EPS Blog

Philosophia Christi (Winter 2009): Religious Pluralism

2009-11-07T21:39:00.000-08:00

The Winter 2009 issue of Philosophia Christi features a dialog on "religious pluralism" with scholars Keith Yandell, Paul Moser and Paul Knitter.

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Keith Yandell, "Religious Pluralism: Reductionist, Exclusivist, and Intolerant?"

Abstract: There is a general recognition that there are various self-identifying religions. Many people find the idea that these religions differ in significant ways altogether too distressing to accept. Thus Religious Pluralism is often taken to define the only unbiased, rational, and acceptable approach to the diversity of religions. In fact, the Pluralist route is anything but unbiased or rational. Rather than being the only acceptable approach, it should be flatly rejected. While proclaiming its respect to all nice religious traditions (ones that are not nice are simply cast out), it proposes a radical reshaping of religious traditions along the lines that it favors. Coming to clear terms with this imperialistic fact concerning Religious Pluralist procedures is no part of their agenda.

Paul K. Moser, "Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Kardiatheology"

Abstract: This paper contends that although many religious views are exclusive of each other, a morally perfect God worthy of worship would seek to include all willing people in lasting life with God. The paper distinguishes some different variations on religious exclusivism and inclusivism, and proposes an inclusive version of Christian exclusivism. The account implies that one can yield volitionally to God’s unselfish love and thereby to God de re, without any corresponding acknowledgment de dicto and thus without one’s knowing (or believing) that God exists. The paper finds the basis for this approach in the teachings of Jesus himself. In addition, the paper recruits a notion of kardiatheology to emphasize that a God worthy of worship would seek to transform the heart (or motivational center) of a wayward person even if this person does not (yet) believe that God exists.

Paul F. Knitter, "Religious Diversity: What to Make of It ... How to Engage It? A Conversation with Paul Moser and Keith Yandell."

Abstract: Knitter asks Moser if the soteriological inclusivism he is proposing for our understanding of God can also be extended to our understanding of Christ: Christ’s death and resurrection do not constitute or bring about saving grace; they reveal it, thus leaving room for the possibility of other revealers. For Yandell, Knitter first clarifies that the necessary conditions for dialogue are not established before but in the dialogue. He then urges an epistemic humility for all Christian philosophers in view of the ineffable Mystery of God—a Mystery that may well include, to the philosopher’s consternation, a “coinciding of opposites.”

God, Evidence and the Will

2009-11-07T20:53:00.000-08:00

Thomas Nagel, an atheist philosopher at New York University said something very revealing in his book The Last Word:

In speaking of the fear of religion, I don’t mean to refer to the entirely reasonable hostility toward certain established religions and religious institutions, in virtue of their objectionable moral doctrines, social policies, and political influence. Nor am I referring to the association of many religious beliefs with superstition and the acceptance of evident empirical falsehoods. I am talking about something much deeper–namely, the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that (Oxford Univ. Press, 1997), 130-131.

Nagel seems to be speaking for many when he reveals what the root problem is—an unwillingness to acknowledge God’s lordship in his life. Note too how Nagel admits that a lot of smart people he knows are believers, which makes him very uncomfortable.

Let me mention another book that addresses the will in relationship to God and the available evidence. Christian philosopher Paul Moser’s book The Elusive God (Cambridge University Press), or from his 2008 EPS plenary paper, directs us to the need to consider the role of the will and “perfectly authoritative purposively available evidence” from God. Moser, with whom I have had the pleasure of co-editing The Rationality of Theism (Routledge) has been writing for some time on the dangers of cognitive idolatry and mere “spectator evidence” for God that fails to engage the will. We can easily treat discussions about God with non-believers as mere armchair theorizing rather than a topic of potentially life-altering significance. Notice the priority of the will in Jesus’ words in John 7:17: “Whoever chooses to do his will shall know whether my teaching is from God or whether I speak on my own.”

Sometime ago I spoke at an open forum at the University of South Carolina on “God’s Existence and Why It Matters.” Below is a list of questions I raised at the beginning of my talk. I spoke of evidence, but I also addressed the topic of human need for outside assistance (“grace”) and that God has taken initiative in the person of Jesus to identify with us in our broken human condition and to bring us into a filial relationship with God. In my talk, I pointed out the deep interconnection of God, the will, and evidence. Here are some of the questions I raised to start the conversation:

Could it be that I am looking at the evidence for God in the wrong way—like the duck-rabbit scenario? Perhaps God seems hidden from humans because we aren’t paying attention or because we don’t want God’s authority “interfering” with our lives or because we’ve determined the height of the bar over which God must “jump”?
If a good God exists, what would God’s goals be? If God exists, what does God have to do with me?
If a good, perfectly authoritative God exists, am I willing to acknowledge my unworthiness to receive this God’s grace? Do I make demands of God (“if God exists, then he ought to put on a display of divine pyrotechnics”) rather than ask, “What demands does God have on me?
Do I have a right to demand evidence of God if I am unwilling to go undergo personal transformation?
Am I open to evidence for God in whatever form it comes—or do I insist that evidence must be a certain way?
Does my will have anything to do with my actually benefiting from evidence?
If God exists, how would this impact my life? Is it possible to intellectually believe God exists but my life to remain unchanged by knowing this intellectual fact? What’s the point if my life remains unchanged and self-centered rather than God-centered? What’s the point of evidence if I’m not willing to be transformed by the reality of God?
Does God want more than just an acknowledgment of his existence? What if God wants an I-you relationship with individual humans?
What kind of an attitude does truth-seeking require? Does the fact that people want to disprove evidence for God actually reveal an attitude of non-truth-seeking?
Is it possible that some people might hate God all the more as one piece of evidence for God is stacked on another? Is it possible for me to believe God exists and still hate God (James 2:19)?
Can my will interfere with God’s goals for me—to relate to me and to change me from being self-centered to being God-centered and other-person-centered? Are we willing to do what a loving God wants for me so that I might find out what life really is?
Must God leave us unavoidable evidence before I believe—or might he leave me avoidable evidence that reveals whether I am genuinely truth-seeking?
Wouldn’t it be a strange God who made no demands on us or who didn’t care if we had our way over against God’s?

What if accessing relationship-producing evidence is like that of tuning a radio dial to seek out universally—but not necessarily immediately available dismissible armchair evidence?

God isn’t interested in just changing our beliefs. He’s interested in changing *us*! A loving, authoritative God made us to relate to us. Are we willing to receive evidence on God’s terms?

These are some of the themes in Moser’s thought-provoking book. Whatever one thinks of Moser’s views on, say, natural theology, he is surely right to direct us to the centrality of the will and to the very goal of God’s self-revelation—namely, to reveal God personally to human beings so that we might experience intimate, personal knowledge of God through his Spirit, by whom we cry out, “Abba! Father!”

Aseity, Fictionalism and Moral Values

2009-11-03T23:23:00.000-08:00

At ReasonableFaith.org, I recently received a questions about the topic of divine aseity in light of my understanding of fictionalism and abstract objects:

What are morals according to the fictionalist? Can the fictionalist hold to objective morality without having to be a command theorist? If not, then how can the fictionalist account for arbitrary commands from God (e.g., torturing little children is okay if God commands it to be so)?
My second question is: can we interpret John 1:3 with a quantifying restriction. That is, can we interpret John saying something like the following: "Through him all things were made [except for abstract objects]; without him nothing was made that has been made." Why or why not?

These are excellent questions, which have confronted me in the course of my study of divine aseity (self-existence). For readers who might lack the background of these questions, let me first say that the problem here is what many philosophers, usually called Platonists, think that in addition to concrete objects like tables and people and stars, there exist abstract objects like numbers, properties, and propositions. The problem is that many (though, interestingly, not all) abstract objects exist necessarily and so were never created by God, and many are what we might call "uncreatables," that is to say, they cannot be created, since in order to be created, they would have to exist already, so that one winds up with a vicious circularity (see my and Paul Copan's Creation out of Nothing, chap. 5). The Fictionalist solves the problem by denying that abstract objects really exist—they're just useful fictions (like the average American family with 2.5 children).

With that bit of background, let's take question (2) first. The motivation behind this question is, I think, to ask whether biblically there's really anything problematic about holding that there are uncreated abstract objects, things other than God that also exist a se (through themselves alone). It seems to me that Platonism is so problematic theologically as to be deeply unchristian. It postulates an incomprehensible number of beings, real objects in the mind-independent world, which exist independently of God, so that God becomes just one being among many. It thus espouses a metaphysical pluralism which robs God of His ultimacy and primacy as Creator.

So even if John did not have abstract objects consciously in mind when he wrote that "all things came into being through him (i.e., the Word)," I am confident that if a Platonist were to sit down with John and explain to him just what numbers and sets and functions are on a Platonic ontology and explain to him the metaphysical status of propositions and properties according to Platonism, until John had a clear grasp of Platonist ontology, then John would have said, "If such things really do exist as robustly as concrete objects, then certainly they, too, were created by the Word!" It would have been pointless to affirm the Word's creation of the infinitesimally tiny realm of concrete objects while allowing most of being to exist independently of God. What good does it do theologically to affirm the Word's creation of all concrete objects when these are a mere triviality in comparison to the infinity of infinities of uncreated beings with which God finds Himself confronted? To allow such an ontology would be to rob John's prologue of its theological force.

Moreover, —and this is really interesting!—it's not implausible that John actually did have such abstract objects in mind when he wrote his prologue extolling Christ as the divine Logos (Word). For the Logos is not original with John. The figure of the creative Logos of God is also found in the writing of John's contemporary, the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria (20 B.C. - A.D. 50). In his On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses, Philo explains that on the first day of creation God marked out, like an architect designing a city, an intelligible cosmos to use as an ideal model for the sensible cosmos (16). Philo admonishes that "To declare or suppose that the cosmos composed of the Ideas exists in some place is not permissible" (17). Therefore,

Just as the city that was marked out beforehand in the architect had no location outside but had been engraved in the soul of the craftsman, in the same way the cosmos composed of the Ideas would have no other place than the divine Logos who gives these (Ideas) their ordered disposition (20).

In short,

If you would wish to use a formulation that has been stripped down to the essentials, you might say that the intelligible cosmos is nothing else than the Logos of God as He is actually engaged in making the cosmos. For the intelligible city, too, is nothing else than the reasoning of the architect as he is actually engaged in planning the foundation of the city. This is the doctrine of Moses, not my own (24-25).

In Philo's philosophy of religion we see the confluence of Judaism and Greek Platonic philosophy. Plato's realm of Ideas, what we today would call abstract objects, is not a realm external to God but has been moved into the mind of God where it serves as the archetype of creation by the divine Logos.

John's Prologue breathes this same atmosphere of Middle Platonism, as it is called, and it is not at all implausible to think that John imagines the realm of abstract objects to exist in the mind of the Logos. This is to espouse Conceptualism, not Platonism. On Conceptualism abstract objects exist as ideas in God's mind, not as independently existing entities.

Now as to the first question above, there are Fictionalists who advocate an "error theory" of ethics: moral statements are all of them false but nonetheless useful and important for human relations. By contrast, the theist will affirm moral truths, but he will not adopt some sort of Platonism as the basis of their truth. For God Himself, who is a concrete object, is the paradigm of moral goodness, just as the meter bar in Paris once served as the paradigm of a meter, rather than some abstract mathematical object. The divine command theory of ethics which I have embraced thus fits perfectly with anti-Platonism. Indeed, it was crafted, in part, precisely to avoid the Platonistic horn of the Euthyphro dilemma of Plato (For more info, see here and here).

Can we hold to objective morality without being divine command theorists? Perhaps, if we can find some other way to ground moral values and duties in God, say, by imagining the natural moral law to exist in God's mind. What we cannot do is adopt some Platonist account of moral values.

The last question of (1)—if objective morality necessitates divine command theory, then how can the Fictionalist account for arbitrary commands from God?—seems to be confused. Does it mean how can a Fictionalist avoid arbitrary commands from God? That just is the other horn of the Euthyphro dilemma answered in the above questions. God's commands are reflections of His nature, so that God cannot issue commands arbitrarily. So the Good is not some abstract object existing apart from God; rather God Himself is the Good and the source of our moral duties via His commands to us.

Why Universals Matter

2009-11-03T08:46:00.000-08:00

I just returned from a trip to Eastern Europe where I have been going for 15 years. As usual the trip involved giving lectures at state and national universities in addition to presenting a paper at two conferences on Charles Darwin. I lectured on moral philosophy with political implications and worldviews & the arts. It is rather exciting to see young university students in this rather atheistic context make connections that, for the most part, have been ignored or denied by those in the academy. At one point in the lecture titled “Worldviews and the Arts” we discussed Paul Gaugin’s work titled Whence Come We? What Are We? Whither Do We Go? The question this posed was how to answer these three important questions if nature is all there is. I had made the point that without the transcendent in which our values, ideals, morals were grounded, it was impossible to find meaning in life. One young lady wondered why she could not live by her own ideals. But another replied, that they would still not be universal (or transcendent) as they would only be hers. In addition, she was asked, how would she live with others who had different ideals to which she had no answer. The conclusion was that particulars alone are insufficient to answer the questions of meaning in general and the three questions in particular. In fact, it became clear as responses were pushed to their logical conclusion all that would be left is relativism.

This highlights what I believe to be a very important point, a point which I wonder if evangelicals fully appreciate or understand. If all that exists are particulars, then it is impossible to ground any universal meaning in particulars as particulars by definition are changing. I think Richard Weaver was right when he wrote: “The denial of universals carries with it the denial of everything transcending experience. The denial of everything transcending experience means inevitably – though ways are found to hedge on this – the denial of truth. With the denial of objective truth there is no escape from the relativism of ‘man the measure of all things.’” (Ideas Have Consequences). Philosophically the name given to the denial of universals is nominalism. While I think most Christians would affirm the idea of universals (and I would hope this includes the idea of essences) I fear that too often our response to the naturalistic arguments fail to make use of this point.

There are implications that go beyond the questions of morality and meaning. This discussion touches the evolutionist claim that the process of evolution is able to bring about new species. I have been arguing for some time that this claim would only take root where the idea of that which transcends experience has faded from view. That is, the Platonic notion of the Forms, or what I would call essences (one does not have to accept all the details of Plato’s Forms to accept the idea—as Augustine did). Aristotle was right when he spoke of the formal cause, namely, a thing is what its essence determines it to be. I was amazed this week as I was reading Dawkins new assault on theism—The Greatest Show on Earth. He quotes the late Ernest Mayr's suspicion as to why it took evolution so long to find acceptance. His thought was, according to Dawkins: “The culprit was the ancient philosophical doctrine of---to give it its modern name—essentialism. The discovery of evolution was held back by the dead hand of Plato [Dawkins' language]” He is precisely on point. I think Mayr’s suspicion that the notion of essences was the philosophical foundation for the idea of fixity of species. The conclusion of Enlightenment thinking is there is nothing existing above experience.

I wonder at times if evangelicals really understand the critical importance of their own affirmation of universals as understood within a Christian worldview.

A Call for Political Philosophy

2009-10-02T21:30:00.000-07:00

There is no question that we live in politically volitile times. Not only is their political unrest in many places around the globe such as Iran and Korea; not only are we fighting terrorists and Islamic extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan, but right here in the good ole USA the political polarization couldn't be greater. With the economic problems and the election of Barack Obama as president, the political rhetoric has heated up more than I can ever remember it. And the debates over States' rights, the conservative tea parties, Obama's healthcare plan, various economic bailouts, immigration policy, the possibility of a looming war with Iran, not to mention the on-going "culture war" over moral issues like abortion and same sex marriage, I get the sense that our nation may be headed for political and social turmoil on a scale we haven't seen since the Civil War. I hope I'm wrong about that but I won't be surprised if I'm right.

In light of this, I believe that Christians, especially evangelical Christians, are in serious need of guidance through the political turmoil that we are already facing, not to mention the more severe upheavals that we may face in the near future. The guidance I have in mind is a guidance that evangelical philosophers can provide, namely, a well-thought, biblically grounded political philosophy. Most Christians simply do not have any significant training and education in the purpose and function of civil government and its application to the issues of the day such as nationalized healthcare, distributive justice, foreign intervention, war, etc. They simply fly by the seat of their pants and follow the folk political theory they are brought up with whether that be liberal or conservative.

At the risk of exposing my own ignorance, it seems to me that evangelical philosphers (even Christian philosophers in general) haven't done a lot of serious work in political philosophy recently. We have (no doubt rightly) focused our attention on matters more obviously apologetic such as natural theology, philosophical theology, and historical evidences for the faith. But just as we have made significant forays into ethics in order to help Christians find Christian positions and provide cultural salt and light on matters like abortion, homosexuality, and cloning, it is time perhaps to venture into political philosophy to help Christians (and our society generally) know how to form a just and responsible state.

I would very much like feedback from readers of this blog as to whether or not my sense for this need is correct and, if it is, how we might proceed in fulfilling it. (For what it's worth, Jim Spiegel and I, in our recent book The Love of Wisdom: A Christian Introduction to Philosophy, included a chapter on political philosophy that we hope can have a positive influence in this regard among undergraduates--and others!)

Atheists Against Darwinism

2009-09-24T00:43:00.000-07:00

Allow me to draw attention to this paper recently published on the EPS website:

'Atheists Against Darwinism: Johnsons' "Wedge" Breaks Through'

Abstract

Intelligent design theory claims that 1) empirical evidence warrants 2) a scientific design inference using 3) reliable design detection criteria. Philosophia Christi published my paper "The Design Inference from Specified Complexity Defended by Scholars Outside the Intelligent Design Movement: A Critical Review" (Philosophia Christi, Vol 9, Number 2), which defended the third of these claims by reviewing the work atheists and theistic evolutionists. This paper defends the second of these claims, likewise by reviewing work by agnostics and atheists.

Hence this paper rounds off a two-part defence of the philosophical elements of Intelligent Design Theory (claims 2 & 3), and does so in two phases. Phase one focuses upon the growing acceptance of Phillip E. Johnsons' analysis of the role played by methodological naturalism in buttressing Darwinism, while phase two focuses upon Thomas Nagel's positive interaction with Michael J. Behe's argument in The Edge of Evolution (Free Press, 2008). I argue that Nagel's reticence about embracing ID is philosophically inconsistent.

Philosophia Christi Winter 2009 Issue

2009-09-22T16:44:00.000-07:00

We are in production for the very next issue of Philosophia Christi.

The Winter 2009 issue features a unique and stimulating discussion on "religious pluralism" with exceptional contributions by Paul Moser, Keith Yandell, and Paul Knitter. In addition to this lead discussion, the very next issue will showcase a unique Christian analysis of dispositions, capacities, and powers, notable work on trinitarian subordinationism, the preferential nature of divine love, and several other creative articles, notes and book reviews about a Christian philosophy of work, intelligent design, secularism's capacity to change conditions for religious belief, body-soul dualism, and several more important topics!

Subscribe/Renew today by clicking here.

William P. Alston, 1921-2009

2009-09-18T14:20:00.000-07:00

The EPS honors the life and work of Christian philosopher Dr. William P. Alston, who died on September 13, 2009.

Below is an obituary received from Valerie Alston, Dr. Alston's beloved wife. And a personal tribute from Paul Copan, President of the Evangelical Philosophical Society. We welcome further personal and professional appreciations about Dr. Alston's life and work. Please submit your comments to this blog post (see below).

William Payne Alston

William Payne Alston, 87, died September 13, 2009, at the Nottingham Residential Health Care Facility in Jamesville, New York. He was born November 29, 1921 in Shreveport, Louisiana.

In 1942, Bill received a Bachelor of Music degree from Centenary College. During WWII, he served in an Army Band stationed in California. While in the service, he became interested in philosophy, and after his discharge from the Army, he entered the Graduate Program in Philosophy at the University of Chicago. His Ph.D. work led to a position at the University of Michigan, where he taught philosophy for twenty-two years and established himself as an important American philosopher. He then moved to Rutgers University and, later to the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. In 1980 he joined the faculty at Syracuse University where he completed his fifty-year career teaching and writing about philosophy. He was best known for his work in the philosophy of language, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. He published several books and over 150 articles. His many Ph.D. students play a major role in philosophy today. He was founding editor of the journals Faith and Philosophy and Journal of Philosophical Research.

Bill received the highest honors of his profession. He has been President of the Central Division American Philosophical Association, the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, and the Society of Christian Philosophers. His international travel included trips to the Vatican as part of an eight-year project on "God's Actions in the World in the Light of Modern Science," sponsored by the Vatican Observatory. He was a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, and he received Syracuse University's Chancellor's Award for Exceptional Academic Achievement.

He is survived by his wife of 46 years, Valerie Alston; a daughter, Ellen (John) Donnelly of Wayne, NJ and grandchildren, Patrick & Anna Donnelly; step-children, Marsha (Gary) Dysert of Charlotte, NC, James (Nancy) Barnes of Toledo, OH, Kathleen (Blair) Person of Troy, MI; four step-grandchildren and three great step-grandchildren.

A memorial service will be held at St. Paul's Cathedral on November 2, 2009 at 11:00 a.m. Fairchild & Meech are in charge of arrangements.

In lieu of flowers, donations may be made to St. Paul's Episcopal Cathedral, 310 Montgomery Street, Syracuse, N.Y. 13202.

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A personal tribute to William P. Alston, from Paul Copan, President of the Evangelical Philosophical Society

On September 13, 2009, Christian philosopher William P. Alston died at the age of 87. Alston wrote prolifically on a wide range of topics in the philosophy of religion—from the problem of evil to divine action to the Spirit’s indwelling to divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Alston’s groundbreaking work is particularly noteworthy in the areas of defending meaningful religious language and articulating an epistemology of religious experience. Other significant contributions include his rigorous defense of truth in realistic terms (“alethic realism”) and of metaphysical realism.

I first heard of Bill Alston when I was a philosophy student at Trinity Seminary in Deerfield, Illinois in the mid-1980s. (I was a student of Drs. Stuart Hackett and William Lane Craig back then.) During this time, I began subscribing to the Society of Christian Philosophers’ journal, Faith and Philosophy. I was aware that Alston and Al Plantinga had helped launch the SCP—a momentous achievement whose time had finally come and for which Christian philosophers everywhere will be ever grateful.

During my studies at Trinity, I had my first exposure to Alston’s writings. The very first Alston piece I read was his essay “Divine-Human Dialogue and the Nature of God” (Faith and Philosophy, January 1986). I not only appreciated the topic he tackled; I marveled that a sophisticated philosopher would give a questionnaire to adults at his church, asking them, “Do you ever feel that God speaks to you? (Not necessarily in audible words. The question could be phrased: do you ever feel that God is communicating a message to you?)” Alston tallied the results: Yes-17; No-2. Thus began my great appreciation and respect for Alston’s insight and exceptional scholarship as well as his personal devotion as a Christian.

After my studies at Trinity, I had the opportunity to meet Alston in 1988 at a Society of Christian Philosophers conference at Gordon College in Wenham, Massachusetts. He was one in an impressive line-up of presenters, which included Richard Swinburne, George Mavrodes, Stephen Evans, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Eleonore Stump, and Marilyn Adams along with biblical scholars Anthony Thiselton and the late James Barr. A few of these presented papers made their way into the Faith and Philosophy October 1989 issue.

Years later, I wrote a book review of Thomas Morris’s God and the Philosophers (Oxford University Press 1994) for The Review of Metaphysics (June 1997). Alston’s autobiographical chapter gave me further insight into his experience with God personally—even speaking in tongues—through the influence of charismatic Christians. Alston discussed his attraction to the Christian community through the love he had experienced within it: “my way back [to Christ] was not by abstract philosophical reasoning, but by experience—experience of the love of God and the presence of the Spirit, as found within the community of the faithful” (p. 28). Alston has served as a model of rigorous philosophical thought as well as a deep experience of God by His Spirit. His experience reminds us that the gospel is powerful in a holistic sense: it not only has explanatory philosophical power, but it has the power to transform lives and meet the deepest of human needs.

Back in 2002/2003, I had the privilege of working with Alston on a book project. With Paul Moser, I coedited The Rationality of Theism (Routledge), and Bill led off with the superb essay, “Religious Language and Verificationism.” He concluded his piece by calling the Verificationist Criterion to be “but a paper tiger, in philosophy of religion as elsewhere.” He added, “It poses no threat to the apparently obvious truth that talk of God contains many statements about God that have objective truth-values—whether we can determine what they are or not.”

I am honored to have learned from and worked with this notable philosopher and, even more significantly, a brother in Christ and a partner in the gospel.

Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord.

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Other remembrances about Alston can be found here:

From Tom Senor
From Jeremy Pierce
From Trent Dougherty
From Andrew Cullison
From Lydia McGrew
From Matthew Flannagan

For further info, see Daniel Howard-Snyder's helpful bibliography of Alston's scholarly work (since 2006) and Daniel's 2005 biographical entry in the Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers.

We welcome personal and professional appreciations in honor of Dr. William P. Alston. Please submit your comments to this post!

Interview with Gregg Ten Elsoff: I Told Me So (part two)

2009-08-13T11:25:00.000-07:00

We continue with the final part of our interview with Gregg Ten Elshof, author of I Told Me So: Self-deception and the Christian life (Eerdmans, 2009).

Can self-deception ever be a tool used for our good?

Yes. In the book I argue that both (i) the mechanisms that make self-deception a possibility for us and (ii) self-deception itself have legitimate ends. God gave us the amazing capacity to deviate in inquiry from the general practice of pursuing belief in accordance with evidence. I think he did this for a reason. For the most part, believing what is true and what is in accordance with one’s evidence is a very good idea. But in special cases, believing can serve ends that outweigh truth and (epistemic) rationality. Think, for example, about the terminal cancer patient who believes (despite evidence easily available to her) that she will overcome her condition or the drug addict who believes (despite overwhelming inductive support to the contrary) that this time he will quit. The cancer patient actually has a slightly less radically improbable chance of overcoming her condition if she believes she will. The addict’s recovery is less improbable if he believes he’ll recover. Love, loyalty and friendship may sometimes require belief out of step with the evidence in the good of the beloved. And God has graciously allowed me to keep at the edges of consciousness (and beyond) several truths that would almost certainly undo me were they faced squarely (e.g., the gravity of my own sin and the overwhelming glory of his own being).

How do we often incorrectly deal with self-deception? How would you counsel Christian leaders about how to lead others in a life that is not burdened by self-deception?

We most often deal incorrectly with self-deception, I think, by ignoring it. We typically don’t ignore it altogether, of course, since we’re quick to recognize it in others. But we’re slow to take seriously the idea that we, ourselves, are significantly taken in. One is reminded of Bishop Butler’s haunting suggestion that “those who have never had any suspicion of, who have never made allowances for this weakness in themselves, who have never (if I may be allowed such a manner of speaking) caught themselves in it, may almost take it for granted that they have been very much misled by it.”

To face it squarely, we must first recognize its place in the Christian life. It is not chief among the vices. It is a God-given capacity with a narrow range of legitimate application. We get into trouble with this capacity (like any other God-given capacity) when it is misappropriated. Three strategies for avoiding the misappropriation of self-deception are (i) to die to the sinful tendencies that give rise to the need for hypocrisy, (ii) to seek membership in communities and groups where it is safe to disagree and (iii) to seek the community of the Holy Spirit who knows us better than we can know ourselves and who knows when we can and cannot handle a particular truth.

Are there particular social environments where self-deception can live rather well? If so, how and why?

If the inside of a group is defined according to whether or not folks believe this or that and if the stakes are very high for being on the inside of the group, the conditions are prime for self-deception. This has obvious implications for Christian belief and for creedal Christianity in particular. This is not to say that such groups are inappropriate. I am a member of various groups of just this sort. But, as members of such groups, we should have our eyes open to the fact that we are subject to the kinds of pressures that make self-deception likely.

Are there relevant factors at the level of a person's "world view" that are more conducive to self-deception? If so, how and why?

Yes. Here’s just one example: Very often people simply don’t know what to do with disagreement. Often they implicitly assume that when equally well-informed, equally intelligent, and equally sincere inquirers disagree, it must be that the subject is not one about which knowledge is available. Now Christians are slow (or should be slow anyway) to give up on the idea that they know the great truths of the gospel. But they’re not so blind as to miss the fact that people disagree with them. So what are they apt to conclude? That those who disagree with them are either uninformed, stupid, or insincere. While few would put it quite so baldly, many Christians interact with those on the other side (or with other Christians who disagree with them on some matter of theology for that matter) with a disdain or condescension that suggests exactly that – my opposition is either unintelligent, uninformed, or unwilling to take an honest look at the evidence. But if we think of our opposition that way, we’ll blind ourselves to whatever genuine insight they might have to offer. What is needed and often lacking is a category in one’s world view which allows one to assess another person in the following way: I know that p. She thinks that not-p. We disagree. Nevertheless, she’s as smart as I am, is in possession of all of the evidence I possess and is equally committed to an honest inquiry toward the end of discovering the truth on this matter.

How can philosophers and theologians further contribute to this discussion?

We need to think together more carefully about the implications of disagreement between thoughtful parties to a discussion. It's easy to demonstrate that it doesn't follow from disagreement that there's no objective truth of the matter or that nobody can know the truth. But what exactly SHOULD we infer from the fact that thoughtful, intelligent and sincere people disagree about something? What does it say about the human condition that such disagreement is possible? What does it say about God that he sustains in existence the conditions that make such disagreements possible?

More about Gregg Ten Elshof's work can be found at his faculty web page.

Interview with Gregg Ten Elshof: I Told Me So (part one)

2009-08-06T12:07:00.001-07:00

We are pleased to have interviewed Gregg Ten Elshof about his latest book, I Told Me So: Self-Deception and the Christian Life (Eerdmans, 2009). Gregg is a professor of philosophy and the department chairperson of the undergraduate philosophy program at Biola University. He has also been a contributor to Philosophia Christi. Below is part one of a two part interview with Gregg.

How did this book come about for you?

I first took up an interest in self-deception as a graduate student at USC in the 90’s. I was just beginning to modify my approach to the Way of Jesus in response to the reading I had been doing about spiritual formation (from Dallas Willard, Richard Foster, etc.). I began to suspect that I had fallen prey to self-deception in significant ways and that my Christian brothers and sisters had too. But I found precious little in the contemporary literature on the Christian life that focused on self-deception. I devoted my doctoral research to defending a model of self-knowledge which made sense of self-deception with an eye toward writing this book at some point. In the ten years or so since, I’ve been reading and teaching courses about self-knowledge and self-deception. Finally, last year, I felt like I had enough to say to warrant the writing of a book.

What is your model of self-knowledge that makes sense of self-deception?

I've defended a traditional account of self-knowledge according to which the most direct way of knowing about yourself parallels the most direct way of knowing about anything else -- observation. Put differently, I've defended an observational account of introspection. I think an observation model makes the most sense of our experience of ourselves. So it's defensible for its own sake. But it also makes clear sense of self-deception. Just as there are recognizable conditions that make for illusion in sense-perception (speed, lack of light, object too small, object too big, object under water, etc.), one can expect there to be recognizable conditions that make for illusion in introspection or inner-perception.

How does your book contribute to our knowledge of Christian experience?

Most Christians who are interested in spiritual formation suspect (as I did) that self-deception is alive and well in their own experience and in the experiences of those around them. Most pastors are aware that self-deception is occurring to one degree or another in their congregations. Psychologists who focus on this sort of thing have explored the various forms that self-deception can take and the conditions under which it reliably occurs. I Told Me So is the only contemporary book I know about, though, that explores the various manifestations of self-deception in Christian sub-cultures in particular and provides explicitly Christian wisdom about what to do with and about it.

Why do you think there has been a lack of responsible attention to the issue of self-deception?

The first chapter of the book is given over to this question. Part of the answer, I think, has to do with the fact that authenticity has been given a very large promotion in the ordering of the virtues over the past 100 years or so. Interestingly, for college-aged students, the most significant qualification for a leadership position is authenticity. Older generations, by comparison, rank competency much higher on the list of qualifications. In our culture, it has become all-important to be authentic. Interestingly, self-deception often occurs when there is some painful truth about yourself that you’re not willing to face squarely. Well, if authenticity is all-important, then self-deception is chief among the vices. The rise in significance of authenticity means that the admission of self-deception in oneself is more damning and painful. So the motivation to avoid that admission is stronger. I think we have collectively avoided the topic of self-deception because, as we heap increasing praise on authenticity, it is an increasingly painful thing to recognize in ourselves.

So what is self-deception? How does it come about?

As you might expect, philosophers argue about what exactly self-deception is. Its label practically screams paradox and invites philosophical reflection about how best to characterize what it is that that we’re talking about. I doubt that there is a single set of necessary and sufficient conditions that captures all of the phenomena we’re likely to label “self-deception.” I Told Me So interacts with cases of self-deception, though, that can be characterized this way: To be self-deceived is to intentionally manage one’s own beliefs for some purpose other than the pursuit of truth. It’s worth noting that, given this characterization, one can be self-deceived in believing what is true. One can even be self-deceived in believing something that is true and for which one has evidence. Self-deception occurs most often when there is an emotional attachment to believing in a particular direction. It often involves the management of attention away from evidence that would disrupt the desired belief. And it seems to be capable of achieving greater distances from truth and rationality in groups than in the individual. It was Nietzsche, I believe, who said that insanity is rare in the individual but the rule in groups.

How must the self be understood if self-deception is to be rightly understood?

Well, the kind of transparency that characterizes the Moderns (Descartes, Locke, etc.) is out. There’s a whole lot going on in my mind that is not available by means of direct and simple introspection. On the other hand, I don’t think a proper understanding of self-deception requires anything like the Freudian unconscious censor. In the book, I try to steer clear of both of these models. What we need, I think, is a view of the mind and of intention which accommodates the suggestion that things can be closer or further away from the center of attention and consciousness. At any given time in my experience my direct focus is on a very limited number of things. Beyond that, though, there is a horizon of conscious experience which fades gradually into objects which lie beyond the scope of my awareness. Self-deception most often occurs, I think, on the peripheral edges of consciousness – not in the center of my focused attention but also not in an unconscious self that is, in principle, off limits to examination.

Next week we continue with part two of our interview with Gregg Ten Elshof.

Call for Papers: Religious Toleration

2009-07-20T11:17:00.000-07:00

The Philosophy of Religion Group is issuing a call for papers for its session at the 2010 American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting on the topic of Religious Toleration. In the seventeenth century many European philosophers were deeply concerned with religious intolerance that spawned intra- and inter-national violence on a massive scale. Locke, Spinoza, Bayle and others famously drafted arguments aimed at providing religious partisans with reasons for tolerating more religious diversity in their midst than they might otherwise have been inclined to allow. While the arguments these philosophers made may have been influential in the development of religious toleration in Europe and North America in the 18th Century, it is not clear that they have as much appeal in the contemporary West or elsewhere in the world. This session will be devoted to revisiting the topic of religious toleration both to examine its philosophical roots and its contemporary cogency.
　
The session will consist of three papers, two presented by Edwin Curley (Michigan) and Robert Audi (Notre Dame) as well as a third paper drawn from submitted abstracts.
　
Those wishing to submit papers for consideration should send a 350 word (or less) abstracts to the Program Chair, Michael Murray at Michael.murray@fandm.edu no later than OCTOBER 1, 2009.

Interview with J.P. Moreland: The Recalcitrant Imago Dei (part two)

2009-07-05T10:14:00.000-07:00

We continue our interview with J.P. Moreland about his book, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei. In this part, J.P. shares how our view of human persons forms culture, how philosophy of religion work is helping to challenge naturalism in various areas, and how J.P. teaches philosophy.

You seem to wear multiple hats in this book as a philosopher, theologian and cultural observer. For you, how are these areas interrelated when offering an analysis of “human persons and the failure of naturalism”?

The philosopher, especially the Christian philosopher, should take a realist understanding of the imago Dei seriously. That understanding presents the philosopher with a prima facie justified case that the six features of human persons mentioned above are real and irreducible. The theologian should take the philosophical arguments seriously as an example of how to clarify the key issues and options and make crucial distinctions relevant to their resolution. The cultural observer should be careful to observe the connection between broad cultural drifts in the arena of ideas and the way human persons are depicted by the advocates of those various drifts.

In your book, you use an important Pitrim Sorokin distinction between a “sensate culture” vs. an “ideational culture.” Can you expand upon what that distinction means and why it is significant?

A sensate culture is one that believes only in the physical world that can be seen and touched. An ideational culture accepts the physical world but also believes in an unseen realm that can be known in other ways. Sensate cultures don’t last very long because they do not have the intellectual resources to sustain a vibrant cultural form of human flourishing. Sensate cultures degenerate into greed, dishonesty and conflicts over power.

For example, it is not wide of the mark to locate the fundamental intellectual cause of our current economic crisis in the ubiquitous presence of a sensate culture in the contemporary West. By contrast, an ideational culture, especially a Judeo-Christian one, allows questions like these to be asked and provides a robust answer to them: Is there meaning to life and, if so, what it is? What is right and wrong? Is God real and is there life after death? What ought the state, public education, and other key institutions do and what role ought they play in a culture conducive to human flourishing? What role ought wealth play in such a culture? None of these questions can even be asked, much less answered, from within a scientific, sensate perspective.

How can a robust view of the image of God positively shape public policy discussions?

In a reductionist culture, human persons will be identified with things such as being an animal, sexual orientation, ethnicity, which are not the most important thing about us—that we are made in zthe image of God, or so I argue in my book. In a reductionist culture, free will and rationality disappear, and are replaced with biological and sociological determinism. Along the way, personal responsibility vanishes and social engineering at the hands of cultural elites achieves hegemony. My book stands against these trends.

It seems that the homogeneous character of naturalism is actually starting to crack and break for some in Western academic circles. If that is the case, what is going on?

For twenty years or so there has been an explosion of Christian philosophy in the academy, and the overwhelming majority of Christian philosophers are theistic realists in the sense that they take their Christian theism to have ontological and epistemological implications that do intellectual work in their field. In the next decade, the prominence of Christians in philosophy will expand even more, and a backlash is sure to precipitate. Scholars in other fields, especially theology and religious studies, would do well to take note of what is happening in philosophy and seek to learn from this phenomenon. The Recalcitrant Imago Dei would be a good place to go to see an example of theistic realism at work.

There is a constant theme in a lot of your writing: Christianity is a knowledge tradition. What is the significance of this claim for how Christianity is perceived in the culture?

If Christianity were regarded as an alleged source of knowledge of reality, then its ideas would be taken seriously, put to the test, and evaluated rationally just like other alleged sources of knowledge. Knowledge, not faith, is what gives people the right to act responsibly in culture. Religious knowledge gives theological claims authority. In The Recalcitrant Imago Dei, I seek to re-establish theological claims about human persons as a reliable source of knowledge about their actual nature.

What type of philosophy courses at a university or a seminary would most benefit from this book?

Courses in philosophy of mind, comparative religion, theological anthropology, ethics (especially metaethics or end-of-life ethics), worldview comparison, and the sociology of culture would benefit from the course. Psychologists would also find much of interest here.

How do you like to teach the areas of philosophy that your book covers?

I usually begin my course by presenting the class with facts and considerations that demonstrate the broad, cultural importance of issues at the core of philosophical and theological anthropology. Then, I seek to use texts that defend various positions on those core issues and work through them carefully with the students. My book would be a good one to use in a course in philosophy of mind/action or theological anthropology. It would also be good for a course in comparative religion, since it presents and defends a Judeo-Christian understanding of the self, and treatments of the self are central issues for any religious system.

More about J.P. Moreland can be found here.

Interview with Steve Cowan and Jim Spiegel: Love of Wisdom (part two)

2009-07-03T15:29:00.000-07:00

We continue our interview with Steve Cowan and Jim Spiegel concerning their latest book, The Love of Wisdom: A Christian Introduction to Philosophy (Broadman & Holman, 2009). In part one, Steve and Jim talked about the uniqueness of their textbook and its approach, including a brief overview of the book's scope. Below is the second and final part of our interview.

As professors, how has your extensive teaching experience shaped what you say and the manner in which you communicate your ideas in this book?

SPIEGEL: More than twenty years of college teaching in philosophy has confirmed to me the need for a text that is clearly written and engages students’ interest without sacrificing accuracy in discussing views and arguments. Also, students are bugged by imbalance and bias as much as we professors are. So the ideal of fairness and humility in presentation of views was also paramount for us as we wrote the book.

COWAN: I think students like to see the big picture first before they get to the nitty-gritty details of an issue. They need to know how the topic at hand fits in with other questions and concerns, and they need to see the relevance of the issue for real life. When one gets to the details, there need to be clear and concise explanations of the philosophical problems and their answers, and it doesn't hurt if there is some way to make the discussion interesting and fun. Also, I try to approach topics systematically so that we deal with questions in an order that makes sense, so that what is said later builds on what's gone before.

Regarding the need to make things interesting, I have found in my teaching and writing that using lots of illustrations, examples, case studies, and thought experiments are indispensible pedagogical tools. So, as in my teaching, I included in the book lots of illustrations from film, novels, comic books, and so on in order to help explain tough issues in a fun and relevant way. For example, in discussing the Gettier problem in chapter two, I chose to present the problem not by using Gettier's own rather plain counterexamples but by telling a story about an imposter Spider-Man showing up at a public event where Peter Parker, the real Spider-Man's alter ego, was present. Likewise, in the section on free will, I explained Frankfurt-type counterexamples by telling a story about Dr. Doom planting a computer chip in the brain of Reed Richards, leader of the Fantastic Four. The students love it!

At the beginning of each chapter you intentionally introduce your discussion with a literary, film or pop cultural illustration or allusion. What are you trying to communicate or show by introducing a chapter’s topic in this way?

SPIEGEL: In addition to making the text more readable and interesting, these illustrations underscore the fact that Philosophy is not a remote, esoteric discipline but rather a field of study that can be, and should be, applied to literally all aspects of human experience and interest. This includes film, music, sports, literature, television, and everything else in our lives. Also, as Christians, we are called to apply our worldview to all that we do, and providing these links to everyday experience, including arts and entertainment, should remind readers of this fact.

COWAN: As I see it, these illustrations communicate two things. First, they tell readers who have never engaged in any formal study of philosophy that they are already familiar with many philosophical issues whether they know it or not. In the films, TV shows, and books they have read, philosophical concepts and problems are already a part of the experience. In this way, we take the edge off the strangeness and apparent irrelevancy with which philosophy is often perceived by newcomers. Second, and this is closely related to the first point, we hope to show the reader that philosophical ideas can and do influence people even if they have never studied them academically. I tell my students often that even though philosophical ideas often originate in the ivory tower, they never stay there. They always find their way down to the street where people live. And they typically make this transition by means of art—film, literature, etc.

Based on your assessment of the progress of Christian philosophers engaged in philosophical work, what areas of philosophical study remain under-developed or weak? Please list these areas and briefly explain why you think they are under-developed or weak and how might they become more developed and strong.

COWAN: Since the resurgence of Christian philosophy in the last few decades, Christians have done extensive and profitable work in the philosophy of religion and epistemology. Some areas in metaphysics have also received significant attention such as the mind/body problem and free will and determinism. But I think we have only recently begun to have an impact on key issues in general metaphysics or ontology. And, as far as I can tell, we have seen very little work on political philosophy and aesthetics. We seem rightly to be working our way outward from issues of central apologetic concern to Christianity (God's existence, divine attributes, problem of evil, religious epistemology) to broader areas relevant to the larger Christian worldview.

SPIEGEL: I agree with Steve here and would add that Christian philosophical aesthetics is especially in need of some strong work. It is telling that our book is the first Christian introductory philosophy text to feature a chapter on aesthetics.

How do you like to teach a philosophy or apologetics class? How do you use a textbook or other readings in the class?

COWAN: In my philosophy classes I take what I call a mixed Socratic approach. I usually begin a topic with a lecture that explains, say, a particular philosophical problem and then sketches some of the major strategies for solving that problem. Then I ask the students questions that lead them to evaluate the problem themselves and draw out the strengths and weaknesses of the various proposed solutions. I also ask questions designed to help them draw implications and practical consequences from given ideas and views. I like my textbooks to facilitate this method by providing summaries of philosophical issues and discussions of the various positions that can be taken on them. In my apologetics classes, I take a similar approach, though I usually seek to lead the students more directly to particular answers given that apologetics (at least as I conceive it) is designed to train students to defend the faith once for all delivered to the saints. So here I prefer apologetics textbooks that state and defend traditional views which I supplement with additional lecture material and evaluative questions.

SPIEGEL: My teaching style is much like that described by Steve. As for my use of textbooks, I prefer to use an anthology of readings and supplement this with a secondary text which provides commentary, thoughtful discussion of key arguments and, if available, a Christian orientation. Our text provides all of these features I desire in a secondary text, thus making it ideally suited for a course in which it is coupled with an anthology of some kind. But, of course, The Love of Wisdom can be profitably studied on its own, in or out of the classroom.

Interview with Chad Meister: Introducing Philosophy of Religion (part two)

2009-07-01T08:00:00.000-07:00

We continue our interview with Chad Meister about his Introducing Philosophy of Religion. In this part, Chad shares with us about he teaches philosophy and how philosophy of religion has influenced other areas of philosophy.

What are some lessons that you’ve learned over the years about how to teach philosophy of religion?

My overall pedagogical methods in the classroom have changed significantly over the last ten years or so, and this is especially true in upper level undergraduate philosophy courses such as philosophy of religion. Here are what I consider to be some significant lessons for teaching philosophy of religion (or any undergraduate philosophy course). Some of these lessons I gleaned from pedagogy researcher Ken Bain:

Students are not typically familiar with many, if not most, of the central topics and ideas discussed in the field, nor are they familiar with how the topics are typically approached. So rather than focusing on one or two main issues, or reading one or two primary sources, I find it helpful to first introduce them to a number of relevant topics and then to hone in on several key ones. For their assigned papers, then, I give them the opportunity to choose one or two issues with which to spend a good deal of time over the course of the semester.
I usually begin class with an excellent question (a question that is meaningful to the student)—that is, with a BIG question. So I generally create at least one major question for each class period and write it on the board or in PowerPoint. For example, I might ask, “What is John Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis, and what are some reasons you have for agreeing or disagreeing with it?” The lecture/discussion will generally, then, focus on this question.
As Ken Bain notes, a recent Harvard study of the most successful students included two key elements in the classroom: tough classes and the opportunity to try, fail, get feedback, etc. separate from a grade. I believe creating assignments, such as short papers on a central theme, that allow students to work on a topic, turn in the assignment, receive comments, and re-work the assignment are effective means. These early papers receive no grade, but the final product (a longer paper including research and reflection from the earlier shorter ones) does.
Students need to have some control over their own education. For papers, I offer students multiple topics from which to choose, or I allow them to pick a subject related to their major or area of interest.
As many of the great ancient Greek philosophers understood, one of the most helpful ways of acquiring knowledge and being transformed by it is seeing it modeled by a respected mentor. So, for example, I invite students over to my home regularly to discuss issues in that environment and work to develop respect by the “younger” students for the more advanced ones. I even encourage their involvement in an official mentoring program at the college where students and faculty mentor others, and I mentor a number of the philosophy majors myself. There should be regular collaborative efforts between students, so I have them work together in small groups on projects both in and outside of class. When appropriate, I have the “advanced” students help/mentor the “newer” ones. Especially for the philosophy majors, I try to create an environment where we are growing together and encouraging one another as a community of learners.
Students must believe that their own work will really matter (though it may be quite basic at this stage), so I have individual meetings with them to discuss their paper topics. I encourage them to focus on a theme that is significant—both to them and to the field at large—and explain why what they are doing is philosophically significant. Furthermore, I offer them the opportunity as a class to craft a journal—one structured very much like a professional philosophy journal, but with other features that make it more fun and exciting for undergraduates (for example, including timelines, glossaries, even a comics section!). This has been a very productive, collaborative kind of project which, in one case, we published. I also encourage students to work toward writing publishable papers (and to try to publish them if they are of that quality) and to attend conferences where students and others are presenting papers. It is oftentimes in these kinds of contexts where the significance of their own work can be more fully appreciated.

How has philosophy of religion work influenced other fields in philosophy?

There is a long story to be told here, but I’ll try to keep this brief. There is a fascinating symbiotic relationship among those doing work in the various fields of philosophy you mention and work being done in philosophy of religion. Consider first a brief account (one probably quite familiar to many readers) of the resurgence of philosophy of religion over the past century with respect to work done in epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language.

Philosophy, especially within the analytic tradition, emphasizes precision of terms and clarity of concepts. Religion, however, is often imprecise and veiled in mystery. This imprecision was challenged in the mid-twentieth century with the rise of logical positivism. Logical positivists used a principle of verifiability to reject as meaningless all non-empirical claims; only the tautologies of mathematics and logic, along with statements containing empirical observations or inferences, were considered meaningful. Many religious statements, however, such as claims about the transcendent, are neither tautological nor empirically verifiable. So certain fundamental religious claims and beliefs (such as “Yahweh is good” or “Atman is Brahman”) were taken by the positivists to be cognitively meaningless utterances. Positivism became a dominant philosophical approach and for a time, for this and related reasons, philosophy of religion as a discipline became suspect.

The philosophical tide began to turn, however, in the latter half of the twentieth century with respect to religious language. Many argued that the positivists’ empiricist criteria of meaning were unsatisfactory and problematic. Due to the philosophical insights on the nature and meaning of language provided by the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, the rise of a pragmatic version of naturalism offered by Willard Quine, and other factors, logical positivism quickly waned. For these reasons, along with the exemplary work of such analytic philosophers of religion as Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, John Hick, and others, by the 1970s discussions about religious (and metaphysical and ethical) concepts were revived and soon became accepted arenas of viable philosophical and religious discourse.

Since that time, philosophy of religion has become a burgeoning field. For example, two leading philosophy journals today—Philosophia Christi and Faith and Philosophy—are primarily focused on issues in philosophy of religion. In addition, two of the largest (if not the largest) subgroups within the American Philosophical Association are the Evangelical Philosophical Society and the Society of Christian Philosophers. Furthermore, one could cite countless examples of recent work that integrates other fields of philosophy with philosophy of religion, or philosophy of religion work which has influenced other fields. Consider just a few fine examples (with apologies for the many other fine examples which are not included):

Metaphysics: work on ontology and naturalism by Mike Rea, JP Moreland, and Alvin Plantinga;
Epistemology: work on religious epistemology by Paul Moser, Alvin Plantinga, and Doug Geivett;
Ethics: Paul Copan’s work on God and morality; John Hare’s work on ethics and religion;
Philosophy of Mind: Charles Taliaferro’s work on the mind; JP Moreland’s work on the argument from consciousness;
Philosophy of Time: work on God and time by William Lane Craig, Greg Ganssle, Gary DeWeese, and Alan Padgett.

The list goes on and on. Those doing work in philosophy of religion have indeed made great strides in influencing other fields in philosophy over the past fifty years, and there is no indication of its waning any time soon.

More about Chad Meister can be found at his website.

Call for Papers: Hiddenness of Spiritual Realities

2009-06-29T20:13:00.000-07:00

The Philosophy of Religion Group is issuing a call for papers for its session at the 2010 American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting on the topic of "The Hiddenness of Spiritual Realities." While the topic of "divine hiddenness" has received a modest amount of attention in recent years, the topic of this session is being cast a bit more broadly. Those proposing papers are welcome to address the topic of divine hiddenness, however the program committee is also interested in considering papers that address hiddenness in non-theistic traditions, as well as aspects of hiddenness that are not focused on the existence of God. Papers might thus address other topics where the hiddenness of a spiritual reality is initially surprising or unexpected given particular claims within a tradition. For example, for traditions with an emphasis on natural law, the hiddenness of divine moral mandates might merit attention. For traditions with a commitment to reincarnation, the seemingly minimal evidence for the existence of "past lives" might require explanation. Etc.

Those wishing to submit papers for consideration should send 350 word (or less) abstracts to the Program Chair, Michael Murray at Michael.murray@fandm.edu no later than SEPTEMBER 1, 2009.

Interview with J.P. Moreland: The Recalcitrant Imago Dei (part one)

2009-06-26T09:53:00.000-07:00

We are glad to announce the release of J.P. Moreland's latest book, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism (SCM Press, 2009). J.P. is the Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Biola University. We previously interviewed him about his Consciousness and the Existence of God (Routledge, 2008). Below is part one of our interview with him about his latest book and the philosophical failure of naturalism.

In roughly 200 pages, you try to clarify, if not recapture, an emphasis on the recalcitrant imago Dei? Why this emphasis?

In its doctrine of the image of God, the Bible teaches that the human constitution has features in common with God; we are like God in important respects. Namely, we have a will, consciousness, reason, etc. If Christianity is true, one would predict that alternative worldviews whose basic entity or entities are not spiritual would find these features of the human person recalcitrant, that is, hard to explain or explain away. And that is exactly what one finds, especially in connection with philosophical naturalism. If, in the beginning was the Logos, then, I claim, it is easy to see how six features of human persons could obtain—consciousness, libertarian freedom, rationality, a unified/simple self, equal and intrinsic value, and moral action of a certain sort. But if, in the beginning were the particles, then one cannot adequately account for these features, and reductive or eliminative strategies must be employed. I argue that these strategies are a failure, and, therefore, these six features provide rebutting defeaters for naturalism and confirmation (to a degree I specify) for biblical theism.

What is the worldview of naturalism?

Naturalism has many incarnations, but if it is taken to be explanatorily superior to rival worldviews, then it may be fairly characterized according to a majority construal of it, which would be (1) a scientistic attitude, which says that all that is real is physical and that knowledge is only that which can be detected by the sciences; (2) an origins account constituted by an event-causal story explains how everything has come-to-be as a result of combinatorial processes and rearrangements of micro-physical entities to form various structurally different macro-objects, and centered on the atomic theory of matter and evolutionary biology; (3) a strictly physicalist ontology that quantifies over and only over those entities that conform to (1) and (2). I argue in the book that the naturalist ontology cannot account for real substances (besides atomic simples if such there be) or genuinely emergent, sui generis properties, especially those constitutive of the six features mentioned above.

It seems that most public policy and pop cultural discussions about what it means to be a human person are largely shaped by the offerings of the hard or soft sciences. How is your approach different and why does that matter?

The fundamental questions about the nature of human beings are these: Is consciousness real and is it non-physical? Do I have free will and, if so, what is it? How could human rationality be possible, and if it is, what does that tell us about the nature of the human person? Do I have a unified self that remains the same through change, or am I just an aggregate of parts? Do human persons have equal and high moral value, and if so, how could such a thing be the case? What is a moral action, and can human persons engage in such? None of these questions is capable of being formulated or answered by the hard and social sciences, because they are, one and all, descriptive and not prescriptive disciplines. They have nothing to say about what must be the case or what ought to be the case. The questions listed above are all philosophical and theological questions. That is how I treat them in The Recalcitrant Imago Dei, and the answers I provide require philosophical and theological evaluation.

Philosopher Howard Robinson (Budapest’s Central European University) says that the “great service” of your book is that you cumulatively demonstrate how naturalism fails to give us an accurate account of some of the most basic fundamentals of human existence. Can you further unpack the failure of naturalism?

I argue that the worldview of naturalism denies the objectivity of value, meaning in and to life, free will and responsibility, normative rationality, sameness of self through various changes, and the possibility of a ground for equal rights and moral action.

With an overreliance on the hard sciences, secularism reduces us to our brains, our wills to nerve reactions to inputs, our value to the dictates of the herd. In the process, we lose what is so special to us—our consciousness, freedom, rationality, self and value.

Naturalism has singularly failed to provide a plausible, deep analysis of human persons sufficient to account for who they are, how they can have value and purpose in life, and how they can flourish in a robust social and ethical way. As naturalist views of human persons proliferate, people turn to sex and entertainment, all centered on the satisfaction of immediate desire, as the rails upon which they run their lives. In turn, this generates passivity and all kinds of addictions.

The worldview is kept in business, intellectually, by its alleged—but non-existent—connection with physical science, and, spiritually, by anger towards God and hostility towards religion. The former is simply false—it is not science, but philosophical naturalism itself that underwrites its core intellectual commitments (and a troublesome argumentative circle is lurking in the neighborhood; to avoid this, one must provide independent epistemic and methodological arguments for adopting naturalism, but these are, in my view, extremely weak). The latter is becoming more apparent now that the resurgence of Christian philosophy has made it more difficult to justify intellectually the claim that belief in God is irrational.

Does one have to be a Christian in order to buy into your view of the human person?

One does not need to be a Christian theist to accept the analysis of human persons I defend in The Recalcitrant Imago Dei. But if that analysis is accepted, then one is obligated to offer an account concerning how human persons could be this way. In other words, one does not get a free pass in their ontology of the human person. One has to tell a broad worldview story, including a creation account, within which that ontology is intelligible and plausible.

Stay tuned for part two. More about J.P. Moreland's work can be found here.

Interview with Steve Cowan and Jim Spiegel: The Love of Wisdom (part one)

2009-06-23T14:51:00.000-07:00

We are pleased to announce the latest book by Steve Cowan and Jim Spiegel, titled, The Love of Wisdom: A Christian Introduction to Philosophy (Broadman & Holman, 2009). Steve and Jim are members of the EPS, contributors to Philosophia Christi, and professors of philosophy at Southeastern Bible College and Taylor University (Indiana), respectivelly. Look for future content from them to appear at the EPS blog. Below is part one of an interview with Steve and Jim about their latest offering.

What is unique about your intent, approach, and features in this Christian introduction to philosophy?

COWAN: We set out to produce a book that avoided two shortcomings we found in other Christian philosophy texts. On the one hand, we did not want to treat issues in a superficial and cursory way. We wanted to provide significant depth so that the reader could come away with a good grasp of the issues and the range of answers that have been given to major philosophical questions. On the other hand, we did not want our discussion to be limited to only a narrow range of topics. We wanted to introduce the reader to all the main areas of philosophy.

Secondly, we wanted the text to be as friendly as possible to the needs of teachers. This required that we include pedagogical aids like diagrams, illustrations, study questions, recommended reading lists, and the like. It also required that we leave a lot of philosophical discussions open-ended rather than stating and defending our own preferred answers to every question. So on issues where Christian philosophers are deeply divided, we resisted the temptation to come down firmly on one side. This way, no matter what view a teacher holds, he or she can comfortably use the text to inform students about the debate and generate classroom discussion.One unique feature of the book, as has been widely touted, is that it includes chapters on subjects that usually get shorted or ignored in other texts, namely political philosophy and aesthetics. Jim and I wanted our treatment of value theory go beyond the requisite chapter on ethics and include these other subjects as well. It is a much better book because of it.

Your text intends to take the acquisition of wisdom as a serious matter when “doing philosophy.” How is this intention realized throughout the book?

SPIEGEL: The two primary ways we do this are methodological and substantive. As a matter of method, we explain and apply the “Socratic method,” which emphasizes humility in inquiry, as well as defining terms and using well-constructed arguments. Substantively, at various places in the discussion we explain how a particular view or acquaintance with an issue will help readers to understand to make wise judgments regarding a wide range of practical issues in ethics, politics, and aesthetics. In addition to standard moral issues, such as abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, and animal rights, we address such issues as civil disobedience, religion in the public square, and how to assess artworks which are aesthetically admirable but morally problematic.

COWAN: Where possible, throughout the book, we try to bring out the practical implications of the views we discuss. Even in philosophical areas that are seen as more abstract we want the reader to see that whatever position he takes, it will have practical and ethical consequences. For example, it's hard to imagine a more abstract topic than the metaphysical debate between Platonism (the view that universals exist) and nominalism (which denies the existence of universals). We show that nominalism has adverse implications for the objectivity of moral values. If there are no universal essences, say, then there is no such thing as humanity. And this makes it hard to make sense of the concept of human rights. So even abstract philosophical topics can contribute to our ability to navigate wisely through life.

Who do you have in mind to most benefit from this book?

SPIEGEL: We wrote the book in such a way that Philosophy students at all stages would have much to gain by reading it. Beginners will appreciate the clear presentation of issues and definitions of terms, while intermediate and advanced students will appreciate the thorough review of arguments for and against the major positions on the issues. As Philosophy teachers ourselves, we appreciate texts that allow for flexibility in use. Professors will benefit from the thorough coverage of topics, which will enable them to tailor reading assignments according to the specific structure and aims of their courses.

Walk us through a brief overview of the three main parts of this book and their significance of content and organization.

SPIEGEL: The book is divided into three parts: knowledge, being and value. The first part contains chapters on logic, epistemology, and philosophy of science. The section on being features chapters on metaphysics, human nature, and philosophy of religion. And the last section includes chapters on ethics, political philosophy and aesthetics. Perhaps our Trinitarian Christian theology impacted our decision to go with all of these triads :), but the book really just seemed to make the most sense this way from an organizational standpoint. The early chapters on logic and epistemology provide readers with conceptual tools that are valuable for reading the other chapters. And understanding several issues in metaphysics, human nature, and philosophy of religion is critical for properly addressing a number of questions in value theory taken up in the last section of the book.

You can learn more about the work of Steve Cowan and Jim Spiegel by visiting their websites: Cowan Chronicles and JimSpiegel.com

Interview with Chad Meister: Introducing Philosophy of Religion (part one)

2009-06-18T10:51:00.000-07:00

We are pleased to interview Chad Meister about his recently released Introducing Philosophy of Religion (Routledge, 2009). Chad is the Director of the philosophy program at Bethel College (Indiana) where he has been teaching philosophy for the past decade. Among other hats that he wears, Chad is one of the book review editors for Philosophia Christi.

What is the overall aim of this textbook?

The aim of this textbook is to help students and others reflect philosophically on important religious ideas, including religious diversity, concepts of God/Ultimate Reality, arguments for and against the existence of God, problems of evil, science and faith, religious experience, the self, death and the afterlife.

What is unique about your content, approach, intent, and scope for this introduction to philosophy of religion?

This book covers a broad array of topics—some of which are not typically covered in philosophy of religion texts but are nonetheless important in contemporary discussions—including non-Western conceptions of Ultimate Reality and conceptions of the self, reincarnation, and karma. Unlike other works I’ve done, I am not arguing in this book for any particular positions which I may personally hold. I attempt to be as fair and impartial as possible, and to provide arguments and evidences for each position.

Here is a quick overview of the chapter titles and main objectives:

Chapter 1: Religion and the Philosophy of Religion

Describe what is generally meant by the terms philosophy, religion, and philosophy of religion
Access an extensive philosophy of religion timeline
Explain religious realism and non-realism and note prominent adherents of each

Chapter 2: Religious Diversity and Pluralism

Describe several central elements of five major world religions
Explain six different philosophical approaches to religious diversity
Clarify five fundamental criteria for evaluating religious systems
Expound on some important reasons for manifesting religious tolerance with respect to the various traditions

Chapter 3: Conceptions of Ultimate Reality

Elucidate some major differences between Eastern and Western views of Ultimate Reality
Provide a concise summary of Hindu Absolutism and Buddhist Metaphysics
Present five attributes of the traditional concept of the God of theism and some challenges to them

Chapter 4: Cosmological Arguments for God's Existence

Explicate three cosmological arguments for God's existence and describe support for and objections to each of them
State scientific evidences for and against the claim that the universe began to exist
Concisely explain the cosmological argument for atheism

Chapter 5: Teleological Arguments for God's Existence

Explain three teleological arguments for God's existence and describe support for and objections to each of them
Expound on scientific findings which relate to alleged fine-tuning of the universe
Describe the intelligent design movement and arguments for and against irreducible complexity

Chapter 6: Ontological Arguments for God's Existence

Explain two ontological arguments for God's existence: one classic and one contemporary
Summarize several main objections and replies to each of these two arguments

Chapter 7: Problems of Evil

Classify various kinds of evil
Explicate the logical, evidential, and existential problems of evil and responses to them
Describe three major theodicies and some central objections to them

Chapter 8: Science, Faith and Reason

Explain three primary relationships between religion and science
Differentiate between rational validation and non-evidential views of religious justification
Understand the meaning of classical foundationalism, a reason for rejecting it, and the role of properly basic beliefs in a more recent version of foundationalism found in Reformed epistemology

Chapter 9: Religious Experience

Delineate three general features common to religious experience
Distinguish three general categories of religious experience
Provide reasons for and against the use of religious experience as justification for religious beliefs
Describe two scientific explanations for religious experience

Chapter 10: The Self, Death and the Afterlife

Explain four major conceptions of the self from the East and the West as well as arguments for and against them
Describe the doctrines of reincarnation and karma and their significance to two Eastern religious traditions
Expound on four arguments in favor of immortality and three arguments against it

There are a number of pedagogical features in the book and on a Routledge website dedicated to the book, including charts, diagrams, chapter outlines, objectives, timeline, glossary, PowerPoint slides, and other resources.

My hope is that students and others working through this text (along with an anthology which is relatively global in scope, such as my corresponding Philosophy of Religion Reader) will gain a broad and fairly comprehensive understanding of the field of philosophy of religion as practiced today, and that they will be enticed to further research and study on these topics.

How has your extensive experience as a professor and work as an editor of several philosophy of religion books shaped what is unique to this textbook?

Teaching at both the graduate and undergraduate levels over the past ten years has undoubtedly provided a plethora of dialectical encounters with students which proved fruitful in crafting this textbook as a dialogical work. I have also gained significant insight through various editing projects over the last few years. For example, in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion (which I co-edited with Paul Copan), The Philosophy of Religion Reader (read the interview here), and The Oxford Handbook of Religious Diversity (which I am just now finishing), I have been engaged with the works of philosophers of religion from across religious and philosophical spectrums. It has been a most enlightening experience working with atheists, pluralists, feminists, Continental philosophers, and Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic scholars. I have leaned much from them and am deeply indebted to them, and this dialogue has enriched my own thinking about a number of issues.

For more about Chad Meister, visit his website: http://www.chadmeister.com/

Downward Causation

2009-06-05T08:22:00.000-07:00

It is always heartening to see other thinkers whom I admire moving in similar directions. My own recent work in philosophy of mind involves a defense of downward (or top-down) mental-to physical causation (e.g., see "Is Downward Causation Possible?" in the most recent issue of Philosophia Christi Vol 11, No. 1 2009, pp. 93-110). I have just read and reviewed an excellent work in defense of the soul, libertarian free will and teleological (downward) causation, namely Naturalism by Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro. This is highly recommended. I found it so engrossing, I was able to give it a first read on the plane while tired during apologetics events! Since then I have taken copious notes and learned a great deal.

Naturalism is a concise yet potent anti-materialist salvo, and is perhaps the ideal appetizer for my main entree J. P. Moreland's Consciousness and the Existence of God. (See his book interview here.) This is a very important work, also defending downward causation and showing how the varieties of naturalism are in real trouble. In the last chapter, Moreland notes the strange fact that while the case for dualism has now been developed with impressive sophistication, there is a failure of physicalists to "enjoin the dualist literature" (186) and a repertoire of "dismissive maneuvers" used to camouflage this exercise in intellectual irresponsibility. So my hope and plea is that we can change this situation and invite (or if necessary, shame) naturalists to engage the actual positions of the best contemporary defenders of dualism and theism.

Finally, on the apologetics front, a definite thumbs-up for Peter Williams' A Sceptic's Guide to Atheism, which contains a lot of helpful material for responding to the new atheists' attempts to dismiss religious belief and experience as an illusion (which helped me considerably in presentations I gave at UCLA and Fort Wayne). See his interview here.

Right now I am working on a defense of libertarian free will against the claims of some scientists and philosophers that neuroscience has undermined conscious free will. This has become a hot issue in the philosophy of law, as some claim that retributive justice is obsolete, leaving only utilitarian, "crowd control" arguments for punishment. The paper I am working on will be delivered at the IVR World Congress meeting on Philosophy of Law in Beijing, China, September 15-20th of this year in the workshop on the connection between Punishment, Retribution and Free Will.

Closer to Truth

2009-05-22T12:30:00.000-07:00

For anyone teaching philosophy, I've found the content at www.closertotruth.com to be a great resource to "kick off" my classes. This sight is especially helpful for discussions in the philosophy of religion, as it includes interviews on teleology, cosmology, consciousness, morality, natural theology, Reformed epistemology, and much more. The interviews are with first rate thinkers (Plantinga, Craig, Tooley, Linde, Davies, Swinburne, Murphy, and more). In case you have not seen this sight, or the series on television, it is worth the time.

The Believing Primate

2009-05-19T17:25:00.000-07:00

EPS member Michael J. Murray, a Professor of Philosophy at Franklin and Marshall College, and also Vice President of Philosophy and Theology at the Templeton Foundation, recently edited a collection of writings (with Jeffrey Schloss) titled, The Believing Primate: Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion (OUP, 2009)

In Evolution of Religion: Studies, Theories, and Critiques, he has a chapter titled, "Four Arguments that the Cognitive Psychology of Religion Undermines the Justification of Religious Belief."

Michael recently interacted with Paul Bloom (Yale) about much of the topics in the above mentioned book. The below interview is from Bloggingheads.tv:

Welcome Steve Cowan and Jim Spiegel

2009-05-18T10:59:00.000-07:00

We are pleased to have Steven Cowan and Jim Spiegel as contributors to the EPS blog. Stay tuned for a forthcoming interview about their recently released book, The Love of Wisdom: A Christian Introduction to Philosophy (Broadman & Holman).

Steve Cowan is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Apologetics at Southeastern Bible College. He is also the Associate Director of the Apologetics Resource Center and the Editor of the Areopagus Journal. Within the EPS, he oversees our regional meetings and he is a frequent contributor to Philosophia Christi. For example, see his recent discussion on molinism in our Summer 2009 issue. More of Steve can be found at his Cowan Chronicles blog. We are pleased to have his thoughtful and unique contribution at the EPS blog in the areas of philosophy of religion, ethics and apologetics.

Jim Spiegel is a professor of philosophy at Taylor University. He has written, edited or contributed to a range of books and articles at the intersection of philosophy of religion, theology, ethics and aesthetics, including break-out titles like Faith, Film and Philosophy (with R. Douglas Geivett), Hypocrisy and his award-winning How to Be Good in a World Gone Bad. Jim is also a contributor to Philosophia Christi and a member of the EPS Executive Committee. In addition to his scholarly work, Jim is a devout music and recording enthusiast. More about Jim can be found at www.jimspiegel.com and also at his blog where he and his wife contribute. We are pleased to have his perspective and creative thinking at the EPS blog.

My Ways are not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible

2009-05-13T12:29:00.000-07:00

Given that a tremendous amount of attention is being given to the moral implications of divine commands in the Old Testament, I thought many of our readers will be interested in attending this event at the University of Notre Dame, from September 10-12. For any other information, including speakers, times, and such, please see the following link:

http://www.nd.edu/~cprelig/conferences/HebrewBible/shtml

I think the docket of speakers is first rate, and expect much fruit from this event.

Symposium: Did God Mandate Genocide?

2009-05-01T11:20:00.000-07:00

Philosophia Christi (Summer 2009) features a fascinating symposium that diversely addresses the theme, "Did God Mandate Genocide?" Primarily in view is the Old Testament destruction of the Canaanites.

Subscribe today!

Contributors to this discussion include: Wesley Morriston, Randal Rauser, Joseph Buijs, Clay Jones and Paul Copan.

This discussion was originally prompted by Copan's Philosophia Christi 10:1 (Summer 2008) article, "Is Yahweh a Moral Monster? The New Atheists and Old Testament Ethics."

Below is a snapshot of each of the contributions:

Did God Command Genocide? A Challenge to the Biblical Inerrantist
by Wesley Morriston

Abstract: Thoughtful Christians who hold the Old Testament in high regard must at some point come to terms with those passages in which God is said to command what appear (to us) to be moral atrocities. In the present paper, I argue that the genocide passages in the Old Testament provide us with a strong prima facie reason to reject biblical inerrancy—that in the absence of better reasons for thinking that the Bible is inerrant, a Christian should conclude that God did not in fact command genocide. I shall also consider and reject the attempts of two prominent Christian philosophers to show that God had morally sufficient reasons for commanding the Israelites to engage in genocidal attacks against foreign peoples.

"Let Nothing that Breathes Remain Alive": On the Problem of Divinely Commanded Genocide
by Randal Rauser

Abstract: In this essay I argue that God did not command the Canaanite genocide. I begin by critiquing Paul Copan’s defense of Canaanite genocide. Next, I develop four counter-arguments. First, we know intuitively that it is always wrong to bludgeon babies. Second, even if killing babies were morally praiseworthy, the soul-destroying effect these actions would have on the perpetrators would constitute a moral atrocity. Third, I develop an undercutting defeater to the claim that Yahweh commanded genocide. Finally, I argue that we ought to repudiate divinely commanded genocide given the justification this provides for ongoing moral atrocities.

Atheism and the Argument from Harm
by Joseph Buijs

Abstract: One line of argument commonly lodged against religion is that it is usually or alway sharmful, individually and socially, and for that reason should be abolished from our cultural landscape. I consider two variations of the argument: one that appeals to direct harm caused by religion and another that appeals to indirect harm on the basis of attitudes instilled by religion. Both versions, I contend, are seriously flawed. Hence, this so-called harm argument fails, both as a critique of theism and as a defense of atheism.

We Don't Hate Sin So We Don't Understand What Happened to the Canaanites: An Addendum to "Divine Genocide" Arguments

by Clay Jones

Abstract: Skeptics challenge God’s fairness for ordering Israel to destroy the Canaanites, but a close look at the horror of Canaanite sinfulness, the corruptive and seductive power of their sin as seen in the Canaanization of Israel, and God’s subsequently instituting Israel’s own destruction because of Israel’s committing Canaanite sin reveals that God was just in His ordering the Canaanite’s destruction. But Western culture’s embrace of “Canaanite sin” inoculates it against the seriousness of that sin and so renders it incapable of responding to Canaanite sin with the appropriate moral outrage.

Yahweh Wars and the Canaanites: Divinely-Mandated Genocide or Corporate Capital Punishment? Response to Critics
by Paul Copan

Abstract: The divine command to kill the Canaanites is the most problematic of all Old Testament ethical issues. This article responds to challenges raised by Wes Morriston and Randal Rauser. It argues that biblical and extrabiblical evidence suggests that the Canaanites who were killed were combatants rather than noncombatants (“Scenario 1”) and that, given the profound moral corruption of Canaan, this divinely-directed act was just. Even if it turns out that noncombatants were directly targeted (“Scenario 2”), the overarching Old Testament narrative is directed toward the salvation of all nations—including the Canaanites.

William Lane Craig vs. Christopher Hitchens

2009-04-05T22:17:00.000-07:00

On April 4th at Biola University, William Lane Craig debated Christopher Hitchens concerning the question, "Does God Exist?" The debate was moderated by columnist, law professor, and radio host Hugh Hewitt. Both Biola's student body and the graduate program in Christian apologetics co-sponsored the debate.

Below is a basic overview of the web coverage. A helpful, summary transcript can also be found here.

Some regional and local college papers covered the debate, including the Whittier Daily, San Gabriel Valley Tribune, Pasadena Star, the Daily Titan (Cal State Fullerton), and Biola's Chimes.

Perhaps the best atheist response comes from the Common Sense Atheist blog.

And some of the best theistic blog coverage and analysis can be found from Doug Geivett (Biola philosopher), Melinda Penner (apologist), MaryJo Sharp (apologist), and the Evangelical Outpost (cultural commentary).