Eeben Barlow's Military and Security Blog

PROGRESSION OF WAR AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA

2012-02-10T18:36:00.001+02:00

Africa has been wracked by numerous wars, civil wars, rebellions and insurgencies, conflicts that have all been very similar in progression - a progression that closely follows Mao Zedong’s views on how these actions ought to be conducted.

This does not imply that those insurgencies have all been Maoist in thought and deed but rather that the Maoist progression model has been relatively easy to implement.

In the West, those who ferment such a revolution with the aim of overthrowing a government are often viewed as “freedom fighters” or “non-state actors”. Within Africa they are not viewed as such as the term itself gives those who turn to armed conflict a legitimacy that is often undeserved. As such revolutions inevitably make use of extreme torture of captured opponents, brutality towards the innocent and extreme terrorisation of the local populace, they are instead referred to as “rebels”, “terrorists” or “criminals”.

Africa has also been witness to numerous coup d’etats, the results which have often led to the establishment of military juntas that are inexperienced in political matters and therefore prone to mismanaging the political responsibilities associated with government. This has been partly due to the large influence of politics within the military as well as the quest for ultimate power.

Conventional wars, as understood in the Western sense of conventional land battles, are not common to Africa. Although there have been large, isolated classical conventional battles on the continent post 1945, it is the manner of conduct and approach to war that differs vastly from Western military thinking. Examples of such conventional battles are the Ugandan invasion of Tanzania in 1978-79 and the South African Defence Force battles against Cuban and Angolan forces in 1987. Such conventional actions have all followed the same progression:

· Antagonism, anger or perceived danger/threat

· Diplomacy

· Failed diplomacy

· Build-up of forces

· War

The African model for revolution is often misunderstood by Western military thinkers. This model invariably follows the following progression:

· The mobilisation of the people against real or perceived oppression

· A phase of armed struggle utilising the operational environment as well as the political environment. This is usually in the form of guerrilla warfare and may include acts of terrorism. However, soft targets are of primary importance to show results and get mass media attention. It is this phase of war that is referred to as an insurgency and the fight against it is referred to as counter-insurgency. Engagements are of short duration and the insurgent will then melt away into the bush and blend into local population concentrations

· Mobile warfare aimed primarily at rear areas with the aim of cutting supply lines and capturing arms and ammunition. This is not a phase where Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) are employed but should rather be viewed as a phase in which the insurgents mount large-scale operations. Vehicles or motorcycles may be used to deliver them to close proximity of their targets

· Conventional warfare – a phase where mass support from the people has been given to the insurgent movement – a phase where numbers and anger will tell.

As can be noted, the above progression closely follows the Maoist model for revolution despite the fact that many insurgent groups are not Maoist organisations.

This type of progression, with variations, has become a very successful conflict-model and has proven itself in numerous armed insurrections in Africa. Although not every revolution in Africa has been successful, many important lessons are evident – lessons that remain applicable to counter-insurgency students – regardless of origin.

It is only by knowing and understanding this progression of conflict that an effective counter can be designed and implemented.

THE LEVELS OF WAR

2012-02-06T15:55:00.007+02:00

The military strategy is an intelligence-driven, intellectual process that results in possible future or definite action.

The waging of war ie the implementation of strategy is conducted at four distinct yet inter-related levels. These levels are known as the levels of war and consist of:

1. The political level

2. The strategic level

3. The operational level

4. The tactical level.

The Political Level: Sometimes referred to as War by Political Means, this is the highest level of war and is often ignored by the military. Although the Grand Strategy or National Strategy is the highest level of strategy, the political level of war is, likewise, the highest level of war and is associated with political, economical and/or covert politico-military operations. Sometimes referred to as War by Political Means, it is the applying of political and/or economical sanctions against a country that is considered to be conducting unacceptable political practices. Likewise, financial sanctions aimed at wearing down or exhausting a country economically are further examples of war at the political level. Other examples of the war at the political level include expelling of diplomatic staff, pressure to ensure international isolation of a threat country, international boycotts, international support to nationalist groups, and the conduct of highly-sensitive, high-level covert operations aimed at achieving a specific political goal and so forth. The conduct of highly-sensitive, high-level covert operations are usually deniable by the government. Where war at the political level may require discretionary warfare, these types of operations straddle the boundary between political and strategic level warfare yet remain highly sensitive and are usually deniable. War at the political level is ultimately aimed at bringing about a regime change without overtly committing the armed forces to direct battle.

The Strategic Level: At this level of planning, strategists and planners will ultimately be left with four definitive choices of how the government will want to resolve the situation. These are:

· Neutralising rebel or insurgent forces intent on usurping government support through violent means

· Annihilating the opposing forces

· Exhausting the opposing forces

· Attrition of the opposing forces.

The threat, the terrain, Own Forces capabilities and the economy or support to sustain the war will determine how it will be fought at this level. Military operations conducted at this level are referred to as strategic warfare. War at the strategic level will encompass either distant or close strategic offensives as well as strategic defensive warfare. Strategic defensive warfare can take the form of conventional, unconventional and semi-conventional operations and can include long-distance offensives, cross-border raids (sanctioned or not sanctioned) and Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations.

The Operational Level: War at the Operational Level is aimed at achieving the strategic military objectives through a series of battles and/or campaigns, conventional or otherwise, aimed at achieving the theatre objectives and can last for weeks, months and even years. These actions are not restricted to operations beyond the borders of the country but may unfold nationally as well.

The Tactical Level: At this level of war, short term engagements are fought between Own Forces and the enemy utilising Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) as the foundation of the engagements.

It is at the levels of war that the strategy unfolds via the approved military strategy, commander’s intent, designs for battle, operational plans and action. However, a lack of sound intelligence will result in weak or poorly executed strategies that may bring about a collapse of the government or a defeat of the armed forces.

Prematurely extricating the armed forces from operations that have been poorly planned and executed may lead to grave embarrassment of the state and a decline in regional and international respect. In turn, this may adversely impact on both the security of the state and even the tenure of the government.

TOO MANY MANAGERS, TOO FEW COMMANDERS

2012-01-31T18:28:00.000+02:00

Of late, there seems to be a tendency to believe that we ought to “manage” troops instead of commanding them. I know the SADF of old almost fell into the trap of “Management” as opposed to “Command”. I have my own very pretty management certificate to prove the point.

There is however differences between a marketing plan and a design for battle.

“Unity of Command” is a golden albeit a forsaken principle of war. The word “command” is used and has been for years – not “Unity of Management”. The military has senior commanders and not senior managers – or at least it ought to have senior commanders.

In my view, commanders issue orders and managers issue instructions. Although some may view this as hair-splitting, the principles of management are somewhat different from the principles of command. The circumstances under which orders vs instructions are issued are also vastly different. When orders are not followed, disciplinary action – usually severe - takes place. When instructions are not followed, managers reprimand the guilty parties. That in itself is a difference.

In the field, a commander will issue an order: “Place the machinegun there and engage targets!” A manager will issue an instruction: “Please move the machine gun to that position and then open fire”. There are differences in how these actions are requested and enforced and they differ from one another.

Orders are obeyed as a result of discipline. This discipline is taught on parade grounds across the world. Soldiers are taught to immediately react to an order without question – unless it is of course an order that is not legitimate – such as killing an unarmed civilian or executing a POW for no reason. I have yet to see a manager tell a worker to “give me 30 push-ups” if the worker has not complied with an instruction – or confine him to his office for a lengthy period.

Situations like this cannot be “managed”

Some may consider the strict discipline of an army as being too harsh and vicious. Wars are harsh and vicious and there is not time for niceties when it comes to doing battle. Men who do not instinctively obey orders are a danger not only to themselves but to everyone with them. Disobeying a simple order can mean the difference between victory or defeat. To get soldiers to carry out their orders requires commanders and not managers.

The military is not a business entity dressed in uniform and armed with assault rifles and other weapons. It is an organisation that is tasked to carry out missions as required by the Grand Strategy and the Military Strategy. These missions ultimately require the army to win battles, not manage them. In the process of winning the battles, soldiers are required to do things they would not normally do – such as killing people. It is especially here that soldiers need to instinctively follow orders and react – if not, they are dead.

Some academics, management consultants and other non-combatants are keen to enforce their ideas of management on the armed forces. Whereas there are times that some management skills can be exercised in the military, for example in headquarters or administrative offices, we cannot “manage” an army as they wish us to. We cannot “manage” a firefight or a mechanised infantry assault on an enemy target.

If commanders continue to fall into the trap of wanting to “managing” as opposed to “commanding”, they risk an identity crisis – a crisis a wily enemy will rapidly exploit.

The time has come to stop trying to follow ideas that are aimed at making war more politically correct and politically palatable. That will never happen as wars are vicious and destructive. Ask any soldier – they will tell you so. By trying to make war and conflict more businesslike is only going to degrade the efficiency of the armed forces.

It is time for the real commanders to step forward and those who want to manage, to rather leave and find a job elsewhere.

WARS IN AFRICA

2012-01-28T09:40:00.000+02:00

Africa has been at war with itself for centuries.

I believe that this is not likely to end within the short or even the medium term. There are numerous reasons for this continued state of conflict and it will not lessen, no matter how hard the outside world wishes it to as there are many agendas that drive this continued state of conflict.

Many countries on the African continent have faced numerous types of warfare in the past – and will face similar – or expanded - threats in the future. Over decades, the continent has witnessed hot wars as well as cold wars – all aimed at achieving political-ethnical, tribal, religious, economical and even criminal goals. Countries will go to war with one another over water, food, resources, territorial disputes and so forth. Others will use proxy forces to achieve their aims and ambitions. Some will resort to the tactics of terror to achieve their aims. But they all have one common aim: Power.

This places the senior command cadre of the African armed forces in a position of having to contend with both regional and domestic political, social and military matters.

The threats that governments in Africa face are diverse, multi-layered and complex. Countering these threats, therefore, extends beyond the normally accepted role of the armed forces. This requires military strategists and planners to have access to intelligence as well as foresight and vision (based on sound intelligence) of the geo-political and military developments in the region. If they cannot “see over the hill”, they will be caught unawares by what comes down the valley.

In the African context, the armed forces are an instrument of not only foreign policy but also of domestic policy. Therefore, to conduct effective military operations, the armed forces must be organised, trained, postured and correctly equipped and prepared for deployments and actions both within and/or beyond the country’s borders. These actions must cover the ambit of Military Operations Related to War (MORW), Military Operations other than War (MOOTW) and also Military Intelligence Operations (MIOs).

Most African armies are structured along the lines of the old colonial armies, ie sections, platoons, companies, battalions and so forth. Whereas this structure gives some continuity to the rotation of units and sub-units, it is in my opinion, not the type of structure that is entirely valid for Africa. Added to this are numerous fractured colonial-era doctrines mainly unsuitable for war and conflict in Africa. In turn, this hampers the operational effectiveness of the armed forces more than is given cognisance to.

With few exceptions, most wars in Africa tend to be so-called small wars. Most African armies tend to be “conventional heavy” with little emphasis given to unconventional warfare units. The terrain in many countries is unsuitable for mechanised and armoured warfare. Where terrain allows it and the infrastructure exists, these units tend to be mainly road-bound, making them easy targets for ambushes and IEDs.

I am not advocating that African armies do away with their conventional units. These units need to be kept but reduced in size to make them more efficient fighting units. Conventional units remain important as African armed forces must be able to carry out multiple missions in order to give the government options.

However, in containing future wars and conflicts, I believe the time has come for African armies to seriously assess the validity of small war units, ie unconventional forces capable to operating in smaller sized units with sufficient helicopter support to sustain deployments, conduct air assaults and the leap-frogging of units as well as conduct casevac missions. Where necessary, terrain permitting, they must be supported by mechanised and armoured units. Close air support using sophisticated strike aircraft may have a significant role to play in a conventional clash of arms but in most unconventional operations, soldiers need slower low-flying aircraft to provide close air support.

Nations don’t need a military that can only do one mission at a time. They need a military that can conduct multiple missions to give the nation’s leaders and general officers as many options as possible. To achieve this, there needs to be a carefully assessed balance between conventional units and unconventional units, this balance being guided primarily by the threat and the terrain.

However, a lack of focus on both the enemy and the political objectives that need to be attained will result in a strategic failure.

What remains a fact is that wars will continue in Africa and the armed forces of African governments will need to carefully asses their future missions and responses. They will also need to reassess the structure, training and equipping of their armed forces.

Until this balance is achieved, many conflicts and wars in Africa will simply continue to simmer.

HAPPY CHINESE NEW YEAR 2012

2012-01-13T14:19:00.000+02:00

As I will not be home when the Chinese New Year of 2012 begins, I would like to wish all of my Chinese friends a very Happy Year of the Dragon – even though my wishes are about a week too soon.

The Chinese New Year (also known as the Lunar New Year) takes place in the early months of our calendar year, typically in January or February. In 2012, the Lunar New Year begins on 23^rd January and its beginning marks 15 days of celebration and the start of the Year of the Dragon.

In Chinese tradition, each year is dedicated to a specific animal, these being the following 12 animals: Boar, Dragon, Dog, Horse, Monkey, Ox, Rat, Rabbit, Ram, Rooster, Snake and Tiger. It is believed that each of these animals bestow their characteristics to the people born in their year.

The Year of the Dragon (2012) heralds the end of the Year of the Rabbit (2011).

May you all have a very happy, healthy and prosperous Lunar New Year.

THE ART OF WAR GIFT

2012-01-06T07:25:00.000+02:00

As a young officer – and later – I read just about every version of Sun Tzu’s Art of War I could lay my hands on. Resting in my bookcase, I have six different copies and interpretations of this incredible work. The last edition I bought was Sun Tzu’s Art of War by General Tao Hanzhang in 2011.

Now I have seven – and the latest edition is the most special edition I could ever dream of having. Besides, as I said to LP a while back, I am not an e-book type; I love the feel and smell of books. However, the latest addition to my Sun Tzu collection is an incredible piece of art in its own right albeit somewhat very different from those normally found in bookstores.

My very good friend Raymond Cheung presented me with this version of Sun Tzu’s Art of War over dinner at the Ye Shanghai restaurant on the 26 December 2011 and it is an edition I will treasure for the rest of my life.

Although my photographs can never do justice to this amazing gift, I would nevertheless like to share it with you all.

This version of the Art of War is presented in its own redwood presentation case:

Once the presentation case is opened, this is what one finds:

Inside is a bamboo scroll, a stand, a pair of surgical gloves and a magnifying glass with which to read the scroll with as the print is very small. The surgical gloves are included to ensure that sweaty hands do not degrade the writing on the scroll.

When the scroll is removed, it can be placed on its own stand:

The scroll has Sun Tzu’s Art of War in both Chinese and English and can be opened and read at will:

Obviously, the print is very fine, hence the magnifying glass.

I look at this incredible gift daily and marvel at the skill it took to produce this edition.

Thank you, Raymond!

A BLESSED, HEALTHY AND SAFE 2012 TO ALL

2012-01-03T13:46:00.000+02:00

To all who sent my family and I Christmas and New Year messages and blessings, I need to apologise for not having responded sooner but I was not near my computer...Thank you very much for your messages of friendship, good wishes and support.

Having arrived back home today (3 January 2012), the new year has already started but I wish to offer you and your loved ones my (belated) best New Year’s wishes. I hope that your coming year will be filled with good health, much happiness and that you will all be kept safe.

I was very fortunate during 2011 as I was able to travel to new(ish) places, meet new friends and work alongside them. Of course, there are also those elected officials who believe that they were never elected but born into their positions who severely frowned upon my friends and I. However, it was good to meet them as well – or at least to discover who they are – as it is always better to know who your enemies are than be blissfully unaware of their existence.

I wish all followers and visitors to my blog a very belated yet blessed Christmas season. To those who did not celebrate Christmas for whatever reason, I hope you had a peaceful festive period. To those who are trapped in the numerous conflicts around the world, I hope that you were able to have some peace.

Thanks again to everyone who took time to read and contribute to this blog throughout the year. Your comments continue to be appreciated and highly valued and continue to allow me to broaden my own scant knowledge base.

To everyone who wrote letters of encouragement re this blog – my thanks to you. To those who continue write “private” mails to me, I hope that you will be able to get rid of the ghosts that haunt your lives. To the many students, I hope that the blog has been able to give you some positive input re your studies.

To all who are deployed in the conflict zones around the world, beit as soldiers, sailors, airmen, law enforcement officers, spooks or PMC contractors, keep your heads down, your eyes peeled and be ready at all times to do what needs to be done. However, let us never forget those who paid with their lives so that others may taste freedom. We must never allow them to be forgotten.

Finally, I would also like to wish each and every one of you – and your loved ones - a great 2012. May the coming year be filled with good health, happiness and safety.

PS: I will soon get to the blog responses I have received. My apologies for not being able to post and respond sooner.

FOR VETERANS ACROSS THE WORLD

2011-11-11T18:26:00.001+02:00

My friend RG sent this to me for Veterans Day – a day we ought to remember with thanks to the many men who gave their lives for what they believed in. Without their selfless contribution, our world would surely be a lot different. We must never be allowed to forget that they gave their tomorrows for our today. A greater sacrifice there can never be. May you all have peace where you may be.

THE FINAL INSPECTION

The soldier stood and faced God,
Which must always come to pass.
He hoped his shoes were shining,
Just as brightly as his brass.
'Step forward now, you soldier,
How shall I deal with you ?
Have you always turned the other cheek ?
To My Church have you been true?'
The soldier squared his shoulders and said,
'No, Lord, I guess I ain't.
Because those of us who carry guns,
Can't always be a saint.
I've had to work most Sundays,
And at times my talk was tough.
And sometimes I've been violent,
Because the world is awfully rough.
But, I never took a penny,
That wasn't mine to keep...
Though I worked a lot of overtime,
When the bills got just too steep.
And I never passed a cry for help,
Though at times I shook with fear.
And sometimes, God, forgive me,
I've wept unmanly tears.
I know I don't deserve a place,
Among the people here.
They never wanted me around,
Except to calm their fears.
If you've a place for me here, Lord,
It needn't be so grand.
I never expected or had too much,
But if you don't, I'll understand.
There was a silence all around the throne,
Where the saints had often trod.
As the soldier waited quietly,
For the judgment of his God.
'Step forward now, you soldier,
You've borne your burdens well.
Walk peacefully on Heaven's streets,
You've done your time in Hell.'

Author Unknown~

ASSESSING THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

2011-11-11T07:36:00.000+02:00

Much is said and written about the different environments soldiers need to conduct operations in.

A crucial factor that needs to be appreciated when developing and formulating the operational design/commander’s intent is the operating environment (OE). Failure to appreciate this environment in detail can lead to problems and even disaster once the operational design is implemented. This is because the OE has a major impact on our tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

The operating environment can by defined as the result of the appreciation of a combination of factors that include – but not restricted to - terrain, climatic conditions, population distribution and their feelings towards opposing forces, vegetation, infrastructure (or lack of), tribal distribution, religion, culture and so forth.

The OE can vary within a single AO

The OE is therefore the result of several appreciated factors in order to determine their impact within the Area of Operations (AO) that can, may or will influence combat operations.

This will allow the commander to determine to what extent the OE favours either own forces or those of the enemy and what can be done to negate enemy advantages as well as ease and sustain own forces combat operations.

The OE is classified as friendly, neutral or hostile. In turn, this can result in limited activity operations to highly complex operations and can result in both conventional warfare operations and COIN operations within a single Area of Operations (AO).

Combat operations in Africa can, within a single AO, result in operations being conducted in a savannah-type area to very dense jungle. Dry, flat, sparsely vegetated desert-like conditions to hilly, swampy, water-logged areas are not uncommon. This variation within a single AO will determine the type of transport assets that will be required and will greatly impact on the type of logistical supply lines to sustain combat forces.

A detailed appreciation of the OE will provide guidance on:

1. Classification of the OE

2. Type of area(s) operations may or will be conducted in

3. Type of environment that operations may or will be conducted in

4. Infiltration or deployment possibilities

5. Type of warfare/combat operations soldiers will be expected to carry out

6. Offensive options

7. Adaptions to TTPs

8. Logistical possibilities and options

9. Medical possibilities and options

10. Communications possibilities and options

11. Advantages /disadvantages OE presents to own forces

12. Advantages /disadvantages OE presents to enemy forces

13. Termination and withdrawal options, etc.

Additionally, this appreciation will expose vulnerabilities that own forces may face during the conduct of operations.

Assessing the OE is part of the commander’s appreciation, the result of which is his operational design and intent. This, in turn, forms part of the larger formation design for battle, a design that ultimately stems from the military strategy.

HIGH SUICIDE RATES PLAGUE THE VETERAN COMMUNITY

2011-11-07T16:02:00.001+02:00

Douglas Karr, USN Veteran

Operations Desert Storm & Desert Shield

(I would not normally publish another writer’s article on my blog but this is for a good cause. My hope is that veterans that visit this blog may find some value in Doug’s article).

According to The Chronicle of Higher Education close to half of all veterans have contemplated suicide and 20 percent have made actual plans to kill themselves. Suicide among returning soldiers has become a rampant problem over the past decade.

Reasons for Suicide

There are many reasons veterans contemplate suicide. Frequently, returning soldiers are faced with difficulty reintegrating into civilian life when they return from combat. Additionally, in today’s economy, veterans are also forced to deal with the difficulty of finding civilian employment and may also be stunned to discover that their home is in or on the verge of foreclosure. Add to this potential injuries and long-term health issues that arise from being exposed to combat conditions and the risk of suicide escalates among veterans.

When someone contemplates suicide, it is often because they simply cannot see a future for themselves. They do not have feelings of hope that things will get better or their lives will improve. For veterans with PTSD or severe physical injuries, pain can also be a contributing factor. For those with PTSD, the symptoms of the condition can be so overwhelming that soldiers may feel completely out of control and they may never regain their equilibrium. For those with physical pain symptoms, the pain may become so hard to cope with that they would rather not live than continue living with the pain.

Symptoms of Depression and Suicide Risk

Depression often goes hand-in-hand with risk for suicide. Common symptoms of depression include irritability, difficulty sleeping (sleeping less or more than normal), changes in appetite (eating more or less than usual), feeling down or depressed, feeling hopeless, feeling sad, crying, problems with concentration and difficulty being motivated.

People who are contemplating suicide may have access to ways to hurt themselves, they may actually develop a plan and may even consider what to say to those they leave behind. They may go through a process of giving away possessions that mean something to them. Or may also talk about what they want to happen when they are no longer living.

Suicide and depression are health conditions that are vastly different from those faced by veterans who were exposed to hazardous materials like asbestos and later developed mesothelioma and asbestos cancer. Depression and risk for suicide often cannot be traced back to a specific cause, but to an accumulated set of events.

If you believe you are depressed or know of veterans who you are concerned may hurt themselves, call the Veterans Crisis Line. They have trained staff to help them and potentially prevent a tragic death.

For more information or if you wish to get advice and help, please contact Doug at dkarrusn@gmail.com

WHY AM I NO LONGER SURPRISED?

2011-11-02T14:57:00.004+02:00

An article on today’s News24 website ran a piece about Simon Mann’s long awaited book “Cry Havoc”.

Personally, I think it is time that he documented his side of the story as there have been a lot of allegations regarding his failed Equatorial Guinea coup attempt. Do not get me wrong: Simon and I are not and have never been the best of chums but I am not surprised that he wrote the book – although I suspect there are those that would have preferred him not to write it.

What did surprise me though was what I perceive to be a deliberate piece of disinformation in the News24 piece. An extract from the piece I am referring to reads as follows: “According to Mann, the CIA initially approved of the plan, which was backed by Executive Outcomes, a private military company run by a man he referred to as "The Boss"”.

It is very clear to me that whoever penned that piece of rubbish did not even bother to do any research. I somehow doubt that Simon would have said that unless he has become delusional.

First of all, I established Executive Outcomes (EO) in 1989. That usually overlooked bit of proof can be found by simply visiting the South African Registrar of Companies. Any journalist that is serious about reporting the truth only has to ask to view the founding statement and the registration documents. I suspect that there are not many serious journalists around – if there were, why would they consistently get their “facts” wrong?

Secondly, EO shut its door quite some time ago. In fact, a simple check again can confirm that it happened on 31 December 1998. Since then, numerous companies have awarded themselves that name with the hopes of misleading governments into believing they are indeed “Executive Outcomes” – something they can never - and will never - be.

Thirdly, EO never partook in any coups or attempts at “regime change”. This too has been well documented, despite the anger of some in the media at EO’s role in ending conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. Those journalists, along with their secret paymasters, need to keep fuelling as many lies as they can and work hard at ensuring that conflict in especially Africa continues.

Fourthly, EO was only ever contracted by internationally recognised governments and legitimate corporations – something many journalists seem to forget. During that time, EO also exposed numerous criminal acts, another aspect many journalists did not like.

Given my experiences with the media, and in particular the South African media during EO’s existence, I can only shake my head in amazement at how simple facts can continually be either distorted or purposely changed to suit their lies.

The nefarious agenda the writer of this particular story has can only be speculated on. I think if one digs deeper, the agenda will surface.

However, as the facts regarding EO have been rather well documented (with evidence to back it all up), I have to wonder what game someone is now trying to play. Perhaps the time has come for the media to be held accountable for the misinformation that is often published. Decent journalists do decent investigations and do not get major facts in a story wrong.

This deliberate and misleading lie sadly tarnishes the names of the many good men who served in EO – as well as those in the media who try to inform instead of trying to misinform.

But then, this latest “revelation” does not surprise me...

APOLOGIES...

2011-10-28T11:01:00.001+02:00

I am sorry to have been off-line for a few weeks. As I was busy travelling and jumping on and off planes, I did not have sufficient access to the internet to allow me to answer the comments on the blog.

Before a new rumour starts – no, I was not near to or even in Libya. In fact, I was neither in the Middle East nor North Africa.

I note that there have been several attempts to contact me by the media demanding to know if I am - or was - in Libya. I hope that they can understand what I am saying although some days, I have to wonder.

I will shortly be adding another posting to the blog so thanks to those who, despite my apparent tardiness of updating, continued to visit the site.

RELENTLESS PURSUIT: A NEGLECTED COIN PRINCIPLE?

2011-08-21T12:51:00.001+02:00

Fighting an apparently elusive enemy during COIN operations can be very frustrating, especially for the men in the field.

The frustration is increased when it appears that the enemy has the initiative – which he indeed has at times - as he can chose his place, time and method of attack. These attacks are usually of short duration but have the sole aim of killing, wounded or delaying own forces members – and getting maximum publicity for their cause.

When the enemy believes he has the initiative, he becomes bolder and more daring. When we believe that the enemy has the initiative, it places us in a reactive state-of-mind, thus giving the enemy the initiative.

Wresting the initiative from the enemy is not as easy as it sounds, but it is not impossible. We need to place the enemy in a position of continual disadvantage and then exploit it with speed, aggression and firepower.

One aspect I feel is not emphasised enough in COIN operations is the principle of “relentless pursuit”.

Relentless pursuit implies the enemy is pursued with speed and aggression, without stopping, pushing him past the limits of his endurance whilst we continually substitute the men doing the pursuit with fresh troops. This forces the enemy into a state of exhaustion as he has no time to eat or rest. It also impacts negatively on his morale, leads to panic and subsequently leads him to make mistakes.

When the enemy is tired and hungry, he becomes weak thus slow in his movements, disorientated and prone to making poor decisions. It is these mistakes we need to identify and exploit in order to seize the initiative.

Troops conducting the relentless pursuit should not be over-burdened with equipment and gadgets. They should only carry the very essentials of what is required to achieve their mission.

Implementing relentless pursuit requires, amongst others, that troops:

&1. Can eat whilst on the move

&2. Can track an enemy at speed

&3. Have the ability to leap-frog ahead of the enemy by means of helicopters

&4. Have outstanding communications

&5. Are aggressive

&6. Are adept at night operations

&7. Must outgun the enemy

Troops need to be “taught” how to eat whilst on the move. During relentless pursuit, troops cannot stop to prepare meals as this will give the enemy time to make good his escape. Dry rations and water is all these troops need to carry with them especially since they will only be moving for a few hours before being relieved by fresh troops.

The ability to track humans is an essential prerequisite. Good trackers can tell the age of a track as well as indicate if the enemy is carrying heavy loads, the types of weapons he has (this is identified when locating enemy resting points), if the enemy is moving hurriedly, what he is eating and so forth. Good trackers are also able to identify disturbances in the soil or tripwires indicating a possible landmine or IED.

The use of helicopters to substitute troops after a few hours of follow-up adds to the concept of relentless pursuit. Tired troops can be replaced with fresh troops in order to maintain momentum and keep the pressure on the enemy. Once the trackers have analysed the age of the tracks to within an hour or less, helicopters can be used to deploy troops into blocking positions as well as deliver troops onto tactically advantageous ground. Alternatively, troops can be deployed to seal off villages and prevent their use to the enemy.

Good communications is essential to ensure that pursuit forces do not engage in so-called friendly-fire incidents. Communications is also essential to enable the calling for air support, fresh troops, and reinforcements and so on. By frequently reporting the pursuit forces coordinates, operations officers will be able to plot and even predict the enemy’s intended direction of movement.

Troops need to develop their aggression level to such a point that the enemy fears them. Aggressive pursuit is aimed at initiating contact as heavily with the enemy as possible.

Pursuit must continue after dark and into and during the night. Equipment such as night vision goggles and illumination flares must be used to the optimal. Battlefield illumination, when closing with the enemy, is useful for slowing an enemy’s progress or forcing him to show himself prematurely.

The enemy must be engaged at maximum range, terrain depending, in order to force him to deploy tactically. Long distance engagements may not cause enemy casualties but it will slow his progress and allow own forces to begin offensive tactical manoeuvres. Weapons such as the 20mm PAW, 60mm patrol mortars, RPG-7s and so forth can force the enemy to slow his progress, take cover and thus slow his escape.

When the enemy scatters (bombshells), at least one set of tracks should be taken to ensure a successful pursuit as it is likely that the enemy may regroup at an emergency RV.

To apply relentless pursuit, the troops need to be fit, mentally alert and ready to immediately take offensive action.

Failure to apply relentless pursuit will continue to give the enemy options and advantages, often at our own peril.

LOCKERBIE BOMBING: ANOTHER BLOG, ANOTHER LIE

2011-08-19T14:25:00.003+02:00

I am used to being falsely accused of many things although I never expected a so-called Professor Emeritus to allow his blog to be used for disinformation purposes – unless, of course, he has proof of what he allows to be placed on his site or he is acting as someone’s propaganda agent.

Even less did I expect Professor Robert Black (http://lockerbiecase.blogspot.com/2011/07/general-magnus-malan.html), a man of the legal profession and who so eloquently states on his blog that he “is often referred to as the architect of the Lockerbie trial at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands” to allow such a libellous and slanderous comment to be placed on his blog without even taking to trouble to verify it. This certainly does not say much for the esteemed professor’s abilities as a man of the law.

The lie I am referring to was placed by a person who identified himself as Patrick Haseldine. This buffoon wrote the following:

Eeben Barlow, commander of South Africa’s Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) Europe Branch coordinated the Lockerbie Bombing on 21 December 1988 by targeting UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson, the most prominent of the 270 victims.

At Heathrow airport, CCB operatives had six hours in which to substitute the “bomb bag” for Bernt Carlsson’s checked-in suitcase, while Carlsson was attending a meeting in London with De Beers diamond cartel. No trace of his suitcase was ever found following the Pan Am Flight 103 disaster.

The esteemed professor simply published Haseldine’s lie without doing any research. As he touts himself as “the architect of the Lockerbie trial”, I have to question his legal reasoning – and feel pity those whose interests he apparently claims to be working for.

Perhaps Patrick Haseldine (and maybe even Professor Black?) is still smarting from the fact that EO destroyed the terrorist groups UNITA in Angola and RUF in Sierra Leone (perhaps they would prefer the term “liberation movements”), thus leading to financial losses all round? After all, many people – and even listed companies - were supporting these two groups in exchange for cheap diamonds.

Since Patrick Haseldine has decided to spread lies about me, I have decided to spread the truth about him. Haseldine was a British civil servant that was found unsuitable for service and considered to be a mediocre government official. Apparently, his superior prepared two confidential reports on his performance whilst he was employed by the UK’s FCO – both of which were very unflattering. One report even stated that he had “some serious weaknesses, not good enough to get by”. He could have been demoted, taken early retirement or even dismissed. These reports were counter-signed by different officers who agreed with the conclusion of his superior, namely that he was not suited to work in a political department. He was eventually given the boot and sacked.

Professor Robert Black, on his web page http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professor_Robert_Black, claims to spend “six months of the year at his second home near a remote village in the Northern Cape of South Africa”.

Now, were I to say that I will trace the good professor and pay him a visit next time he is in South Africa, he will no doubt state on his blog that I have threatened him and then most probably ask for South African Police protection. But, I also have to wonder who in Military Intelligence visits him whilst he is here?

The dear professor should however not worry as I am not about to waste my time on someone such as he. I would however love to meet this gigantic legal brain.

I have made my feelings on the UN’s Peacekeeping Department perfectly clear – and I shall stand by them. I have long held the belief that they create conflicts in Africa and then prolong them. One only has to do a bit of research on their performance to come to that realisation.

I trust that Professor Black (he has certainly given meaning to the term “black propaganda”) will likewise stand by the comment he allowed on his blog that I was responsible for the Lockerbie bombing. Given that the professor probably has a cosy relationship with the South Africa law enforcement agencies, I also hope he will now call for my extradition to stand trial for a crime I never committed.

I would love to stand trial for this alleged crime and I cannot wait to hear what evidence Haseldine and Black will present during my trial.

Note 1: Thanks to “Jackson” for the Private Message referring me to Black’s site. I will also post this comment on Black’s blog.

Note 2: On 25th August, Prof Robert Black, the man who deemed it necessary to allow a posting on his blog alleging that I was the “mastermind” behind the Lockerbie bombing, finally came to his legal senses with a comment on his blog. He wrote: Because Patrick Haseldine does not have any evidence. This correspondence is now closed. All further contributions will be deleted. (I just love his rape of English or perhaps in his haste, he simply used a full stop where he shouldn’t have).

BACK AGAIN

2011-08-15T14:29:00.000+02:00

I do apologise to everyone who wrote to me and sent comments to my blog and have yet to receive a reply or an answer.

Having been away for a few weeks, in an area where internet connection is something of the future, returning home and being able to read my mail and your comments, was indeed a pleasure.

Please give me a day or two to catch up on all my mail. I shall get back to the blog within the next few days.

In the meantime, keep your comments coming and stay well.

“COURAGEOUS CONSTRAINT” – WHAT ON EARTH ARE WE DOING??

2011-07-19T12:37:00.003+02:00

Having read an article about the sheer lunacy of an instruction to exercise “courageous constraint”, I have to ask myself what on earth are we doing?

Going to war is a political decision.

Making war is the military’s responsibility.

Making war and in the process minimizing collateral damage is something all soldiers accept as necessary. However, there will seldom be a situation where an enemy action provokes an own forces retaliation with zero collateral damage – unless the enemy acts away from population concentrations. Sadly, this is something the modern-day enemy does not do.

To order troops not to fire on the enemy as it risks waking up the local population is going several steps too far. By having to get permission to open fire on an armed and identified enemy laying IEDs – or face murder charges if that order is violated - is nothing other than surrender without honour.

Playing politically correct games with the enemy at the expense of the lives of the very people the politicians sent there must surely border on treason. Given the deaths that have already occurred due to this stupidity, those who formulated and applied it should be tried for manslaughter – as that is what it is. Better still, they should be forced to show soldiers how to apply this new principle when under a looming threat.

It is even more shocking that military commanders seem to go along with this treasonous order. It seems to me that they are no longer soldiers but wannabe politicians posing as soldiers, more concerned about their media profiles and political futures than the lives of the men they supposedly command and their mission.

To add credence to this stupidity, the next thing will probably be a medal to those who were able to exercise this “courageous constraint”. In fact, cowardice under fire can now be ascribed to acting with "courageous constraint".

Whereas it is seemingly fashionable to be politically correct, it is this correctness that will lead to the deaths of many good soldiers – and has already led to the deaths of soldiers.

As it now appears that the politicians and senior commanders have lost the stomach to follow through on their decisions, perhaps the Principles of War ought should be whittled down to 2 basic principles in order to appease them.

Principle #1: Do not fire at the enemy.

Principle #2: If you observe the enemy, either run away or surrender.

When senior military commanders simply accept such orders, they are, in my opinion, not fit to command. If they lack the moral courage to stand up for their men, they ought not to be in uniform at all. If they are so lacking in moral fibre as to bend and buckle with the political whims of the politicians who drafted their mission, then they may save more lives by simply surrendering to the enemy and then disbanding the armed forces and going home.

It is time the real military commanders stood up for their men, accepted their mission and brushed aside the stupidity generated by politicians whilst doing the job the politicians sent them there to do.

Unless, of course, there never was an intention of ending the war....

REVISITING THE PHASES OF WAR DURING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

2011-06-05T13:09:00.000+02:00

Whether we like to admit it or not, Africa is in a state of perpetual war.

Most countries view their neighbours as either threats or potential threats. The political situation is fluid and subject to dramatic changes that have the potential to erupt into armed conflict. Foreign policy is viewed through the lens of power and this may entail supporting – or being part of - proxy or insurgent forces to destabilise a neighbouring country and gain a position of “one-upmanship” in the region.

Governments are forced to choose regional and international allies often at great cost to the political, social, military and economical well-being of the country.

The military strategies are often flawed and based on optimistic assessments and an over-estimation of the abilities of the armed forces. Intelligence collection plans are not always carefully thought out, nor are they correctly executed. This results, in part, to flawed military strategies. The armed forces are required to conduct tasks and missions they are not always trained, equipped and prepared for.

Planning for war and conflict is, for many reasons, not always done with vision and the resultant effect is often being caught by surprise when a potential threat suddenly becomes reality.

To overcome this disadvantage, African countries need to revisit the phases of war and understand that those of Western and Eastern powers cannot simply be used as templates with which to conduct offensive operations. African governments should reassess their entire approach to both the offense and the defence and in doing so they will create a situation where they are not caught off-guard by an “unexpected” threat.

As Africa remains in a state of perpetual war, I believe that the phases of conventional offensive war need to be readjusted as follows:

Intelligence Gathering: All strategies are intelligence driven. Without this critical prerequisite, it will be impossible to know and understand the potential threat(s), where, when and how the enemy will react to an attack, strike or incursion, what weapons and weapon systems the enemy will deploy and how, and so forth. This activity or phase remains ongoing throughout the duration of all offensive and defensive operations. Without this intelligence, it will not be possible to develop a viable military strategy.

Sound intelligence will, furthermore, give commanders an indication of how the enemy will react to an offensive operation. Knowledge of these enemy operational counter-plans are imperative to enable own forces to devise operational plans that will surprise and overwhelm the enemy’s forces and reduce the enemy’s reactions.

Simultaneously with the gathering of intelligence is the screening of own intentions to prevent the enemy from knowing what is being planned, how, where and when. This is achieved by applying Operational Security (OPSEC), deception, ruses, counter espionage actions and so forth to confuse the enemy.

Reconnaissance: Intelligence can change dramatically and within a short space of time. To allow commanders to rapidly readjust plans and thereby maintain the initiative, the deployment of reconnaissance teams is imperative.

Whereas the initial aim of the reconnaissance teams will be to verify the intelligence on the ground, these teams can be deployed in several different ways.

It is possible that within a single theatre of operations, different types of reconnaissance teams and units can be deployed simultaneously or in conjunction with one another.

Although reconnaissance teams and units deploy with stealth and guile, they must nevertheless able to fight if necessary.

Advance: With the necessary intelligence and the associated ground truths gleaned from reconnaissance, the advance can be planned in detail and executed to best achieve the aim – the aim being to move into enemy-held territory or to make contact with the enemy or to follow up a retreating enemy force.

The advance is an offensive manoeuvre aimed at moving the advancing forces to just beyond the range of enemy fire or to follow up a deliberate enemy withdrawal.

During the advance, continued reconnaissance of the front and flanks is maintained to provide early warning of unexpected enemy movements or actions.

Air superiority is critical to ensure the advance maintains momentum and speed.

Advance to contact: Beyond the range of enemy indirect fire systems such as artillery, mortars and heavy machine guns, the units manoeuvre into an attack formation in order to be correctly postured to follow through with an attack or counter an enemy attack. These positions will have been identified by the reconnaissance teams/units.

Utilising momentum and speed, the advance to contact is used as a method of establishing final contact with the enemy or re-establishing lost contact with the enemy.

Control of air space remains critical to provide aerial reconnaissance and provide close air support to ensure momentum and speed.

Contact/Attack: Contact, by means of fire-and-manoeuvre/movement, is made with the enemy positions that are to be attacked.

The attack is the most important phase of offensive warfare as it is this action that will bring about the defeat of the enemy – or the failure of the commander’s plans. It furthermore requires the skilful application of fire and movement – and coordination - of all direct and indirect weapons onto the enemy and his positions. It also requires commanders to act with audacity.

Consolidate: As each objective is overrun, seized or captured, the commanders will immediately alter the attacking forces’ posture in order to defeat an enemy counter attack.

Exploit: An attack does not end on the objective. The enemy is kept under fire, even in the withdrawal or retreat and must be pursued in order to inflict maximum casualties and loss of equipment.

Known as the exploitation forces or the follow-up forces, these forces are assembled and deployed prior to the attack and are tasked to maintain contact with the enemy and drive home the attack. Mobile reserve forces are particularly well suited as exploitation forces.

The limit of exploitation, determined prior to the attack, is usually conducted to a tactical bound beyond the objective.

Defend, hold and dominate: Upon the follow-up forces reaching the laid down limit of exploitation, the attacking forces move forward to take possession of this position. The aim is to occupy, defend, hold and dominate the ground that has been gained from the preceding actions or phases.

During this phase, reconnaissance elements are redeployed to the front in order to obtain ground truths, thus allowing the commander to readjust his plans where necessary and continue the advance.

The above phases of war presuppose that the armed forces are correctly trained, correctly equipped, correctly postured and correctly sustained during operations.

I shall soon be giving my thoughts on the phases of defensive warfare and unconventional warfare.

THE NEW YORK TIMES “CORRECTION” AND OTHER THINGS

2011-05-28T18:32:00.003+02:00

Having been away for a couple of days, Matt (www.feraljundi.com) alerted me to the fact that the New York Times had finally responded to my letter accusing them of lying about Executive Outcomes in an article they had published.

The New York Times printed a correction on 18 May and although not apologising for the deception, wrote the following:

An article on Sunday about the creation of a mercenary battalion in the United Arab Emirates misstated the past work of Executive Outcomes, a former South African mercenary firm whose veterans have been recruited for the new battalion. Executive Outcomes was hired by several African governments during the 1990s to put down rebellions and protect oil and diamond reserves; it did not stage coup attempts. (Some former Executive Outcomes employees participated in a 2004 coup attempt against the government of Equatorial Guinea, several years after the company itself shut down.)

Ironically, it seems that the New York Times considers the murder, rape and mutilation of innocent civilians by foreign-backed insurgents as mere “rebellions”. Of course, they also felt it very necessary to, in their correction, mention that some ex-EO men were involved in Simon Mann’s poorly planned coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea whilst not mentioning any other company’s ex-employees. But it appears as though every time a South African is involved, it should be blamed on EO.

Whereas I am not entirely satisfied with the correction without an apology, I shall be discussing the matter with my legal council before deciding what action to take next.

I note that there are several comments pending approval on my blog. I apologise for not yet publishing and responding to them – I shall do so as soon as I have caught up on my backlog of administration.

On request of several readers of the blog, I have finally opened a Twitter account. I am still trying to master this new element of social media but until such time as I can, I shall remain a twit.

NEW YORK TIMES PEDDLES LIES IN ARTICLE

2011-05-15T14:11:00.005+02:00

They say if you tell a lie enough times, it eventually becomes “the truth”.

The New York Times have certainly tried to keep up with that adage, prompting me to write to them a few minutes ago.

My letter read as follows:

Pretoria,

South Africa

15^th May 2011

Dear Editor,

It was with interest that I read your article headlined Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder dated 14 May 2011 by your journalists Mark Mazzetti and Emily B Hager.

As the founder and chairman of the now defunct Executive Outcomes, I found it of even greater interest that they state in their article as fact that Executive Outcomes was “a South African company notorious for staging coup attempts...in Africa”.

Indeed, the only fact in their reference to Executive Outcomes is that it was a South African company.

Had your journalists done even the most basic of research, they would have discovered that:

1. Executive Outcomes was intimately involved in drafting the South African government’s legislation on foreign military companies

2. Executive Outcomes had a licence from the South African government to conduct its business

3. Executive Outcomes only accepted contracts from legitimate, internationally recognised governments. This included South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Sierra Leone and Indonesia to name a few

4. The South African media apologised to me for allowing themselves to be used to perpetuate disinformation on both myself and my company.

The book Executive Outcomes: Against all Odds, was written by myself and published in 2007 by Galago Publishing, detailing the company’s origins, contracts and activities. To date, no information I gave in the book has been refuted by any party.

I personally remain opposed to coups and I also run a blog where I have written, warned against and prevented coups in Africa (http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/warning-against-joining-planned-coup.html)

However, as your paper accepted and published a factually incorrect comment on Executive Outcomes, despite it being libellous, I reserve the right to take legal action. Meanwhile I demand that your journalists furnish me with proof of any coup attempts planned or staged by the defunct Executive Outcomes. Should your journalists argue that the failed coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea is an example of such an action, may I point out that Executive Outcomes closed its doors in January 1998. It therefore cannot, in any way, be linked to a coup attempt several years later. If any ex-Executive Outcomes men were recruited by the planners of such a coup, Executive Outcomes can still not be linked to the attempt.

I look forward to your comments.

Sincerely,

EEBEN BARLOW

(Signed)

I received a reply back that read:

THANK YOU for writing The New York Times. We are grateful to readers who take the time to help us report thoroughly and accurately. Your message will reach the appropriate editor or reporter promptly.

I will keep you all informed of their actions and responses as I in particular want to know when EO acted in the manner they claim it did.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

2011-04-28T18:33:00.002+02:00

Many have written asking on the progress of my planned book and exactly what it will cover in terms of military operations in Africa.

To date, I have completed 20 chapters. They are as follows:

Chapter 1: Understanding war and conflict in Africa

Chapter 2: The relationship between political strategy and military strategy

Chapter 3: Understanding strategic warfare

Chapter 4: Developing an African art of war

Chapter 5: Land warfare principles in Africa

Chapter 6: Military operations related to war

Chapter 7: Operations other than war

Chapter 8: Intelligence operations

Chapter 9: The development of doctrine

Chapter 10: The phases of war

Chapter 11: Reconnaissance

Chapter 12: The advance

Chapter 13: The attack

Chapter 14: Consolidation

Chapter 15: Exploitation

Chapter 16: Defence

Chapter 17: A concept force for manoeuvre

Chapter 18: A concept force for counter insurgency

Chapter 19: A concept force for semi-conventional warfare

Chapter 20: Pseudo Operations

Chapter 21: Night operations

There will probably be an additional 5 chapters (I have not yet named them) added to the above.

To date, chapters 1 to 8 have been edited and I am still working on bits and pieces in chapters 9 to 21 before I submit them to my editor, Dr Deane-Peter Baker, a lecturer at the US Naval Academy. Deane has done a great job on the chapters he has had under pen and I am really happy at the guidance he has given me.

Unfortunately, time has been a constant threat to my efforts and I write when I can.

The reaction I have had from the blog readership as well as several African armies has been very encouraging so I continue to slog away when I have time.

My hope is that once the book has seen the light of day, those who read it will be able to have a better understanding of this very demanding and different theatre of conflict and war and if called upon, will be able to make a positive contribution to ending that which has and continues to devastate Africa.

A HUMOROUS BLOG ON SOUTH AFRICA

2011-04-28T16:04:00.000+02:00

This is totally off-topic but given the concern of many people both within and outside of South Africa on the situation here, my wife decided to write a blog with the hopes of making people see things differently.

It is a more humorous view of life here and if you are easily offended, take yourself too seriously, have a chip on your shoulder, find it impossible to laugh at yourself or your fellow beings, then do not visit it.

However, if you are someone who can see the funny side of things – even of tragically funny things – then you may enjoy the blog and have a few good laughs as well.

There are perhaps many South African colloquialisms and phrases that my foreign readers may not fully understand but I am sure that you will get the picture.

If we South Africans cannot laugh at ourselves and see the funny side of things, then we will be doomed forever.

Her blog can be found at http://southafricansociety.wordpress.com/

CONTROLLING THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

2011-03-31T09:54:00.001+02:00

We cannot dominate the battlefield if we cannot control it.

The Area of Operations (AO) is greatly influenced by the terrain and the prevailing climatic conditions in which the operations take place. Exploiting and gaining control over the Area of Operations with surprise, speed and firepower ought to be a priority for own forces commanders.

The Operating Environment, also referred to as the Operational Environment (OE), is a combination of circumstances and influences that impact greatly AO and, in turn, on the decisions of commanders and subsequently, the deployment of forces and assets.

As Own Forces control over the AO/OE will place the enemy at a disadvantage and allow commanders to dictate the flow and tempo of battle or operations, the enemy will use every means possible to prevent this control and thereby attempt to impede Own Forces’ momentum and deny Own Forces the initiative.

To gain and maintain control over both the AO, the enemy or insurgent forces must be denied the ability to:

1. Prevent Own Forces access to the AO: The enemy will achieve this by denying, delaying and disrupting own forces that wish to enter the AO. These actions will be strengthened by propaganda, mines, IEDs, ambushes, stand-off bombardments, selective demolitions or a combination of these actions. Access routes and logistical lines will become prime targets to prevent effective deployment and sustainment of own forces within the Area of Operations.

2. Influence the local population: Regardless of the type of operation, the enemy will make maximum use of influencing the local population to his advantage. This advantage can include the gathering of intelligence on Own Forces entering or in the AO, assist the enemy in channelling forces into preplanned killing grounds (this can be done with simple methods such as using children or even livestock to block a specific route) and so forth. If the local population realise that Own Forces will withdraw soon after the operation, they will support the enemy to prevent retaliation after these forces have withdrawn.

3. Disperse forces: The enemy will attempt to divert the focus of Own Forces commanders in order to preserve his combat forces. This will be achieved by deploying his forces over a wide area/front whilst exploiting terrain of strategic and tactical importance to stage smaller actions aimed at inflicting casualties and confusing commanders. These actions may induce commanders to attack enemy forces at a time and place favourable to the enemy, thus causing casualties amongst the local population and unnecessary collateral damage. This will turn the local population against the attacking forces. Dispersion will, furthermore, prevent Own Forces commanders from accurately determining the enemy’s Trinity of Gravity

4. Impede momentum: The enemy will exploit every weakness in the advancing or attacking forces thrust in order to slow down the momentum. Ambushes, nuisance minefields, IEDs and such will prolong the conflict whilst drawing forces into terrain that is favourable to the enemy. By impeding momentum and thus prolonging the conflict, the enemy will attempt to survive tactically in order to achieve a strategic victory over the advancing or attacking forces. Logistical supply lines - along with static forward bases - will become prime enemy targets, being subject to assaults, raids, stand-off bombardments and even suicide bombers. These actions do not only lead to Own Forces casualties but may deprive commanders of the initiative.

5. Neutralise strengths: The enemy will attempt to neutralise the attacking forces by occupying villages, towns and other complex areas in order to divide the forces and attack them at a time and place of their choosing. Using villages to shield their actions, the enemy will be able to inflict casualties and even achieve small tactical successes. As the enemy will often know the AO better than the attacking forces, he will use the terrain to his advantage and strike high-visibility targets to gain a propaganda and psychological advantage. Retaliation by the armed forces may result in excessive collateral damage, resulting in increased local support to the enemy and the resultant propaganda proclaiming the enemy is “everywhere”

6. Deny safe areas: The enemy will make every attempt to deny safe and secure areas to the attacking forces during all phases of the operation. Using indirect and direct fire, landmines, IEDs and so forth, the enemy will target laager areas, temporary bases from positions that prevent Own Forces retaliation, such as villages, towns and so forth

7. Achieve surprise: As the enemy will in many instances be more familiar with the AO than the attacking forces, he will use every advantage he has in order to gain a strategic or tactical surprise. This may include the use of deception, feints, raids, stand-off bombardments and other actions to confuse the Own Forces commanders.

8. Gather intelligence: Good OPSEC measures as well as counter intelligence techniques must be used to prevent the enemy from gaining a clear understanding of Own Forces’ strengths, weaknesses and TTPs. Avoiding routine, alternating routes, night operations and so forth can be used effectively to confuse the enemy and deny his understanding of how Own Forces operate.

Climatic variations, although having a significant impact on operations within the AO, are beyond the control of both Own Forces and the enemy. Like terrain, it favours the one who “reads” it correctly, and uses and exploits it.

Whereas air power is crucial to achieving air superiority, conducting aerial reconnaissance and providing Close Air Support, air power loses much of its utility when the enemy make use of towns and villages to shield his activities.

Controlling the AO should therefore not rely exclusively on air power but rather rely on soldiers who are correctly trained, equipped and deployed to ensure domination of the area.

THE UN DOES IT AGAIN...

2011-03-05T15:38:00.002+02:00

Many folks have written to me asking what my thoughts on the UN’s actions in Ivory Coast (Cote d’Ivoire) are. I am no specialist on that country but what I read in the media is apparently very skewed to say the least.

A few days ago I was referred to an article written by South Africa’s former deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Aziz Pahad. Pahad held that post from 1994 to 2008. This article was published on http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Analyses_12/What-is-the-Truth-about-the-Ivorian-Crisis.shtml, a site edited by Dr Gary Busch. Much of what Pahad wrote I had long suspected.

Then came other shocking rumours of the UN’s activities in Cote d’Ivoire. Whereas I did not doubt the content-authenticity of the rumours, I did not have any confirmation of these alleged actions. But, I thought that had PMC had acted in such a manner, the UN would have called for their immediate suspension and would have wanted them charged with war crimes. It was, after all, the UN that had fabricated it fair share of lies about EO and tried every trick in its large book to close the company.

The UN, it appears, is apparently above the law and entitled to break it whenever they wish without any action ever being taken against them.

It also seems to me that the UN works tirelessly to ensure that conflicts are kept alive and in the process, will do whatever it takes to ensure that chaos reigns, including deceit and murder. It is therefore no small wonder that this gigantic organisation feels threatened when a PMC is about to end a conflict. Should that happen, what would their function be? The ending of conflicts will make the UN redundant – something those in the organisation cannot afford.

One merely needs to travel to conflict areas in Africa to witness who drives the new 4 x 4s, who lives in the best hotels and who dines in the best restaurants. The answer: the UN and their parasitic NGOs.

Hot on the heels of my shock at new rumours of alleged UN activities in the Cote d’Ivoire, I was sent another article published on www.ocnus.net, titled “The End Game in the Ivory Coast”.

Reading this article I hoped that many African governments who are being held to ransom by the UN will finally come to realise that whereas there may be some good people in the UN, the organisation holds no good for them or their countries.

Dr Busch wrote the following:

The long political impasse of the Ivory Coast is coming to an end. The forces of the rebel leader, Alassane Ouattara have failed to get others to remove the elected President of the country, Gbagbo by force, sanction or military provocation. Now, electricity, water and most communications networks are shut off in the Northern rebel areas. Since 28 February the switch has been turned off.

The ONUCI (the United Nations occupying force) in Abidjan have found that they are being denied fuel supplies so have taken to theft and murder to keep their supplies available. (See http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Dysfunctions_2/Caught-Robbing-Gas-Stataion-UN-Forces-Kill-3-Civilians.shtml) The rebel cause is unable to deliver any services to its captive populations on its own. During the nine years of occupation of the North they have built no institutions for public service or administration nor for the supply of water, electricity and fuel but have relied on the good will of the Gbagbo Government to supply these to them. Moreover they have not paid any taxes to the legitimate government during this period. They have not paid income taxes, customs duties, excise taxes or rents for the properties these tin pot warlords occupy or the services provided for them. There have been no contributions for social services (schools, hospitals, roads, etc.) during these nine years. All the costs of running the country and maintaining its position in the world through diplomacy, economic treaties, participation in international organisations, bank transfers to the French Treasury through the BCEAO and support for the CFA franc have been done by Gbagbo’s government.

The imposition of rebel warlords as members of the Cabinet of a joint government imposed by the French and the UN added nothing to their contributions to the State but cost the Ivoirian taxpayers a small fortune as each rebel minister demanded cabinet rank wages, fancy cars, and jobs for their families. It was a major cost to the government and the people of the Ivory Coast to keep these rebels in the styles in which they chose to live. This was tolerated and accepted by the people as it was part of an agreed process of disarmament and disengagement by the rebels. It was agreed that no elections should take place before the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of all the armed forces was completed and the unification of the country achieved. Indeed, the UN specifically extended the term of Gbagbo as President through United Nations Resolution 1633 (2005) which extended Gbagbo’s term of office until this was achieved. This resolution demanded that all the parties signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra III and Pretoria Agreements, as well as all the Ivorian parties concerned, implement it fully and without delay...” [emphasis added] That is, the rebels must disarm before new elections could be held. That was part of every agreement. This was largely the agreement created by Thabo Mbeki who was the UN-appointed mediator. Nothing has changed in the legal requirements since.

What has changed is that the French were able to persuade the UN and President Gbagbo (but not his party, the FPI) that it was possible to hold elections in a divided country with armed rebels in charge of the North of the country and on the basis of a rigged electoral role provided by the French military company SAGEM. The presidential election in Ivory Coast was held on October 31st, 2010, with a second round on November 28th, 2010. The results of the election are disputed and the position of the Electoral Commission wholly discredited, even by members of that commission. The French and American ambassadors showed up at the campaign headquarters of Ouattara with one of his key electoral advisors. Without any authority the ambassadors and the Ouattara campaign manager announced that Ouattara had won the election. The next day the Constitutional Court said that Gbagbo had won the election. Since then the ‘international community’ has said that Ouattara was the legitimate president but the constitutional authorities of the country have said Gbagbo was the President.

None of this really matters any more. The ‘international community’ has introduced sanctions on the Ivory Coast and a ban on the country’s ability to deploy its assets retained by the French Treasury, It brags that it will starve Gbagbo out by stopping his financial ability to pay the army and the state employees. This has failed abysmally. Yesterday, 4 March 2011 Laurent Gbagbo paid over 60 per cent of civil servant salaries, suggesting Western sanctions meant to starve him of funds and force him to leave have not had full effect. The balance will be paid in three days.

Gbagbo has had great support from other African countries (except for the colonial satrapies of France). The UN and the French have been demanding that the ECOWAS and other African states invade the Ivory Coast to oust Gbagbo. They have refused, or offered such a feeble response, that any deployment of their forces in a hostile climate would quickly end with their soldiers being sent home in body bags. Two of the countries with the strongest armed forces on the continent, Angola and South Africa have been openly opposed to any military initiative to oust Gbagbo. These are two armies which have spent years in real battles and have plenty of equipment and battle-hardened soldiers who have experience in African wars. The supporters of Ouattara are raggedy irregulars who call themselves the New Forces and incompetent and inexperienced conscripts from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger who have only ever fought over cattle, water and civil disputes. The Nigerian Army is sitting this out as they have their own battles to fight against a Muslim fundamentalist uprising in the North and an election to supervise. The presence offshore of the South African frigate Drakensberg has had a laxative effect on UN planners.

Being unable to starve Gbagbo out and without the military resources need to take on the regular Army (FANCI) and the FDS and CECOS units the irregular rebel force which has been concentrated on the Golf Hotel where Ouattara and his colleagues have hunkered down have relied on surreptitious acts of brutality against the civil population and the gendarmerie to try to provoke a response from Gbagbo’s forces. They have formed “the invisible commando” force which shoots at soldiers and policemen whenever a protest march is formed. They shoot, and often kill, policemen and then melt away into the arms of the UN emplacements and wait for a response from those who have been shot. They then call this response ‘genocide’ or an illegal use of force against civilians. The government forces have shown great restraint in their retaliation and the Ouattara people are growing ever more desperate. Two days ago they killed seven women and blamed this on Gbagbo’s forces, despite the fact that the presence of the ‘invisible commando’ force was filmed. Their crocodile tears have been reported as real by the UN and the US and have been echoed around the world as if they were true.

The UN knows it is a lie and only compounds this with additional lies. The UN Secretary-General just announced that Gbagbo had acquired three Mi-24 helicopters from Belarus in defiance of the UN sanctions. This was not only a deliberate lie but served to mask the fact that the UN had indeed brought in three Mi-24 helicopters for its own use. This was not admitted until three days later.

There is a mysterious aura which surrounds the UN and NGO personnel when it comes to facing reality. It is a special mind set which allows their personal prejudices and egos to be seen by them as facts even when confronted by the opposite. During the First Afghan war we were contacted by the UN, the NGOS and the journalists to see if we would fly them into the northern territories (then controlled in part by Massoud). We agreed and arranged for them to be picked up from Dushanbe where we had two helicopters. The UN, NGOs and journos arrived in Dushanbe and said, in great horror, “But these helicopters are armed.” I said “Of course they are armed”. We had two MI-24 gunships, fully armed with six Spetsnaz troops on board with long Afghan experience. They said “It is inappropriate for us to fly in armed helicopters. We are neutrals. We do not judge. We only want to help and report. Why are the helicopters armed?” I said they were armed because we wanted to be able to return. One helicopter would hover to provide ground cover and the other would deliver passengers. I explained that the people on the ground could not distinguish the fact that the plane was full of unarmed humanitarians until we landed and they introduced themselves. Therefore we would take all precautions. They flew but we started to get all sorts of calls from editors and assorted NGO luminaries asking us to use unarmed helicopters. After a week I told them to walk. I sent them a map of the Khyber Pass and told them where to go. It was a good lesson about these humanitarians. If they couldn’t see about their own safety what kind of judgements could they be making about other people’s problems. They are a special breed with a special kind of arrogance. As a rule they should not be believed or trusted.

So, despite the fact that the UN is continually lying to the rest of the world about the situation in the Ivory Coast and relying on their coterie of morally challenged NGOs and journalists to back up their specious claims, the UN presence is deteriorating badly. Gbagbo has ordered them out of the country but they refuse to go. Instead of supervising the disarmament of the rebels, which is their primary role in the mandate they were given for the Ivory Coast, they continue to rearm and supply the rebels with newer and more lethal equipment. Now they have helicopter gunships. Unfortunately for them Gbagbo’s troops do not rise to the bait. They have refused to engage in open warfare with the UN. The UN is opposed by unarmed civilians and they cannot deal with this.

There is a lot of rubbish being spoken about the civil war breaking out. There never was a civil war. The French stopped the Ivory Coast Army from wiping out the last holdouts of the rebellion in Bouake in 2002. Without the French and the UN forces there would be a civil war which would last for about three days. The 8,000 well-trained and armed forces of the legitimate government would wipe out the Forces Nouvelles even if the rebels actually decided to fight. It is only the French and the UN which are credible enemies. The problem for the UN and the French is that there are thousands, if not tens of thousands, of French and other foreign nationals in the Ivory Coast who will be targets the moment the ‘international community’ attacks. It takes only a glance at Libya to see what happens when ‘African mercenaries’ are caught, lynched and burned by Libyan democrats to envision what might happen if the French or others start killing Ivoirians.

So, the UN can push it but not too far. They can’t risk a full-fledged conflict without serious risk to themselves and to the civilian hostages. As long as Gbagbo’s forces refuse to retaliate the UN is powerless. It is the rebels who are growing weaker every day. They have no legitimacy in the lands they have occupied over nine years and now, with no water, electricity, hospitals; schools and transport the local population are likely to rise against them. They have nothing to offer. Ouattara demanded an end to cocoa sales. This affected only his own people. The rebels are finished. It is only a matter of time before the people of the North throw them out. Gbagbo needs to do nothing. The men trapped in the Golf Hotel realise this and they are growing desperate.

Soon the ‘international’ community will see that their hypocrisy and deceit in the Ivory Coast will be exposed for the whole world to see. They are talking about a military response to the crisis of North Africa but doing nothing. They want ’democracy’ but apparently only for Muslims. What a shambles.

DEBUNKING ANOTHER MYTH

2011-02-28T10:35:00.004+02:00

I continue to remain amused at how some self-proclaimed “experts” on Executive Outcomes continue to regurgitate their story that the company fell victim to South Africa’s laws on military assistance.

It seems this gem of disinformation was initially fed to a journalist working under control of South Africa’s Military Intelligence Division (MID), that paragon of truth (I know because I spent time there), and was subsequently picked up by numerous other “experts” who spun the lie enough times for it to become a “fact” in their feeble minds.

Members of the foreign media were equally keen to grasp at these mistruths. Whether it was because of a lack of integrity or to also earn money on side, only they can tell.

At the time that EO was operating, numerous other “Executive Outcomes” also appeared on the scene, all posers and some actually being run by MID, all in an attempt to smear the real EO and the many good men who worked in that company. It was this more than anything else that led to my comment to the media that EO would welcome legislation regarding companies operating in the military field.

EO was subsequently invited to attend South African government meetings on the planned legislation and numerous inputs given by the company were eventually contained in what became the Bill that was finally passed.

In their attempts to earn their extramural salaries from MID and the other services, they had to continually perpetuate the lie. Even the UN, that shining light of competency and integrity, jumped onto the bandwagon although I suspect their agenda had more to do with covering up their incompetence than anything else.

To this, they had to add that EO was paid in mineral concessions; something that even today remains laughable. But, these mistruths were quickly swallowed by a gullible readership. Despite having challenged numerous journalists, and even the UN, to produce evidence to substantiate their claims - even today they cannot do so because it is difficult to prove a lie – especially one of such gargantuan proportions.

These lies, along with numerous others, have even made their way into “intellectual papers” and are contained in numerous theses on PMCs and Executive Outcomes. This really does bring into question the validity and standard of many “intellectual” works.

But the great shining lie was the so-called “fact” that EO was closed due to SA government legislation. The story in short claims that EO never had a government licence to operate and was therefore, by implication, operating illegally.

The bad news for these habitual liars (intelligence whores would be a more appropriate title for them) is that EO did indeed have a permit to operate.

This may come as a shock to many but it was issued on 24 October 1997 and the permit number was 6-97-00006. To those who continue to make these false claims, a copy of the original permit is shown below.

I hope that those who continue to write about EO will have the courage and journalistic integrity to rectify their previous “errors” and stop perpetuating disinformation.

PHOTOS OF THE HUNTER LSV

2011-02-14T14:28:00.006+02:00

Since posting a piece about the Hunter Light Strike Vehicle (LSV) and its role as a mobile gun platform (MGP), I have had numerous requests to post some more photos of this unique vehicle.

Conceptualised, designed and manufactured by OTT (www.ott.co.za) this MGP is capable of delivering a mass of firepower onto a target.

The Hunter LSV can be equipped with a 20mm QFC, 14,5mm or 12,7mm main gun. Added to its firepower can be a total of four additional 7,62/12,7mm machineguns and 30mm or 40mm grenade launchers such as the AGS-17 or the M-19.

Hunter LSV with 12.7mm – view over driver’s cab. Can also be fitted with 14,5mm or 20mm

12,7mm main gun plus 3 PKMs. It can also have a PKM added for the co-driver

12,7mm and three PKMs mounted

With 6-shot 40mm MGL added. Can also mount M-19 or AGS-17