Ethics, Religion, Economics, Politics

A Theodicy of Hell--Ch. 3 (I-II)

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Wed, 23 Aug 2017 00:33:00 +0000

This is part of a series on the book A Theodicy of Hell by Charles Seymour. For the index page, go here.

Seymour covers "The Argument from Justice" in this chapter. The argument is as follows. Humans over their lifetime only commit a finite amount of wrongdoing. Hence, they are only deserving of a finite amount of punishment. An infinite amount of punishment would be wrong for only a finite amount of finitely wrong acts. Hence, an eternal view of hell is unjust.

Section II covers preliminary responses from Augustine and Aquinas.

Augustine (p. 38)

Augustine makes two main points:

The length of the punishment is not always equal to how long the wrong act took to commit. For example, a crime that only took a moment may take years of jail time to pay back the debt to society.
The government has the right to punish people in a 'permanent' fashion (through death or life imprisonment). Since these are justifiable, then God punishing sinners in a 'permanent' fashion could also be justifiable.

Augustine's first argument misses the point. The original argument from justice is not commenting on how long it takes to commit the act but the severity of it (that it is only finitely wrong). This argument also fails to prove eternal punishment is justifiable. While he proved that a crime that only takes a moment to commit can be paid back with years of punishment, he has not proven that therefore an infinite amount of punishment is justified. Hence, the argument from justice is unaffected.

His second point is more effective but still falls short. While we can sometimes punish people in a permanent fashion, these punishments are not truly eternal. Life imprisonment may last a long time but will eventually come to an end. It is still doubtful whether eternal punishment is just assuming Augustine's second argument.

Aquinas (p. 40)

Aquinas responds to criticisms of Augustine's second argument as follows. He argues the finite length of punishments like life imprisonment are only accidentally finite. If humans lived forever, then life imprisonment could go on forever and that would still be a just punishment.

However, the assumption that an eternal punishment can be justified is exactly what is under dispute. Aquinas needs to provide an argument why this is so.

The Infinite Intention of Sin (p. 41)

Aquinas also argues that the fact that a sinner only sins a finite amount is due to his mortality. Given the opportunity, the sinner would sin forever.

However, Seymour notes that not all unrepentant sinners have the intention of sinning forever. For whatever reason, they may not be thinking about the future at all. Even granting that those that intend to sin forever deserve eternal punishment, this is only a subset of unrepentant sinners. The rest of the sinners would not deserve eternal hell.

Even for those who intend on sinning forever, it still does not imply that we should punish people eternally for this intent. Suppose someone wants to rob a bank and steal $100K but only gets away with $10K since he hears the cops are coming and cuts it short. Should he be punished for the $10K, $100K, or as if some intermediate amount was stolen?

It is also the case that some sinners may also intend to perform other good acts as long as they live. A thief may also intend on giving a portion of his money to the poor or feeding those in need. However, this would imply that a person who has both good and bad qualities would be entitled to an eternity of reward and punishment. Maybe the person would deserve a state that is neither great nor terrible? Maybe they deserve some reward and some punishment back to back for eternity? This is clearly difficult to square so the principle should be rejected.

This argument only works if there is a sinner who intends to sin constantly for eternity and not perform any commendable actions for eternity. Since this only justifies hell for an extremely unusual set of people, this does not justify an eternity of suffering for those who fail to repent.

Symmetry Between Heaven and Hell

I covered this argument in this post. To restate the argument, Aquinas tries to use the argument from justice to show that it works against heaven as well. Aquinas argues that it is 'unfair' to send those who repent to heaven since they have only done a finite amount of good acts in their life. At most, they only deserve a finite amount of reward, not an infinite amount. However, it is fair to reward some with eternal heaven. As a result, the argument from justice fails.

This argument is easy enough to refute. One can agree that heaven is not owed to the good people but that doesn't make it unjust. If I find $20 on the ground and give it back to its owner, there wouldn't be anything unjust about the person giving me $40 to thank me for returning it. However, when one commits a wrong act, then any more punishment than what is necessary is unjust. There is a necessary disanalogy between rewarding people for good actions and punishing them for bad actions.

Conclusion

So far, I generally agree with Seymour's defense of the 'argument from justice.' The arguments so far do not justify an eternal hell. See my upcoming post to see how the book continues to defend the argument from justice against an eternal hell.

A Theodicy of Hell

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Wed, 23 Aug 2017 00:33:00 +0000

Hi,

It's been a long hiatus. I spent several years reading very little philosophy. I've been reading some books lately and wanted to get back into this.

I recently read Four Views on Hell and was a great dialogue between four talented authors. It represented the Eternal Conscious Torment (ECT) view, annihilationist view, universalist view, and a view that included purgatory. All of the essays helped me to better understand their positions and appreciate them more.

In reading this book, I remembered a very good and thorough book on the topic that I read several years ago A Theodicy of Hell. (Don't ask me why the book is so expensive! I got it on sale for $22 in 2008)

Charles Seymour covers every major argument against the existence of hell. His goal is to provide a 'theodicy' of hell. In other words, a plausible explanation for why some may end up in hell for eternity.

In the introduction (p.12), he has main assumptions that he assumes throughout the book. They are libertarian free will and God having 'middle knowledge' of future actions of humans. I personally do not believe in either of these positions but for this series, I don't plan on questioning them too much since they can be pretty common views among Christians.

He defends what he calls the 'freedom view' of hell. Basically, those that go to hell end up there due to unrepentant sinning. Once in hell, they have the freedom to serve out their punishment for their wrongdoing and potentially crossover into heaven. Those that choose to stay in hell and keep sinning may end up suffering eternally. In this situation, those in hell still have the possibility of leaving if they repent so may seem fairer than other versions of hell. However, this view of hell is not perfect either and still has some issues.

I plan on going through the book's various sections and summarizing the arguments he makes and making my own comments. I will skip chapters 1-2 as 1 provides a short introduction and 2 provides a history of the belief of hell. I'm more concerned with justification so I'll start with Ch. 3.

Also, I will note that generally, he does not examine biblical texts until the end and the book is primarily philosophical, not biblical. I'll mainly focus on philosophical arguments as well.

A Theodicy of Hell

Chapter 3: The Argument from Justice

Sections I-II

Chapter 4: Arguments from Divine Love
Chapter 5: Arguments from Human Choice
Chapter 6: The Freedom View Compared with Rival Versions
Chapter 7: Theodicy and Theology

Second Presidential Debate, Some Notes

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Wed, 17 Oct 2012 15:04:00 +0000

Last night, Obama and Romney debated for the second time. Here is a link to the transcript and here is a link to the video. I want to make some quick notes on what Romney said.

Revenue Neutrality

You heard what I said about my tax plan. The top 5 percent will continue to pay 60 percent, as they do today. I’m not looking to cut taxes for wealthy people. I am looking to cut taxes for middle-income people.

And why do I want to bring rates down, and at the same time lower exemptions and deductions, particularly for people at the high end? Because if you bring rates down, it makes it easier for small business to keep more of their capital and hire people.

And for me, this is about jobs. I want to get America’s economy going again. Fifty-four percent of America’s workers work in businesses that are taxed as individuals. So when you bring those rates down, those small businesses are able to keep more money and hire more people.

Does anyone else here see the contradiction? If the wealthy keep paying the same amount they pay today, then they will not be able to keep more of their capital. He's made such a big point about his plan being revenue neutral that I'm surprised he turned it into a tax cut argument.

One may respond that he was talking about his middle income tax cuts here but then we have a conflict with his revenue neutrality. If the tax revenue from the middle class goes down due to tax cuts, then the revenue from either the lower or upper class has to increase to compensate for this. However, Romney has explicitly denied he will raise taxes on the wealthy or the poor.

AK-47's and Getting Parents to Stay Together

Romney's answer to the AK-47 question was awful and even the moderator called him out on it. I want to look at this part.

But let me mention another thing. And that is parents. We need moms and dads, helping to raise kids. Wherever possible the -- the benefit of having two parents in the home, and that’s not always possible. A lot of great single moms, single dads. But gosh to tell our kids that before they have babies, they ought to think about getting married to someone, that’s a great idea.

Because if there’s a two parent family, the prospect of living in poverty goes down dramatically. The opportunities that the child will -- will be able to achieve increase dramatically. So we can make changes in the way our culture works to help bring people away from violence and give them opportunity, and bring them in the American system.

So what is Romney proposing here exactly? To make a speech to parents that they should stay together after having kids? That is an important part of his plan for reducing poverty and violence? See this blog post for a similar point.

Contraceptives

Romney's answer to the equal pay of women was also terrible. He did have this to say.

I’d just note that I don’t believe that bureaucrats in Washington should tell someone whether they can use contraceptives or not. And I don’t believe employers should tell someone whether they could have contraceptive care of not. Every woman in America should have access to contraceptives.

Um, except the Republican party has been hammering Obama for making contraceptives a required benefit for health insurance. This supposedly denies the religious freedoms of some employers. Here, he seems to be saying that employers should not deny coverage for contraceptives to employees.

He may be saying that he is in favor of allowing women to spend their own money and not insurance money on contraceptives and that is what he meant here. However, that is irrelevant to Obama's point. Obama's point was that he was expanding access to contraceptives by making it a required benefit for health insurance and Romney ignored that.

Romney's 12 Million Jobs

Romney claimed again that his 5-point economic plan will create twelve million jobs in 4 years. He was asked to substantiate this claim and I will just leave it to Ezra Klein's team to debunk this. The studies Romney cites are:

A study that claims a Romney-like tax plan will create 7 million jobs in 10 years (if fully paid for and instituted in an economy with full employment).
A study that says under current policies, there will be 3 million energy related jobs over 8 years (not taking into account any of Romney's policies).
A study that says if China were to respect our intellectual rights, 2 million jobs would be created (Romney is not proposing anything to help with this).

From these three studies, Romney concludes that his plan will create 12 million jobs in 4 years. What a joke.

Even worse, Moody's shows that over the next four years, 12 million jobs will be created under current policy anyways.

I was anxious for Obama to bring up these points but he did not do so.

Pretty good debate overall and I'm glad Obama came out swinging this time.

Recession Economics

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Tue, 22 Mar 2011 04:04:00 +0000

Brad DeLong on the causes and cures of the great recession and why the many supposed cures floating around in politics are wrong.

1, 2

Research = rationing?

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Sat, 12 Mar 2011 02:01:00 +0000

We have Mike Huckabee objecting to comparative effectiveness research:

Tucked away in the $787 billion stimulus was the establishment of the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness, which will become our version of Britain’s National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, the ironically and Orwellian-named NICE. NICE decides who lives and who dies based on age and the cost of treatment. So the stimulus didn’t just waste your money; it planted the seeds from which the poisonous tree of death panels will grow…

After Sarah Palin invoked death panels in her critique of the health care bill, it has become a standard objection that buried somewhere in the healthcare bill (or in any other bill), there is something that will lead to health care rationing. This is a fact and we don't need very much argument to prove it.

However we need to find out what treatments work better than others. Surely, having more knowledge in this area is not a bad thing. If this will lead to rationing, why not just abolish any research done to test treatments? If comparative effectiveness research would lead to rationing, so would any research at all.

And even if we would use this information to encourage the use of the cheaper treatment in Medicare, would that be a bad thing? Many insurance plans already do something similar by requiring higher co-pays for brand name drugs versus the generic version.

The bigger point though is that he is saying if the government isn't willing to pay for something, then it is rationing. However, there are millions of uninsured people who aren't able to pay for their own care. As a result, they do not receive care. If this is rationing, their plan (which is to not provide universal coverage) would also lead to rationing. Their plan is to ration by price instead.

Rationing by prices will not always lead to the most desired goods going to those who need them most. If everyone had the same level of wealth, we could allocate goods to those who are willing to pay the most for them. These people would also be the people who value them the most.

However, clearly we do not live in a world where everyone has the same amount of income to draw from. As a result, the good of healthcare will go to the ones who can pay more. So, any attempt to level the playing field (through say Medicaid or the healthcare bill) attempts to fix this income effect so markets can work better.

The despair Huckabee finds in the fact that government may at some point attempt to control its costs by encouraging Medicare recipients to use less costly (but just as effective) treatments is astounding. His view of government would leave millions uninsured with no ability to pay for care. This should lead Huckabee to much more despair and corresponding support of the healthcare bill. Yet, consistency is not his strong suit. This may be the most despairing thing of all.

See these two blog posts for similar points: The "Rationing" Switcheroo and Cutting Off Your Nose to Spite Your Face.

Aggregate Value

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Fri, 04 Jun 2010 23:42:00 +0000

Alonzo is doing a series which kills the objection:

There's no way to aggregate well-being over different individuals.

Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Subjective Morality: Fact or Fiction?

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Thu, 03 Jun 2010 22:45:00 +0000

In a comment to this post, a commenter stated something that is commonplace amongst moral subjectivists and relativists.

Who said happiness, desire fulfillment are good and suffering is bad is an objective truth? They may exists as being objective in some sense, but applying labels to them is not grounded in anything objective.

We can apply the same reasoning to the statement "Pluto is a planet." In one sense of the word, a sense adopted for a long time, the statement was true. However, after scientists decided to change the definition, it became false. So, is the statement objectively true or false? It depends on the definition of "planet" being used.

None of this affects the objectively true statements in astronomy. Scientists can define existing terms in new ways or make up entirely new words to describe an object. As long as we are saying something that is objectively true about the object, we are fine.

There is no magical reason why we should define the term "planet" in one way or another. So why should we expect the same thing of any other label?

So, if by "Rape is bad" one means that it thwarts desires, then it is equivalent to the objectively true statement "Rape thwarts desires." Labels are made up and the definitions thereof do not matter. They do not change the facts about rape.

If the statement "Rape is bad" is a statement that has no basis in fact, then it must be fiction. We would not look at the statement "There are invisible teacups flying around Saturn" and say, "Oh well since you can't prove or disprove it, it is a subjective claim." No, we would say it is false.

To bring to light the absurdity even more, moral subjectivists are saying there is no evidence that can prove an act to be wrong, yet we are justified in taking a position one way or another. However, shouldn't one withhold judgment when faced with a lack of evidence? Why would we choose one way or the other?

But then moral subjectivists usually argue that we have strong moral feelings and that is enough to justify our moral beliefs. However, "My feelings say you should be sent to jail" is not any justification for sending someone to jail or determining who lives and who dies.

So, in summary, moral statements are either fact or fiction. There is no third option. Moral statements are not statements that have no basis in fact but are somehow still relevant to the real world. We cannot use our feelings to justify sending people to jail. Admitting the truth of moral statements depends on our feelings does away with morality altogether. It relegates it to the world of fiction.

See this post for a similar sentiment from Alonzo.

So why should we label desire fulfillment as "good" and desire thwarting as "bad?" Stay tuned for the answer in a later post.

Good Physicist Gone Bad

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Sun, 30 May 2010 08:51:00 +0000

Steven Weinberg, a physicist who won the Nobel prize, wrote a mantra of New Atheism which is indicative of the brilliance Dawkins and Hitchens come up with:

With or without religion, good people can behave well and bad people can do evil; but for good people to do evil—that takes religion.

Now this statement is false and bigoted and one should condemn whoever says it. One can note the vagueness of certain words and that the statement is only true in an irrelevant sense. One can easily switch a few things:

With or without religion, good people can behave well and bad people can do evil; but for bad people to do good—that takes religion.

With or without religion, good people can behave well and bad people can do evil; but for good people to do bad—that takes atheism.

Surely, atheists would take these claims to court, and rightly so. But those same reasons would take Weinberg's claim to court as well. And the prosecution rests its case.

See this post for the standard objections I have to blaming evils on religion.

Business Ethics

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Thu, 27 May 2010 04:03:00 +0000

Milton Friedman is a famous economist of the 20th century. In this paper, he argues against a business being concerned about social issues, except that which the law forbids. Here is a quote from the article:

There is one and only one social responsibility of business–to use it resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.

He also states elsewhere that a business needs to follow the law as well. So we can define his principle as follows:

MF: A business does no wrong in maximizing its profits when it is not breaking the law and engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.

Why believe this is true? Friedman states that a manager's sole obligation is to its stakeholders. If the manager decides to use money from selling hamburgers to help save the rain forest, he is not maximizing profits for the shareholders which presumably is what they want. If they wanted money going to the rain forest, that would be fine too but if they want him to maximize profit, then he must do it as long as he does not break the law and engages in open and free competition.

In advanced societies, one may be tempted to think the law is good enough to keep businesses out of trouble. However, imagine a society where a "Hitman" company would not be illegal. A business could accept payment in return for killing someone. In such a society, a business could follow the Milton Friedman principle yet still be unethical.

Everyone would agree such a society should make a law against corporations being allowed to kill people. However, if a corporation has no social obligations outside of those mandated by law and free trade, then how could one say this? In this society, the act is not illegal, deceptive or fraudulent. The foundation on which this principle is built falls apart when considering this.

The only justification for laws limiting what a business can and cannot do comes from the ethical obligations of a business. Making a law stating businesses cannot kill people is only justified if businesses already have an ethical obligation to not kill people.

Since there are societies where the law can be seriously inadequate, one cannot simply follow the law to avoid any wrong. One must act ethically. If the Milton Friedman principle is to be justified, it must be done by appealing to the social responsibility of businesses. As has been shown, there are more responsibilities than following the law and avoiding deception (like not killing people). Therefore, the Milton Friedman principle fails.

See this paper for another negative assessment of Friedman's paper. See this post for a similar argument against the claim "One should not legislate morality."

The Manhattan Declaration: Objections

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Thu, 03 Dec 2009 00:27:00 +0000

The Manhattan Declaration is a declaration by Christians of all types about the threats to vital institutions in our current society. The three are life, marriage, and religious liberty.

Sanctity of Life

The three dangers to the sanctity of life, according to the authors, are the institutions of abortion, stem cell research, and euthanasia. They object to the first two because they kill an innocent life. Here is what they have to say about euthanasia:

At the other end of life, an increasingly powerful movement to promote assisted suicide and “voluntary” euthanasia threatens the lives of vulnerable elderly and disabled persons. Eugenic notions such as the doctrine of lebensunwertes Leben (“life unworthy of life”) were first advanced in the 1920s by intellectuals in the elite salons of America and Europe. Long buried in ignominy after the horrors of the mid-20th century, they have returned from the grave.

Their argument is that allowing assisted suicide or euthanasia will lead to something similar to the Nazi death camps where instead of putting people of a particular race in the camps, we are killing off the disabled and elderly.

It seems they cannot tell the difference between allowing someone to choose when to die and killing someone outright. Why is it that when the idea of allowing someone to die, when it conforms to their will, is brought up, cases are brought up where people have been killed when it is against their will? Clearly, these are two different situations and allowing one does not imply we will allow the other.

Also, there is an assumption that any life, no matter how unbearable, is worth living. This is clearly false. Denying this does not give any legitimacy to the Nazi death camps however.

Imagine the following situations:

1. A person is in a car accident and arrives at the hospital brain dead and in a coma. The person is still alive, thanks to the machines he is hooked up to. However, he will never be able to function again. Once the machines are disconnected, he will die.

Is this a life worth living? Clearly not, so we are not doing anything wrong in pulling the plug and letting the person die.

2. A person is in a car accident and survives. However, he is completely paralyzed from the neck down for the rest of his life.

Is this a life worth living? Suppose the person wants to end it all and just die. Suppose also this is a persistent desire, not just a spur of the moment decision. The person is not able to do the job himself since he is paralyzed. He asks his friend to give him a lethal injection to kill him.

Many people argue there is a morally relevant difference between the two situations. However, in both cases, the person is acting to end the life of someone. In the first case, the person pulls the plug, knowing this will surely kill the patient. In the second case, the person gives his friend a lethal injection, knowing he will surely die. If the first situation is not wrong, the second one cannot be either.

Also, it is important to note here that we are not ending all lives that are judged as unworthy of life. We require the consent or the implied consent of the person being killed. That is the difference between euthanasia and the Nazi death camps.

Redefining "Marriage"

The second objection the authors make is to people to threaten marriage by thinking of allowing same sex marriages or polygamous marriages. They argue the following:

It would lock into place the false and destructive belief that marriage is all about romance and other adult satisfactions, and not, in any intrinsic way, about procreation and the unique character and value of acts and relationships whose meaning is shaped by their aptness for the generation, promotion and protection of life.

Later on, the authors state that allowing homosexual marriages implies we should allow polygamous and incestuous marriages as well. But wait, polygamous and incestuous marriages can still procreate. One may object that in incestuous marriages, birth defects can occur. However, there are plenty of cases where we allow people to procreate even when it is likely they will create a child with some unfortunate characteristic. For example, two carriers of the cystic fibrosis gene will have a 25% chance of having a baby with cystic fibrosis. There are countless other genetic diseases that have a good chance of being passed onto the children of parents. So, one cannot object to incestuous marriages for this reason.

So, their argument here also implies that we should allow incestuous or polygamous marriages too. They must come up with an independent reason why these should not be allowed, which has nothing to do with reproductive capabilities.

But do reproductive capabilities matter? The person arguing the above would also have to argue that a couple with one infertile person should not be allowed to be married. After all, they cannot procreate. What about people over a certain age? They cannot procreate either. Should we have couples get a fertility test and create an age ceiling on when people can get married?

Also, suppose another situation. A couple gets married and has a couple of kids. The kids are grown up and move out of the house. The couple is now in their 70's. They are unable to have any more kids and clearly are not taking care of their kids anymore. This argument would seem to imply we should not allow these people to be married anymore. If marriage is only for those who can procreate and take care of children, then how can one argue that we should allow marriages to continue that are no longer involved in this function?

Or imagine a member of the marriage loses their ability to procreate at some point in the marriage. If they do not already have children, then the argument would imply the couple should no longer be allowed to maintain their marriage.

Therefore, any argument against homosexual marriage because they cannot procreate clearly does not work.

The authors state one bad thing that comes from legalizing homosexual marriage is that family life and school sex-ed programs will teach children that such unions are "marriage" even though many people believe they are wrong. However, imagine we lived in a society where many people believed interracial marriage was wrong. Imagine someone argues, "Children will be taught that interracial marriage is okay when many people clearly believe it is wrong. Therefore, we should not allow interracial marriage." Does this argument make any sense?

Also, it is argued that calling homosexual unions "marriages" disallows their religious liberty. Once again, imagine a member of a religion which vehemently opposes interracial marriages. Should we make interracial marriages illegal because this group's religious liberty is jeopardized? Clearly, not.

Protecting Religious Liberty

The third point made in the article is threats made to Christian's religious liberty. However, one must note that religious liberty is not a liberty that trumps all other concerns. If the 9/11 hijackers argued anyone who gets in their way is jeopardizing their religious liberty, we surely have reason to regard their argument as wrong. Religious liberty is only relevant when the relevant belief is not harming others. Once the religious belief is doing harm to others, we can stop people from acting on that belief.

Jehovah's Witnesses object to blood transfusions. Should we ban blood transfusions because this religious group does not agree with it? Does it harm Jehovah's Witnesses' religious liberty to give other people blood transfusions? Clearly not.

Therefore, a religious belief cannot inform the law to ban a particular act. This brings us full circle to the other two points of the article. Using the Bible to argue against particular laws should have no effect since considerations of the law should be apart from any particular religion. It does not matter if the religion is the majority one or not.

This is what protecting religious liberty really means. One should not be forced to suffer based solely on rules from another person's religion. So, the statements concerning what the Bible says or what Christians believe may well motivate Christians to object to the laws, they do not form a basis for changing the law. Any basis for the law must not be informed by Christianity or any other religion.

What do you think the probability of God is?

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Tue, 24 Mar 2009 18:24:00 +0000

Here is a link to a test that will tell you what you think (or what your beliefs imply) the probability of God is. It uses Bayesian probability to compute this.

Enjoy!

Carrier-Craig Debate: Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Tue, 24 Mar 2009 18:09:00 +0000

Hi everyone,

Here is a link to the .mp3 of the debate between Richard Carrier and William Lane Craig on the topic: Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? Carrier says no and Craig says yes.

Enjoy.

Why does God Exist?

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Fri, 03 Oct 2008 19:16:00 +0000

Introduction

The Cosmological argument for God's existence looks at the universe and asks what the cause of it is. Proponents of the argument also maintain that God's existence need not have a cause. Atheists have long replied that theists can't have it both ways. If theists are willing to posit God without any explanation, why are atheists not so obliged to posit the universe without any explanation?

Historically, theists have attempted to circumvent explaining the existence of God (but still positing a cause for the universe) in three ways: (1) God has existed for eternity, (2) God is logically necessary, or (3) God contains the reason for his own existence.

I attempt to show that all three ways fail to satisfactorily answer the question. I will give a fourth response that does salvage the Cosmological argument and admits that (1) God's existence is a brute fact but yet (2) the universe should be explained using God's existence.

Analysis

Key Assumption

In the following analysis, I will use the following proposition to establish my criticism of the three different responses.

P: One can imagine God as not existing. That being either that there is no God, there is nothing at all, or there is a very powerful being who could have varying degrees of knowledge and goodness.

Surely, P is true. We could imagine there being a God who is pretty good, but not morally perfect. We could imagine there being a very powerful evil being instead of an all-good God. We could even imagine there being nothing. This shows that God's existence need not occur.

Response 1: God's existence had no beginning.

When attempting to explain why we need not explain God's existence but we do need to explain the universe's existence, some theists have mentioned that God has existed for eternity. The universe, on the other hand, hasn't always existed so this begs for an explanation whereas God's existence does not.

This response relies on the following assumption (denoted A1):

A1. Something has a cause for its existence if and only if it had a beginning.

Perhaps it can be established that if something had a beginning, then it has a cause. However, this doesn't imply that if something doesn't have a beginning, it cannot have a cause.

Let's bring up proposition P from before. Surely, even if God has existed for all eternity, he may have had different properties. God could have existed for all eternity and been less than morally perfect. God need not have all knowledge to have existed for all eternity and it is the case that he could have not existed at all, for all eternity. Therefore, mentioning that God had no beginning fails to explain why God has the properties he has or why he exists in the first place.

To put it a different way, this argument supposes that the existence of God at a given time can be fully explained by looking at a time before when he existed. However, this does not explain why God exists in the first place with the properties he has.

So, the first response fails to establish that we need to explain the existence of the universe but yet God's existence can go unexplained.

Response 2: God is logically necessary

Another way to circumvent the issue is to argue that God's existence is logically necessary via the Ontological argument. Basically, this argument attempts to show that God's non-existence is logically impossible. Much like the statement that 2+2=4. This statement has to be true, regardless of anything else. The argument attempts to establish God's existence being akin to the existence of mathematical theorems or logical rules.

To throw some doubt onto any form of the ontological argument, one must note that most philosophers do not accept it as sound. Also, we can recall proposition P. If P is true, then God's existence need not hold which implies that God's existence is not logically necessary. It is curious that one is able to imagine God as not existing or to exist in a different way if the ontological argument is supposed to be successful.

So, the statement that God is logically necessary is not a good response since it relies on a rejection of proposition P and relies on the Ontological argument. Since P is intuitively true and the Ontological argument is widely criticized, the retreat that God is logically necessary is not a successful one.

Response 3: The Principle of Sufficient Reason

Leibniz, in positing his version of the Cosmological argument, relied on the principle of sufficient reason. The principle states:

For every entity x, if x exists, then there is a sufficient explanation why x exists.

This can be read as denying the existence of any brute facts. He argues that God contains his own reason for existing while the universe does not. Therefore, according to the principle of sufficient reason, the universe still needs a reason for its existence but God does not.

The problem here is by saying that God contains the reason for his own existence. Unless one is also relying on God being logically necessary (see response 2) the argument will fail. Of course, one can use statement P cited in the beginning to show that God could have possibly not existed so by the principle, God must need a reason to exist.

Response 4: Swinburne Salvages the Argument

With these 3 responses failing, many have concluded the Cosmological argument cannot be salvaged. However, Richard Swinburne has come up with a way to do so. In his book The Existence of God, Swinburne argues that one should move beyond a given explanation only if doing so results in a gain in explanatory power and simplicity.

One example is the law of gravity. One can note that objects fall to the ground when they are released. Why does this happen? One can posit the law of gravity as an explanation. Why is this a good explanation and why is it warranted to move beyond accepting objects falling to the ground as a brute fact?

Using Swinburne's point, in doing so, one gains simplicity and explanatory power. Surely, with the law of gravity, one can explain why objects will fall when released. Also, one gains simplicity because positing the simple law of gravity explains all the instances of objects falling to the earth. One need not accept all these separate instances as brute facts (a very complex hypothesis) but can instead posit one simple law to explain all the observations.

As a sidenote, it is interesting to note two objections often heard against positing God as an explanation for the universe are rebutted.

One being,

"If you say God created the universe, then what created him? Without saying what created God, you can't explain the universe by positing him."

This is obviously false since one can explain objects falling to the ground with the law of gravity without having to explain why the law of gravity exists.

The next being,

"When you posit a God, you have complicated the explanation. When choosing between only the universe existing and the universe and God existing, the simpler explanation is just the universe. So, Occam's Razor should be used to cut God out of the picture."

However, this objection could also be brought against the gravity explanation.

One could say, "In positing gravity, you need to posit all the instances of objects falling to the earth and the additional statement that the law of gravity makes them do so. I'll use Occam's razor and stick to the simpler picture that these objects just fall to the earth with no law to govern them."

However, since the law of gravity is being used to explain objects falling to the earth, one need not posit both in an explanation. Since the law of gravity is simpler than supposing all the separate instances when objects have fallen to the ground, gravity can be used to explain the instances in question.

Likewise, since God is being posited to explain the universe, one need not posit both entities, just God. If God is simpler than the universe, then positing God is the simpler hypothesis.

So, Swinburne's principle states that if you gain simplicity and explanatory power by positing a new entity, then that increases the probability the entity exists. However, why think that God is simpler than the universe? Also, how can God be used to explain the universe's existence? What reasons does God have for that?

Swinburne argues that positing God is positing an entity with only one property. That being omnipotence. He uses this property to argue that God must also be omniscient, perfectly free, and morally perfect. Since God is a being with one property, he is clearly simpler than the universe we observe.

Also, God has good reasons to create a universe like the one we observe. Clearly, creating humans is a good thing. It is good for beings to exist who have the choice between good and evil and can affect the world around them, for better or worse. (See Chapter 6 of The Existence of God.)

Clearly, God has the ability to create a complex universe since he is omnipotent. Therefore, positing the existence of God gives us reason to expect a universe with humans.

It has been established that God is a simpler hypothesis than the complex universe and can be used to explain the existence of that universe. Therefore, the observation of a complex universe increases the probability of the existence of God.

But why does God exist? Why can we stop at God and not stop at the universe? Well, using the same principle, if we posited a cause for God, we would not gain simplicity since God is already an exceedingly simple being. So, it is not unlikely God would exist uncaused. However, the universe, given its complexity, is very unlikely to exist uncaused.

Swinburne concludes chapter 7 on the Cosmological argument in this way:

There is quite a chance that, if there is a God, he will make something of the finitude and complexity of a universe. It is very unlikely that a universe would exist uncaused, but rather more likely that God would exist uncaused. (p. 152)

Using Swinburne's principle, we have salvaged the Cosmological argument.

Conclusion

Critics of the Cosmological argument have long objected that you can't ask for a cause of the universe while also ignoring that God is being posited without an explanation. Three responses to this charge have traditionally been given but they all fail. They are (1) God has a beginning but the universe does not, (2) God is logically necessary but the universe is not, and (3) God has sufficient reason to exist but the universe does not.

A more sophisticated response from Swinburne states that God is simpler than the universe and one gains explanatory power by positing God, so the probability God exists is increased. This response allows God to exist uncaused rather than allowing the universe to exist uncaused. This is because of the simplicity of God compared to the complexity of the universe. Since God is far simpler, it is far more likely he would exist uncaused rather than the universe.

(For Swinburne's discussion of these points, see Chapters 5-7 of The Existence of God.)

Attacking Christianity

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Tue, 02 Sep 2008 02:27:00 +0000

If taking down the ten commandments from a courthouse is attacking Christianity, then isn't putting them up attacking non-Christians?

If not mandating daily school prayer is an attack on Christianity, then isn't mandating one an attack on nonbelievers?

If attempting to remove the phrase "under God" from our pledge and "In God we Trust" from our national motto is an attack on Christianity, then doesn't keeping those phrases constitute an attack on other religions (polytheists) and nonbelievers?

If attempting to remove the process of swearing on the Bible in court is an attack on Christianity, then isn't keeping that process an attack on non-Christians?

Or perhaps stopping these acts does not constitute an attack on any religion but recognizes the fact that a particular religious belief is not required to be an American. That many non-Christians have made great sacrifices to our country (like say, fighting for us in war) and to attempt to create a division and call the religious American and the non-religious unpatriotic would be woefully unjust.

McCain vs. Obama on Healthcare

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 22:32:00 +0000

Here is a very informative article written by the CATO Institute comparing the two presidential candidates' healthcare proposals.

Legislating Morality

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Tue, 26 Aug 2008 23:10:00 +0000

Many people have used the phrase in political debate that one should not legislate morality. However, this claim is false and not coherent. We will see why below.

"One should not legislate morality"

It is important to see what those who are against 'legislating morality' are claiming to be against. People who are against 'legislating morality' often point to laws that go too far and do not respect people's privacy. A law against homosexuality would be 'legislating morality' since sexual orientation, as long as it's not harming others, should be a private matter. The government should not be ignoring people's right to privacy. The argument can also be extended to many other examples.

However, one must note the presence of the clause "as long as it's not harming others." What is the justification for this clause? Also, how does one say "The government should not be ignoring people's right to privacy?"

The justification of any law must come from morality. If one shows that, without a given law, many people would be hurt only proves it is a just law if it is morally required that we care about other people's suffering. The same can be said about any other justification of a law. Adding the phrase "as long as no harm is done to others" presumes that morality demands that we care about harming others.

So, when one is talking about what the law ought to say, one has no other choice but to resort to morality. Realizing this makes the statement "The law ought not legislate morality" very puzzling since the phrase "ought" is in there. If that is a 'moral' ought then one is equivalently saying, "Morality demands that we do not legislate morality."

Clearly, something has gone wrong here. If we can't legislate morality, then what morality demands would be irrelevant. We wouldn't be able to use morality to show morality can't be legislated.

In order to legislate morality, one need not argue that since an act is wrong, it must be legislated against. There are many competing issues when determining what acts to legislate against. An act would have to be immoral but we also have to consider if, in policing the act, we are violating people's rights. One of these rights is a right to privacy. Surely, this right can be overridden if the act is terrible enough. These are things that must be weighed. Surely, no one is arguing that one should make all immoral acts illegal.

Morality provides a framework to weigh competing considerations. Without morality, you cannot weigh these considerations at all to determine what acts one should legislate against.

Conclusion

Clearly, one has to legislate morality. The phrase "One ought not legislate morality" is a confused one and is surely false. For another person expressing the same viewpoint, see Alonzo's post here.

Ch. 1: Is Evil Evidence against Belief in God?

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Sun, 10 Feb 2008 04:35:00 +0000

Chapter 1

We have three debaters to debate this chapter. William Rowe will argue that evil is evidence against belief in God. His opponents are Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann.

William Rowe's Case
First, William Rowe makes his case that evil is evidence against God's existence. He makes it very clear at the beginning what is being argued. He isn't attempting to show that God doesn't exist or that overall, the evidence is against him. He is attempting to show that, all other grounds for belief in God aside, the consideration of the amount and intensity of suffering that exists makes God's existence less likely.

His argument structure is the following:
1. There exists horrendous evils that God would have no justifying reason to permit.
2. God would not permit evil without a justifying reason for doing so.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.

He does not claim to be able to establish premise (1) with certainty. His point is given the instances of horrendous evil that we see every day, it is plausible that (1) is true. He gives two instances of seemingly pointless suffering which are:

1. A fawn is horribly burned in a forest fire caused by lightning. It lies on the forest floor suffering terribly for five days before death relieves it of its suffering.

2. A five year old girl is brutally beaten, raped, and strangled in Flint, Michigan, on New Year's Day.

He states that examples such as these are plentiful and it is pretty difficult to believe that God had a good reason for allowing them to occur. It seems that whatever good we can come up with, it doesn't seem to justify God allowing the event to occur. These are examples of seemingly pointless suffering which make premise (1) seem plausible.

First Objection: Argument from Ignorance

Rowe responds to the objection that his argument from evil is an argument from ignorance. The argument goes: We are not omniscient like God is so we shouldn't expect to understand all the reasons he allows bad things to happen. It is fallacious to argue that we don't see a reason why certain bad events occur to argue that there is no such good reason. After all, a good parent may have to make his kids suffer for their good even if they can't understand why. A little kid is made to go to the dentist, for example.

Rowe responds that it may be plausible to think a finite being has a good reason for these evils to occur, it isn't plausible to think an infinite being does. Also, if God were a good parent, why doesn't he comfort us while we're going through this necessary evil? Why does he stay silent? It would be like a parent sending their kid to the dentist and not comforting them and telling them that it's for their own good. God, if he exists, has been silent on many occasions where horrendous suffering has occurred. Rowe wonders why.

He meets the argument head on on page 9 by saying that we have a reasonable judgment of the goods involved in many of these seemingly pointless instances of suffering. Therefore, we can trust our intuition and say that it is plausible they are pointless.

Second Objection: Theodicies

Rowe then considers that someone could bring up a reason why God allows such evils and if that reason worked, then that would refute his argument. However, he contends such theodicies fail. He briefly mentions and objects to the free will theodicy.

Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann's Response

Snyder and Bergmann aren't interested in bringing up any theodicies to defeat Rowe's argument. Instead, they take the first objection, that Rowe's argument is an argument from ignorance. That we don't have good reason to say, one way or the other, whether an omnipotent, omniscient being would have justifying reasons to allow the given instances of suffering.

Nosseum Arguments

Snyder and Bergmann bring up the example of extraterrestrials. They imagine someone who sees no evidence for aliens to argue that they probably don't exist. To guarantee this conclusion however, the following proposition is needed:

P1. More likely than not, if aliens existed, we would find evidence for them.

However, P1 doesn't seem true. We can think of many reasons why we wouldn't see any evidence for aliens if they existed. Perhaps they live too far away or are not intelligent enough to make contact or have no desire to do so. So, it is not reasonable to accept P1.

They argue there is a similar proposition in need of proving in Rowe's argument, that being:

P1'. More likely than not, if a justifying reason for God to allow these horrendous evils existed, we would see them.

They argue that we just don't have enough knowledge to know if this statement is true. Therefore, the burden is on Rowe to show that it is.

Rowe's Response

Rowe responds to nosseum argument that he is making something more like a no-conceivum argument. Not only is it the case that we don't see goods coming from the horrendous evils, we can't imagine why a God would allow such things. This does not parallel the case of extraterrestrials because we can imagine situations where they wouldn't visit us but still exist. However, we can't imagine justifying reasons God may have.

He also criticizes them by asking how much evil would it take for it to be enough against God's existence? Even if all of our lives were characterized by constant suffering, Bergmann and Snyder seem like they would still argue that we are not in a good enough position to say whether God would allow it.

Bergmann and Snyder's Response

They respond that Rowe still hasn't given a good reason to think that if God had justifying reasons for the evils we see, that we would see them. He is arguing that we can't conceive of a reason for God to allow them which implies there probably isn't one. This takes a nosseum proposition like P1' given above and none has been defended.

Evaluation

Overall, I would say that Rowe's argument is not an argument from ignorance. I think, without a theodicy of any sort, when faced with the large amounts of evil that occur, they have to count against God's existence. I think there is a good theodicy given by Richard Swinburne in his book Providence and the Problem of Evil. However, the number of seemingly pointless instances of suffering do cry out for an explanation. It seems that in general, we are in a good position to tell whether a future event is likely to result in unnecessary suffering. We do it all the time.

Bergmann and Snyder do make an initially convincing case though. However, their case seems to go against the statement that if something seems true, that gives evidence towards it being true. They want to argue in a case similar to Stephen Wykstra. He argues that the following principle is true with regard to believing something based on appearances.

"On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim 'It appears that p' only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would be different than it is in some way discernible to her."--(quoted from Providence and Problem of evil, p. 25)

For example, we can only say of an object that it appears to be red if we have reason to believe that if it wasn't red, it would appear in a different way and we would be able to detect it as so. However, this claim is too bold and leads to an infinite regress.

Take any ordinary claim like my computer appears to be in front of me. Using Wykstra's argument, we would only be able to claim this if I could say that if my computer weren't in front of me, then it wouldn't appear to be there. This appears fine and true, but using Wykstra's principle, this is not enough. We need reason to think that if this statement were false, we would know it. We may be able to come up with yet another reason but in the end, we would be stuck in an infinite regress trying to justify each appearance. So, it seems the general principle underlying Wykstra's and Bergmann's and Snyder's response is false. (I owe this point to Richard Swinburne which is made in his book Providence and Problem of Evil, p. 25-27)

So, in the end, I believe Rowe has made a better case, that theists have to put up a theodicy to answer his argument from evil. His argument is not an argument from ignorance. In response, someone can't rely on the general statement that we can only claim that it appears that p if we have good reason to think if p were false, we would detect it. A theist must come up with a theodicy if he is to answer Rowe's argument from evil. I do think such a theodicy exists (Swinburne's) but without one, Rowe's argument succeeds.

Go here for a good paper on nosseum arguments.

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Sun, 10 Feb 2008 04:29:00 +0000

Hello there,

I recently checked out Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. It has many different contributors. I'd like to start a series where I review a debate in here every week. There are 12 total. When I do them, I will create links on this page so they can all be found in one spot.

Chapter 1: Is Evil Evidence against Belief in God?

Connecticut Valley Atheists: Imagine No Religion

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Sun, 10 Feb 2008 04:26:00 +0000

Hello,

The Connecticut Valley Atheists have posted a sign that has a picture of the twin towers standing with the statement: Imagine No Religion. This is a bigoted sign and should be treated with discontempt. It is just as bigoted to look at all the wrong done by Joseph Stalin and post a picture of it and say: Imagine No Religion. Joseph Stalin was an atheist but clearly not all atheists are bad like Joseph Stalin. The people who ran airplanes into the World Trade Center were religious but clearly not all religious people are prone to these acts of violence.

A religion caused 9/11. That is very different from saying all religions cause extreme acts of violence. Sure, the world would be a better place if there weren't any Islamic fanatics running airplanes into buildings. That doesn't mean that the world would be better if there were no religion at all. That statement takes a lot more evidence. (Note, I am not saying anything about Muslims in general, just the fanatical ones who caused 9/11.)

A post I made earlier echoes similar comments and gives a more thorough treatment of the atheists who wish to blame religion for the wrongdoing of the religious. It also criticizes theists who wish to blame atheism for the wrongdoing of atheists.

Here is a post by Alonzo Fyfe who is an atheist against the sign posted by the Connecticut Valley Atheists.

Please remember it is not religion or atheism that causes these things, it is people's blindness to the truth. It is their exceedingly strong desire to believe a certain act is good that makes them ignore all the evidence to the contrary.

From a comment made by Alonzo on his blog, he writes:

"Think of a sign that says, "Imagine: No Arabs." We can defend such a sign the same way people are trying to defend the "Imagine: No Religion"sign. Yes, it is possible that some non-Arab might have some day attacked the towers. However, if we had a world without arabs, chances are, the towers would still be standing.

Does this justify the sentiment, "Imagine: No Arabs?"

No . . . because it blames a whole group of people who did nothing wrong.

Similarly, "Imagine: No Religion" blames a whole group of people who did nothing wrong.

Both versions are morally repulsive and for the same reasons."

See this post for more defense by Alonzo.

The Moral Argument for God

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Mon, 23 Apr 2007 23:22:00 +0000

Please, I beg of you.

Don't use the moral argument for God to argue for God's existence. One may ask, "Hmm, moral argument for God? What is that all about?"

Well I'll tell you. Moral laws exist. Moral laws couldn't exist without a law maker. Therefore, there must be a lawmaker that exists and creates these laws. Humans can't be the creators of these laws because the moral laws transcend human laws. Sometimes, humans can be mistaken with regard to which laws are right or wrong. If God doesn't exist, humans are the only beings left who will make the laws. If one disagrees with a law made by humans, they have no higher standard to appeal to. So, they can't object to the human laws at all. So, if God doesn't exist, human laws are the top of the line, they are all we have. But clearly, moral relativism, the view that if a majority of humans agree on a law, then it's real is wrong. So is subjectivism, the view that morality is nothing more than a personal preference, nothing more than preferring turkey over ham on your sandwich. If God doesn't exist, it is either the individual or the society one lives in that gets to make the rules. Since this is false, there are rules outside of these systems, God must exist.

So, that's the argument. Where does it go wrong?

1. God can't make up any laws he wants and still be a good being. If God made up the law, "Everyone rape as much as possible" then that wouldn't make the law good, that would make God bad. So, it seems the laws must even transcend any God that may exist. Therefore, the "moral laws" cannot rely on any being.

2. What does it mean to say that God's laws are "better" or constitute a "higher standard" than human laws? One may saw that God is all-good, so his laws must be better. However, what does "all-good" mean? It must mean something other than "whatever God's laws dictate" otherwise, if God commanded rape, rape would become good. One must use a standard of good apart from God to state meaningfully that God is all-good. One may say that God is omniscient so in that way, his standard is better or higher. However, God merely exists as a signpost for morality, he is not then the creator of morality. So, this response fails to establish the argument. One may say that God is all-powerful, so his standard is better. However, the amount of power you have doesn't affect how good your laws are. What matters is that they allign with what is good, not that you have the power to enforce them.

With these two fundamental problems, one may wonder who uses this argument? Many people. One example is from the book titled I Don't Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist. In chapter 7, the writers defend this argument as sound. They spend pretty much the entire chapter proving that the moral law exists. They however spend no time at all linking the premise "the moral law exists" to the conclusion that "God exists." They surely don't respond to the Euthyphro Dilemma which is a 2,000 year old response to this argument and is basically a reformulation of point #1.

Here is another example of someone using the argument.

The writer defines something as moral if it adheres to a standard given by a legitimate authority. However, this runs into the same problems mentioned. What makes an authority legitimate? Because it's commands are good? And why are they good? And so on.

Here is his supposed solution to the Euthyphro dilemma.

"The Solution

The general strategy used to defeat a dilemma is to show that it's a false one. There are not two options, but three.

The Christian rejects the first option, that morality is an arbitrary function of God's power. And he rejects the second option, that God is responsible to a higher law. There is no Law over God.

The third option is that an objective standard exists (this avoids the first horn of the dilemma). However, the standard is not external to God, but internal (avoiding the second horn). Morality is grounded in the immutable character of God, who is perfectly good. His commands are not whims, but rooted in His holiness.

Could God simply decree that torturing babies was moral? "No," the Christian answers, "God would never do that." It's not a matter of command. It's a matter of character.""

However, if something is good because it agrees with God's character, we still have the same problem. If God's character were different, if God's character was such that he liked rape and as a result commanded it, then God would be evil. That wouldn't make rape good. Also, it isn't explained what it means for God's character to be "good." Does it mean that God's character is God's?

Also a related subject, some theists argue that if morality doesn't depend on God, then God must somehow be less powerful as a result. However, I find this to be a mirror image of a similar objection. Some people argue the same result would follow if logic doesn't depend on God. If God can't make false the law of noncontradiction, then God must be bounded by the rules of logic. So, this makes God trapped and forced to obey the rules of logic.

This idea is silly. What would it mean for God to make something exist and not exist at the same time? Is God any less powerful for not being able to do this? What would it mean for God to disobey the rules of logic? Or change them?

I think a similar consideration applies to God's inability to make rape good. Given certain facts about humans, it follows necessarily that rape is wrong. Much in the same way that it's necessarily false that something exists and doesn't exist at the same time. Given the fact that people don't like rape, it scars its victims for life, and so on, that necessarily makes rape wrong.

God can't make it so that the same things are true of rape that are true of it now, but make rape right. God can't hold the amount of pain and agony rape causes constant, but change how he feels about it and it would magically become right. This is because these facts cause rape to be wrong (obviously).

So basically, what people who argue in this fashion are saying is the following: God would be more powerful if he could hold all the facts about how much rape hurts its victims but magically change the moral status of rape. This claim, I argue, makes as much sense as saying God would be more powerful if he could create a square circle or a 10-sided triangle. It is logically impossible to do so, so it doesn't make any sense to say that a being can do it.

So, I don't think it handicaps Christianity or any other theistic belief to say that morality doesn't depend on God. Sure, morality may depend on God in an indirect manner. He created us with certain psychological mechanisms which causes us to hate being raped. Then, rape is wrong. He could have created us so that we didn't care about being raped, so in that sense, he causes rape to be wrong. However, this isn't the same as saying that God could have created us with the same psychological facts but instead made rape right. This is what those who say morality depends on God are saying (in some shape or form). It should be fairly obvious that they are wrong.

The IPCC on Global Warming

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Mon, 23 Apr 2007 23:21:00 +0000

The UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is made up of 2500 scientists from around the world who work to look at the evidence of global warming and assess its impact on the world. They just put out a new report and its is very frightening. Here is some things they say:

"The IPCC concludes that global warming has almost certainly triggered changes in the Earth's ecosystem that have already been felt in increased drought, shrinking glaciers and changing seasons, and these effects are expected to intensify. Freshwater stored in glaciers and snow cover will be lost, while rainfall will increasingly come in destructive deluges, reducing the water supply to one-sixth of the humanity — with the teeming masses dependent on the melt water from the Himalayas particularly hard hit. Some 20-30% of plant and animal species are at risk of extinction if global temperatures rise in line with median projections, while by 2080, many millions of people living along coastlines will face an annual flood risk.

The IPCC expects climate change to bring "increased deaths, disease and injury due to heat waves, floods, storms, fires and droughts," with most of the pain being borne by the poor, tropical countries already on the edge of environmental disaster. In Africa by 2020, between 75 and 250 million people are expected to suffer from increased water shortages resulting from climate change, and attempting to adapt could consume as much as 10% of the GDP of African nations. In poorly nourished Central and South Asia, crop yields could decrease 30% by 2050. "The poorest of the poor are going to be the worst hit," said IPCC Chairman Rajendra Pachauri. "People who are poor are least able to adapt to climate change."

The IPCC has also concluded that it human activity is most likely the "chief driver" of global warming. However, these things can fail to occur if we act now to prevent it. Now is a crucial time. So, what do the politicians of China, US, and Russia do about it?

"The IPCC had concluded in February that greenhouse gas emissions from human activity were "very likely" the chief driver of global warming, and Friday's report dealt with its human and ecological impact. But clashes between scientists and political officials over its wording almost prevented the report from being published on schedule. Countries such as China, Russia and the U.S. reportedly pushed to water down the IPCC's predictions, while the scientists whose work formed the backbone of the report fought back in an all-night session preceding Friday's release."

From the Time article here.

A Perspective on the Pledge by Alonzo Fyfe

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Mon, 23 Apr 2007 23:20:00 +0000

An interesting parody of the people who often argue "the pledge of allegiance says 'one nation under God' in it to reflect our heritage. Therefore, it should stay there."

From here.

"Okay," said Shawn. "Then, 50 years ago, Congress added the word white to the Pledge of Allegiance. We are supposed to be one white nation, indivisible. When we pledge allegiance to one white nation, doesn't this mean that not being white is as bad as being in favor of rebellion or tyranny or injustice?"

"No," Shelby said with a sigh of relief. "No, not at all. Congress added that to reflect our heritage. It simply pays respect to the fact that all of our founding fathers were white, and that they clearly wanted to establish a white nation, and the fact that all of our past Presidents have been white."

16 Questions for Atheists

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Mon, 23 Apr 2007 23:19:00 +0000

My friend James Lazarus has posted his answers to 16 questions for atheists originally posted by some Christians. Here is a link to his response to the 16 questions. I will provide my own.

1. Why is there something rather than nothing?

This question is ambiguous. First, it may mean, "Why does anything exist at all?" If it means that, then I think the theist and nontheist alike is plagued by the same question. Why does God exist rather than not? Some theists have argued God is a logically necessary being via the Ontological Argument. In that argument, it is attempted to show that God must exist due to logical necessity. However, I don't think the Ontological Argument works since it is possible to imagine a universe without a God existing. Therefore, I don't think it can be shown that God is logically necessary in the same way that "2 + 2 =4" is. Given this, theists also have to wrestle with the question of why there is a God rather than not.

The statement may also mean, "Why does the universe exist?" The theists will answer that the universe exists because God created it. The nontheist cannot use a similar answer of course. However, why think there needs to be an answer? One can just ask the theist where God came from and given the failure of the Ontological argument above, they wouldn't have an answer. God's existence would go unexplained. Either side has to posit a brute, unexplained fact. The theist posits God and the atheist posits the universe. Why prefer one over the other?

One can decide between the two in terms of simplicity and explanatory power. If it can be shown that God is the simpler hypothesis and has more explanatory power than the brute fact of the universe, then God would be shown to exist. This needs to be shown first before asking this question, however.

2. How do you know that you exist (without being circular)?

I'm not all that sure what relevance this has to theism. I don't think we can have an answer to this that isn't circular. I take it as a basic belief without evidence that I exist. I think it is also possible to "know" some things that are basic. I'm not exactly sure how this works though since usually, knowledge is in need of justification and basic beliefs are by definition not based on any other beliefs.

3. Where does human self-consciousness come from?

I don't know. I haven't researched the subject much. I'd say the current research on the brain can explain a lot about ourselves but I'm not sure it can explain it all. I also think atheism is consistent with mind-body dualism though I don't know how one would explain where the mind came from.

4. How do you know your senses are reliable (without being circular)?

I don't think one can answer this in a non-circular fashion. A theist would say that her senses are reliable because God made them and He would make them reliable. However, one can then ask how one knows God is concerned with truth or how one knows God is morally perfect? One must then appeal to their "sense" of truth or some type of argument which, even if not evidential, will have to rely on some type of reasoning which would be carried out by the person's mind. One can then ask why they rely on their reasoning faculty.

The atheist is in the same boat. We have a better chance of survival if we have true beliefs and reliable methods of obtaining those beliefs. Evolution then would be likely to give us some reliable faculties which we can use. We can then improve on these faculties throughout our lives through training and make them even more reliable. This is why I trust my senses and in general, my reasoning abilities. If this is circular, then so is any theist response.

5. What is truth?

A proposition is true if it corresponds to reality. It is false if it doesn't.

6. What is the cause of everything?

Well, I take this to mean, "What is the cause of the universe?" and my answer would be similar to the answer to #1.

7. What is the purpose of mankind?

Well, an atheist wouldn't believe mankind has any divine purpose. However, that doesn't mean there is no right or wrong thing to do. What is right or wrong need not be defined in terms of how our creator planned us to live. In fact, it only could be if the creator was good. If the creator were evil and gave us the purpose of causing as much suffering as possible, that wouldn't make us obliged to follow it. At that point, we would be obligated to go against our given purpose. So, even if there is no purpose of mankind, that doesn't mean there is no morality.

8. How do we determine right from wrong? Is there such a standard? Where does it come from? The State? DNA?

Some people look at their religious text to determine right from wrong. If these religious texts are false, then that is not a reliable standard. In determining if the standard is reliable, one must make sure that in relying on the standard, one isn't positing imaginary entities that don't exist in the real world. If one's standard relies on a nonexistent God, then it is not a good standard. If one's standard relies on the claim that "Whatever my state says is morally correct" or if it says "Whatever my DNA has programmed me to believe about morality" is morally correct, then these are not good standards.

I'd say that a reliable standard is a consequentialist one. Not in the sense of, judge the act by its consequences, but to judge a desire by its consequences. For the long, extended explanation, see Alonzo Fyfe here.

9. What is the difference, from an atheistic standpoint, between love and hate? Aren't these merely emotional responses triggered by certain stimuli? Why is one better than the other?

These are emotional responses triggered by stimuli but that doesn't remove the possibility of people being morally responsible for them. These emotional responses are produced by our beliefs and desires. How someone reacts to say someone calling them a bad name reflects their character. Different people with different characters will react differently. Therefore, one can blame someone for their reactions to stimuli.

Love is better than the other because it is conducive to desire fulfillment whereas hate is generally not. Hate is by definition desire-thwarting so this makes it a desire we shouldn't promote in others, that is if we are concerned for our own well-being and that of others. So, love is better than hate for this reason.

10. How do you explain transcendent truth? i.e. Even folks that have never heard of the Bible (like tribe people in deep jungles) knowing that stealing, murder, adultery, etc. is wrong?

I think this one is fairly easy. I would take out murder since murder is immoral by definition. It's like asking, "How did you know the blue ball was blue?" Well, it's a blue ball so it must be blue, duh!

As for the rest, I would say that figuring out that the desire to steal is not conducive to desire fulfillment overall is pretty obvious. I don't think we need complex scientific theories to see this is true. The same can be said of committing adultery and the general act of being dishonest. Surely, society functions much better when people have a desire to tell people the truth and to not steal from others.

11. Isn't implicit, weak or negative atheism (ala George Smith, David Eller & Michael Martin) just another form of agnosticism? If the atheist critiques theism without justification, then isn't he/she believing in atheism with something other than rational thought? And as soon as the atheist provides any kind of rational justification for his/her critique of theism, hasn't he/she just moved into explicit, strong or positive atheism? And if so, doesn't he/she then need to worry about some burden of proof for his/her belief in a lack of belief?

One could define lack of belief in a God as a form of agnosticism. Definitions don't matter much to me. See my earlier post. I don't know what it means to "critique theism without justification" so I can't answer the second question. I think critiquing theism would be equivalent to giving evidence for positive atheism only if "atheism" is defined as the "disbelief in the God being critiqued." I don't think one can argue from "God as you define it has problems, therefore all definitions of 'god' will have problems." I don't understand the last question since positive atheism is a disbelief, not just a lack of belief.

12. If you honestly do not believe there is a God, why do you ask so many questions about a God you don't believe exists?

I'd say there's many reasons. The first is that religious people use their religious text to justify harm done to others. At this point, it is important to research whether using the given religious text is the right thing to do. Is it reliable? Are the other claims it makes true? To answer these questions, one needs to know certain things about the ancient world, God, and so on. A second reason is that so many people believe in some form of a god that atheists want to know why. A third reason is that if there is a God in the traditional sense, then it would be very important morally. To find out that a morally perfect being created you and gave you the gift of life, that would make it super-wrong to do wrong acts. Also, since we owe a being who created us something, we would owe God obedience (to a certain extent). Of course, there is a limit to how much God can ask of us much the same way there is a limit to how much anyone can ask of us when a favor is done. See my answer to #7 above. If our creator asked us to rape as much as possible, then even though we owe our creator certain things, we don't owe it to him to obey that command. So, I think God's existence would have some bearing on morality and he would be a source of morality. See my earlier post.

13. If you really don't believe God exists what does it matter to you, how He should choose to punish those who don't believe?

I think it matters because people often use their belief in this matter to justify harming others. Some people who believe that homosexuals go to hell use this fact to justify beating them up and calling them names. They justify these things by saying that if it'll help even one person change their ways, it was worth it since hell is such a bad place.

I don't think belief is a morally cupable action that one can be blamed for. So, a morally good person wouldn't punish someone just for their belief. He would only punish people insofar as their beliefs indicate the presence of bad desires. I think it is important for wrongdoers to atone for their wrongdoing. It is important to "make it up" to the person you wronged. I don't think there is any good reason why God would draw the line at death as the last chance to atone for our sins. I think good people who don't end up atoning for their sins before they die should go to a limbo-type place where they can find out the truth and see if they want to atone for their sins. If they don't want to, I think they should either be allowed to continue to exist in a place other than limbo or heaven or possibly if they no longer want to exist, then God would terminate their existence.

14. If you really believe God doesn't exist, then there is no worry of punishment for you anyway, so why get upset just because someone else believes you're going to a place they believe exists?

I don't get upset because someone has different beliefs about the afterlife than me. I may want to show their view to be false or indefensible, but I don't get upset about their view. And the reason why atheists tend to get upset is because the religious people, believing atheists will go to hell and never return, try many immoral things to get atheists to become of their religion. That is something to be upset about.

15. How about "life from no life?"

I don't really see what the trouble is in believing this. I don't think life is so fundamentally different from non-living things that perhaps non-living things would eventually bring about life. People who are alive are made up of the same elements as the things that aren't alive. Diamond is a form of carbon. I think one needs to give a good explanation of how life came about, yes but I don't think the fact that scientists don't have one means we should automatically jump to "God did it." Theists have made this mistake in the past and have been wrong, things like "God makes the planets revolve around the sun."

Most biologists agree that it's possible and I don't see any reason to think they are wrong. It's just an area where science hasn't given us a definite answer yet, but that doesn't mean there isn't one forthcoming. However, there are many plausible stories, none of which has any definite evidence over the other, but they are still plausible nonetheless.

16. How can atheists speak definitively, authoritatively, or otherwise on the metaphysical (and spiritual)which is beyond their experience?

Many theists don't have the relevant experience they would need to say other religions are false. They never studied the Kabballah, Hindu religious texts, or the Koran. They never went to other churches and prayed to their god(s) and worshipped them in the way the leaders told them to worship. So, how can they say the other religions are false?

I think reason can play a part here. If they have some argument or some type of personal experience, they may reason from that to say that other religions are false. The same can be said of atheists though they don't necessarily have a personal experience, they just have arguments. But surely, one is only better than the other because one is more certain than the other. It's not that one needs to have both to be justified in their take on religion.

For example, if someone believed in leprachauns, you would be justified in not giving their claim very much weight. If they responded with, "Well you're no expert on leprachuan-searching, how would you know they don't exist?" one can easily see the absurdity of asking the question. So, one can respond to metaphysical questions which is beyond their experience if they think the object is impossible or improbable to exist. The same goes for everyone.

Using heaven to argue for hell

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Sat, 31 Mar 2007 01:15:00 +0000

Against the idea that hell is eternal, people often argue that it is unjust to punish someone for an infinite amount of time for a finite number of sins. This is because each sin is only finitely wrong and hence only deserves a finite amount of punishment. Since one can only commit a finite number of sins, there is only a finite amount of wrong they can commit. Hence, they would only deserve a finite amount of suffering, not an infinite amount. So, punishing someone in hell for an infinite amount of time is wrong.

Sometimes to counter this, Christians argue that the argument can go against sending people to heaven for eternity as well. Each person who goes to heaven only commits a finite number of good acts in their life and hence is only entitled to a finite amount of reward. Any more reward than what they deserve would be unjust. Therefore, it would be unjust for God to send people to heaven for all eternity.

However, since it is not unjust for God to send people to heaven, then the argument has been reduced to absurdity so it must be unsound.

This doesn't work however, because there is a necessary disanalogy between punishing people more than they deserve and rewarding people more than they deserve. If we give people good things, even give them good things that they don't deserve, it is not wrong to do so. It actually may be supererogatory in some circumstances. For example, when you give money to the poor, perhaps the poor don't "deserve" your money. However, that doesn't show that it's wrong or unjust to give to the poor. It is still a good thing to do.

However, it is wrong and unjust to punish someone more than they deserve. If I deserve n days of punishment, punishing me for n+1 days would be wrong. The same with any more amount of punishment than what I deserve. So, the argument can't be reduced to absurdity because the statement " Any more reward than what they deserve would be unjust" is false. There is a disanalogy between punishing people more than they deserve and rewarding people more than they deserve.

Limited Omniscience is compatible with moral perfection

noreply@blogger.com (Andy) — Sat, 31 Mar 2007 01:13:00 +0000

I have a correction to make after reading Richard Swinburne's Providence and the Problem of Evil (specifically p. 231-232). An argument that I thought was sound is actually not a good one. As has been explained before, Swinburne believes that God doesn't know the future with absolute certainty. He may know what is probable, but he isn't absolutely sure that it will happen. Michael Martin in his book, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification brings up an objection to this. I summarize his argument on my page:

"Limited Omniscience vs. Moral Perfection

If God doesn't know the future, then he can't know whether or not his past actions were morally correct. Whether or not an action is morally correct depends on, in part, what the consequences are. However, God cannot know the consequences of his actions, therefore He can't know that He is morally perfect. God could still choose all the correct actions. However, this would have no relation to his knowledge. He would do the right thing purely on accident. Because no being can be morally perfect on accident, it follows that a being with "limited omniscience" cannot be morally perfect. Since God is supposed to be such a being, it follows that God cannot exist. [2]"

As Swinburne explains however, this objection has a false premise. What makes an action morally correct is, in part, the probable consequences of the act. The actual consequences only matter insofar as they are probable. Someone can't be blamed for what happens if they have no indication whatsoever that it will happen. Since God will know how probable all outcomes are, he can do the act that maximizes the expected value. The act that he does will be the right one.

So, since someone can't be blamed for the actual consequences of an act if there is no indication that those consequences will happen, then what makes an act right or wrong is the probable consequences. Therefore, the argument has a false premise. So, Martin's argument is unsound even though I once thought it worked. I will change it on my site and explain why the argument doesn't work.

It is important to note that this response to the argument only works if we suppose it is impossible for a being to know more than God does about the world. For example, God doesn't know the future on Swinburne's understanding. We also have to give a reason why God cannot know the future in order for this response to stick. Otherwise, one could say that a morally perfect being must know the future which would be a possible thing to know. If one shows that knowing the future is impossible if humans have libertarian free will, then the concept of moral perfection must not require a being to be morally perfect in order to fulfill it; otherwise moral perfection would be necessarily nonexistent.

So, if one defines "moral perfection" in a way that is possible for a being to fulfill it, then one must not need the requirement that the being who is morally perfect knows the future with absolute certainty. If one needs this requirement, then their definition of moral perfection is inapplicable to any possible being. This doesn't show a problem with the idea of God being morally perfect in any sense, just a problem with the sense of moral perfection that the arguer is using. If one defines a concept in a self-contradictory way, one cannot be surprised when it cannot be applied to any being at all.

And for the record, I still think the argument above it titled The Free Will Argument for the Nonexistence of God still works. However, I think it only disproves a God who can know the future. It doesn't disprove Swinburne's God who doesn't know the future with absolute certainty.