EU-MED

“More for More” - Redefining the strategy

2011-05-22T15:32:00.006+02:00

The revolutionary upheavals in North Africa have triggered a debate on the future of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). In light of the recent events across the Mediterranean region, the Commission is currently reviewing the Southern dimension of the ENP. After several delays, it is expected that the Commission will publish a comprehensive review on 24th of May. Any new approach needs to restore credibility in the EU’s neighbourhood policy to ensure the success of the democratic transitions and to close the huge prosperity gap between the Southern and Northern shores of the Mediterranean.

The ENP was developed in 2004 to offer its Mediterranean neighbours a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values. While the EU negotiated under the ENP framework detailed Action plans and monitored the neighbors’ progress in delivering on reforms, the EU has de facto not exercised serious pressure on the authoritarian regimes to move beyond superficial reforms. While the ENP placed rhetorical emphasis on democratization it has constantly sidelined the aim to support grassroots democratic movements. In the discussion on the ENP’s future shape, the Eurosceptic Think-Tank Open Europe published a report looking at the effectiveness of EU assistance to North Africa and the Middle East. The report states that despite of the EU's funding effort towards its Southern neighbours of about €13 billion (1995-2013), the EU’s aim to promote democracy in the region largely failed to meet the high expectations. The Commission has consistently increased its funding commitments “despite noting limited or no progress in terms of democratic reforms and human rights”. The report mentions, for instance, the EU’s questionable aim to consider an Association Agreement with the Gaddafi Regime, the direct aid funding of autocratic regimes, poor monitoring of projects or dubious funding measures such as the 40 Million Euro grant to the Palestinian Authority. Next to those allegations, there are also other examples where the Commission granted financial support to pro-government groups prioritizing political stability over democracy. (e.g. the Moroccan Initiative Nationale du Dévéloppement Humain)

The Open Europe Report has prompted a reaction by the Commission. The EU Commission states that indeed “mistakes were made in the past” but that the “Report gives an erroneous and simplistic vision of the ENP”. The statement stresses that the EU has a “robust system in place ensuring that funds are correctly used”, and that the potential Association Agreement with Libya would have been mainly supportive for the civil society etc. In regard to close ties with autocratic regimes, the Commission states that the “serious shortcomings of a government do not justify isolating a population”. This sentence expresses a dilemma the EU’s neighbourhood policy is facing: Is it justified to turn a blind eye to the promotion of democratic values in order to help the people? Or is it rather an excuse to protect its own interests in the fields of security, energy, or economy? In February, the Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle acknowledged in his speech that the EU’s stability-oriented approach - supporting the perpetuation in power of authoritarian and corrupt regimes - was based on “short-termism that makes the long term ever more difficult to build”.

A New Partnership?

The communication of 8 March proposes a modification in the EU’s strategy reflecting the emerging challenges in the Southern neighbourhood. The “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” should react to the changing political landscape in the region building on three elements: democratic transformation and institution-building, a stronger partnership with the people, and sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development. The EU offers “more for more” by linking democratic reforms and aid: More economic benefits & increased financial aid for more democratic reforms. The Partnership should be “an incentive-based approach based on more differentiation“.

In the debate about the revision of EU’s policy towards Southern Mediterranean, the key question concerns which incentives Europe is willing to provide to strengthen the partnership. Conditional offers and assistance, the more active support of good governance, a bottom-up democratization process all relies ultimately on the EU’s ability to exercise influence and on the willingness of the partner countries to cooperate. Thus, the EU’s possibilities in dealing with the Southern neighbors are de facto limited if Europe continues granting little offers to the Mediterranean countries. When the EU asks more from its partners it must also offer in return greater openness in areas such as movement of people, access to the European markets and financial assistance. However, in times of austerity many EU states are not enthusiastic to increase the financial support for the Southern dimension of the ENP but rather demand that funds should be directed in a smarter way. German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle recommends that any financial assistance to the EU’s neighbours should be strictly conditional on their reform progress. On the other hand, the foreign ministers of France, Spain, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta request in a letter to Catherine Ashton more funding for the Mediterranean region and that the disparities in the ENP spending - €1.80 per capita to Egypt, €7 to Tunisia compared to up to €25 to Moldova - cannot be sustained in light of the current events.
In regard to greater market access, some EU countries favor opening the EU market for agricultural products. However, the Southern EU countries will not easily agree on easing all tariff quotas on agricultural products from the Southern Mediterranean. The issue of mobility and easier visa regime is even more complicated. Few governments will be ready to open up their labor markets to North Africans. While the facilitation of visas for students and business people and mobility partnerships are a step in the right direction, any significant step, as for example, a necessary “'pact for labour and skills' between the EU and Arab countries that choose a path to democratic transformation” is not expected to happen.

The proposal of the Commission calls for a greater differentiation and bilateralism. However, the ENP is already a very flexible instrument with tailored Action Plans varying in scope and ambition. More differentiation means less coherence between the Southern Mediterranean countries. The EU should maintain a multilateral dimension with the region. Although it is clear that the UfM needs an overhaul concerning its goals, resources, and mandate. Ho the overall strategic goals for the region, such as enhancing regional integration and the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area need a greater intra-regional coherence which can better be achieved via interregional cooperation.

In the mid-term, it is unrealistic that Europe will fundamentally change its policy towards the region. The democratic transition in North Africa will probably rather increase the perceived soft-security threats from the region such as illegal migration, human trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. Thus, the EU’s main interest in securing stable relations in the ambit of energy, immigration and security will most likely persist. If the new Partnership should be a “qualitative step forward” in the Euro-Mediterranean relations, the EU needs to improve the mutual trust among the two regions and among the partner states themselves. A close partnership based on common standards and interests needs a strong political will for deeper cooperation.

The State of the Disunion – Inconsistency Backfires on European Union’s Foreign Policy

2011-02-28T23:42:00.003+01:00

The revolutionary uprisings in North Africa have been a true earthquake for Europe’s foreign policy standing in the region. The way how the EU reacted on this critical challenge tells a lot about the state of disunion in regard to its foreign policy. Both individual EU Member States and the EU itself were slow to react to the events in Tunisia and Egypt. European leaders have been unable to agree on a foreign policy line or to speak with a single voice. The dissonance of voices over the unrest, various passive statements, and the only carefully encouragement for regime change were contradicting the EU’s ambitions to be a key player in the neighboring region.

Moreover, this was the first test for the EU’s foreign policy and new diplomatic service after the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty. Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was absent while the revolts continually unfolded in Tunisia and Egypt. In regard to the ongoing mass protests, Ashton’s “lowest common denominator” statements have been internally and externally criticized. The Union struggled to find the right balance between supporting the democratic aspirations and exercising diplomatic reservation.

As long as the EU is incapable of responding with a strong voice on urgent external affairs, it should focus on the strengths of the Union instead. Given the seismic change in the region, the EU should revise its Euro-Mediterranean relations and rethink its neighborhood policy in order to prove that maintaining strong partnerships with its neighbors is still a key interest. The EU does not need a single voice to be influential but the Union needs to act with unity.

Seeking a balanced response - A chronology of dissonance
The reactions and official statements in Europe have shifted through a number of phases according to the flow of events. When the revolts started in Tunisia in mid-December, Europe was caught completely off-guard and neither the EU nor the EU Member States were prepared for the scenarios developing in the nearby countries. For a long time, the European leaders showed rhetorical restraint towards the popular revolts. The EU needed almost two weeks to agree on calling for free and fair elections in Tunisia. Likewise, Europe was slow to react when the tumults reached Egypt. The European reaction was partially discordant and again the EU leaders failed to take a firm joint position. Only when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for an “orderly transition” to democracy, Europe jumped immediately on the bandwagon. “Orderly transition” became the new maxim and Europe’s official comments followed much of the same tame path. The EU “Big Five”, which includes France, Germany, Italy, UK, and Spain, first issued a joint statement calling for a “process of transition.” Still, this statement was ambivalent since it did not call directly for Mubarak to step down, cited the need for “dialogue” with the regime, and encouraged the embracement of “political reforms”. Not surprisingly, not the EU but the national leaders of Europe took the initiative and delivered the long-awaited European statement. On February 4, the 27 EU governments and Catherine Ashton repeated the mantra of supporting a transition process toward democracy but they remained vague about what exactly that meant. Still, the European leaders hesitated to demand the resignation of President Mubarak out of concern that the disruption in the region could backfire on Europe. Europe was fearful of interfering in the internal affairs of Egypt, a longstanding ally of the West and stability factor in the region. Some EU leaders, among them German Chancellor Angela Merkel, were emphasizing the right of the Egyptian people to determine their own future and the idea that the Union neither had the right to demand regime change nor to interfere in domestic issues.
Europe’s ambiguous and cautious reaction was a balancing act in order to be prepared for every possible outcome of the revolts. The EU proved incapable of expressing its own interests in the region. The EU conferred the lead role to the US, following Obama’s script and patiently waiting for announcements from Washington. Afterward, it was not the EU under the direction of Lady Ashton, but the “Big Five” national states who took the lead. Ashton got left out.
When Catherine Ashton headed off for a tour of North Africa on the 14th to present Egypt and Tunisia with a package of measures, including financial aid, support in preparing for elections, and election monitors to guide the transition process toward democracy, here, again, the EU problems became evident. When the EU’s foreign policy chief visited Tunisia after the Jasmine Revolution other European leaders, including Britain’s foreign minister Hague and the German foreign chief Westerwelle, had been already there. Similiarly, in Egypt, David Cameron and not Ashton was the first Western leader to visit the country.

Blame on Baroness
All EU leadership was missing and soon the guilty one was found: High Representative Baroness Catherine Ashton. Throughout the European capitals, the press, politicians – for instance David Cameron –, and EU parliamentarians from all parties (including ALDE leader Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the Socialists Martin Schultz, and Daniel Cohn-Bendit from The Greens) blamed Ashton’s and the EU’s low-key role. European decision-makers were surprisingly united in their critiques. They all shared the same opinions regarding the lack of a coherent European message and the invisible role of EU Foreign Minister Catherine Ashton.
Much criticism is centered on the new EU's High Representative for foreign affairs. Dissatisfaction over the EU’s role in North Africa is related to Ashton’s absence since she might have missed the opportunity to react in the name of the Union. Indeed, Ashton did not have much support when she started her new post one year ago. Baroness Ashton lacks of experience in international diplomacy. She is unknown in Washington, Beijing, and Moscow and unpopular in Brussels. A new survey by Burson Marsteller revealed that more than 68% respondents rate that Ashton’s track record of keeping her performance up to the standard of her commitments has been “below-average” or “disappointing”.

A single phone number but no single voice
The Lisbon Treaty should have brought the necessary powers and competency to Brussels in order to design a new, coherent European foreign policy. High expectations were vested in the communitarisation with the appointment of a foreign affairs chief and development of diplomatic services. The new post of the High Representative should, according to the Treaty, “ensure the consistency of the Union's external action” and, thus, should enable the Union to have its own phone number and a single voice with which to speak.
Baroness Ashton invested a great deal of time to build up the European External Action Service (EEAS) in that, over the last year, she managed its development, structure, and staffing. The EEAS started operating only in the beginning of 2011. The newborn EEAS has potential but it is too early for the service to be able to ease the transition in Egypt and in Tunisia. Still, many features about the collaboration with other diplomatic services and the goals of this external relations service are still unclear. So far, the creation of these structures has not yet led to a more coherent, visible, and integrated EU foreign policy. De facto, the formal transfer of competences over to Brussels has not changed a lot.
When the “Big Five” issued their shared position it showed, on the one hand, its dominance in foreign affairs issues and that the discourse is still dominated by national voices. However, on the other hand, it also showed that Europe cannot wait until 27 governments find a shared position when a statement is needed quickly. It takes too long to find a common policy without a clear hierarchy. Ashton has to maneuver among all EU Member States. She needs to deliver a statement that represents the views of all countries. This compromise must satisfy the leaders of the Member States and their foreign ministers, the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, and President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, all of whom have their own foreign policy goals. In the recent case, Ashton’s statement was well-balanced between those various positions. She spoke for the lowest common denominator between all EU states, and consequently, the content often remains vague. Therefore, it is not only a defeat for Ashton but also for the slow-moving European Union in general. For too long, the debate over the EU’s foreign policy was too long focused on the battle between the intergovernmental and the supranational sphere, and neglected issues regarding improved decision-making strategies, clarification of the EU foreign policy mission, and determining what added value the institutions could provide.
Remember, the appointment of Ashton was the very outcome of the EU’s complicated decision-making process where 27 puzzle pieces had to be fit together and a long game of diplomatic trade-offs between UK, Germany and France was played. With this compromise nomination, the leaders of the big powers could feel assured that it would not impinge their own national foreign policy ambitions and their sovereignty. The EU heavyweights got what they wanted without substantial loss of individual power. Without the support of the national governments and the European leaders, Ashton does not have the necessary trust, standing, and political influence to deliver a strong and substantial message in the name of the EU. It poses a dilemma for the EU that Europe lacks a visible face that represents the continent and is backed by all national powers. Similarly, the EU’s policies and statements cannot be more than the compromise of 27 Member States. The framing of the EU as normative power is just the outcome of basic European values which should be preserved. Without clear foreign policy priorities and common strategic interests, the Union will be regarded solely as a club of states with shared principles and values, high ideals and grand vision. Thus, even if Europe has finally has a phone number, there is not much of a reason to call.

Grand Ambitions or Small Steps
The upheavals in North Africa represented the first genuine test of the abilities of EU foreign policy and the EEAS after the Lisbon Treaty came into force. The inability of the EU to cope with and adapt to the revolutionary events in Tunisia and Egypt had damaging consequences for the credibility of Europe in the Southern Mediterranean region. It has undermined the EU’s appeals for change and will not help to assert Europe’s power in the world. The EU’s disorganized response to the revolts in North Africa proved that the new structures in Brussels have not fundamentally changed the EU foreign policy. New structures and processes cannot deal with the dilemma if there is no streamlined European voice. One could predict that Europe will not manage to agree on a single voice for foreign policy in the foreseeable future. The primacy of the national states in foreign affairs will prevail and it is illusionary that sovereign member states will give the EU exclusive powers on critical external policy issues in the short-term. While the 27 EU governments agree on many aspects regarding the overall direction and values of the foreign affair policies, they do not all have the same strategic interests. More political commitments and a common will would be needed to change this.
The lack of a strong, clear voice has eroded the Union’s credibility throughout the Southern neighbourhood. Europe risks permanently damaging its long-term interests in a region that is also vital for its future. Even if the events in the Mediterranean region will have some impact on the way that European Union foreign policy is made, the EU must acknowledge that its ability to react assertively to those events will be limited if it does not have effective leadership . However, this does not have to be a major problem as long as the EU can agree on a single strategic response to the revolutions in the region and act accordingly. Since the revolts carry unpredictable consequences for the whole Arab world, a coherent strategy to stabilize the countries and prevent a return to authoritarianism or extremism is more important than ever. The EU should focus on the strengths and potential of the EU soft policies. Traditional cooperation and partnership tools, economic and cultural partnerships, trade and development funding, support for civil society, and the strengthening of democratic institutions have been consistent features of EU’s relations with foreign countries and regions. The EU’s broad mix of bilateral and multilateral instruments and unique net of diplomatic relations gives the Union a strong position in the world. In addition, if another lessons should be learned from this crisis then it is that the EU has to determine how it could react to crises in a more timely and coherent manner. A task-force, headed by the EU High Representative and composed of EU leaders (for instance Barroso and Van Rompuy) and national governments representatives (for example the foreign minister of the EU presidency), that is trusted to by all national leaders to represent Europe as a whole should be created to response to international crisis events.

Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution unmasks the EU’s misguided policy approach in the Southern Backyard

2011-01-20T00:22:00.006+01:00

The Crumbling Façade of Europe’s Bulwark of Stability

The events in Tunisia are a bitter lesson for the EU’s indulgent policy towards Ben Ali’s repressive regime. Europe has remained silent for a long time and did not show any intention to intervene in Tunisia when Ben Ali’s regime oppressed various democratic freedoms. The fear of major destabilization in the region hindered the EU in insisting on a political opening of Tunisia’s regime. The EU’s policy towards the North African state focused on economic matters, security and counter-terrorism, and maintaining stability and the status-quo. This approach discredited the EU’s foreign policy and considerably deteriorated its once-significant standing in the neighboring region. The EU and France should engage themselves more actively to pursue a peaceful transition in Tunisia and urgently need to improve their dialogue with the leaders of the Arab states, as there are signs that popular movements might erupt in the Mediterranean area.

When the first wave of protest erupted in mid-December in Tunisia, the international community did not pay much attention. The protests, sparked by high youth unemployment, rising food prices, and pressing social problems, started locally in the Tunisian periphery but quickly spread to other parts of the country, the capital Tunis, and even neighboring countries. The protests have turned more and more into a political movement, nourished by a frustration with the corrupt regime of President Zin Al-Abiden Ben Ali, a lack of democracy, and human rights abuses. The current second wave of protest was supported by a larger part of the Tunisian society. Ben Ali, having been in power for 23 years, came under increased pressure to control the violence, as the protests have become more political in nature and are directed against the regime.

When Ben Ali stepped down on January 14th, after weeks of worsening riots, it was not only a victory for the protesters in Tunisia, but was also a warning towards other autocratic regimes in the region. The regimes in Algeria, Libya and Egypt fear a spillover to their countries because the people might feel encouraged to express their anger against the despots and demand economic, social, and political reforms. If a third wave of protests inspired by the Jasmine Revolution erupts in these countries as well, the regimes will no longer be able to hinder real devolution of political power.

The unrest in Tunisia was already ongoing for almost a month before it got international attention. While the protests had been discussed extensively in social networks and journalists, bloggers, and activists had reported steadily about the Tunisian revolt on Twitter, the events in North Africa were only a marginal note in the international press. Similarly, the international community sat back for a long time without taking notice of the tensions. Only after the bloody protests during the second weekend of January did the US, EU, UN, and France officially react to the protests, criticize the brutal response of Tunisia’s police forces, and express their concern about the freedom of expression.

Still, the various responses by the world powers have been fairly low-key without encouraging or supporting the democratic aspirations of the Tunisian people. The international community has essentially said very little about Ben Ali’s autocratic rule and has not made it clear that its repressive State security apparatus and human rights violations are unacceptable and contrary to Tunisia’s international commitments. The low level of coverage in the media and the reserved reaction of the world powers gave Ben Ali’s regime a free pass to crackdown violently on the protests with police and military forces.

The passive role of the EU comes particularly surprising as Europe is directly affected by the social tensions and the political situation in the Maghreb. The EU should be particularly concerned about the situation in the Southern backyard, which could destabilize the whole region: New local conflicts can emerge, the economic situation could worsen, Islamist movements could gain more grounds, and the pressures to migrate to Europe could grow.

When the riots peaked in the beginning of January, Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, was in the Middle East for a two-day visit. No statement was given on the situation in the Maghreb even though it was the EU that created the vision of a unified Mediterranean space consisting of North Africa and the Middle East. This shows that the EU policy towards the region, after more than 15 years of Euro-Mediterranean initiatives, has not improved the dialogue between the regional actors, let alone established a political framework where these issues could be discussed. The EU hardly commented on the situation, although the stability of the Southern Mediterranean countries has been one of the main subjects of the policy approach towards the region. Tunisia was long considered to be a bulwark of stability in the neighborhood, although social tensions have been rising constantly over the last decade.

Tunisia – the poster child for Europe
After Tunisia gained independence from France in 1957, the small country, with a population of 10 million, achieved considerable progress in terms of economic and social modernization, along with a good educational and healthcare system. Tunisia is considered to be a role model of the Mediterranean region in several areas.
Economically, the small North African country is often described as the poster child of developing economies. Economic reforms have progressed, inflation has lowered, the savings rate has increased, and the budget deficit has remained stable. The Global Competitiveness Index of 2010 from the World Economic Forum ranks Tunisia as the 32nd most competitive economy – the highest in all of Africa. The strong economic growth during the past decade is intertwined with Europe, which has been supporting the Tunisian economy with cash, investment, and economic assistance. Within the Barcelona process Tunisia received the highest amount of aid per capita of all of the Mediterranean countries, amounting to about 80 million euros per year. The trade relationship between Europe and the Maghreb country is robust and the EU is Tunisia’s most important trade partner. More than 60 percent of Tunisia’s imports come from the EU and it exports between 70 - 80% of its total exports to the EU. Economic relations are strong and Tunisia’s economy is very integrated with the European single market. Tunisia became the first Southern Mediterranean country to have a free trade area with the EU for industrial products, with prospects for further liberalization ahead (e.g.: services, the right of establishment, and even agriculture).

Politically, Tunisia is a close and reliable partner for Europe and one of the most cooperative partner states within Euro-Mediterranean relations. Tunisia was the first Mediterranean country to sign an Association Agreement with the EU within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995. EU-Tunisian relations have made significant advances within the EMP since 1995, as well as in the bilateral European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In the European Commission’s reports regarding the implementation of the ENP Action Plan, Tunisia has achieved steady progress in a number of cooperation areas. The North African country has been keen to upgrade its bilateral relations with the EU and demanded the benefits of an advanced status with the EU in November 2008. Like Morocco, the government of Tunisia requested this new status, which would bring several economic benefits (e.g.: preferential trade conditions) and political benefits, since these benefits improve Tunisia’s international image. The European Commission established an ad-hoc group in mid-2010, which began working on a roadmap with the aim of promoting their relations to an advanced status. Because Tunisia has good relations with its neighbors, the country has always played a positive role towards setting up a free trade area in the Mediterranean rim and towards regional integration in the Maghreb.
Despite Tunisia’s steady economic growth, the employment outlook remains poor. The average unemployment rate throughout the country is around 14 percent. Large parts of Tunisian society have not benefited from economic reforms and the situation is especially acute among young people. The demand for jobs among the increasing number of youths has not been addressed and the global financial crisis has further worsened employment figures. University graduates suffer the most from the low performance of the labor market. According to World Bank statistics, the unemployment rate for individuals with higher education between 20-29 years of age is about 27 percent.

Shortcomings on the road to democracy
Tunisia’s achievements in the mentioned areas, however, have not led to a political transition. The modernization process under way and the economic reforms have not shown the potential of driving more democratic reforms. Ben Ali’s regime has not improved upon the basis of its legitimacy and has resisted any degree of political opening. The existence of opposition and opponents of the regime have not been tolerated. The repressive grip of the Tunisian authorities has drastically restricted press freedoms, and the freedom of expression.
Despite the fact that Ben Ali promised to enhance democratic reforms in his election campaign in 2009, the situation has worsened during the course of the last year. Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) intensified the amount of repression against opposition parties and human rights activists. The lack of political institutions that could be used as channels of representation of the society, combined with the low confidence in state institutions, are enduring features of Tunisian society.
In Europe, Ben Ali’s record was well known, since the ENP Action Plan steadily reported shortcomings in the areas of human rights, justice, and freedom of expression. But even if these issues were addressed in the various subcommittees and working groups, no consequences from the EU have followed.

Quid pro quo – A political trade-off
With the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in 1995, the EU committed itself to consolidate stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean region and to promote the values of dialogue and solidarity. In the Association Agreement signed with Tunisia and in the Action Plan of the ENP, Brussels and Tunis committed to gradually encourage political modernization, democracy, and human rights.
However, in practice, Brussels has not put democratic values high on the agenda and has not insisted enough on the core norms and values of the partnership ranging from democracy to human rights. The EU’s efforts to support human rights and good governance projects within the EMP and the ENP have not led to democratic structures and the expected political change. Many projects to support transparency and the rule of law have not brought about any important results, as the money or the technical assistance spent on these reforms flow directly to the Tunisian authorities. Independent human rights activists and representatives of civil society were supported less in order to maintain stable relations with the Tunisian government. Ben Ali’s ban of foreign human rights organizations in the country was not met with any consequences from the EU.
Positive and negative conditionality was not used as an instrument to reward or sanction reforms in these areas. Any use of conditionality was blocked by the partner state’s governments or the EU hesitated to set certain conditions for their support (e.g.: trade benefits or aid) in order to maintain good relations with the government. As a trade-off, Ben Ali’s regime cooperated in important areas for the EU such as illegal migration, Islamist fundamentalism, or terror-related issues. The EU’s interests have been focusing largely on security cooperation (counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, and illegal migration), stability, and economic matters (investment and economic reforms) and have outweighed any pushes for democratic reform, since this might lead to a destabilizing situation in the region and bring anti-Western forces to power. Thus, the EU’s policy-making in the Southern periphery is undermining the values upheld by the European Union and the commitments inherent in the Association Agreement to strengthen democracy and political participation. As long as the benefits outweigh the costs, the EU and European leaders prefer the status-quo and have relations with autocratic but cooperative governments. The EU’s tendency to support pro-regime policies that offer stability has secured stable, dependable, and reliable relations with Arab autocrats.
Despite all critics, the EU’s strategy towards the Mediterranean should not be considered to be a genuine democratization agenda imposing democratic change from outside. A partnership does not include the right to blindly pressure sovereign governments on democratic reform and intervene in domestic issues. Europe does not have a great deal of leverage in the region and any serious and public intervention in domestic politics could bring instability and disruption. Thus, the demand for democratic change must come from the society itself but the EU can be more active to support human rights organizations and pro-democratic forces.

A ring of authoritarian regimes
In conclusion, the EU’s “ring of friends” rhetoric has become rather a “ring of friendly regimes” agenda. Brussels’ approach that maintained the status-quo did not bring domestic stability in Tunisia. Although many indicators rank Tunisia as a highly developed country, behind the façade Tunisia’s internal balance has been uneasy for years.

The uprising in Tunisia could be followed by similar popular movements in Arab countries, which would affect the whole region and have heavy geopolitical repercussions. After the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, which was based on repression and control, the people of other Arab countries might feel encouraged to protest against their regimes. The Tunisian people’s overthrow of their government will intensify the pressure for change, with a possibility that the resistance to dynastic successions can be replicated in other countries.

Many Arab regimes present similar political conditions and social characteristics: Aging authoritarian leaders whose long-surviving regimes have prevented a real rotation of power. A lack of legitimacy, accountability, and transparency, along with manipulated elections, corruption, and a suppressed opposition are among them. The people do not benefit from the wealth, which is in the hands of a few who derive substantial economic assets. A depoliticized society, high unemployment, poor living conditions for large parts of the society, and a large, frustrated youthful population that lacks perspective can be found in Algeria and Egypt and, to some extent, in Libya and Jordan.
There is the potential for growing unrest among the youth, already noticeable in Algeria or Jordan, which could rapidly expand all over the region. For instance, in Algeria, the anger has recently increased against price increases on some basic foods. Although the protests and the riots vary and some states, such as Egypt, for example, are more resilient than other Arab regimes, the risks of a spill-over and similar unrest emerging in the region exists. This bottom-up demand for democracy could gradually bring regime change to the Arab world. A genuine democratic movement, not installed from outside, would be unique and significant for the whole Southern Mediterranean area.

Libya and the EU - The new partnership against illegal immigration

2010-11-05T20:04:00.001+01:00

Two years after the start of negotiations on the EU-Libya Framework Agreement the European Commission and Libya agreed on a common migration agreement for the period 2011- 2013. The agreement was signed by the Commissioner for Home Affairs and the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy together with the representatives of the Libyan government during a meeting from 4-6 October in Tripoli. Both sides agreed on more dialogue and financial assistance to support Libyan reforms in the field of migration and asylum. For the next three years the EU will allocate €50 million for projects aimed to adopt new legislation on refugee protection, to fight against smuggling and trafficking in human beings, to upgrade the border surveillance systems and not least better control the immigration flows to the European continent.

Libya has become a mayor transit country for sub-saharian migrants heading north to Europe, especially to Malta and Italy. Many migrants try to cross the country in order to reach to European continent or to find work in Libya. Many are asylum seekers coming from African conflict zones such as Somalia, Eritrea, Darfur and western Africa. Following the adoption of the ‘Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation’ between Italy and the authoritarian administration of Muammar Gaddafi in May 2009 fewer migrant boats crossed the Mediterranean. In 2009 the number of irregular people caught heading to Italy fell from 32,052 to 7,300 in 2008. The practice of intercepting boat people trying to reach Southern Europe on small ships by border guards in the central Mediterranean and returning them back to Libya has raised concern and criticism by Human Rights Groups. They condemn the current push-back practice on the high seas and accuse Libya of human rights violations, arrests in migrant detention centres, and deportations of the refugees.

No blank check to Libya
Despite of criticism at both domestic and international level against the vague and worrying friendship agreement, the Libyan leader was not discouraged to propose publicly that the EU should pay the North African country €5 billion a year to stop clandestine immigration to Europe or in his words “to prevent Europe from turning black”.

Even if the EU have never seriously considered Gaddafi’s offer the very fact that a cooperation deal with the authoritarian regime is concluded is a worrying point. Within the non-binding agreement, Libya is set to receive money and assistance from EU experts. Although, as the Commission states, the money will not be handed over to the Libyan government but spend directly into the projects under the supervision of the Commission.

Libya is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol for the treatment of refugees according to human rights. The state has no appropriate asylum system and does not even recognize the term “asylum seeker”. In June 2010 the local office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was closed in Tripoli. The UN's refugee agency will not reopen its department in Tripoli unless Libya recognizes international asylum protections standards and the adoption of the Geneva convention. It remains to be seen if the UNHCR will return after the EU’s intention to help building up an asylum system based on international standards and to raise standards in the detention centres.

A starting point for reinforced bilateral relations
For a long time already, the EU is pushing for a dialogue with Libya to improve the cooperation. The deal with Libya on various migration aspects is an important step in the relations between the EU and the North-African country. The bilateral relations between the EU and Libya have over the past three years developed constantly. The Commission has also decided to open an EU-Office in Tripoli, under the authority of the EU Delegation in Tunis, which should become operational in early 2011. The ambitious cooperation agenda on migration could be a starting point for other areas of cooperation. Migration is one of the key areas for Europe next to for instance energy, trade, and security. However, the negotiations about an EU-Libya Framework Agreement, that would cover several aspects of mutual interest such as free trade area issues and cooperation in energy, transport, migration, JHA, environment, maritime policy and education, have been pending since the end of 2008. The Framework Agreement would be the basis for further political dialog and cooperation in foreign policy and security issues. Soon there is another chance for discussion when the next negotiation round takes place in the Libyan capital set for end of November.

EuroMed Intercultural Trends 2010

2010-10-07T21:21:00.004+02:00

A small but important stone in the mosaic of Euro-Mediterranean relations

On 15th September, the Anna Lindh Report "EuroMed Intercultural Trends 2010", a public opinion poll on intercultural trends and values in the Euro-Mediterranean region, was launched in Brussels. For the first time, this report sheds light on the reality of intercultural relations in the region. Coordinated by the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures and the consultancy Gallup about 13,000 people from across the two shores of the Mediterranean were asked in this opinion poll.

According to André Azoulay, president of the Anna Lindh Foundation, the report provides an answer to the key question of how "relations between Islam and the West could be built". The poll gives evidence whether there are any cross-cultural values shared between European countries and those on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean.
Concerning the mutual perceptions of the people living in societies in Europe and in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region the Anna Lindh Report finds out that despite increased interaction the people from the two shores are still suffering from a distorted and stereotyped perception of each other. The main and most pronounced difference in values between people across the region could be found in the importance on faith and religious values, which affects as well the mutual perceptions.

In addition, there are interesting data in regard to the political relations between the two shores. Are the people in favor of a Mediterranean Union and is there a shared vision of the Mediterranean as an organizing concept? Is the Euro-Mediterranean region viewed as one geographic or cultural space and does a solid basis for regional cooperation exist?

The poll confirms that the Mediterranean is a shared space with specific values and even with a shared ‘Mediterranean attitude’. There exists a common mindset which could allow the people of the Euro-Mediterranean region to feel part of a regional grouping. The people across the region expect that common projects, such as the new Union for the Mediterranean, can benefit their societies positively in the future.

To conclude, there is no doubt that important features of interregional cooperation are still lagging behind expectations. The political dialogue, cultural exchanges and the freedom of the movement of the individuals, just to name a few, have to be improved in the future. For all those willing to enhance the cooperation the Anna Lindh Report provides important background information. It is full of interesting and sometimes surprising findings about the perceptions, interests and feelings of the people across the region. Although the Report is just a small stone in the mosaic of intercultural relations, it is an important one which may contribute to a more integrated Euro-Mediterranean Region. Or in the words of Stefan Füle, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy: "This report and its recommendations will help us to address some of the challenges we are facing in the region”.

Go to the Anna Lindh Report website or download the PDF version EuroMed Intercultural Trends 2010

THINK EU-MED #3

2010-09-06T14:12:00.003+02:00

Europeanization beyond the EU: The Dynamics of Europeanization in the Southern Mediterranean Partner States
by Moritz Schneider

Since the European Union has almost reached its natural geographical borders the process of exporting European values, laws and standards via the membership prospect is more limited. Yet, even without the incentive of a concrete membership offer, the EU has created several policy instruments towards its neighbouring countries to foster Europeanization outside the European territory as well. In the context of the Euro-Mediterranean relations, the EU enjoys bilateral and multilateral policy frameworks to spread the Union’s common values and institutions.

My paper analyses the main mechanisms for inducing Europeanization in the Southern Mediterranean region, namely the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The multilateral EMP promotes Europeanization and regional integration through a socialisation and imitation processes, while the bilateral ENP focuses on country-specific Action Plans based on conditionality rules to foster Europeanization in the neighbouring countries. The logic of differentiation of the ENP and the logic of regionalism of the EMP have however proved ineffective strategies to foster reforms or intra-regional integration. The EU’s transformative power in the neighbourhood and the adaptation of European institutions and values has been low in the Mediterranean region. The paper argues that the EU’s external policy framework towards the Southern Mediterranean states is following a dual strategy between the concepts of Realpolitik and Idealpolitik. The lack of a clear strategy undermines the efficiency of EU policies and the possibility to promote Europeanization in the region.

The new Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is intended to create a new form of institutional governance by abandoning the asymmetric power structure, enhancing co-ownership and promoting a more balanced partnership. However, the UfM is not responding to the policy shortcomings of the ENP and the EMP, but rather seems to be a compromise of bilateral and multilateral patterns of the two former approaches - the logic of differentiation and the logic of regionalism. The paper will conclude that the EU has to reconsider its strategy of the UfM or, even better, remodel its policy approach towards the Southern Mediterranean countries to improve co-operation and foster the process of Europeanization.

L'EUROPE EN FORMATION Année 2010 - été 2010 - n° 356
Dossier: Euro-Mediterranean partnership: The end of a vision?

Europeanization beyond the EU: The Dynamics of Europeanization in the Southern Mediterranean Partner States, Published: August 2010

THINK EU-MED #2

2010-08-03T15:23:00.000+02:00

The Union for the Mediterranean -Evolution and Prospects

Roberto Aliboni’s 8-page long paper assesses the nature of the Union for the Mediterranean. The author sheds light on the various dimensions contributing to the failing of the UfM after its inception more than two years ago. The high ambitions to give new momentum to the EU's cooperation with Mediterranean countries have not yet translated into tangible achievements so far. This lack of visible results is, according to Aliboni, related to the political identity of the UfM, its relations with the acquis of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the functioning of its institutions.

Taking these problems into account, the author lists a number of recommendations how the EU might improve the policy output of the Union:
First, institutions matter: the institutional profile of the UfM needs a revision. The Co-Presidency and the structure of the Secretariat of the UfM should be revised and the UfM must be a policy of the entire EU.
Second, multilateralism matters: Aliboni suggests to “create a parallel, but connected, multilateral dimension” within the realm of the Neighbourhood Policy.
Third, projects matter: The large-scale regional projects of the UfM should be implemented as soon as possible. Furthermore, the EU should not only boost progress in the six areas of the UfM but also include other fields, such as agriculture that is still absent in the Euro-Mediterraean relations framework.

Aliboni concludes by proposing to scale back any high ambitions at the political level, that the UfM can promote political solidarity in the short- and medium-term future.

Roberto Aliboni is Vice-President at the Istituto Affari Internazionali and head of the Institute's programme on the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The Union for the Mediterranean Evolution and Prospects; Published: 12 February 2010

Failed Summits -The Union for the Mediterranean at a standstill

2010-06-17T14:33:00.004+02:00

After being in place for two years the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) has not achieved any policy outcome and still lacks a visible rapprochement between the two shores. This is even more frustrating when considering that the Spanish EU presidency will pass the torch to Belgium in a few weeks without having been able to breathe new life into the Union. Once again the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has blocked any policy developments in the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Does the Union have any future at all?

When Spain took over the EU presidency, it was expected that Madrid is able to bring the Union back on track after two years of political stagnation. Spain’s high ambitions in the fields of EU’s foreign and neighbourhood policy should be especially translated into the relations with the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. Two summits were considered as one of the cornerstones of the Presidency’s agenda, namely the 4th Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference about water-management in the region and the 2nd meeting of the Head of states and governments which should have been one of the political highlights of the Spanish presidency.

The Water project is among the six key priorities of the UfM and should manage the water resources and promote common initiatives in the region. It was one of the areas of cooperation which was seen beforehand as a rather uncomplicated field as it was designed to make progress in a specific technical field of cooperation without touching sensitive political areas of the participating states. In addition, it was supposed to be an important field of cooperation for the water scarce region affected by climate change and high population growth. The summit in Barcelona in April 2010 brought together ministers from the 43 countries of the UfM in order to declare the joint ambitions of lowering the consumption of water between now and the year 2025, to levels 25 % below those of 2005. However, instead of signing the document, the conference ended without any feasible result and hampered again any multilateral approach. The conference failed because of a nuance of terminology when Israel and Arab countries disagreed over how to name the occupied Palestinian territories. Israel’s representatives objected to “occupied territories” in the document and proposed instead the term “territories under occupation” which was not accepted by the Arab bloc. In the end, the meeting failed to approve a joint strategy for guaranteeing the water resources of the whole Mediterranean basin.

The 2nd summit of the Head of States and Governements in Barcelona, scheduled to be held in Barcelona on June 7, should have been a key date in the agenda of the Spanish Presidency and give fresh impetus to the stalled relations.
The summit has been cancelled and postponed to November to give the peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians a chance to succeed and time to bear fruit. In a statement, the Spanish foreign ministry said: “This postponement will also give a greater amount of time for the process of Israeli-Palestinian talks, which has just been launched, to begin to yield results that will help create the right conditions to ensure the success of the summit.”
Unofficially, many Arab governments have threatened beforehand to stay away from the summit if Israelis foreign minister Liebermann would attend the summit. What actually motivated the Spanish presidency of the EU and the two co-chairs of the Mediterranean Union, Egypt and France, to postpone the Summit is however secondary. Neither Spain is to blame or the new structures of the rotating presidency after the Lisbon Treaty but again the EU’s approach towards the Mediterranean which is depended and too vulnerable from the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Middle East conflict remains the major impediment to improved EU-Med relations and to regional integration. The relations with the MENA region are infected by the conflict which will hinder the implementation of any common strategy in the near future. After the Gaza war in late 2008, the East Jerusalem settlement expansions and most recently the Gaza flotilla conflict it will be increasingly difficult that Israelis and Arab representatives will sit on the same table within the UfM.

How to overcome this standstill?

Should the EU go ahead without including Israel in the future network of cooperation as Eberhard Rhein suggests?

Should the EU-Med relations be completely redesigned by making peace in the Middle East a priority?

Should the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation try a new regional approach, particularly in the Maghreb as Jean-Baptiste Buffet proposes?

THINK EU-MED #1

2010-06-10T17:36:00.000+02:00

What future for the Union for the Mediterranean?

Timo Behr asks in his 2-page comment for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs about the future for the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) after the cancellation of the biannual summit.
The current Israeli-Palestinian crisis has led again to the blockage of the UfM and Behr suggests that it should not be an option for the EU to wait out for any progress in these indirect peace talks. As the chance of success is little the EU should rather concentrate on its own policies and act now to avoid the “further disintegration of its regional policy.”
The Union has to “employ a mixture of quick fixes and long-term restructuring”.

In the short-term perspective Behr recommends, on the one hand, to solve the question of the successor of the French-Egyptian Co-Presidency which ends this July. One the other hand, the newly created Secretariat in Barcelona needs to push ahead the UfM’s core projects such as the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the Motorways of the Sea.

In the long-term the UfM needs to be isolated “from the vagaries of the Middle East” by strengthening the non-political Secretariat and by increasing the “variable geometry” in the development of the envisaged projects.

Dr. Timo Behr is Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs

What future for the Union for the Mediterranean? Published 7.6.2010

Masade, Masa'deh, Massedeh

2010-03-14T21:06:00.006+01:00

Since the 4th of March 2010 the organisational structure of the secretariat of the Mediterranean Union is in place. The capital of Catalonia, Barcelona, is the home of the new Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean, where already the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was founded in 1995. The EU Member States and the 16 States of the Mediterranean region presented the Jordan Ahmad Khalaf Massadeh officially as first Head of the organisation.

Although the writing of the Jordan diplomat varies in the media from Masade, Masa’deh or Massedeh (among others) he is not a dark horse in the European diplomatic world. Massedeh is a former minister and Jordanian ambassador to the EU and NATO in Brussels. (his CV on EIB)

Massadeh’s close relations to the diplomat circle in Brussels might have even facilitated his election as first secretary-general of the Union of the Mediterranean. What underlines this assumption is the untransparent and behind-closed-doors deal which seemed to have led to his nomination. Instead of having a Summit with all participants of the Union to elect the new secretary, the foreign ministers of France, Spain, Egypt, Tunis and Jordan met in Cairo to support Massadeh’s candidacy. According to them this represents a consensus of all Union member states. French spokesperson Bernard Valéro is quoted as saying: “The candidacy of Jordan's Ahmed Masade [sic!] for the post of secretary-general was mentioned and received the support of the five ministers.”

Just five countries out of 44? Is this the new mechanism of differentiation which should make the Union more successfully than its predecessor or is it just a lack of interest by the other Member States? No official press conference or official document can be found which is also due to the fact that there’s still no official website of the UfM. This is ridiculous taking into account that 16,6 Million Euros were mobilized for the inauguration event in Paris 2008 and the Union presents no less than 780 Million inhabitants. If the UfM will be a transparent and efficient organisation for the people and not another diplomatic framework with rather useless high-level Summits, there need to be an official presentation or at least a phone number to ring.

The Mediterranean Solar Plan

2010-02-10T23:49:00.000+01:00

One of Europe’s most demanding future challenges will be to find an answer how to address the increasing energy demand without harming the environment. Renewable Energy could offer sustainable solutions to these challenges at a stroke as climate change, energy supply and energy security are all linked together. Especially solar energy would perfectly balance the triangle of security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability which provides the most positive outcome.
The neighbouring Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries dispose of vast solar power resources which could tackle Europe’s most pressing issues and can at the same time fix complementary issues in the Mediterranean region such as the energy poverty, socioeconomic development and efficiency. In the MED region the growth of population and economy will lead to a rising demand. The energy demand may increase by 65% before 2025, as a result of the influence of population growth and the increase in demand associated with economic development according to Plan Bleu. By 2050, the electricity demand will almost triple and will achieve an electricity demand in the same order of magnitude as Europe.
In order to gain control over the energy demand, energy constraints and CO2 emissions, there is a necessity to enforce Renewable Energy on a large scale. The share of Renewables in the primary energy supply are under-exploited in the region and were only representing about 3% of the MED energy consumption.

The Mediterranean Solar Plan and DESERTEC
In the Euro-Mediterranean Relations energy issues have become more central when at the 5th EMP Ministerial Conference on Energy the partners established a Priority Action Plan 2008-2013 that contains measures covering a wide area of energy related subjects. The new created Union for the Mediterranean aims to give renewed vigour to Europe’s relationship with its southern neighbours and let arise a fresh opportunity for cooperation on energy issues and climate change. The Union’s intention is to increase collaboration with North Africa on energy issues and to place greater focus on Renewables through EU development policy. The UfM will integrate existing Euro-MED policies in various fields, and several ongoing regional programmes will be continued or established. At the core of the UfM are several projects in the field of solar energy cooperation are envisaged among them the ambitious Mediterranean Solar Plan.

The Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) was endorsed at the Paris Summit on 13-14 July 2008. The MSP is expected to develop 20 GW in order to satisfy the increasing energy demand. Additionally, it should support an integrated renewable market for the EU-MED region. At the Summit it was concluded that “market deployment as well as research and development of all alternative sources of energy are a major priority in efforts towards assuring sustainable development”. (Joint declaration) The principal issue is the high costs of the MSP of about 80 billion Euros. The Neighbourhood Investment Facility, amounting from 2007-2013 over 700 million Euro for transport, energy, environment, and the social and private sector, and the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment, with 32 million Euro per year for 2007-2013 via the EIB, are not enough to implement these high cost projects.

The political and financial problems could open the door for the German initiative Desertec, a private sector consortium, which proposes a system approach enhancing 40 GW. Desertec is outside of the UfM what makes it a more flexible project which can rely on willing partner countries without having to cooperate multilaterally. Desertec’s Concentrating Solar-Thermal Power Plants (CSP-Plants) are a new technology which present features particularly suited to the regional context as they can generate power all the time, deliver power on demand whenever it is required and can be installed in isolated semi-desert grounds. (Desertec) The goal of the Desertec project is to achieve a competitive, secure and compatible supply of electricity within the integrated EU-MED region up to the year 2050. However, next to the enormous high investment costs of about 400 Billion Euros, the Desertec project will also be dependent on the same technical and political issues

Prospects of a Solar Plan strategy
The Lisbon Treaty have finally ensured that the EU "speaks with one voice" on external issues. This prospect and the actual Spanish EU-presidency could strengthen the role of cooperation between the shores from which both the European countries and their partners from the southern shore have a lot to gain. In May 2010, Spain will host in Valencia a conference regarding Mediterranean projects of renewable energies. It is suggested to convene a Euro-med Energy Ministerial to advance the integration of energy markets in the region and take note of progress in implementing concrete solar projects. In addition, the project "Paving the Way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan", expected to start soon in the first of half of 2010, shall progress the establishment of a harmonised legislative and regulatory framework in the Euro-Mediterranean region favourable to large-scale renewable energy adoption and use, renewable electricity trade, energy efficiency and energy savings and improvements in intra- and inter-regional knowledge transfer.

A successful solar cooperation, either through the MSP or Desertec, might bring stability and promote the development of the North African economies, assumed that a share of power generated will remain in the MED region. Anyway which project will become reality, a close cooperation between the EU and the Mediterranean in renewable energy could create a win-win situation for both in terms of security of supply, economical benefits and climate change mitigation. However, this requires a simultaneous focus on all technical, political, legal and financial challenges. The implementation of all necessary measures might take at least two decades to become effective, what calls for the quick introduction of the necessary policies.
Links:
Plan Bleu: Environment and Development in the Mediterranean
DESERTEC Foundation
Valencia Mediterranean Solar Plan Conference
EU's External Energy Policy

A revised Foreign Policy under the Lisbon Treaty?

2010-01-16T19:44:00.005+01:00

Under the new Lisbon Treaty the European Union will have a genuine foreign policy chief and a full-fledged foreign service. It is expected that the Union’s foreign policy will be better coordinated and there are high hopes that the Union will finally able to speak with one voice at the international level. The new High Representative, Catherine Ashton, presented her agenda and priorities at the Parliament’s public hearing last week.

The new Lisbon treaty came into force on the 1st of December and introduced two new top posts, the permanent President of the EU Council to chair EU summit meetings, and a High Representative for Foreign Affairs. The European Heads of state and government appointed at a summit on 19 November the Belgian Herman Van Rompuy as EU president and the British Catherine Ashton as High Representative. The Lisbon Treaty will reform the decision-making apparatus of the EU institutions, making the functioning of the 27-member Union more efficient and democratic. With the scrapping of the pillar division the Community and the European Union are now unified which equips the Union with legal personality to act under international law and within international organisations. All foreign policy actions will be coordinated at the meetings of foreign ministers under a single permanent chair.

The new High Representative for Foreign Affairs will lead the monthly meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council and be also the Vice-President of the European Commission. Catherine Ashton, who has taken the post from Javier Solana, will coordinate all parts of the Union’s external action. Ashton was the former European Commissioner for Trade and could convince in her role with accurate decisions and tough negotiating skills. However, the appointment of Ashton as High Representative came surprising as she has little experience in foreign affairs what have triggered controversies throughout Europe.

Baroness Ashton’s first important tasks will be the establishment of a new EU foreign service, the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS is one of the key innovations which the Lisbon Treaty foresees to carry out a common EU foreign policy. Around 500 to 700 officials will work under the leadership of Ashton which will be composed from staff of the Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council and the national government administrations of the Member States. The creation of the European External Action Service is according to Ashton an “opportunity to build something that brings together all the elements of our engagement – political, economic and military – to implement one coherent strategy”

The neighbourhood and especially the Mediterranean region will be one of the top priorities for Ashton. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy stresses the importance of the Mediterranean in the public hearing by stating that “we as EU have primary responsibility for our neighbourhood” and “there are deep historical ties and common interests that bind us, as well as common problems including illegal migration. We need to take forward the work started under the Union for the Mediterranean.”
Additionally, Ashton put the Middle East the Israeli-Palestinian conflict high on the EU agenda. In early February she is expected to travel to the region to push for a reinvigoration of peace talks and resume talks with a fixed timeframe. Ashton will keep pressure on Israel to halt settlement building and urge Palestinians back to negotiations which have been suspended for a year. Ashton wants to work together with the Middle East Quartet and coordinate a common effective strategy with the United States. According to Ashton the EU needs to be active and operational “both on the global issues, where Europe is expected to play its full role, and in our immediate neighbourhood, where we are expected to take the lead”.

Baroness Ashton will not probably lead the EU to a new era of common European diplomacy. The new institutional settings provided by the Lisbon Treaty will not create a genuine EU foreign minister who has the final voice in all European foreign affairs. Decision in foreign policies will still be the result of coordination between the Member States and will be taken by unanimity. However, if Catherine Ashton seizes the opportunity she can help that the EU have a serious debate on its foreign policy goals in order to find a stronger and more coherent voice on the world stage..

Links:
EurActiv: Ashton to push for Middle East talks
ENPI: Catherine Ashton: Mediterranean is a top priority
Asthon: Opening Remarks to European Parliament Hearing

North Africa a Transit Region for International Migration

2010-01-04T16:11:00.013+01:00

In the year 2009 the European continent saw a decrease of 17 percent in irregular border crossings from the Southern Mediterranean rim. This sharp drop of the immigration flow heading to the "privileged" shores of the European Union is caused by the EU's border control and externalisation policy against irregular immigration. In the consequence, the northern African states and Turkey are confronted with an increasing migration pressure which their authorities are unable to cope efficiently and according to international human rights rules.
The drop in the number of irregular migrants trying to enter the bloc in 2009 is partly caused by the global recession which had an effect on the motivation why people leave their country in order to start a better life elsewhere. Due to the economic downturn many migrants were less confident to find a job in the potential destination country and the costly crossing was further discouraging the emigration.
However, the main reason for the decreasing irregular immigration to Europe lies in the more repressive EU’s migration policy. Although the Member States’ economies are increasingly depended on migrant labor, the EU is today applying a strict policy on border and external relations. Immigration controls, measures for the detection and expulsion of irregular migrants, and other common procedures under both EU rules and the Schengen Treaty were implemented more comprehensibly in the last year. The external border security agency Frontex, which is operating since October 2005, contributed to the reduction of the number of would-be migrants in Europe by strengthening the sea patrols.

The key tools of the European externalisation policy are bilateral cooperation with non-EU countries of origin and transit which progressed over the last years to curb illegal migration in coastal areas and along land borders. The EU Member States demand in the bilateral and regional agreements with their neighbouring countries that restrictive immigration measures should be already implemented in the concerned transit countries before the migrants could reach EU mainland. The externalisation in the field of migration includes basically stronger border controls of coastal areas and land borders and the signing of readmission agreements to regulate the involuntary return of unauthorized migrants and refugees. Bilateral cooperation agreements are today the predominant strategy with the Southern Mediterranean states in the management of countering irregular immigration. Morocco and Spain have already joint naval patrols to catch boat migrants and there is a readmission treaty in place between the two counties that accepts the return of sub-Saharan boat migrants to Morocco. Italy signed a friendship Treaty with Libya in February 2009 which allows the Italian authorities to send migrant and potential asylum seekers back to the Libyan territorial waters. While these measures have some short-term effect for Europe there are crucial consequences for migrants and transit countries and the long-term effects of these policies are alarming.

Due to the increased border controls many migrants and refugees who fail to enter the European continent get stuck in transit countries in the EU’s neighbourhood. The numbers of sub-Saharan migrants have already overtaken North Africans as the largest category of irregular migrants intercepted by European border controls and in the North Africa states and Turkey the immigrant trend have lead to an emerging sub-Saharan community. According to Hein de Haas there are in Mauritania and Algeria more than 100,000 sub-Saharan migrants, l, 1 to 1.5 million in Libya, between 2.2 and 4 million Sudanese migrants in Egypt, and in Tunisia and Morocco several tens of thousands but this number is growing rapidly. Next to the growing numbers of immigrants who stay in the Southern Mediterranean Region in transition on their way to Europe or those who consider the North African countries as primary destination the region is facing with a huge number of mixed migration movements. The migration flow is diverse and composed of various sub-Sahara regions such as West Africa, the Horn of Africa or other countries affected by economic decline or civil wars such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Sudan. These migration flows are not only mixed in terms of diverse origin countries but also in terms of their migration type (e.g. labor migrants, asylum seekers and refugees). The North African states have been transforming during the 90s to mayor transit countries for migrants and refugees from other African countries and this new pattern of globalized migration is overtaking the traditional regional migration which has deep historical roots within the Mediterranean. (cf. Hein de Haas)
About 120,000 refugees from Africa are estimated who try to reach Europe via the Mediterranean each year. The North African States are not prepared to deal with this huge immigration inflow and they can not provide any suitable mechanism to deal with the composition of new immigrant populations. Therefore, all migrants are lumped together anyhow whether labor migrants, refugees or asylum seekers and considered as illegal. The conditions in the reception centres and detention centres are unfavorable. There are not policies in place which could facilitate their integration into the labor market and society but migrants are rather forced to leave the country and driven to other states in the region. There are not stable mechanism according to international human rights standards to deal with legal asylum claims and fair hearings and assessments of legal claims are often denied.

Hein de Haas:Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends

The Israeli-Palestinian Movement “Combatants for Peace”

2009-10-16T19:40:00.011+02:00

مقاتلون من اجل السلام / לוחמים לשלום

An open dialogue, cultural initiatives and exchanges between Palestinians and Israelis are rare and difficult to obtain. The ongoing military conflict, fixed prejudices and imaginaries, and a lack of openness in the region are hindering are joint dialogue for mutual understanding. However, there are a few civil movements who try to break down these collective barriers and raise the consciousness in both societies in regard to this bloody conflict.

The non-violent resistance group “Combatants for Peace” is the very best example that a jointly movement for a better relationship is possible. It is a civil movement jointly established by former Palestinian militants and Israeli soldiers in order to promote a peaceful solution of two states (according to the Oslo Treaty) through dialogue and non-violent means. The bi-national movement “Combatants for Peace” leads a pacifist struggle against the occupation, fights for peace and justice in various joint actions. The activist’s goal is to enhance trust and solidarity between Palestinians and Israelis and, in the end, lead their societies out of the vicious cycle of conflict.

“Combatants for Peace” was formed in 2005 by a group of 12 Israeli soldiers from the Israeli army (IDF) and four former Palestinian fighters, mostly from the Fatah movement. Both sides took an active role in the violent struggle in the region and decided together to drop their arms. They become convinced that a military solution to the conflict is impossible and motivated to talk to each other” "Initially we were full of fear, but we learned that we're all human and can talk together,” said Palestinian Fatah fighter Sulaiman al-Hamri to the Jewish Journal. After a series of meetings, the group of Israelis and Palestinians jointly expressed the desire to fight peacefully for a solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and formed the “Combatants for Peace on Pessah” in 2006.

Today the movement consists of more than 250 activists involving also non ex-military participants who gather in weekly group dialogue meetings. But dialogue is not the end in itself, but rather a starting point for a number of concrete actions and real change in the area. For instance, the movement engages to help Palestinian farmers who have limited access to their fields due to military presence or who face harassment from settlers. The Combatants remove road blockages that tears the Palestinian villages apart, assist in the re-building of demolished houses and provide cultural and social activities such as tours of east Jerusalem, lectures and nonviolent demonstrations.

In a press release Raed Hadar and Avner Wishnitzer, Palestinian and Israeli coordinators of the movement emphasise: “We believe that only by joining forces, will we be able to end the cycle of violence, the bloodshed and the occupation and oppression of the Palestinian people. We no longer believe that it is possible to resolve the conflict between the two peoples through violent means; therefore we declare that we refuse to take part any more in the mutual bloodletting

Recently, the efforts of the “Combatants for Peace” were honoured with the 4th Euro-Med Award for Dialogue between Cultures 2009. The award, an initiative of the Anna Lindh Foundation and its partner Fondazione Mediterraneo, promotes the dialogue between cultures shared by the 43 countries of the Union for the Mediterranean. The official Ceremony was held in Stockholm, on 21st of September 2009, the International Day of Peace.

Links:
Please visit: www.combatantsforpeace.org
Jewish Journal: Former Israeli and Palestinian fighters push for peace—together
Anna Lindh Euro Mediterranean Foundation: www.euromedalex.org

Italy and Recent Developments in the Area of Asylum

2009-10-03T21:21:00.036+02:00

Lampedusa, Sicily or Sardinia... when you hear about these Italian islands in the Mediterranean you won’t automatically associate these spots with beaches and holidays nowadays but rather with floods of refugees, reception centres and human rights abuses. The Italian policy of intercepting migrants and refugees without giving them a chance to request asylum has aroused sharp criticism, as many legitimate refugees and asylum seekers are forced to get back to places where their lives are threatened. This rough immigration practices are also strongly criticised by the European Union, although the Union’s own incapacity to carry out a European solution is highly related with the problems in the Mediterranean Sea.

The European Union has so far failed to enforce a common European treatment of asylum claims and until there are not adequate systems to offer safety to asylum seekers and refugees who need it across Europe, the story will continue. Ten years after the establishment of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), the achievements in the area of Asylum have been plain-spoken modest. The security discourses have taken precedence on the European agenda and the priorities have shifted towards issues relating to external frontiers and undocumented immigration, which has conjured up images of a “Fortress Europe”.

In 2008, there were nearly 240,000 asylum applications lodged in the EU and just 13% of applicants were granted refugee status. 193 690 first instance decisions were made on asylum applicants. There were 73% rejections, 13% applicants were granted refugee status, 10% subsidiary protection and 5% authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons. (Eurostat, 2009) The Hague Program called for an improved asylum regulation, common procedure and uniform status for asylum seekers as the so-called Dublin Regulation, defining that the first EU member state that a migrant enters examines the asylum application, has been unsatisfactory. Various approaches, such as the Asylum Procedures Directive, Reception Conditions Directive, or the Qualification Directive should harmonize the conditions, procedures, and the rights conferred on the status of refugees or asylum applicants in the different EU countries.

However, the level of harmonization is still relatively low and the national authorities and courts do not always correctly apply the EU’s directives. The situation is particularly critical for rejected asylum seekers who are often times forced to work in substandard conditions, exploited, or taken into trafficking networks. The EU’s measures to protect these victims of exploitation and trafficking are inadequate. The recent Employers’ Sanctions Directive proposal on Third country nationals (TCNs) working illegally and the proposal for a “Return Directive” illustrate the predominant trend to focus on illegal residence and working, and repressive security measures rather than on protecting the migrants’ rights.

Nevertheless, the Commission is pushing for standardization and, in December 2008, it presented an asylum package that should change the European legislation by setting minimal standards for asylum seekers at the point of their arrival - Measures to improve the asylum system and strengthening asylum seekers' rights specific standards must be guaranteed in terms of “housing, food, clothing, health care, financial benefits, and freedom of movement and access to work.” (European Parliament, 2009) Furthermore, the creation of a European Asylum Support Office and a “solidarity” clause to unburden greatly affected EU members such as Malta, Italy, and Greece is foreseen. On May 7, 2009, the package was adopted by the European Parliament which called for a binding mechanism to be set up before 2012.

In the meantime, it is feared that unilaterally national initiatives will further gain ground and violate international law, as the case of Italy demonstrates. In May 2009, Italy started its highly controversial return policy with joint naval patrols in Libyan territorial waters and a bilateral agreement with Tripoli. In order to combat illegal immigration, Italy rejects every boat approaching the Italian coastal borders and the Italian coast guard sent all migrants back to so-called reception centres in Libya. A new Human Rights Watch (HRW) report illustrates the bad treatment and inhuman conditions in this Libyan centres to which all of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are sent regardless their official status in international law. Libya has not ratified the international convention on refugees and treats all returned people as illegal immigrants, regardless of their legal status. Many of them are refugees and asylum seekers from conflict zones such as Somalia or Darfur who would have a right to international protection. The Human Rights Watch Report stresses that 2008 about 75 percent of the people coming to Lampedusa were asylum seekers. As a consequence, the irregular boat migrants to Sicily, Lampedusa and Sardinia fell by 55 percent in the first six months of 2009 compared to the same period the previous year according to the HRW. Frontex statistics show a 31% decrease in the number of migrants detected heading towards Italy and Malta in the first half of this year compared to the same period last year.

On 21 September 2009, a Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting was held in Brussels to discuss actions in the area of irregular migration, joint EU Resettlement Programme, asylum issues, unaccompanied minors and a report from the European Commission as a follow-up on the European Council conclusions of 18/19 June 2009. The Italian case was not high on the agenda despite of UN critics that fundamental human rights standards of refugees have to be respected. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, recently called the current European asylum policy “dysfunctional” and urged EU Member States to help refugees who are fleeing from conflicts in their countries.

Links:
Human Rights Watch: Pushed Back, Pushed Around Eurostat: Data in Focus, 8/2009, Asylum applicants and decisions on asylum applications in Q4 2008 European Parliament: Press Release: 07.05.2009 Council of the EU: European Council conclusions of 18/19 June 2009
Council of the EU: JHA Council conclusions 21 September 2009

Europa Jaratouna - أوروبا جارتنا على

2009-07-19T15:29:00.011+02:00

A new communication project of the European Commission, Eurojar, is officially being launched in Beirut on 24 June 2009. The project’s name “Eurojar” stands for Europa Jaratouna (Europe our neighbour) and aims to maximize the visibility of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The website eurojar.org, launched in May this year, has already published a series of articles on Euro-Mediterranean relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Articles, information, reactions and opinions are available on the website.

Eurojar is one of 13 projects funded by the Commission’s EuropeAid Regional Information and Communication Programme. The Eurojar budget amounts 1.5 million Euros and will last for at least one year. Europa Jaratouna seeks to increase awareness and understanding about the EU’s policies among the citizens of eight Arab countries, which are Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestinian Territories, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria.

A consortium of media networks is realizing the multimedia project:
The leader of the consortium is the Lebanese daily paper L’Orient Le Jour. Every Monday, the newspaper publishes an article or an analysis about EU-Mediterranean cooperation. So far, the articles of L’Orient Le Jour have dealt with the prospects for a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the Euromed Audiovisual programme.
Furthermore, the pan-Arab press company Al-Hayat group will publish 52 articles over a period of one year. The French-Lebanese Le Commerce du Levant will present once every month an analysis or an economic or socio-economic report on one of the aspects of Euro-med relations. Last but not least, a group of Lebanese and Arab TV channels, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC), will broadcast 32 TV episodes on LBCI and LBCsat.

Web Links:
Eurojar: www.eurojar.org/
L’Orient Le Jour: www.lorientlejour.com
Al-Hayat: www.daralhayat.com
LBC: www.lbcgroup.tv
Le Commerce du Levant: www.lecommercedulevant.com

Hibernation, Celebration and Revitalisation

2009-07-08T14:09:00.015+02:00

The next 13^thof July will mark the first anniversary of the Union for the Mediterranean. However, there is not an occasion to celebrate. Despite of the structural reforms with the establishment of the general secretariat in Barcelona and the Mediterranean University in Slovenia, the outcomes of this new framework are rather limited not only because the escalating conflict in the Middle East at the end of 2008 has slowed down any progress.

After six months of standstill there is some hope that the Union for the Mediterranean have come out of hibernation. Under French initiative, the delegations from the 43 members met in Paris on 25 June to discuss a set of priority development projects in the field of sustainable development. The ministerial meeting addressed the main themes in the framework of the UfM, namely water and environment, transport, energy and urban development. A new impetus to regional cooperation is required to tackle drinking water shortages, pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, natural habitats and agricultural areas in the coastal areas which remain serious problems for the southern Mediterranean states.

The challenges in the Mediterranean region are today more demanding then ever. The proceeding of these transnational projects and an intensification of cooperation between Europe, North Africa and the Middle East is needed after the cooperation itself on the working level were put on ice and came to a near standstill for months. Since November 2008 no formal meetings among the heads of state and government have taken place. In contrary to the technical meetings of experts and civil servants in the framework of the Barcelona Process, the UfM framework foresees high level meetings. In the consequence, the meetings might have on the one hand a stronger political impact but can be on the other hand easier hindered by political events.

Although the member states have agreed to resume formal meetings, the financial crisis is now challenging the success of the planned projects. The financial crisis is hitting the real economy and businesses in the Southern Mediterranean are suffering from the recession. The gross domestic product growth for the Middle East is projected to decline from 6 percent in 2008 to 3.1 percent in 2009. Access to bank financing is increasingly difficult and investors hesitate to finance projects. The current EU budget for Mediterranean policy (16 billion euro from 2007 to 2013) is limited and many envisaged projects need further private loans and additional funding to be realized. Exceptions are projects in the field of energy as the expectations from the European side for an energy partnership are high. On initiative of Germany and France a solar plan was included into the list of projects of the UfM. The Southern Mediterranean countries are considered as a perfect source for solar energy due to abundance of sunshine. At least from solar power projects some results might be achieved if they bear fruit in the near future but this solely prospect is somewhat disappointing taking into account the high expectations in the UfM.

Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere

2009-06-29T19:14:00.001+02:00

The Internet and Democracy project at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society has produced a map of the Arabic blogosphere. In the report approximately 35,000 active Arabic language blogs were identified which are mainly organized around countries. According to the analysis the Egyptian blogsphere is the biggest which consists primarily of political opposition organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
This study gives an assessment about how issues of politics, media, religion, culture, and international affairs are discussed in the Arabic blogosphere.

Download the full report here: Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere: Politics, Culture and Dissent

Obama offers a New Beginning

2009-06-06T14:44:00.000+02:00

US President Barack Obama's speech at Cairo University marks an important step toward a new American policy in the Middle East.

Obama extended a hand to world Islam by emphasizing that a two-state solution is the only viable solution and that Israel will have to cease settlements. The message received different and contradicting reactions in the Arabic world. While many praised his speech others are demanding concrete actions to prove the credibility of his words and his supposed good intentions.

Trust is needed to build up cooperation between the United States and the Muslim world. This can not be achieved in one well-intended speech. Therefore, Obama's speech could just be a historic turning point when his words are followed with deeds.

Shared Euro-Mediterranean news –a shared destiny?

2009-05-10T17:27:00.007+02:00

On 15 April, the European Commission launched a new media project to foster co-operation and dialogue with the Middle East and North African neighbours. The new television channel EuroMed-News aims to promote the EU’s neighbourhood policy and boost the visibility of EU-funded projects in the region. EuroMed-News is a 1-year project supported by the European Commission with €2.16m with a possible option for extension.

The cultural and political ties between the EU and its southern neighbours have not significantly improved since the Barcelona process and the launch of a Union for the Mediterranean last year. The new television channel EuroMed-News aims to strengthen the intercultural dialogue with the neighbour partners in the south and promote cultural diversity and gender equality. According to EU's external relations Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "little by little, using these images, we can help these societies become more open."
In addition, the EuroMed-News seeks to increase the coverage of EU issues in the media and to raise the public opinion awareness regarding EU’s policies. The EU-funded project guarantees some media attention to improve the image of the Union in the neighbour countries. Thus, one of the central policies of the new channel is to foster the awareness among the local populations by providing information about European policies and actions supported by the European Union which benefit the countries in the neighbouring region.

The EuroMed-News project is jointly produced by the Arab States Broadcasting Union, Euro-Mediterranean media association COPEAM and the European Broadcasting Union under the leadership of France Télévisions. Furthermore, it gathers broadcasters and national TV stations from Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Libya und Algeria to reach a broad coverage. EuroMed-News will produce news topics, magazines and documentaries about North African society and the economy. The programmes will be broadcast on public television across the southern Mediterranean States and is available via the Internet.

It remains open whether the EuroMed-News can really create better cultural and social ties between Europe and the Southern Mediterranean States. Sure is, that both regions have much more in common than just the Mediterranean Sea. The executive producer Lyes Belaribi is hopefully right when he states on the website: "The Mediterranean plan, a shared destiny".

Visit the website: http://www.euromed-news.org/

European Neighbourhood Policy– Catalyst or Impediment?

2009-04-07T19:21:00.018+02:00

Recently, the EU saw itself confronted with several conflicts in the neighbourhood – from the war in Georgia over the gas conflict in Ukraine to the Gaza war. In all conflicts the EU was not capable to coordinate a coherent policy approach and just monitored the status quo. The current neighbourhood policy of the European Union has several shortcomings due to the Union’s misguided perspective on how it should interact with its neighbours.
To be a strong international political entity and a key actor in the neighbourhood the EU needs to reassess its neighbourhood policy. The enlargement of 2004 expanded the Union’s area of geopolitical influence and put the EU into direct contact with new areas of strategic interest which would face the Union with new challenges that can not be answered with integration policy. Without an appropriate institutional set up to work out its relations with the neighbourhood its political reputation will be further undermined.

Neighbours becoming Members
The former EU’s neighbourhood integration strategy aimed to prepare candidate states for membership in the Union. In 1993 the European Council laid down specific rules and obligations for countries wanting to join the Community. The so-called Copenhagen criteria requires that an applicant nation adopt the acquis communitaire, have a functioning market economy and have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. During the EU’s eastward enlargement, the EU used conditionality to secure compliance from the candidates on a broad range of political, economic, and legal matters. The conditionality tool had powerful effects in the negotiation and reform processes and deeply impacted the public policies of applicant states. As the former external relations Commissioner Chris Patten stated, “…over the past decade, the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument has undeniably been the promise of EU membership”. (European Commission, News European Neighbourhood Policy, 2003)

Prior to the last accession of new member states in 2004 and 2007, enlargement was one of the EU’s most powerful foreign policy tools. The “golden carrot” of membership was the most effective instrument for influencing neighbouring countries’ policies and for promoting peace, prosperity, and stability. As the EU’s borders advanced and neighbours became members during the eastward expansion, previously distant countries then became direct neighbours. These neighbouring countries are unlikely to be admitted to the Community in the short-term what forced the Union to change its concept of neighbourhood. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is the response to the shifting political climate between the EU and its surrounding nations.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
The European Neighbourhood Policy was introduced by the European Commission in 2003 (Wider Europe) and further developed in the “Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy” published in May 2004. Initially established with the purpose of providing its new eastern European neighbours a credible alternative to membership, the EU decided later to offer the same type of structured relationship to its southern neighbours (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria and Tunisia). The objective of this new policy is to extend the reform stimulus of enlargement to the new neighbours and to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. The ENP is directed toward the countries bordering the EU but it lacks the prospect of membership that was inherent in the former accession policy.
The ENP has ambitious goals for bringing security and stability to those countries and regions. The new foreign policy tool should handle the neighbours’ problems such as organised crime, trafficking, and illegal migration, which may have indirect and direct implications for the EU. The ENP framework is a combination of bilateral dialogue and cooperation. The bilateral relations are based on Association Agreements and jointly agreed Action Plans in which the EU and the partner states define a set of priorities covering a number of key areas for specific action. The result is that the EU may follow up on certain issues, particularly on those pertaining to good governance, human rights, and political reform in partner countries.

The ENP and the Mediterranean Partner States
Since the former policy towards the Mediterranean neighbourhood, the EMP (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership), had neither bilateral agreements nor effective use of conditionality, the ENP was seen as an advanced tool. In individual action plans described by the ENP, the principles of conditionality and joint ownership should be applied. In return for implementing policy reforms, the EU offers an increased participation in programmes, aid flows, and a stake in the EU’s internal market with the possibility of having a free trade area. However, the access to the European Internal Market is restricted in certain areas like the Common Agricultural Policy and the Free Movement of People which are of particular interest for the southern partner states.
The Mediterranean case shows that the ENP strategy of encouraging further reforms has been largely unsuccessful. The ENP has largely failed to meet the high expectations. In the view of the Mediterranean partners, the policy framework is mostly designed to pursue EU’s interests. Without the prospect of membership, the incentives for southern governments to adopt EU standards and to undertake political, economic and institutional reforms are insufficient. Especially if there is a risk of losing political power and popularity by implementing economic reforms or legislative reform is high. In addition, the EU has not used conditionality to push for political and economic reform, thus far, as it might create instability. As the EU preferred objective in the regions are stability and security, autocratic leaders were backed and a move to a free market democracy prevented. Thus, Europe is far away from a coherent policy because it does not know what it wants from the countries; stability and security or free markets democracy.
Without offering partner countries sufficient incentives for closer cooperation in various fields the consistency and effectiveness of EU conditionality on policy change is low. Economic incentives and increased partnership are not enough to encourage the level of political and economic change required by the EU.

Conclusion
The prospect of membership in the Union has promoted countries to undergo fundamental changes voluntarily in order to prepare for the accession. While conditionality during the enlargement process was a powerful instrument for dealing with candidate nations, the strategy of offering incentives in return for the will to undertake reform has not been successful with the new neighbours.
The EU’s neighbourhood policy was initially seen as a complement to enlargement. However, the ENP is not an adequate alternative to the enlargement instrument, as the primary objectives are not clearly defined and hardly realistic in some cases. Incentives of closer ties, a (nearly) free-trade zone and temporary agreements can not replace the “carrot” of membership for ENP partner countries. To date, the Union has no other carrots, but it has no sticks either.

Proposal for the establishment of European Asylum Support Office

2009-02-21T23:46:00.008+01:00

On 18 February, the European Commission proposed a Regulation to establish a European Asylum Support Office (EASO) which could be running by 2010. The establishment of a new agency is in line with the Policy Plan on Asylum adopted by the Commission in June 2008 which proposed an extension of European legislation on asylum. The EU’s objectives are to build up administrative cooperation between the Member States and to abolish the differences in the national asylum policies.

With the increasing numbers of asylum seekers in Europe, the mayor tasks of the EASO will be to support Member States in their efforts to implement a more consistent and fairer asylum policy. The agency will support practical cooperation on asylum, assist Member States under particular pressure through possibly deploying asylum support teams and contribute to the implementation of the Common European Asylum System.

This regulatory agency will take the form of an independent European body without decision-making powers.
The Office's structure will consist of a management board, an executive director, an executive committee and a consultative forum. The management board will be composed of representatives of the Member States and the Commission. UNHCR will be present on the board, although without voting rights. NGO influence is only possible through the consultative body.

EU Press Release: Setting up of European Asylum Support Office proposed by the Commission

Obama meets Al-Arabiya

2009-02-03T21:57:00.001+01:00

On his first day in office, US President Barack Obama put an end to the controversial U.S foreign policy towards the Middle East during the Bush administration. Bush's "war against terrorism" should be replaced by a new diplomatic strategy of dialog and cooperation with the whole region including Syria and Iran.
The reactions in the Middle East were divided: some expressed pessimism about the capacity of the Obama administration to bring about real change in the region, others were optimistic that Barack Obama is able to devise a more balanced role in the region.

In Obama's first interview since taking office, the new president said that the U.S. are not the enemy of the Muslim world and that Israel and the Palestinians should resume peace negotiations. US President Obama offered to the Islamic world a "new partnership in mutual respect". In his "greater Middle East" strategy Obama will use credible and active diplomacy that employs "all instruments of US power".
The crucial question will be whether Obama will succeed in translating his words into direct actions for the benefit of the region.

The Middle East experts Amr Hamzawy and Marina Ottaway conclude in a publication of Carnegie Endowment:

"Obama’s election was a public diplomacy triumph for the United States, the first real success the United States has won in the Arab world in a long time, and probably the most important one since President Eisenhower backed Egypt’s efforts to regain control of the Suez Canal in 1956. Yet the success could prove short-lived: Arabs were reacting to concrete change, not to words, and are likely to revert to the old hostility unless Obama’s words are backed by concrete changes in U.S. Middle East policies."

Check out Obama's first interview with the Arab satellite station Al Arabiya:

Iran: An Unpredictable Variable

2008-12-29T11:59:00.024+01:00

Iran’s aggressive foreign policy, coupled with its incipient nuclear program, is a serious concern and currently one of the most pressing problems in international politics and diplomacy. This article focuses briefly on Iran’s international standing and the origins of the tension between this country and the western world. In the end, it gives some personal remarks on how the conflict might be solved.
Iran is a country of special geostrategic importance due to its central location in Eurasia. In addition, the country has large reserves of petroleum and natural gas. Despite the advantages gleaned from its location and energy stores, Iran faces difficult internal problems (e.g. a high unemployment rate and inflation) and enormous diplomatic conflicts with the western world. Even though political relations between the West and Iran have been tense since Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1979, these relations have significantly worsened in recent years. One cause of the increased tension is the renewal of a Shiite radicalism in Iran under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Iranian leader is developing intermediate range missiles that have the ability to strike Israel, and he is a strong proponent of the nuclear program. Ahmadinejad continues to call for Israel’s destruction, proclaiming that a nuclear war with Israel will bring the return of the last Shiite Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, to earth. Teheran is sharply critical of the US invasion of Iran’s former chief rival, Iraq, as the state is worried about US hegemony in the region.

Iran’s Nuclear Program
Iran has moved ahead rapidly with its nuclear program. The Persian nation has been steadily increasing the number of centrifuges at its uranium enrichment plants, which according to Teheran officials, will solely be used for peaceful purposes. Iran is insisting on its inalienable right to enrich uranium and build centrifuges for peaceful power generation. In opposition to this declaration, the West is accusing Teheran of seeking to enrich uranium to levels high enough for use in nuclear weapons. In particular, Israel sees the nuclear ambitions of Iran as a threat to their existence and fear that Teheran’s program could drive other states in the Middle East to pursue nuclear power for armament and weapons.
Various diplomatic incentives have failed to halt Iran’s nuclear program, which is currently under surveillance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, the means of the IAEA have shown to be inadequate for detecting countries that have clandestine enrichment programs, such as Algeria, Libya and Syria.

Copyright (C) 2000,2001,2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.

Equally ineffective are the sanctions by the United Nations Security Council. Recently, a United Nations Security Council resolution imposed a series of sanctions on Iran after the state declined an international offer that would require the suspension of its nuclear activity in exchange. Russia’s role is important here because this country has veto power in the UN Security Council, where sanctions need to be approved unanimously by the five permanent members. Oftentimes, Russia has threatened to boycott the decision due to recent tensions with the United States. Russia is a nuclear supplier and it supports Tehran's nuclear program for constructing the Bushehr reactor and selling its nuclear expertise. Furthermore, Moscow sees Iran as a strategic partner against an American presence in the Middle East, and is supportive of like-minded forces such as Hamas, Shiite Hezbollah, and Syria. If Russia is further willing to deepen ties with Iran, ( e.g. within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); a military alliance, seen as a counterbalance to NATO, between Russia, China, and several Central Asian former Soviet states in which Iran has observer status) there could be a dangerous redistribution of power in international politics.

How to Deal with Iran?
What are the options for dealing with Iran? Should we accept a nuclear-armed Iran and live in a more insecure world where Israel’s existence is endangered? Should we bomb the country and have a “second Iraq”? There are different suggestions about how to react to Iran’s aggressive foreign policy. Israel is willing to attack Iran’s nuclear installations. The Bush administration oftentimes discussed using force to stop the rapidly expanding Iranian nuclear program, but there is hope that Barack Obama will attempt to solve the crisis diplomatically. Obama is generally inclined towards a worldwide nuclear disarmament.
Admittedly, diplomatic activities with Iran have not been a great success, thus far. However, military action should not be the preferred means of dealing with Iran. The western world has to pull out all the stops to prevent an armed conflict or even another invasion in the region. The European Union (EU) should strengthen its “soft power” agenda in the case of Iran. The EU could be effective because of its good reputation for international diplomacy and its good relationship with Russia. A security community that involves the EU, US, and Russia as equal partners could be the key solution to the current friction. With the committed support of the European states, Obama could be empowered to reinitiate direct diplomatic policy with the Persian state. A common strategy of a mix of “carrots and sticks” is most appropriate. Offering economic incentive packages and permitting a nuclear program under control of the international society could persuade Tehran to suspend its uranium enrichment program. If direct talks and “carrots” will not halt Iran obtaining nuclear material, Europe and the US must act in concert to put international pressure on the Iranian economy to prevent Ahmadinejad’s next win in the polls; Ahmadinejad will most likely win the 2009 Iranian presidential election, mainly because of the support of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The western states have to make it clear to the Iranian people that a moderate policy towards Israel and the rest of the world is necessary and more beneficial for themselves. Another victory of Ahmadinejad would make productive policy changes regarding Iran’s nuclear program nearly impossible.

Immigration and the European Union – Reflections on the New Pact

2008-11-12T14:43:00.027+01:00

On October 15, EU heads of state endorsed the 'European Pact on Immigration and Asylum'. The Immigration Pact, one of the centerpieces of the French EU presidency, mandates common approaches for handling future European immigration and provides a roadmap for implementing these policies. It sets out five priorities for action: legal immigration and integration, a European asylum system, control of illegal immigration, effective border controls and development. The EU will introduce a 'Blue Card' for the purpose of attracting highly-skilled migrants from developing countries. This new work visa, which is based on the US Green Card, will come into force by mid-2010.

Since October 2007, when the Blue Card plan was first tabled, difficult bargaining was needed to reach an agreement. The member states have very diverse requirements concerning immigration. Despite the member states’ differences regarding various policy details and frameworks, there were also converging viewpoints. All member states have to tackle the demographic change, need to be competitive in the global market and most importantly have a common interest in maintaining strong external Community borders. Furthermore, Europe’s ongoing integration in many fields such as the labour market, has created the situation where member states affect one another. Europe has a mutual solidarity, and the states understand that immigration is a pan-European issue that must not be handled simply as a domestic matter.

However, the asylum policy questions this "solidarity" within the member states. While, for example, the number of asylum seekers to Central Europe is low and declining every year, hundreds of asylums are arriving at the coasts of southern Greece, southern Spain, and Malta every day. Nevertheless, the EU does not want to introduce a quota to distribute the asylum seekers in Europe, so those countries taking in large numbers of asylum-seekers will just receive money to solve this problem. On November 7, the European Commission adopted the multi-year program under the European Refugee Fund to give Malta 4.8 million Euros in assistance between 2008 and 2013. But it is unclear whether the financial solidarity will be enough.

Finally, the EU states agreed on adopting a balanced pact between regulating illegal immigrants/asylum-seekers and welcoming skilled workers. The Blue Card allows an immigrant to work just in one EU country, without having the right to move to another country for work purposes. The immigrant can not move freely within the EU, as this worker must apply for a new Blue Card when moving to another EU country. This restriction on labor mobility will make the scheme less attractive. Therefore, the Blue Card is not the right scheme to compete, for instance, with the US market for the best minds. In the US, similar market restrictions are not posed on any states, and also, there is not the disadvantage of having many different languages, as is the case in the EU.

The immigration pact is both a legitimate means of discouraging illegal immigration and enabling Europe to become more dynamic in its welcoming of highly qualified immigrants. It foresees stricter rules on the unification of immigrants' families, and also aims to make returning home easier. It will be harder for member states to grant mass amnesties for illegal migrants, like Spain did this for around 600,000 illegal immigrants in 2005.
Thus, the new immigration pact is both selective and also more controlled, with more returns of illegal immigration. So, some experts are wrong for assuming that the period of security minded policies of the European Union is over. The more than 100,000 illegal immigrants who reach the EU member states every year from the southern Mediterranean states can not easily controlled by this measure. The entire northern Mediterranean shore is a transit point for thousands of Africans refugees and migrants who are fleeing war or poverty in the Horn of Africa. Most of them arrive in Libya, where trafficking gangs transport help them for many dollars to reach Europe's coast. And all the thousands of people who reach Europe's Mediterranean shores, dead or dying of thirst, will not stop either with this EU Pact. Not to forget that immigration is not just an economic issue but also has a moral obligation. The EU can not just pick the best educated minds in order to fill a gap in the employment market and then send them home after a couple of years. This selective immigration is not only too unattractive for highly skilled people but also creates a brain drain on human resources in the developing states.
The EU pact on immigration and asylum is not a turning point in a common strategy. The "European fortress" is not only still alive, it is now the "Europe of the 27 fortresses".

• Council of the European Union: European Pact on Immigration and Asylum
• European Commission: European Refugee Fund 2008-2013 - Malta

Further information on the Blue Card Watch Eurinfo