feedback of any sort.

5GW DEFINITION

5GW is the secret deliberative manipulation of actors, networks, institutions, states or any 0GW/1GW/2GW/3GW/4GW forces to achieve a goal or set of goals across a combination of socio, economic, and political domains while attempting to avoid or minimize the retaliatory offensive or defensive actions/reactions of 0GW/1GW/2GW/3GW/4GW powered actors, networks, institutions, and/or states.

WHO

WHAT

WHERE

Socio, economic, and political domains
Dimensions of War: physical, moral, mental, and institutional
CyberSpace? (for a future post)

WHEN

Small step by small step over a long period of time

WHY

To achieve or increase the probability of achieving a goal against (or for) an otherwise unwilling target
To wage war with inferior power or resources compared to the target
To avoid counter-activity by the target (aka increased 5GWer survivability)
“…an outcome which is lasting, i.e. a strong and resilient system, and this would also require that those living within any newly created or newly modified system consciously or unconsciously continue to maintain that system — rather than consciously or unconsciously form groups to bring it down.” [Source: CGW]
Love?

HOW

Quietlly/Stealthfully
Rely upon N-Order effects
Use Leverage Factors
Secretly/Anonymously
Slowly/Patiently

Note: The unofficial 5GW Theory Song

Update: Corrected some typos. Added an idea from here by CGW.

(Cross-posted to PurpleSlog)

Media Spectacles in Information Campaigns

Wed, 01 Jul 2009 12:55:28 -0600

  posted by Adam Elkus

Curtis highlighted my recent note on the Michael Jackson media spectacle and Iran. I agree very much with his characterization that "any info-war effort will need to be aware of the possibilities of an MJ-type black swan squashing that effort," despite the fact that the Iranian information campaign was not necessarily externally directed and thus wasn't substantially harmed by the MJ black swan.

I'd like to expand on this idea a bit in reference to the strategy of information campaigns. Media today is both incredibly pervasive and balkanized. Although big media outlets do still drive coverage, there is no hegemonic single "face of the news" like Walter Cronkite who holds the nation at rapt attention. You'd think, following the "Long Tail" rule, that this diffusion would lead to a diversity of both source and content that would resist the media spectacle. However, the diffusion in fact amplifies the effect of media spectacles. Twitter is a great example of this--during the Iran crisis one in four Iran-related Tweets was a Re-Tweet. So when there is a mega media spectacle you get the same story (albeit with some minor changes) from every single channel.

The Iranian protestors didn't suffer from this because their goal was to widen their own mobilization and flip regime elites. I'm not going to go as far to say that the international attention was completely meaningless--it severely unnerved the regime and gave the internal mobilization a kind of snowball effect. But if there were a significant US protest campaign going on that sought to influence a specifically national-level American center of gravity, something like the MJ death would have been a body blow.

There is more "bad" news. Black swans like the MJ event are as old as the proverbial Roman practice of "bread and circuses." But in recent years everyday events and people--provided that they are sensational or bizarre enough--can become media spectacles. The Californian "Octo-Mom," the messy end of reality TV stars John and Kate Gosselin's marriage, and the "missing white woman syndrome" all demonstrate the media's power and interest in turning ordinary life into cinematic spectacles that follow preset scripts.

Journalist Neil Gabler writes eloquently about this Hollywood-ization of everyday life in his book Life: The Movie, noting also that people come to identify celebrities' lives with their own and also identify their lives with those of celebrities. What this means is that everyday life, to many, has a more consciously cinematic quality than it did in the past. We come to see ourselves as the stars of our own private production, and increasingly expect to be famous.   What Gabler's book tells us about our age is that it is easier than ever for something to become a media spectacle.

For an information campaign planner looking to maximize public attention, both classic (megacelebrity troubles) and new (reality-TV, human interest stories) media spectacles are a critical problem. How are you going to keep people's interest in your cause when Brangelina are about to adopt another Third World baby?

The Situationists' answer was to try to shatter the "society of the spectacle" through attention-grabbing pranks, satires, and parodies of commercial content. The Culture Jam movement reconceived this idea with the metaphor of "jamming" the dominant cultural message by re-appropriating cultural objects and media sources. Both approaches are essentially tactical in that they seek to create attention for attention's sake. Worse, their method of doing so is to try to rage against the spectacle itself--a tactic as bizarre as shooting a handgun at an approaching stormcloud in order to keep dry.

A more productive course of action would be to ensure that your information campaign doesn't have a single point of failure. The difference between an epheremal flash mob and a long-term information campaign is that the latter can be restarted even after a momentary loss of attention. This requires centralized planning and vanguard leadership, elements that wiki and crowdsourcing boosters systematically undervalue. With a backup plan and strategic direction, "culture jams" and other attention-grabbing stunts and spectacles are not mere bids for attention but beachheads to build on--and can be effectively used to restart the movement's momentum after it has been lost.
Tagged: Iran (2), Michael Jackson (1), Twitter (1)

Comments: 14   (Last comment by A.E.)

Principles of 5GW: Hands in the Field

Mon, 29 Jun 2009 19:44:03 -0600

posted by Curtis Gale Weeks

(This is part of a series of posts exploring what I consider to be the essential principles of 5GW.)

I. Hands in the Field

Early Mentions

I think that my earliest use of the phrase "hands in the field" in conjunction with the theory of 5GW may have been in a Q & A response to an early criticism of the theory of 5GW: "Where is the 'war' part?" (October 14, 2006):

If we really want to engage in 5GW, we shouldn't be talking about how 5GW is a manipulation of free will. We should be declaring that individual freedom is essential to victory.
No and yes. Do you want terrorists to have individual freedom? This talk of freedom -- platitudes, really -- may well be essential for 5GW, simply because a people that is being told, "We are manipulating you!" will prove less pliable. Make them believe they have absolute freedom to act: Yes, of course. Convince them they have the power to change the world...because changing the world will require a lot of hands in the field.

although the idea behind the phrase began to take form earlier.

Soon after, in a comment on the blog ZenPundit (13 November, 2006) I referenced an entry on my now-defunct blog Phatic Communion in which I'd found fault with President Bush's use of the terrorism threat. Regardless of the actual number of active anti-American terrorists roaming the world,

For each terrorist, there is at least one American standing in opposition.

The problem is: GWB's rhetoric has been disempowering individual Americans; whereas, in 5GW, you gain hands in the field by empowering your (perhaps unwitting) agents. And we will probably need to move into the next generation of warfare if we are going to win this Long War -- before our enemies do (as you have already pointed out.)

In other words, at the time I meant: no reason exists for believing Americans should live -- pragmatically -- in fear of the terrorists since -- pragmatically -- any given American could do what any given terrorist might do, or do better, and there are so many more Americans than there are anti-American terrorists. That was a rough statement of an idea I'd been trying to work into usefulness. This was a meme circulating at the time, particularly by critics of the GWB method of population mobilization. ("Shop and we won't drop!")

Subsequent discussions expanded the idea. At D5GW-contributor Dan tdaxp's blog, one commenter named Ron contributed a quote by T.E.Lawrence during a discussion of the OODA Loop (February 12, 2007):

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”

and I responded,

The quote from Lawrence is interesting. In fact, the idea can be used to better understand the 'hands in the field' dynamic of 5GW: Get others to do the work altering the perceptions in the necessary ways.

Under another tdaxp post, one exploring the issue of patriotism (March 15, 2007), I suggested that remaining patriotic in the jingoistic with-us-or-against-us manner would be ineffective for the 5GW operator, while incorporating two more ideas:

Now, of course you might say that we can love them while hating their nation, also while loving our own nation as patriots; but this in-depth loving that would seek to “embrace and extend” in order to co-opt so many hands in the field, working the system from multiple sides, might require that we embrace whatever national identity they have — even while we try to extend it into becoming something else.

I had been influenced by Dan's recent consideration of the "Embrace and Extend" tactic. (March 13, 2007) -- and by Thomas P.M. Barnett, too, who frequently uses the idea of "co-opting" to win.

The Inefficiency of One Hand Clapping

A recent series of posts helped to inspire me to begin this series on the principles of 5GW with Hands in the Field. In my first post on my new blog, I let off some steam concerning the "greening" of Twitter which is ostensibly meant to help the dissidents of Iran. I labeled the effort 4GW.

Two other bloggers have added to the consideration. In "Media Spectacles, Michael Jackson, and Iran," D5GW contributor Adam Elkus concludes that effective mobilization of the Iranian dissidents will depend much more on what happens in Iran and locally than on whether Americans are paying attention, and that any info-war effort will need to be aware of the possibilities of an MJ-type black swan squashing that effort. Joseph Fouche, meanwhile, goes into some depth to understand the power structure of the "Twitter War: Now With Tasty Frosting":

Twitter is a dimension of power characterized by low resistance and low persistence. It is a target of power primarily because it’s a medium of power through which a war of influence could be waged. It is not the goal. Control of Twitter does not bring you into the zone of realization. Twitter is only a medium of power, a zone of application. The target of power, the zone of realization, is any force sufficient to bring kinetic power to bear on the regime. That didn’t happen because the medium was mistaken for the target.

These considerations returned me to an exploration of 5GW which predates my use of the term "hands in the field" but nonetheless laid the groundwork for it. One of the seminal early considerations of 5GW, written by Dan tdaxp, introduced the idea of the importance of secrecy to a 5GW effort (indeed, this blog is named after that post), and that concept ultimately led me to write a series of posts in an effort to understand how, exactly, 5GW would be conducted. To summarize: 1) no war effort would be worth the effort if the world was not actually changed by it, 2) every change to the world is an actual, physical change or it is not a change whatsoever, and 3) every actual concrete effect is observable, if not directly then through a type of forensics, or indirectly; and so 4) this concept of "secrecy" in 5GW needed an update.

As a side note, yet a relevant example, Adam Elkus recently considered the Western impulse to love the SEI renegade -- just before squashing him. (RTJ) In other words, open and direct activity invites retaliation.

From that chain of thought, then, sprang many other implications, all of which led back to the idea of "hands in the field."

Indirection, for instance, or operating at several degrees away from final outcomes, would help maintain secrecy; multiple domains would need to be shaped to create 4th, 5th, etc., order effects. (Direct action is quite traceable.)

Such manipulation would require many actors; but many actors would not act, or would act contrary to the war effort, if they knew they were being manipulated. Thus, the 5GW effort would be strengthened via co-option: let self-interest motivate those being utilized as "hands in the field."

A winning 5GW would seek an outcome which is lasting, i.e. a strong and resilient system, and this would also require that those living within any newly created or newly modified system consciously or unconsciously continue to maintain that system -- rather than consciously or unconsciously form groups to bring it down. (They must remain the 5GW effort's "hands in the field".)

In one variation of the argument, even enemies would be made hands in the field via co-option, simply because wiping them out would be impossible and leaving them to run wild would threaten the 5GW effort.

One might then ask why those participating in the greening of Twitter are not, after all, conducting 5GW, since so many are participating.

Joseph Fouche answered that question well:

Khamenei, in the words of Zenpundit, is a political valet interested in this life. He is interested in concrete power. The opposition would only ever triumph if they attracted government elements who could present a sufficient physical counter-force to Khamenei’s forces. As of yet, that has not happened. Twitter War would have to…

* Trigger internal forces to side with the opposition.

Or.

* Trigger external forces to intervene on the side of the opposition.

…in order to actually reach the zone of realization with any impact.

Khamenei has to date been more focused on the physical, actual world plane than have the Twit supporters who have managed to garner support from other Twit greeners or, in the case of those dissidents in Iran, from other dissidents in Iran or sympathizers abroad. In other words, nothing has really changed. Greeners, whether Iranian or Western users of Twitter, were already opposed to the Iranian Regime.

As I expressed in Skirting the Metaverse, the changing of an icon to green may seem like a great action of support -- the beating of paths into highways in the field -- but it is more appropriately the sound of multiple people clapping one hand in the effort to increase the volume of their outrage. We should not presume to know all that is happening within Iran or in the West that will have an actual effect on the outcome -- I even mentioned a relatively ridiculous possible MJ-5GW-related interpretation of the Twitterverse -- and so I would admit the possibility that every Twit greener has been co-opted in some 5GW fashion. They would be the 5GW hands in the field, not the 5GW operators themselves, but only if the increase in volume/noise was the work -- action -- required by the 5GW operators.

While some thought has been given to the possibility of stand-alone superempowered actors conducting a type of destructive, system-perturbing 5GW, one is hard-pressed to define success on the basis of outcomes. System perturbation on the order of Armageddon (and some do like to see that far) would be psychopathy rather than a warfare effort; and anything less would invite extraordinary retribution upon the SEI actor or group.

For any warfare effort to be considered 5GW, the utilization of "hands in the field" -- i.e., massive co-option and not mere tribal bonding -- will be key.

I. Introduction
II. Principles of 5GW: Hands in the Field
III. Principles of 5GW: Evolved EBO

Tagged: Co-optation (9), Hands in the Field (6), Principles of 5GW (3)

Comments: 3 (Last comment by PurpleSlog)

Principles of 5GW: Introduction

Mon, 29 Jun 2009 17:31:52 -0600

posted by Curtis Gale Weeks

Although I have been largely absent for very nearly a year (last post was July 1, 2008) I have occasionally alternately marveled and cringed at whatever 5GW-related blog posts, here at D5GW and elsewhere, I have happened to read in that time.

Admittedly, with respect to the content I cringed more often than I marveled, when I wasn't simply indifferent; but I did marvel at the expansion of the topic into new territories -- blogs and authors new to me have been addressing the subject in new ways. I eagerly await the publication of The Handbook of 5GW, which will include a handful of chapters written by people I had never known during my time blogging here and those years of 5GW discussion which occupied me before July 1, 2008.

In the last year, whenever "the blogging bug" would bite me (and this was a rarity), it was always an impulse to revisit the subject of 5GW via a dissemination of my own 5GW dream. That is, certain cringe-worthy implications in the works of others on the subject produced in me a desire to write back, "But...!" or "Why is [X] being totally forgotten/ignored?"

Typically I would have a very strong desire to begin a list of "principles of 5GW" which I think are essential to any discussion of the fifth ~~generation~~ gradient of warfare. In the last year, I fought the impulse and consoled my hurt daemon by shoring up a sense of curiosity: "What is this thing happening to the theory of 5GW, as it spreads?" It was a feeble consolation but it was enough. Until now.

In no particular order, then, I will begin my list with my next post, to be followed by additional posts outlining what I think are the essential principles of 5GW without which the discussion of 5GW theory can only flounder. I will return to edit this post with an outline and links to the others, as they are written.

-------

I. Introduction
II. Principles of 5GW: Hands in the Field
III. Principles of 5GW: Evolved EBO

Tagged: Principles of 5GW (3)

Comments: 1 (Last comment by Arherring)

XGW and Torture

Wed, 13 May 2009 11:01:31 -0600

posted by Arherring

Cross Posted at Red Herrings.

When considering the use of torture within the framework of XGW it becomes clear that torture has real utility at only three gradients of doctrine.

0GW Torture:

0GW - Confrontation and Conflict at its most basic level is an expression of natural selection. This genetic imperative is the principle behind any doctrine that is essentially the projection of Force for the survival of an individual organism.

When considering torture from the most basic, survival, level consideration of morality has no bearing upon the use of any method that ensures survival. The imperative is the continuation of the line, therefore, so long as the subject of the torture isn't of that line any method of information extraction is justified.

4GW Torture:

4GW - Fourth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of the attainment of a functional invulnerability that prevents the opponent from being able to orient upon a threat and creates a perception that saps the ability of the opponent to function effectively.

The use of torture at the fourth gradient is premised upon the creation of a sense of dread of the unknown in the minds of the opponent. Torture becomes a method not just of gathering information, but a weapon of fear. Used as an extreme, the opponent may have a fear of capture by the 4GW actor that prevents the opponent from orienting effectively, always considering most immediately the need to be able to escape rather than the most immediate method to execute their own doctrine. The morality of the use of torture at this gradient is ignored in the necessity of its utility to inspire fear.

5GW Torture:

5GW - Fifth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of manipulation of the context of the observations of an opponent in order to achieve a specific effect.

Torture at the fifth gradient takes on a different aspect from the use of torture at 0GW and 4GW. At those gradients the negative moral aspect of torture is either irrelevant or used to give torture utility. For 5GW the moral aspect of torture is the most important aspect. In most (if not all cases) 5GW is a warfare of competing ideas and ideals. At the fifth gradient the least desirable outcome is to have your ideology linked to an overwhelmingly negative meme like torture either through your own actions, or by the manipulation of an opponent that links torture to your ideology.

Do the Ends Justify the Means?

Calling it torture or "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" makes no difference, if a method is seen to be torture it carries a negative moral connotation. As it is argued above, for two of the three gradients this is either irrelevant or desirable, however, for 5GW the moral aspect is paramount. At the risk of editorializing, the United States of America is at its very core an expression of an ideology, an expression of connectivity and freedom and the ideal that all good things are possible with enough hard work and determination. As such, The United States of America in spreading that ideal must always approach any conflict or confrontation from the fifth gradient mind-set. Because of that, the USA must never engage in a method or doctrine that has a negative moral aspect, and must always guard against an opponent's attempt to manipulate the USA into a morally negative action, lest that negative meme be linked to the positive ideological foundation of the country.

For 5GW the means justify the end.

Tagged: 0GW (2), 4GW (21), 5GW (8), Torture (1), XGW (6)

Comments: 4 (Last comment by Arherring)