Dustin Dehez

Let's Arm the Syrian Opposition—Here is Why

2012-02-11T14:03:00.000-08:00

Courtesy of the US Army on flickr

Marc Lynch has come up with a long list of reasons why scepticism vis-à-vis arming the Syrian opposition should prevail, calling arming the Syrian opposition a daunting task. But just because it would be a daunting task is not a good enough reason for not doing it. Here is the complete list of what Lynch has to offer in opposition to arming the Free Syrian Army (FSA):

We do not exactly know whom we should and would be arming. For one thing the Free Syrian Army is too localised and too small to really challenge the Assad regime, for another it is too fragmented and disorganised to be an effective adversary to the Syrian regime.
We cannot provide enough weapons to really level the battlefield, the regular Syrian army is too well trained and well-equipped. Moreover, us arming the opposition could motivate the Russians and Iranians to arm the Assad-regime in response.
What will Assad be doing in response?
What if arming the opposition does not give the opposition a fighting chance or does not bring Assad to the bargaining table?
What if he does fall and the ensuing chaos would be even more disastrous?

All these are perfectly valid points and questions that need to be raised. But I do take issue with this list for a couple of reasons and would challenge some of the points.

It is certainly true that the Free Syrian Army (FSA) is currently very small and weakly organised. But if we are waiting until the Free Syrian Army has the sort of command and control structures we are used to within NATO, we might be waiting a while. The whole point of the debated assistance is to help a generally weak opposition. Weakness is not a a very good argument against assistance. Such assistance could also be made conditional: as we arm the opposition, further arms shipments can be made conditional on progress in consolidating command and control structures within the FSA and some sort of a formal agreement
Even if we do ship arms to the Syrian opposition, we will not be able to really alter the military balance in Syria. That much certainly is true. The regular Syrian armed forces have about 4900 MBTs, 2600 BMPs and another 1500 APCs at their disposal. This is an arsenal so large that Syria has amassed more firepower than most European NATO countries combined, at least far as ground forces are concerned. That is, if all of that stuff is actually operational, which I highly doubt. But arming the opposition would still help level the battlefield. Most of these tanks are of ancient design and can easily be hit. (The Russians have lost a number of comparable vehicles in the 2008 Georgian war and only prevailed because of a WWII-like strategy) The influx of weapons and the destruction of some weapons could trigger even more defections. The angle here is not levelling the odds in battle, but morale of government forces.
It is also true that Iran and Russia might be arming the Syrian regime, once we start arming the opposition. But Iran and Russia are doing that anyway. And while Iran will continue to do so no matter what we do, the Kremlin might eventually realise that it is about to repeat all the foreign policy mistakes it made in the late 1990s on the Balkans.
It is also true that arming the opposition might not help change the situation at all and that we might still have to intervene. Put differently arming the opposition might well pave the way for intervention. But politics is a game of alternatives, not ideal solutions. As long as the consensus is that we do not want to intervene now, but also do not want to see the Assad-regime to continue its horrible and awful regime, we might at least gain some time in the meantime by arming the opposition.

The case for arming the Syrian opposition is not be found in what or how little we know about Assad's adversary, it is to be found in how well we know Assad by now. Surely, problems might well remain, as they do in Libya. But the argument Marc Lynch completely fails to engage is that the lack of action is also producing costs, first and foremost in lives lost. Dan Drezner therefore has it right: Arming the opposition will be bloody and costly. But in all probability, that will still be the lesser of two evils.

On History and Strategic Thought

2012-02-08T10:31:00.000-08:00

After having slammed Brzezinski pretty hard for a serious lack of strategic thinking and intellectual rigour, I do feel compelled to give an example of what sound historical and strategic thinking should look like. Historical thought is, after all, an indispensable prerequisite for strategic thought, even though it is largely underestimated. Consider for a moment this:

“No government which is vicious in principle and corrupt in practice can hope, particularly in the atmosphere of military defeat, to retain the allegiance of those who do not share in the benefits of its dishonesty.”

Despite its beautiful prose, it is hard to tell to which country and which crisis it applies. But to a certain extent the question would miss the point. Sound historical thought has always been primarily concerned with learning about the underlying structures in time (Reinhart Koselleck, my favourite German historian, always wanted to draft a historical theory of time. He never had the time to do it, which I am guessing, must be some kind of historical joke. But his first attempts can be found here and here). The quoted sentence has first been written in 1923 by Harold J. Laski (and is now available here). Laski was describing Tsarist Russia and explaining why it had to give way to the Soviet Union. Yet, what he has penned here can be applied to virtually all states at all times. Some thirty or forty years ago, Reinhart Koselleck published a book in which he followed the introduction a new general rural law in Prussia (its a 700 pages volume and was in fact the first book I've read when I began to study modern history). Though he was studying a very limited period in Prussian history, from the angle of a very specific subject—rural law—he was still making a more general point. Namely, that every state is constantly situated between reform and revolution and that in fact reform is the minimum of change necessary to avoid a revolution. The consequences are, of course, enormous and the conclusion can still be applied today and with far better and more convincing results than any IR-theory. Iran, for instance, is structurally incapable of reform, a revolution will inevitably be the result. The most fascinating part of Karl Marx's introduction to the Communist Manifesto is still his description of an unfolding global economy, an apt and particularly terse summary of globalisation, still outranking a Stiglitz, Zakaria or the lame attempts of a Paul Krugman. Laski, by the way, was doing what every historian is educated to be doing his whole life, the essence of historical thought: comparing.

I make these points for a single reason. Understanding the underlying forces of history, getting a glimpse of the longue durée is a prerequisite for strategic thought. It allows for the certainty that Iran's regime will eventually fail and allows the policymaker to formulate a strategy that will not trigger (there is no need for that), but accelerate the process. It'll motivate a dialogue on the sources of historical change that can and should be taken into account by anyone trying to formulate grand strategy. It will also help avoid the bizarre generalisations a Brzezinski makes. I finish this post with yet another Laski quote on fascist Italy and communist Russia:

“Yet, save in intensity, there has been no difference in the method pursued by the two men; and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the different reception of their effort is the outcome of their antithetic attitudes to property. Yet the danger implicit in each philosophy is a similar one.”

On the State of the Afghan Campaign

2012-02-07T07:16:00.000-08:00

Courtesy of the US Army on flickr

It has not been that much of a secret that if you look for a substantive critique of the allied effort in Afghanistan, you do not have to look much further than what the U.S. military publishes itself through its various organs. In fact, the ease with which U.S. officers and military leaders can sometimes voice their opinion stands out in stark contrast to the practices on this side of the pond or, in fact, to the commonly held assumption that the U.S. is one tight behemoth that does not reflect in any meaningful way on its own operations. In fact, the best insight into allied efforts has often been produced by the SSI and is often being published in the public domain by such quarterlies as the Parameters (It is here that in 1986 a young major named David Petraeus penned a stark challenge to the Powell-Weinberger doctrine as the ultimate lesson from the war in Vietnam). The Armed Forces Journal is not a DOD publication, but many of its authors have a background in the military and the journal has therefore gained a reputation for being very much right on the mark.

In a piece that has already gone viral, Lt. Col. Daniel Davis demonstrates why that reputation is well-deserved. In Truth, lies and Afghanistan, he paints a gloomy picture of Afghanistan today, noting the virtually total absence of progress in the Afghan theatre. What struck me most in the stories Lt. Col. Davis relates is that Afghan security forces are already bracing themselves for the day allied forces leave. Now, Davis repeats what many others have said already, basically that we are now in this war's tenth year and have little to show for it. And that is not quite accurate. ISAF has been restricted or rather restricted itself to Kabul for the first half of the mission. Only since 2006 has NATO begun to expand its mission to the entire country and only in 2009 did the counterinsurgency-campaign commence in earnest. And just as the campaign was making progress in the wake of the Afghan surge, the alliance already started eyeing for the exit. But a real counterinsurgency-campaign needs about eight to ten years to be effective and so far no allied government has made the sort of commitment necessary. I'll leave it here, but suffice it to say that the real problem of the Afghanistan mission is not its futility, but the lack of a real strategy and the willingness to commit to it.

Zbigniew Brzezinski's Failure in Strategic Thinking

2012-01-29T08:16:00.000-08:00

Every society praises its own elder statesmen, even if they have become mere shadows of their former selves. Helmut Schmidt, former German chancellor, is often being touted as a strong Atlanticist and strategic thinker, for saying things along the line of China is growing in international stature and the U.S. will have problems to stand its ground. Put differently, an elder statesman is more likely than not to waste one's precious time.

And now Zbigniew Brzezinski insists on adding to that experience. In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, he calls for a new U.S. Grand Strategy. In itself that's a useful idea in that such a grand strategy is indeed lacking. So one is fully prepared for Brzezinski to weigh in. What he argues is basically this: The U.S. needs to shift to Asia, keep its commitment to NATO and help the EU to bring Turkey in and integrate a truly democratising Russia. To which one is tempted to reply: really, I haven't thought of that!

What Brzezinski is doing is in fact a pretty good example of what strategic thinking is not. Strategic thinking is not to formulate the most grandiose foreign policy goal one could possibly think of and than state it as if it were already a strategy in itself, without as much as a word on the possible obstacles.

But as if that weren't enough, Brzezinski took the time to formulate his strategy in all proper context, calling for nothing less than a “U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Upheaval.” That's certainly a true context, since more and more of the traditionally held assumptions about foreign policy are unravelling. But to then proceed without ever loosing a single word on what exactly he means by upheaval is really beyond me, because positions on that really could not differ more dramatically in the circles of international politics and academia.

But Brzezinski is not concerned with such small detail. He then proceeds to explain that in balancing the East and upgrading the West, the U.S. should use the German–Polish–French triangle (on this side of the pond, we call it the Weimar triangle) to foster reconciliation between Russia and Poland. Which is fine, would the Weimar triangle actually work (which it kind of does not). And whenever one reads sentences like “As the United States and Europe seek to enlarge the West, Russia itself will have to evolve in order to become more closely linked with the EU”, one should smack oneself on the forehead for not having written such nonsense oneself. Let me give it a try: In order to feed its population, North Korea will have to reform itself. See, I've done it. Problem with that sort of thinking is that it is true but does by no means ensures that it will or is in any way likely to happen. Strategy, let alone grand strategy, is about formulating a policy of getting there, which rather tellingly, Brzezinski does not even try.

Even Brzezinski seems to realise that there is a problem with this argument, and circumvents it by acknowledging that perhaps the process might stall sometimes, before lurching forward again. No kidding. Argues Brzezinski at length in his manner of wishful thinking: “It is not unrealistic to imagine a larger configuration of the West emerging after 2025. In the course of the next several decades, Russia could embark on a comprehensive law-based democratic transformation compatible with both EU and NATO standards, and Turkey could become a full member of the EU, putting both countries on their way to integration with the transatlantic community. But even before that occurs, a deepening geopolitical community of interest could arise among the United States, Europe (including Turkey), and Russia. Since any westward gravitation by Russia would likely be preceded and encourages by closer ties between Ukraine and the EU, the institutional seat for a collective consultative organ (or perhaps initially for an expanded Council of Europe) could be located in Kiev, the ancient capital of Kievan Rus, whose location would be symbolic of the West's renewed vitality and enlarging scope.”

Any resemblance this statement has to foreign policy is merely coincidental. I'd also like to see Turkey joining the EU, but I also know that its not going to happen any time soon, or perhaps ever. And that Ukraine is pulling Russia into the Western camp is really a statement of Kafkaesque proportions. I spare you the part, where Brzezinski argues that we should simply ditch Taiwan, because China is more important. This really is the worst piece Foreign Affairs carried since Jeffrey L. Cimbalo's “Saving NATO from Europe”.

Zur Thalia-Theater Kontroverse

2012-01-23T11:16:00.001-08:00

Und apropos Religion. Das Thalia Theater zeigt heute die Aufführung „Gólgota Picnic“. Dafür ist das Theater von extremen Katholiken und der Pius-Brüderschaft scharf angegriffen worden, wobei insbesondere letztere mit einer Strafanzeige droht, sollte das Thalia-Theater nicht „Rücksicht auf die Gefühle der Christen“ nehmen. Denn das Theaterstück wirft die (vollends berechtigte) Frage auf, inwieweit nicht Religion selbst zum Bösen gehört. Das Theater verteidigt sich damit, dass es auch positiv besetzte religiöse Momente im Rahmen der Lessing-Tage gebe. Aber das ist natürlich die falsche Verteidigung. Denn das Infragestellen der Religion ist an sich nicht nur berechtigt, sondern auch notwendig. Die Pius-Brüderschaft selbst ist schließlich ein gutes Indiz dafür, dass Religion alles andere als gut ist. Aber entscheidend ist, dass die Meinungsfreiheit schlicht und ergreifend ein höheres Gut ist, als die Gefühle einer religiösen Gruppierung, ganz gleich welcher. Als dänische Botschaften im Nahen Osten angegriffen wurden, weil eine dänische Tageszeitung eine Mohammed-Karikatur gedruckt hat, hat es viel zu wenig Solidarisierung mit der Jyllands-Posten gegeben, gerade in Deutschland. Nun bemüht sich ein katholischer Orden, auf die gleiche Art die Kunst mundtot zu machen. Das darf nicht unkommentiert bleiben.

On Syria – The Russia Card. Lets Drop it From the BRICS

2012-01-23T10:22:00.000-08:00

Russian foreign policy is merely a shadow of its Soviet past and though the regime of Medvedev and Putin clings to the lost promise of the Soviet Union—Putin, to the dismay of nations like Estonia, Lithuania, Georgia and others, has called its demise the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century—its foreign policy is no longer anchored in any ideology in particular. So much is certainly not too controversial a statement. The sale of 36 additional YAK-130 jets to Syria is not that big of a deal in military terms, but it is significant nonetheless. The announcement comes on the heels of the Russian aircraft-carrier Admiral Kutzenov making a port call in Syria, lending credibility and international legitimacy to the otherwise isolated Syrian dictator. During the Cold War, Syria was the linchpin of Russian foreign policy in the Middle East; ever since the demise of the Soviet Union Damascus has remained a principal ally of the Kremlin, even though genuine common interests are difficult to determine. In fact, Moscow's major interest in Syria is as a reliable customer of Russian made military hardware; there is no common agenda other than that.

That the Kremlin is willing to veto any (meaningful) resolution on Syria is dispiriting. Though an international intervention is justified under the R2P, the United Nations Security Council would not have to move in that direction right now. For one thing the Syrian opposition is not consolidated enough to really be an alternative. For another, sanctions and embargoes could be useful steps for the moment and might indeed be sufficient to get some concessions from Assad's regime (though I do think that in the end he needs to be removed by force). But with Russia vetoing any action on Syria, the United Security Council is quickly loosing more of its legitimacy. While Syria is on the verge of civil war, even the Arab League has gained more legitimacy in dealing with the crisis than the Security Council. Russia is no longer a superpower and other nations have surpassed it in economic and political weight. But Russia has a unique role in the UNSC that is no longer justified by its political role or economic weight. Can we do anything about it? For the moment, let us realise for a second that Russia's economy is not going to grow that much; that its political system is bankrupt and that no state except Belarus is willing to follow its course or model no matter what. So lets get serious and drop Russia from the BRICS. Its been the odd one out anyway, so when talking about emerging powers, BICS is far more accurate. And making that change might help the Kremlin realise that in order to be regarded as a leading power, it might be helpful to formulate an agenda that other nations might be willing to buy into. You know, as a general principal.

This post, by the way, distracted me from commenting on some Sikhs arguing that the first amendment does not protect jokes about the Sri Darbar Sahib, where the Sikhs host their holy scriptures. I kid you not. Apparently they do not keep a copy of the U.S. constitution there.

A Strait Too Far - Iran's (Probably) Empty Threat

2012-01-07T10:16:00.000-08:00

Courtesy of the U.S. Navy

As 2011 drew to a close and yours truly was taking too short a hiatus in Bremen and Berlin, Iran stepped up its military posture in the Strait of Hormuz, warning that a further escalation in tensions over the Iranian nuclear programme might trigger Tehran to enact a blockade of the vital chockepoint. It also warned the United States not to re-deploy an additional carrier group to the strait and staged a ten-day military exercise in order to underscore its aggressive posture. The sabre-rattling was in all probability a reaction to the then-pending additional embargoes on the Iranian oil market, recently enacted by the European Union and stronger banking sanctions already passed by the United States. In short, they demonstrate that sanctions finally seem to have a serious impact on the Iranian economy, calling into question the durability of Iran's stance vis-à-vis the international community. But is Iran really in a position to threaten the Strait of Hormuz? And if so, is it likely to do so?

Despite the sabre-rattling one should keep in mind that the Strait of Hormuz is not only Iraq's and Saudi Arabia's major avenue for oil exports. In fact, Iran's own exports have to be conducted through the Strait. And while it is sometimes assumed that the United States is fully dependent on Middle Eastern oil, Europe and China are in fact far more reliant on Middle Eastern oil supplies than the U.S. The economic effect of a potential blockade would be devastating to the world economy. But in terms of actual supply China and Europe would be hit harder than the United States. Such a blockade would hence bring China fully in the Western boat making such a move strategically self-defeating for Iran. Moreover, not only would Western navies intervene, such a move would virtually require a military response from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

A potential blockade would therefore seem rather unlikely, but it becomes outright ridiculous once you take a look at the military capabilities of Iran. Iran does not have a traditional military structure. In fact, its regular armed forces and navy suffer from years of neglect and though the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, the real military backbone of the country, have some experience in operations against ground forces, certainly do not have the capabilities for a fully fledged naval campaign. Iran's navy, consisting largely of Soviet-era Kilo submarines and virtually ancient frigates does not stand a chance in a confrontation with the U.S. Navy. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards might be deployed in such a scenario, but their swarming tactics have never been put to a test. And whether the regular Iranian navy and the naval wing of the Revolutionary Guards can coordinate effectively in terms of jointness is more than doubtful. Iran might deploy some anti-ship ground missiles but the effect of those is more than questionable, since for those to be effective Iran would need reconnaissance that Iran does not really have.

But the most important aspect is this. Trying to essentially shut-down the Strait of Hormuz is a real military objective that does not adhere to the logic of asymmetric conflicts. For it to be effective, it needs durability. Iran would fall short of its objective would it not be able to maintain the blockade. In fact, would the U.S. or some other navy break the blockade in a short couple of days—as is likely—Iran would have lost the conflict decisively. And that is something Ahmadinejad and Khamenei certainly cannot afford.

The Glittery Holiday Reading List Reviewed

2012-01-04T04:47:00.000-08:00

There are two things about reading lists that tend to drive me crazy. First, it always seems like virtually everybody else is getting more reading done through the holidays than me. That's of course insane, but finding an honest reading list is really sort of an art form. And I actually love to read, so I don't let myself be distracted by mum easily. Second, most reading lists are either incredibly dull or so highfalutin that one cannot seriously believe that any reader would ever really follow through with it. In contrast my reading list is absolutely erratic and lists only the books I actually did read in precisely that order.

James Mann – The China Fantasy: This book was published first a couple of years ago, but only now did I find time to fully read it. Its actually more sort of a pamphlet than a real book. Since reviewing his The Rise of the Vulcans I have come to expect quite a lot from James Mann. This book, however, falls short of these expectations. It makes one single argument over and again: that maybe China is not inevitably to turn into a democracy just because it has introduced economic liberalisation. Strongest point in favour of Mann's theory: China is still an autocracy. To which I can only respond sure that, but then again. China is not a democracy and I despise the system it has just as much as Mann does. But that does not change the fact that in contrast to 1978 and 1989 Chinese are now at least allowed to harbour an opinion. Will it lead to democracy? Probably. I've got more on that, but I'll wait with that tiny bit, till, well, wait for it.

Jeffrey Eugenides – The Marriage Plot: Read it! Its great! But I only now realise that the book a) is not academic and b) received some critical reviews. So here is in a nutshell why its a good read. 1) Its vintage Eugenides in style and prose. 2) It gives a lovely view of an America in the early 1980s when Reagan became president and the 68 generation makes way for the first entertainment generation. Its also a love story (though that does not qualify for a third point in favour).

Condoleezza Rice – No Higher Honour: I've already read some of the other memoirs from George Bush administration veterans and Rice's No Higher Honour fills in some of the blanks. It is also fairly obvious that Rice must have been the smartest person in the administration since her reflections reach a level of abstraction somewhat oddly missing in Rumsfeld's and Bush's own memoirs. But having said that, Rice is not exactly a comedian and the near total absence of anecdotes make this 700plus pages book a bit tiresome to read. It is, however, still an important document of one of the most contested presidencies of the past decades.

Cry Me a River, Transnistria!

2011-12-23T14:45:00.000-08:00

Courtesy of the US Army on flickr

Now, to readers of this blog (and there must be some, or so my provider keeps telling me) it will not come as a total surprise that Russian foreign policy is something I can go on about for hours (I've did so here and here). I've recently started preparing a lecture for my second trip to the Caucasus and started to dive into Russian foreign policy (and what a dive it is). In any event, I've already commented on the insane fuss about NATO missile defence and the failure of the CFE treaty due to Russian stubbornness and foreign policy blunders. But Russia (i.e. Putin) is resurrecting a foreign policy that to the historian looks more like the heyday of Brezhnev than détente. And though its hardly being covered in German media outlets, its not that the Russian government is trying to be too opaque. Far from it, the de facto termination of the CFE treaty was only the latest in a whole series of setbacks for Western-Russian relations. For years Russia has had what it calls peacekeeping forces in places like Georgia and Transnistria. At least the more educated know how intensely Russia has been working around both the CFE treaty and the CIS mandate to turn its peacekeeping troops into de facto occupying forces in the run-up to the 2008 Georgian war. And there have long been fears that it might do the same with its peacekeeping forces in Transnistria. Igor Smirnov, the self-proclaimed president of Transnistria, has recently lost an election there (though as of now, it is not clear what is to become of him or the elections), but previously had time to sit down with the nice people of the highly readable and new New Eastern Europe. In this interview the gloves came off (sort of). Transnistria, he proclaimed, has never left the Soviet Union and therefore is part of Russia (to the rest of the international community its actually part of Moldova, but you know, who is Smirnov to care, since he can't travel to Europe anyway). So, Transnistria is one of the lovely places that theoretically do not even exist but will in all likelihood be a hot button issue between NATO and Russia and one of the frozen conflicts to watch out for next year. And yes, I know its only a couple of minutes to christmas, so I've got this off my chest.

Zum Tode Christopher Hitchens

2011-12-22T01:21:00.000-08:00

Mein Nachruf auf Christopher Hitchens ist heute in der Jungle World erschienen und findet sich hier.

An Obituary for Christopher Hitchens

2011-12-16T04:58:00.000-08:00

Christopher Hitchens once said that you do not become an atheist. You just discover that you always have been. As on so many other issues, he has been absolutely right. And in honour of the giant, I relate my own experience, if I may. I was born in Northern Germany where people usually are no longer being baptised. But when I turned seven, my parents moved to Freiburg where I had to enter a public primary school, which, as is common in the Catholic parts of Southern Germany, still taught religion as a compulsory subject. I was then also ill with neurodermatitis, which is a skin disease that leaves an itching pain on virtually all the limbs. Worse still, it doesn't leave you until you grow up, if it leaves you at all. As an non-baptised child I was sent to the protestant class, which to this day I find telling. I was hence subjected to religious classes, in which a priest from a local parish would instruct us in the bible and Christianity. Being ill—and admittedly knowing nothing about the children starving in North Korea or Somalia—and being the social outfit of my class—children can be cruel to one another—I once challenged the priest. Asking him, why god had so apparently treated me differently from all the other children, I was told that it would turn out fine in the end, he would make it just in the end. I was startled and asked how it could ever turn out to be just, when it is not now. I was then further instructed by the priest that god certainly had a plan and that his ways of doing justice were beyond my or his grasp, in fact that the ways of his justice were incomprehensible. I was eight years old and something about the answer did not quite satisfy me, though I could not point my finger at it. Today I know that what was related to me disguised as justice was the very definition of injustice. Once the ways of how justice are being delivered are incomprehensible, there no longer is any justice of any sort. Equality, transparency are missing in god's justice just as much as they were missing and are being missed in places such as North Korea, where, as Hitchens pointed out, people live in exactly that: a theocracy—that is if the trinity of father, son and the holy spirit, in fact, ring a bell.

I was interested in history and politics long before I came across Hitchens' work. As a matter of fact, I have been an atheist my entire life, I came to develop a strong interest in foreign policy and defended the Iraq invasion long before I ever read a book authored by the Hitch. I had a fascination with Marxist historical thought ever since university and found all forms of totalitarianism disgusting. I despised the left for its willingness to abandon its anti-totalitarian legacy in favour of an awkward, ill-defined so called anti-imperialism. And out of the blue, two years ago, I came across a Christopher Hitchens interview on Uncommon Knowledge and found a voice who's been there all along and more importantly long before I had developed any interest in these sort of things. And a voice, who would articulate the thoughts I harboured and expressed so much better than I could ever hope to. I spent the last two years catching up on Hitchens' extended writings and found him the greatest source of inspiration I have come across in recent years. Christopher Hitchens died today, aged 62. And though I am sad that he lost the races against clock and cancer, I remember him saying once that even though Shakespeare is dead, one could always meet him in his writings. Since there Shakespeare would be immortal. Hitchens is immortal in his writings, but he has a greater legacy than that. In the face of totalitarian aggression, Hitch stated that one simply needs to take a stand. Well, he did that.

Bringing out the Bear – Russia Is Getting Testy

2011-12-07T10:16:00.000-08:00

Photo courtesy US Army on Flickr

Its always been the greatest nonsense issue around in international security politics. The fuss about NATO's missile defence project. Nobody with any clue on such matters seriously argues that the shield is or could be directed against Russia, but the Putin/Medvedev government likes to play the great fear card to help its citizens rally around the Russian flag whilst ignoring the incompetence, corruption and dismal record of its leaders. So today, SPIEGEL reported that Russia is moving air defence missiles to its border with NATO to maintain a strategic balance, whatever sort of balance they are referring to I do not know, since NATO countries all cut their defence budgets while Russia is actually increasing its own but, you know, anyway. This latest move, however, is not an isolated step toward escalation. In fact, two developments have spurred the escalation in recent months. What most papers, the SPIEGEL included, completely failed to report is that after years of restraint, Russia has again started to refer to the Baltic states as having entered the Soviet Union voluntarily, which obviously these nations take issue with. Dimitrij Rogosin, the Russian ambassador to NATO and among the leading candidates to become the next Russian defence minister, has also made comments in that direction. Interestingly enough, this time the Baltic states refrained from turning it into a larger issue and responded relatively low-key to this sort of falsification of history. The second development is perhaps even more important. Russia has suspended the CFE-treaty in 2007 (that is the Conventional Forces Europe treaty). The treaty originally stipulated a Russian withdrawal from Moldova and Georgia, which Russia of course always declined to do. For years, NATO harboured hopes that Russia would return to the CFE, but after four years NATO, Georgia and Azerbaijan all suspended the CFE as well during the past two weeks. Fact is that the relations between Russia and NATO have hit a new low and for the moment Russia has largely domestic motives for keeping them there.

Modern Classics in War and Warfare - XII

2011-11-29T06:35:00.000-08:00

When a couple of weeks ago, the United States Attorney General announced the indictment of various suspects who were allegedly planning to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States, many if not most felt that such a brazen plan could hardly enjoy the endorsement of the Iranian leadership. Too dangerous, too risky, and too belligerent a move that the always careful Iranian theocracy could have possibly ordered it. One is well advised, however, to take a step back and remember that the Iranian leadership—and I do mean this Iranian leadership—is responsible for a whole number of politically motivated assassinations and terror plots. In the 1990s, shortly after Ali Khamenei became Supreme Leader, Tehran was going on the offensive. In 1990 a plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to Sweden had failed and shorty thereafter exiled opposition leaders were murdered in Vienna. But my own country has seen one of the most brutal plots the Iranian leadership had mounted. In 1992 exiled opposition leaders from the Kurdish region of Iran were meeting at a Berlin restaurant, the Mykonos, when gunmen entered and killed four of the politicians gathered. Thus, on the soil of Germany, state-sponsored terrorism had been carried out a mere two decades ago. I can write that with all certainty, because it is not just an allegation, it has been proven in a court of law. In 1996 a German court sentenced the gunmen carrying out these attacks. But it also ruled that those who ordered it, were sitting in Tehran and could not stand trial, the most important of them former Iranian intelligence minister Fallahin, who is today serving on the Expediency Council, one of Iran's most important political bodies, responsible among other things, for choosing Iran's Supreme leader. Such is the leadership of a state that is now developing nuclear weapons. The story is being told in a book that has hit the shelves in a rather timely fashion: Roya Hakakian's Assassins of the Turquoise Palace.

It is indeed an entertaining book that takes the reader through the events of 1992 and the subsequent trial in Berlin in a rapid pace (at times, however, a little too rapid). Roya Hakakian had the lovely idea of ridiculing the theocracy while describing their heinous acts by starting each chapter with a quote from an Iranian satirist, the very people the regime was and is waging war against (to give you an idea, yours truly feels obliged to give you an example: “Nietzsche's famous Thus Spoke Zarathustra finally cleared the censors at the ministry of culture when its title was changed to Thus Spoke the Ayatollah.”). But the point really is that the Iranian theocracy has had an extensive programme with which it tried to assassinate no less than 500 political leaders, writers, and intellectuals in exile. We do not yet know whether the culprits of the botched assassination plan in the United States were acting on orders of the Iranian regime. The trouble for Tehran, however, is that it would fit a pattern. A pattern most have forgotten but that Roya Hakakian reminds us of.

In Defence of Foreign Aid

2011-11-22T13:01:00.000-08:00

The final quarter of a year is always when things are getting really busy, though I have no earthly idea why. Rushing from one commitment to another, I have little time to digest daily news. But what former Republican presidential candidate Mike Huckabee and Norm Coleman put out on politico is worth reading and, well, noting. This year's presidential debates have shown a bunch of Republican candidates largely out of touch with international affairs. With the notable exception of John Huntsman, they hardly seem to have a grasp on what is going on, in a world where knowing what that sound is, has become more important than at any other time before. One simply has to feel flabbergasted when most of them, even the serious ones like Rick Perry, suggest that cutting back on foreign aid is a particularly lovely idea to save the budget. Increasing foreign aid was one of the most important successes of the Bush-administration and having a group of presidential contenders running away from such a legacy is really dispiriting. But then again, of the current crop, I'd have to endorse Huntsman. Though I've got the vague feeling that that doesn't carry much weight in New Hampshire.

The U.S. in Asia - Not That Much of a Shift, Mind You

2011-11-17T16:05:00.000-08:00

The leading political paper in Germany is—as one might recall even outside Germany—Der SPIEGEL and I remember vividly that when I first developed an interest in politics some two decades ago, I took to the weekly for my insight into the world. But in recent years, the weekly cannot really pride itself in its journalism. Instead it has often taken an alarmist tone, even when that would defy reality. Commenting on President Obama's visit to Australia, the paper ran an article today called Obama provoking the red leaders, characterising Obama's policy in the Pacific as a fundamental re-orientation of the United States' foreign policy. That is quite a strong statement, considering that the Pacific ocean and the South China Sea have been a focus of international security policy for more than a decade now, with the U.S. being involved in it to a larger extent ever since George W. Bush managed a rapprochement with Vietnam in the early 2000s. And sometimes the paper is getting outright absurd in its coverage, arguing today that the U.S. is not only about to permanently station U.S. Marines in the North of Australia but also warships and fighter jets in a move to encircle China. Even though up to 2.500 Marines will permanently rotate through Australia, the part on the increased presence of fighter jets could not possible be more off the mark. What the agreement does say is that the United States will be allowed to use the facilities of the Royal Australian Air Force for its own planes, which is quite different from establishing a permanent base for fighter jets (which would be nonsense anyway, since no jet in the U.S. arsenal could do much about the South China Sea from a base in Northern Australia, you know, the stuff about range, refuelling, overflight rights, etc. I am just saying...).

Is this really provoking the Chinese? Well, in a sense, certainly. But not because Chinese interests are really threatened. The People's Republic has replaced its long-standing foreign policy rationale of a peaceful rise with a more assertive stance in the South China Sea. A sense of entitlement to predominance in an area, where other sovereign states have just as legitimate interests (Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia). Beijing can hardly be surprised that its military build-up is being met with these powers having an interest in an American counterbalance. And in that sense, its China that really invited the U.S. But 2.500 Marines and access to some air force and naval facilities are not going to change the military balance in the region and given China's recently made gains in anti-ship and area-denial systems, even an additional U.S. carrier group would not tilt the balance more in the U.S.' favour. What is missing in the picture presented not only by SPIEGEL is that China's neighbours are investing in their armies and navies as well, investments that are far more important than a slightly increased U.S. naval presence—even though that remains an important stabilising factor in the Pacific.

The Indian Bid for Fresh Fighter Jets Revisited

2011-11-14T17:04:00.000-08:00

Now, as some of you may recall, I've recently lambasted the gifted colleagues of the American Enterprise Institute for arguing that the Indians were truly making a mistake by not buying F-18s and instead focusing on possible procurement of the French Rafale or the Eurofighter Typhoon. I feel largely vindicated by Michael Mazza's latest post, in which he welcomes the possible sell of F-35s to India. Just as I've argued, its about getting the right amount of bang for a particular amount of bucks. And as a matter of principle, selling the F-35 is actually an idea that appears to be more attractive from the view of India's security environment as well. It'll piss of the Pakistanis, of course, but then again, Tom Ricks had a rather valid point on that recently: "Pakistan is now an enemy of the United States." More on that to come.

We better stop, hey, what's that sound - A new War in Sudan?

2011-11-14T16:54:00.000-08:00

As Buffalo Springfield once wrote: there's something happening here, what it is ain't exactly clear. If what the press is reporting is true, the formation of a new Sudanese rebel group—the Sudanese Revolutionary Front—is a remarkable new development in the war-torn country. After all, the secession of South Sudan earlier this year has brought one of Africa's most devastating civil wars to an end. Or so it seemed at the time. In the end, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front brings together the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the SPLM-N. In all those cases, the question really is, whether the formation of a new conglomerate of rebel movements is a sign of weakness or strength. Overcoming splits and different agendas speaks to the latter—the new movement has already laid out an agenda of overthrowing Omar al-Bashir, Sudan's current leader—whereas the formation itself can also been seen as the result of struggling movements under intense military pressure. And this is certainly true for JEM, which has been hit hard by the government in its area of operations, Darfur. Not coincidentally, JEM has long been the platform used by Hassan al-Turabi to get back at his one time political ally Omar al-Bashir. By the way, the conflict has led to renewed calls for a no-fly, though I spare you the feasibility-debate on that particular issue. As far as SLA and SPLM-N are concerned, these groups are basically leftovers of the SPLM/A, the liberation movement that succeeded in its secessionist bid with the formation of South Sudan. Put differently, there are strong indications for both interpretations.

Which also leaves me asserting this. Though state failure has received a lot of attention in the wake of the Somali, Yemeni and Afghan conflicts, what is less analysed is the nature of state-failure. Somalia and Afghanistan basically imploded, whereas Sudan seems to be failing on its periphery. I'll get into this another time. But what we do know is this, if I may put in terms, that might sound familiar. There's a man with a gun over there. Its Bashir and its time for him to go.

Loosing China's Soft Power

2011-11-07T05:56:00.000-08:00

Photo courtesy of US Army on Flickr

It is now well known that China's somewhat inevitable rise to being one of the world's most powerful nations is creating some backlash among its Asian neighbours (take a look at all the China stuff I put out on this blog). But what is hardly covered is the full extent of this sometimes painful relationship. With its newly gained prominence, the Chinese leadership is often finding itself abandoning its long-held philosophy of a peaceful rise and is instead bragging about, what it calls, its anti-imperialist legacy. Neighbouring nations are often fringing at the imagery China employs. Vietnam's elite—Vietnam is of course itself a rising power—has seen its record in fighting American and South Vietnamese forces during the Vietnam war called into question by largely inflated claims by China's elite about its role in the fight. It might indeed be one of the reasons why the Vietnamese elite, despite the Vietnam war, is trying to forge a close alliance with the U.S. I am currently reading Andrew Wiest's highly readable collection of essays in Rolling Thunder in a Gentle Land and came across this short piece written by Bui Tin, himself a veteran of the Vietnam war whilst serving in the armed forces of the North:

“The Chinese inflated their importance when they claimed that 200,000 to 300,000 Chinese troops had fought in the American air war. In truth, the Chinese supplied about 40 gun squads, belonging to 12 battalions, and four regiments of air defense, along with several corps of army engineers and various transportation, communication, logistics, and medial units. These rotated through the country in two-to-three-month cycles, from 1966 until 1972, when they were recalled. They were stationed north of the Hong River, at the request of the People's Liberation Army of China, who wanted their troops 'to get combat experience suited for modern warfare and learn about the activities of the American Air Force.' At Vietnam's request, the Chinese soldiers lived in the jungle away from Vietnamese population, to avoid trading between the two peoples and the formation of relationships between the Chinese soldiers and local women. The local Vietnamese disdained the Chinese for being on a 'wild turkey shoot.' The Chinese expended great amounts of ammunition, shooting skyward while reciting Mao's slogans and waving his little red book over their heads, but they never downed a single American aircraft.”

Taking Out Joseph Kony and Ending the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

2011-10-21T09:00:00.000-07:00

The war the Lord's Resistance Army is waging against the civilian population of North-Eastern Congo, Northern Uganda and parts of South Sudan and the Central African Republic has never really received any media interest. But now that U.S. President Barack Obama has ordered the deployment of about 100 soldiers to the region as force enablers, it is finally getting some attention. I've actually written about the conflict before on this blog, when reviewing The Lord's Resistance Army. Myth and Reality. But I recently also had the pleasure of moderating an expert group meeting with the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Roger A. Meece. And what emerged from the meeting is that the LRA is having a disproportionate impact on the security situation in the Kivu provinces of the DRC. The LRA is responsible for the death of some troops belonging to the United Nations Mission in the DRC, even though the LRA probably does not field more than 200 core fighters and its leader Joseph Kony is probably somewhere in the Central African Republic. Putting an end to the nihilistic insurrection is hardly controversial.

One should, however, expect that a mission tailored to take out its leader would trigger some sort of debate on targeted killings. That it does not is probably due to the consensus that has emerged over the past decade that the only way to put an end to the LRA is the killing of its commander Joseph Kony. It is a consensus, one might add, that even humanitarian relief organisations, non-governmental organisations and high-ranking United Nations officials share. I warmly welcome Obama's decision to commit his administration to this mission. It ends three year's of neglect toward the Sub-Saharan African region.

DER SPIEGEL—Most Ridiculous Media Bias of the Day

2011-10-13T02:25:00.000-07:00

The leading German weekly Der SPIEGEL ran a story today with the somewhat revealing title “USA räumen Ungereimtheiten bei Iran-Komplott ein”, which roughly translates to “United States concedes to inconsistencies in Iranian assassination plot”.

Its media bias because:

1) The article makes it look as if the U.S. presented a case that it now has to walk back, acknowledging to faults when it first presented the case. That is simply false. The entire affair was made public when Attorney General Eric Holder held a press conference. Anyone watching it had to realise just how careful he was not to make it sound like the political leadership of Iran knew about the plot. He repeatedly said, I am paraphrasing here, that the plot was supervised by an entity belonging to the government of Iran (i.e. the Quds forces). He never said that it was ordered by the Iranian government, by Ahmadinejad or Khamenei. In fact, when he was pressed on the issue, he repeatedly pointed out that that was beyond the scope of the investigation. There, my dear editors from Der SPIEGEL, is nothing to walk back upon.

2) Der SPIEGEL quotes an unnamed expert as saying that it is a rather unlikely pattern to have come from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. I have no idea, who they are quoting here, but it sounds like the exact translation of what Evan Kohlmann said on MSNBC's Hardball last night. But he never doubted the case the government has made so far.

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Reasonable Expectations – Analysing the Romney Foreign Policy Package

2011-10-12T10:00:00.000-07:00

Remember the lovely Hitchens-Rushdie anecdote on books that did not quite make it? The Good Gatsby, Reasonable Expectations. One can spend an entire day going through one's own book shelves, extending this little experiment (I've just come up with Anthills of some Savannah, Some Kind of Traitor, Conditional Surrender, A Tale of Two Villages). Or one can study the policy papers that did not quite have had an impact. Paper that did not quite make it of the week: Mitt Romney's foreign policy white paper, released a couple of days ago. So far, most candidates running in the GOP primaries have first and foremost commented on domestic issues and would it not be for Congressman Ron Paul, we would have hardly seen anyone with a consistent foreign policy message. But Paul's largely isolationist stance has always been his major political weakness and though he has been remarkably consistent on that, it will always lead to certain defeat at the polls. I don't agree with any of his foreign policy prescriptions, mind you, but he commands respect for being consistent. That being said, most observers would have to wonder where the current GOP's frontrunner would take U.S. foreign policy. Where would a Romney foreign policy be headed? After all, most of the traditional conservative and neoconservative foreign policy pundits have shied away from taking sides thus far and most must have harboured hopes for a Chris Christie run. But with Christie out of the race, the field is largely set and its time to take sides and shape ideas.

Mitt Romney is the first to come out with a real foreign policy blueprint. And while MSNBC's Rachel Madow is already starting to portray Romney as a come-again neoconservative Bush light, it might well be worthwhile to take a look at the actual piece and not only the names on his foreign policy advisory board. Though having said that, there are some impressive names on that particular list. Eliot Cohen, for instance, is the pre-eminent scholar in the field of civil-military relations and has written a foreword summarising from which parts of the Obama foreign policy a Romney administration would have to depart. Its certainly no coincidence that the first thing Cohen is alluding to is the phrase most conservatives now associate with the White House foreign policy stance: “leading from behind”. And indeed Romney's plan rebukes some of the less successful parts of the Obama foreign policy legacy. He summarises the shortfalls of the Obama administration rather tersely: He thinks, quite rightly, of the reset-button for U.S.-Russia relations as a gimmick that led nowhere; he treats the idea of global-zero as what it is, an utopian illusion and criticises the president, again correctly, for wavering on a number of free trade deals. What got the most traction for obvious reasons is that he attacked President Obama's arbitrary withdrawal date from Afghanistan. In similar vein, he criticises Obama's ill-fated outreach to Syria.

But the real question is: where to go from here? What Romney comes up with is a list that is sometimes murky, sometimes surprisingly specific and at other times quite revealing. Quoting Lincoln—The United States being the 'last best hope of earth'—always is a winning line for anyone who believes in American exceptionalism. But being the last best hope entails having the means available of actually doing something. One of the most noted indicators of the U.S.' declining military posture is the number of ships in the U.S. Navy. The size of the American fleet has shrunk to 284 ships in service today, the lowest number since 1916. Romney makes boosting the Navy's capabilities a key pillar of his foreign and security policy plan. But whether it is really financially feasible to increase the number of ships build annually from nine to fifteen is an entirely different story. Now, you don't need to have prophetic powers in order to realise that even a Romney administration will not push the number of naval vessels build annually up to fifteen. As this example illustrates, campaign documents are better treated with great care. Yet boosting naval capabilities ranks so prominently in the paper that some initiative on the matter might indeed be foreseeable.

But Romney's foreign policy sticks to more general terms when it comes to the pre-eminent challenge to U.S. supremacy: China. The plan does entail a more assertive stance by the United States in the face of China's military build-up. The transfer of more capable weapons systems to Taiwan and the introduction of radar and detection technologies and early warning systems for what the plan dubiously calls “disputed waters”, a not so subtle reminder of the territorial conflicts in the South China Sea, is pretty bold. A more assertive stance coupled with an increased presence might indeed lead to a more nuanced approach to the conflict by Beijing. Finally, Romney is offering a sweet carrot as well, the creation of what the plan calls a “Reagan Economic Zone”, a free trade area open to all Asian nations, including the People's Republic. And I admit that I was terribly pleased to see an entire paragraph devoted to human rights in China—the Romney campaign is making defending dissidents in the People's Republic and engaging its civil society a pillar of its foreign policy approach. Surely, not all of that will survive the realities of sitting in the Oval Office, but its finally a plan worth studying. And it is true, Obama has sometimes been lukewarm in his support for human rights abroad.

The recently uncovered Iranian state-sponsored terror plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States on U.S. soil makes a look at Romney's proposed Iran-policy all the more interesting. The first step envisaged by Romney would be an increased military presence of aircraft carriers groups in both the Eastern Med and the Persian Gulf, coupled with a new round of major sanctions. But Romney shies away from discussing the ultima ratio, military action. His plan looks a little like he's contemplating a containment and deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Iran. Accelerating the building of ballistic missile defence hints in the same direction. This leaves me wondering whether that really is a practical approach, though its certainly one of the more revealing parts of the document.

I am not going to comment at length on the Israel part—but one quote is noteworthy: “The key to negotiating a lasting peace is an Israel that knows it will be secure.” He is certainly right on that. Israel's security environment today looks less like the environment established following the Oslo accords, but rather resembles the tense situation of 1973. But Romney's plan is remarkably murky when it comes to the real challenge. How to foster a situation in which Israel regards a lasting settlement as beneficial to its own security perceptions? It is here that the white paper is a real disappointment.

I'll comment on Afghanistan in a different context, but two other ideas are noteworthy as well. For quite some time, State Department officials joked that “you can do anything in Latin America, except think about it.” Well, Romney's foreign policy advisory board devoted some of its energy towards Central and Latin America and came up with the idea of a Campaign for Economic Opportunity in Latin America (it already has an acronym [CEOLA], which indicates that they are somewhat serious about it), to offer a credible alternative to Hugo Chavez' regional hegemonic policies. With regard to the drug war in Mexico, Romney advocates reciprocating the strategies that worked in Colombia, which does not exactly stand out as too imaginative. The basic conundrum being that there is hardly enough time for these strategies to work.

Rather surprisingly, the Romney advisory board decided to go with some tough language on Russia. The white paper states in clear terms: “Russia is a destabilising force.” Disillusioned with Russia, the paper calls for a full review of the implementation of the New Start treaty, which is interesting since the cooperation between NATO and Russia already suffers severe setbacks. Moscow stopped to inform NATO on troop movements as called for in the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty (CFE) a couple of years ago, NATO is going to suspend its notifications at the end of this year (which is quite a bombshell in itself). The Romney campaign instead moves to a far more assertive stance toward Russia, announcing support for the Nabucco pipeline that circumvents Russia's transport monopole on natural gas to Europe, while at the same time staying remarkably quiet on what the next steps would be with regard to the Ukraine and Georgia. Nonetheless, the campaign outlines the development of a new soft power approach vis-à-vis Russia, calling for more civil society support and expanded exchange programmes. That might make for a good start, it does not, however, make for a real strategy.

Establishing a regional directorate to coordinate democracy promotion and stabilisation programmes for Egypt, Libya and Tunisia is a lovely idea and could have come as easily from a democrat. I am guessing that his ideas on reforming the foreign policy apparatus will be far more controversial. Restructuring the State Department along regional directorates similar to the Pentagon's combatant commands won't go over easy with the State Department. But he is certainly right that the Congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force needs to be revisited to clarify against what groups force can and should be used. As in other cases, its also interesting to note what the 44-pages white paper does not touch upon: Notably absent from the Romney foreign policy blueprint:

Europe
India
Japan
Africa
NATO

Also missing are thoughts on restructuring the Pentagon. He is certainly right that State needs reform, but its hard to imagine anyone seriously arguing that the need for Pentagon reform is actually smaller than the need for reform at Foggy Bottom. There is certainly some work left to be done. But so far, I am reasonably impressed.

The Sclerotic State of Russia

2011-10-07T02:16:00.000-07:00

Today marks the fifth anniversary of Anna Politkovskaya's murder, or shall we say execution in Russia. Her death was only a small step in curbing freedom of the press in Russia, but it demonstrates just how far the country has come under Putin and Medvedev. The unchecked authoritarian tendencies of its leadership have produced a society of fear of nearly Orwellian character. So, to mark the day, I've come up with a short commentary on Russia sclerotic state of affairs.

Getting Back to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions – The case of MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

2011-09-30T14:25:00.000-07:00

A couple of days ago I had the great pleasure and honour of moderating Roger A. Meece, who is the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations and the head of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, at an expert talk convened by the German United Nations Association. Roger A. Meece, a former U.S. diplomat and ambassador to countries like Congo, the DRC and Malawi was truly impressive and there are some points I've taken away from the evening that are worth sharing, at least for foreign policy nerds like me.

For a start, one issue constantly raised during the evening was, somewhat unsurprisingly, the inadequate resources at the mission's disposal. Normally, when talking about blue helmet missions, observers point out that most contributors are not equipped for such complex missions since the largest contributors are states like Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, etc., states that do not exactly maintain the most professional of all armies. But there are tactical issues that are often overlooked. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for instance, the equipment most needed are transport helicopters. But the withdrawal of attack helicopters has left the mission, interestingly, without a major deterrent to warlords. So far, I've never seen a single paper studying the role of attack helicopters in UN peacekeeping missions. Getting into that now entered my to-do list.

But the major issue with which MONUSCO is currently preoccupied are the national elections coming up in November. The outcome of national assembly elections are difficult to predict, but it stands to reason that a number of parliamentarians are about to lose their seat. The elections are a major challenge to MONUSCO and the government. While in 2006 50.000 polling stations were set up across the country, this years' elections will see 62.000 polling stations up and running. With the increase in polling stations come large scale logistical challenges. While there are less candidates running for president in 2011—eleven candidates are registered, whereas in 2006 33 candidates were running—the number of parliamentary candidates has significantly increased. The drop in number of presidential candidates is partly a product of the success of the 2006 elections. Most candidates then running were surprised to find that the elections were taking place at all and initially registered only to be part of an eventually negotiated settlement of the elections.

The 2011 national elections are going to be particularly challenging when it comes to the national assembly. There are now 19.000 candidates running for 500 seats. In all probability the elections will set a world-record in ballot size, with some 1.500 candidates competing for a single seat. However, the larger circumstances of the elections are somewhat more promising than in 2006. In 2006 three belligerent factions made conducting elections difficult, whereas today there are no armed factions threatening the larger area of the DRC. The major security threat in the 2011 elections, by contrast, are demonstrations. Although they could have an impact on the local level, they should be manageable. Overall it needs to be stressed that the elections will in all likelihood not lead to a new Côte d'Ivoire situation and instead can be expected to run rather smoothly.

The Drug War – A Truly Silly One

2011-09-28T13:45:00.000-07:00

While on a train from Berlin the other day (I was moderating a lecture by His Excellency Roger A. Meece, the current head of MONUSCO), I've had a chance to look into the current issue of the Foreign Affairs. Now, I am not among those who oppose any war out of some weird and misapplied principle, but I do oppose silly wars. And yes, I am still supporting the war in Iraq, so you might be wondering which war I find myself opposing? Its the war on drugs; a war that no one will ever win and that will never end, so maybe stop calling it a war is a pretty good idea for a start. But that isn't it. In the current Foreign Affairs' Mark Kleinman is making a rather persuasive argument calling the decades old war a failure. Instead of having been able to curb the influx of drugs, the supply is so plentiful that prices even for hard drugs have dropped by 80 to 90%. And even though the profits that can be made in the drugs business have dropped as well, the U.S. government is today imprisoning more people on drug-related charges than at any other time since prohibition. Kleinman is reaching the most important and convincing part of his case when talking about Mexico by making a small, but decisive note. Mexico, he argues, is fighting a war in which it has absolutely no stake. The war in Mexico, after all, is nearly entirely driven by the high demand on the North American illicit drug market. Would that demand drop or would the border indeed be fully secured, the violence in Mexico would be reduced or should the drug trade follow different routes, Mexico would become less important to the drug cartels virtually overnight. The war is threatening the foundations of the Mexican state, even though Mexico itself is neither the market nor the producer of the drugs. But the solution Kleinman is proposing is somewhat less compelling: he argues that instead of fighting the drug cartels altogether, the U.S. and Mexican authorities should introduce a scoring system and go after the most dangerous and violent cartel only. That strategy would reduce violence, he argues, because it deters drug cartels from fighting each other and killing innocents. I somewhat doubt that that is what would happen. It appears to me that drug cartels would play that system just as much as they have played any system so far. It only takes the first season of the Wire to realise just how futile that would be.

Putin's Sclerotic State of Mind

2011-09-24T04:00:00.000-07:00

Whoever had time to watch the FOX/Google presidential debate was most certainly spending the next day dissecting just how much of a lacklustre performance Texas Governor Rick Perry delivered and how Mitt Romney succeeded in re-establishing himself as the GOP's best bet to beat Barack Obama in 2012. There are those who find the entire enterprise tiresome and prefer not to spend a regular night listening to nine Republicans harbouring largely similar ambitions. But one is well-advised to remind oneself of the marvel of having such a beautiful process in the first place when compared to the tedious predictability of Russian politics. President Medvedev today nominated Vladimir Putin to serve as Russia's next president. I am not guessing that anyone doubts that Putin will be 'elected'. Not just because Putin is so incredibly popular, but also because anyone daring to challenge him in a serious manner will find himself constrained by two rather daunting hurdles. On the one hand the regime has established a system that favours the government party in ways unthinkable a mere twenty years ago. The press is gutted and the society mobilised in ways that are Orwellian in character. Should a journalist dare to live up to the promise of his profession, he can be certain to face what the state media will term an accident. Then on the other there is the constant danger that too successful a challenge will inevitably lead you to spend the remainder of your life in prison, as Kasparov can attest to.

For many years Western observers made themselves believe that there is a secret struggle between Putin and Medvedev as to who is going to run for president next. And there is a decent chance that such a struggle did indeed take place. But in hindsight Medvedev, despite his moderate leanings, has always been too soft and indecisive as to mount a serious challenge to the Prime Minister. He has been overrun by the Putin time and again and even whilst Medvedev was president, it often looked as if it was Putin who was really in charge. Some observers have suggested that Putin brings stability to Russia and is therefore not the worst thing that could happen to the country, while others have suggested that Russia is on a pathway to again become a Tsarist system. There is some truth in all of that, but one should not forget that Putin is first and foremost a populist; the sort of chap that would sport a little war to manifest himself favourably in history (one might remind oneself for a moment of the 2008 August war). The one thing he will not do is to reform the system of the Russian state, a state that has—as today's news again demonstrate—become literally sclerotic.