The South China Sea has emerged as a theatre for great power contestation as several countries in Asia make contesting claims to the areas that fall within their Exclusive Economic Zones as per international laws governing maritime commerce. In contrast, China makes claims almost in its entirety to this strategically important maritime space. As trillions of dollars of cargo transit through this critical sea area, the issue of securing safe transport by major sea faring nations are drawn into the picture.

Philippines is one of the claimants that approached the international tribunal at The Hague for adjudication as China violated its sovereignty by encroaching into its EEZ and secured a verdict in its favour in July 2016. China rejected the ruling, being aware that the tribunal has no law enforcing authority and thus found the ruling not binding to observe. Since then the situation and activities of China in the South China Sea has increased. In particular, it is involved in a series of spat with the Philippines including firing water cannons and deploying coast guard ships to islands that have remained strategic strongholds for the Philippines for a long time. Such activities have drawn other major maritime powers not having claims but have maritime interests so that international maritime traffic is secured from potential disruptions. 

Some major powers have chosen two-fold approach: to engage China by holding duelling military drills in the South China Sea and holding separate drills with their partner countries with twin objectives – to deter any unilateral actions by any single power and be ready to meet any contingency. 

In the latest initiative on this, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) warship transited for the first time the Taiwan Strait and then joined naval and air forces from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and the US for joint military exercises in the disputed South China Sea. In view of the ramped-up tensions in the area, the joint show of force came in response to Chinese military’s Southern Theatre Command’s claim that it had organised its air and sea forces to carry out drills and patrols of the sea and airspace around the flash point Scarborough Shoal in the strategic waterway. 

According to the US Indo-Pacific Command, the drills by the US and its partners in the Asia Pacific – the fourth iteration of the Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity or what commonly known as joint military exercises – were held within an unidentified area of the Philippines’ EEZ in the strategic waterway.           

The exercises involving the armed forces of five countries – the US, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, and first time New Zealand – in Manila’s EEZ aimed to improve the militaries’ interoperability. The exercise involved a Philippine warship, the US’ USS Howard, Japan’s JS Sazanami, and New Zealand’s HMNZS Aotearoa. The drills demonstrated the “collective commitment to strengthen regional and international cooperation in support of a peaceful, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific”. 

As mentioned, the drills came after a series of air and sea encounters between the Philippines and China and both at confrontational mode over the control of the strategic and one of Asia’s most contested Scarborough Shoal that has been occupied by China’s coast guard for more than a decade.      

When the naval vessels from New Zealand and Australia sailed through the Taiwan Strait, part of the South China Sea, China was quick to protest, saying it alone exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction over the strait and that the “democratically governed Taiwan” has no right to claim to be independent as it is an integral part of China. That is a separate issue to be discussed separately. The moot point is that both the US and Taiwan say the strait is a major trade route through which about half of global container ships pass is an international waterway. This is at the core of the conflict between the China and the US and other partner countries. 

As a major resource exporting nation, Australia too is concerned and has consistently pressured China on peace and stability in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait to secure its maritime interests and protect from major disruptions, which is why its Foreign Minister Penny Wong in a speech to the UN General Assembly commended the resumption of leader and military level dialogue between the US and China. Regretfully, China exposed its insincerity by deploying its air and naval forces to conduct manoeuvres in a disputed area of the sea hours after the top diplomats of the two countries – Foreign Minister Wang Yi and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken - were discussing ways of reducing regional tensions and avoid conflict in the South China Sea. For record, China claims nearly all of the South China Sea, despite overlapping maritime claims by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, angering its neighbours.

The Southern Theatre Command of the People’s Liberation Army claimed that the drills included “routine” early warning and reconnaissance exercises as well as patrols around Scarborough Shoal. It further claimed that the theatre troops maintain a high degree of vigilance, resolutely defending national sovereignty, security and maritime rights and interests, and firm in maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea. As one of Asia’s most contested features, the Scarborough Shoal is just 200 km (124 miles) off the Philippines, within its exclusive economic zone.

China did not honour the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, which ruled that China’s sweeping claims were not supported by international law. Instead it continued its aggrandizement activities and by disrespecting other countries’ sovereignty and national interests. China’s claims to almost the entire South China Sea includes the atoll, covered for its bountiful fish stocks and stunning turquoise lagoon, despite overlapping claims in the busy waterway by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The tribunal did not determine sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal but said it was a traditional fishing ground for several countries. 

It may be recalled that in March 2024 Blinken has assured the Philippines its defence partnership with the US was “ironclad” after Manila accused Beijing of aggressive deployments in the South China Sea of its coast guard and fishing vessels suspected of being maritime militia. Though Blinken raised the issue of China’s dangerous and destabilising actions in the South China Sea, Wang Yi stuck to his argument that Beijing would prefer resolving differences with countries directly through dialogue and consultation and exhorted the US not to always stir up trouble in the South China Sea and undermine efforts of regional countries to maintain peace and stability.  

Though the US lays no claim to the sea passageway but U.S. Navy ships and fighter jets have carried out patrols for decades to challenge China’s expansive claims and promote freedom of navigation and overflight. The US is obligated to defend the Philippines under a 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty if Filipino forces, ships and aircraft come under attack, including in the South China Sea. Thus, there seems to be no easy solution to the South China Sea issue.

Japan's upcoming general election on October 27, 2024, represents a critical juncture for both the nation and its ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), now led by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.

This election occurred at a moment of significant challenges for Japan, which include an ageing and stagnating population, issues of economic growth, and escalating geopolitical tensions in East Asia. For the LDP, which has maintained a dominant position in Japanese politics for decades, this election serves not only as a referendum on its governing efficacy but also as an opportunity to reaffirm its relevance amid increasing public scepticism. 

Simultaneously, opposition parties such as the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and Nippon Ishin no Kai (Innovation Japan Party) are positioning themselves as credible alternatives, providing voters with new perspectives on the future of Japan. The outcome of this election will not only influence the country's domestic policies but may also indicate a shift in Japan's international role and political trajectory.

Historically, the LDP has been the foundation of Japanese politics, having governed almost continuously since its establishment in 1955. Its maintenance of power can be attributed to a combination of economic growth during the post-war era, strong leadership, and fragmented opposition. However, the political landscape in Japan is transforming. Voter dissatisfaction is growing, particularly concerning the LDP’s management of crucial issues such as Japan’s ageing society, a stagnant economy, and the evolving security dynamics in East Asia.

The nation faces a demographic crisis characterized by an ageing population and a declining birth rate, which poses significant threats to future economic growth and exerts immense pressure on the social security system. Although the LDP has implemented policies aimed at addressing these challenges—such as promoting female workforce participation and fostering technological innovation—progress has been incremental. A substantial portion of the electorate perceives the LDP’s strategies as inadequate, thereby providing the opposition with an opportunity to present alternative solutions.

Furthermore, Japan continues to struggle with a sluggish recovery following years of deflation and limited economic growth. While inflation remains modest by global standards, it has eroded purchasing power, and wage stagnation persists as a critical issue. The LDP’s economic policies, including "Abenomics" under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, sought to stimulate growth through monetary easing and structural reforms. Nevertheless, many citizens believe these initiatives have not met their expectations, and discontent regarding economic inequality and scant job opportunities continues to grow.

Opposition parties are seeking to capitalize on this dissatisfaction. The Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), Japan's principal opposition party, has positioned itself as a progressive alternative, advocating for more robust social welfare policies and a heightened focus on mitigating income inequality. The CDP seeks to engage younger voters and those grappling with the economic challenges characteristic of contemporary Japan. Another critical aspect influencing the upcoming election is Japan’s role in regional security, particularly regarding its relations with China and North Korea.

Amidst rising geopolitical tensions—especially concerning China's military assertiveness and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions—Japan's foreign policy and defence expenditures are subjected to intense scrutiny. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has a longstanding tradition of aligning with a strong pro-U.S. stance, endorsing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, and advocating for an enhancement of Japan’s defence capabilities. Nevertheless, a segment of the electorate is increasingly apprehensive about the potential risks associated with escalating regional tensions. 

Nippon Ishin no Kai, which has gained prominence as a reformist right-leaning party, advocates for more radical alterations to Japan's defence policy. The party calls for increased decentralization of government and critiques what it deems the LDP's antiquated approach to governance. By emphasizing political reform and economic revitalization, Nippon Ishin no Kai aims to garner support from voters dissatisfied with the status quo.

Public sentiment leading up to the 2024 election suggests that the LDP confronts its most significant challenge in years. Opinion polls indicate that while the LDP retains popularity among older conservative voters, younger generations are increasingly disenchanted with the party's perceived failure to address their concerns. This generational divide offers an opportunity for opposition parties such as the CDP, which has been advocating for a more inclusive and equitable vision for Japan’s future. Furthermore, Nippon Ishin no Kai's emphasis on political reform and anti-corruption initiatives has resonated with individuals seeking structural changes in Japan's governance.

Although the opposition remains fragmented, a strong electoral performance by either the CDP or Nippon Ishin no Kai could jeopardize the LDP’s ability to retain its majority. The prospect of a coalition government, should the LDP fall short of a majority, could significantly reshape Japanese politics in ways not observed since the brief tenure of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) from 2009 to 2012. While the LDP has demonstrated resilience in the face of previous challenges, the 2024 election presents a distinct test of its capacity to adapt to an evolving political landscape.

The future success of the LDP will hinge on its ability to address not only the immediate concerns of voters but also to articulate a compelling long-term vision for Japan. However, the emergence of opposition parties such as the CDP and Nippon Ishin no Kai indicates that the electorate is becoming increasingly receptive to alternative political options. Whether the LDP can maintain its dominant position or whether a new political force will arise to lead Japan remains to be determined. Should the opposition succeed in coalescing around shared objectives and presenting a unified front, Japan may be on the cusp of a political transformation that could alter both domestic policy and the nation's role on the global stage. 

In conclusion, the forthcoming election represents a pivotal opportunity for both the LDP and opposition parties to recalibrate their strategies and address the evolving needs of the electorate. The LDP must articulate clear and actionable policies regarding economic reform, demographic challenges, and national security to sustain public confidence. Conversely, opposition parties such as the CDP and Nippon Ishin no Kai must unify their platforms and offer coherent, viable alternatives to effectively challenge the LDP's preeminence. Regardless of the electoral outcome, it is imperative that Japan's next government prioritizes inclusive economic policies that address inequality, implements ambitious reforms to tackle the demographic crisis, and navigates geopolitical tensions with an emphasis on diplomacy and security. This election will serve as a seminal moment in determining whether Japan will continue along its current political trajectory or embark on a new path characterized by innovative leadership and fresh ideas.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own.

References

1. Curtis, Gerald L. The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change. Columbia University Press, 1999.
2. Pempel, T.J. Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy. Cornell University Press, 1998.
3. Stockwin, J.A.A. Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Resurgent Economy. Wiley-Blackwell, 2008.
4. Schoppa, Leonard J. Race for the Exits: The Unraveling of Japan's System of Social Protection. Cornell University Press, 2006.
5. Kingston, Jeff. Contemporary Japan: History, Politics, and Social Change Since the 1980s. Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

In a significant move aimed at addressing the country's ongoing energy crisis, the Bangladesh government has approved the import of two cargoes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Gunvor Singapore Private Limited, a prominent energy trading company. This decision, expected to cost around Tk12.89 billion, is part of broader efforts to maintain a steady gas supply and support uninterrupted business activities in the country.

The decision was made during the sixth meeting of the Advisory Committee on Government Procurement, held at the Cabinet Division's conference room. The meeting was chaired by Finance Adviser Dr. Salehuddin Ahmed on Wednesday. In addition to the LNG import, the meeting discussed and approved six other proposals aimed at strengthening the country's procurement strategies.

Efforts to Combat Energy Shortages

Speaking to reporters after the meeting, Dr. Salehuddin stressed the importance of these decisions in mitigating the country's energy challenges. "Today's meeting discussed and approved seven proposals, including the LNG import. We are making efforts to address the country's energy crisis and ensure the continuation of business activities," he said.

This import is crucial as Bangladesh has been facing a significant energy shortage, which has been exacerbated by increased demand for electricity and gas in recent years. Energy is critical to the nation's growing industrial sector and the government's development agenda, which places high priority on securing a reliable energy supply to maintain economic momentum.

LNG Purchase from the Spot Market

The approved LNG imports will be sourced from the spot market, in line with the Public Procurement Rules 2008. The spot market allows countries to purchase commodities like LNG at current market prices rather than through long-term contracts. This flexibility is especially useful for countries like Bangladesh, which needs to meet fluctuating energy demands quickly.

The Department of Energy and Mineral Resources submitted the proposal for the purchase of the 26th cargo of 2024, which amounts to 3,360,000 MMBtu (million British thermal units) of LNG. This cargo will be purchased at a cost of Tk6.4 billion from Gunvor Singapore Private Limited, with a price of $13.57 per MMBtu.

The procurement process involved a competitive bidding process where four companies submitted bids. Gunvor Singapore Private Limited emerged as the lowest bidder, which led the Proposal Evaluation Committee (PEC) to recommend purchasing the LNG from them. This method ensures transparency and cost-effectiveness in the government's procurement process.

Another LNG Cargo Approved

In addition to the first cargo, the committee also approved the import of a second LNG cargo, which will be the 27th cargo of 2024. This shipment, also from Gunvor Singapore Private Limited, is expected to cost Tk6.49 billion, with a price per MMBtu set at $13.77. For this procurement, three companies submitted bids, all of which were deemed technically and financially responsive. Once again, Gunvor Singapore Private Limited offered the most competitive price, leading the PEC to recommend the purchase.

With both purchases approved, the total LNG import will amount to 6,720,000 MMBtu of LNG, a significant step toward ensuring the stability of Bangladesh's energy supply.

Addressing the Broader Energy Crisis

Bangladesh has been grappling with energy supply issues for years, and the situation has worsened recently due to global energy price fluctuations and growing demand in the domestic market. As one of the world's fastest-growing economies, Bangladesh's energy needs are expected to continue rising, driven by industrialization and infrastructure development.

LNG has become a critical part of Bangladesh's energy strategy, as the country looks to diversify its energy sources to meet demand. The government has been working to increase LNG imports to offset declining natural gas production from domestic fields. By securing competitive prices through spot market purchases, the government aims to manage the financial impact of these imports while meeting the energy needs of the country.

Despite the high cost of LNG imports, the government views these purchases as necessary to prevent power outages, which could hamper industrial activities and economic growth. Maintaining a steady energy supply is crucial for sectors like manufacturing, textiles, and agriculture, which are vital to Bangladesh's economy.

Government's Commitment to Energy Solutions

The approval of these two LNG cargoes reflects the government's broader commitment to addressing the energy crisis and ensuring economic stability. By focusing on efficient procurement strategies, including using the spot market for energy imports, the government is attempting to balance immediate energy needs with financial prudence.
The meeting's approval of seven procurement proposals demonstrates the government's proactive approach to tackling supply chain issues across various sectors, particularly energy. These steps are part of a larger framework designed to modernize Bangladesh's infrastructure and energy grid while ensuring that industrial and economic activities can continue without disruption.

As Bangladesh continues to grow, ensuring a stable and affordable energy supply will remain a top priority for the government. These LNG imports from Singapore represent a critical component of the country's energy strategy, aiming to ease pressure on domestic gas production and stabilize the country's overall energy supply in the short term.

In a stunning upset in the biggest political contest in Japan, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) picked its new president on 27 September, who automatically became the country’s next prime minister. With the party’s rating sagging, the LDP picked a perennial and consummate outsider and by extension the next prime minister, the former defence minister Shigeru Ishiba, who truly represented a different direction for the party and a dissident who spent his career refusing to acquiesce to orthodoxy of the party. 

There were a record nine contenders in the race in the LDP presidential bid. The prominent hopefuls were Sanae Takaichi and the dashing Shinjiro Koizumi, the 43-year-old son of a previous equally dashing Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Had the party chosen its first woman leader, Takaichi would have been a case for continuity with the policies of the late Abe Shinzo, who was credited with getting Japan out of its lost decades of economic malaise. 

It was Ishiba’s fifth presidential bid. He had served as the party's secretary general, won 215 of the 409 valid votes cast by LDP lawmakers and rank-and-file members, while Takaichi secured 194, in a closely competitive race with a record nine contenders. Japanese politics may see a churn under Ishiba’s tenure as he is seen as an anti-Abe for years and might reverse some of Abe’s policies which Kishida too continued.  

So, what could be Ishiba’s foreign policy priorities and focus? Favouring a utilitarian diplomacy, Ishiba would opt for a softer policy towards China. As regards US-China rivalry, he is unlikely to blindly side with the US but would choose a neutral position between Washington and Beijing. Such a stance could displease the US President Joe Biden as he invests much on the alliance relationship to contain Mainland China. Ishiba is likely to pursue a policy of accommodating China to reduce hostility and aim a larger regional goal.    

Since Ishiba is unlikely endorse Abenomics, it would be interesting to watch what approach he chooses to deal with the country’s economy. Sometimes his comments are seen to be contradictory. The opposition would not hesitate to pounce upon if Ishiba makes any error. For this to be effective, the opposition needs to put its acts together to confront the LDP, which has ruled Japan almost uninterruptedly since the end of World War II but has been losing much of its credibility with the public. Since outgoing Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s public approval rating had plummeted drastically, he was forced to step down and withdrew from the LDP presidential leadership race. That situation led to the radical choice of Ishiba as his successor.    

The 67-year-old Ishiba is well-versed in defense, agriculture and regional revitalization, was named prime minister in parliament on 1 October, replacing Kishida.  Both the ruling and opposition lawmakers are bracing for the possibility of a general election before the end of 2024. Ishiba has hinted 27 October as the date when a snap poll shall take place. After winning the leadership race, he urged the LDP members to unite, noting that the party hit by a political funds scandal, faces strong headwinds. Cleaning the system and regain public’s trust would be of his immediate priority. 

Ishiba's leadership skills will be put to test as economic growth remains shaky against a backdrop of rising costs affecting households, while provocative actions by China, North Korea and Russia continue to pose security threats to Japan. After Ishiba was elected, China called on Japan to adopt a “positive and rational” policy stance, while South Korea expressed hope to maintain close communication and continue improving ties with Tokyo, building on the momentum established under Kishida.  

Ishiba envisions the creation of an Asian version of the NATO collective security framework in the region, where tensions remain high between China and Taiwan, drawing a parallel to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. While he emphasizes the need for the Japan-US bilateral alliance to be solid, he has also said that as premier, he would seek to review the agreement defining the status of US forces stationed in Japan.

As a former defence minister, Ishiba is known for his interest in warships and fighter planes. He has indicated that he wants a more equal relationship with his country’s only formal treaty ally, the US, which could cause friction. However, his vision for an Asian equivalent of NATO is seen by many as unworkable. It remains to be seen whether his individualistic streak can restore faith in the LDP. 

Washington has rejected Ishiba’s vision of an Asian NATO as it thinks it is too hasty. Though his idea about collective defence in the region sounds noteworthy but it remains unclear how he wants to accomplish it. Since most of the US troops in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa, Ishiba would seek greater oversight of the bases used by the US. He also wants Washington to give Japan a say how it would use nuclear weapons in Asia.  

Ishiba’s push to boost the military and call for the creation of an Asian NATO could rile Beijing, but he is careful with his words concerning China. He argues that Japan’s military should be able to take a stronger response when territorial airspace or waters are breached. Currently a warning shot is the only option, and China is “well aware” of that.

Since the days of Abe at the helm, the issue of revising the Constitution has faced headwinds during the successive Prime Ministers. Amending the Constitution, especially war-renouncing Article 9 has remained elusive. Being aware of the virtual impossibility in a highly polarised political system, Abe introduced the right to collective self-defence, thereby diluting the spirit of Article 9 without actually amending it.

Being a former Defence Minister Ishiba knows a bit more on defence and security matters. He wants to revise the war-renouncing Constitution to specifically mention the country's Self-Defense Forces, which aligns with the LDP's long-held goal of ending the domestic debate over the constitutionality of the armed organization. If he tries too much in resetting the alliance relationship with the US, Ishiba could navigate through difficult terrain. Since the US is also going to have a new President, Ishiba cannot afford for a dramatic overhaul in Japan’s ties with the US. If he dares to do so, China, Russia and North Korea would surely take advantage to make Japan’s position more vulnerable.    

As regards the domestic front, steering the economy would be a challenge. There remains uncertainty. Initially the yen traded wildly before it finally sharply rose against the dollar, jumping to 142 to a dollar on Ishiba’s election win. This was because Ishiba’s nearest political rival, the economic security minister Sanae Takaichi advocated monetary easing, while Ishiba floated the idea of imposing a higher tax on financial income and supports the normalisation of Japan’s monetary policy. In contrast, Takaichi had expressed her intent to continue promoting “Abenomics”, a hallmark program of Abe intended to stimulate the economy. 

Abenomics is associated with bold monetary easing, intended to depreciate yen and higher stock prices. But the yen strengthened with Ishiba’s win for his advocacy to strengthen the country’s financial income taxation. Ishiba expects the monetary policy will be normalised at a pace that does not disrupt the economy and people’s livelihood, while respecting the Bank of Japan’s independence. As the Nikkei stock futures dropped by around 1,500 points on Ishiba’s win, investors see an ‘Ishiba shock’ that could trigger a market plunge. Takaichi was seen as dovish on economic matters who believed that the Bank of Japan should be cautious in raising interest rates.

While uncertainty remained over how Ishiba will steer the economy, and with news of his victory sending the Japanese yen sharply higher against the dollar, he has taken a positive stance on allowing married couples to use different surnames, a contentious issue that has met resistance from conservative members like Takaichi, who value traditional family structures. Backed by conservatives aligned with the late premier Shinzo Abe, known for his hawkish views, Takaichi, 63, aspired to become Japan's first-ever female prime minister in a country known for its failure to promote gender diversity. As it transpired, that aspiration must remain for a future date to be fulfilled. 

Had Takaichi been the winner, she would have clashed with the Bank of Japan over monetary policy, push for more fiscal stimulus and potentially damage relations with Japan’s neighbours by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial for the nation’s war dead seen by Japan’s neighbours as a symbol of past militarism. 

As a senior member of the ruling LDP and an intellectual heavyweight on foreign policy and national security, Ishiba’s foreign policy strategy could be two-fold. One the one hand, he might seek a more independent foreign policy posture vis-a-vis Japan’s relations with the US, he would be averse to adopt a policy of confrontation towards Japan’s neighbours by preferring a more accommodative approach. In his memoir, Ishiba wrote “Japan is still not a truly independent country” because of the “asymmetry” of its dependence on the US. If he sticks to this position, it could complicate relations with Washington.  

As regards his policies on other issues, Ishiba is against the increased use of nuclear energy. Being a Christian, he supports some socially progressive policies like changing the law to allow married couples to use separate surnames, a move opposed by the party’s more conservative LDP lawmakers.  Being a former agriculture minister, he promised to move some ministries and government agencies out of Tokyo to help revive Japan’s moribund regions. He has also proposed establishing an agency to oversee the construction of emergency shelters across disaster-prone Japan.

For some time he had quit the LDP being unsatisfied with some of the policies. He remained an outspoken critic of LDP’s policies under Abe and his four year defection to an opposition group in 1993 had come on the way to get 20 nominations he needed from fellow lawmakers to qualify as a candidate in the election on 27 September but somehow crossed the barrier and finally the frontier to emerge the winner. Two factors went in his favour: the sagging popularity of his predecessor and the slush funds scandal.

Among the innovative ideas that Ishiba has in mind are to create a government agency in charge of disaster prevention in the earthquake-prone country that is also frequently hit by typhoons and heavy rain, and revitalisation of rural regions.     

Where does India factor in Ishiba’s foreign and defence policy calculations? Keeping his focus on national defence, Ishiba is expected to prioritise strengthening Japan’s military capabilities and fostering deeper international partnerships, particularly with India, with whom Japan shares significant strategic interests. Ishiba assumes office at a critical juncture as Japan grapples with increasing geopolitical challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly from China. However, Ishiba’s experience as defence minister might motivate him to adopt a more hawkish stance on security, further solidifying Japan’s military posture. This potential transition raises important questions about the continuity and evolution of Japan’s strategic objectives and their implications for foreign policy, especially regarding its partnership with India. This being said, India would not endorse Ishiba’s Asian NATO idea since India in principle is against alliance relationship with another country. That would also test Ishiba’s foreign policy on how he deals with India, an important partner and member of the Quad.    

By Iku Tsujihiro and Riley Walters

This past week, Representative Shigeru Ishiba was elected as the next leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan’s largest political party. The LDP, with its coalition partners from the Komei Party (Komeito), holds a majority in both houses of Japan’s National Diet. Therefore, Ishiba will almost certainly become the prime minister of Japan on October 1.

After receiving the second most votes in the first round of voting among LDP members, Ishiba collected 215 votes in a runoff, 21 more than his opponent, Representative Sanae Takaichi.

If all goes as expected over the next week, Ishiba and the LDP will finish establishing a new leadership team. He will also establish his first cabinet, including ministers of foreign affairs, finance, and defense. Ishiba previously served as Japan’s minister of defense from 2007–2008.

Ishiba stated in his acceptance speech that he would assign the eight candidates who ran against him to key posts within the LDP or to cabinet positions.

Though not required to do so, Ishiba may soon take advantage of the LDP’s public support and call for an early general election in hopes that the LDP and Komeito can keep their majority in Japan’s lower house, the House of Representatives.

Ishiba’s Domestic and Foreign Policies

Ishiba has highlighted several key domestic and foreign issues that his administration would focus on.

Domestically, Ishiba sees overcoming deflation as Japan’s top priority. He wants to make wage growth outpace price growth, provide additional support for low-income individuals, and raise taxes on corporations. He plans to encourage companies to expand into underdeveloped regions and create jobs outside of Tokyo. He also believes in promoting geothermal and small-scale hydroelectric power generation to maximize energy conservation and availability.

On national security, one pillar of Ishiba’s platform is a new national security law that may increase the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ political importance. He also supports the creation of an Asian alliance similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United States has security treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and others in Asia. But these are bilateral agreements with the US, rather than agreements among Asian countries. He would also consider nuclear weapons sharing across this Asian NATO.

Finally, on foreign policy, Ishiba sees the US-Japan alliance as lopsided and wants Tokyo to be an “equal partner” to Washington. For example, he has suggested an agreement to allow the Japan Self-Defense Forces to station units in Guam in the same way that US forces have bases in Japan. Ishida would also like to bolster Japan’s strategic relationships with countries like the Philippines, India, France, and the United Kingdom. Finally, he envisions the continued strengthening of Japan’s multilateral and trilateral relationships, such as the QUAD (among the US, Japan, India, and Australia) or the US–Japan–South Korea relationship.

Ishiba has said that Ukraine today is Asia tomorrow, emphasizing that the threat Russia poses to Ukraine is similar to the threat the People’s Republic of China presents to Taiwan. Ishiba visited Taiwan in August and met with President William Lai.

Ishiba recently shared these and other thoughts on the future of Japan’s national security and foreign policy exclusively with Hudson in a memo titled “Japan’s New Security Era: The Future of Japan’s Foreign Policy.”

Looking Ahead

Ishiba’s move to the prime minister’s office comes at a turbulent time for Japan’s national security. Since Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced he was stepping down, the PRC has escalated its already aggressive behavior toward Japan.

In late August, Chinese military aircraft violated Japanese airspace, and on September 18, a People’s Liberation Army aircraft carrier entered Japan’s contiguous waters. Russian and Chinese naval vessels have also been performing joint operations around Japan. Japan’s Ministry of Defenserecently stated that the country faces the most severe and complex security environment since World War II.

Ishiba will not only inherit the challenges Prime Minister Kishida dealt with—the PRC and Russia—but also continue Japan’s efforts to modernize its military and integrate further with US forces in Japan. And after November, Ishiba will need to prepare to work closely with whichever administration will move into the White House in 2025.

This article references comments Ishiba made before he was elected prime minister. These views are his personal opinion.

About the authors:

• Iku Tsujihiro is a Research Associate at the Hudson Institute
• Riley Walters is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute

Source: This article was published by the Hudson Institute

ECOWAS should use its special summit on regional integration in 2025 to reconsider its approach to managing coups.

By Aïssatou Kanté 

Recurrent coups since 2020 and the decision by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reveal the region’s deep governance and democracy challenges.

ECOWAS’ struggle to address these crises, along with perceptions of double standards in its handling of military coups vs. ‘constitutional’ coups perpetrated by elected governments, has damaged the organisation’s image in West Africa.

The decision by ECOWAS heads of state to hold a Special Summit on the Future of Regional Integration in West Africa in 2025 presents an opportunity to resolve these issues. The summit will be inclusive and consultative and aims to strengthen ECOWAS, making it more efficient and reactive. West African leaders also called for a strategic review, including of ‘the relationships between electoral processes, democracy and development.’

The summit should, however, specifically reflect on how to better respond to coups, manage military transitions, and strengthen democratic governance. This includes the recurrence of coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Niger and the prolonged nature of their transitions back to civilian rule. The ability of military leaders to resist pressure from ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), United Nations and bilateral actors should also be on the agenda.

Security cooperation in West Africa is becoming fragmented at a time when violent extremism is rising

Africa is currently facing a broad crisis of multilateralism. In this context, ECOWAS’ strategic review should first consider the regional features that led to the recent coups and challenged its ability to effectively respond and support transitions. Three features in West Africa stand out.

The first is that the popular support initially shown to the putschists was less about giving them carte blanche than an expression of public dissatisfaction with the performance of the overthrown regimes.

The second is the lack of effective responses from ECOWAS and the AU to terrorism since 2012, particularly in the Sahel, and to governance crises stemming from constitutional amendments and controversial third terms. This situation limits both organisations’ ability to play a decisive role in current and future crises.

The third is Western partners’ diminishing influence amid heightened geopolitical competition with Russia. Combined with the sovereigntist stance of military regimes, external actors have little room for manoeuvre in the region. Paradoxically, this has caused the fragmentation of political and security cooperation in West Africa at a time when violent extremism is rising in the Sahel and spreading to Gulf of Guinea countries.

It is crucial for ECOWAS to make its Supplementary Act on sanctions clearer and more predictable

New Institute for Security Studies research shows that given the consolidation of current military regimes and the failure of regional and continental coup management approaches, pragmatism is needed to stabilise affected countries. This includes improving specific ECOWAS regulations and institutional practices.

ECOWAS will need to refine its tools and procedures when dealing with coups based on its experiences in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger. Following the Niger overthrow in July 2023 in particular, the regional body applied an unprecedented array of political, economic and financial sanctions and threatened to intervene militarily.

None of these measures worked – instead, they consolidated popular support for the military. The creation of the Alliance of Sahel States and the announcement of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger’s withdrawal has fragmented ECOWAS and severely limited its deterrent capability.

To build support, it is crucial for ECOWAS to make its Supplementary Act on sanctions clearer and more predictable. Well-defined procedures on the use of force are also needed, along with strategies for carrying out military action while maintaining its strategic and financial autonomy.

More broadly, ECOWAS heads of state should restart efforts to revise the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. These were initiated in 2015 after the overthrow of Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré and again in 2021 after the succession of recent coups began. Member states proposed ways to strengthen democracy and governance, including giving ECOWAS additional means to act against the manipulation of constitutions, and establishing a standard on term limits for presidents.

ECOWAS is widely perceived as more concerned with the interests of leaders than the region’s people

The timing of the proposals indicates ECOWAS’ tendency to react rather than prevent crises. The lack of progress suggests that heads of state are more concerned with protecting their power than meeting popular demands for better governance oversight. This largely explains West Africans’ disillusionment with ECOWAS, which is widely perceived as a ‘union of heads of state’ more concerned with the interests of leaders than the region’s people.

The political stakes of ECOWAS reform are high. The commitment of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to the goal of promoting and protecting democratic governance is crucial. But these are the very states whose positions have undermined ECOWAS.

Ahead of its 50th anniversary in 2025, ECOWAS remains a key player in regional integration and security cooperation. Becoming more efficient and reforming its ability to manage coups will improve the organisation’s image in the eyes of West African citizens. Above all, it will help to stabilise a region facing major political and security problems.

• About the author: Aïssatou Kanté, Researcher, Littoral West African States, ISS Regional office for West Africa and the Sahel
• Source: This article was published at ISS Today

By Gretchen Baldwin and Marta Bertea

This month marks 24 years since the adoption of the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), which was the first stand-alone resolution on mainstreaming gender into peace and security architecture at the multilateral level. Resolution 1325 and nine subsequent resolutions now constitute the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. The anniversary is an opportunity to reflect on the relevance of the WPS agenda today, understand the obstacles its advocates face, and evaluate progress and gaps in its implementation.

Implementation of the WPS agenda has ranged from efforts at the grassroots level towards social cohesion, gender equality and human security to trying to increase women’s participation (or at least representation) in security institutions and peace processes. Two fundamental questions persist in discussions of the WPS agenda’s future. First, should the focus be on expanding the agenda (most often understood as a new Security Council resolution) or strengthening implementation of the existing WPS-related resolutions? Second, how can the drift towards securitization and militarization in implementing the agenda be corrected?

Origins of the WPS agenda

Resolution 1325, championed by diverse coalitions of civil society organizations, was a turning point at the international level for gender equality advocates. For the first time, a multilateral institution had formally recognized the role of gender in shaping the experiences of people in conflict settings and within peace processes. The resolution called for action around four pillars: participation of women at all levels of decision making related to peace and security; protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence; prevention of violence against women; and application of a gender lens to international crisis relief and recovery. The agenda has a transformative core, rooted in the concept of feminist peace and a desire to reshape the traditional security architecture which, paradoxically, the Security Council embodies

Between 2008 and 2019, the Security Council adopted another nine resolutions on WPS. As of May 2024, 56 per cent of UN member states have adopted at least one national action plan for implementing the WPS agenda, several regional organizations have taken a similar approach, and some municipal and district governments have adopted local action plans. However, a persistent lack of accountability and resourcing, along with other systemic challenges—such as shrinking civic space, militarization and embedded patriarchal norms—have significantly hampered progress.

Over the past two decades, mainstream discourse about the agenda’s implementation has skewed towards security rather than peace. Many argue that the agenda has become securitized, while meaningful consultations with women’s civil society, women’s participation at the onset of peace negotiations or mediation efforts, or addressing gendered root causes and drivers of conflict (such as nationalistic conceits of men as heroic protectors) are consistently overlooked in practice.

Moving forward: New WPS resolutions or stronger implementation?

A key question in the coming years is how best to move a holistic WPS agenda forward. Advocates have long pushed for the Security Council to ensure that any new WPS resolutions strengthen the agenda rather than simply rehashing existing language. Following this logic, Swedish non-governmental organization Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation gathered the perspectives of women involved in building and sustaining peace on the current state of the WPS agenda.

The study, released around the agenda’s 20th anniversary in 2020, prompted the drafting of a shadow resolution on women’s economic rights, leadership and participation. While such civil society advocacy did not result in a new WPS resolution in 2020, a rather unusual peacekeeping resolution on women’s participation in peace operations—Security Council Resolution 2538—was adopted that year. Indonesia’s decision to frame Resolution 2538 as a peacekeeping resolution rather than a WPS resolution was likely strategic given the difficult passage of the previous two WPS resolutions, but it is nevertheless complementary to the WPS agenda. A few months after Resolution 2538 was co-sponsored by all 15 Security Council members, Russia proposed a highly controversial new WPS resolution, which was not adopted.

Although next year’s 25th anniversary of Resolution 1325 will draw significant attention to the WPS agenda, the prospects of a new WPS resolution, especially one that moves the agenda forward, seem remote. Indeed, while gender has always been a topic of ideological contestation, the processes leading up to the adoption in 2019 of Security Council resolutions 2467 and 2493 saw vetoes being threatenedover language about sexual and reproductive health that had been accepted in the preceding eight resolutions. Disagreement over progressive language on gender is common in debate on Security Council resolutions, but the outright contestation of previously agreed language marked a significant shift. Given the increasing backlash against women’s rights and so-called gender ideology (a term used by conservative movements for anything promoting non-normative gender roles, sexual and reproductive rights, or LGBTQ+ inclusion) as well as continued polarization in the Security Council, advocates for progress on the WPS agenda are understandably reluctant to subject new texts to debate.

Therefore, an alternative way to keep up the momentum on WPS is to strengthen the implementation of the existing WPS resolutions and resist securitization of the agenda. Civil society has long advocated for strengthening implementation, noting that it must be holistic, recognizing that the agenda’s four pillars are interconnected and that, as such, neglecting one will end up hindering the agenda as a whole.

Redirecting WPS implementation away from securitization

An increasingly common critique of the securitized approach to WPS implementation is that, rather than trying to disrupt the structural conditions that lead to violent conflict, it only addresses the after-effects, such as by supporting survivors of conflict-related sexual violence. There has been very little progress on the consistent inclusion of women in peace negotiations or mediation. 

Consultations with women’s groups and other diverse civil society representation at the start of Security Council policy processes are rare. And, in recent years, strengthening implementation of the WPS agenda has often been interpreted narrowly as achieving gender parity in security institutions. While the ‘participation’ pillar is an integral component of the WPS agenda, a securitized approach often means integrating women into militarized structures antithetical to the transformative roots of the agenda, and deprioritizing the other pillars. The success of Resolution 2538 and its overwhelming popularity, compared with the near-impossibility of negotiating new WPS resolutions in the past five or so years, illustrates a significant imbalance between security-focused and peace-focused interventions.

This is borne out by statistics. For instance, SIPRI data shows that the share of women uniformed personnel deployed in UN and European Union peace operations has been steadily increasing since 2018, when the UN introduced its uniformed gender parity strategy. However, women’s representation in active peace processes led or co-led by the UN dropped from 23 per cent to 16 per cent between 2020 and 2022, according to the 2023 Report of the Secretary General on WPS.

Implementation of other WPS pillars is also lagging. For example, a report compiled by the UN Development Programme in 2017 found that in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste post-conflict reconstruction initiatives failed to significantly address women’s needs, advance gender equality or mainstream gender into mechanisms for mobilizing and allocating resources. The study highlighted the lack of UN-wide standard procedures and criteria to integrate gender into UN-managed post-conflict processes. Demilitarization strategies are also often missing from national action plans and other implementation tools. Instead, the benefits of increasing women’s participation in uniformed services are emphasized with arguments often relying on harmful gender stereotypes.

Ways forward

The 2024 and 2025 anniversaries of Resolution 1325 present important opportunities to reflect on and revive the transformative potential of the WPS agenda. Given continued tensions in the Security Council and steadily growing resistance against gender and women’s rights norms, genuine progress through new resolutions is unlikely. Instead, the more productive path seems to be full—and accelerated, per the recently adopted Pact for the Future—implementation of all four pillars of the agenda, doubling down against essentialist or stereotyping language about both men and women, supporting localization of WPS to address community-level security concerns and advocating for desecuritization across all aspects of the agenda. The ‘add women and stir’ mentality has plagued the WPS agenda since its early days but, with continued advocacy and creativity, securitized approaches can shift back towards using gender as a tool to upend inequality with the clear aim of fostering positive, sustainable peace.

About the authors:

• Gretchen Baldwin is a Researcher in the SIPRI Peace Operations and Conflict Management Programme.
• Marta Bertea was an intern in the SIPRI Events Team, supporting the organization of the 2024 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development.

Source: This article was published by SIPRI

By Camille Grand

On 1 October 2024, Mark Rutte became the new NATO secretary. The former Dutch prime minister succeeds the former Norwegian prime minister, Jens Stoltenberg, who over his ten-year tenure oversawimpactful transformation – but faced the issue of growing tensions between NATO members.

Rutte’s appointment takes place at a critical time for global diplomacy and security. But he is an experienced and qualified political leader, serving as Dutch prime minister from 2010 to 2024, including in leading a complex coalition government; is an influential figure at the European Council; and recently presided over the Netherlands joining the NATO ‘two per cent club’. Most allies easily endorsed Rutte, despite some hoping for the first female secretary general and more national diversity – issues he can at least partially address when choosing his deputy. But strong support for Rutte from the United States and the larger European nations enabled rapid consensus on the leadership to emerge.

Now comes the hard part. Given the uncertainty regarding America’s upcoming presidential election and how the conflict in Ukraine will develop, Rutte is faced with four immediate challenges:

1. Preserving alliance cohesion and support for Ukraine

The war in Ukraine will enter its fourth year in 2025 and NATO’s unified response is at risk. Dissenting voices already exist in Hungary and Slovakia; in the event of another Donald Trump presidency, the populist parties still questioning the provision of assistance to Kyiv could feel emboldened to step up their opposition. War fatigue and appetite for a compromise settlement also seem present in several Western nations.

In this context, NATO allies may not be able to guarantee long-term assistance to Ukraine. It will be an uphill battle for many pro-Ukrainian politicians in both parliament and public. Behind the NATO Vilnius Summit 2023 and NATO Washington Summit 2024 statements, Ukraine’s accession to the alliance remains a divisive issue which – like every NATO move – requires consensus.

Rutte should spare no efforts to preserve the political unity of the alliance in tackling the complex issue of NATO membership for Ukraine, which has been promised since 2008 and reaffirmed as an objective during both summits. But the accession of Ukraine continues to raise objections. For example, it is unclear if a country at war or which does not control its entire territory can even join NATO; and whether the ascension of Ukraine would be an asset or a liability for the wider alliance.

Rutte will therefore have to set a clean path fulfilling the promised accession once a ceasefire is secured. There are solid military, strategic, and political arguments for bringing Ukraine into NATO early; but it will take nerve to push this agenda forward at pace, given the reluctance of some allies, including the US, to agree to this.

2. Sustaining defence spending and military modernisation

NATO’s track record of increased defence spending is good, but brings rising tensions. Among the allies, nine are not at the agreed two per cent of their GDP; some, such as Belgium and Canada, have only vague plans to reach the ‘magic number’ in the next decade. Many more are under severe fiscal pressure and would happily lower their two per cent commitment, should the security environment improve even marginally.

At the same time, all military and defence experts insist on the importance of a sustained defence effort which should last over a decade or more. This could see defence spending significantly rise above two per cent. Rutte will be held accountable – in Europe as well as Washington, as the spending gap between European countries also widens – for keeping the pressure on all allies and ensuring that defence spending and burden-sharing move in the right direction.

Such pressure is necessary to meet the ambitious military and capability targets, including in defence and manpower, needed to fix existing gaps. These are defined under the demanding NATO defence planning process and assigned to the 32 allies. This is also no longer an optional task; the US is unlikely to cover Europe’s military shortfalls indefinitely.

3. Fixing the NATO-EU relationship

On a political front, the change of NATO and European Union leadership offers an opportunity to revisit their relationship and jointly clarify the EU’s new role in defence. Rutte is a genuine transatlanticistand more familiar with EU processes than his predecessor: but he only has a short window to advance NATO’s defence priorities as the EU develops its plans.

For over two decades, progress between NATO and the EU has been limited, although previously informal relationships have now developed to a good working level between the secretary general and the commission president. But a lack of mutual understanding, ongoing bureaucratic competition between the organisations, and the absence of clear procedures to share information persists. These should be addressed at each organisation’s highest political level, instead of the more bureaucratic traditional approach which also tends to assume that progress will be hampered by Turkish, Cypriot, or Greek opposition.

The US should also review former secretary of state Madeleine Albright’s 1998 “Three Ds” (no duplication, no discrimination, no decoupling) statement: this outdated defensive discourse fails to address the current state of play which pleads for cooperation and mutual recognition of added value.

Whether NATO likes it or not, the EU has become a defence player; rather than competing with or criticising each other, the EU and NATO should use the other’s strengths to establish how the EU can support a robust European pillar in the alliance.

4. Navigating a Trump presidency and changing US priorities

The outcome of the US election remains uncertain. Most, if not all, polls suggest a close call in America’s swing states. NATO needs to prepare for another complex journey, should Trump be elected once again: the Republican candidate has expressed his unwillingness to support “delinquent” allies and suggested he would encourage Russia to attack countries that do not “pay their bills”. He even stated that he would “encourage them [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want.”

At the very minimum, this suggests a return to Trump’s tough stance on burden-sharing and signals his poor understanding of alliances. Under the most extreme scenario, it could threaten the robustness of the 75-year-old NATO. Many on both sides of the Atlantic still hope that Trump 2.0 would be essentially a redux of Trump 1.0: a difficult, more transactional, but ultimately manageable presidency, which NATO can muddle through.

But this semi-optimistic prediction ignores some profound differences with 2016.

• First and foremost, the war in Europe makes an unpredictable US president more problematic for the alliance – a Trump victory would embolden those arguing for major policy shifts on Ukraine, including Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban.
• Although the composition of Trump’s cabinet is unknown, a major difference with his first term is that he is likely to be surrounded by individuals more aligned with his views. They are therefore likelier to transform his instincts into policy, rather than counteract them.
• Trump-leaning think tanks and high-profile cabinet candidates all share a tough approach in the burden-sharing debate and expect the Europeans to do more. While some in the Republican tribessuggest a relatively traditional “peace through strength” approach, others defend more extreme attitudes such a “dormant NATO”.
• Last but not least, the debate on Ukraine could swiftly sour if Trump attempts to force a deal on Ukraine like that suggested by JD Vance. This is an approach that most Europeans fear.

It remains to be seen how well Rutte can prepare for another Trump administration. The NATO secretary general should do his utmost to preserve a solid transatlantic link, and Rutte benefits by having some direct experience of previously dealing with Trump. The burden-sharing debate should enable the new NATO chief to engage the new US administration with convincing arguments about its recent progress – although Trump could still add new demands and raise the bar to three per cent. Rutte should also keep the European allies united in their messaging. If Trump become president, Rutte needs to prevent or mitigate the widespread temptation for NATO allies to bi-lateralise the US security relationship at the expense of a functioning alliance. Although Rutte has strong cards to play, this could easily become a pressing challenge.

Inventing NATO 3.0

Whether under a Donald Trump or Kamala Harris administration, at best the US commitment to European security will remain stable and severely constrained. The European theatre is competing for US military resources in a difficult fiscal environment; China has become the ‘pacing challenge’ for the US military and Washington is facing polarised domestic debates regardless of the election outcome.

The changing of the guard presents an opportunity for a serious transatlantic conversation on what a ‘more European’ NATO 3.0 could look like. This requires a deeper debate on the level of ambition of the European pillar of the alliance; the evolving role and scope of the US security commitment; the new role of the EU; the evaluation of NATO’s long-term role in addressing Russia and China; and the future of transatlantic relations.

Rutte will have to balance tackling urgent tasks with a bolder mid-term approach. His leadership has the potential to adapt NATO for a changing global political environment and simultaneously support the ambitious immediate military transformation of the alliance.

• About the author: Camille Grand is a Distinguished Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He leads the organisation’s work on defence and disruptive technologies in European security.
• Source: This article was published by ECFR. The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

By Kartik Bommakanti

The recent optimism about an improvement in Sino-Indian relations should not be overstated. Reports indicate that India and China have “narrowed” their differences, which in diplomatic language means “progress”. In his latest statement, External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar said 75 percent of “disengagement” problems are resolved. What this progress constitutes needs to be scrutinised.

If the record of previous negotiations and “disengagements” is any indicator of things to come, outcomes for India will remain sub-optimal. Indeed, in May this year, EAM S. Jaishankar made clear that there were pending issues such as “patrolling rights” or “patrolling abilities” and that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) must restore the status ante. What this fundamentally means is that the PRC must completely back down and withdraw all its forces to their pre-April 2020 deployments or garrisons, restore patrolling rights for both sides and honour the 1993 and 1996 agreements.

Let us consider the 1993 agreement which explicitly sets out terms on which border management on both sides will be executed. The agreement permits both sides to conduct troop patrols right up to their perception of the LAC and if they cross each other’s perception line, both sides should resolve the matter there and withdraw their forces. Where a disagreement emerges about the boundary alignment, both sides are obliged to jointly work out a resolution. Neither side can use or threaten the use of force under the 1993 agreement.

The subsequent 1996 boundary agreement between India and China has 12 articles that address each specific issue. The more salient ones require that each side’s capability not be used against the other. In the event military exercises are conducted close to the LAC with a brigade-size force on one side, the latter has to notify the other. Air intrusions across the LAC are also prohibited. No weapon can be fired or explosives used within two kilometres of the LAC. Large forces cannot be deployed close to the LAC and only light patrols are permitted, which was violated when China deployed a large number of troops with heavy equipment occupying tracts of territory on India’s side of the LAC in April-May 2020.

Restoration of the status quo: Comprehensive win for Modi government?  

Indeed, if China were to restore the status ante along the LAC by honouring the 1993 and 1996 agreements, it would mean a comprehensive win for India against the PRC, despite the bloody altercation of Galwan in June 2020 that claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers.

A restoration of the pre-April 2020 status quo would deliver a massive diplomatic and domestic win for the Modi government. Fundamentally, it would mean that India’s counter-coercion pressure against the PRC’s coercion in Eastern Ladakh along the five friction points that involved the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’ occupation of territory in the Depsang Bulge, Gogra-Hot springs, Galwan, both South and North banks of Pangong Tso and Demchok worked very effectively. The outcome would be comparable to India’s victory against Pakistan at Kargil without the combat casualties and third-party intervention.

However, what would the comprehensive restoration of the status ante mean for the PRC and its leader Chairman Xi Jinping? A climbdown of this magnitude will have repercussions. It would mean a complete loss of face for Xi and his small cohort of loyal lieutenants, potentially threatening the domestic political position of the Xi-led regime. At the very least, it is difficult to imagine his position not being weakened, leaving him considerably weakened. At a maximum, it may mean Xi’s ouster as Chairman of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and leader.

Whether such an extreme outcome is in the offing, only time will tell, because Xi Jinping may well survive this loss given his tight grip on the Chinese state occasioned by the extensive purges he has executed during his more than decade-long rule. Yet this scenario or outcome, which would be extremely magnanimous and ideal for New Delhi as it would deliver a massive victory for Prime Minister Modi, is still hypothetical. There is another possibility.

What does disengagement mean? 

The possibility of “disengagement” which is now doing the rounds might involve exactly what India and China negotiated in July 2020, August 2021, and February 2021. In early July 2020, a 1.5-kilometer buffer zone on both sides followed a mutual force pullout from Galwan. This was the first of the “disengagements”. Gogra Post-PP-17 was mutually vacated by the PLA and IA in early August 2021 creating a five km buffer zone.

A subsequent agreement involved Chinese forces pulling back from both the South and North banks of the Pangong Tso and India’s reciprocal withdrawal from Kailash Range heights which Indian forces seized in late August 2020 and helped perch them on dominating heights. With regard to Pangong Tso, prior to April 2020, the Indian Army (IA) used to patrol right from Finger 1 at the westernmost edge of the Pangong Tso to Finger 8 located at the easternmost edge of the lake. India claims that the LAC runs right up to the Finger 8 which is where its patrolling threshold ends. Before April 2020, Indian troops from their Dhan Singh Thapa post situated close to Finger 3 would patrol right up to Finger 8. China believes the LAC ends at finger 4 against India’s claims that it ends at Finger 8.

The February 2021 agreement ended up creating an 8-kilometre buffer zone between Finger 4 and Finger 8 that prevented patrols from both sides with New Delhi also surrendering its occupation of the strategically important Kailash Range heights. Following the latter disengagement, another was completed at Hotsprings or PP-15in September 2022 following the 16^th round of military corps commanders meeting. All these disengagements, due to mutually negotiated buffer zones, wound up giving India no physical access to points up to which it could patrol pre-April 2020.   

Now if the government proceeds to negotiate “disengagement” from the remaining two friction points at the Depsang Bulge and Demchok, it risks creating the same buffer zones as it did with the other friction points. This fundamentally means there will be no restoration of patrolling rights for Indian forces, let alone the complete withdrawal of Chinese to their pre-April 2020 positions and Beijing’s commitment that it will honour the 1993 and 1996 agreements. As the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) made clear in its latest statement: “Both sides must [do not yet agree] fully abide by relevant agreements, protocols and understandings reached in the past by the two governments.” In a nutshell, India and China will end up negotiating the same disengagements they did earlier leaving India at best in former IA Chief General V.P. Malik's words: “non-physical surveillance”.

A solution of this kind will only serve as a palliative because China still has a considerable number of forces deployed both in-depth as does India, but Beijing can mobilise its forces rapidly in the event it wants to seize the territory it has vacated as part of the disengagement. This is exemplified by several infrastructural and logistical measures that the PLA has undertaken that give quick access to the LAC in Eastern Ladakh.

Since the Doklam crisis of 2017 and from April-May 2020 onwards, the Chinese upgraded and developed a new rail, road and communication network along the entire contested boundary with India. Adjacent to eastern Ladakh on their side, the Chinese have built up road infrastructure. They have constructed a new G216 highway that gives them easier access to all areas in dispute in eastern Ladakh. The G216 will serve as a parallel or alternative to the current highway—GJ19 where Beijing sees a key vulnerability.

Supplementing these two highways is another called the GJ695, which is under construction and roughly 10-15 kilometres from the LAC enabling Chinese forces to rapidly mobilise in a future conflict, but also help them quickly seize territory on the LAC or beyond should they wish to do so, pre-empting resistance from the IA. As if this were not enough, satellite imagery released in July 2024 reveals that the Chinese have now built a bridge that connects the North and South banks of the Pangong Tso. Apart from depriving India of patrolling rights and compelling disengagement that has led to the establishment of buffer zones, the shrinkage in mobilisation time through a massive infrastructure build-up has been among the real gains for the Chinese since April 2020. Regardless of the air of optimism surrounding current negotiations between New Delhi and Beijing, India would be well-advised not to celebrate prematurely, because the definition of disengagement is a band-aid, not a restoration of the status quo ante.

• About the author: Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
• Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation

By Kyunghoon Kim

In 2022, Indonesia achieved the World Bank’s upper-middle-income status, a noteworthy accomplishment amid challenging conditions. To cement its position, the government is bolstering its developmental role by mobilising state-owned entities. But Jakarta will have to strengthen its governance institutions to ensure the sustainability of this strategy.

The most striking feature of the government’s expanded influence in the Indonesian economy is state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Over the last decade, the government has propelled SOEs’ growth through large capital injections and state-directed loans, reduced dividend payouts and numerous development project assignments.

As a result, the total assets of these companies under the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises have more than doubled in the past decade, surpassing US$648 billion (Rp 10 quadrillion) in 2021 and US$750 billion (Rp 11.6 quadrillion) in 2023. These assets as a percentage of GDP have increased from 43 per cent in 2014 to 55 per cent in 2023, nearing pre-Asian financial crisis levels.

SOEs in Indonesia operate across diverse sectors including energy, telecommunications, minerals, plantations, transportation, hospitality and more. They also manufacture fertilisers, cement, steel, trains and even airplanes.

SOEs play a pivotal role in strengthening the country’s infrastructure. State-owned constructors such as Hutama Karya and Jasa Marga have focused on building toll roads and in the past decade have nearly tripled the length of toll roads built in the four decades prior to 2014.

Another significant aspect of Indonesia’s SOE policy is the establishment of state-owned holding companies. Despite the rapid growth of SOE assets, the number of companies under the SOE ministry dropped from 121 in 2014 to 70 in 2023. This reduction reflects the government’s strategy to form sectoral holding companies for economies of scale and synergies. Under this mechanism, the government shifts its shareholdings in state enterprises in a specific sector to the designated sectoral holding company.

A notable example is Mining Industry Indonesia (MIND ID), a holding company in mining, originally with four members. Over the past few years, it acquired stakes in Freeport Indonesia and Vale Indonesia. It is also playing an important role in fostering the mineral sector’s downstream industries. Following the export ban of nickel ores in 2020, MIND ID’s affiliated mining firm Aneka Tambang began to establish processing and refining facilities to enhance domestic value addition. MIND ID affiliates account for 50 per cent of ownership in the Indonesia Battery Corporation tasked with fostering the electric vehicle value chain.

The Indonesian government’s expanded role is also evident in the financial sector. State-owned banks, among the largest in the country, have seen their share of bank loans significantly risefrom 34 per cent in 2014 to 43 per cent in 2023. They are also major players in digital banking, having established a digital wallet service, LinkAja, in 2019 in cooperation with other SOEs. State-owned financial institutions also play important roles in Indonesia’s insurance, pension and securities industries.

To tackle development challenges, the government is increasingly mobilising specialised financial institutions, known as special mission vehicles. Assets of these institutions under the Ministry of Finance have more than quadrupled, from US$5.7 billion (Rp 88 trillion) in 2014 to US$23.5 billion (Rp 363 trillion) in 2023. The government has ramped up infrastructure investment, but due to fiscal constraints, it is also leveraging special mission vehicles for infrastructure financing.

One prime example is the Indonesia Investment Authority, the country’s sovereign wealth fund tasked with investing in productive assets like infrastructure. Sarana Multi Infrastruktur, a development bank that finances various projects, particularly in infrastructure, has also grown rapidly.

These examples show how Indonesia’s state-owned entities are playing an increasingly central role across the economy. While debates on the optimal level of government intervention continue, the expanding presence of state-owned entities is both a current reality and a future trajectory.

Indonesia is relatively late to the expansion of the state-owned sector. This means that Indonesia can learn from the mistakes of other countries that have had similar structural characteristics in their economies. In Brazil and Malaysia — electoral democracies with swelling state-owned sectors — the most significant corruption scandals have involved state-owned entities. These events have played a pivotal role in bringing down their respective governments.

It is imperative for Indonesia to enhance its governance of state-owned entities. Despite their impressive growth, governance mechanisms have not kept pace. Strengthening institutional capacities for monitoring and auditing state-owned entities and enhancing transparency through better access to information is crucial for reinforcing checks and balances and securing political legitimacy.

In particular, information regarding the fiscal and financial resources allocated to SOEs, their corporate and developmental performance, and details about their subcontractors should be readily accessible. Additionally, the government should provide clear rationales for appointing commissioners and directors of SOEs based on their qualifications. To accelerate governance reform, the government might consider listing a small portion of SOE shares while retaining a majority stake. These efforts are essential to ensuring the development strategy driven by state-owned entities is sustainable.

But government leaders often become short-sighted and lose interest in governance reform in favour of other priorities. This means Indonesian media and civil societies need to be vigilant. Watchdogs should continue highlighting the consequences of deteriorating transparency and the risks of corruption as SOEs grow in Indonesia’s economy.

• About the author: Kyunghoon Kim is associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
• Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum

The revisions to GDP data generally are not of much interest to anyone except a small group of economics nerds who follow the data closely. However, this year’s revisions are a big deal which should interest many people. Basically, they tell us a story of an economy that has performed substantially better since the pandemic than we had previously believed.

The highlights are:

+ An economy that grew substantially more rapidly than previously believed and far faster than other wealthy countries

+ Substantially more rapid productivity growth, suggesting more rapid gains in wages and living standards and a smaller burden of the national debt;

+ Higher income growth than previously reported, with both more wages and more profits;

+ A higher saving rate, meaning that the stories about people having to spend down their savings were nonsense.

There were also a couple of not-so-good items:

+ A higher profit share that is still near a post-pandemic peak;

+ A lower implicit corporate tax rate, although still well above the 2019 level.

Faster GDP Growth

Starting with GDP growth, the revisions indicate that GDP grew a cumulative total of 1.3 percent more than previously reported. This puts cumulative GDP growth since the fourth quarter of 2019 at 10.7 percent.

By comparison, among the G-7 Italy comes in second with 5.1 percent cumulative growth, less than half of the U.S. growth. Japan comes next at 2.4 percent (less than one-fourth the U.S. rate) and at the rear are the U.K. at -0.9 percent, Germany at -1.8 percent, and Canada -3.0 percent.

The growth we have been seeing is even more than was predicted before the pandemic. At the start of 2020, CBO projected that the economy would grow 8.2 percent between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2024. The difference comes to almost $660 billion in annual output, or nearly $2,000 for every person in the country.

This means the economy under Biden-Harris has grown more rapidly than would have been expected if we had not had a worldwide pandemic. While the pandemic largely derailed growth in other major economies, it did not have that effect here. The performance since 2019 looks great by any measure, but especially if we grade on a curve.

Before the revisions, productivity growth averaged 1.6 percent from the fourth quarter of 2019 to the second quarter of 2024. This is slightly slower than in the four years just before the pandemic (fourth quarter of 2015 to fourth quarter of 2019), but considerably faster than the 1.1 percent average rate for the decade from the fourth quarter of 2009 to the fourth quarter of 2019.

A Productivity Speedup 

While that story makes the case for a productivity uptick ambiguous, the picture will look much better when we factor in the effect of this revision, as well as the revision to employment growth reported last month. That revision implied that hours in the second quarter of 2024 were roughly 0.6 percent less than previously reported. With GDP now reported as being 1.3 percent higher, this means the level of productivity is roughly 1.9 percent higher in the second quarter of 2024 than is now reported. (The actual number will be somewhat different, since the calculations for both the numerator and denominator are somewhat more complicated than implied here.)

With these revisions, the average rate of productivity growth will come to roughly 2.0 percent in the years since the pandemic. This is a huge deal.

If we can sustain a 2.0 percent pace of productivity growth, it means that real wages can grow at a 2.0 percent annual rate without inflation or any erosion of profit shares (we will come back to this.) It also means that we can sustain 4.0 percent nominal wage growth, a somewhat faster pace than we are now seeing, and still hit the Fed’s 2.0 percent inflation target.

Faster productivity growth will also translate into faster GDP growth. If productivity grows 0.5 percentage points more rapidly than expected, then GDP will grow roughly 0.5 percentage points more than expected. This lowers the ratio of debt to GDP. If we sustain a 0.5 pp uptick in GDP growth for a decade, then GDP will be 5.0 percent higher ten years from now than if we didn’t have this uptick. This means, other things equal, the debt-to-GDP ratio will be 5.0 pp lower than we had expected.

For folks worried that our debt-to-GDP ratio is approaching a point where we are going to hit a crisis, this is very good news. It also is good news for those who would just rather not see such a large share of GDP handed out as interest payments on the debt.

Higher Income Growth Than We Had Thought

As noted, the revisions were larger on the income side than the output side. The cumulative revision to income was an increase of 3.8 percent. This meant both higher wages and higher profits than had previously been reported. Labor income was revised up by 1.5 percent compared to what had previously been reported. Profit income was revised up by an even larger amount, with the new figure 11.5 percent higher than the previously reported number.

There were also large revisions in percentage terms for income in proprietorships (mostly small businesses and professional practices), which were revised up by 5.4 percent. Income for farm proprietorships was revised up by an extraordinary 41.1 percent.

Saving Rate Was Revised Up

This is one outcome that was 100 percent predictable from the large statistical discrepancy (2.7 percent of GDP) between the output measure of GDP and the income side measure. These measures of GDP are defined as being equal. Revisions that moved the two measures closer together would either lower output, almost certainly meaning less consumption, or raise income, which would likely translate into higher disposable income. Either way, the saving rate would be revised upward.

That is exactly what happened in today’s report. The saving rate for the second quarter was revised up from 3.3 percent to 5.2 percent. That is somewhat below the 6.2 percent average in the four years before the pandemic, but not out of line with what we have seen in prior years. (The saving rate was 5.4 percent in 2016.)

This upward revision indicates that the whining seen in many news stories, about hard-pressed consumers being forced to draw down their savings, were not based in reality. The low saving rate reported in recent government releases was a measurement quirk, not something that existed in the world.

A Higher Profit Share

As has been widely noted, the profit share of income rose during the pandemic. This was most immediately attributed to the supply-chain problems during 2021-2022. However, as these problems receded into the past, many of us expected that the profit shares would revert to their pre-pandemic level. That does not seem to have happened.

With the revised data the profit share is almost back to its post-pandemic peak. It stood at 28.7 percent in the second quarter. This is down by 0.5 percentage points from its peak of 29.2 percent in the fourth quarter, but still up by more than 4.0 percentage points from the 2019 level. (This figure subtracts out the profits earned by the Federal Reserve banks from total profits.)

While the cause of this rise can be debated, its existence cannot. Whether or not greater market power is the cause, there clearly is substantial room for wages to rise at the expense of profits, unless for some reason we think the 2019 profit share was unsustainably low.

A Lower Tax Share of Corporate Profits

One unheralded success of the Biden-Harris administration was an increase in the share of corporate profits collected in taxes. This has been falling for the last five decades, partly due to a reduction in tax rates by also as a result of increased avoidance and evasion. The tax share of corporate profits has increased in recent years, presumably mostly as a result of increased enforcement.

In 2019 the share of profits paid in taxes was just 15.3 percent. In the unrevised data, the share stood at 22.3 percent in the first half of 2024. In the revised data it is 20.3 percent. This is still a considerable gain from the 2019 share, with the tax take almost one-third higher when measured as a share of corporate profits.

The Good Economic Picture Looks Even Better with Revisions

In sum, an economic picture that already looked extremely impressive before the revisions looks even better with this presumably better data. Perhaps most importantly, we now have a better story to tell about an uptick in productivity growth. If this can be sustained, the future could be much brighter than prior projections implied.

• This article first appeared on Dean Baker’s Beat the Press blog.

The Saimaa Canal, which links the internal waterways of Finland to the Gulf of Finland via 34 kilometers (21 miles) of Russian territory, is rapidly becoming a flashpoint in the deteriorating relationship between Moscow and Helsinki. More generally, it is becoming a point of tension between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Finland joined in 2023.

The situation has even become a point of disagreement between Russia and China. The canal, built in 1856 and modernized several times since, has long been an important trade route not only for Russia and Finland but also as a transit for others. The traffic volume has declined to a fraction of what it was a decade ago, primarily due to sanctions and countersanctions arising from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attacks on Ukraine and fears by both parties that the other will use the waterway to subvert  their national security. Helsinki is worried Moscow will use the canal to undermine Finland’s independence by sending in refugees or covert forces (Window on Eurasia, April 19). Moscow is convinced NATO is planning to use the waterway to invade Russia if Putin’s oft-threatened war between Russia and the West breaks out in earnest (Rzd-partner.ru, September 23; Stoletie, September 27).

The situation around the canal, already dire, now appears to be worsening. Less than a month ago, Finland suspended the body that oversees its cooperation with Moscow concerning the canal (Finish Ministry of Transport and Communications, September 11). Last week, well-connected Russian commentators suggested that the Kremlin is mulling canceling the agreement that allows Helsinki to rent the portion of the waterway on Russian territory—a step permitted this year under the most recent bilateral treaty governing the canal (Fond Strategicheskoi Kul’tury, September 26). 

This would effectively end the canal’s role as a trade route, negatively impacting  not only Finland and Russia, but also the Central Asian states and China. These latter two parties view Finland as an important transit country, something that could come to an end as a result of changes in the Saimaa Canal (Trans.ru, April 12). Consequently, the shuttering of the canal would send economic and political shockwaves far beyond Finland and Russia. This seemingly minor bilateral problem between Finland and Russia appears set to become a major international crisis in the near future.  

The situation in and around the Saimaa Canal deteriorated sharply after Putin annexed Crimea in 2014. This trend only continued following his expanded invasion of Ukraine in 2022, further compounded by Finland’s entry into NATO shortly thereafter. EU sanctions limited Russian transit through the canal as well as stops at various ports along the canal, and Russian counter-sanctions on Finland reduced trade going in the other direction.

After Finland’s accession to NATO in 2023, Helsinki expressed concern that Moscow might use the canal as part of its effort to destabilize Finland by bringing refugees to the Finnish border or implant other forces covertly into Finland (The Moscow Times, April 13). Finally, the situation has almost been brought to a breaking point by public contemplation from  Moscow about canceling the Finnish-Russian agreement on the canal. The Saimaa Canal treaty is the only accord in which Russia has rented its territory to a foreign country, something that many find unacceptable in Russia’s increasingly nationalistic atmosphere (Svobodnaya Pressa, April 30).

Russian rhetoric regarding Finland over the last two and a half years has become increasingly sharp, and Helsinki has responded in kind, with President Alexander Stubb declaring that his country does not fear Russia and is not about to be pushed around (Topwar.ru, September 13). In addition,Stubb has annoyed Moscow further by being one of Ukraine’s most active supporters —and one of the most prominent critics of items viewed by the Kremlin as unquestioned prerogatives, such as Russia’s veto in the UN Security Council (Interfax, September 13; Helsinki Times, September 30).

This stance has led Finland to impose ever more restrictions on the canal’s ports (many of which have been closed) and its use by passenger vessels and cargo carriers(T.me/first_arctic, November 28, 2023; T.me/customs_rf; Rosbalt; The Moscow Times, April 13). These actions, in turn, have prompted further arguments from Russia that the agreement should be ended, with the Kremlin arguing that NATO is using Finland for its own goals (Fond Strategicheskoi Kul’tury, December 29, 2023). 

Given all this, one might have expected one of the parties to have already canceled the Saimaa Canal agreement. Both Finland and Russia, however, have compelling reasons not to do so, although the force of those reasons seems to be wearing down. Finland is keeping the accord in the hopes that after Putin’s war in Ukraine ends, it will be allowed to use the canal as a transit corridor to the extent it did previously—a powerful stimulus for the area’s economy.

Many of Finland’s other ports are suffering because of the reduced use of the Saimaa Canal (Fond Strategicheskoi Kul’tury, December 29, 2023). Finland’s economic prospects are thus far dimmer than they would be if the canal were to recover, especially because building alternative routes would be extremely—perhaps prohibitively—expensive in the short-to-medium term (Rzd-partner.ru, September 23; Fond Strategicheskoi Kul’tury, September 26). Russia, too, has some important reasons to want to keep the canal agreement in place and see traffic volume recover. On the one hand, Helsinki currently pays $1.5 million in annual rent for the canal, something it has been doing even as the use of the waterway has collapsed (Window on Eurasia, April 19).

Given Moscow’s budgetary stringencies since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, few in the Russian capital are going to want to lose this source of income. Likewise, if the canal were closed, Russia would lose important leverage over Finland and likely alienate Helsinki for decades to come. Most important from Putin’s current point of view, however, is the fact that any such move would infuriate Beijing, which hopes to use Finland as a transit route (Kazak Invest, April 11).

Such considerations may temporarily slow the move to end the Saimaa Canal’s unique role, but the longer the war in Ukraine goes on, the less compelling any of these are likely to be. If it continues, Finnish and Russian moves may very well combine to end the agreement governing the canal, with serious consequences for both countries, the West, and China. 

• This article was published at The Jamestown Foundation

By Kian Sharifi

(RFE/RL) -- Israel has invaded southern Lebanon, in what it has called a “limited, localized, and targeted” ground operation against Hezbollah.

Israeli forces on October 1 crossed the border for the first time since the 34-day Israeli-Hezbollah war in 2006.

Hezbollah is both an armed group and political party that controls much of southern Lebanon. It is considered a terrorist organization by the United States, although the European Union has only blacklisted its armed wing.

What Is Israel’s Goal?

The Israeli military has said its aim is to destroy Hezbollah targets along the border. One army division, which usually numbers more than 10,000 soldiers, is involved, it said.

Israel last month made the return of some 60,000 residents of northern Israel displaced by Hezbollah attacks a key war aim. Israel and Hezbollah have exchanged constant cross-border strikes since Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip in October 2023.

Michael Horowitz, head of intelligence at the Bahrain-based Le Beck International consultancy, said Israel is trying to dismantle Hezbollah’s infrastructure along the border, including tunnels and observations posts.

“In that sense it is ‘limited,’ as the goal is not to defeat Hezbollah, which would require a much broader invasion of most of Lebanon,” he said.

But it is unclear if Israel’s invasion will be limited in scope.

U.S. officials have noted that Israel initially billed its 1982 invasion of southern Lebanon a “limited” attack, which turned into an 18-year occupation.

Israel has also ordered communities in southern Lebanon to evacuate north of the Awali River, some 60 kilometers from the border, raising concerns of a larger offensive.

Horowitz said Israel risks being “pulled in even deeper” if it tries to create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon. But he said Israeli leaders likely want to avoid being dragged into a protracted war.

“At the same time, if Israeli troops pull back, Hezbollah is likely to come back and launch new attacks against Israel, which would be embarrassing for the Israeli government,” he said.

Can Hezbollah Put Up A Fight?

Hezbollah has suffered major setbacks in recent months. Israel has assassinated most of its leadership, neutralized a significant part of its military arsenal, and disrupted its communications.

While Hezbollah has been weakened, experts said the group should not be written off, given its considerable manpower and military arsenal.

Israel thinks Hezbollah is “in a state of chaos, and there's a gap in the command-and-control system,” said Hamidreza Azizi, a fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. “We can expect initial advances and successes by Israel.”

But Hezbollah, he said, has a “considerable advantage” in ground fighting because of the group’s experience in guerilla warfare and familiarity with local terrain.

Since it was formed in the early 1980s, Hezbollah has grown to become the dominant military power in Lebanon, effectively sidelining the country’s conventional army.

Azizi said the Lebanese Army is “comparatively weak” compared to Hezbollah, which is estimated to have some 40,000 fighters.

The army has only a limited presence in southern Lebanon, where a UN peacekeeping force is deployed. With Hezbollah controlling much of the region, the Lebanese Army is unlikely to play a major role in ground combat with Israeli forces.

The Lebanese army “simply isn't built to defend Lebanon from the [Israeli Defense Forces] and, there is probably a lot of international pressure to move it out of the way,” said Horowitz.

Will Iran Get Involved?

Iran, Hezbollah’s key ally, has been under pressure to respond after Israel’s killing of Hassan Nasrallah, the longtime leader of the organization, in air strikes in Beirut on September 27. Israel’s ground invasion of southern Lebanon is only likely to heap more pressure on Tehran.

But experts said Tehran is unlikely to launch a direct military strike on Israel, a move that could provoke all-out war with its archenemy.

When another Iranian ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, was at risk of being toppled during that country’s civil war, Iran intervened to keep him in power.

But Azizi said Iran is unlikely to deploy proxy forces as well as its own military advisers -- as it did in Syria -- in Lebanon.

The Lebanese government has also blocked Iranian planes from entering the country’s airspace after threats from Israel.

Azizi argued that Iran’s only viable option is to help other members of its so-called axis of resistance -- Tehran’s loose network of proxies and allies – to “mobilize and increase their attacks against Israel.”

The proposal to establish a NATO Presence Office in Japan has been raised again and is gaining substantial support from Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.

This initiative marks a significant shift in the strategic dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region, responding to China’s increasingly assertive actions. The proposal necessitates a thorough analysis of the current balance of power and the effectiveness of regional mechanisms, particularly those created by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in managing tensions with China. Japan's support for NATO's strategic pivot toward Asia underscores growing security concerns related to China's territorial ambitions.

However, integrating an external military alliance could complicate ASEAN's delicate balancing act among major powers. While NATO's presence may enhance deterrence against China, it risks undermining ASEAN's regional security framework and could potentially exacerbate polarisation. Thus, a careful and coordinated approach is essential to ensure that NATO's presence does not disrupt ASEAN's diplomatic efforts or threaten long-term stability. 

Over the past decade, China's assertive actions in the Asia-Pacific have raised significant concerns. Its sweeping claims in the South China Sea, asserting territorial control over nearly 90% of these waters through the ambiguous "ten-dash line," have created tensions with various regional actors, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. The development and militarisation of artificial islands have further heightened these tensions, making the South China Sea a potential flashpoint for conflict.

Additionally, China’s repeated incursions into Japanese airspace and waters near the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea have heightened security alarms in Tokyo. The Chinese government’s military enhancements and use of economic coercion against neighbouring states have intensified worries about its long-term strategic objectives. In this context, Japan views NATO’s involvement in the region as a crucial measure to counterbalance China's influence and safeguard regional security. For NATO, establishing a presence in Japan reflects an increasing recognition that global security threats extend beyond the European theatre.

With China identified as a strategic challenge in NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept, the alliance is expanding its focus to include the Indo-Pacific region. The proposed NATO office in Japan aims to enhance intelligence sharing, defence coordination, and joint military preparedness among NATO, Japan, and the United States. For Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, this initiative aligns with his administration's commitment to fostering a more assertive Japanese defence posture and strengthening its role in regional peacekeeping.

As a key ally of the United States, Japan has faced growing pressure to take on greater responsibility for regional security, and NATO's presence would enhance Japan's capacity to deter Chinese aggression. This strategic pivot presents new complexities, particularly for ASEAN, a ten-member regional bloc that has traditionally prioritised neutrality and non-alignment in its dealings with major powers.

Responses from ASEAN member states to the NATO Presence Office in Japan reflect their varied geopolitical and economic relationships with both China and the West. For instance, countries like the Philippines and Vietnam, which are involved in direct territorial disputes with China, may view NATO's presence in the region positively. The Philippines, in particular, has been strengthening defence cooperation with the United States after incidents of harassment against its vessels in its exclusive economic zone. Similarly, Vietnam, with its long-standing tensions with China, may welcome NATO’s expanded role as it seeks additional external support against Chinese aggression. 

In contrast, ASEAN members such as Indonesia and Malaysia may have reservations about NATO's involvement in the region, primarily due to concerns over an external military presence and their desire to maintain neutrality between China and the United States. As the largest ASEAN country and a proponent of regional diplomacy, Indonesia has consistently emphasised the importance of ASEAN’s centrality in managing regional security. This inclination is reflected in its support for initiatives like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ongoing negotiations with China for a legally binding Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea.

Similarly, Malaysia, which has significant economic ties with China, may hesitate to endorse actions that could provoke Beijing or heighten regional tensions. For these countries, NATO’s involvement carries the risk of exacerbating great power competition and undermining ASEAN’s role as the primary platform for resolving regional issues. A key concern about NATO’s presence in Japan is the potential for it to inadvertently undermine ASEAN’s established approach to managing relations with China. ASEAN has worked to create multilateral frameworks that include China, as seen in initiatives like the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and various diplomatic mechanisms focused on resolving disputes through dialogue rather than force. Introducing NATO into this dynamic could escalate tensions, as China might perceive the alliance's presence as a provocation, potentially leading to increased military activity in the region and greater economic coercion against ASEAN countries that align closely with NATO.

Additionally, this development could risk dividing ASEAN members, forcing them to choose sides between NATO and China, a situation that would threaten ASEAN’s cohesion and diplomatic effectiveness. To address this challenge, it is essential to strike a balance between NATO's objectives and ASEAN's mechanisms. First, NATO should engage in enhanced dialogue with ASEAN, ensuring that its presence in Japan does not undermine ASEAN's role in regional security. Establishing trilateral dialogues among NATO, Japan, and ASEAN would help align security approaches and reduce conflicting agendas. Furthermore, NATO must be transparent about its intentions, making it clear that its presence is defensive rather than offensive. This clarity can alleviate concerns among ASEAN member states, preventing the perception that NATO's involvement indicates a move towards increased militarization.

In conclusion, while NATO's presence in Japan, backed by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, could offer a vital counterbalance to China's assertiveness, it may also complicate ASEAN's diplomatic efforts and increase regional polarization. To ensure long-term stability, a comprehensive strategy that integrates NATO's defence capabilities with ASEAN's existing diplomatic frameworks is crucial. By fostering dialogue and maintaining ASEAN's central role in regional affairs, NATO can support the bloc's initiatives to manage China's behaviour, ultimately contributing to a more stable and secure Asia-Pacific region.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own.

References

• Acharya, Amitav. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. 3rd ed., Routledge, 2014.
• Friedberg, Aaron L. A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. W.W. Norton & Company, 2011.
• Kaplan, Robert D. Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific. Random House, 2014.
• Sutter, Robert G. Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War. 4th ed., Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
• Tow, William T., and Brendan Taylor. Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending Cooperation. Routledge, 2013.

By G.L. Lamborn

Of Sweet Potatoes and Newsreels

(FPRI) -- During the American Revolution, a British officer was sent from Charleston under flag of truce to negotiate a prisoner exchange with “Swamp Fox” Francis Marion. The officer was blindfolded but treated courteously as he journeyed under escort to Marion’s hidden camp. The Swamp Fox warmly greeted the British officer upon his arrival and invited him to dine. The British officer noted that although the camp was austere, morale was high, and the cook provided baked sweet potatoes for breakfast. Francis Marion indicated that the only food he and his guerrillas had to eat was sweet potatoes, but the visitor was told that he might eat as many as he pleased. The visiting officer was awed by Marion and his men—in good spirits despite obvious privation. Upon his return to Charleston, he declared that the Americans could never be beaten and that the Royalist effort in the South would ultimately fail. His testimony had an impact as British morale began to fall despite their military victories in the Carolinas. Canny and resourceful, the Swamp Fox conducted a successful influence operation. Francis Marion won a small but important psychological victory using only courage, courtesy, and sweet potatoes.

In another war on American soil, four months had passed since the battle ended. It was late November and turning cold. After a great orator spoke for two hours, a gaunt-looking man in a dark suit and wearing a tall hat rose to speak. He did not have much to say because he thought himself a poor public speaker. But he hoped to encourage a nation grown weary of war: “that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

When Abraham Lincoln sat down, he thought few persons “would little note, nor long remember” what had been said at the dedication of a military cemetery at Gettysburg. But his unadorned address captured the agony and hope of a nation and inspired Americans to carry on the struggle.

Eighty years later, the chief of staff called a filmmaker to his office and outlined a project he believed was of vital importance in mobilizing American public opinion at a critical time. Japanese bombs had drawn the United States into a world war that most Americans had been anxious to avoid. General George C. Marshall asked legendary producer-director Frank Capra to make a series of films for Americans explaining to every citizen why the nation, however reluctantly, had to defeat global fascism. With Marshall’s full support, Capra produced the “Why We Fight” series. Using newsreels—including German and Japanese footage—Capra’s work achieved Marshall’s goal. Artistic talent helped to explain America’s war aims and succeeded in molding public opinion.

These vignettes, chosen from three different wars in U.S. history, make several points. Each event took place during a desperately fought armed conflict. Each activity was shaped by the situation at hand and the brainpower of the men involved. We have examples of influence by deed, by speech, and visually by film. Whether using sweet potatoes or newsreels, an impact was made having tangible consequences and contributing in some way to the war effort of its time. Yet not a single shot was fired in any of the three.

Perhaps in an age of artificial intelligence and weapons of high technology, we forget that the most effective weapon system we possess is brainpower. Brainpower does not require a budget. Values, imagination, and a deep understanding of human nature are essential elements of effective influence operations.

Influencing the Willpower of Combatants

After making his central point about war being the extension of politics, Carl von Clausewitz taught that there are two aspects of war—the material side and the metaphysical side, or “will.” The material side can be counted or estimated—numbers of soldiers, weapons, resources available, and even factors such as time and distance.

But like Sun Tzu centuries before him, and Mao Zedong a century after him, Clausewitz raised the subject of will or morale as a key element in war. Perhaps taking a potshot at his Swiss contemporary, Antoine Jomini, Clausewitz expounded:

It is still more ridiculous if . . . we reflect that the same critic [ed. Jomini?], in accordance with prevalent opinion, excludes all moral forces from theory, and will not allow it to be concerned with anything but the material forces, so that all must be confined to a few mathematical relations of equilibrium and preponderance, of time and space, and a few lines and angles. If it were nothing more than this, then out of such a miserable business there would not be a scientific problem for even a schoolboy.^[1] 

Clausewitz believed that “where Strategy borders on political science, or rather where the two become one . . . [moral force has] more influence on the ‘how much’ and ‘how little’ is to be done than on the form of execution.”^[2]

Mao echoed Clausewitz when he decreed, “The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target of far more importance than the bodies of his troops.”^[3]

So, What Makes “War,” War?

Americans make a sharp distinction between what we define as “war” and what we consider “peace.” We commonly limit our understanding of war as being the violent use of arms in support of policy. Put another way, if there is shooting, we are engaged in war. If there is no shooting, we are not at war. Pentagon thinkers therefore coined the strange acronym MOOTW (military operations other than war)^[4] as a catch-all for “not-war” military activities; a more recent term is MISO (military information support operations). Since “information operations” do not involve shooting and violence, they must fall outside the American definition of war.^[5]

Our principal adversaries hold very different views of war and therefore of influence operations. The Leninist view of warfare is a continuum from agitation and propaganda to the use of nuclear weapons. Autocrats consider lethal arms merely one means (of many) to achieve their political ends. In his 1962 work, Military Strategy, Marshal Vasiliy Sokolovskiy noted this continuum: “In a war period, the political struggle is transferred from nonmilitary to military form.”^[6] For Russian and Chinese military thinkers, there is merely a change in the means used to achieve the ends sought, but the condition of political struggle is unchanged. The object of war remains the imposition of one’s will on an adversary.

This contrasts with the American view of how to influence. The Pentagon’s official term is information operations (IO). Unfortunately, IO is a misnomer for two reasons. First, IO means different things to different people and ranges from public relations to tactical deception. Second, information per se has little to do with the business of influencing target audiences. You cannot “information” someone to do something. Certainly, information exists. But by itself, information has no power to motivate; information only informs. Moreover, playing tank engine sounds, showing newsreel images, conducting tactical ruses, corrupting databases, conducting denigration operations, producing false or misleading “orders,” or even offering sweet potatoes to an enemy officer may influence someone to do something—but none of these acts are information.

Rather than branding “not-war” activities as information operations, we should ask ourselves what it is that we hope to achieve through our deeds and images as well as spoken and written words. What really matters in politics, in commercial activities, and in warfare is the influence of groups and individuals that lead us to a specified, desired result. Put more directly, we want someone to do something that meaningfully aids our cause or, conversely, to cease doing things that hinder our cause. In an election, we hope to influence voters to vote for our candidate. In commerce, we want consumers to buy our product. In war, we want “our side” to prevail over its enemies. But note that in all cases, we want someone to DO something—not merely to KNOW something. We want something to happen, something to take place. And we have the means to achieve that end.^[7]

The Soviet concept of “active measures” comes closest to describing the operations we should be conducting. This is also for two reasons. First, active measures are defined as the continuance of political relations, but using brainpower rather than firearms. Second, active measures (influence operations) can be included in war plans and tasked with specific goals or objectives. Information per se cannot.

The Chinese View of Influence in Warfare

In 1999, two well-informed colonels of the People’s Liberation Army published a theoretical work titled Unrestricted Warfare. In this work, the colonels defined a “battlefield beyond the battlefield” as the ultimate target in future conflict. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui went so far as to proclaim that “warfare is now escaping from the boundaries of bloody massacre, and exhibiting a trend towards low casualties, or even none at all, and yet high intensity.” They go on to note that warfare may take many forms; in their view, there is “almost no domain which does not have warfare’s offensive pattern.”^[8]

In effect, the Chinese officers stated that due to advances in technology and the blurring distinction between “civilian” and “military” operations, warfare was changing. Warfare would continue as an extension of politics, not merely with armaments, but with “weapons that are not weapons,” that reach into the barracks, classrooms, boardrooms, and even living rooms of the enemy.

Political power, in short, no longer comes just from the barrel of a gun, but also from computer chips and algorithms enabling one side to place an adversary in a disadvantageous position with no shots fired. Attacks launched on the battlefield beyond the battlefield would target an enemy’s databases, computer systems, infrastructure, communication networks, and ultimately public opinion. This capability is aimed both verbally—and non-verbally—at hobbling an enemy. The target of the battlefield beyond the battlefield is nothing less than the “mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders.” The operational question posed becomes how best to influence the enemy’s mind and erode his will to resist.

In addressing the issue of influence, Qiao and Wang humorously described the ideal valorous soldier of the People’s Liberation Army of the future: “The era of ‘strong and brave soldiers who are heroic defenders of the nation’ has already passed. In a world where even ‘nuclear warfare’ will perhaps become obsolete military jargon, it is likely that a pasty-faced scholar wearing thick eyeglasses is better suited to be a modern soldier than is a strong young lowbrow with bulging biceps.”^[9]

The point made by the jolly colonels is that the nature of warfare has fundamentally changed, and that brainpower armed with 21^st-century technology has moved to center stage. Leaflets and loudspeakers remain but have been joined by the Internet and computer trolls. We might note some dark humor of our own: “No danger is greater than a high IQ with evil intentions.” Neither the Chinese nor the Russians will leave untouched any opportunity to damage American economic or military assets or set Americans at each other’s throats.

China has one unique aspect to its doctrine. This is the ancient admonition of Sun Tzu that enemy states should be taken intact, not ruined, by conquering without fighting.^[10] The Chinese preference is to heed Master Sun’s advice and use psychological and political pressures rather than arms to bring down an enemy. Does this change our definition of war?   

The Limits of the American View

The United States suffers from three misperceptions that render us vulnerable to defeat on any battlefield beyond the battlefield: failure to comprehend the continuum of conflict, our Jominian approach to military analysis and weapons procurement, and our apparent blindness regarding culture and psychology in conflict.

The Soviet Union is gone, but with Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, the Leninist view of war remains. In the People’s Republic of China, this view is augmented by collective memory of a century of humiliation at the hands of Western imperialists. Warfare may vary in its form depending upon circumstances, but struggle is permanent. 

In military operations of any type, it is not a question of whether to employ techniques to influence the attitudes and actions of a given group, but rather of when, how, and to what degree. In many of America’s past operations, such as the Afghan war, both Gulf wars, and Vietnam, the United States did not make effective use of influence operations. In the case of the twenty-year war in Afghanistan, American influence operations (such as they were) had almost no bearing on the outcome. Indeed, as U.S. forces were withdrawn and the collapse of the Afghan republic appeared imminent in early 2021, attempts at mobilizing support for the government virtually ceased.

Retired Army Colonel Robert Curris, a former commander of the U.S. Army’s Fourth Psychological Operations Group, had this observation: “A crucial yet underutilized tool in the U.S. strategic arsenal can help counter the multifaceted threats sophisticated adversaries pose: military information support operations, or MISO, carried out by psychological operations forces. In layman’s terms, MISO is designed to develop and convey messages and devise actions to influence select foreign groups and promote themes to change those groups’ attitudes and behaviors.”^[11]

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Defense Department expanded the role of psychological operations primarily with the former Soviet Union in mind. As Colonel Curris notes, “This strategy included establishing specialized units, developing cutting-edge technologies, and creating sophisticated methodologies for influencing target audiences.”^[12] Psychological operations (PSYOP) units in the Cold War had language and area expertise—a rarity even in many military intelligence units. All PSYOP units were expected to conduct research on their specific country or area of interest. Many units—the majority trained for use in the European theater—had organic broadcasting and printing teams capable in some cases of acting within minutes of an “actionable” incident taking place.

The policy winds evidently shifted during the 1990s, and both PSYOP and civil affairs units faced reductions in numbers and capabilities. Despite Congressional interest in PSYOP, Defense Department strategists placed a greater premium on firepower than on brainpower.

Colonel Curris warns of the error of deemphasizing brainpower at a time when military-political problems are increasing around the globe:

A decline in psychological operations capabilities is a strategic error that will have severe implications for U.S. national security. The time for half-measures is over; the United States Congress and defense senior leadership must act decisively to restore psychological operations and the military information support operations mission to its rightful place in the pantheon of national security tools. Failure to act now will have long-term implications for the United States’ ability to protect its interests and counter the growing threats posed by adversaries who are increasingly leveraging information warfare as a tool for achieving their strategic objectives.^[13]

In the American defense establishment, greater emphasis has always been given to weapons procurement than influence operations. Perhaps this focus reflects the American fascination with mechanical things. Clausewitz would probably shake his head at the American penchant for counting numbers of weapon systems and calculating trajectories as advocated by Jomini, while devaluing the human element in war.

Clausewitz viewed war as messy and chaotic, with the outcome shaped by courage, persistence, and luck. In contrast to Jomini, who considered war almost a thing of mathematical beauty, Clausewitz came to think of warfare as a game of chance with victory or defeat determined by human factors such as persistence and guts. In a game of poker, each player holds different cards. Some hands may be stronger than others. As the game progresses, cards are played, and opponents try to “read” each other and anticipate the next move. There is bluffing and deception and astute guessing of what cards each player holds. Even a weak hand, if shrewdly played, could win. American humorist Josh Billings said it best: “Life consists not in holding good cards but in playing those you hold well.” Clausewitz would agree.

An American Blind Spot

If influence means getting people to do things for us, it follows that we must first understand those we hope to motivate—their needs, beliefs, goals, myths. Everything. There is absolutely no substitute for constant study of your audience and adjustment of the means of influence as revealed by continual analysis: “You must know your target audience better than it knows itself.”^[14]

Cultural and psychological aspects of a target audience are central to an influence campaign. These aspects can only be understood by experience and close study of the people we hope to influence. An argument can be made that in World War II, our influence operations generally were more effective with European adversaries, Italians and Germans, rather than with the Japanese. Americans of Japanese heritage were not used extensively in the Pacific theater where their knowledge of the Japanese language and culture could have played a positive role in overcoming enemy resistance.^[15]

American-supported influence operations in Central America in the 1980s were generally successful. American advisors in El Salvador worked closely with their Salvadoran counterparts following the May 1984 election that brought a reformist administration to office. The Salvadoran army changed its character from a plutocratic institution preying on the campesinos to a force committed to help and protect the people. Emphasis was placed on civic action and sophisticated psychological operations.^[16] The army distributed school items, provided medicines, and became a credit to communities. In 1991, the army succeeded in bringing an estimated 200,000 people to the capital for a “peace demonstration”—well covered by radio and television. Politically, the Salvadoran guerrilla group, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), was outmaneuvered.

American advisors taught Salvadorans, provided intelligence and technical advice, and obviously financed the operations. But the influence operations themselves—which included sponsoring a Salvadoran girl with a “peace song” that became a national hit—were Salvadoran, not “made in the USA.”^[17]

Another relatively successful influence campaign was that in the Philippines against the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA). This program was successful after an honest election brought Cory Aquino to the presidency. Improved rural administration lessened citizen grievances, thus removing many issues that fueled the NPA’s agitation in Luzon and the Bicol Peninsula. 

American influence operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan fell short due to cultural obstacles that could not be overcome. An obvious problem was the inability to influence groups holding strict Islamic values and having cultures alien to our own. Few Americans were familiar with either Iraq or Afghanistan, and even fewer spoke Pashto or Dari. Our troops and leaders were dependent upon interpreters. There was also considerable ignorance of Islamic beliefs and practices.

In contrast to El Salvador or the Philippines, soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan found themselves in culturally alien environments in which even routine actions of American GIs, such as drinking beer, eating bacon, or even shaving were viewed by strict Muslims as haram.^[18] News reports of disrespect of the Prophet Mohammed or Islam merely added to negative impressions of Americans created by our cultural differences.^[19] In Iraq, revelation of the gross misconduct at Abu Ghraib fatally undermined our credibility.^[20]

In Afghanistan, in addition to Islam, the Pashtuns have a code of conduct known as Pashtunwali, which stresses hospitality and protection of strangers—even enemies—in one’s home. And yet, U.S. units routinely conducted midnight raids to capture Taliban suspects, invading homes and forcibly taking captives in violation of Pashtunwali. Many breaches of Pashtunwali were done in sheer ignorance.

The Afghans saw our posters and listened when U.S. colonels spoke about the importance of elections to the Afghan republic’s parliament. Most tribesmen were respectful during meetings or infrequent cultural gatherings, but it is doubtful whether any were persuaded or much was achieved.

Professor Shibley Telhami of the University of Utah notes that “there is a complete gap between what we say and how our words are received in the region. Why? Lack of trust. When we say we’re going to bring democracy, people don’t believe us. They don’t believe that’s an objective. If you don’t trust the messenger, you don’t trust the message.”^[21]

This having been said, all successful influence operations—even against so-called hard targets—are based on thorough, insightful, and continuous target audience analyses. To motivate any audience, even those holding rigid ideologies (or religious beliefs), propagandists require a comprehensive understanding of the culture, psychology, and physical needs of the target group.^[22] It is also necessary to understand how a target audience views itself and other groups. Unfortunately, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, PSYOP research and analysis capabilities were curtailed sharply, perhaps due to funding cuts from the so-called peace dividend. Moreover, by 2001, many experienced officers had retired or left the PSYOP–civil affairs community. 

The lack of in-depth analyses of significant target groups in Afghanistan or Iraq was a major shortcoming that undermined American influence operations. In-depth studies might have made our influence operations more effective. Instead, during both conflicts there was a rush to “do something”—a typical American trait—which upon occasion earned us a black eye with those whom we hoped to motivate. Lacking a fully integrated countrywide political-military strategy in either country created a yawning gap between tactical operations and influence operations. Influence operations often were piecemeal. Upon occasion, tactical operations and firepower “undid” in minutes what PSYOP and civil affairs units had accomplished over weeks and months of patient effort.

Special operations troops were used to kick down doors and make midnight arrests—while by radio we professed support for “democracy” and the rule of law. (Of course, Western concepts of law are poles apart from Islamic law deriving from the Word of God.^[23]) Some units air-dropped leaflets using excerpts from the Qur’an. As the leaflets fell to the ground, the Islamic opposition pointed to the airdrop as prima facie evidence of the Unbelievers’ sacrilege.^[24] Civic action projects—a tangible form of influence—aided civil governments (often viewed as corrupt.)^[25] “Leader engagements” (a direct means of influence) lacked credibility as U.S. commanders focused on the number of such engagements but not their effectiveness. “Mullahpaloozas” became Kiplingesque photo opportunities mentioned in reports sent to Bagram, but rarely achieved permanent political gains; American commanders and mullahs met, but talked right past each other.  

Where To From Here?

On the eve of the American Revolution in 1775, British politician and philosopher Edmund Burke warned that “the use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment, but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again, and a nation is not governed, which is perpetually to be conquered.”^[26]

In our expeditions abroad, especially in parts of the globe having markedly different cultures from that of the United States, our military forces have a checkered record of successes and failures. Contributing to its failures abroad is the American misconception that force alone may substitute for political influence. Clausewitz noted: “War can never be separated from political intercourse, and if . . . this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object.”^[27] Influence operations of various kinds might have helped stabilize the Afghan republic but were never integrated with combat operations. Much was done, but, lacking an overall plan, influence operations failed.

As mentioned, our adversaries do not make the mistake of separating combat operations from influence operations. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietcong (VC) skillfully blended politically relevant actions such as propaganda and agitation with tactical operations. The NVA/VC used deeds and speeches in an integrated way with tactical operations intended to secure villages and districts politically. We did not do this.

American influence operations have atrophied in the last thirty years and, as Colonel Curris points out, PSYOP units need new staffing and funding. But of greater importance, the Defense Department needs to reassess the role of influence and fully integrate it into American war planning. PSYOP and civil affairs units should be organized into their own command with units placed in direct support of all engaged frontline units. If this is done, regular infantry units could call upon “their Influencers” to outwit an enemy or consolidate the area of operations where the infantry units must operate.

Of highest importance, however, is rebuilding the research and analysis capability of the PSYOP–civil affairs community, and staffing units with personnel having native fluency in foreign languages and in-depth knowledge of the culture and psychology of the people living in areas of operational interest.

The Last Word

It has been said that “politics is how who gets what when.”^[28] Politics is competition for scarce resources; it is the contest for power and position; it is the struggle between rivals for dominance and supremacy. And for some, it is a battle for mere survival. Whatever the specific aims or purposes of politics at any level, it is ongoing from the smallest precinct to the global stage. As we know, warfare is the continuation of politics with “additional means” intended to influence the outcome.

Influence is power to make something happen (or prevent something from happening.) Influence takes many forms. Its purpose is to build support for one’s own side, strengthening resolve and willpower. At the same time, it can break the will of an adversary and weaken resistance. Influence does this by projecting hope and positive expectations to encourage friends—or just as easily, conveying visions of doom and failure that discourage enemies.

Regardless of influence’s specific mission in any particular case, it is a truism that influence operations are tools—indeed, weapons—in the hands of a skilled practitioner. Influence is an element of strategy that can be used to achieve victory and that, if omitted, can lead to defeat. It is therefore of great importance that leaders at all levels take seriously the inclusion of thoughtful influence operations in their campaigns and battles. Clausewitz would expect nothing less.   

• About the author: G.L. Lamborn, a retired Central Intelligence Agency and Army Reserve officer, took part in nontraditional wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America from 1967 to 2013. He holds a Master of Arts degree in Chinese studies from the University of Washington.
• Source: This article was published by FPRI

^[1] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), book three, chap. 1, 242.

^[2] Clausewitz, 243.

^[3] Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare (1937), 23. B.H. Liddell Hart in Strategy made a similar observation: “The profoundest truth in war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders; not the bodies of their men.”

^[4] Military operations not involving arms (MOOTW) include peacekeeping, disaster response, humanitarian aid, military engineering, law enforcement, arms control, deterrence, and multilateralism. MISO is the latest Pentagon jargon; the term misrepresents influence operations, which are in fact means of warfare without weapons.

^[5] The author holds that the catch-all term “information operations” is an unfortunate label that misrepresents what in fact are political-military means used to influence the outcome of conflict. The author believes the phrase “influence operations” to be more appropriate.

^[6] Vasiliy Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy (1962), quoted in Graham D. Vernon, ed., Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1981), 19.

^[7] G.L. Lamborn, Jihad of the Pen: A Practitioner’s Guide to Conducting Effective Influence Operations in an Insurgency (Defense Intelligence Agency, Afghanistan-Pakistan Training Group, 2010), 15.

^[8] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America (Beijing: People’s 
Liberation Army Publishing House, 1999), 189.

^[9] Qiao and Wang, 44.

^[10] Sun Tzu Bing-fa, “To conquer without fighting is the acme of skill.”

^[11] Robert Curris, “The Army Needs to Invest in Psychological Operations, Not Cut Them,” Military Times, November 1, 2023.

^[12] Curris.

^[13] Curris.

^[14] Lamborn, Jihad of the Pen, 129.

^[15] Known as the “Ghost Army,” the 23^rd Headquarters Special Troops consisted of only 1,300 officers and men, but with brilliant artistry, they deceived the Germans into believing that they faced two fresh American divisions, thereby diverting German attention and saving Allied lives. The highly decorated 442^ndRegimental Combat Team, all Japanese-American, distinguished itself in Europe, but there was no unit in the Pacific comparable to the 23^rd.

^[16] El Salvador made extensive use of television and employed former FMLN members in “attraction programs” used to induce fighters to take amnesty and drop out of the fighting.

^[17] Author has direct knowledge of the Salvadoran influence operations, having served there. It helped that most advisors spoke some Spanish and had available extensive research on the country and the FMLN.

^[18] Islam divides human actions into halal, which are recommended or indeed mandatory, and haram, which are actions forbidden or highly disapproved.

^[19] The Qur’an burning in Florida and the Danish cartoons lampooning the Prophet triggered terrible riots in Jalalabad and other cities, undoing months of U.S. efforts to engage with the people. It took many weeks to rebuild decent relations in Jalalabad.

^[20] Abu Ghraib destroyed American credibility and handed a propaganda victory to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and our al-Qaeda enemies. Zarqawi posted a video in 2005 making American misconduct plain to all.

^[21] See Shibley Telhami, “Does Arab and Muslim Public Opinion Count?” Middle East Center University of Utah, January 24, 2005.

^[22] These are called “Basic PSYOP Studies” (BPS) and present detailed analyses of the country and target audiences of PSYOP interest. A BPS will note operationally relevant cultural and political aspects of various target audiences for possible campaigns. Lacking target studies, much American propaganda was “Made in USA” and lacked credibility. By contrast, the Taliban capitalized on our lack of cultural sensitivity and actions.

^[23] Ordinary Afghans noted the corruption of the Afghan republic’s courts of law, which contrasted sharply with the Taliban’s Islamic courts where justice was delivered swiftly and honestly.

^[24] Complicating matters for those of us in the field, almost no pre-testing or sampling with focus groups was done. American influence therefore often had little relevance to the local people.

^[25] Civic action teams, known as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), did excellent work that benefitted Afghan communities, but their accomplishments were often undercut by the corruption of district and provincial governors. On occasion, even U.S. tactical units “undid” projects by the PRTs.

^[26] Edmund Burke, “Speech on Conciliation with America,” March 22, 1775, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch1s2.html.

^[27] Clausewitz, On War, book five, chap. 6, 402.

^[28] Attributed to Professor Harold D. Lasswell (1902–78), political scientist and communications theorist, credited as the founder of the field of political psychology.

By Sameer Patil

On 17 September 2024, in an unprecedented development, thousands of pagers reportedly belonging to the members of the Hezbollah cadres exploded across Lebanon. The explosions, which appeared to be large-scale, coordinated attacks, killed more than 40 people and injured thousands. A day later, in the apparent second wave of attacks, walkie-talkies exploded in Hezbollah strongholds in eastern and southern parts of the Lebanese capital, Beirut. Both Hezbollah and Lebanon blamed Israel. These attacks mark a new phase of hostilities in the latest round of conflict in West Asia. However, it also opens a new chapter in electronic sabotage and offensive cyber operations.

Initial reports suggested that Israeli intelligence agencies may have rigged the pagers at the production level by planting a small amount of explosive material in the device model that Hezbollah ordered from a Taiwanese company, Gold Apollo. Other reports suggested that the devices were produced by a Hungarian firm, BAC, through a licensing deal with Gold Apollo. The explosives were then reportedly activated through a code or an error message.

In warfare, states have eternally looked for new ways to surprise their adversaries with spectacular tactics on and off the battlefield. Even then, the hacking and rigging of Hezbollah’s communication devices shows once again the deep reach of Israeli security and intelligence agencies. The symbolic message is that despite the intelligence failure of the October 7 Hamas raid last year, Israel retains its capability to target its adversaries the way it wants and at the time that it chooses to.

Israel’s use of cyber and other advanced tech 

In the preceding decades, Israel has often upped the ante against its adversaries by engaging in unconventional tactics and advanced technology.

First, in 2010, Israel and the US deployed Stuxnet malware against Iran’s nuclear programme. The virus caused such damage that, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 2009 and early 2010, Iran was forced to replace approximately 1,000 centrifuges at Natanz due to damage caused by Stuxnet, dealing a severe blow to its nuclear ambitions. This showed the acute physical impact of cyber weapons for the first time. Then came the Israel Defense Forces’ bombing of the Hamas’ technology division in the Gaza Strip in May 2019 to thwart a potential cyberattack. The Israeli response set a precedent by being the first instance of a military countering a cyberattack in real time amidst a conflict situation.

In addition, Israel has been blamed for running a decades-long covert campaign to target Iran’s scientists spearheading the nation’s quest for atomic weapons and ballistic missiles. In one of the most prominent targeted killings, Israeli intelligence agencies reportedly used an AI-enabled, remotely operated sniper machine gun to kill top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in Absard, Iran, in 2021. This was the first documented long-range use of such a device.

However, Israel’s reported targeting of Hezbollah’s communication devices potentially begins a new phase in pursuing geopolitical rivalries in cyberspace. 

Lowering the threshold for cyberattacks  

Disruptive attacks on critical national infrastructure, including Distributed Denial of Service, malware and ransomware attacks, by adversarial state and non-state actors have now been a regular occurrence in cyberspace. Israel and its adversaries—Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas—have frequently launched cyberattacks against each other’s critical infrastructure. However, sabotaging and targeting communication devices will likely lower the threshold for cyberattacks, opening a new chapter in offensive cyber operations. This is also the first time we have seen such extensive physical damage and human casualties being caused by electronic sabotage and cyber tactics. Non-state actors, including terrorist organisations, may find these tactics alluring to fulfil their intentions of committing large-scale, mass-casualty terrorist attacks.

More importantly, these attacks raise complex questions about the distinction between targeting combatants and civilians. This critical distinction has guided states and their militaries for centuries but has also progressively weakened with the use of advanced tech in modern warfare. Regarding cyberspace, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) explicitly mentions that “cyberattacks must not be directed against civilians or civilian objects.” Admittedly, the targeting in this case was specific: only the pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah cadres. Yet, as ground reports suggested, their impact was not limited to the cadres. A panel of United Nations human rights experts has already termed the rigging of pagers as “malicious manipulation” and “terrifying violations of international law.”

Supply chain vulnerabilities 

States have constantly attempted to sabotage and disrupt their adversaries’ critical infrastructure, including communication networks. The US, for instance, has long alleged that the Chinese government planted backdoor vulnerabilities in Huawei telecom equipment. However, the purported tampering of Hezbollah’s pagers is the first known instance of hardware tampering at the production level. This exposes how supply chain vulnerabilities can be weaponised with catastrophic outcomes. The opaqueness of supply chains spread far and wide and sometimes concentrated in a handful of countries aggravates this concern.

The strategic benefits of exploiting such a vulnerability are up for debate. However, given its potential for disruption and destruction, at least in the short term, more actors may be tempted to leverage it to target their adversaries. Moreover, while it may be difficult for non-state actors to get such deep physical access at the equipment manufacturing stage, determined state actors can have their way with the right resources.

Mitigating this possibility will be a major cybersecurity challenge with the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the proliferation of smart electronic and communication devices. By 2023, it was estimated that the world would have 43 billion IoT-connected devices. Often designed with limited computational power and inadequate encryption capabilities, these devices are more susceptible to cyberattacks.

Conclusion 

The sabotaging of Hezbollah’s communication devices and the targeting of civilians has carried the consequences of cyber warfare to the physical realm. This has broader implications for cyberspace stability if other actors decide to emulate it. It also has a psychological impact by aggravating the vulnerability inherent in relying on modern electronic devices. Mitigating this risk will, therefore, require further strengthening of anti-sabotage measures for electronics, securing supply chains, establishing stricter export control measures for the transfer of sensitive technology and enforcing accountability for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

• About the author: Sameer Patil is the Director, Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation. 
• Source: This article was published at the Observer Research Foundation. 

What is green hydrogen?

Green hydrogen

Green hydrogen is hydrogen produced through the electrolysis of water using renewable energy sources, such as solar, wind, or hydroelectric power. It serves as an energy storage medium, an energy vector, and a fuel for transportation, making it a pivotal element for future energy markets and sustainable environmental solutions. (1)

Unlike conventional hydrogen production methods that often rely on fossil fuels, green hydrogen is considered environmentally friendly as it generates minimal carbon emissions.

Hydrogen (H2) is an invisible, odourless gas and is the lightest and most abundant chemical element on earth. It is rarely present in a pure state, but is a component of water and hydrocarbons. Hydrogen is not only a source of energy but also an “energy carrier” that can be stored on a large scale over the long term. (2) Hydrogen's properties make it suitable for different applications, depending on the production process:

- In a natural gas network mixed with methane to generate heat;

- In a vehicle as an energy source for an electric motor (the electricity is produced by a fuel cell integrated into the vehicle) or thermal (direct combustion of hydrogen); and

- In the electricity grid, to produce electricity.

Hydrogen can also be used in the chemical industry, where it is exploited for its chemical properties:

- Hydrogen is used as a raw material in the refining of hydrocarbons;

Hydrogen is used as a raw material in hydrocarbon refining, fertiliser production and certain chemical applications; and

- Hydrogen mixed with CO2 produces synthetic methane, a molecule identical to natural gas. Derived synthetic fuels can also be produced in this way: methanol, diesel, paraffin, etc.

Today, the global hydrogen market is essentially an industrial market. Hydrogen is used in processes in the oil and chemical industries. The three largest markets are the desulphurisation of petroleum fuels, ammonia synthesis mainly for fertilisers, and the chemical industry. (3)

For Woodrow W. Clark II and Jeremy Rifkin, a green hydrogen economy is in high demand today by the large public to save the planet from potential destruction: (4)

“Clean environment and renewable energy lead to a healthier atmosphere. Global climate is a concern of all citizens. Our children are depending on us to do something today. Not do anything and leave the problems to the research laboratory or future generations. Aggressive improvement in energy efficiency, along with well thought out and executed transitional strategies, are essential to a clean environment.’’

Power-to-hydrogen

Hydrogen can be produced in a low-carbon and economical way thanks to electrolysis technology, which consists of separating a molecule of water into Hydrogen (H2) and Oxygen (O2) using electricity, provided that the electricity used to produce it is itself produced from renewable sources.

The production of hydrogen by electrolysis of water is ultimately a key solution for integration of renewable energies into the energy system. Hydrogen produced in this way will accelerate the decarbonisation of a number of sectors in industry, mobility and gas networks. (5)

It should be noted that electrolysers also produce oxygen, at a rate of 8Kg of Oxygen (O2) for 1Kg of Hydrogen (H2). This means that Morocco will also have a substantial quantity of oxygen for various industrial applications, both for the local market and for export. (6)

The benefits of green hydrogen 

Green hydrogen is highly beneficial as it is produced using renewable energy sources, making it completely sustainable. It does not emit greenhouse gases during production or combustion, unlike fossil fuels. Additionally, it can provide clean power for industries that are difficult to transition away from fossil fuels, thereby contributing significantly to reducing pollution and reliance on non-renewable energy. (7)

Green hydrogen offers numerous benefits as a clean energy source, particularly its ability to decarbonize sectors that lack alternative green solutions. It plays a crucial role in transitioning towards a sustainable energy future, contributing to both energy security and reduced greenhouse gas emissions. Its clean-burning nature and versatility make it a promising candidate for achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. Additionally, it can serve as a secondary energy source, integrating well within future energy systems. (8)

As such the benefits are as follows:

-Environmental Impact: Green hydrogen production emits no greenhouse gases, contributing to reduced carbon footprints and helping combat climate change.

-Energy Storage: It provides a solution for storing excess energy generated from renewable sources, helping to balance supply and demand.

-Decarbonization: Green hydrogen can replace fossil fuels in various sectors, such as transportation, industry, and heating, facilitating the reduction of carbon emissions.

-Energy Security: Using domestic renewable resources for hydrogen production can enhance energy independence and security for countries.

-Job Creation: The development of green hydrogen technology and infrastructures can create jobs in manufacturing, maintenance, and research.

-Versatility: Green hydrogen can be utilized in multiple applications, including fuel cells for vehicles, industrial processes, and as a feedstock for producing other chemicals.

-Grid Stability: It can help stabilize energy grids by acting as a flexible energy carrier, integrating with systems reliant on variable renewable energy sources.

Overall, green hydrogen is seen as a key component in the transition to a sustainable, low-carbon economy.

The key: low-carbon, competitive electricity

The attractiveness of hydrogen does, however, come up against some important environmental realities. The large amount of water consumed by water electrolysis is a considerable challenge, especially for a country that has to contend with major droughts. Finally, hydrogen production requires the production of large quantities of renewable electricity, which could conflict with the objectives of decarbonising Morocco's electricity mix, which is still heavily dependent on coal. (9)

There are 4 processes for producing hydrogen: natural gas reforming (the most common), coal and biomass gasification and, finally, water electrolysis. This last process separates hydrogen and oxygen from water using electricity, and currently accounts for less than 1% of global hydrogen production. Yet it is the only potential source of green hydrogen (if the electricity used is decarbonised), and therefore represents a hope for the decarbonisation of many sectors. (10)

Total hydrogen production was estimated at nearly 100 million tonnes in 2020, and could be multiplied by 5 in carbon-neutral scenarios. In its Net Zero Emissions (NZE) scenario, the International Energy Agency (IEA) projects a growing role for low-carbon hydrogen in sectors where emissions are difficult to reduce and where other mitigation measures may not be available or would be difficult to implement. These include heavy industry (manufacture of nitrogen fertilisers after conversion into ammonia, cement manufacture, replacement of coal in the steel industry), passenger transport, shipping (in the form of methanol or ammonia for container ships), and aviation (in the form of sustainable aviation fuels). (11)

Many reference bodies agree that low-carbon (blue or green) hydrogen will play a growing role in our future low-carbon economies. However, it should be noted that in all cases, the reductions in CO2 emissions made possible by hydrogen remain relatively small compared with other climate change mitigation measures such as sobriety or the massive deployment of renewable energies. (12)

One of the main cost factors for green hydrogen is the renewable electricity needed to power the electrolysers. The production costs of green hydrogen are currently 4 to 10 times higher than those of grey hydrogen (USD 4-12/kg compared with USD 1-2/kg), even in the most favourable production sites. The expected reductions in the production costs of renewable energies and electrolysers will make green hydrogen more competitive in the long term. Thanks to its abundant sunshine and strong exposure to wind, Morocco has significant renewable potential, giving it a central role in the future of global hydrogen.

The expertise acquired by Moroccans since the launch of the 2009 strategy, as well as the technological developments, which have undergone fundamental changes over the past 4 years, are creating a new situation. Indeed, the costs of renewable energies are now competitive. The latest wind energy tenders in Morocco in 2015 were awarded at a cost of 0.30 MAD/kWh, while in the photovoltaic sector, the last tender in the Middle East region was awarded at a tariff equivalent to 0.13 MAD/kWh under conditions similar to those in Morocco. These are figures that were completely unthinkable before, and they represent a profound paradigm shift, and call for an acceleration of the implementation of the King of Morocco’s Vision with a fresh approach to implementation. Energy can thus become Morocco's new green emergence.

Morocco's renewable energy potential, which is now more competitive, is remarkable. It virtually represents a production capacity equivalent to that of Nigeria or Venezuela. Exploiting this deposit would make it possible to energy dependence, improve the purchasing power of Moroccan citizens, the competitiveness of industries and public accounts, but also to consolidate the country's international positioning. (13)

In the near future, Morocco could play a key role in supplying Europe with green energy via electricity or hydrogen, thereby reshaping the geopolitical balance in the region. The new European commitments to carbon neutrality by 2050, formalised in the Green New Deal, open up this opportunity. A German study recently ranked Morocco among the top 5 countries in the world for developing such an energy partnership.

In order to achieve these benefits, forward-looking modelling shows the need to embark on a strategy that looks at energy transformation as a whole, beyond electricity and beyond traditional uses. This requires:

- Devote future electricity capacity almost exclusively to renewable sources and storage (STEP, batteries and technologies under development);

- Maximise decentralised electricity generation at household, industrial, community, farm and grid level;

- Maximise decentralised electricity production at household, industry, community, farm, cooperative, etc. level; 

- Gradually transforming mobility, which currently accounts for 40% of total energy consumption, to maximise the use of renewable energy.

- Consumption to maximise the use of sustainable public transport and electric cars;

- Implement a coordinated energy efficiency policy;

- Invest in desalination using renewable energies, the cost of which is also on a downward trend to address, in part, the problem of water stress; and

- Join the hydrogen revolution (Power-to-X), in which Morocco's comparative advantages are considerable.

The importance of green energy

The world has made the fight against climate change one of its top priorities. Rarely have so many international resources been allocated to a common goal. Recent studies have established that “green hydrogen” – hydrogen obtained from renewable energies - now has a major role to play in decarbonising the global economy. Countries around the world are now seeking to develop their own global strategy for green hydrogen, and the countries of the South are no exception.

Driven by a very strong demand for change in public policy with regard to the climate, the countries of the North are now extremely focused on green hydrogen issues. However, they are coming up against one main constraint: cost. With very high production costs, the countries of the North are turning to countries - such as Morocco - with the capacity to produce green hydrogen at a much lower price.

A forerunner in Africa with one of the most ambitious energy strategies, Morocco now needs to position itself at once in a rapidly growing and structuring international green hydrogen market. With its many assets, Morocco has an essential role to play in the global energy transition.

Emergence of this type of industry in Morocco already has two major advantages. Firstly, it will help to decarbonise part of the Moroccan economy, mainly the 68.8 million tonnes of CO2 it emits every year. (14) Morocco would thus be doing its bit to combat global warming. Secondly, exporting green hydrogen internationally: by succeeding in producing at a sufficiently low cost and by structuring an efficient supply chain, Morocco could export the surplus green hydrogen it produces to other countries.

Morocco has set itself ambitious climate targets for 2030 in its updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), (15) which was revised upwards in 2021. As such, Morocco wishes to continue to lead the way in terms of climate ambition under the Paris Agreement, following the example of its NDC, by making a full contribution, commensurate with its current and projected socio-economic capacities, to the fight against climate change, and projected capacities, to the response to the climate emergency highlighted by the IPCC (16) reports, and in the global objective of climate neutrality.

Macroeconomic Profile

Morocco has been characterized over the last two decades by political and macroeconomic stability, and low inflation levels (+/- 2%). A dynamic mainly supported by; (1) structuring institutional reforms, (2) the consolidation of productive fabrics (agriculture, industry, etc.) through the massification of investments, (17) (3) as well as the development of the country's competitiveness on a regional and global scale.

However, the difficult context of the COVID-19 pandemic coupled with a drought in 2020 hampered the continued growth rate, despite the Kingdom's strong responsiveness to these crises. The national economy thus suffered a contraction of 7.2% at the beginning of this decade (compared to +2.9% in 2019). The year 2021 marked a stirring of economic recovery and posted a growth rate of 7.9%, an effort whose results would be mixed in the economic conjecture of the year 2022.

The latest projections from Bank-Al-Maghrib (BAM) predict growth of 1% in 2022, and a recovery of the Moroccan economy in 2023, with a projected growth of 4%, under the assumption of a successful agricultural year (return to average cereal production). (18) 

It should be noted that the World Bank predicts continued growth in 2024, with a projected rate of 3.6%. For the period 2025-2030, Morocco's new development model (NMD), (19) which constitutes a key strategic reflection in terms of the Kingdom's development, (20) establishes an average growth hypothesis of around 6%, which represents an ambitious scenario that will depend directly on the recovery of the global economic situation. (21)

Furthermore, the unemployment rate reached 11.9% in 2020 (compared to 9.2% in 2019), with a more significant worsening for the youth category (15 to 24 years old), whose unemployment rate reached 31.2% (compared to 24.9% in 2019). (22) The unemployment rate in Morocco rose to 13% in the fourth quarter of 2023, an increase from 11.8% during the same period the previous year. Youth unemployment is particularly high, averaging 21.84% from 1999 to 2024 and peaking at 38.20% in the third quarter of 2023. For the most recent data, the unemployment rate decreased to 9.11% by July 2024.

In this context of crisis, the national economy is experiencing an uncertain year marked by the deterioration of the twin deficits and the level of treasury debt (which could approach the threshold of 80% of GDP in 2022 compared to 60% in 2019), with a 2021-2022 agricultural season impacted by drought (23) and the sharp rise in the prices of raw materials, particularly energy. This inflation, the impact of which remains unpredictable, was exacerbated by the outbreak of the Russia/Ukraine war.

Furthermore, Morocco's foreign trade was marked by a reduction in the trade deficit resulting from a drop in imports of 70 billion MAD in 2020 and a relatively less significant impact on exports (-22 billion MAD). Trade transactions thus fell by 11.7% to 685.1 billion MAD in 2020, compared to 775.4 billion MAD in 2019.

Since 2010, the trade balance situation has improved significantly. The coverage rate of imports by exports increased by 42.8% in 2009 to reach around 63% in 2021. This situation is the result of the growth rate of imports (1.3%), 3.3 points lower than the growth rate of exports (4.6%) during the period 2015-2020 (PAI deployment period). Progress has been noted in recent years in Morocco's share of the global trade market, which rose to 0.16% in 2019 (compared to 0.12% in 2010). In addition, the momentum generated at the national production system level, thanks to the sectoral plans deployed, has proven opportune to strengthen Morocco's integration into global value chains. (24) Morocco recorded a trade deficit of 22349 MAD Million in June of 2024. Balance of Trade in Morocco averaged -12247.29 MAD Million from 1998 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of -1254.60 MAD Million in January of 1999 and a record low of -34567.00 MAD Million in July of 2022. (25)

For its part, the Moroccan financial sector has undergone a continuous process of modernization over the last two decades in order to increase its efficiency, support and sustain the country's economic and social development, and improve its international attractiveness. (26) Banks granted a total of approximately MAD 988 billion in credits at the end of 2021, compared to MAD 621 billion in 2010. In relation to GDP, bank credits represented 80% in 2021. (27)

Green hydrogen in Morocco

Morocco has developed a favorable energy model for the production of green hydrogen, leveraging its excellent conditions for renewable energy generation. The government has also created a project known as "Offre Maroc/ GREEN HYDROGEN MOROCCAN OFFER" (28) focused on this initiative, which is open to national and international investors. This commitment indicates Morocco's strategic move towards expanding its renewable energy capabilities, particularly in green hydrogen production.

In the words of MASEN, the Moroccan institution in charge of the above-mentioned Offer. The Offer in question is stated in the following words: (29)

“The Morocco Offer applies to integrated projects upstream from the generation of electricity from renewable energies and electrolysis to the downstream transformation of green hydrogen into ammonia, methanol, synthetic fuel as well as the associated logistics.”

The Kingdom of Morocco has launched a regional initiative aimed at creating an economic and industrial sector based around green molecules, particularly hydrogen, ammonia and methanol, in order to consolidate its energy transition by helping to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and supporting the decarbonisation of partner countries. This drive is based in particular on exploiting exceptional potential in renewable energy sources, as well as the expertise acquired by the Kingdom over the last 10 years. (30)

The production of green hydrogen in Morocco will promote economic growth, contribute to the decarbonisation of its industry and the security of its energy and non-energy input supplies. It will also bring added value to the production of electricity in particular its transformation into products with higher energy density and energy-dense products with high demand potential for the world's major economies, which also represents a real opportunity for Morocco to export green energy. (31)

The introduction of the green hydrogen industry and its derivatives, “Power-to-X (PtX)”, (32) is a major step forward that will enable the Kingdom to diversify its energy mix through the integration of renewable energy sources in sectors that are difficult to decarbonise.

The establishment of a national industry based on hydrogen would first make it possible to replace ammonia imports with local production of this important raw material in the fertilizer sector. This transition will help to de-risk this critical activity for the country and guarantee long-term supply.

Concerning Morocco’s interest in green hydrogen, El Youssoufi Attou, S. and Nadir, B. write: (33)

“Hydrogen, a chemical element frequently used in industry, functions as a raw material, fuel and energy carrier. At present, most of its production is based on raw materials derived from fossil sources. However, in the context of the fight against climate change and the reduction of greenhouse gases, the challenge is to promote decarbonised or green hydrogen production methods. With this in mind, a promising option based on the combination of renewable energies as an energy source and hydrogen as an energy carrier is emerging. The emergence of a new sector such as green hydrogen requires appropriate incentives and legal frameworks to encourage its development. Indeed, the integration of green hydrogen into the Moroccan energy landscape requires a strong and proactive government commitment. This article looks at the public policy measures taken to promote green hydrogen in Morocco.”

Morocco's potential

Morocco, through its ambitious energy strategy, has been able to rise over the last ten years to the rank of regional champion of the energy sector and has contributed to its competitiveness. The fall in the price of the renewable kilowatt-hour, together with the abundance of Moroccan sites combining high wind speeds, there is a real opportunity to produce hydrogen and derivatives without CO2.

Morocco's proximity to the European continent makes it a key strategic partner. Several European countries, notably Germany, have expressed their willingness to consolidate their energy partnership with Morocco. This is a competitive advantage, especially as it has already established energy interconnection infrastructures.

Indeed, Morocco could draw on its gas and port infrastructures, which are well connected to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to set up a logistics platform for exporting green hydrogen and its products to Europe.

The World Energy Council's “Power-to-X Roadmap” (34) study identified a number of areas where the region could make a significant contribution. Indeed, for “Power-to-X Roadmap” study, (35) Morocco is one of the 6 countries with the greatest potential for producing and exporting hydrogen and its products to Europe.

Morocco has developed an energy model that is favourable to the production of green hydrogen, based essentially on the increased use of renewable energies. Over the last 10 years a revolution in terms of the deployment of renewable energies, with ambitious and proactive targets for the capacity to be installed to exceed the 52% target by 2030 target announced at COP21.

On the far-reaching benefits of establishing a global Power-to-X industry in Morocco, Energy Economics writes: (36)

“Establishing a global power-to-x industry would render significant benefits in Morocco. The country has a carbon intensive energy matrix and its supply is heavily dependent on imports. The last decade, oil made up more than half of primary energy sources consumed, most of which were procured from international markets. Enhancing the use of its renewable energy potentials represents a pertinent option for decarbonising its economy and for strengthening its security of supply. The benefit of developing a PtX industry in Morocco transcends its borders. Synthetic fuels are at the centre of worldwide decarbonisation strategies by enabling close to immediate substitution of pollutant fuels, the continued use of existing energy infrastructure and providing a real clean alternative for hard-to-decarbonise sectors.”

As for the role that Morocco could ultimately play at the international level, Info Mineo writes: (37)

“The Research Institute for Solar Energy and Renewable Energies (IRESEN) has announced recently that Morocco will become a carbon-neutral energy exporter by 2030 through the launch of construction works for a dedicated platform for green hydrogen and ammonia starting January 2020.

This infrastructure, with an investment amounting MAD 150 million, results from a partnership between IRESEN, via Green Energy Park, and both OCP and the Mohammed VI Polytechnic University on the Moroccan side, as well as Fraunhofer institutes on the German side. The platform will be dedicated to the R&D demonstration of Power to X technologies, with a diversified research program on hydrogen applications in the production of high added value green molecules such as ammonia and methanol.

It is worth pointing out that this technology is complementary to renewable energies and will help to reduce carbon emissions while creating a strong opportunity for economic and social development through exports due to the current lack of profitability of conventional electricity exports given the sharp drop in renewable energy costs compared to electricity transmission. 

In addition, beyond the existing infrastructures, in particular, the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline and the port infrastructure, capable of playing the role of a liquid fuel export platform, economic relationship with the European Union are constantly strengthening. In Europe, Germany which is the Kingdom’s privileged partner in renewable energy sector, intends to replace its fossil fuel (coal) and nuclear energy needs starting from 2022 until 2038 by importing clean energy, in accordance with its environmental commitments. According to Badr IKKEN the General Director of IRESEN, this situation represents an important opportunity for countries like Morocco, capable of producing clean fuels, particularly green molecules such as hydrogen and green derivatives.”

The development of green hydrogen in Morocco

The development of green hydrogen will be implemented gradually, with a view to ensure that the full potential is exploited, both for the national economy and for export.

2020 - 2030

In the short term, the development of the green hydrogen industry in Morocco will be based on two industry pillars:

- The first is local use as a raw material in industry, in particular for the production of green ammonia in the fertiliser industry,

- The second is the export of green hydrogen products to countries that have committed to ambitious decarbonisation targets.

During this period, the costs of green hydrogen products will remain higher than those of conventional products. The development of the hydrogen industry would be based on various pilot and development projects supported by the public authorities and subsidised funding from national and international financial institutions.

2030 - 2040

In the medium term, other specific favourable conditions and, in particular, the reduction the cost of green hydrogen products and the introduction of environmental regulations will enable the first economically viable projects to be developed for ammonia and green hydrogen, both nationally and internationally.

The same applies to exports of synthetic liquid fuels such as paraffin, diesel and petrol, provided that encouraging environmental regulations are adopted in regions such as Europe that import green hydrogen and which presents opportunities for Morocco to develop this sector gradually.

The local use of green hydrogen products in the electricity sector, as an energy storage, and in transport as a fuel, could support the expansion of the hydrogen industry in Morocco. However, pilot projects for these sectors could be launched in the short to medium term to test the technological applications and readapt them to the Moroccan context, with a view to optimising their deployment in the long term.

In the energy sector, green hydrogen can be used as a vector for the storage of energy in order to reduce energy consumption, network congestion and improve the flexibility of the national electricity system.

2040 - 2050

For this period and beyond, the business cases for ammonia, hydrogen and green synthetic fuels for export, and the development of green hydrogen technologies and industry would accelerate globally including in Morocco. This expansion will further evolve through the local use of green hydrogen in industry, for heat production, in the residential sector and in urban mobility and air transport.

Nevertheless, the demand for green hydrogen or synthetic methane in these sectors, particularly in the case of the residential sector, relates to potentially small volumes of demand combined with high investment requirements for the development of major distribution infrastructures.

In the transport sector, long-term development opportunities are focused on aviation. Some demand could emerge in the transport sector, probably associated with green hydrogen used for freight, mining and public transport in pilot projects.

Projections and prospects for a green hydrogen economy

The market potential for green hydrogen and its derivatives up to 2050 in Morocco is calculated using a methodology based on estimates of future demand and specific evaluations:

- Assessment of domestic demand for green hydrogen and its derivatives as a raw material for industry;

- Evaluation of the export potential of green hydrogen and its derivatives; and

- Assessment of the domestic demand for green hydrogen and its derivatives for transport.

Two scenarios are taken into account, a reference scenario (minimum estimate) and an optimistic scenario (maximum estimate), to formulate an indication of the potential demand for green hydrogen .and its derivatives

Assessment of the export potential of green hydrogen and its derivatives

The World Energy Council study estimated that the global market for green hydrogen and its derivatives at 20,000 TWh in 2050. We assume that in 2030, this global market would represent 600 TWh.

The study “Opportunités Économiques du Power-to-X au Maroc” (Economic Opportunities for Power-to-X in Morocco) has shown that the Kingdom of Morocco has a very large market for green hydrogen and that it could capture up to 4% of this global demand in 2030.

By 2050, Morocco's share of the world market is expected to fall to around 1%, while other countries accelerate the pace of development of this industry. Finally, it is assumed that 75% of exports will correspond to hydrogen, exported in the form of ammonia, and 25% to synthetic liquid fuels.

Assessment of domestic demand for green hydrogen and its derivatives as a raw material for industry

This application will mainly concern the fertiliser industry and possibly the refining sector. The share of the Moroccan market for ammonia is very significant, given the needs of the OCP Group in particular (≈ 2Mt in 2019). The development of the ammonia sector in Morocco will depend on reducing costs compared to the conventional sector in order to guarantee its competitiveness.

On the issue of Morocco’s sustainable energy transition and the role of financing costs, Thomas Schinko, Sönke Bohm, Nadejda Komendantova, El Mostafa Jamea and Marina Blohm argue: (38)

“Morocco is facing major challenges in terms of its future energy supply and demand. Specifically, the country is confronted with rising electricity demand, which in turn will lead to higher fossil fuel import dependency and carbon emissions. Recognizing these challenges, Morocco has set ambitious targets for the deployment of renewable energy sources for electricity generation (RES-E). The realization of these targets will lead to a fundamental transition of the Moroccan electricity sector and requires substantial public and private investment. However, different risks constitute barriers for private RES-E investments and lead to high financing costs, which may eventually discourage capital-intensive RES-E projects.”

In line with the most optimistic forecasts, previous studies of ammonia exports from Morocco, it is assumed that this demand would account for a larger share than domestic (x2 to x9 plus by 2050).

For the refining sector, hydrogen demand has been calculated based on the refineries that could be built in Morocco. This should start at Mt and reach 10 Mt in the long term. It is assumed that green hydrogen covers 25% of total demand for this fuel, by 2030 and could reach 40% by 2050.

Morocco intends to become one of the world's largest producers of green hydrogen

Morocco intends to become one of the world's largest producers of green hydrogen, the fuel made from water and renewable energy, a major energy transformation involving a colossal investment of $60 billion. This fuel of the future, extracted from water by electrolysis using renewable energy, is at the heart of the country's strategy to position itself as a world leader in this highly promising sector. (39)

The government, in synergy with national and international investors, has already expressed its interest in more than 400 green hydrogen projects. One million hectares of land have been allocated for these ambitious initiatives, which will cover the entire value chain: from hydrogen production to transport, storage and end use.

The roadmap drawn up by Morocco, in collaboration with the German Fraunhofer Institute, envisages the production of 160 terawatt-hours of green hydrogen by 2050. This amount of energy represents an enormous potential, equivalent to seven times the heat of the sun's core, and underlines the importance of stability and heat for the success of fusion reactors.

Considered the Holy Grail of energy, green hydrogen is a clean, sustainable and versatile source of energy. Morocco plans to use this resource not only to meet domestic needs but also to become a key supplier to Europe, benefiting from financial support from the European Union to the tune of €624 million.

Morocco enjoys ideal natural conditions for the production of green hydrogen, with an abundance of sun and wind. With a wealth of experience in renewable energies, including solar and wind farms, the country is well placed to make a success of this energy transition.

At a meeting with the CGEM on 2 April, 2024 Leila Benali, Minister for Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, stressed the need to triple annual investment to achieve the objectives of Morocco's energy strategy. In her view, to achieve the ambitions set for 2030, it is imperative to invest 1 billion dollars a year in electricity generation and renewable energies.

The Minister also highlighted the under-investment in the electricity network, an area that requires a significant increase in investment. The Office National de l'Électricité et de l'Eau Potable (ONEE) has been asked to review its equipment plan, in particular the share of investment capital in transmission and distribution networks, which should represent at least 25% of its total investment plan.

This action plan reflects Morocco's commitment to embracing the energy future and playing a leading role in the transition to a greener, more sustainable economy.

Green hydrogen has the potential to revolutionise Morocco's energy status

At a time when the world is regularly experiencing energy crises, which have major repercussions on the socio-economic fabric of countries, Morocco intends to use green hydrogen as a lever of sovereignty to promote its emergence.

Green hydrogen has the potential to revolutionise Morocco's energy status in just a few years' time. A clean energy source with promising prospects for Morocco, (40) which dreams of becoming a regional and international leader, reshuffling the geopolitical energy cards. At a working meeting on 22 November 2022, devoted to the development of renewable energies and the new prospects in this field, King Mohammed VI gave instructions to draw up as soon as possible an operational and attractive “Morocco Offer” (41) covering the entire value chain of the green hydrogen industry. The meeting was part of the Sovereign's regular monitoring of the strategic objectives that the Kingdom has set itself in terms of large-scale development of renewable energies, particularly the goal of increasing the share of these energies to more than 52% of the national electricity mix by 2030.

This is clearly an issue of energy sovereignty, which will ultimately help to reduce supply costs, loosen the stranglehold of dependence on major energy-producing countries and position the Kingdom as a key player in the low-carbon economy in the decades to come, creating a comparative advantage for Morocco. It is also an opportunity to attract more domestic and foreign investment in the sector.

Morocco is well qualified to become a key player in the development of green hydrogen, given its geographical location, energy interconnections and exceptional renewable resources. Green hydrogen can also replace fossil fuels as a fuel or energy source. To put it simply, to produce green hydrogen, engineers generally use an electrolyser. In this device, an electric current is passed through water to separate the hydrogen molecules from the oxygen molecules in the water. To qualify as ‘green’, ‘low-carbon’ or ‘renewable’, the electricity used must come from renewable sources, or in some cases from non-renewable low-carbon sources such as nuclear power.

Endowed with significant renewable energy resources, Morocco adopted a national energy strategy in 2009 to achieve a successful transition to a low-carbon energy system that harmonises economic development with social and environmental objectives. (42) Morocco has taken a number of steps to develop this energy sector, including the creation of the National Green Hydrogen Commission, bringing together public and private players, the launch of a study to draw up a green hydrogen roadmap, and the development of an integrated programme for the production of green ammonia.

The Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy (MASEN) has chosen the Guelmim-Oued Noun region to develop Morocco's first green hydrogen production project, “Power to Hydrogen (PtX)”. Four sites in the province of Tan-Tan have been pre-qualified to host the components of this strategic project. The project involves developing a hybrid power plant combining solar and wind power to supply a green hydrogen production plant with an electrolysis capacity of 100 MW, most likely connected to a seawater desalination plant.

According to a study carried out in December 2022 by the European Investment Bank (EIB), the International Solar Alliance (ISA) and the African Union (AU), Africa has the means to become a power in the global green hydrogen market, citing Morocco as one of the major centres of this continental energy transition strategy.

Morocco has everything it takes to become a champion of green hydrogen

Hydrogen has been widely used since the middle of the 20^th century in a number of industrial sectors, but there is now renewed interest in it as a means of decarbonising the economy. Demand for this “green gold” is expected to increase fivefold between now and 2050, fuelled by environmental concerns and the climate crisis.

Morocco is an ideal candidate to become a leader in the production of green hydrogen, taking advantage of both its vast solar and wind energy resources and its strategic location at the crossroads of Africa and Europe. The Moroccan government recently put in place an ambitious framework with the Morocco Offer published in March 2024, which aims to support the development of the hydrogen industry in the country.   

Morocco has everything it takes to become a champion of green hydrogen, thanks to its abundant renewable resources, available land and stable legal framework. The almost unique feature of Morocco is the abundance of sites combining exceptional resources for both solar and wind power, ensuring a perfect hybrid for the operation of the electrolyser and the production of ultra-competitive green hydrogen on a global scale. In addition, Morocco is a major consumer of hydrogen and its by-products (the Office Chérifien des Phosphates -OCP- consumes large volumes of ammonia and nitrogen fertilisers made from hydrogen), and could therefore address its domestic consumption with green hydrogen produced on its territory. Finally, its proximity to Europe, which has set very ambitious targets for the development of the hydrogen and associated industries (for example, see the recent legal obligations to incorporate sustainable aviation fuels), makes it a candidate for export, which is of major strategic interest for the Kingdom, which can go from being an importer of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) to an exporter of green molecules. This prospect is all the more relevant given that a quarter of the world's hydrogen demand could be traded internationally by 2050.

Morocco has announced the availability of 1 million hectares of land for the development of green hydrogen projects, including solar power plants, wind farms, electrolyser batteries, processing plants (ammonia, methanol, etc) and associated infrastructure. This considerable figure represents more than 1% of the country's surface area of 71 million hectares. The Morocco Offer has been eagerly awaited since it was announced in November 2022, and was designed to clarify a number of key elements for the successful development of green hydrogen projects: allocation of land, responsibility for developing the necessary infrastructure, government incentives, and government requirements in terms of financial and social benefits.

On this last point, it is important to note that the development of a Moroccan low-carbon hydrogen market can represent significant development opportunities, with positive externalities on the economy and employment, at different stages of the production chain. The positive externalities on the economy, training and employment, and more broadly on the development of Morocco, depend directly on the proportion of these activities that would ultimately be located on Moroccan territory.

Like the rest of the international sector, Morocco has seen little concrete progress to date, apart from the strategic initiative of OCP, which has begun construction of a pilot project to produce 1.4k tonnes per year of green ammonia at its Jorf Lasfar plant, and is at an advanced stage on its giga-project at Tarfaya: 1 GW of photovoltaic solar power and 2.3 GW of wind power, as well as a 60 Mm3 desalination plant feeding a 1.85 GW electrolyser and an ammonia production plant with a production target of 1 million tonnes a year by 2027 and 3 million tonnes a year by 2032. Other large-scale projects have been announced by a number of players, particularly in Europe. 

TotalEnergies, for example, is reportedly planning to invest $10.69 billion (100 billion MAD) in a green hydrogen and ammonia production project in Timelzoune (Guelmim-Oued Noun). The hybrid project is expected to generate more than 10 GW by combining solar and wind power over a total area of approximately 180,000 ha. It is interesting to note that the mega-projects announced in Morocco are much larger than the biggest European projects. These projects would have limited social acceptability in Europe, notably due to their high environmental impact; negative externalities that would eventually be relocated by northern countries to producer countries such as Morocco.

Which technology?

Water electrolysis, in particular proton exchange membrane (PEM) electrolysis and alkaline electrolysis, is a widely used method of producing hydrogen from renewable energy. Renewable energy is used to power the electrolysis process, which separates water into hydrogen and oxygen. (43) Other technologies such as biomass gasification, which converts biomass into a mixture of gases containing hydrogen, and solar thermolysis, which uses solar energy to break down water into hydrogen and oxygen, are also under development.

The question posed concerns the identification of the most appropriate renewable energy technology for producing green hydrogen in Morocco. (44) There is no single answer to this question, as it depends on various factors such as the availability of resources, the intra-day and seasonal correlation of production with consumption, cost, the spatial and temporal complementarity of the technology in question with other renewable technologies in place, the impact of climate change on production, as well as environmental sustainability and technological maturity. The renewable energy technology best suited to producing green hydrogen may also vary according to the level of renewable energy penetration in a given energy system. (45)

A thorough analysis of these factors is needed to determine which renewable technology would be most appropriate to meet the growing demand for green hydrogen in Morocco while maximising the use of the country's renewable resources and reducing dependence on fossil fuel generation, thereby reducing the costs of integrating renewable energy and the emissions associated with the balancing services required for conventional generation. 

Available scientific research work carried proposes different scenarios for the large-scale integration of onshore wind with photovoltaic (PV) and concentrated solar power (CSP) without or with different battery or thermal storage capacities. This work assesses different renewable penetration assumptions, the impact of different storage configurations, the effect of investment, operation and maintenance costs on this integration, and analyses how these energy sources can complement each other spatially and temporally in the current and future climate characterised by global warming. The work also identifies the geographical areas suitable for each energy source. Such an analysis could help to make an informed decision in the context of green hydrogen production in Morocco. (46)

On the assessment of green hydrogen production in Morocco, using hybrid renewable sources, Ilham Ourya, Nouhaila Nabil, Souad Abderafi, Noureddine Boutammachte, and Samir Rachidi argue: (47)

“Green Hydrogen is considered a promising vector of energy to accompany the energy transition and to contribute to achieving climate change ambitions. The intermittency aspect of renewable energy is not allowing the adaptation to the increasing demand for energy. For instance, to achieve the energy sector decarbonization, it was necessary to increase the share of renewable energy in power generation in 2015 to more than 60% in 2030 and 85% in 2050. In 2021, annual renewable capacity additions increased by 6% to approximately 295 GW. This green molecule appears to be one of the most suitable energy carriers for long-term storage to overcome this problem and increase the renewable energy integration rate. In addition, hydrogen is applicable in different sectors such as transport and chemical industries. Green Hydrogen could be used as a feedstock in the chemical industry (ammonia, refinery, methanol) to replace grey hydrogen. It is also expected to replace natural gas for heat and power generation in gas injection pipelines. In the power sector, Hydrogen could be used directly in fuel cells to generate energy or fed into a gas turbine to boost power system flexibility. Another promising usage of Hydrogen includes transportation applications, using fuel cells in cars, heavy trucks, and buses to decarbonize the transport sector.’’

Indeed, given Morocco's favourable geographical conditions, solar (PV and CSP) and wind technologies are generally considered to be the most promising. Morocco enjoys abundant sunshine throughout the year and excellent wind potential, particularly in coastal and mountainous regions. The electricity generated by these resources can be used to power electrolysers and produce green hydrogen.

It is important to note that the combination of these two technologies, solar and wind without storage, could be beneficial in delivering more consistent and reliable green hydrogen production, particularly at low levels of renewable penetration, as solar and wind production profiles can complement each other.

Adding battery storage to a PV system or thermal storage to CSP can help mitigate the intermittency of low solar electricity generation. Excess electricity produced during sunny periods can be stored in batteries or phase change materials and used later to power electrolysers and produce green hydrogen when there is less sun.

Morocco in the green hydrogen league

During 2022, Morocco continued to build on its momentum in the development of green hydrogen, commonly known as Power-to-X, attracting major investors to the point where observers consider it to be a new Eldorado for the sector. Indeed, the Kingdom is currently one of the best positioned countries in the green energy revolution, a technology for which it could offer some of the lowest production costs in the world.

Moreover, Morocco, which has significant potential for developing this new sector of the energy transition, was at the forefront of deploying large-scale solar and wind power capacity in 2022, and its ambitions to achieve more than half of its energy mix in renewable energies by the end of the decade are even more impressive.

Endowed with an ambitious, pragmatic and forward-looking vision, Morocco is a model to follow in terms of energy transition thanks to its political and social stability, the Kingdom is undergoing major transformations in several sectors, and is betting more than ever on green hydrogen.

In this context, Morocco has launched the first Green Hydrogen Cluster in Africa, “Cluster Green H2”, made up of public and private, national and international players, with a view to working on all the technological developments in this highly promising economic and industrial sector, with the ambition of becoming a key player in the export of green hydrogen to Europe at very competitive costs.

An OCP-Fortescue (49) joint venture was announced on Monday 8 April 2024. The two parties are joining forces in Morocco for a world-leading green energy, green hydrogen and green ammonia project. Focus on the Moroccan phosphate giant's new partner. The 50:50 partnership aims to supply green hydrogen, green ammonia and green fertilisers to Morocco, Europe and international markets, OCP Group and Fortescue say, noting that it also includes the potential development of manufacturing facilities and an R&D Hub to advance Morocco's fast-growing renewable energy industry. These proposed projects will also benefit from the expertise of INNOVX, a multi-sector business platform dedicated to developing innovative and sustainable businesses, and contributing to the creation of emerging ecosystems with a strong local impact. (50) The Australian green energy giant Fortescue has, also, signed a strategic partnership to export green energy produced in Morocco to the old continent and international markets. It has concluded an agreement with Belgian maritime construction group Jan De Nul to develop submarine cables.

This year also saw the announcement of the development of a hydrogen storage project launched by HDF Energy and Somas, which will enable this gas to be stored in the cavities of the Mohammedia salt mine, as well as the conclusion of a contract between TotalEnergies and the Spanish denim manufacturer Evlox, which intends to strengthen its position in the industrial and commercial sector to support companies in their energy transition in Morocco.

Total Eren, a subsidiary of TotalEnergies, has also committed 10.69 billion dollars, in this case 100 billion MAD, to a green hydrogen and ammonia production project in Guelmim-Oued Noun. In other words, a project that will enable the country to decarbonise certain major sectors of its economy, including mining and maritime transport, and create a Moroccan green energy industry that will generate thousands of direct and indirect jobs that cannot be relocated and are competitive, as well as supplying Europe with clean energy.

Ranked by the World Energy Council Germany as one of the five countries with the greatest potential for the production and export of green molecules (ammonia, methanol, etc.), Morocco could capture up to 4% of the global hydrogen market, or nearly 3 billion dollars, which could boost the growth of this burgeoning industry.

Conclusion: Green energy, what future?

Over the last few years, Morocco has become a regional and continental pioneer in the field of renewable energies, and hopes to play, in the future, an international leadership role in the green hydrogen economy. The country has the best conditions for the production of green hydrogen and is open to national and international investors. (51)

Morocco is developing a strong foundation for green hydrogen production, benefiting from its excellent natural conditions. The Moroccan government has allocated one million hectares of land for green hydrogen projects and is actively seeking both national and international investors to participate in these initiatives.

To the question, what future to green energy in Morocco, Rim Berahab writes: (52)

“While Morocco has made strides in reforming its renewable energy laws, there remain significant areas for improvement within its broader green industrial policy framework. One of the main challenges is the lack of clear, long-term policy signals and targets that are essential for guiding private sector investment. Furthermore, inconsistencies and regulatory gaps, coupled with insufficient coordination between national, regional, and local authorities, present additional challenges. The distribution of responsibilities across multiple entities—including the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, ONEE, MASEN, and the National Authority for Electricity Regulation (ANRE)—has resulted in a fragmented approach. This fragmentation leads to overlapping roles, conflicting priorities, and a lack of cohesive coordination among stakeholders, delaying the effective implementation of policies (Berahab et al, 2021). For example, the slow enactment of existing laws and the absence of necessary secondary legislation have hindered the effective liberalization of the electricity market.”

Green hydrogen in Morocco is considered crucial for energy production, particularly for producing ammonia, which is a key component in nitrogen-based agricultural fertilizers. The Moroccan government has recently revealed plans to develop a green hydrogen sector, emphasizing its importance in national policy and economic strategy.

The Kingdom has just taken a new step by publishing, in a circular, a first “Morocco offer” (53) for the development of green hydrogen capacities on its territory. In concrete terms, this document defines the roles and missions of the various players in the green hydrogen sector and sets out the criteria that investors must meet if their hydrogen projects are to be taken into account.

Morocco's offer is aimed at integrated green hydrogen projects - from the production of renewable energy to the conversion and production of green hydrogen - as well as large-scale industrial projects with a minimum surface area of 10,000 hectares.

With its strong commitment to green hydrogen, Morocco is positioning itself as a strategic hub, ready to meet the environmental and economic challenges of the 21^st century. In the global context of the fight against climate change, Morocco has identified green hydrogen as a key vector for decarbonising industrial sectors with high carbon emissions.

This resource, produced from renewable energies, offers a clean and sustainable alternative to meet growing energy needs. At the end of July, 2023 King Mohammed VI (54) reaffirmed the Kingdom's ambitions in the Speech from the Throne, calling on the government to “rapidly and qualitatively implement” the “Morocco Offer” for green hydrogen. The Sovereign stressed the importance of “making the most of our country's assets in this area and responding as effectively as possible to the projects put forward by global investors in this promising sector”.

On September 2023, the government announced its intention to launch a green hydrogen project as early as 2024, against a backdrop of growing global demand for clean energy. Morocco is seeking to increase the share of renewable energies in electricity production from 60% by 2040 to 70% by 2050. By 2050, revenues from clean hydrogen are expected to exceed 280 billion dollars.

According to Adil Gaoui, Chairman of the Moroccan Association for Hydrogen and Sustainable Development (AMHYD): (55) 

“Morocco has everything it takes to become a world pioneer in the H2 industry. Indeed, it took a valuable option by subscribing to the photovoltaic industry several years ago. The solar power stations in Ouarzazate and elsewhere, alongside the wind farms, give the country a major advantage in having a green renewable resource to produce hydrogen gas at the foot of these stations and thus solve the major problem of storing the surplus energy produced and thrown away in the absence of storage solutions.”

All European neighbours now see the UK as a potential supplier of green H2. The European Union wants to duplicate what Japan is already doing with Australia by producing Australian green H2 that can be exported to Japan. The ORNX project, with its launch of the study phase for a green hydrogen production platform in Boujdour, stands out as one of Morocco's flagship initiatives in this field. A combined capacity of 1.8 GW of wind and solar energy is expected to produce more than 100,000 tonnes of hydrogen and 600,000 tonnes of green ammonia. However, the road to green hydrogen production is not without its challenges. (56)

The intermittency inherent in renewable energies calls for ingenious solutions. Electrolysis technology is being considered, but the final choice has yet to be made. In addition, the European Union plans to extend the H2Med project to Morocco by 2040. This extension of the Mediterranean hydrogen corridor opens up significant diplomatic and economic prospects. (57)

Morocco could become a major supplier of green hydrogen to Europe, helping to build a more environmentally-friendly global economy. The construction of infrastructure, such as gas pipelines, is part of Morocco's strategy to secure its role in the European Hydrogen Backbone network. Partnerships with key players, such as Spain, and companies like Cepsa, underline the collaborative dimension of this energy transition. Green hydrogen projects in Morocco are also designed to transform industries with high carbon emissions. Cement and steel, essential to economic development, could benefit from this transition by reducing their environmental impact. In addition, Morocco’s geostrategic position, with its first-rate port facilities, puts it in pole position to become a global hub for green hydrogen.

For the Net-Zero Circle the Moroccan initiative in the green hydrogen field is a bold move forward towards a sustainable energy future: (58)

“The development of the green hydrogen sector in Morocco has significant environmental and economic implications. Environmentally, it contributes to global efforts to combat climate change by reducing carbon emissions. Economically, it promises to create new industries, jobs, and revenue streams, driving sustainable growth and energy independence for the country.

Morocco’s venture into the green hydrogen sector represents a bold step towards a sustainable energy future. By harnessing its renewable energy resources and strategic geographic position, Morocco is setting a global precedent in green hydrogen production. This initiative not only aligns with the country’s energy strategy but also resonates with the global imperative for clean and sustainable energy solutions. As Morocco continues to innovate and invest in green hydrogen, it not only moves towards its own energy independence but also contributes significantly to the global energy transition, marking a new chapter in the story of sustainable energy.”

The importance of green hydrogen for Morocco lies in its potential to leverage the country’s abundant sunlight and wind resources to create a sustainable energy source. Green hydrogen production can help Morocco address water scarcity by utilizing desalination plants, diversify its energy mix, and stimulate economic growth by establishing a new industrial sector. Additionally, it positions Morocco as a significant player in the global renewable energy market.

Morocco is focusing on green hydrogen as a critical energy source, especially for producing ammonia, which is vital for nitrogen-based agricultural fertilizers. The Moroccan government has unveiled plans to develop the green hydrogen sector, emphasizing its significance in national energy strategy and agricultural sustainability.

You can follow Professor Mohamed Chtatou on X: @Ayurinu

Endnotes:

1.  Giddey, S., Badwal, S. P. S., & Kulkarni. (2013). A. Review of electrochemical ammonia production technologies and materials. Int. J. Hydrogen Energy, 38, 14576-14594.
2.  Hassan, Qusay, et al. (2024). Green hydrogen: A pathway to a sustainable energy future." International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 50, 310-333.
3.  Clark II, W. W., & Rifkin, J. (2006). A green hydrogen economy. Energy Policy, 34(17), 2630-2639.
4. Ibid
5.  Abad, A. V., & Dodds, P. E. (2020). Green hydrogen characterisation initiatives: Definitions, standards, guarantees of origin, and challenges. Energy Policy, 138, 111300.
6.  Zhou, Y., Li, R., Lv, Z., Liu, J., Zhou, H., & Xu, C. (2022). Green hydrogen: A promising way to the carbon-free society. Chinese Journal of Chemical Engineering, 43, 2-13.
7.  Stöckl, F., Schill, W. P., & Zerrahn, A. (2021). Optimal supply chains and power sector benefits of green hydrogen. Scientific reports, 11(1), 14191.
8.  Germscheidt, R. L., Moreira, D. E., Yoshimura, R. G., Gasbarro, N. P., Datti, E., dos Santos, P. L., & Bonacin, J. A. (2021). Hydrogen environmental benefits depend on the way of production: An overview of the main processes production and challenges by 2050. Advanced Energy and Sustainability Research, 2(10), 2100093.
9.  Er-rbib, H., Kezibri, N., & Bouallou, C. (2018). Performance assessment of a power-to-gas process based on reversible solid oxide cell. Frontiers of Chemical Science and Engineering, 12, 697-707. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11705-018-1774-z 
10.  Carafa, L., Frisari, G., & Vidican, G. (2016). Electricity transition in the Middle East and North Africa: a de-risking governance approach. J Clean Prod 128, 34-47 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.07.012
11.  Kourougianni, F., Arsalis, A., Olympios, A. V., Yiasoumas, G., Konstantinou, C., Papanastasiou, P., & Georghiou, G. E. (2024). A comprehensive review of green hydrogen energy systems. Renewable Energy, 120911.
12.  Panchenko, V. A., Daus, Y. V., Kovalev, A. A., Yudaev, I. V., & Litti, Y. V. (2023). Prospects for the production of green hydrogen: Review of countries with high potential. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 48(12), 4551-4571.
13.  Choukri, K., Naddami, A., & Hayani, S. (2017). Renewable energy in emergent countries: lessons from energy transition in Morocco. Energy Sustain Soc, 7, 25. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13705-017-0131-2
14.  Ministère de la Transition Energétique et du Développement Durable – Département du Développement Durable. (2021). Stratégie Bas Carbone à Long Terme – Maroc 2050. Retrieved from https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/MAR_LTS_Dec2021.pdf  The document titled "Stratégie Bas Carbone à Long Terme – Maroc 2050," published by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development in Morocco, outlines a strategic plan aimed at achieving a low carbon development goal by 2050. It includes a co-design process for its climate change framework and emphasizes developing long-term sectoral action plans for decarbonization.
15.  Morocco's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) outlines its commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions during the period from 2020 to 2030. On June 22, 2021, Morocco submitted its revised Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the UNFCCC Secretariat, raising its NDC ambition to a 45.5% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared to the business-as-usual scenario and setting a conditional GHG reduction target of 27.2%. This report also includes information about Morocco's legal and governance framework related to climate action. 
16.  The IPCC stands for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (intergovernmental body of the United Nations). It is the leading scientific authority on climate change, providing governments with assessments of the scientific knowledge on the subject by reviewing relevant scientific literature.
17.  Investment rate exceeding 30% of GDP over the decade 2009-2019, one of the highest in the MENA Region (MEF).
18.  Bank Al-Maghrib. (2022). Rapport sur la politique monétaire - 2022. Retrieved from https://www.bkam.ma/content/download/775501/8669545/RPM_Q4%202022.pdf 
19.  Morocco's New Development Model (NMD) is the result of a participatory approach, where various driving forces within the country contributed through different channels to shape its framework. This model aims to address emerging challenges, including economic growth and immigration issues, particularly in light of climate change and other socio-economic factors. The New Development Model adopts the Constitution as its normative framework, striving to make its principles drivers of development and its values ​​methods of action. Development is understood as a global and multidimensional process: it is seen as a virtuous dynamic of wealth creation and human development.
20.  World Bank Group. (2024). Morocco Economic Monitor – Summer 2024 Morocco's Economy Proves Resilient but Private Sector Faces Challenges. Retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/morocco/publication/morocco-economic-monitor-summer-2024-morocco-s-economy-proves-resilient-but-private-sector-faces-challenges
21.  The World Bank predicts that Morocco's economic growth will continue in 2024, with a projected growth rate of 3.6%. This follows a recovery in the economy, demonstrating resilience against global challenges. For the period of 2025-2030, the nation's new development model (NMD) is expected to play a significant role in shaping future growth dynamics.
22.  Statista. (2024). Morocco: Unemployment rate from 2004 to 2023. Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/502794/unemployment-rate-in-morocco/ 
23.  Bouramdane, A.-A. (2023). Assessment of CMIP6 Multi-Model Projections Worldwide: Which Regions Are Getting Warmer and Are Going through a Drought in Africa and Morocco? What Changes fromCMIP5 to CMIP6? Sustainability, 15, 690. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15010690 
24.  Trade Economics. (2024). Morocco Balance of Trade. Retrieved from https://tradingeconomics.com/morocco/balance-of-trade 
25.  Office des Changes. (2024). Indicateurs des échanges extérieurs à fin juillet 2024. Retrieved from https://www.oc.gov.ma/fr/actualites/indicateurs-des-echanges-exterieurs-a-fin-juillet-2024 
26.  Atalayar. (2023). Latest data on bank credit, loans and deposits in Morocco. Retrieved from https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/economy-and-business/latest-data-on-bank-credit-loans-and-deposits-in-morocco/20240229190000197363.html 
27.  In Morocco, bank credits primarily refer to loans provided by financial institutions to the private sector, which can include consumers and businesses. These loans are a significant part of the domestic credit landscape and contribute to the country's GDP. To access consumer credit, individuals typically need to have resident status in Morocco.
28.  MASEN. (2023). GREEN HYDROGEN MOROCCAN OFFER. An operational and incentive offer with a simplified investor pathway. Retrieved from https://www.masen.ma/en/green-hydrogen-moroccan-offer  
29. Ibid
30.  Saoud, Karim (OCP Group). (2023, May 19). Nous ambitionnons de produire un million de tonnes d’ammoniac vert d’ici 2027. La Tribune. Retrieved from https://afrique.latribune.fr/think-tank/entretiens/2023-05-19/nous-ambitionnons-deproduire-un-million-de-tonnes-d-ammoniac-vert-d-ici-2027-karim-saoud-ocpgroup-962815.html 
31.  El Kanabi, Mohamed Jaouad. (2023, May 26). Hydrogène vert : Total Energies annonce un mégaprojet hybride au Maroc. Hespress. Retrieved from https://fr.hespress.com/315930-hydrogene-vert-total-energies-annonce-un-megaprojet-hybride-au-maroc.html#   
32.  Power-to-X (also P2X) is the conversion of electricity or its storage using excess electrical energy, typically during periods when intermittent renewable energy production exceeds demand. Power-to-X conversion technologies allow electrical energy to be decoupled for use in other sectors (such as transport or chemicals), possibly using the energy supplied by electricity produced by a dedicated installation. A large number of pathways and technologies are encompassed by the term. In the terminology, the X can refer to any of the following: power-to-gas, power-to-hydrogen, power-to-ammonia, power-to-chemicals, power-to-fuel, power-to-liquid, power-to-methane, power-to-food, power-to-power, and power-to-syngas. Although: electric vehicle charging, space heating and cooling, and water heating can be time-shifted to match production, these are more commonly referred to as demand response. Collectively, Power-to-X systems that use excess energy fall under the umbrella of flexibility measures and are particularly useful in energy systems with high shares of renewable energy generation and/or strong decarbonization targets.
33.  El Youssoufi Attou, S., & Nadir, B. (2024). Émergence de l’hydrogène vert au Maroc : perspectives juridiques. Revue Internationale du Chercheur, 5(1), 508-531. Retrieved from https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/MAR_LTS_Dec2021.pdf 
34.  The "Power-to-X Roadmap" refers to strategic frameworks that outline the steps for converting renewable electricity into various forms of energy carriers, such as hydrogen, synthetic fuels, or chemicals. It integrates various applications and sectors to enhance energy transition efforts, promoting sustainability and addressing international energy challenges.
35.  World Energy Council. (2018). INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF A POWER-TO-X ROADMAP A report prepared for the World Energy Council Germany. Retrieved from https://www.weltenergierat.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/20181018_WEC_Germany_PTXroadmap_Full-study-englisch.pdf 
36.  Torres, Maria Paula, & Perner, Jens. (2024). Energy: Paving the way for a global power-to-x industry in Morocco. Frontier Economics. Retrieved from https://www.frontier-economics.com/uk/en/news-and-insights/case-studies/case-study-i8853-energy-paving-the-way-for-a-global-power-to-x-industry-in-morocco/ 
37.  Info Mineo. (2020). “Power to X”: What role could Morocco play in this new paradigm? Retrieved from https://infomineo.com/natural-resources-energy/power-to-x/ 
38.  Schinko, T., Bohm, S., Komendantova, N. et al. (2019). Morocco’s sustainable energy transition and the role of financing costs: a participatory electricity system modeling approach. Energ Sustain Soc, 9(1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13705-018-0186-8
39.  Boucetta, M. (2023). Policy Brief: Le marché de l’hydrogène vert :l’équation industrielle de la transition énergétique.  Policy Center, 01(23). Retrieved from https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2023-01/PB_01-23_Boucetta.pdf 
40.  Bumpus, A., & Comello, S. (2017). Emerging clean energy technology investment trends. Nat Clim Chang, 7, 382-385. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3306 
41.  Kingdom of Morocco, Head of Government. (2024). Morocco Offer. Retrieved from https://www.mem.gov.ma/PublishingImages/Lists/Lst_Actualites/AllItems/Circulaire_H_vert_-_En.pdf 
42.  Alhamwi, A., Kleinhans, D., Weitemeyer, S., & Vogt, T. (2015). Moroccan National Energy Strategy reviewed from a meteorological perspective. Energy Strategy Reviews, 6, 39-47. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2015.02.002
43.  Agyekum, Ephraim Bonah, Christabel Nutakor, Ahmed M. Agwa, & Salah Kamel. (2022). A Critical Review of Renewable Hydrogen Production Methods: Factors Affecting Their Scale-Up and Its Role in Future Energy Generation. Membranes, 12(2). https://doi.org/10.3390/membranes12020173 
44.  Touili, S., Alami Merrouni, A., El Hassouani, Y., Amrani, A., Rachidi; S. (2020). Analyse du rendement et du coût de production de l'hydrogène électrolytique à grande échelle à partir de différentes technologies solaires et sous plusieurs zones climatiques marocaines. Journal international de l'énergie hydrogène, 45 (51), 26785-26799. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2020.07.118
45.  Bouramdane, A.-A. (2023). Hydrogène, Captage et Stockage du CO2 et Sobriété Énergétique : Tour d’Horizon. Energie/mines & carrières. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.7774592. Retrieved from https://energiemines.ma/hydrogene-captage-et-stockage-du-co2-et-sobriete-energetique-tour-dhorizon/ 
46.  Ourya, I., Nabil, N., Abderafi, S., Boutammachte, N., & Rachidi, S. (2023). Assessment of green hydrogen production in Morocco, using hybrid renewable sources (PV and wind). International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 48(96), 37428-37442. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2022.12.362
47. Ibid
48.  The "Cluster Green H2" refers to a strategic initiative or network aimed at developing a robust green hydrogen ecosystem in Africa. Green hydrogen, produced using renewable energy sources like wind and solar through the electrolysis of water, is seen as a sustainable alternative to fossil fuels and a key element in the global transition to a low-carbon economy. In Africa, with its abundant renewable energy potential, green hydrogen clusters are emerging to harness these resources and promote the continent as a key player in the global green hydrogen market.
49.  Fortescue Metals Group (FMG) is an Australian iron ore company that has rapidly grown to become one of the largest iron ore producers in the world. In recent years, Fortescue has expanded its focus beyond mining, particularly through its subsidiary Fortescue Future Industries (FFI), which is leading the company’s efforts in renewable energy and green hydrogen.
50.  Elouali, Lamia. (2024, June 11). Énergie verte : le géant australien Fortescue confirme ses projets au Maroc. Le 360. Retrieved from https://fr.le360.ma/economie/energie-verte-le-geant-australien-fortescue-confirme-ses-projets-au-maroc_MANYQZQA3VEARK6GMIWHWSU22U/ 
51.  Zenasni, M.  (2019). La finance verte levier d’impulsion de la croissance verte Cas du Maroc. Revue Internationale des Sciences de Gestion, 2(4), 306 -326.
52.  Berahab, Rim. (2024). Transforming Economies: How Is the Green Transition Shaping Trade and Industrial Policies? A Focus on Morocco. Policy Center of the New South, 13. Retrieved from https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2024-09/PP_13-24%20%28Rim%20Berahab%29_0.pdf 
53.  https://www.advantageaustria.org/ma/news/Circulaire_Offre_Maroc_Hydrogene_vert.pdf 
54.  Chakir Alaoui, M. (2023, July 30). Hydrogène vert: le Roi valide «l’Offre Maroc» et appelle le gouvernement à accélérer sa mise en œuvre. Le 360. Retrieved from https://fr.le360.ma/politique/hydrogene-vert-le-roi-valide-loffre-maroc-et-appelle-le-gouvernement-a-accelerer-sa-mise-en-oeuvre_DVWJU24FHRAZNFQCJRJJYUP7N4/ 
55.  Finances News Hebdo. (2023, December 29). Hydrogène vert: le Maroc poursuit sa montée en puissance. Retrieved from https://fnh.ma/article/developpement-durable/hydrogene-vert-maroc 
56.  Mokhtari, G.&Karoum, M. (2023). Hydrogène vert au Maroc: Défis et opportunités pour le Royaume Chérifien. Institut Marocain d’Intelligence Stratégique (IMIS).
57.  Sebbahi, S., Nabil, N., Rachidi, S., El Ganaoui, M. & Benyoussef, A. (2022). Hydrogène vert au Maroc: état  des  lieux  et  perspectives. Annales des Mines -Réalités industrielles, 4, 148-153. DOI :  10.3917/rindu1.224.0148. Retrieved from https://www.cairn.info/revue-realites-industrielles-2022-4-page-148.htm 
58.  The Net-Zero Circle. (2024). Morocco and the Future of Green Hydrogen. Retrieved from https://www.netzerocircle.org/articles/morocco-and-the-future-of-green-hydrogen 

By Luke Coffey

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to New York last week focused on much more than just addressing the UN General Assembly.

A war in Ukraine that many expected to last only a few days in February 2022 has turned into a grinding conflict measured instead in years, and Zelensky knew this visit to America was one of the most important since the Russian invasion.

As a former comedian and actor, he understands the power of communication. During his visit, Zelensky delivered important messages to three audiences: the American people, the international community, and US leaders

His first stop was a munitions manufacturing plant in Pennsylvania, where he met workers producing artillery rounds for Ukraine’s armed forces. The main purpose of this visit was to personally thank those working tirelessly to arm Ukraine. Even though it was not the intention, this stop had political implications. In the 2020 presidential election, Joe Biden narrowly beat Donald Trump in Pennsylvania by 80,000 votes. It is a swing state, home to about 800,000 Ukrainian Americans. Kamala Harris has run television ads there emphasizing her support for Ukraine. Meanwhile Trump has been increasingly critical of aid to Ukraine, making Zelensky’s visit seem to some like an indirect endorsement of Harris. From a logistical perspective, Pennsylvania’s proximity to New York and Washington DC made it a logical stop for Zelensky. Although his visit was not intended as an interference in US domestic politics, the significance of Pennsylvania with the election weeks away inevitably sparked debate.

In New York, Zelensky delivered a passionate speech to the General Assembly outlining Russia’s violations of the UN Charter. He used the platform to promote his 10-point Peace Formula to end the war. The proposal addresses key issues such as respecting Ukraine’s borders, ensuring nuclear safety, securing global food exports, and holding Russia accountable for war crimes. Notably, this remains the only concrete diplomatic proposal on the table.

A crucial aspect of Zelensky’s time in New York was his outreach to leaders from the Global South, many of whom are neutral in the war or sympathetic toward Russia: in a UN vote in March 2022 condemning Russia’s invasion, many abstained or voted against. They view the war less as Russian aggression and more as a proxy conflict between Russia and the West. Zelensky’s challenge was to convince them that Ukraine’s fight was one of national survival, not a mere battleground for competing global powers.

Zelensky’s final major stop was Washington, where he met President Joe Biden at the White House. The primary objective was to reinforce Ukraine’s strategic needs and emphasize the importance of continued US support. Zelensky revealed his long-awaited “victory plan” to Biden, though few details have emerged. One of his key requests was for the US to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range weapons against military sites in Russia. So far Biden has been cautious, fearing an escalation of the conflict. From Ukraine’s perspective, this allows Russia to launch air raids from within its territory with little fear of retaliation.

The military rationale behind this restriction is debated: many experts argue that Ukraine should be allowed to attack airfields that threaten its cities. We do not know if Biden agreed to Zelensky’s request, but the meeting did yield significant other outcomes, including one of the largest single aid packages for Ukraine. Also, next month Biden will convene a meeting of about 50 countries in Germany to discuss and coordinate more military aid to Ukraine. Usually this would chaired by the US defense secretary, so it is notable that the president will do so.

Observers have also noted a subtle but significant shift in the language used by the Biden administration about Ukraine. Instead of saying the US will support Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” the White House now says it will provide Ukraine with “the support it needs to win this war.” The previous phrase had been criticized as ambiguous and lacking a clear goal. Whether the new language represents a more focused commitment to helping Ukraine achieve victory remains to be seen.

Despite the additional aid and Ukraine’s recent battlefield success in Kursk, Ukraine’s situation remains dire, especially as US domestic politics evolve. Regardless of the election’s outcome, Ukraine faces challenges. Trump has expressed skepticism about continued aid and has suggested Ukraine may need to cede territory to Russia in a peace deal. On the Democratic side, Harris has yet to articulate a comprehensive strategy for Ukraine if she wins. So far, her position aligns with Biden’s — supporting Ukraine enough for it to survive but without taking the bolder actions needed for Kyiv to win decisively.

Zelensky’s visit came at a critical moment in the war. But unless there is a drastic change in US thinking, which seems unlikely, 2025 will be a difficult year for Ukraine.

By Foo Siew Jack

After weeks of violent demonstrations, Bangladesh’s prime minister Sheikh Hasina was forced to abdicate in August 2024, ending 15 years of dominant-party rule. The rollback of democratic institutions, meant to entrench the Awami League’s rule, instead worsened social and economic grievances. With the exit of an administration viewed by many as autocratic but stabilising, the future of Bangladesh now lies on the quality of its transition and consolidation.

Originally touted as a model for democracy in the developing world, Bangladesh is one of the few Muslim-majority countries that has had substantial experience with procedural democracy. From 1991 to 2008, Bangladeshi politics was defined by intense competition between the Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Both parties enjoyed successive rotations in government during the country’s 17-year experimentation with parliamentary democracy, where the country’s mostly homogenous ethnic structure, decent record of economic growthand strong culture of student activism enabled democracy’s survival.

This halted when AL was returned to power in 2009 under Sheikh Hasina, who worked to undermine democracy by marginalising the opposition and installing a corrupt and repressive regime characterised by election malpractice, judicial harassment, forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and intimidation of media and civil society organisations. During this period, the electoral playing field was so severely skewed in favour of the incumbent that the main opposition parties sat out of national elections in 2014 and 2024, twice denying the Hasina regime the legitimising effects of authoritarian elections.

Bangladesh’s political record concords with the trends seen during the third wave of democratisation in the 1990s, as well as to its ‘reverse wave’ in 2008 and the third wave of autocratisation in 2018. Until recently, the Hasina regime was well on-track to becoming a consolidated hegemonic autocracy. But it ultimately fell short because it faced a slowing economy, deepening crisis of legitimacy and critically overstepped on repression, culminating in a powerful ‘bottom-up’ transition.

It is very unlikely that the AL will return to top form anytime soon. The reintroduction of a non-partisan ‘caretaker’ government to oversee elections should re-equilibrate interparty competition from one-party dominance back into a nominally multi-party environment and national elections  are expected to be freer and fairer than in preceding decades. A strong appetite for democracy, including the willingness of rival parties to oppose an AL ban and the interim government to accept media scrutiny, are positive signs that democratic values are being normalised and upheld through mutual consensus.

The BNP appears well-positioned to be a winning alternative coalition to the AL given its previous governing experience and current status as the country’s largest opposition party. The radical right-wing Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) party, often seen as a fringe ‘third force’ aligned with the BNP, might also see a limited return to electoral politics after being sidelined for years under government decree.

BNP and JI, by virtue of their Islamic platforms, will try and speak to the 91 per cent of Bangladeshis who are Sunni Muslims, even if their prospects for greater success will be constrained by their general unpopularity among youths in the local circuit.

The exit of the AL has led to concerns that conservative Islamist forces might return once again to aggravate the already severe majoritarian tensions between the Muslim majority and Hindu minority communities. The latter, owing to a lack of guardianship and choice today, might resort to  falling back on the AL or its remnants for representation, giving an alternative pathway for its old patron to return in a diminished capacity as an authoritarian successor party.

BNP’s increasing dissociation with its Islamist partners might empower it to return to its centrist-liberal roots to reinvigorate secularist support for the party, which is consequential since the Hindu community makes up approximately 8 per cent of the population. While this move may alienate its conservative base, it will likely bolster its overall representative appeal among minorities and moderates.

Current developments suggest that Bangladeshi democracy is robust. The surprisingly weak potency of violent coercion to stop ‘people power’ and the military’s recalcitrance to mobilise against protestors are clear indications that coercive tactics no longer work .

The large population of highly-educated politically active youths with linkages to the Westshould give the new transitional government a solid foundation to call on the world’s industrialised democracies for support, should they need it. Neighbouring countries that have deep strategic interests in Bangladesh, like India and China, will similarly try to shore up their influence by offering assistance whenever possible.

The next national election — slated to be held within the next 18 months — will be one to watch, as it will usher in a new government that may or may not come from the existing AL-BNP duopoly. But as this process becomes drawn out, there is a real risk that a military-backed ‘king’s party’ might emerge out of gridlock to compete in elections with disproportionate access to resources, given the speculation about the launch of a new political party with connections to the interim government.

Clear reform, communication and transparency, along with a close working relationship with political parties and civil society, will be key to strengthening public trust and aspiring leaders know that they must move fast to ensure that the military too can trust them well enough to credibly safeguard its corporate interests, lest it be forced to intervene with constraints on the developing political system to obtain them. History has shown that sometimes this has been the case and certainly not in democracy’s favour.

• About the author: Foo Siew Jack is a student researcher specialising in Asian politics at the International Association for Political Science Students (IAPSS). He holds a Master of Arts in International Relations from the University of Nottingham, Malaysia and a Bachelor of Arts and Social Sciences in Global Studies from Monash University, Malaysia.
• Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum

China is a major natural gas importer by pipeline and the world’s largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG). In the last 10 years, the Chinese government has actively supported the development of unconventional natural gas resources to reduce import dependence and enhance energy security. 

According to a report from S&P Global Commodity Insights (SPGCI), the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 2023 produced natural gas from shale in the Low Cambrian formation in the Sichuan Basin at a depth exceeding 14,760 feet, marking the first time that commercially viable natural gas was produced from this deeper formation. SPGCI reported that the Zi 201 well initially produced 26.1 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d), a commercial rate that could signify the entry of the Cambrian formation into a new phase of large-scale shale gas development. 

Currently, only two of China’s national oil companies—CNPC and the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec)—produce shale gas, mainly from the existing fields in the Silurian Longmaxi formation of the Sichuan Basin. At an average depth of 11,500 feet, the Silurian Longmaxi shale formation is shallower than the Low Cambrian. 

China’s domestic shale gas production averaged 2.51 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) in 2023, up from 0.02 Bcf/d in 2013, according to data compiled by SPGCI. Since 2013, Chinese companies have gained a greater geological understanding of shale formations and deployed more advanced hydraulic and automation techniques, steadily growing shale gas production. However, we estimate that shale gas accounted for just 12% of China’s domestic natural gas production of 21.7 Bcf/d in 2023 as geological and cost issues have hampered more rapid development. In 2023, China’s natural gas imports averaged 16.0 Bcf/d and accounted for 42% of China’s total natural gas supply, compared with 15% of its supply in 2010. 

In 2018, the Chinese Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation introduced a preferential tax policy to reduce the resource tax on shale gas production to 4.2% from 6.0%. Last year, this policy was extended through December 2027.

Following the release of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan in 2021, policy directives continued to support development of unconventional natural gas resources. Production from unconventional formations, such as tight gas, shale gas, and coal-bed methane in China averaged 8.6 Bcf/d in 2023. 

Currently, China is one of four countries in the world where commercial volumes of shale gas are being produced. The others are the United States, Canada, and Argentina. Our World Shale Resource Assessments report of 2015 estimated 1,115 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable shale gas resources from the seven most prospective of China's natural gas basins. More than half of these resources are in the Sichuan Basin (626 trillion cubic feet). The southwest region of the Sichuan Basin dominates China’s shale leasing and drilling activity because it offers China’s best combination of favorable geology, flat surface conditions for accessibility, existing pipelines, abundant water supplies, and access to major urban natural gas markets. Other parts of the Sichuan Basin are structurally or topographically complex or have elevated hydrogen sulfide (H₂S) contamination that makes commercial shale gas development more challenging. 

• Principal contributors: Faouzi Aloulou, Victoria Zaretskaya
• Source: This article was published by AIE

By Pavel K. Baev

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced neither surprising nor radical revisions in Russia’s nuclear doctrine on September 25 (Kremlin.ru, September 25). He committed to revising the government’s vague document back in June. In the ensuing months, many “patriotic” pundits have advocated various drastic changes, from formalizing the “escalate-to-deescalate” proposition to breaking the non-proliferation regime (see EDM, June 3; Kommersant, September 11).

Putin opted for very modest revisions and tried to compensate for this moderation with staged gravitas at his Security Council’s so-called “standing conference on nuclear deterrence.” The conference had never been known to exist before but this time was covered on  prime-time television (Kommersant, September 25;Meduza, September 26). The announced shifts in the justifications for Russia hypothetically resorting to using its vast nuclear arsenal have already been scrutinized minutely, but the timing of Putin’s heavy hints and direct threats is indicative of his real intent.

Typically, Putin’s attempts at brinkmanship are aimed at influencing key decisions in the US-led coalition on expanding support to Ukraine and providing weapon systems of higher capacity, such as Leopard main battle tanks or M142 HIMARS multiple rocket launchers. The physical arrival of these arms, such as the deployment of the first squadron of F-16 fighters in early August, is invariably ignored, even when equipped with the JSOW glide bombs (Izvestiya, September 26).

Putin’s previous surge of nuclear rhetoric was timed to coincide with a meeting between US President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer that focused on whether to grant Ukraine permission to use the Storm Shadow air-launched missile to strike targets deep in Russian territory (Interfax, September 14; see EDM, September 16). The doctrinal revisions were announced as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held meetings with Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris, and, perhaps most importantly for Moscow, former US President Donald Trump (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, September 27). An upcoming meeting between Biden, Starmer, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and French President Emmanuel Macron will likely invite new threats from Putin (Izvestiya, September 25).

Moscow has rarely responded to long-distance Ukrainian strikes with enhanced nuclear saber-rattling, even to strikes of such spectacular impact as that in Toropets, Tver oblast, which caused the destruction of a major artillery arsenal (Current Time, September 19). The shocking offensive by Ukrainian troops into Kursk oblast, which is still ongoing despite Putin’s order to push the “bandits” out of Russia’s territory, has also seen no nuclear reaction (see EDM, September 3; The Insider, September 27).

Kyiv is keen to take advantage of Russia’s self-restraint for demonstrating the hollow symbolism of Putin’s “red lines,” to much consternation among Moscow’s hawks (Meduza, September 23; see EDM, September 25). New boundaries drawn in the revised Russian nuclear doctrine will surely be breached without delay by the ways and means that would yet again catch the General Staff by surprise (Carnegie Politika, September 26; NV.ua, September 27).

Disconnected from the battles in the kinetic war, the ups and downs in Russian brinkmanship show a distinct correlation with Ukrainian peace offensives. Zelenskyy’s first peace summit in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, on June 15–16, 2024, saw not only a furious Russian diplomatic campaign of sabotage but also an escalation of nuclear rhetoric, most notably at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum (Fontanka.ru, June 7; Forbes.ua, June 18; see EDM, June 20).

This time, Putin’s posturing aimed to disrupt Zelenskyy’s address to the UN General Assembly centered on the proposal for the second peace summit (Kommersant, September 25; RIAC, September 26). Moscow resolutely rules out any possibility of participating in this summit, but may have difficulty derailing it, as India has begun to cautiously signal its interest in hosting the summit (RBC, September 21; NV.ua, September 24).

The resonance of rhetoric decrying nuclear threats among countries in the Global South is clearly a major concern for the Kremlin, as it is constantly on the lookout for opportunities to spread its influence in other parts of the world (Russia in Global Affairs, September 1). The official recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status, necessitated by Pyongyang’s readiness to sustain the supply of artillery shells to depleting Russian stocks, is upsetting for many stakeholders in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime (The Moscow Times, September 26).

Russian leadership grants extraordinary importance to ensuring the success of the BRICS (a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit scheduled for October 22–24 in Kazan, Tatarstan. These strategic calculations could compel Putin to tone down his nuclear saber-rattling in the couple of weeks preceding the gathering (RIAC, September 25).

The key to the BRICS summit’s success is held by China’s President Xi Jinping, who confirmed his intention to partake but has signaled his disapproval of Putin’s cavalier attitude toward nuclear matters in various subtle ways (RBC, September 12). Beijing is promoting the proposition for an international treaty prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons. Russia’s revisions to its nuclear doctrine do not fit with this initiative (RIAC, September 27). 

Experts in Moscow evaluate China’s displeasure with the utmost attention and tend to conclude that it will remain superficial so that no negative consequences for the evolving strategic partnership are to be expected (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, September 26). Such opinions are underpinned by the assessments of China’s sustained efforts at strengthening its own nuclear capabilities, including the recent test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (Kommersant, September 25). The Russian program of such tests has been significantly curtailed, and the explosion of the RS-28 Sarmat missile in a silo at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in the Arkhangelsk oblast is a significant setback, about which the Kremlin remains in denial (Meduza, September 25).

Putin’s nuclear brinkmanship follows an oscillating pattern. The announcement of revisions in the nuclear doctrine is supposed to mark an upswing in Russia’s attempts at nuclear coercion. The Kremlin hopes that these revisions will reinforce Western fears of Russia’s nuclear capabilities to influence the proceedings of the Ramstein format meeting. An ensuing pause in nuclear rhetoric timed for demonstrating responsible statesmanship on the eve of the BRICS summit is also reasonably predictable.

The sequence of Ukrainian long-distance strikes is set to continue, but these increasingly spectacular hits—whether by domestically produced or Western-supplied weapons—will make little difference in Russia’s nuclear maneuvering across the political space of the long war. Like every aging autocrat, Putin is highly egocentric and cannot comprehend that his blatant blackmail makes it impossible for Western leaders to yield.

• About the author: Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).
• Source: This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 140

By Deepak Kumar Nayak

On September 25, 2024, a 50-year-old villager, Soyam Pandu, was thrashed to death by armed cadres of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) in Bhandarpadar village in the Bhejji area in Sukma District. The Maoists had barged into his house, dragged him out, and beat him in front of family members and villagers. Maoists suspected that Pandu worked against them as a ‘police informer’. The villagers were threatened not to inform the Police of the matter.  

On September 24, 2024, two CPI-Maoist cadres were killed in an encounter with Security Forces (SFs) in the Karkanguda Forest area near the banks of the Chintawagu River under the Chintalnar Police Station limits of Sukma District. Reports indicate that Maoists fired Under Barrel Grenade Launcher (UBGL) shells during the confrontation, demonstrating their capabilities to manufacture and use country-made grenade launchers.  

On September 14, 2024, a CPI-Maoist cadre, Madvi Kosa, an ‘area committee member’ of ‘platoon number 4’, carrying a cash reward of INR 500,000, was killed in an encounter with SFs in the jungles on a hill near Tumalpad village under Chintagufa Police Station limits in Sukma District. Kosa was involved in planting Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), making spike holes, getting roads dug up, and attacking Police parties. 

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 22 fatalities (eight civilians, three SF personnel, and 11 Maoists) have been recorded in Sukma District thus far in 2024 (data till September 29). During the corresponding period of 2023, 16 fatalities (seven civilians, three SF personnel, and six Maoists) were recorded in the district, reflecting a spike of 37.50 per cent in 2024. In the remaining period of 2023, one more fatality (an SF trooper) was recorded. There was a total of 11 fatalities (three civilians, two SF personnel, and six Maoists) in the district in 2022, the lowest in a year since the creation of the district on January 16, 2012. The second lowest of 17 fatalities was recorded in 2012 and 2023. The district recorded a maximum of 89 fatalities (15 civilians, 18 SF personnel, and 56 Maoists) in 2018.  

The numbers show that Maoist violence against civilians, a crucial index of the security situation in an area, has increased. Civilian fatalities have followed a cyclical trend in the district, and a low of three fatalities was recorded on two occasions, in 2014 and 2022, while a high of 33 such fatalities was recorded in 2013. Conspicuously, Darbha Ghati, where 28 persons were killed and another 30 sustained injuries, some of them critically, in a swarming attack by the Maoists on May 25, 2013, falls under Sukma District in Chhattisgarh’s ailing ‘Bastar division’, which still remains a major challenge for the state. 

Speaking on the civilian killings by the Maoists, Inspector General of Police (IGP), Bastar Range, Sundarraj P. asserted, on September 26, 2024, 

Killing of innocent civilians and attack on soft targets are indication of weakness in the Maoist camp. In an attempt to boost up the shattered morale of the cadres, Maoist leadership are indulging in such cowardly acts. But they should realize targeting the native population would be a huge reason for their downfall.

Meanwhile, in the fight against the Maoist rebels, SFs have lost three of their personnel in the current year, so far (data till September 29), as compared to three in the corresponding period of 2023, and there was one more fatality in this category in the remaining period of the year, taking the total to four through 2023. SFs lost 42 personnel, the highest registered in this category in the district for any year, on two occasions, in 2014 as well as in 2017. 

On the other hand, SFs have eliminated at least 11 Maoists in Sukma District since the beginning of 2024 (data till September 29). During the corresponding period in 2023, six Maoists had been killed in the district, and there were no more fatalities in this category in 2023.  

Significantly, in 2024, the kill ratio is in favour of SFs at 1:3.66 (three SF personnel, 11 Maoists), and was at 1:1.5 (four SF personnel, six Maoists) in 2023, and 1:3 (two SF personnel, six Maoists) in 2022. Since 2012, with a total of 197 SF personnel and 234 Maoists killed in the district, the overall kill ratio remains in favour of SFs, though marginally, at 1:1.18

Since January 16, 2012, Sukma has documented a total of 553 fatalities (122 civilians, 197 SF personnel, and 234 Maoists) in Maoist-linked violence, accounting for 29.76 per cent of the 1,858 fatalities (463 civilians, 477 SF personnel, and 918 Maoists) recorded in the state.  

Meanwhile, other parameters of violence also suggest that the security situation in the district has improved over the past several years. No major incident (resulting in three or more fatalities) has been recorded in the current year, as compared to one such incident in 2023. A total of 31 such incidents has been documented since 2012. The Maoists have been unable to carry out any incidents of arson in the current year so far (data till September 29), as compared to three such incidents in 2023. Moreover, the Maoists carried out two incidents of abduction, in which five persons were abducted; of them, one was killed while the others were released with warnings in 2024. At least four such incidents were reported in 2023, in which seven persons were abducted; of them four were killed while two were released after warning. The whereabout of one civilian remained unknown.  

In the intervening time, in operations against the Maoists, at least 19 incidents of the recovery of arms have been recorded in the current year, as compared to 15 such incidents in 2023. A total of 152 incidents involving the recovery of arms has been recorded in the district since 2012.  

Sukma, one of Chhattisgarh's 32 districts located in the state’s southernmost area, was formed on January 16, 2012, and comprises 385 villages, three tehsils (revenue units) – Konta, Chhindgarh, and Sukma. It has an area of 5635.79 square kilometres, of which around 3,500 square kilometres (more than 75 per cent of its total area) are under forest cover. Sukma shares borders with other Maoist-affected districts of the ill-famed ‘Bastar division’ within the state – Bastar, Bijapur, and Dantewada – to the north and west; moreover, the Malkangiri District of Odisha to the east; and the Khammam District of Telangana to the south, are both Maoist-affected, and offer the Maoists distinct tactical advantages, allowing them to establish disruptive dominance over this difficult landscape.  

Constant vigilance against extremists and continuous search operations have resulted in the arrest of 706 Maoists in the district since January 16, 2012, at least 35 in the current year. Recently, on August 12, 2024, five CPI-Maoist cadres were arrested from a forest near Chikometta village under Jagargunda Police Station limits in Sukma District, and various explosive materials were recovered from them. Among those arrested, Uika Chaitu (30), a resident of Jagargunda area, was an active ‘area committee member’ in Gadchiroli in neighbouring Maharashtra, and carried a reward of INR 500,000 on his head.  

Besides, increasing SF pressure also led to the surrender of 1,419 Maoists in the District. At least 59 surrenders have been reported in the current year, so far. Recently, on September 19, 2024, three CPI-Maoist cadres surrendered in Sukma District. The trio cited their disillusionment with Maoist atrocities and the state's policy and welfare schemes as reasons for their surrender. 

On August 9, 2021, Sukma District Police launched its flagship campaign, 'Poona Narkom’ (a local Gondi dialect expression, meaning ‘New Dawn’), under which medical camps were organised in different places of the district, including the district headquarters, for the tribal villagers of rural areas, in collaboration with the district health department, to attract more surrenders. Useful materials of daily use were also distributed to the villagers. Under the campaign, work was to be done to create awareness of the policies of the government, along with education, health, and employment. Though the specific number of surrenders under the campaign have not been disclosed, according to the SATP database, at least 425 surrenders have taken place in the district since then. 

Meanwhile, a field hospital was opened by SFs under the 'Niyad Nellanar' scheme, in the Puvarti village of Sukma, the native place and stronghold of top elusive Maoist leader Hidma, in an effort to reduce the gap between locals and SFs. Briefing on the development, IGP Sundarraj observed, 

We are working as per the action plan under which security forces are trying to ensure basic facilities at newly established camps (be it of paramilitary or police) in the region. According to the 'Niyad Nellanar' scheme of the state government, basic facilities like medical, ration outlets, schools and power supply are being provided to villages in insurgency-hit districts. Keeping the same in mind, a CRPF camp has recently been established at Puvarti, and the paramilitary force has developed a field hospital at their level.

Concerns, nevertheless, persists. According to a June 23, 2024, report, SFs recovered a huge cache of Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICNs) printed by Maoists and the printing equipment used, from a forested hill near Korajguda village in Sukma District. While the rebels managed to flee, the SFs found currency printing machines, ink, templates and FICNs of several denominations - ₹50, ₹100, ₹200 and ₹500, at their hideout. Several other items, including a gun, a wireless set and a large quantity of explosives, were also seized. Sukma Superintendent of Police (SP), Kiran Chavan, disclosed that this was the first time FICNs had been recovered from the Maoists in the state. SP Chavan disclosed, further,

Prima facie it was found that Maoists were engaged in printing fake notes. Our investigation suggested that in 2022, Maoists in west Bastar division area gave training of printing fake notes to some of their cadres. Under pressure and due to shortage of funds, Maoists have been trying to use fake notes for procurement of various items in the weekly markets of the region's interior pockets and duping local tribal vendors.

On the positive side, however, Chavan asserted that the seizures suggest that continuous anti-Maoist operations have choked the ultras' funding chain. 

On September 14, 2024, CPI-Maoist cadres opened fire at the newly established Puvarti security camp located on the Bijapur-Sukma border, under Jagargunda Police Station limits in Sukma District. They fired 15-20 rounds of UBGLs. SFs retaliated, forcing the Maoists to retreat into the forest. No casualty was reported on either side. 

Meanwhile, according to an August 14, 2024, report, to counter Maoist violence in the region, Chhattisgarh Police will be deploying at least four new battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), about 2,800 personnel, in a couple of months in the Bastar Division, especially along the intersections of Sukma and Bijapur districts. An unnamed senior Police officer disclosed,

Four battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force have been sanctioned by the Union government, and we are planning to deploy them in Sukma and Bijapur districts. The aim is to counter the violence of Battalion number 1 of Maoists, which is responsible for all major attacks in the last 15 years.

According to the Chhattisgarh police, there are currently around 60,000 SF personnel deployed in the Bastar region, including 40,000 Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and 20,000 state police personnel.

Aggressive SF consolidation across the state, as well as in Sukma, has put the Maoists in shock. However, the rebels continue with their efforts to repossess their erstwhile areas of dominance, though with little present success. Continued SF operations in Sukma's difficult topography will remain necessary to contain the residual challenge in the district, and in the state at large.

• Deepak Kumar Nayak
  Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

By Priyanka Devi Kshetrimayum

On September 24, 2024, on the occasion of the laying down of arms by two prominent insurgent outfits - the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) - in Tripura, Chief Minister Manik Saha, stated, "Now onward we could declare that there is zero insurgency in Tripura." He also remarked that the current development in Tripura is a larger outlook of Prime Minister Narendra Modi of developing the region of Northeast, which implies the overall development of India. 

On the occasion, Biswamohan Debbarma, the self-styled 'president' of the Biswamohan Debbarma faction of the NLFT (NLFT-BM) said, "We are celebrating the homecoming ceremony, which follows the accord we signed recently on 4th September. I would like to thank [Union] Home Minister Amit Shah, the Tripura government, and state agencies such as the Tripura Police, BSF, and Tripura State Rifles. We are very happy to have joined the mainstream. Now, more work lies ahead since we have returned home. There are many programs planned, and we will move forward in peace."

The 'presidents' of the NLFT-BM, Biswamohan Debbarma; the Parimal Debbarma faction of the NLFT (NLFT-PD), Parimal Debbarma; NLFT Original (NLFT-ORI) Prasenjit Debbarma; and ATTF's Alindra Debbarma handed over their AK series rifles. A total of 584 cadres of NLFT and ATTF laid down their arms as well. Out of these numbers, 261 were from NLFT-BM, 100 from NLFT (PD), 100 from NLFT-ORI and 123 from ATTF. The weapons handed over included 89 country-made guns, 13 pistols, nine AK series rifles, eight factory-made guns, seven land mines, one revolver and one rifle. 

The occasion followed the Peace Agreement or the Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) which was signed between the Government of India (GoI), the Government of Tripura, NLFT and ATTF, in the presence of the Union Home Minister Amit Shah, at North Block, in New Delhi on September 4, 2024. For long years, since the inception of NLFT and ATTF on March 12, 1989, and on July 11, 1990, respectively, the two militant outfits have been involved in violent activities with the common objective of deporting all foreigners who entered Tripura after 1956, and restoring alienated tribals' lands. In conjunction with the Agreement, Upendra Reang, 'secretary general' of the NLFT-BM, observed,

"Our movement has always been for the welfare of the Tiprasa people. We wanted a solution to the suffering of the indigenous community. With the government showing willingness to engage in talks and build trust, we felt it was time to seek a peaceful resolution."

The catalyst for the agreement was the realization of the decline in the number of insurgent-related incidents and fatalities in Tripura. According to partial data compiled by the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP), since 2010, fatalities have been recorded in single digits for eight of the 14 years, while no fatality was reported in another six years (data till September 29, 2024). For the current year, no insurgent-related fatalities have been reported to date (data till September 29). There was a total of 13 insurgent-related killing incidents in which 16 fatalities were recorded [five civilians, seven Security Force (SF) personnel and four terrorists) from 2010 to September 29, 2024. Of these, NLFT was involved in 10 incidents including two NLFT-BM related incidents in 2021 and 2022, while ATTF was involved in only one incident, on January 4, 2023, which is also the last reported insurgent-related fatality in Tripura. The remaining two incidents involved the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF), and another involving an unidentified militant group at the time of reporting.

Precursor agreements had also been signed between different stakeholders, the GoI and the Government of Tripura, to address the prevailing problems in the state. Three of the important precursor agreements involved the Sabir Kumar Debbarma faction of NLFT (NLFT-SD) (2019), the Bru Agreement (2020) and the Agreement with The Indigenous Progressive Regional Alliance (TIPRA) (2024). 

The Peace talks with NLFT were initiated in 2015 and subsequently, the MoS between NLFT-SD, the GoI, and the Tripura Government, was signed on August 10, 2019, in which 88 NLFT-SD cadres surrendered with 44 arms. After the agreement, three insurgent-related incidents of violence were reported in the state: 

January 4, 2023: ATTF cadres shot dead a Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) local tribal leader in Sadar (East) subdivision of Tripura. Police said Bidya Debbarma, a member of the Janmejaynagar Local Committee and former chairman of the village development committee, had gone to meet his friend Gurumohan Debbarma in nearby Maharam Sardar para area in the evening. At around 7 pm, five ATTF cadres entered Gurumohan's house and dragged Bidya away. The militants shot him dead from point-blank range 250 metres from the house.August 19, 2022: NLFT-BM militants killed a Border Security Force (BSF) trooper, Head Constable Girjesh Kumar Uddey, in a remote, forest area of Kanchanpur sub-division in North Tripura District. August 3, 2021: Two BSF personnel - Sub-inspector (SI) Bhuru Singh and Constable Raj Kumar - were killed in an ambush by suspected militants of the banned NLFT-BM at RC Nath Border Outpost (BOP) near the India-Bangladesh border in the Dhalai District of Tripura. Around 10 armed NLFT-BM militants ambushed a team of Security Personnel who were out to check the border fencing. 

With a single insurgent-related incident reported in each of the three consecutive years (2021, 2022 and 2023), it is evident that insurgent activities in the state had collapsed.

Indeed, according to SATP, between 1993 and 2004, Tripura recorded a total of 3,085 fatalities, including 2,225 civilians, 399 Security Force (SF) personnel, 403 terrorists, and 58 in the Not Specified category. In each of these 12 years, fatalities were in triple digits, with a high of 514 recorded in 2000, and an annual average of 257 fatalities. In the next five years, between 2005 and 2009, a total of 215 fatalities included 60 civilians, 44 SF personnel, 95 militants, and 16 Not Specified, yielding an annual average of 43 fatalities. In almost fifteen years between 2010 and 2024, there was a total of just 16 insurgency-related fatalities (as mentioned above). In fact, during this period, Tripura recorded fatalities in single digits for eight of the years, while no fatality was reported in another six years.  

Another critical agreement, signed on January 16, 2020, between the GoI, the Governments of Tripura and Mizoram and Bru-Reang representatives in New Delhi, ended the 23-year-old Bru-Reang Refugee Crisis.   

Another significant accord was a tripartite agreement signed between the GoI, the Government of Tripura and The Indigenous Progressive Regional Alliance/TIPRA, popularly known as Tripra Motha, and other stakeholders, in the presence of Union Home Minister Amit Shah, in New Delhi on March 2, 2024. The pact resolved issues pertaining to the indigenous population of Tripura in relation their history of land and political rights, economic development, identity, culture and language.  

These agreements were accompanied by packages of aid, rehabilitation and relief. The latest special package of INR 250 crore was approved by the Centre for the development of the tribal population in Tripura. In the Bru-Reang agreement, a package of INR 600 crores was sanctioned as aid for the overall development of 34,000 Bru refugees that would be settled in Tripura, while Union Home Minister Amit Shah announced that every family that was relocated due to ethnic violence in 1997 would receive a residential plot, a fixed deposit of INR 400,000, free rations for two years, INR 5,000 in monetary assistance each month, and INR 150,000 in assistance to build a house. Finally, the NLFT-SD peace agreement (2019) was accompanied by the UMHA’s Surrender cum Rehabilitation Scheme, 2018.  

Meanwhile, the porous international border with Bangladesh (parts of Tripura’s 856-km-long border with Bangladesh are still unfenced due to local disputes) remains a hindrance, with numerous infiltration attempts by Bangladeshis and Rohingyas owning to the tumultuous state in the neighbouring country. A report compiled by BSF noted that, from January 2023 to April 15, 2024, as many as 1,018 persons, including 498 Bangladeshi nationals, were detained in Tripura while attempting to cross the Indo-Bangla international border.  In the year 2023, a statement by BSF on January 2, 2024, as noted by SAIR earlier, a total of 744 people had been arrested by BSF while they were trying to illegally enter India from Bangladesh through the international border in Tripura. Among the detained individuals in 2023, 112 were identified as Rohingyas, while 337 were Bangladeshis, and 295 were Indians. In June and July 2024, more than 250 Bangladeshi nationals and Rohingyas were caught while infiltrating. 

The most recent agreement which that brought an amicable resolution between NLFT, ATTF, the Government of Tripura and the Union Government, is a milestone for India’s policy towards the Northeast. NLFT and ATTF armed cadre have agreed to uphold national integrity and take part in the peaceful democratic process, ending the 35-year-long conflict in Tripura. At the same pace, the Government of India affirmed its commitment to the development of the North-East “while preserving the culture, language, identity of people of North-East.” 

• Priyanka Devi Kshetrimayum
  Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Efforts at building bridges are on, but the breach is palpable     

The post-Sheikh Hasina interim government in Bangladesh headed by Nobel Laureate Dr.Muhammad Yunus (84) has clearly won hearts in the West led by the United States. Yunus' recent visit to the US to attend the UN General Assembly session is testimony to this.

But Bangladesh's rapprochement with neighbouring India does not seem to be imminent despite a change of stance on both sides that gives hope of an understanding emerging from the welter of contentious issues eventually.   

Yunus and US President Joe Biden not only met but displayed good chemistry, with Biden hugging Yunus like a dear friend. On the contrary, Yunus and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not meet at all! Again in contrast, Yunus met India's bete noire, Pakistani PM Shebaz Sharif. 

However, there was a meeting between the Bangladesh Foreign Advisor Touhid Hossain and Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar. But neither side reported what exactly transpired. The official photograph released by the Indian External Affairs ministry showed Hossain smiling and Jaishankar looking grim and disapproving. There is, clearly, a question mark over the real state of bilateral relations post-Hasina. 

India was understandably upset with the change of guard in Dhaka as it had a special relationship with Sheikh Hasina and her family over decades. Indo-Bangla bilateral relations had reached the pinnacle under Hasina's 15-year rule. But the close association between the two was seen in a very unfavourable light in post-Hasina Bangladesh.

On its part, India was worried about anti-Indian outfits like the Jamaat-i-Islami, and other radical and pro-Pakistan outfits gaining control, either directly or indirectly through the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). The BNP has a history of antagonism towards India. Memories of BNP governments sheltering Indian separatists are fresh in Indian minds. 

The role the Bangladesh army was also of concern as India had had a troubled relationship with it between 1975 and 1990 when army Generals disrupted Bangladesh or ruled it in turns to force the government to adopt anti-India policies.  

The ultra-nationalist mass media in India, seeking high viewership,  stoked the fires of suspicion and antagonism towards the new Bangladesh. On the other hand, the media in Bangladesh stressed Indo-Bangla differences over a variety of sensitive issues and kept up the chant that Hasina must be extradited from India, thus putting New Delhi in a tight political and diplomatic spot. 

However, both the Yunus government and the Indian foreign policy  Establishment treated the imbroglio over Hasina and other matters with exemplary restraint and caution. Even as it was silent on the issue of Hasina's extradition, New Delhi did not rock the boat by setting her up against Yunus, as conspiracy mongers wanted. 

In fact, Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar expressed confidence that India's relationship with Bangladesh will continue to be "positive and constructive". Speaking at an event titled "India, Asia and the World" hosted by the Asia Society and the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York last Tuesday, Jaishankar decried the propaganda that India is trying to control every political aspect of its neighbours. 

"That's not how it works. It doesn't work, not just for us, it doesn't work for anybody else," Jaishankar said. "At the end of the day," he added: "each of our neighbours will have their own particular dynamics. It's not our intention to suggest that their dynamics must necessarily adhere to what we might consider as being better for us. I think this is the real world."

And further: "Everybody makes their choices and then countries adjust to each other and find ways of working it out. Every country will have its own dynamics. In foreign policy, you try to read, anticipate and then respond to it."

Stressing the particularly close ties with Bangladesh, Jaishankar said:  "What we have done over the last decade is projects of various kinds which have been good for both of us. Economic activity overall has picked up, and logistics of that region has improved."

"Something happens in the region every few years and people suggest that there is some kind of irretrievable situation out there, but you then see the correctives beginning to manifest themselves. I am confident that our relationship would continue to be positive and constructive." 

Rounding it off, Jaishankar said: "I'm very confident at the end of it all, in our neighbourhood, the realities of interdependence or mutual benefit and our ability to get along will serve both our interests. Those realities will assert themselves. That's been the history."

India-BNP Rapprochement  

Reports from Dhaka say that India and the BNP are making tentative moves towards a rapprochement. The recent visit of the Indian High Commissioner to the BNP's office is considered significant. BNP leaders assured the Indian envoy that the party will not allow Bangladesh to be used by Indian separatists, which is India's principal concern.

Amir Khasru Mahmud Chowdhury, a member of the BNP's Standing Committee, told Dhaka Tribune that "there is no reason for relations between India and the BNP to deteriorate." 

To sum up, the picture of Indo-Bangla relations is not exactly cheerful, but there is light at the end of the tunnel.

US-Bangladesh

On the contrary US-Bangla relations appear to be strong and on the upswing. The United States had reasons to be the happiest with the change of guard in Dhaka given its tussles with Hasina over democracy, human rights and the anti-China Indo-Pacific architecture. 

It is also generally believed that the US indirectly supported the anti-Hasina movement and that Yunus was the US candidate for the Chief Advisor's post. 

Yunus met the US President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the side lines of the UNGA in New York. Blinken underscored US support and assistance but linked it to free and fair elections, observance of human and labour rights, media freedom and furtherance of an inclusive, and democratic Bangladesh without corruption.

Yunus met USAID Administrator Samantha Power who pledged US$ 199 million for resettlement of Rohingya refugees. The World Bank President Ajay Banga affirmed US$ 3.5 billion in loans for the energy sector. The Bangladesh media noted that Yunus received much attention from the elite US media, think tanks, and policy makers. 

Yunus' Reforms

While there is bonhomie abroad in the West particularly, Yunus faces significant challenges at home. 

In his August 25 speech, Yunus had outlined an ambitious vision for a "new Bangladesh centred on unity, transparency, and democratic renewal."  On September 11, he laid out specific reforms for real change. Through his NGO Grameen Bank, Yunus had demonstrated how NGOs could drive powerful social and economic change where governments often struggled. 

But Prof. Shafiqul Islam, of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University points out that running a government is an altogether different challenge. It requires navigating political complexities, balancing competing interests, and making painful compromises, he says.  

Islam said that Interim government's reform agenda is promising. But it must ensure that reforms are not a substitute for democratic processes or alienating key political actors.

"Yunus' ability to lead will depend on his skill in coalition-building and maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of both political elites and the public. Members of the Interim Government need to be cautious about becoming entangled in the very political games they seek to transcend. They must strike a delicate balance between being innovative reformers and astute politicians, ensuring that the vision of a new Bangladesh can survive the political process without being compromised by it," he cautioned.

Six Commissions 

Yunus has set up six commissions for a structured and transparent process for addressing corruption, inefficiency, and structural flaws. The commissions are tasked with delivering results within three months, after which consultations with political parties, students, and civil society will take place.

But Shafiqul Islam points out that the critical issue is the lack of representation for ordinary citizens in these commissions. 

"Despite the student-public-led uprising that ousted the previous regime, decision-making remains concentrated among the educated elites and privileged classes, with limited input from the broader public, Shafiqul Islam he observes.   

"To avoid past regime failures, Yunus must include all relevant stakeholders. Nyay (ideal justice) and Niti (procedural justice) have to go together," he urges

As we delve deeper into the digital age, personal data has become the most coveted commodity.  The once intangible promise of technology now faces the harsh reality of data exploitation, where privacy is eroded and the commodification of personal data mirrors the extraction of natural resources. By recognizing this growing threat, in May 2018 the European Union (EU) implemented the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a legal framework that seeks to safeguard individual rights, ensure privacy in the digital era and inspire global change.

Data has become the fuel driving the global economy, yet privacy has become the collateral damage of global development. Cyberspace has been brutalized by rapid monetization and weaponization. For instance, corporations and governments have capitalized access to personal information and individuals are left with minimal control of vast amounts of personal data.  In this case, GDPR has shaped the global conversations of data governance, which has become the blueprint for privacy regulations worldwide, providing individuals major control over their data they are using. Its impact has been evident not only within the EU, but also in regions such as Southeast Asia and Indonesia, nations that look to adopt similar frameworks. GDPR seeks to restore the balance of data, creating a legal framework that empowers individuals and takes into account how data is collected, used and stored in corporations and governments. This accountability is critical because, according to the Journal of the Cyber Policy, in this digital era where data is being misused, data protection is essential for ensuring digital trusts and the integrity of online ecosystems (Ford, 2019). This sets a global standard, the EU has inspired distinct regions, prioritizing that data protection is now a fundamental human right.

Beyond Europe, the GDPR's influence has reverberated across various regions. Southeast Asia and Indonesia, for example, have adopted similar frameworks to enhance data protection and digital trust. But the ripple effect is perhaps most significant in Latin America, where countries are increasingly aligning their data protection laws with international standards. Brazil’s Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados (LGPD), enacted in 2020, mirrors many of GDPR’s key provisions, while Mexico’s comprehensive updates to its data protection laws signal a commitment to aligning with global expectations. Argentina, recognized for its early adoption of privacy regulations, continues to revise its framework to meet GDPR standards, while Colombia’s Law 1581and Ecuador’s new Organic Law on Data Protection are testaments to the region’s growing focus on protecting individual rights in the digital landscape.

As Latin American countries continue to strengthen their regulatory frameworks, they are not only protecting the privacy of their citizens but also positioning themselves as key players in the global digital economy. This regional evolution demonstrates how GDPR has inspired a global movement toward prioritizing data protection as a fundamental human right, shaping the future of data governance across the Western Hemisphere and beyond.

Latin America and GDPR Influence

Latin America, like many regions around the world, has faced significant challenges in the implementation of comprehensive data protection laws. However, GDPR has had a noticeable ripple effect across the continent, influencing countries to adopt similar frameworks. Latin American countries, driven by the need to modernize their data protection frameworks to facilitate international trade and digitalization, have increasingly aligned their laws with GDPR principles.

One of the most prominent examples of GDPR’s influence is Brazil’s Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados (LGPD), which came into force in 2020. Modeled closely on GDPR, the LGPD sets out comprehensive rules for how personal data must be collected, processed, and stored. It grants individuals the right to access, correct, and delete their data, similar to the rights conferred under GDPR. The LGPD also imposes significant fines on companies that fail to comply, mirroring GDPR’s strict enforcement mechanisms. The Brazilian government has established the Autoridade Nacional de Proteção de Dados (ANPD), the national data protection authority, which is responsible for ensuring compliance with LGPD and addressing privacy violations (Marini & Figueiredo, 2019).

Brazil has already seen cases that test the effectiveness of the LGPD. One of the first major data breaches under LGPD involved a leaked database containing the personal information of over 200 million Brazilians. The breach, which occurred in early 2021, exposed names, addresses, and sensitive tax information. The ANPD launched an investigation into the breach, highlighting how seriously the country is taking data protection in this new regulatory environment (Braga, 2021). The incident also underscored the growing need for Latin American nations to adopt robust frameworks to address such large-scale breaches and protect citizens' privacy.

In Mexico, the Federal Law on the Protection of Personal Data Held by Private Parties, passed in 2010, serves as the foundation of the country’s data protection regime. Though it predates GDPR, the law shares many similarities, including provisions on data portability, the right to rectification, and stringent penalties for non-compliance. In recent years, Mexico has been working to update its framework to better align with GDPR and strengthen protections for personal data, especially in light of increasing cross-border data flows with the EU (Reding, 2021).

Argentina was one of the first countries in Latin America to adopt a comprehensive data protection framework with its 2000 Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA). Recognized by the EU as offering an “adequate level of protection” for data transfers, Argentina has maintained strong privacy standards. In 2018, Argentina announced plans to update its PDPA to further align with GDPR, as it seeks to enhance its competitiveness in the global digital economy (Belli, 2021). Argentina’s existing framework already provides individuals with the right to access, correct, and delete their data, but the proposed reforms will add more stringent requirements for data controllers, especially in terms of obtaining explicit consent and strengthening the role of the data protection authority.

Colombia, one of the most digitally advanced countries in Latin America, also has a robust data protection regime. In 2012, Colombia enacted Law 1581, also known as the "Habeas Data Law," which provides a comprehensive framework for the protection of personal data. The law is similar to GDPR in several respects, including granting individuals the right to access, rectify, and delete their data. Colombia’s Superintendence of Industry and Commerce (SIC) serves as the regulatory body for data protection and has been actively enforcing the law, with significant penalties imposed on companies for data breaches and misuse (García, 2021).

Colombia has embraced GDPR’s influence, particularly in its emphasis on data security and the need for transparency in the handling of personal information. For example, in 2019, the SIC imposed a major fine on a Colombian telecommunications company for failing to comply with data protection laws, demonstrating the country's commitment to ensuring data privacy. Colombia is currently exploring updates to Law 1581 to strengthen it further, with a focus on adapting to emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and big data analytics (García, 2021).

In Ecuador, data protection has historically been weaker than in some of its neighbors, but the country is now making strides toward establishing a comprehensive framework. In 2021, Ecuador enacted its first-ever data protection law, the Organic Law on Data Protection (OLDP), which took inspiration from GDPR. This law establishes clear rules for data processing, requiring companies to obtain consent before collecting personal data and allowing individuals to request the deletion of their data under certain circumstances (Sánchez, 2021). Ecuador’s move toward GDPR-like legislation is seen as a significant step forward in a country where data breaches have become more common in recent years.

For example, in 2019, Ecuador experienced one of the largest data breaches in its history, involving the personal information of over 20 million people, including deceased individuals and children. The breach highlighted Ecuador’s vulnerability to cyberattacks and the urgent need for a comprehensive data protection framework. The OLDP is intended to address these vulnerabilities by providing clearer guidelines for data controllers and empowering individuals to take control of their personal information (Sánchez, 2021).

Privacy in the Digital Economy

Digital economies that are rapidly expanding, such as ASEAN regions, GDPR is an essential guide for shaping privacy laws. In 2012, the ASEAN Human Rights of Declaration adopted the protection of personal data as a fundamental right, reflecting a regional acknowledgment of the need for more builded privacy protections (ASEAN, 2012). On the other hand, countries like Indonesia, with a burgeoning e-commerce market, face similar challenges similar to those that GDPR seeks to address. For example, in 1945 the Indonesian Constitution mandated the protection and welfare of its citizens, which aligns with the GDPR’s key principles of privacy and human dignity. As the government of Indonesia emphasizes, Indonesia’s law No.11 of Information and Electronic Transactions details the importance of extra-territorial jurisdiction in regulating cross-border data flows. This is critical since digital data transactions increasingly cross national borders. Yet, by adopting comprehensive privacy laws that go in hand with GDPR, Indonesia could strengthen its data governance and rank itself as a leader in Southeast Asia’s digital economy. 

Latin American countries also find themselves in a similar position. As digital economies expand in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, the adoption of GDPR-like regulations is becoming more urgent. These regulations are critical for establishing trust in digital transactions and creating a foundation for long-term economic growth. Data protection frameworks modeled on GDPR are essential for fostering international business relationships, particularly with regions like the EU, where data privacy standards are high (Reding, 2021). By aligning with GDPR, Latin American countries not only protect their citizens' rights but also position themselves as competitive players in the global digital economy.

Cryptography and Data Security

Besides privacy, cryptography is an essential tool for data protection nowadays. In this case, GDPR emphasizes the need for the organizations to adopt strong encryption practices in order to safeguard data from cyber threats (European Union, 2018). Cryptography has two purposes: protect civilian data and ensure national security. This is essential because for countries like Indonesia, the balance between privacy and national security is extremely delicate. As stated by The Jakarta Post, Indonesia has already begun to develop policies to aim for a well developed cybersecurity process, but more comprehensive regulations should also be standardized since they are needed to protect personal data effectively (2019). 

Similarly, in Latin America, data security is an increasingly important concern. With the rise of digital transactions and the growth of e-commerce, Latin American countries are beginning to implement encryption standards to protect sensitive data. Brazil’s LGPD includes provisions for data security and mandates that organizations adopt measures to safeguard personal data, including the use of cryptography. These developments are crucial for ensuring that data is protected from breaches and cyberattacks, which have become more frequent across the region (Marini & Figueiredo, 2019).

Overall, GDPR provides a valuable model. It explains and regulates organizations to notify authorities immediately in the event of a data breach, meanwhile ensuring transparency and accountability. In addition, GDPR highlights data minimization, this requires organizations to collect only the necessary data for their operations, which sets a crucial standard for reducing any risk associated with data misuse. 

The Right to be Forgotten

The right to be forgotten and data probability are mechanisms introduced in GDPR, which allows individuals to control their personal data in an efficient manner. According to the European Union, these rights empower citizens to request their transfer of data from one organization to another, and have the right to erase their data if needed; this provides citizens a sense of ownership in the digital realm (2019). Furthermore, as noted by the Journal of Law and Cyber Warfare, the right to be forgotten is particularly relevant in the context of social media, since in this platforms vast amount of personal information is being shared an often misused (Zimmerman, 2020).For example, in Indonesia these provisions are crucial because they address the growing concerns around data misuse and ensures citizens they are protected from unauthorized data exploitation. Implementing a robust right to be forgotten, Indonesia, and many other countries, are protecting its citizens from the long term consequences of data misuse. 

The Caribbean and Latin America are also witnessing the growing importance of the right to be forgotten. Brazil’s LGPD, for instance, grants individuals the right to request the deletion of their data when it is no longer needed, mirroring GDPR’s provisions. This right is especially relevant in the context of online platforms and social media, where personal data can be easily misused (Marini & Figueiredo, 2019). As Latin American countries continue to implement GDPR-like frameworks, the right to be forgotten will become an essential tool for protecting citizens’ digital rights.The right to be forgotten is not only about protecting privacy but also about safeguarding human dignity. 

A Global Blueprint

Moreover, GDPR has set new standards by balancing the rights of individuals with the interests of businesses and governments. GDPR represents a global shift in how personal data is managed. For instance, in Southeast Asia, its spillover effect is evident, this is because these types of countries are beginning to recognize the importance of comprehensive data protection frameworks. The ASEAN region, which is home to one of the world’s fastest-growing digital economies, stands to benefit immensely from adopting GDPR-like regulations. By prioritizing privacy and data security, ASEAN nations can foster greater trust in digital transactions and position themselves as leaders in the global digital economy.

This similar trajectory is being followed in Latin America. By implementing GDPR-inspired frameworks, countries like Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina are not only protecting their citizens' digital rights but also positioning themselves as competitive players in the global digital marketplace. The adoption of GDPR-like laws in Latin America is essential for fostering trust in digital transactions, ensuring compliance with international standards, and protecting the rights of individuals in an increasingly interconnected world (Reding, 2021). 

Latin America: Looking Ahead

As Latin America continues to develop its digital infrastructure and integrate more deeply into the global economy, data protection will become an increasingly critical issue. The region’s adoption of GDPR-like frameworks, as seen in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, and Ecuador, reflects a growing recognition of the importance of data governance in the digital age. However, Latin American countries face unique challenges in implementing these frameworks, including the diversity of legal systems, varying levels of technological development, and limited resources for enforcement.

Looking ahead, Latin American countries will need to address these challenges by building stronger enforcement mechanisms and ensuring that data protection authorities have the resources and expertise necessary to oversee compliance. Furthermore, as the region continues to embrace new technologies such as AI and the Internet of Things (IoT), existing data protection frameworks will need to be updated to reflect the complexities of data flows in an increasingly interconnected world.

Latin America's journey toward GDPR-like data protection frameworks is a work in progress, but the region is on the right path. As countries continue to strengthen their laws and align with international standards, they will not only enhance their citizens' digital rights but also position themselves as competitive players in the global digital economy. The future of data protection in Latin America will hinge on the region's ability to balance privacy rights with economic growth, ensuring that personal data is protected while fostering innovation and investment.

Conclusion

The lessons from Europe’s GDPR and its counterparts in Latin America extend beyond these regions, offering a global blueprint for balancing individual rights with the interests of businesses and governments. By safeguarding privacy in the digital age, GDPR has catalyzed the adoption of similar frameworks in countries like Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. These countries recognize that data protection is essential for fostering trust, innovation, and economic growth in an increasingly interconnected world.

The digital age presents both unprecedented opportunities and risks. Individuals today are more vulnerable to data exploitation, as vast amounts of personal information are collected, processed, and stored by corporations and governments. The risks associated with data misuse are significant, ranging from privacy violations to identity theft and the erosion of personal autonomy. GDPR, by providing a comprehensive legal framework for data protection, has addressed many of these concerns, ensuring that individuals retain control over their personal data.

Furthermore, GDPR-inspired regulations in Latin America, such as Brazil’s LGPD and Argentina’s data protection reforms, demonstrate how global privacy standards can empower citizens and ensure accountability. These frameworks emphasize the importance of transparency, consent, and data minimization, creating a more secure digital ecosystem where individuals' rights are prioritized.

However, the adoption of GDPR-like regulations is not only about protecting personal data—it’s about fostering trust in digital economies. As technology continues to evolve, the ethical handling of personal data will be critical for maintaining public trust and ensuring that digital innovation benefits society as a whole. Governments worldwide must invest in enforcement mechanisms, educate citizens about their rights, and collaborate to create interoperable data protection frameworks.

Ultimately, the adoption of comprehensive data protection regulations like GDPR ensures that the digital world remains a space for innovation, freedom, and trust. By safeguarding privacy and promoting responsible data governance, governments can help shape a future where technology enhances human dignity, economic growth, and global connectivity, while protecting citizens from the growing risks of the digital age.

About the authors:

• Anis H. Bajrektarevic is chairperson and professor in international law and global political studies, Vienna, Austria.  He has authored nine books (for American and European publishers) and numerous articles on, mainly, geopolitics energy and technology. Professor is editor of the NY-based GHIR (Geopolitics, History and Intl. Relations) journal, and editorial board member of several similar specialized magazines on three continents. His 10^th book ‘Justice and Home Affairs Diplomacy’ is scheduled for release later this year in New York.
• Valentina Carvajal Caballero of the Colombia ’s Universidad de Los Andes, is specializing in communication and digital media. As an Information Officer at IFIMES, she applies her expertise in research and digital transformation to advance the organization's goals. Founder of Clan Nativus Phydigital Agendas, Valentina combines her entrepreneurial drive with a deep understanding of Latin American digital landscapes to promote positive change through technology.

Source: The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of IFIMES.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) are fundamentally transforming financial markets, influencing various aspects ranging from trading operations to investment strategies.

The capacity of AI to analyze extensive volumes of data at unparalleled speeds enhances efficiency, precision, and profitability. However, these advancements also introduce potential risks, including market manipulation, systemic instability, and ethical concerns. To fully leverage the benefits of AI within financial markets, a balanced approach to development is imperative, integrating innovation with regulatory measures to ensure fairness and stability in a rapidly evolving landscape. 

One of the most notable impacts of AI on financial markets is observed in algorithmic trading, particularly high-frequency trading (HFT). AI models facilitate the execution of trades within microseconds, employing complex algorithms to identify opportunities and make decisions at a pace unattainable by human traders. These systems analyze historical data, market signals, and even unconventional datasets, such as social media sentiment or satellite imagery, to forecast price movements and execute trades. This combination of speed and precision has rendered AI indispensable in trading, resulting in reduced transaction costs, increased liquidity, and enhanced competitive advantages for firms.

Nevertheless, the emergence of algorithmic trading is not devoid of challenges. AI-driven trades, especially in HFT, can contribute to market instability, most notably exemplified by “flash crashes,” wherein automated trading algorithms initiate rapid sell-offs in response to price fluctuations. Such occurrences underscore the risks associated with an overreliance on algorithms that operate without human oversight, rendering markets vulnerable to sudden volatility. Furthermore, AI systems may generate feedback loops in which similar algorithms, responding to the same data inputs, exacerbate market movements. The systemic risk associated with these technologies necessitates careful management to avert potential market disruptions.

In addition to trading, AI's influence on predictive analytics and investment strategies is significantly reshaping the asset management industry. Machine learning models are increasingly employed to develop sophisticated, data-driven investment strategies that leverage vast datasets for predicting market trends, optimizing portfolios, and enhancing risk management. Asset managers can utilize AI to adjust portfolios in real time, ensuring optimal return-to-risk ratios based on continuously evolving data.

Notably, hedge funds such as Renaissance Technologies have effectively harnessed AI's predictive capabilities to achieve substantial returns through quantitative trading models that surpass traditional human analysis. While the potential of artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance investment strategies is substantial, the technology also introduces new risks, particularly about bias inherent in AI models. AI systems are trained on historical data, and if such data reflects biased or incomplete information, the resulting models may perpetuate these biases within decision-making processes. In the financial sector, this could lead to inequitable outcomes, especially in areas such as lending, credit scoring, and wealth management, where biases may exacerbate economic disparities. Ethical concerns surrounding transparency and accountability in AI decision-making have prompted increasing calls for regulatory frameworks that effectively address potential discrimination and bias in financial models.

The growing prevalence of AI in financial markets also raises apprehensions regarding market manipulation. AI can be exploited for unethical purposes, including algorithmic strategies specifically designed to manipulate stock prices. Techniques such as spoofing—where substantial orders are placed and subsequently cancelled to affect prices—can be more readily executed through AI-driven trading platforms, thereby posing significant risks to market integrity. Regulatory bodies, including the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), have levied substantial fines against traders employing such tactics; however, the escalating sophistication of AI complicates the detection and prevention of manipulation. 

To mitigate these risks, there is an increasing imperative for regulatory oversight that evolves alongside AI innovations. Existing financial regulations were conceived for human-managed markets and are often inadequately equipped to address the intricacies of AI systems. Regulators must establish frameworks that incorporate the distinctive characteristics of AI, such as its ability for real-time decision-making and the opacity of certain machine learning models. A globally coordinated regulatory approach will be necessary to ensure that AI technologies are utilized responsibly and ethically within financial markets, striking a balance between fostering innovation and safeguarding market participants. 

Despite these challenges, AI possesses the potential to substantially enhance risk and compliance management within financial institutions. AI tools can facilitate the detection of fraudulent activities, the assessment of credit risk, and compliance with multifaceted regulatory mandates, such as Anti-Money Laundering (AML) laws. By automating these processes, AI diminishes the manual workload on compliance departments while enhancing accuracy and efficiency.

Furthermore, AI is increasingly employed to monitor markets for suspicious activity in real-time, thereby enabling regulators and institutions to preemptively address financial crimes before they materialize. The future of artificial intelligence (AI) in finance transcends traditional domains such as trading and asset management. The emergence of robo-advisors and AI-driven personalized financial services is democratizing access to advanced financial planning tools, enabling individual investors to receive customized advice at reduced costs. These systems utilize AI's data processing capabilities to construct tailored portfolios aligned with investors' specific goals and risk profiles, thereby providing services that were previously exclusive to high-net-worth individuals. Furthermore, the integration of AI with blockchain technology and decentralized finance (DeFi) is positioned to establish new financial ecosystems that may further disrupt conventional markets by eliminating intermediaries and enhancing transaction transparency.

In conclusion, the influence of AI on financial markets is significant, offering transformative opportunities in trading, investment strategies, and risk management. Nonetheless, as these technologies continue to advance, they also present substantial risks, including market manipulation, systemic instability, and ethical dilemmas such as bias. To effectively leverage the potential of AI, financial institutions and regulators must collaborate to develop comprehensive oversight frameworks that address these risks while promoting innovation. A balanced approach is essential—one that fosters technological advancement while ensuring the maintenance of market fairness, transparency, and stability.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own.

References

• Bartram, Söhnke M., et al. "Artificial Intelligence in Finance: Challenges, Opportunities, and Implications." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55.1 (2020): 33-54.
• Narang, Rishi. Inside the Black Box: The Simple Truth about Quantitative Trading. John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
• Phillips, Peter C.B., et al. "Flash Crashes and High-Frequency Trading: An Evaluation of Risk Models." Journal of Financial Economics 119.1 (2016): 45-62.
• Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder. Random House, 2012.
• U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). "SEC Charges Traders in Spoofing Schemes in Stock and Options Markets." SEC Press Release, 2019.

Proclaiming 10 years of Make in India a big success, Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goel was euphoric to claim India more competent than China+1 strategy. He said, “India is competitive, not dependent on China+1”, focusing Ease of Doing Business and improving India’s ranking.

Incidentally, Commerce Minster’ claim turned over-emphatic. South East Asia emerged a more attractive destination for foreign investors with the advent of China+1 strategy. Foreign investment spurred in South East Asia  ( ASEAN 10) with mega share of  investment shifting from China. In contrast, foreign investment in India plunged. Make in India lost steam, leading to manufacturing growth at an abysmally low level.  

Exports of ASEAN surged to double digit growth, while  India’s exports underscored an erratic trend. India topped in unemployment, while ASEAN inched up for slender growth in unemployment.     

China+1 is a supply chain strategy. It garnered global attention between 2014 and 2015. It sparked a new movement for diversifying from China, due to escalating costs of labour in China, minimizing  supply chain dependency on China and increase sourcing options in other Asian countries. The goal was to reduce the risks of over dependence on a single nation for sourcing and manufacturing. Now, 10 years later, China+1 has seen a resurgence, fueled by geopolitical tensions, and COVID19.

China+1 means foreign investors will allow business to continue in China, while spreading their expansions across multiple countries, which are considered “Plus One”     

Sadly the success story of Make in India has failed. It lost steam and its target. The key objective of Make in India was to boost the share of manufacturing in GDP from 17-18 percent in 2014 to 22 per cent in 2022. On the contrary, the share declined over the decade. It declined from 18.2 percent in 2015-16  to 17.3 percent in 2023-24. 

Exports plummeted during the ten years period of Make in India. Share of exports in GDP declined from 15.2 percent in 2014-15 to 12.2 percent in 2023-24.  

Foreign investment in India plunged. This is despite the fact that India was among few countries which underscored one of the highest global growth. Foreign investment declined by 19.5 percent during the three years period of 2021 to 2023. 

Eventually, unemployment skyrocketed. India topped unemployment in South Asia and South East Asia countries. It hovers around 7-8 percent during 2016-17 to 2023-24 -  the period which was proclaimed for the success of Make in India. In contrast, ASEAN unemployment inched to slender growth -  by  0.98 percent in Thailand, 1.6 percent in Vietnam and 5.2 percent in China. 

Unemployment became the core issue in 2024 general election. It has been alleged as  one of the major issues for Modi losing his charisma and BJP losing a majority in Lok Sabha 

This raised alarm over the present Government's economic success as well as the success of Make in India.  Eventually, the Government prompted for job creation incentive in the Fiscal Budget for 2024-25. Incentives will be given to the employers to expand employment opportunities. Sarcastically, it has been argued that how can an employer increase employment without expansion in manufacturing. Virtually, India would be the first nation to introduce job creation incentive in the world.    

In contrast, South East Asia emerged as a more attractive destination for foreign investors to reap the windfall of China+1 strategy. Foreign investment (FDI) in ASEAN increased by 10.7 percent in 2023 over 2021. The trigger in FDI was due to massive investment shift by USA. It spurred by 125.3 percent in 2023 over 2021. The mega share of US investment in ASEAN was  diversifying of investment from China under the China+1 strategy. 

Eventually, ASEAN  global exports boomed, despite COVID 19 deterrence. ASEAN exports surged by 14.9 percent in 2022 over 2021. Here also, USA became the trigger, being the biggest export destination, followed by EU. Exports to USA spurred by 13.5 percent in 2022 over 2021, followed by exports to EU, which increased by over 15 percent during the same period. 

Then, why has India failed to reap the benefits of China+1 strategy? The crucial issues were India failing in the race to South East Asia and embargo on Chinese investment.

Over the ten years period, the supply chain emerged as the major global manufacturing template. It accounts for 40 percent of world trade. Its disruption due to COVID 19 caused a major deterrent to global manufacturing. 

China has been the world factory for supply chain manufacturing and hub for world trade. The COVID 19 pandemic inflicted a hemorrhage to China manufacturing, which led world growth to plunge. World GDP growth declined to 3.2 percent in 2022, from 6 percent in 2021. 

Till COVID 19, India focused on Make in India. This represented domestic production – from beginning to end  – neglecting  the priority on supply chain production  in consonance with global trend. It was PLI scheme , which inducted the initiative of supply chain manufacturing and global integration.   

Besides, the embargo on Chinese investment became major deterrent to the diversification of foreign investment to India from China. To this end, the sudden downfall of USA investment in India is a case in point. USA MNCs in China were reluctant to shift to India since their Chinese supply chain manufacturers were barred to enter India. 

This is despite the fact that USA and western assemblers viewed India a better destination for manufacture than China. Even though India is lagging behind China in critical components manufacture, they preferred India for long term benefits. 

To this end, India’s recent voltae face to Chinese investment raises hope for India’s resurgence for foreign investment destination. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitaraman supported Economic Adviser’s suggestion to focus on Chinese investment in India in Economic Survey 2023-24.  

India achieved spurring  growth in electronic and automobile industries. But the growth relied more on imports from China. With the ease of Chinese investment in India, India is likely to be more attractive destination for foreign investment in these industries with lesser dependence on imports. 

Should we be one step ahead to encourage Chinese investment, burying the the security concern argument? 

Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban just announced the country will re-open its embassy in Muscat, Oman.

This follows the United Arab Emirates’ acceptance of the credentials of the Afghan ambassador in August. And in January, Chinese leader Xi Jinping personally accepted the credentials of the Afghan ambassador to Beijing. (China’s new ambassador to Afghanistan was officially received  in September 2023.)

And in July, the Taliban government withdrew recognition from the embassies established by the ousted Islamic Republic, shuttering outposts in several European countries, and bringing the number of embassies and consulates they control to 39.

The countries bordering Afghanistan have taken a different approach than the U.S. and Europe and have maintained embassies in Kabul and actively engaged the government, though none have officially recognized the new government.

There are currently seventeen embassies plus a European Union delegation in Kabul. (Qatar represents U.S. interests in Kabul.)

In Central Asia, Kazakhstan removed the Taliban from its terrorist list in December 2023; Uzbekistan never declared the Taliban an extremist group and in 2018 publicly encouraged the Taliban to start negotiations with the Islamic Republic. Turkmenistan was mum on the topic of the Taliban in line with its policy of permanent neutrality. In September 2024, the chief of Tajikistan’s security service visited Kabul for talks that were described as “productive,” and the same month the Kyrgyz Republic removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations.

Uzbekistan’s prime minister visited Kabul in August and the visit resulted in 35 investment and trade agreements worth $2.5 billion, with a goal of increasing bilateral trade to $3 billion. Simultaneously, Kabul hosted a trilateral meeting of  the economy ministers of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan on ways to enhance regional trade ties.

Two weeks later, Uzbek and Afghan officials attended the opening of the Termez International Trade Center, in the border town of Termez, the location of the Friendship Bridge that connects Termez with the Afghan dry port of Hairatan.

Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors are collaborating to ease trade and transport; renovate Afghanistan’s roads and railroads; help Afghanistan improve irrigation projects; ship natural gas from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; build a railroad from Uzbekistan to Pakistan’s seaports; and build a multi-modal transport corridor from Kazakhstan to Pakistan, terminating in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

So, while the Central Asian republics are busy trying to set the terms for future relations with Afghanistan, when will the Americans return to Kabul?

Probably not for a long time.

The U.S. evacuated its embassy in South Vietnam when Saigon fell in April 1975 and did not lift the trade embargo until 1994, though an arms embargo was in place until 2016. Both countries opened embassies in 1995. That is 41 years to resume “normal” relations and that was probably only because China’s power in the region was waxing.

Why might the U.S. be slow to return to Kabul?

U.S. officials and politicians are still angry and humiliated that after two decades, unlimited funding, and loose rules of engagement, America was bested by the low-tech Taliban. Human rights advocates, diaspora Afghans, 9-11 families, and veteran groups may oppose normal relations, with the latter urging U.S. leaders to “honor the sacrifice” of the dead and wounded troops

The United States has imposed a range of sanctions on the Taliban, dating back to their first time in power in the 1990s. These sanctions were tightened after the 11 September 11 2001 attacks on the U.S. The Taliban and the Haqqani Network were labeled as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, allowing U.S. authorities to block and seize their assets and making it a crime to do business with them.

Additionally, the U.S. has frozen more than $7 billion in Afghan government reserves held in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Unwinding the sanctions will be long and difficult and Western businesses will still be reluctant to deal with a Taliban government unless they get approval up-front, which the U.S. sanctions bosses will refuse to do.

And the U.S. is offering rewards for the capture of high-ranking Taliban personalities, so the Afghan government won’t be motivated to deal with U.S. as long as Americans are offering  bounties for their capture.

Are the Taliban in any hurry to welcome the Americans back to Kabul?

Probably not, as they feel they won the war and they shouldn’t be the ones asking for anything. They may be able to get investment from China, and Russia and India will offer trade and some diplomatic support. They are busy dealing with Iran and Pakistan over the millions of Afghan refugees they are hosting, and are starting to expel. Pakistan is angry the Taliban haven’t done anything to rein in the Pakistan Taliban, and Kabul needs to keep an eye on Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

The Taliban are seized with the Qosh Tepa Canal in a quest for food security, and that may drive negotiating water sharing agreements with the Central Asia republics. In addition, Afghanistan and Iran and Pakistan also have outstanding disagreements on sharing water resources. The Taliban also want to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative and that probably won’t happen soon but it burn up a lot of time trying to convince Beijing they are a good bet.

In addition to the 39 embassies and consulates overseas now in its hands, in the past year Kabul has sent  dozens of diplomats to 11 countries, including Turkey, Russia, Iran and Pakistan, according to Taliban’s acting foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. The Taliban is using diplomacy to ensure the Islamic Emirate is recognized as the de facto government of Afghanistan.

Aaron Zelin observes “the Taliban is far less isolated today than it was during its first iteration.” Since 2021, it has had over 1300 meetings with at least 80 countries, has hosted political and business delegations in Kabul, and, since multilateral for are all the rage, inaugurated the Afghanistan Regional Cooperation Initiative in January 2024, which included China, India, Russia, Iran, and most of the surrounding countries.

By going slow and using intermediaries to engage Kabul, Washington can tsk-tsk about Taliban policies but publicly doesn’t have to do much 0ther than issuing sternly-worded demarches. The Americans may also want to wait for more pragmatic leaders to take over when the hard-liners in Kandahar pass from the scene, but “pragmatic” may not equal interest in power-sharing or a more representative government.

And the diplomats, military commanders, spies, and politicians who presided over the constructive loss of American credibility and prestige are still on the scene in Washington. Though they have yet to give public accounting of what all those dollars and lives (American and Afghan) were for, they and their confederates will advise going slowly on openly treating with the Kabul government as it will renew interest in their actions over the two decades after 9/11 when America privileged a military response over statecraft in response to every challenge.

• This article was published at Defense.Info

By Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr

The 118th Congress may engage the Biden Administration with regard to U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia’s National Project for Atomic Energy and the potential for future U.S.- Saudi nuclear energy cooperation. In May 2022, Saudi Arabia invited technical bids related to the planned construction of two nuclear reactors, and, in January 2023, a Saudi minister restated the kingdom’s intention to use its domestic uranium resources for producing low-enriched uranium (LEU) as nuclear fuel.

Congress and successive Administrations have sought the kingdom’s commitment to forgo the most proliferation- sensitive nuclear facilities—those for enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to obtain plutonium—and Saudi Arabia’s acceptance of enhanced international safeguards on its nuclear program. Previous Administrations linked prospects for a U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement to these conditions, and Congress has limited the use of certain funds to support possible U.S. nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia unless the kingdom makes such commitments. Depending on its nature and extent, possible future U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation may require Department of Energy (DOE) authorizations and/or congressional approval of U.S.-Saudi agreements.

Saudi Nuclear Plans and Policy

In July 2017, Saudi Arabia approved a National Project for Atomic Energy, including plans to build large and small nuclear reactors for electricity production and water desalination. The project is part of a broader Saudi government effort to diversify the kingdom’s economy and expand the use of non-fossil-fuel-based energy. Saudi Arabia holds 16% of the world’s proven reserves of crude oil, has the world’s fourth-largest reserves of natural gas, and consumes the second most energy in the Middle East. Oil and natural gas generate roughly 39% and 60% of the kingdom’s electricity, respectively.

Saudi authorities have worked to develop required legal and regulatory frameworks with the support of the IAEA. Agency officials completed a nuclear infrastructure review in Saudi Arabia in 2018 and issued a final report in January 2019. The kingdom established a Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Commission in March 2018, and, in March 2022, created the Saudi Nuclear Energy Holding Company (SNEHC) to develop and operate planned nuclear facilities.

In 2017, the Saudi government solicited marketing information from potential international partner companies for reactor construction; it has since extended its formal bidding process several times. In May 2022, Saudi officials invited technical bids from companies in Russia, China, and South Korea related to the planned construction of two 1.4 giga-watt electric (GWe) reactors at Khor Duweihin, a coastal area between the kingdom’s borders with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

According to Saudi officials, the kingdom intends to develop the capacity to produce nuclear fuel using domestic resources. In 2019, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abd al Aziz bin Salman Al Saud said, “even if we scale up [nuclear power] ... we want to go to the full cycle, to producing the uranium, enriching the uranium.” The minister further stated in January 2023 that Saudi Arabia intends to use its substantial domestic uranium resources for producing LEU.

Saudi Arabia is a state party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which requires the government to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all nuclear facilities. Such comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA) impede the development of nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has not concluded an additional protocol to its CSA. Such a protocol would improve the IAEA’s ability to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities and activities. Saudi Arabia’s CSA does include a small quantities protocol (SQP) which, according to the IAEA, “holds in abeyance” most comprehensive safeguards agreement procedures if the government neither possesses more than a specified amount of nuclear material nor has introduced nuclear material into a facility. The kingdom submitted a request to the IAEA in July 2024 to rescind the SQP and "implement the full" CSA. Other international mechanisms are designed to restrict the spread of sensitive nuclear technology, including enrichment technology.

In 2020, Saudi authorities denied press reports citing unnamed Western officials claiming that Saudi Arabia, with China’s help, built a facility for milling uranium oxide ore. Saudi Arabia’s IAEA safeguards agreement requires the government to declare such a facility to the agency. Other press reports discussed another possible undeclared site.

Threats to the security of critical Saudi infrastructure may raise concerns about the security of Saudi nuclear facilities. The U.S. government notes security threats in Saudi Arabia from terrorist groups and hostile regional actors, including missile and rocket attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and government facilities that U.S. officials attribute to Iran or Iran-backed groups. Ongoing U.S.-Saudi security cooperation seeks to mitigate these threats and others.

U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation

In 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) stating bilateral intent to cooperate on nuclear activities in the fields of medicine, industry, and electricity production. The nonbinding MOU stated Saudi Arabia’s intent “to rely on existing international markets for nuclear fuel services as an alternative to the pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing.”

The Obama and Trump Administrations engaged the kingdom on the prospects for reaching a bilateral civil nuclear energy agreement, including through formal negotiations over the text of a proposed “123 agreement” (see below) in 2012 and 2018. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in 2020 that the governments had “not made significant progress toward a nuclear cooperation agreement because of persistent differences ... over nonproliferation conditions, including U.S. insistence that Saudi Arabia conclude an Additional Protocol with the IAEA and that Saudi Arabia agree to restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing.” The State Department said in August 2020 that the United States would seek an agreement “with strong nonproliferation protections that will enable Saudi and U.S. nuclear industries to cooperate.”

National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Jill Hruby and Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm have talked to Saudi leaders about the government’s nuclear program, Hruby told the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2023, adding that the Administration is “asking the Saudis to be consistent with nonproliferation standards that we have for every other country that we work with.”

In June 2023, the Saudi Foreign Minister said the kingdom would “very much prefer to be able to have the U.S. as one of the bidders” for its program. As of July 2024, China National Nuclear Corporation, EDF of France, the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), and Rosatom of Russia reportedly were approved bidders.

From 2017 to 2019, DOE granted seven “Part 810” authorizations (per 10 C.F.R. §810) for U.S. companies to engage in civil nuclear discussions, including marketing, with Saudi Arabia in response to the kingdom’s 2017 request for marketing information. In 2022, U.S. and Saudi officials signed an MOU on the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters.

According to unnamed U.S. and Israeli officials cited in a September 2023 press report, the United States is considering a U.S.-run uranium enrichment operation in Saudi Arabia in conjunction with proposals to encourage Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel.

U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Requirements

Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA, 22 U.S.C. §§2011 et seq.), requires nuclear cooperation agreements for significant nuclear cooperation with foreign governments. Such cooperation includes the transfer of certain U.S.-origin nuclear material subject to licensing for commercial, medical, and industrial purposes; the export of reactors and critical reactor components; and other commodities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission export licensing authority. Foreign entities’ nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia containing U.S.-origin technology might require U.S. consent.

So-called “123 agreements,” must include the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation, as well as meet several nonproliferation criteria. The President must make a written determination “that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.” The AEA requires Congress to review a 123 agreement for two time periods totaling 90 days of continuous session. If the President has not exempted the agreement from any requirements of Section 123(a), it becomes effective at the end of the second period, unless, during that time, Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the resolution becomes law. Section 57(b)(2) of the AEA allows for limited cooperation related to the “development or production of any special nuclear material outside of the United States.” A 123 agreement is not necessary for such cooperation, which mostly involves transfers of unclassified nuclear technology and services pursuant to “Part 810 authorizations” that are not subject to congressional review.

Section 123 agreements do not require recipient governments to forgo enrichment or reprocessing. The 2009 U.S.-UAE 123 agreement provides the United States the right to terminate nuclear cooperation with that country if the UAE “possesses sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or otherwise engages in activities within its territory relating to enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of nuclear fuel.” An Agreed Minute states that its terms “shall be no less favorable in scope and effect than those which may be accorded” to other countries in the Middle East. If the U.S. government concludes a more-favorable 123 agreement in the region, the Minute says the United States will, at the UAE’s request, consult with the government “regarding the possibility of amending” the 123 agreement with equally favorable terms.

Congress and U.S. Policy

Since FY2020, Congress has directed that no funds appropriated for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs “should” be used by the Export-Import bank to support nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia until the kingdom has a 123 agreement “in effect”; “has committed torenounce uranium enrichment and reprocessing on its territory under that agreement”; and has “signed and implemented” an Additional Protocol with the IAEA (most recently for FY2024 in Section 7041(h), Division F, P.L. 118-47). Proposed appropriations bills for FY2025 contain the same directive (H.R. 8771 and S. 4797). Since 2018, some Members have introduced bills that would have required a congressional joint resolution of approval before a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia could take effect.

About the authors

• Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
• Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS)

By Sauradeep Bag

In India, financial inclusion remains a critical and unresolved issue, with a significant portion of the population excluded from formal banking services. Traditional credit systems, anchored in rigid, conventional data points, have sidelined individuals without established credit histories, creating an inherent barrier to financial access.

But as the digital age brings forth a tidal wave of accessible data, fintech innovators are beginning to rewrite the rules. By leveraging alternative data sources—such as utility payments, mobile phone usage, and social media activity—these companies are developing new credit-scoring models that democratise access to credit. Access to information sits at the very core of these transformations, and when harnessed effectively, it becomes the driving force behind groundbreaking innovation and profound social change.

The real essence of innovation lies not just in the availability of data, but in how it is leveraged to drive social equity and economic empowerment. However, this transformation brings its own set of challenges, with ethical concerns and data privacy standing at the forefront. The journey ahead is filled with hurdles, but the potential for creating a more inclusive financial system is equally vast.

Understanding alternative credit scoring

Alternative credit scoring leverages non-traditional data sources—such as utility payments, mobile transactions, and even social media activity—to assess an individual’s creditworthiness, stepping away from conventional credit reports. By analysing digital footprints, fintech firms open up financial opportunities for those excluded from formal banking systems. In India, the need for alternative scoring is pressing, as many remain “credit invisible” due to informal work and lack of documentation. Without access to traditional loans, people often turn to predatory lenders, perpetuating financial instability. This shift not only democratises credit access but also paves the way for broader financial inclusion in emerging economies like India.

According to the Global Findex Database 2021, only 35 percent of adults had a bank account as recently as 2011, highlighting the long-standing barriers to financial access. The Reserve Bank of India's (RBI)Financial Inclusion Index (FI-Index) reflects gradual improvements, rising from 56.4 in 2021 to 64.2 in March 2024. This persistent gap underscores the urgent need for alternative credit scoring models that can democratise access to financial services for those currently excluded from formal banking systems.

Alternative credit scoring in India, though still in its nascent stages, is gaining traction. Lenders, instead of relying solely on conventional credit scores, can now access a wealth of consent-driven, unstructured data. This data is fed into platforms like CreditVidya, where AI and machine learning algorithms process it to assess credit risk, even when applicants lack traditional credit histories.  Juvo is another organisation that leverages data from mobile user behavior to create proprietary credit scores. These scores unlock new financial opportunities for individuals who lack formal credit histories, offering them access to resources that were previously out of reach. 

Roadblocks and Blindspots

While alternative credit scoring offers a promising path toward financial inclusion, it raises important questions around privacy, data integrity, and regulation. The extraction of personal data—ranging from mobile transactions to social media activity—demands stringent safeguards to prevent breaches or misuse, particularly in a country like India, where data security is a growing concern. Moreover, the quality and reliability of this data vary, and when inaccurate, it risks creating lending decisions as erratic as the financial behaviour it seeks to capture.

Regulatory frameworks are struggling to keep pace with the rapid evolution of alternative credit in India, particularly due to the vast amounts of data being utilised. As the country navigates this emerging landscape, it is essential to establish clear guidelines that ensure fintech companies operate with transparency, protect consumer rights, and adhere to ethical practices.

Despite the rapid growth of fintech and alternative credit scoring models in India, there remains no dedicated regulatory framework governing this practice. Currently, the sector relies on broader laws such as the Credit Information Companies Act and the proposed Digital Personal Data Protection Bill, 2022 for guidance. While these laws provide some oversight regarding data usage and consumer protection, they do not specifically address the nuances and challenges unique to alternative credit scoring.

For example, the Reserve Bank of India's Working Group on Digital Lending Report (2021) raised concerns over fintech providers processing large volumes of consumer data without proper consent. The Digital Personal Data Protection Bill proposed safeguards around the collection, storage, and sharing of data, but as alternative credit scoring models evolve, there may be a need for more tailored regulations. Such regulations would ensure transparency, ethical practices, and better consumer protection in the growing digital lending landscape.

A key trend moving forward could be increased collaboration between fintech companies and traditional banks. However, a potential first step may involve banks experimenting with these models internally. For instance, Axis Bank has already begun testing this approach to improve its underwriting models. By combining innovative strategies with conventional banking practices, these efforts could better address the needs of unbanked populations.

Technological advancements, particularly in AI and machine learning, will refine these alternative credit models even further, offering increasingly accurate risk assessments while streamlining the lending process. Finally, as fintech matures, a growing emphasis on financial literacy will become central to ensuring that the newly financially included understand their rights, responsibilities, and the long-term implications of borrowing. It is not just a technical revolution, but one that requires educating, informing, and empowering citizens.

Going Forward

For many individuals, these new avenues of financing provide the tools to overcome systemic barriers that have long constrained their financial aspirations. Traditional credit assessments often rely on rigid metrics that fail to capture the full picture of a person's financial behaviour and potential. In contrast, fintech solutions utilise a range of data—from payment histories to social media activity—offering a more nuanced understanding of an individual’s creditworthiness.

This shift has profound implications for economic empowerment. By recognising the value of digital footprints, fintech firms are not only enabling greater access to funds but also instilling a sense of agency in those who have been overlooked by traditional systems.

This rethinking of creditworthiness reshapes financial narratives, shifting the focus from a simple assessment of risk to a more meaningful acknowledgement of economic potential. It facilitates innovation and supports entrepreneurship, contributing to a more inclusive financial landscape where individuals are seen for their capabilities rather than being limited by past exclusions. This change reflects a pragmatic shift in how society evaluates economic contributions, offering new opportunities for those who have previously been overlooked.

As the evolution of technology accelerates and regulatory frameworks catch up, the possibilities for these alternative models will only expand. However, it is not without its challenges. Data privacy and the reliability of information are two major concerns that need addressing. Yet, with stronger collaborations between fintech disruptors and traditional banks, India stands at the cusp of creating an inclusive financial ecosystem, where all citizens, regardless of their backgrounds, can engage fully in economic life. This is not just about access to credit; it’s about reconfiguring the economic agency at its core and how data can play an important role. The foundation of these advancements is rooted in access to information. When used wisely, it has the power to spark transformative innovation and catalyse meaningful social change.

• About the author: Sauradeep Bag is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation. 
• Source: This article was published at the Observer Research Foundation