Eeben Barlow's Military and Security Blog

FAILING TO LISTEN

2013-03-25T06:04:00.000+02:00

As has become quite usual and an almost daily occurrence, rebel forces throughout central Africa have gained momentum and succeeded in defeating government forces. Often, the government forces appear to be very well trained in running away whilst the rebel forces appear to be better trained, have more cohesion, are better armed and even have better mobility than the government forces.

I am also amazed at how easily - and quickly - governments dismiss intelligence in favour of disinformation. Could it be that they believe the “advice” given them by foreign governments or so-called “subject matter experts” is more credible than that given by people who do actually have “ears on the ground”?

The escalation of tensions in the so-called Great Lakes region is a fine example of governments’ failure to listen. It appears they are advised to adopt the ostrich approach (sticking their heads in the sand and hoping the problem will simply go away) – an approach that is apparently becoming the norm. This approach apparently assures governments that the problem will indeed “go away” if it is simply ignored.

Often these rumours are clustered around other rumours that give credibility to the false sense of security that an interested party is trying to develop. Selected “leaks” to the media result in these rumour-clusters being given more credibility – and this is then fed back to the government as fact “as the media said so”.

The end-result is that when they finally pull their heads out of the sand, the problem has become a crisis. Those who so generously misadvised at great financial cost have by then long flown the coup. The crisis rapidly escalates into a blood-letting of aggrieved citizens and ill-disciplined troops and the entire system of government collapses.

The culture of failing to listen is partly the result of being fed so much rubbish that it becomes literally impossible for governments to distinguish fact from fiction.

Without naming and shaming governments, we warned four different governments of threats being developed in their countries long before the threats manifested themselves. This intelligence (by the time we advised them, we were no longer giving them simple information) was discarded as rumours, whilst rumours and innuendo that painted a rosy picture were seen a “credible intelligence”. We are still trying to warn another government that a coup is imminent. No doubt they are also being advised it is nothing other than a rumour.

The impact this “intelligence” (rumours, innuendo and false stories) has on the Pillars of State is enormous in that it ultimately alters the perceptions of the populace and leads to a reaction that the governments have often not anticipated. The collapse of the armed forces simply adds to the unanticipated reaction as soldiers and civilians alike join rebel forces and begin a campaign of looting and intimidation.

Then of course, we have the SANDF’s 2013 misadventure into Central African Republic (CAR). Again, a badly advised government force, ill-trained and totally unprepared for the rebel assault on the government of CAR. Needless to say, this has irreparably tarnished the reputation of the SANDF.

Whereas I mourn the death of every soldier, we must not forget that the SANDF has also been the beneficiary of “free advice” and “free training”. Sadly, this resulted in the Seleka rebel coalition outgunning and out-manoeuvring the SANDF. This confirms that not only was the overall SANDF strategy flawed but that the strategy had its foundation resting on poor intelligence – and no strategy can succeed if it is developed off assumptions and rumours.

Additionally, even the best strategy and operational designs will fail if the armed forces are not trained and equipped to implement the operational plans. Inadequately trained forces with poor leadership simply add fuel to the fire.

This all goes back to failing to listen to good advice and instead opting for bad advice aimed at disadvantaging the recipient.

As long as governments fail to listen – instead relying on disinformation – this cycle of chaos will continue.

THE “SPECIALISTS”

2013-03-08T15:23:00.001+02:00

It would almost be funny were it not so sad.

I come across many people on an almost-daily basis that have travelled from beyond the continent to Africa to witness “first-hand” the problems the continent has. Some are businessmen, some are academics, some are members of NGOs and some are from foreign government PMCs.

Almost to a man (or woman), they become “specialists” in African politics and security-related matters only a few days after having set foot on the continent. They firmly believe that they understand our problems better than we do, they have all the solutions and know exactly how our future will look if only we would listen to them. They question but then immediately disregard the answers they get as it does not match with their perceived reality – which is often totally removed from our reality. It is not uncommon to get a response to an answer to the effect that “No, you are wrong. I read on … (chose your search engine) what your problems are”

Many of these newly-born specialists may be well-meaning in their intentions but their actions often result in fuelling already volatile situations or they grossly miscalculate the diverse and complex environment they have entered. But being specialists, they believe they can solve the problem they themselves created and then make it even worse.

Apart from the many tourists that visit Africa, everyone else has one goal tied to their visit: to make money. On the surface, there is nothing wrong with that as we all work to make a profit. However, when they intend to make their money by manipulation, bad advice, acting with little or no integrity, promoting suspicion and even by blatantly lying, my hackles begin to rise. Sadly, some of these charlatans get appointed to serve as “specialist government advisors”. They develop hypothetical solutions to overcome imaginary problems and then implement their “solutions” regardless of reality.

These problems are very prevalent in the intelligence, military and law enforcement areas. Of course they are found in the other sectors as well but as we work in the listed fields, this is where I know I am treading on familiar ground.

As we have numerous ears on the ground as well as many friends across the continent, we regard ourselves as fairly well informed. It is, therefore, not unusual for us to be given advance warning of a potential conflict or problem brewing in or close to a certain country. If we can confirm the information we are given, we warn the targeted government that problems are marching towards their horizon. At times, this intelligence is acted on. On other occasions, this intelligence is discussed with foreign governments who then refute our warnings and claim that we are conducting a disinformation campaign in order to get a contract.

The recent situation in Mali is a good example of intelligence being disregarded and bad advice from “specialists” heeded. Most everyone knows how that panned out. Were it not for the intervention of the French forces, the situation would be vastly different to what it currently is. But that conflict is not over yet.

We have been trying to warn another government of a pending coup but they have been advised by their “advisors” and “specialists” not to talk to us. Numerous other examples exist but I shall refrain from listing them in case the governments we warned are actually seriously considering our warnings.

Many will claim that we warn governments simply to get a contract. I know of several people and/or organisations that have made it their mission to make these claims and try to influence governments not to listen to what we have to say or to discredit us. These individuals and /or organisations are likewise “specialists” on both me and our company. They know more about me than I know about myself. But, truth be told, there is no way we could accept that many contracts from so many governments.

Back to reality: Much of the so-called specialist advice given to African governments is aimed at ensuring conflicts either start or escalate. Peace does not enter the equation although it is bandied about as a buzzword - yet it remains ever elusive. Attention is often diverted from existing problems by creating new problems. Conflict and war implies large profits – and the longer these conflicts continue, the longer the profits roll in. Sometimes these specialists even support both sides engaged in the conflict just to make sure they are covered, regardless the winner.

Many African governments are not masters of their own destiny. Through bad advice, manipulation, economic blackmail and the like, they have become the puppets that jump to their puppet masters’ strings. When they don’t jump at the appropriate time, they are branded as rogue governments. So, to maintain their positions, when asked to jump they then simply ask “How high?”

It can be argued that many African governments are to blame for the situations they find themselves in. Whereas that holds true in some instances, much of what we witness in Africa, especially in the security forces, has come about as a result of bad advice, poor training, incorrect structures, inadequate weapons, irrelevant doctrines and so forth. Co-join this situation to poor statecraft advice and we see what we see…To rectify this, new statecraft and defence approaches are planned and implemented – and fail.

Many of these so-called specialists that visit our shores may come with good intentions. However, given their “vast knowledge” of the continent and their deep “research” on Africa, it is no wonder that such a mess is created. Promises are easily made and then just as easily broken. But then, perhaps this is the aim all along – erode the Pillars of State and create chaos. Out of the chaos will come anger, civil disobedience, racial hatred and tensions, strikes, rebellions, religious intolerance, an increase in transnational crime, a collapse of law and order, distrust towards government agencies, armed conflict and insurgencies – and ultimately, a dysfunctional government or a government teetering on collapse. This creates numerous problems on the security front but also abundant lucrative opportunities on the economic front.

The ultimate result of their “specialist advice” in terms of human suffering boggles the mind.

As I mentioned earlier, it would almost be funny were it were not so sad.

AN APOLOGY FROM EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES PROTECTIVE SERVICES

2013-02-12T11:41:00.001+02:00

In early June 2012, Jason alerted me to a company posing as the reborn Executive Outcomes. Not only did Executive Outcomes Protective Services (EOPS) imply that they traced their origins back to the real EO, they also claimed that I had died...These lies were placed on their website (www.eopssecurity.com)

In response to these fraudulent claims, I posted my view on the matter on my blog on 11 June 2012. See http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/my-early-demiseby-eops.html I also asked a certain Mr M Dominguez to respond to my questions on my untimely death. He never did.

I was once again alerted to EOPS by Jason who directed me to an entry at http://wolfesteel2000.blogspot.com/2012/09/eeben-barlow.html submitted by Charles Wolfe, the newly appointed Regional Manager for the notorious EOPS. His apology on the net reads as follows:

Eeben Barlow

On behalf of Executive Outcome Protective Services I would like to apologize for the way our website has been written. Mr. Dominguez greatly regrets not speaking to anyone for advise on how the Company History should have been written.

E.O.P.S. had no intentions of portraying that our employees came from your founded EO company. Mr. Dominguez was very inspired by your professionalism and dedication and wanted only to be portrayed in the same manner. We have great respect for what you have done in South Africa and abroad, and would like for you to understand what we are trying to accomplish here in South Florida by providing security services with the same mindset and goals such as yours.

I will be changing the way it is written as the Newly appointed Regional Manager. And again we apologize for the misunderstanding.

To be fair, it takes some courage to have to write an apology regarding gross misrepresentation. Charles Wolfe was true to his word and some changes were made on their website, most importantly writing the “late” me out of their site.

However, on their website, they still refer to themselves as “Executive Outcomes”. Some folks just don’t get it. Whereas imitation may be a great form of flattery, false testimony does not endear one to the bearer of that testimony.

I would like to wish EOPS well with their business but as long as they infer their origins, I cannot do that.

HAPPY CHINESE NEW YEAR 2013

2013-02-11T12:52:00.000+02:00

I apologise for being late this year in wishing my Chinese friends a very happy New Year – a traditional Chinese celebration that began yesterday, 10 February 2013.

The Chinese New Year (also known as the Lunar New Year) takes place in the early months of our calendar year, typically in January or February. In 2013, the Lunar New Year began on 10^th February and its beginning marks 15 days of celebration and the start of the Year of the Snake.

The celebrations will culminate in the Lantern Festival on 25^th February.

According to Chinese tradition, each year is dedicated to a specific animal, these being the following 12 animals: Boar, Dragon, Dog, Horse, Monkey, Ox, Rat, Rabbit, Ram, Rooster, Snake and Tiger. It is believed that each of these animals bestow their characteristics to the people born in their year.

The Year of the Snake (2013) heralds the end of the Year of the Dragon (2012).

May you all have a very happy, healthy and prosperous Year of the Snake.

Gong Xi Fa Ca and Gong Hei Fa Choi!

USING HUMOUR TO COPE AND SURVIVE

2013-01-23T10:05:00.000+02:00

I remember clearing for mines around a young soldier who had just stepped on an anti-personnel mine. His broken body had been dragged him into the shade of a tree and the medic was gently tending to his injuries and bandaging him up. The injured soldier was a good tennis player and he had just lost a leg.

Another sapper, eating some bully beef out of a tin with a stick, ambled over to his injured friend. In shock and in pain, the injured man, understandably too scared to look at his injuries asked the sapper “Is it bad?”

His friend the sapper knelt down next to him and said: “Always look on the bright side – in future you only need to buy one “takkie” (tennis shoe)”.

This remark was made without malice or flippantly. It is the way soldiers talk to cope with the horrors they need to deal with. Living on the edge gives rise to a dark sense of humour only those who have been there can fully appreciate and even understand.

It therefore shouldn’t have come as too much of a surprise to find some in the media complaining about recent photo of a French soldier wearing a skeleton mask. Wearing a mask or a scarf to protect one from the dust and debris is rather normal. The fact that his mask resembles a skull is part of the dark humour soldiers develop. It keeps them going.

Photo by Issouf Sanogo, AFP

What did they think he was doing in Mali – baking a cake for the extremists? The next thing they will probably complain about is the aggressive-looking weapons soldiers carry or that their uniforms frighten the enemy. Or maybe even that their weapons can actually kill people.

I am sure that if a company of soldiers wearing masks such as these appeared out of the dust, even the most hardened enemy will be taken aback and worried that he is being attacked by death itself. Which is exactly what should happen anyway.

The photo has resulted in a flurry of condemnation. Even a French military spokesman apologised and stated that the wearing of the mask was unacceptable and not representative of French military action. A hunt is now on to identify the soldier in the picture. Why on earth is that?

Similarly, there are those in the British media who are complaining about Capt Wales (Prince Harry to those who know him better) commenting on the fact that he had fired his Apache helicopter guns at the Taliban and had taken some of them “out of the game” – a common term used instead of “Hell, yes, I blew them to smithereens and there was blood and gore splattered over the entire area”.

Predictably, his frank comments – which do not in the least appear to have been boastful - drew a backlash from anti-war activists who, no doubt when their lives are threatened will call for people such as Capt Wales to save them and take the threat “out of the game”. Perhaps they will hope that someone will come along and “whack” or “slot” the threat to keep them safe so that they can continue to complain.

Even the extremists are complaining – and getting publicity - about his attitude to killing – something they certainly have no qualms about.

Now what did these good armchair analysts think he was doing in an Apache helicopter? Was he supposed to merely observe the enemy whilst they were firing at him or his friends on the ground?

Soldiers need to deal with the stress and fear that accompanies them every day of their lives when in a combat zone. They cannot grieve for their friends who have lost life and limb in a firefight – they need to get the job done as quickly as possible. To do this, they develop their own language to cope with the horrors they need to deal with, smell and witness. This language is littered with dark humour outsiders will not understand. To maintain some sanity in an insane world, they wear strange things, do strange things and say strange things.

However, war is not some game that is played according to gentlemen’s rules. The aim is to identify, locate, neutralise, annihilate, disrupt or destroy the enemy or break his will to such an extent that he no longer has the stomach to fight. If wearing a mask and using dark humour or saying strange things will speed-up the process of achieving the aim, then it should be done.

If the media and the politicians don’t like the way in which soldiers cope with their jobs or if they don’t like their humour or their sayings, perhaps they should go and do the fighting instead. We can then sit on the sideline and criticise.

To the soldiers out there, regardless of where you are, do not let the media and politicians dictate your humour and prevent you from “wearing a mask”. If that is what you need to do to cope or scare the hell out of the enemy and destroy him, then do it.

ISN'T IT TIME TO ASK QUESTIONS?

2013-01-22T14:23:00.000+02:00

Some of my Nigerian friends and I were discussing the situation in Mali and the apparent lack of good advice, intelligence, strategy, training, intelligence forecasting and threat analysis that led to the current situation there. Virtually everything required to make a government strong, secure the state and protect the populace was sorely lacking. (To the folks who asked me about Mali, www.beegeagle.wordpress.com will be able to offer a lot of insight into the current efforts in West Africa and Mali. My friend “Beegeagle” runs this very popular blog - 10 000 visits a day should give an idea of its popularity).

During these discussions, I suggested that it is time for African governments to begin asking some very hard questions, especially in terms of some of the “free” advice and training governments and their armed forces are given. After all, even the SANDF has “benefitted” from some of this advice and training.

But, back to Mali where a very simplistic background is as follows:

The geo-political, economical and threat changes, challenges and developments that have taken place since the so-called Arab Spring have impacted severely on both North and West Africa. The pre-coup Malian government was certainly not as pure as the driven snow. As early as 2003, the former President of Mali allegedly allowed extremist control of the North whilst allegedly raking in huge sums of money from narco-trafficking and ransom payments. Added to this was the issue of depleted land resources – one reason for Tuareg discontent with the Malian government - overgrazing of the semi-arid lands bordering Mali and Niger and the subsequent desertification of those lands. Then there was the steady rise of AQIM, MOJWA and others who had the potential to form hostile anti-government alliances. The collapse of Libya added to the flow of weapons and combat experience into the conflict areas. It appears that no-one was able to predict this or even noticed.

Initially the removal from power of President Amadou Toumani Touré by a coup may have appeared to be to the benefit of Mali and the region. This regime change took place a mere five weeks before a presidential election was to be held with the outgoing President stating that he was not interested in running for office again. But then, a poorly foreign-trained army’s discipline collapsed, opening the door to uncertainty, chaos and an offensive by the extremists in the North. Whilst the extremist offensive was being planned, we twice warned the new government of Mali of the threat build-up and the need to take immediate and drastic action to curb it before the extremist offensive could gain momentum. (To those who think this was an attempt to gain employment – don’t let your imagination run away with you). They were either advised not to listen to the warnings or to simply ignore our “disinformation”.

Poor governance resulted in Mali’s Vital Interests and National Interests becoming even more threatened as the country’s pillars of state came under increasing attack. Some of these interests happened to coincide with the Foreign Interests of France, who arguably had the courage to intervene to protect their interests and their citizens living in Mali.

Nigeria and its West African allies also committed men to the conflict as a successful takeover of Mali by the extremists will certainly pose a threat to West Africa. Extremist success in Mali would only embolden the enemy and provide other similar groups with a safe haven/springboard from where to plan and launch their operations into Europe and deeper into Africa. Additionally, success in Mali will give the extremists a new front from where to launch operations into Algeria. Perhaps they will do this under the guise of “democratic forces” and the international community will once again jump in to help “democratic extremists” as they did in Libya, Syria, Egypt and so forth.

Regardless of the situation, it is the development and escalation of the crisis in Mali that prompted us to beg whether questions should not be asked - and answered. These questions included inter alia the following:

1. Did the “free” advice given to Mali not indicate or even hint at the importance of threat analysis and intelligence forecasting? If so, why not?

2. What advice and support were the Malians given by their advisors during the development of their National Security Strategy?

3. What did the “free” military advice and training consist of?

4. Who trained the Malian armed forces?

5. What happened to the Mali intelligence effort?

6. Who trained the Malian intelligence services?

7. Was no one able to predict the proliferation of weapons into Mali after the collapse of Libya?

8. Why were Malian army units so rapidly overwhelmed by the extremists?

9. Where was the so-called Rapid Intervention Unit?

The list of questions goes on and on...

To anyone who doubts my comments – and concerns – about the level of training given to the Malian armed forces, take a look at the training of their “Rapid Intervention Force” at http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=01NBUiA3Tjs

I have witnessed the results of a lot of this so-called “free” advice and training that is given to African armed forces. In a nutshell, it is pathetic. A look at what happened and is still happening in CAR, DRC, S Sudan and other states is testimony to poor training, bad advice, incoherent doctrines, a lack of intelligence, a lack of strategy, poor discipline and a lack of motivation and will.

African armies have a choice in terms of training, advice and support: Accept the freebies and suffer the consequences or pay for it and have someone to hold to account.

But, the answers to many of these questions will be found in a line in Bob Dylan’s famous song: “The answer my friend, is blowing in the wind...”

WHY THE ARMED FORCES FAIL AT COIN

2013-01-01T08:51:00.001+02:00

The armed forces can, despite their relative strengths in terms of manpower, firepower and other resources, fail at effectively neutralising and destroying an armed insurgency. The reasons for these failures include, inter alia, the following:

1. Lack of support: When the armed forces are tasked to respond to an insurgency, they need maximum government support to achieve mission-success. This support extends beyond mere political and moral support but also in terms of providing it with the equipment and resources it requires. A lack of support from government will result in a lack of determination from the armed forces to accomplish their mission. Similarly, a lack of support from the local populace will cost the armed forces dearly in terms of manpower, intelligence, national support and may result in the populace giving support to the insurgents.

2. Lack of intelligence: A lack of sound and credible intelligence at the strategic level will impede the armed forces’ strategy to counter the coming insurgency whilst at the operational and tactical levels it will restrict the armed forces’ efforts to plan and execute effective COIN operations. Intelligence must provide clear options on where, when and how actions can be conducted and with what force levels. Misappreciating the enemy will result in poor plans and efforts to locate and destroy the enemy and add to the enemy’s momentum. Additionally, a lack of intelligence will lead to unclear and vague orders. A lack of intelligence also prevents knowing the enemy – a crucial factor in defeating the enemy.

3. Poor strategies: Poor strategies – and a subsequent lack of relentless strategic thinking - are not only the result of a lack of intelligence but also due to an inflexible, non-adaptive approach to formulating strategy. The inability to formulate a strategy that attacks the insurgent forces over both a wide and a deep front will cost the armed forces in terms of domination, momentum, initiative and success. Additionally, operational developments must never drive strategy although operational developments can lead to an adjustment of strategy. Poor strategies also result in “mission creep”.

4. Belief: An over-confident belief in their own abilities coupled to a belief that the enemy is inferior, poorly trained, ill equipped and operating with poor leadership will place the armed forces at a disadvantage of their own making. This misguided, at times arrogant belief can result in the armed forces suffering tactical defeats at the hands of the insurgents. In a COIN conflict, relative strengths is not a decisive factor.

5. Lack of preparation: If the armed forces are not correctly prepared in terms of training and equipment, they will remain ineffective and reactive. Using incorrect doctrine, TTPs, approaches and equipment are indicative of a lack of preparation.

6. Poor training: Conventional TTPs are not always relevant to COIN operations. Training must be mission-specific and aimed at allowing the armed forces to “out guerrilla” the insurgents. This requires an in-depth knowledge of the enemy and his TTPs. Initiative, adaptability and flexibility must be emphasised in training. Command and control must be decentralised.

7. Foreign intervention: Foreign intervention must be viewed with caution as Africa has witnessed numerous interventions by foreign forces in COIN situations, only to see the insurgent activities escalate. Where foreign forces intervene in support of government COIN operations, their interests need to be clearly defined and understood. Similarly, foreign NGOs, despite their utterances, do not always wish to see an end to the conflicts as such will result in their reason for existence being questioned as well as a reduction in their income.

8. Neglect of principles: By neglecting the principles of COIN whilst ignoring the principles employed by the insurgents, the armed forces posture themselves incorrectly and give the initiative to the insurgent forces.

9. Expected to govern: The armed forces are not trained, prepared and equipped to fulfil the role of government and the civil service. This results in the misguided belief that the armed forces must conduct “hearts-and-minds” operations as opposed to destroying the enemy. Whereas the armed forces must create the climate in which government can function ie do its job, expecting them to govern is giving the insurgency new impetus to continue.

10. Collateral damage: Unnecessary collateral damage to the populace creates resentment, anger and even a desire for revenge. Collateral damage is also perceived by the populace to represent government policy and, as such, breeds a deeper desire to replace government, in turn swelling the ranks of the insurgency. Collateral damage will, furthermore, reduce the support of the populace towards the armed forces.

11. Disrespect and maltreatment: A lack of respect towards the populace, their property, culture, traditions and religions will breed resentment towards the armed forces. As with collateral damage, disrespect and maltreatment, along with an unwillingness to defend and protect the populace, will be viewed as government policy and reduce any support the populace may have towards the armed forces.

12. Incorrect approach: COIN forces’ primary mission is to conduct enemy-focussed (enemy-centric) operations. By altering the mission of closing with and destroying the enemy in favour of population-centric missions, presents the armed insurgent with numerous advantage as well as the initiative. Disregarding indirect approaches will not favour the armed forces. Agility, flexibility, manoeuvre and relentless aggression must be part of the approach.

13. Constraints: The armed forces are faced with numerous constraints when conducting a COIN campaign. These include poorly formulated Rules of Engagement, international interference (often aimed at assisting the insurgent forces), UN mandates that counter-act the actions of the armed forces and so forth. Unnecessary constraints prohibit the armed forces from achieving mission-success and can severely impact on morale.

14. Poor discipline: Poor discipline in executing tactics as well as in relation to obeying commands is indicative of poor training and a lack of leadership. Fire-discipline and when necessary restraint, requires discipline as does the immediate execution of orders. Poor discipline will also manifest itself in the armed forces behaviour towards the populace in the form of rape, theft, assault and so forth.

15. Inappropriate doctrine: Conventional warfare doctrine does not serve as a template for COIN doctrine. Doctrine is guided by experience, intelligence and the terrain. A failure to develop an appropriate doctrine and to continually assess and adapt it to ensure its relevance will place the armed forces at a disadvantage.

16. Lack of flexibility: Rigid, inflexible operational plans can lead to disaster, especially when senior officers refuse to adapt their plans to cope with an ever-changing environment and situation. This lack of flexibility is often the result of a lack of knowledge and understanding of the insurgent or his strategy.

17. Lack of motivation: Poor training, along with a lack of discipline, leadership and equipment will impact negatively on the morale of the armed forces. Demoralised armed forces will lack the motivation to achieve their mission.

18. Lack of resources: A lack of resources, especially tactical airlift and special weapons can render a well-intentioned and aggressive armed force powerless against the insurgents. A lack of resources can also indicate a government’s lack of faith in its armed forces or even a concern by the government that the armed forces may use their equipment to threaten government.

19. Not understanding the OE: Failing to understand the operating environment will ultimately result in mission-failure. Terrain, weather, demographics, vegetation and infrastructure all influence the operating environment. Similarly, weapons and equipment are determined by the OE. At the operational and tactical levels, failure to exploit the OE will result in the armed forces surrendering the initiative to the insurgents.

20. When politicians make the plans: It is not unheard of that politicians want to determine and dictate military strategy as well as influence military operations. These misguided beliefs on their military prowess will hamper the armed forces and afford the insurgents numerous advantages. Politicians are not trained in generalship and the art of war. Instead, they must set the guidelines and policies for war and support the armed forces to execute their mission(s).

Perhaps the greatest danger the populace face is when the government does not trust its armed forces and the armed forces, in turn, do not trust the government. This can result in internal struggles in which the populace will have to choose sides to survive.

Both governments and their armed forces can be successful in combating an armed insurgency if they negate the above reasons for failure and jointly cooperate to defeat the threat.

A BLESSED FESTIVE SEASON TO ALL

2012-12-23T13:21:00.000+02:00

I have sadly, over the past few months, been unable to maintain my blog as I would have wanted to. I have also been unable to respond to the numerous comments and mails I have received via the blog. For that I apologise. I will, however, get through all of them in the next couple of days. Those comments that are aimed to finding out if I am still okay, although highly appreciated, will not be posted – not because they hold no value but because they are personal in nature.

I would like to make use of this opportunity to wish each and every visitor to the blog a blessed festive season. To those who celebrate the true meaning of Christmas, I wish you and your families a blessed, happy and joyous festive season.

To my many Muslim friends as well as those friends who do not celebrate Christmas for whatever reason, I wish you a time of peace and joy with your families and friends.

To everyone who is far from home over this time, and to those who are deployed in the conflict zones around the world, beit as soldiers, sailors, airmen, law enforcement officers, spooks or PMC contractors, keep your heads down, your eyes peeled, your weapons close at hand and be ready to do what needs to be done.

As another hectic year filled with adrenalin rushes, expectations, waiting, laughter, happiness, satisfaction, blood, sweat and tears winds down, let us also remember those who will not be able to be with those they hold dear. They should never be forgotten. Nor should the sacrifices they have made ever be forgotten.

Thank you to everyone who took time to read and contribute to the blog throughout the year. Your comments are always appreciated and highly valued and continue to allow me to broaden my own knowledge.

Finally, I would also like to wish each and every one of you – and your loved ones - a great 2013. May the coming year be filled with good health, happiness and safety.

THE PASSING OF A GENERAL

2012-11-14T09:31:00.002+02:00

The recent passing of Lt Gen R (Witkop) Badenhorst, SSAS, SD, SM, MMM came as a great shock to me.

I served under Gen Badenhorst when he was the sector commander of Sector 10 in then-South West Africa (now Namibia) and frequently reported to him or briefed him on 32 Bn’s reconnaissance operations. Regardless of the rank I held, he simply called me “Sapper”.

Whenever I was told to report to him, I felt both nervous and scared as he was known to be extremely cantankerous. He was a strict disciplinarian, set very high standards and took no nonsense – not even from his seniors in the armed forces or from politicians – especially politicians as he held them in very low regard.

In later years, he became the Chief of Logistics and then the Chief of Military Intelligence. As a member of MI at the time he was the chief, I did everything in my power to avoid him. Mostly, I was successful.

In later life, after he retired, our paths crossed again and we frequently had breakfast together and discussed all things military. Past operations, mistakes made, lessons learnt, political ineptness and the book I was writing about Executive Outcomes became the main topics of discussion. When he offered to write the foreword for my EO book, I was surprised, excited and honoured.

When I was invited to travel to an African country to discuss doctrine with their armed forces, he offered to “come along” and he was a great source of support and amusement to me and despite his reputation in the military, I discovered that he had never lost his sense of humour. Our African hosts were extremely gracious and kind towards him and many moments of that visit remained with him for a long time after our return.

He had an incredible memory and recounted several stories to my wife that I had semi-forgotten about. Some I cannot recount here but one he particularly enjoyed telling had to do with a briefing a Special Forces officer and I had to give him in his office at Sector 10 headquarters. Maj JW from 5 Reconnaissance Regiment had to give a briefing about his pending operation and I (a captain at that time) a briefing on a pending 32 Reconnaissance Wing operation.

It was very obvious when we arrived at his HQ that Maj JW had ample time to prepare for his briefing as he arrived with flip charts, maps, transparencies and all the paraphernalia associated with given a detailed briefing. I on the other hand did not even have a piece of paper. Maj JW was smart, had shaved and even his boots were gleaming. I on the other hand looked like a scarecrow that had been dragged through a bush.

Glaring at both of us from behind his cigarette smokescreen, he demanded to know who would do the first briefing. I pointed a dirty finger at Maj JW – he in turn glared at me – and then he thankfully started preparing for his briefing. Meanwhile I was getting more and more concerned about my coming briefing, the status of my health after giving my briefing and even contemplated jumping through the window to escape my rapidly approaching fate.

Maj JW’s briefing was a proper Infantry School-style briefing. Brilliantly done and well presented, it showed that a lot of effort had gone into planning his operation. After Maj JW’s almost hour-long briefing, Witkop had no questions, although he gave the major his customary glare – all visible behind his Lexington cigarette smokescreen.

“Sapper, what is your plan?” he growled. Out the corner of my eye I saw Maj JW’s smile as he anticipated the tongue-lashing I was soon to get as he knew I had nothing to present my briefing with.

With trembling legs I walked closer to Witkop’s desk and with a shaky voice I presented my “plan” to him.

“Sir, I don’t want to waste your time as I know you are very busy. The plan is to infiltrate the area, locate and follow the enemy’s tracks, find them and then kill them”.

I wasn’t sure who was the most surprised at my 15-second briefing – Witkop or Maj JW.

Witkop glared at me for what felt like an hour. Watching him slowly light another Lexington whilst given me the evil eye, I felt like a condemned prisoner marching towards the gallows. Then, he slowly smiled and with eyes twinkling he said “Mooi (Good) Sapper. Major, that is the type of briefing I like!”

Once outside the office, Maj JW cursed both my forefathers and myself and stomped off. I rejoined my team – relieved to have survived and happy with my performance.

Whenever Witkop told that story – which he did several times to my wife – he would always laugh about it. But, that was the type of man he was.

At our last meeting, he gave me valuable feedback on book I am currently writing and told me that he was looking forward to reading the rest of my work.

So, it was with great sadness that I learnt of the sudden passing of my old commander - and in later life my friend - Lt Gen R "Witkop Badenhorst SSAS, SD, SM, MMM.

Lt Gen Badenhorst's wife passed away after a long illness last week and he was admitted to hospital a few days later and whilst there decided to join her, barely a week after she died.

I will always remember him as he was – cantankerous, strict, sharp-minded and humorous. I am just sorry I was never able to bid him farewell. I am however very grateful that I was eventually able to know him as a person and call him my friend.

Goodbye General.

BEFORE I GO...

2012-09-27T19:01:00.000+02:00

I was pointed to the Wikipedia pages on Executive Outcomes and it seems rather odd that Sterling Corporate Services has now been placed on the EO pages with great fanfare along with the statement that a:

“UN report from July 2012 criticised the South African security company Sterling Corporate Services for assembling a “private army” in defiance of international agreements and also of Somalian sanctions. The report was conducted by the UN’s Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (SEMG) and revealed strong links to Executive Outcomes”.

Whereas I knew that the UN is dumb, I never realised just how dumb they are. In case they are wondering about my comment, EO closed its doors in 1998. However, as I understand it, Sterling did a good job and would have continued doing a good job had the UN not felt so threatened and taken pity on the pirates. And no, I have nothing to do with Sterling - nor does EO as it closed its doors 14 years ago.

Apart from that, there was a very good article in the recent Foreign Policy on how the UN saved the Somali pirates from extinction (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/20/how_the_un_saved_the_somali_pirates?page=full). But, as EO severely embarrassed the UN in both Angola and Sierra Leone, it is no wonder they are still smarting. Their actions prove that they want conflict to continue – I hope African governments take note of the hidden aims behind the UN’s claims of “peacekeeping”.

Ironically, someone also removed the comment from the EO pages that the media apologised to both EO and myself. The truth must be suppressed at all costs and disinformation and lies must continue, regardless.

However, I never realised that Wikipedia now acts as a mouthpiece for the UN’s disinformation on EO. ...seems rather odd to me, but there you go

BLOG SLOW-DOWN

2012-09-27T16:02:00.000+02:00

My apologies to all followers for taking so long to respond to your comments as well as my tardiness in posting something new.

I have been incredibly busy and will be unable to do much until approximately mid-October.

If all goes “according to plan” I will be back and writing again by mid-October. However, as you all know, a plan is a basis for change...and the only thing in life that does not change is change.

My best wishes to you all.

THE PERCEPTION PILLAR

2012-09-09T13:06:00.000+02:00

I believe that the integrity of the state – as well as its legitimacy – rests on 7 pillars. I refer to these pillars as the Pillars of State. By eroding or neutralising two or more of these pillars, the state becomes weak and unstable and its influence is reduced to the point where it faces a serious threat that may lead to collapse.

Perceptions determine the view people have of the world, their region and their surroundings. This view is, by and large, developed and injected into society by and through the media either through objective reporting or through propaganda. As such, the influence of the media on the perceptions of the populace and by implication the perceptions of the populace on the state must not be underestimated.

In its role as a perception-creator, the media can play either a positive role in supporting the state’s messages and policies or eroding its credibility and thereby negatively influence both foreign policy and investment. The media does, however, need to remain objective, report facts and not abuse its potential power of propaganda.

The mainstream audio, visual and written media can play an enormous role in shaping both national and international public opinion and perceptions and can wittingly or unwittingly erode the Pillars of State.

Social media platforms such as blogs, instant messaging, social networking services and so forth can be used to rapidly reach millions of followers and incite ethnic, racial or religious tensions as well as instigate actions against a government and its various agencies or departments. Furthermore, these platforms can be used to effectively plan, coordinate and execute actions aimed at eroding the Pillars of State.

Failures by the government agencies and services along with government mismanagement and corruption will provide healthy pickings to the media - as will political infighting and bickering. Whereas these failings need to be exposed and brought into the public domain, there will be media-related articles that will subtly encourage the populace to protest and rise up against these factors. However, there will inevitably also be those in both the media and the populace who tacitly approve of - and incite - civil disobedience and whose sympathies will lay with violent protesters and insurgents. Within this climate of rapidly transmitted perceived political and other uncertainties, government messages will become blurred, ignored and even rejected by the populace.

An uncontrolled and hostile media can report on matters that may seriously disadvantage the government and in particular military, law enforcement and intelligence operations. Compromise of planned operations, force levels and deployments, equipment shortages and even planned policy decisions may impact negatively on the government and the country as a whole. Additionally, such reporting can provide hostile intelligence services and insurgent groups with important information as well as battle indications.

Government must however prevent irresponsible and irrational censorship of the media as a free media is considered to be a cornerstone of a modern democratic state. It should however consider methods and techniques of using the media to propagate its messages and policies in clearly understandable language without creating negative perceptions amongst the populace.

Information that will not disadvantage government or impact on the National and Vital Interests must be shared with the populace on a daily basis in order to strengthen public perceptions on these matters. Press releases, press briefings and other methods of communicating with the populace must be used and exploited. Creating a sense of openness, self-criticism and honesty will foster better public perceptions.

As witnessed during the so-called Arab Spring, the alternative media can play an important role in generating, mobilising and coordinating counter-government actions. Blogs, Facebook, Twitter, internet forums and chat rooms as well as personal websites can play a significant part in either shaping public perceptions or attacking government policies and actions. They can, likewise, be used to transmit disinformation aimed at discrediting and gaining international sympathy for a particular cause and be used to mobilise disgruntled people or even criminals.

Appointed and trained government media spokesmen/women must be used to interface with the media and ensure that a good and trusted relationship exists between the media and the government. A trusted relationship with the media will usually lead to self-censorship by editors and publishers alike.

Similarly, the law enforcement and intelligence agencies should monitor and where necessary take action against blatantly subversive, propagandist and tension-inciting mainstream and social media sites.

Whereas governments must be prepared to accept criticism, they do not need to accept blatant hostile propaganda aimed at creating conflict, tension and violence. This tension-inducing approach by the media must be identified, corrected and managed as rapidly as possible.

ANOTHER SPECIAL FORCES/EO WANNABE SHOWS HIMSELF – WITH THE HELP OF A “JOURNALIST”

2012-09-02T10:11:00.000+02:00

I have never been able to understand why some people feel the need to claim an association with a company or with people they have never met. I suppose it is either because they have a very low self-esteem or they believe they will never be caught out as no one will ever come to the fore and expose them for what they are – sad, pathetic people. The vast majority of these “self-confessed heroes” would not last a single day with the real men they boast they were part of.

If I were to spend my time exposing all of these conmen and wannabees (it seems there are thousands who claim to have been in EO), I would have to remain glued to my computer – something I have no intention of doing.

However, some of these pathetic wannabees simply need more exposing than others. Equally pathetic are the journalists who lap up the lies these fools tell them and then publish them as “the truth”.

In this day and age, one would think that someone who has qualified at the London School of Journalism with Distinction in 2001 – who has access to the internet – and is an author, would at least have the drive and integrity to do some fact-checking before publishing an article, not so, Simon Tomlin? It seems to get worse when the said journalist is an ex-army man who suffers from what appears to be a very severe persecution complex.

Tomlin wrote a piece he posted on his News Alliance UK blog (http://newsallianceuk.wordpress.com/2012/08/10/murder-and-mayhem-tolerated-by-the-security-services-to-protect-a-mercenary/) in which he published several blatant lies disguised as “facts”. He did not even bother to check the outrageous and libellous claims he wrote – instead, he blamed it on the piece of garbage he was writing about. In a sense, that is simply proof that Tomlin does not waste time with fact checking. As he boasts of the 4 books he has written, I wouldn’t be surprised if they are likewise books with very little factual foundation.

Enter Shaun Patrick Breach, a British subject who claims (falsely) that he served in the SA Special Forces (no one I spoke to in Special Forces had ever heard of him) as well as that he served in EO – he does not appear on any EO personnel lists nor is there a book number for anyone by the surname of Breach.

Breach happens to be Tomlin’s “source” – and he and Tomlin had a fall-out about a book Breach wanted Tomlin to write. He also happens to be the source that provided the drivel to Tomlin for his grossly inaccurate comments about EO. Everything that Breach claimed was immediately assumed by Tomlin to be fact. In a sense, I can therefore say anything about Tomlin that I want to say and use the same lame excuse he has used – “so-and-so told me so”.

Tomlin it seems believes that EO still exists, is cooperating with the British security services and along with Breach are in some way out to “get him”. This fantasy no doubt has its origins with Breach who can at best be termed a piece of dirt. Breach made numerous claims/statements to Tomlin and despite the claims being able to be verified if the journalist really wanted to, they were simply assumed to be absolute fact. This also shows the incredible gullibility of Tomlin who swallowed this drivel hook, line and sinker.

Looking at some of the emails Tomlin sent to a genuine ex-EO man – I really have to shake my head. Poor man! Tomlin certainly doesn’t like anyone questioning him and his emails are indicative of someone with uncontained hysteria.

Breach on the other hand seems to be a real piece of work and most probably a danger to society. His claims that he was involved in murders and acted as some sort of hitman ought to be investigated.

However, apart from Breach’s lies, I would like Tomlin to immediately provide the ICC with proof of EO’s “war crimes” so that the matter can be swiftly dealt with.

I suspect that both Breach and Tomlin live in a world of fantasy and deserve one another.

EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES: FOUR BALL ONE TRACER

2012-08-24T15:11:00.000+02:00

For many years, Executive Outcomes was – and still is - the target of a web of lies, deception and blatant disinformation by those who were deeply concerned that we might prevent countries in Africa from imploding and whose sole interest was the destruction of the continent for economical and other gain.

A quick Google search will reveal just how many lies are out there on the company. Granted, the media did finally publish an apology for being the mouthpiece of a massive disinformation campaign but it was a little too late as far as I was concerned. Some of these despicable, lying, self-serving members of society who jumped on the bandwagon under the banner of “journalist” had, however, effectively played their role in ensuring the longevity of terrorist groups and insurgents – at the cost of many hundreds of thousands of lives. They also very successfully contributed to the bad name many true journalists have to endure.

When I finally wrote my account of Executive Outcomes (EO), it was primarily to give my version of events – a version which unlike the media’s and the intelligence services’, was based on company documents, interviews as well as video and audio recordings of many of the men who were part of EO or senior government officials who EO had worked for.

After my book was published, I continued to hope and wish that someone who was at the forefront of EO’s operations in the field would follow suit and document their version of events – the good and the bad. After all, as I was trying to run the company whilst fending off the liars, intelligence agents and BS artists who overnight had become “specialists” on EO, I could seldom even visit our AOs, let alone spend much time on the ground.

Rudolph van Heerden, known to many within EO as “Ruff” or “Roelf” finally put pen to paper and along with Andrew Hudson wrote a perspective on EO as seen through the eyes of one of the commanders who was on the ground. I was excited at the news as I believed that it would fill in many of the gaps my book may have left. And I believe the book will do just that.

I was keen to lay my hands on Ruff’s book and when I finally managed to get a copy, - its title is “Four Ball One Tracer” - I was enthralled. Roelf tells the story of EO from the day he signed up to join the company, the nightmare that was Soyo and until the end of the Sierra Leone campaign.

Roelf discusses a lot of things – the training, the tactics, the hardships and the laughs. He tells his story as he lived it – straight and to the point. He also pays tribute to the many good men who served in EO and used their skills and knowledge to bring about positive change in war torn countries.

I do not want to spoil anyone’s anticipation but I would recommend Roelf’s book to anyone who is interested in a lot more detail about EO’s operations.

It is a very good read.

Well done Roelf and thank you again for your service in EO.

THREAT PREDICTION

2012-08-22T16:12:00.000+02:00

Threat prediction is a vital pre-requisite of strategy development. It can, however, be a difficult and problematic task if the intelligence analysts as well as the planners and strategists do not have accurate intelligence at hand, do not understand the historical trends that have manifested over time, and do not understand the political strategies of their own government and those of the target country or target grouping.

If the intelligence services do not utilise all available resources at their disposal, and cultivate new resources where intelligence gaps exist, they will directly contribute to intelligence failures. Intelligence failures can, in turn, lead to misjudging the enemy, doctrinal failures and faulty or disjointed threat predictions and subsequently poor, unrealistic or irrelevant strategies.

The value of threat prediction and its analysis is that it provides benchmarks and indicators that can be used to constantly assess and re-adjust the overall military strategy. The need for flexibility in the developing military strategy is vital in order to prevent a tunnel-vision view of the threats a government may be facing.

The nature of modern warfare and, more broadly, armed conflict has changed dramatically from the classical or historical perspective of war. The days of two opposing armies meeting one another on an open field to engage in a classical conventional battle are, for the time being, long gone.

Although the ever-present threat of a conventional land, sea and air battle will always remain very real, modern war and/or conflict may be characterised by many different concepts such as religious fanaticism, ethnic hatred, radical ideologies, resource grabbing, xenophobia, mass mobilisation of the disadvantaged, a breakdown of law and order, a perceived weakness of the opposition, a growth in power by armed organised crime syndicates and so forth. These factors, more than ever, require detailed investigation – something that can only be achieved by means of a strong, dedicated and aggressive intelligence gathering and analysis capability.

Whereas modern military technology, if correctly applied, can prove to be a force- multiplier on the battlefield, strategists and planners cannot rely on technology alone, as technology is prone to failure, often at critical times. Over-reliance on technology may, therefore, present several serious disadvantages to the user. Correctly used as a battlefield support system, technology can play a valuable role in locating, confusing and even overcoming the enemy. Technology, however, needs to be balanced against the operating environment, the threat and the ability to maintain and apply the technology correctly. It remains a secondary weapon and not the primary weapon of an armed force.

Intelligence analysts, along with military planners and strategists furthermore need to consider a host of different and varying factors that may lead to political tension and thus negatively influence the security of the state, its citizens and the operating environment.

Political tension, on the other hand, may be the result of economic tension, natural resource distribution, border disputes, perceived political sabotage, ethnicity, religious differences and so forth.

Therefore, from a strategic planning point-of-view, several factors need to be closely assessed in terms of how they can be used to the advantage of the armed forces and how they can be successfully exploited thus denying the enemy from gaining an advantage.

Additionally, these factors need to be viewed in terms of the disadvantage they may hold for the political- and the military machinery. Of equal importance is the fact that the opposing forces will be assessing the same factors of the state or grouping they view as an aggressor.

The advantage will thus lie with the strategists and planners who are able to accurately predict the threats facing the state and identify the weaknesses and exploitation possibilities in order to develop realistic options that can be implemented.

PS: I have been travelling as well as ill and have therefore been unable to regularly update the blog. My apologies...

WHY THE ARMED FORCES FAIL AT COIN

2012-07-19T09:55:00.001+02:00

In my previous posting I listed the reasons why I believe governments fail at COIN. Most insurgencies start either as a result of a perceived lack of – or poor - governance or to resist an invader when the government and the armed forces have been overrun.

Governments, despite often being the prime reason why an insurgency starts, are often only too keen to make the armed forces responsible for establishing workable governance in areas that have become positively disposed towards the insurgency.

As it is an internal problem, countering the insurgency is essentially a law enforcement responsibility. The problem is that often the law enforcement agencies do not realise that an insurgency is developing and through ignorance and denial, mislead government – and the nation - on the seriousness of the situation. This provides the insurgents with numerous advantages, most crucial being time to organise, train and escalate the insurgency.

The end goal of the insurgency is political in nature and therefore, the main effort aimed at countering it ought to be political and not militarily. This “passing the buck” approach places the armed forces in a position they can seldom if ever win as the military’s role is not to govern but to ensure an environment in which governance can take place.

An insurgency is neither a strategy nor a war. It is a condition based on the perception(s) of a part of the populace that poor governance exists, that government only governs for its own benefit and that they – the populace - are being marginalised or politically suppressed. In reality, an insurgency is an internal emergency that, left unchecked, can develop into a civil war. The insurgency itself is a means to an end and it is an approach aimed at either weakening or collapsing a government’s control and forcing a negotiation in the favour of the insurgents.

The role of the armed forces, once it has been mandated by government to take control when the law enforcement agencies are unable to contain the insurgency, is to create an environment that will allow government to negotiate from a position of strength – and govern. To achieve this, the armed forces must destroy the armed elements of the insurgency and “out-guerrilla the guerrillas”.

The armed forces can, despite their relative strengths in terms of manpower, firepower and other resources, fail at effectively neutralising and destroying an insurgency. There are many reasons for this failure but not all of the reasons can be laid before the door of the armed forces.

Intelligence failures, poor strategies and a lack of training, equipment and preparation as well as a lack of understanding of the Operating Environment (OE) are major contributing factors. So too are attempts at utilising conventional TTPs to fight an unconventional enemy. Being unable to apply relentless pursuit and locate and destroy the insurgents with ruthless aggression add to the reasons for failure.

However, all the firepower in the world will not end or contain the insurgency if government fails at its responsibilities. The armed forces cannot build national cohesion nor can they be expected to govern in the absence of government.

I suspect that what I was taught many years ago still holds true; countering an insurgency requires an 80% effort by government and a 20% effort by the armed forces. However, in executing their 20% responsibility, the armed forces must give 100% of their effort to succeed in creating the climate government requires to fulfil its duties. This climate is characterised by safety and security.

In the execution of their mission, the armed forces must continuously guard against:

1. Unnecessary collateral damage – this will alienate the populace towards them

2. Disrespect and maltreatment of the populace

3. A lack of operational flexibility

4. Imposing unnecessary restraints on the troops

5. Believing the enemy to be inferior
Inability to adapt

6. Poor discipline

7. Routine
Foreign interference

8. Neglecting the principles of COIN.

Misleading, emotional mainstream and social media in favour of the insurgency can weaken the national resolve and demotivate the armed forces. Furthermore, this type of reporting will give credibility to the insurgents and add impetus to the insurgency.

It is furthermore crucial that the armed forces know when to stop and when government must take over and govern and the law enforcement agencies enforce the law.

WHY GOVERMENTS FAIL...

2012-06-26T15:49:00.005+02:00

I was recently asked my thoughts on why I think governments fail at countering insurgencies.

As I had recently completed that chapter of my book, I could list several reasons why I believe that governments fail in countering an insurgency. (It must, however, be borne in mind that these reasons are different from those of why a law enforcement agency or the armed forces fail at COIN).

There is no single reason why governments fail in countering an insurgency; rather it is a colliding of a host of different factors and reasons that culminate at the right time to give impetus to an insurgency.

I believe that many governments fail to recognise that an insurgency is not “war” but rather a means to an end.

The following are inter alia some of the more common reasons (I have only briefly listed the points) why governments fail when having to counter an insurgency:

1. Poor intelligence

2. The lack of a realistic containment strategy and weak policies

3. Denial or out of touch with the situation

4. Lack of unity between government agencies and departments

5. Ineffective policing approaches and techniques

6. Incompetence and inefficiency within government agencies and departments

7. Unacceptable high levels of corruption and crime

8. Failure to understand the importance of perception of the nation

9. Failure to understand the insurgent’s strategy

10. Failure to isolate insurgents

11. Believing that relative strengths decide the victor

12. Failure to prepare

13. Lack of credibility

14. Lack of legitimacy

15. Lack of information to the nation

16. Lack of national and international support

17. Poor governance and service delivery

18. Divine right (A misguided belief that when having assumed power the government has a divine right to govern and to promulgate self-serving agendas)

19. Abuse of power

20. Failure to listen to the nation

21. Losing the moral high ground

22. Over-reliance on foreign aid and assistance

Governments that govern at the expense of the nation as opposed to governing for the nation place themselves in a position that will be rapidly exploited by aggrieved people and may ultimately result in a national uprising, a challenge to their authority or even into an insurgency.

Governments will inadvertently provide the insurgents with numerous advantages if they fail to take note of the above factors. These factors provide the insurgents with a fertile breeding ground for discontent and recruitment. With national and international media coverage and support, the insurgency will intensify and government reaction may result in both heavy-handed action and over-reaction.

Unlike a conventional war, a COIN conflict’s main effort is aimed at restoring faith in the government and redressing real or perceived wrongs against the populace who are partaking or supporting the insurgency. Failure to do so will simply fuel the insurgency.

When government’s failure is handed-down to the armed forces to “rectify”, the armed forces become the target of government pressure to resolve the situation as fast as possible as well as actions and propaganda by the insurgents who, by their very actions, get free publicity in the media for their cause.

MY EARLY DEMISE...BY EOPS

2012-06-11T11:38:00.000+02:00

Thanks to Jason for alerting me to this bunch of clowns.

To quote Mark Twain, “The rumours of my death have been greatly exaggerated”.

I may have been unable to respond to comments or even to update my blog, but that is due to work-related activities and has nothing to do with my early demise.

However, not so according to Florida-based US company Executive Outcomes Protection Services (EOPS) who, with a few strokes across the keyboard, have killed me.

On their website (www.eopssecurity.com) under company history, EOPS states (unedited) the following:

Our Inspirational founder, the late Colonel Eeben Barlow founded executive outcomes in 1989. A private military contractor (PMC) company. The company acquires notoriety by its professionalism and dedication and by the year 1994/1995 rescuing and returning the constitutional power to the government of Sierra Leone and Angola.

Whereas there are many who would no doubt rejoice at my early demise, I think there are equally some governments that may be concerned as I still need to assist them with some matters. After all, who would want to use a dead guy to provide advice? Besides, I could have killed myself by laughing so much that I fell off my chair and broke my neck laughing.

Sadly EOPS did not do any homework before they decided to pose as a reborn EO. Not only did they get their dates wrong, they also posted photos of obviously well-fed guards. I don’t recall any EO men looking that well fed!

It is said that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery but EOPS are elevating it to a new level.

I wonder if these scoundrels are going to submit my posthumous profits to my family?

Regardless, I am so tired of conmen and posers trying to claim their role in the actions of good men. I can only hope that their clients realise that EOPS are being totally untruthful in their claims.

However, it would be nice if mdominguez@eopssecurity.com would contact me and explain my death to me.

CHARLES TAYLOR FINALLY FOUND GUILTY...

2012-04-26T17:43:00.000+02:00

One has to applaud those who were responsible for finally bringing ex-Liberian President Charles Taylor to justice as well as what must be considered a landmark verdict.

Having at long last been found guilty of his war crimes, which were numerous and horrific – it is just a pity it took so long to bring him before the courts. I can only hope he won’t be given upmarket living quarters with all the luxuries he needs to satisfy his human rights.

What also concerns me somewhat is that I suspect that this is merely lip service being paid to the ex-dictator. I sincerely hope I am wrong. Time will tell how the punishment will be applied. I just hope it will be as harsh as it can possibly be.

It is a sad fact that this person was welcomed into South Africa as a hero of sorts and regarded as a great friend despite him being unable to quench his blood-lust and desire to terrorise, destabilise and steal the resources of another country. Hopefully, the large diamond he presented with such modest fanfare to Naomi Campbell will find its way back to those who it rightfully belongs to.

Whereas I applaud the verdict, what about the victims he and his thugs created? The suffering and misery these poor souls have had to endure defies belief. For them, his verdict may bring some satisfaction but it will never turn back the clock and give them back their lives.

What about the people who trained his so-called Presidential Guard, knowing full well that their students of mayhem were to be deployed in Sierra Leone to support the RUF and conduct atrocities against the innocent and the helpless?? Let us also not forget that this “Presidential Guard” was used to “pacify” and punish thousands of people in Liberia as well.

Apparently, the man who secured the contract to train Taylor’s Presidential Guard was the same man who for years, despite international embargos, supplied UNITA (who by the way did a lot of murdering as well) with a surface-to-air missile to shoot down an EO aircraft which resulted in two good men being killed.

I can only hope that more of Taylor’s associates and “business partners” will be brought to book.

Perhaps the guilty verdict will finally send a clear warning to those in power who believe they are immune to any laws and can therefore rape, murder and plunder as they see fit.

As always, only time will tell how serious we are about bringing these murderers and dictators to justice – or not.

PRINCIPLES OF THE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK

2012-04-26T16:08:00.000+02:00

The aim of the attack is to disrupt, disorganise and destroy the enemy.

The principles of the attack are as follows:

1. The CoG must be targeted

2. Fire-and-manoeuvre must be exploited

3. The attack must be organised in depth

4. The attack must be launched from a firm base

5. The start of the attack must be secured

6. The tempo and momentum of the attack must be maintained

7. The attack must be supported by maximum firepower

8. Assault forces must move close to supporting fire

9. Support weapons must be brought forward as soon as possible

10. Relentless execution.

The CoG must be targeted: The enemy’s Centre of Gravity and those strong points that protect it must be located and targeted. Their destruction will bring about a weakening or a collapse in the enemy’s defences. The destruction of the CoG is a key to victory. (The COG must not be confused with the Trinity of Gravity in unconventional warfare)

Fire-and-manoeuvre: The ability to manoeuvre and utilise direct and indirect firepower to achieve advantageous positions in relation to the enemy must be exploited at all times. All engagements are reliant on fire-and-manoeuvre. Fire without manoeuvre and manoeuvre without fire is of no value. Fire-and-manoeuvre adds to momentum.

Depth: Depth in the attacking forces ensures momentum, provides flexibility, space and options for manoeuvre and additionally reduces casualties amongst the attacking forces.

Firm bases: The attack must begin from a firm base and as the attack develops, commanders must continue establishing firm bases (overwatch positions). This allows the attacking forces to maintain “one foot on the ground” and thus retain balance during the attack. Firm bases make it difficult for the enemy to launch successful counter attacks. Firm bases are established on terrain that provides the attacking forces an advantage in terms of fire and observation.

Secured start: The attack must be launched from a secure position to prevent assault forces from making immediate contact with the enemy as this will make deployment difficult and derail fire plans, especially indirect fire plans. Starting an attack from an unsecured position will give the enemy the initiative, adversely affect own forces morale, create casualties and confusion within the attacking force and disrupt the attack plan.

Tempo and momentum: Maintaining the tempo and momentum of the attack will ensure sustained pressure on the enemy. Sustained pressure will prevent the enemy from being able to reorganise and counter the attack, bring his reserves forward or prepare new positions. Aggressive execution will result in a rapid, relentless attack

Maximum firepower: Effective, sustained direct and indirect fire will inflict casualties and reduce enemy resistance. Fire support is vitally important where exposed assault forces move across open terrain or breach obstacles without adequate cover.

Moving close to supporting fire: The assault forces must move as close as possible to the supporting direct and indirect fire. This will prevent the enemy from reorganising or reacting once the supporting fire is lifted.

Support weapons rapidly to front: The aim of the attack is to destroy the enemy, capture and occupy the objective and defend it. It must be expected that the enemy will try to launch a counter attack as soon as possible to recapture terrain it has lost. Support weapons should rapidly be brought forward to strengthen positions that have been captured from the enemy.

Relentless execution: Once the attack begins ie the attacking forces cross the start line, the execution must be relentless. Relentless execution will enhance momentum, weaken enemy resolve, add speed and tempo to the attack as well as unbalance the enemy.

The above principles are relevant to all types of conventional infantry attacks, regardless of whether they are launched in the day or at night, mounted or dismounted.

The commander who applies the principles of the attack will create the necessary space in which to manoeuvre his forces, exploit his firepower, grasp the initiative from the enemy and develop advantages as they occur.

Note: This posting has been taken from the book I am currently writing and is an extract from Chapter 15: The Attack

SORRY...

2012-04-23T09:06:00.001+02:00

For numerous reasons, I have been unable to update my blog or even answer the many private messages and comments to postings. My apologies for what may appear to be tardiness on my part but it is sometimes impossible for me to devote time to the blog – especially when I am in an area where I have no access to the internet.

Since my last posting, a lot has happened – or not happened:

1. Mali’s situation worsened

2. The conflict between North Sudan and South Sudan has intensified

3. A coup in Guinea-Bissau

4. Our President married (again)

5. President Mugabe was reported to be almost on death’s bed but miraculously recovered

6. I had another article in Counter Terrorist magazine

7. Joseph Kony is still at large

8. Service delivery protests in South Africa have been ongoing

9. The pirates continue with their actions on the high seas...

The list is seemingly endless.

I will be working on a new posting relating to the attack and hopefully, will get it done by this coming weekend.

In the meantime, thanks to everyone who continued to visit the blog during my absence as well as comment on it or write to me.

Regards to you all.

Eeben

MALI – ANOTHER INTELLIGENCE FAILURE

2012-03-25T15:23:00.000+02:00

The unseating of the government in Mali was nothing other than an intelligence failure of epic proportions, not only by the Malian intelligence services but also by the member-states of the AU.

The aim of any intelligence service is to identify potential and real threats to the national interests and vital interests of the state. These threats are then targeted for intelligence collection, interpreted and disseminated. Furthermore, these agencies need to be able to make intelligence predictions based on the database of knowledge they have built up over time. It is apparent that if this was done, it was done very poorly.

In early March 2012, it was already evident that the Malian forces had lost the initiative in the north of the country. The garrison at Tessalit was under siege by the Tuareg-led separatist movement known as the National Movement for the Liberation of Awawid (NMLA). The NMLA claimed it is fighting for “independence” from Mali. Reinforcements were unable to break through to the garrison.

The NMLA had apparently been boosted by “freedom fighters” from Algeria, Chad and Nigeria. Additionally, the Malian government claimed that the MNLA had been boosted by “drug dealers, Al Qaeda factions and other Islamists” – a claim no doubt made with the hopes of getting increased foreign (US and French) support as these are matters that lie close to the heart of the US government – and Mali was a French colony.

Cut-off from reinforcements, outgunned and ultimately defeated by the NMLA in Tessalit, morale in the Malian forces was bound to take a downward turn as soldiers began deserting.

On 20 March 2012, the AU’s Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) met in the capital of Mali to discuss the ever deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region. On 21 March, the demoralised Mali forces toppled the government of Pres Amadou Toure – in the capital – by means of a coup. How the unfolding dissatisfaction in Mali military ranks was something the AU – and its numerous member-state intelligence services – had not foreseen defies belief.

For some time the Malian army has been fighting the NMLA. They have, also on numerous occasions voiced their concern at the lack of equipment, arms and ammunition with which they are supposed to fight the NMLA with. They also voiced their concern that Pres Toure had adopted a too soft approach towards the NMLA.

Pres Toure, however well intentioned he may have been, forgot that one cannot negotiate from a position of weakness – a situation that was very evident in the north of Mali. Ironically, the leader of the coup, Capt. Amadou Sanogo, is now voicing his desire to negotiate with the NMLA separatists. The coup has however created a power vacuum and presented the NMLA the initiative in their fight against the Malian forces and it can be expected that their determination has been increased.

Given the fragility of the Sahel region with its famine, poverty, Islamic terrorism, porous borders, droughts, uncontrolled flow of weapons, along with the NMLA insurgency in the north, it is surprising that this situation was not viewed by intelligence services as a threat to both the national and vital interests of the state.

The deposed president’s seat had hardly gone cold when the fingers began pointing.

Some African government officials were quick to lay the blame for the NMLA’s insurgency the subsequent coup at the door of NATO and its allies for their involvement in Libya.

Whereas it is true that the NMLA insurgency intensified after the collapse of Gadaffi’s Libya – many of the Tuaregs fought against Gadaffi’s forces and returned to Mali after the “regime change” - it is somewhat disingenuous to blame NATO for such an intelligence failure. It will be interesting to see how the new Libyan government views this situation as the Touregs can rightly be seen as their allies.

The fact that the Malian intelligence services (if they were not part of the planned coup) along with the AU member-states’ intelligence services were unable to identify the dangers of a pending coup or anticipate a coup, shows that there was a massive intelligence failure. No amount of finger pointing can and will dispel that fact. Nor will it dispel the threat the Mali coup poses to regional stability.

The domino effect of the “Arab Spring” poses a very real danger to African governments. They need to take note of what happened – and what is happening in their own countries. But, as long as they remain complacent and ignore the dangers developing in their own countries the danger will keep growing.

If other African intelligence services remain reliant on open source information (OSINFO) and believe that just because they are not seeing things and accept that all is well in their countries, they too can look forward to their own intelligence failures in the future.

CUT THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDING

2012-02-19T19:06:00.000+02:00

Fighting the complex and diverse wars of today requires us to be prepared to face an enemy who has no scruples in utilising crime, and total terror against innocent civilians in order to coerce their support with the aim of placing themselves into power.

This does not mean that conventional land battles are something of the past and unconventional warfare something of the future. The fact remains that armies need to prepare for both scenarios as well as their various off-shoots. In many instances, they will need to conduct these missions in support of the law enforcement agencies.

Utilising unconventional methods, and in the process developing their armed gangs, we have allowed these unconventional forces to move funds and equipment, ie arms and ammunition, and in some instances, sympathetic governments have even provided these thugs with passports or allowed their territories to be used for “training”.

This has given numerous terrorist groups freedom of movement as well as financial freedom. Sometimes hidden beneath layers of ostensibly legitimate business, their activities aimed at instilling terror continue – and in some instances they are still able to move large sums of money, albeit in the shape of resources, to fund their activities and crimes. Even more so when they act as proxies for governments who plan the demise of neighbouring states or aim at creating regional instability.

Much has been done with international banking laws and regulations to follow the money trail but I suspect it is the wrong approach to follow. Ex-President Thabo Mbeki recently made the claim that Africa loses US$ 50 Bn annually to illegal activities. Whereas I cannot vouch for the accuracy of this figure, I do know that the amount lost in terms of monetary value is huge. Not only has this undermined the continent, some of this funding has also enriched and empowered those that seek to cause instability.

I dislike using the “when we” label, but when Executive Outcomes assisted African governments with devising military strategies, the prime strategic military targets were the sources of funding. This led to an outcry in the local and international media with wild claims that the company was interested in seizing the sources of funding – mainly diamonds and oil – for its own purposes.

Had those who shouted the loudest spent five minutes thinking about it, the reasons for following that strategy would have become quite obvious:

1. Deny the enemy his source of income

2. With no income, no weapons can be purchased or replaced

3. With no funding, freedom of movement is curtailed

4. With no funding, the enemy will slowly bleed itself into destruction.

What the military-strategists-posing-as-journalists failed to understand was that the enemy – call them rebels, terrorists, activists or whatever – were resorting to criminal and terror activities in order to overthrow legitimate governments. In their foolish attempts to create suspicion on the company, these so-called journalists were not only assisting the rebels but also condoning crime. The crimes got worse when young children were forced to kill their parents and elders as they were coerced into joining rebel or terror networks. This was conveniently not reported.

It is no secret that illegally mined gold and diamonds are leaving the African shores to be sold elsewhere. Much of these profits are filtered back into radical terror networks. This continued access to funds allows them to perpetuate their activities, be they crime or terror actions.

It is also no secret that some countries in Africa have become transit points for drugs shipments to Europe – some of these shipments being coordinated by criminal groups with close association with terror groups.

Despite these facts, we have done very little or nothing to attack the source of the funding. Instead, we have given these forces the freedom to continue with their activities. Ironically, they are doing so in total safety with no real aggressive efforts to stop them.

We need to drastically step up our intelligence gathering capabilities, formulate intelligence-based strategies to attack the sources of funding to reclaim our stability and neutralise those who threaten it. We need to conduct this with aggression and vigour and give no quarter to those who seek to disrupt peace and replace it with terror.

As long as we leave the sources of funding intact, we allow these people to continue with their actions, erode our belief in the state, damage our safety and security and implement their form of rule through savagery.

PROGRESSION OF WAR AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA

2012-02-10T18:36:00.001+02:00

Africa has been wracked by numerous wars, civil wars, rebellions and insurgencies, conflicts that have all been very similar in progression - a progression that closely follows Mao Zedong’s views on how these actions ought to be conducted.

This does not imply that those insurgencies have all been Maoist in thought and deed but rather that the Maoist progression model has been relatively easy to implement.

In the West, those who ferment such a revolution with the aim of overthrowing a government are often viewed as “freedom fighters” or “non-state actors”. Within Africa they are not viewed as such as the term itself gives those who turn to armed conflict a legitimacy that is often undeserved. As such revolutions inevitably make use of extreme torture of captured opponents, brutality towards the innocent and extreme terrorisation of the local populace, they are instead referred to as “rebels”, “terrorists” or “criminals”.

Africa has also been witness to numerous coup d’etats, the results which have often led to the establishment of military juntas that are inexperienced in political matters and therefore prone to mismanaging the political responsibilities associated with government. This has been partly due to the large influence of politics within the military as well as the quest for ultimate power.

Conventional wars, as understood in the Western sense of conventional land battles, are not common to Africa. Although there have been large, isolated classical conventional battles on the continent post 1945, it is the manner of conduct and approach to war that differs vastly from Western military thinking. Examples of such conventional battles are the Ugandan invasion of Tanzania in 1978-79 and the South African Defence Force battles against Cuban and Angolan forces in 1987. Such conventional actions have all followed the same progression:

· Antagonism, anger or perceived danger/threat

· Diplomacy

· Failed diplomacy

· Build-up of forces

· War

The African model for revolution is often misunderstood by Western military thinkers. This model invariably follows the following progression:

· The mobilisation of the people against real or perceived oppression

· A phase of armed struggle utilising the operational environment as well as the political environment. This is usually in the form of guerrilla warfare and may include acts of terrorism. However, soft targets are of primary importance to show results and get mass media attention. It is this phase of war that is referred to as an insurgency and the fight against it is referred to as counter-insurgency. Engagements are of short duration and the insurgent will then melt away into the bush and blend into local population concentrations

· Mobile warfare aimed primarily at rear areas with the aim of cutting supply lines and capturing arms and ammunition. This is not a phase where Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) are employed but should rather be viewed as a phase in which the insurgents mount large-scale operations. Vehicles or motorcycles may be used to deliver them to close proximity of their targets

· Conventional warfare – a phase where mass support from the people has been given to the insurgent movement – a phase where numbers and anger will tell.

As can be noted, the above progression closely follows the Maoist model for revolution despite the fact that many insurgent groups are not Maoist organisations.

This type of progression, with variations, has become a very successful conflict-model and has proven itself in numerous armed insurrections in Africa. Although not every revolution in Africa has been successful, many important lessons are evident – lessons that remain applicable to counter-insurgency students – regardless of origin.

It is only by knowing and understanding this progression of conflict that an effective counter can be designed and implemented.

THE LEVELS OF WAR

2012-02-06T15:55:00.007+02:00

The military strategy is an intelligence-driven, intellectual process that results in possible future or definite action.

The waging of war ie the implementation of strategy is conducted at four distinct yet inter-related levels. These levels are known as the levels of war and consist of:

1. The political level

2. The strategic level

3. The operational level

4. The tactical level.

The Political Level: Sometimes referred to as War by Political Means, this is the highest level of war and is often ignored by the military. Although the Grand Strategy or National Strategy is the highest level of strategy, the political level of war is, likewise, the highest level of war and is associated with political, economical and/or covert politico-military operations. Sometimes referred to as War by Political Means, it is the applying of political and/or economical sanctions against a country that is considered to be conducting unacceptable political practices. Likewise, financial sanctions aimed at wearing down or exhausting a country economically are further examples of war at the political level. Other examples of the war at the political level include expelling of diplomatic staff, pressure to ensure international isolation of a threat country, international boycotts, international support to nationalist groups, and the conduct of highly-sensitive, high-level covert operations aimed at achieving a specific political goal and so forth. The conduct of highly-sensitive, high-level covert operations are usually deniable by the government. Where war at the political level may require discretionary warfare, these types of operations straddle the boundary between political and strategic level warfare yet remain highly sensitive and are usually deniable. War at the political level is ultimately aimed at bringing about a regime change without overtly committing the armed forces to direct battle.

The Strategic Level: At this level of planning, strategists and planners will ultimately be left with four definitive choices of how the government will want to resolve the situation. These are:

· Neutralising rebel or insurgent forces intent on usurping government support through violent means

· Annihilating the opposing forces

· Exhausting the opposing forces

· Attrition of the opposing forces.

The threat, the terrain, Own Forces capabilities and the economy or support to sustain the war will determine how it will be fought at this level. Military operations conducted at this level are referred to as strategic warfare. War at the strategic level will encompass either distant or close strategic offensives as well as strategic defensive warfare. Strategic defensive warfare can take the form of conventional, unconventional and semi-conventional operations and can include long-distance offensives, cross-border raids (sanctioned or not sanctioned) and Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations.

The Operational Level: War at the Operational Level is aimed at achieving the strategic military objectives through a series of battles and/or campaigns, conventional or otherwise, aimed at achieving the theatre objectives and can last for weeks, months and even years. These actions are not restricted to operations beyond the borders of the country but may unfold nationally as well.

The Tactical Level: At this level of war, short term engagements are fought between Own Forces and the enemy utilising Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) as the foundation of the engagements.

It is at the levels of war that the strategy unfolds via the approved military strategy, commander’s intent, designs for battle, operational plans and action. However, a lack of sound intelligence will result in weak or poorly executed strategies that may bring about a collapse of the government or a defeat of the armed forces.

Prematurely extricating the armed forces from operations that have been poorly planned and executed may lead to grave embarrassment of the state and a decline in regional and international respect. In turn, this may adversely impact on both the security of the state and even the tenure of the government.