European Spatial Planning PerspectiveEuropean Spatial Planning Perspective

Connectivity and the Periphery

Alexandru F. Ghita — Wed, 06 Feb 2013 19:58:19 +0000

Accessibility and proximity have played and still play an important role in the development process. They enable economic development and sustain it at the same time. Together they also generate the peripherality effect. That what is outside of the “accessible and close” area is peripheral and presents less interest. My argument here is that in spite of this effect, a third player comes to the table, and its name is connectivity. Encouraged by the Digital Agenda of the EU, I believe that connectivity can actually make peripherality become solely a geographical attribute with reduced economic impacts.

Two Europes... again

“Two Europes” is a popular terms in recent debates. However, my use of the term in this article is not directly related to the two speed Europe that economists talk about. I am rather relating to some of the concepts that planners used in the past to describe the core-periphery dichotomy in the EU. In the last 20 years we have been constantly amused by terms like “Blue Banana”, and impressed by the more serious terms like “Central Regions” and “The Pentagon”. While other concepts were also defined, these are some of which are of specific interest for this post. The core-periphery relation is not something new. It’s a basic principle that can be applied to all types of examples outside of the spatial planning realm. In this particular case though, all of the above mentioned concepts point to “two Europes”. I will try to draw the attention towards those attributes of these Europes, which I believe are most important for the discussion here.

The core

The core is characterised by a dense inter-modal transport networks, which make it very accessible. As a result, along the years businesses found that this is a favourable environment to develop and grow. Soon the core became the economic agglomeration that we know today, mainly containing France, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and Netherlands. To these we could also add the North of Italy and Switzerland, with the latter not part of the EU. The resulting proximity of the business clustering process is one of the strongest attributes of the region. [caption id="attachment_303" align="aligncenter" width="554"] Source: BMVBS, 2007[/caption]

The periphery

In short, and in somewhat simple terms the periphery represents all the rest. Yet, I would recommend to differentiate between several peripheries, which share some basic existential principles, but are in fact very distinct. I see three main types of periphery in the EU.

The former communist bloc, containing all of the 2004-2007 enlargement member states which share the EU Eastern border.
The Northern periphery, consisting of the Baltic states, which share similar cultural and historic characteristics, but which are related only to the Northern part of the former communist bloc, and not sharing too much with Western Europe.
The Southern region of the EU and the countries sharing the Mediterranean coast together with France, are another group which draw cultural characteristics from both Eastern and Western Europe.

One more consideration would be that I've left the grouping of UK, Ireland, and France out of the periphery, mainly because they are peripheral only geographically as technically they are part of the main core of the EU. From the Western coast probably Spain (specifically the West and South) and Portugal are the ones that can be considered as peripheral, but even here their role in colonization processes and their general economic links would raise some issues. The same type of rationale would also apply for the previous 3 countries. Though defining the periphery is a complex matter, for this particular exercise I am referring to the member states on the North, East and South borders of the EU (i.e. 1, 2, 3) [caption id="" align="aligncenter" width="576"] Map Base Source: Wikimedia Commons[/caption]

Digital Agenda and Internet Rollout

The Digital Agenda is one of the EU flagship initiatives aimed at unifying the internet market and improve internet access across the EU, in order to efficiently support the Single Market. In 2011 ESPON published the fourth of the Territorial Observations Series: Trends in Internet Rollout. The study shows improved internet infrastructure and consistent growth patterns. On the other hand, at a closer look the study might not reveal the whole naked truth. The analysis looks at particular indicators to measure internet adoption. And in all fairness, in this respect it does a very good job! But give a little more attention to the actual speed of the internet, and a different picture might appear. [caption id="attachment_307" align="aligncenter" width="505"] Source: Territorial Dynamics in Europe: Trends in Internet Roll-out - Map 6 Households using a high-speed Internet connection, 2006 to 2009[/caption] It is true that internet adoption is an important factor for economic development. Even so, in down to earth terms, what good is the internet if it is not fast enough. Also, considering today’s technology and requirements, the 144Kb/s defined by the authors of this study as high-speed internet is not that fast. Looking at the ranking available on NetIndex we can clearly see that in the EU download and upload speeds in peripheral countries are actually much higher than in the “core” group (with a few exceptions like Luxembourg). I would say that this developed out of necessity, for not being in the core, but this is another issue. At first, this would seem an unimportant aspect (i.e. the speed difference). But I urge you to think a little bit further down the line. Higher speeds result in a higher connectivity index. In lay terms, you can get things done faster with high-speed internet, use more resource demanding services, and reduce the need for physical presence, thus lowering the need for accessibility and proximity.

The result of connectivity

This simple connectivity advantage has transformed this "periphery" of the EU in a magnet for IT&C and knowledge based businesses in general (e.g. tech support, call centers, web services, etc.). Now, considering this image and its potential I would argue that the lack of accessibility and proximity starts to lose its relevance, and peripherality stops being an issue. If distance is no longer a problem, as connectivity allows for remote working, then how can we still make a discriminative choice between the “core” and the “periphery”. I am not ignorant. There are businesses that cannot function in this manner, but they are not dominant economic actors anymore in the post-industrial age. Withal, considering the argument above I believe that it might be time that we start to think about reshaping policy objectives as to take advantage of this unique feature that is connectivity.

Unemployment perspectives – a short brief

Alexandru F. Ghita — Mon, 04 Feb 2013 13:17:36 +0000

Unemployment. The major concern and at the same time the result of the economic crisis, as well as one of the main points to be addressed through policies targeting the reduction of regional disparities across the EU. In short: unemployment is a big issue! It defines and modifies economic processes with direct impacts on spatial development. In my perspective there are two main issues that have to be addressed as part of the strategy aimed at lowering unemployment levels: economic diversity and behavioural change.

Young vs. Old – the unemployment race

The European Policy Centre (EPC) recently published an outlook on the 2013 economic prospects. Among the points made by the different contributors that of the OECD‘s Deputy Secretary-General and Chief Economist - Pier Carlo Padoan – is of main interest for this post. He states that Europe will slowly emerge from the recession during this year, however the OECD’s forecast is that unemployment will rise this year.

In light of the recent unemployment rate released by Eurostat, which in December was “stabilized” at 11.7% this is a most worrying statement. In addition, the report makes a point out of the high youth unemployment in the EU27, which grew since December 2011 from 22.2% to 23.4%.

In the same lines, the EPC also published a policy paper on unemployment, however this time it regards the “older work force” - Creating Second Career Labour Markets – Towards more Employment Opportunities for Older Workers. I highly recommend reading it, as its analysis and policy recommendations are accurate, considering the issue at hand. One of the main points of the paper is the (re)integration of older workers in the labour market, which at present might be out of their comfort zone, due to the change towards a service and knowledge based economy; and which is reluctant to integrate older workers, practising an under-the-table ageism.

Current perspectives

Combining the two issues of young and old unemployment results in a fairly grim picture. Youth unemployment is rising, older workers which have been laid off are finding it difficult to reintegrate in the work force, leaving us with a middle aged population which has to support both. If we also consider that the EU population is ageing faster than 20 years ago, and that the median age of the population across the EU is rising every year, while birth rates go down; well then the picture becomes even grimmer.

Directions to be addressed

Economic diversity

Once again diversity of the economic activities has to be emphasized. This has been a concern for economic growth strategists for some time now. The “sudden death” of one economic giant in certain regions created major spikes in unemployment. This is a(nother) sign that reliance on major companies to produce and sustain jobs on their own is counter-productive. Diversity should be encouraged where possible, and incentives for other smaller services and side products should also be implemented. Building the argument around economic clusters, this would ensure two things:

the major business (i.e. major employer) would feel some relief and support, while the smaller businesses would be able to prolong the life span of the economic cluster;
in case of need the smaller businesses would be able to create a number of jobs aimed at (leastwise partially) alleviating the effects of personnel reductions of larger businesses and reintegrate some of the experienced work force.

Behavioural change

Although important, I believe that the emphasis on the numbers is misleading in terms of impact, as behavioural change is what is needed and wished for. Stakeholders have to change their behaviour; both employees and employers need to look at each other in a different perspective and understand each other. At present there is no middle ground between employers and young people and employers and older people. There are certain expectations from one another in an employer-employee relationship. These expectations have to be addressed and understood by both parties, and conciliation needs to be encouraged. This is a basic principle in addressing social inclusion.

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Funding Innovation in the EU – A governance perspective

Alexandru F. Ghita — Fri, 07 Dec 2012 10:19:04 +0000

As expected social media powered discussions give the opportunity to develop new ideas in unconventional ways. Unconventional brainstorming on Twitter and blogs has its benefits, as it combines ideas from a plethora of people and places. After such a discussion/brainstorm which lasted for some time, Horatiu Ferchiu from Federal Europe – a planner’s view put together a small infographic imaging the skeleton frame for a European innovation and start-up fund. On it, Euronomist drafted a more detailed funding scheme describing the economic actors and tools involved. As I was coopted in an ad-hoc matter into this brainstorm, I will also try to outline some points, from my own perspective, related to governance, participation, and social structure building.

Short Intro

The basic idea of this fund, as presented by Horatiu, is to assign a small section of the EU budget to an investment fund, managed and supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB), and distributed across the member states through national (private) banking systems.

Euronomist detailed the funding scheme and noted that the funding should be divided into a sovereign fund (i.e. national government contribution to the fund, in exchange for a fixed amount of the company’s equity), and a European Investment Fund supervised by the ECB.

This resembles at some extent the way in which structural funds are organized and distributed, but brings to the table a Kickstarter-ish feeling, which would, I believe, make start-ups more comfortable with accessing the fund.

For more details please visit Horatiu’s and Euronomist’s blogs.

A governance view for an innovation and start-up European fund

While I agree with Horatiu’s and Euronomist’s point of view, I would urge further discussion on the basic governance model. The initial idea relies on existing structures in order to function: the ECB and national banking systems. This is logical as in order to keep implementation structures to a minimum, we must use existing structures. Also, this is a healthy way of insuring running-cost minimization.

At the same time, clear and well structured governance rules should be set out in order to prevent preferential treatment and insure efficiency and coherence. Let me explain.

Firstly, building the fund allocation system on national banking systems would mean that each member state would have different rules regarding allocation and especially regarding taxation (not of funds especially, but of the direct output). This could make some member states hot-spots for start-up building and innovation, while leaving others in the shadows. This would lead to further increase in disparities, not making the overall situation any different that it is now. Also, it would neglect start-ups and innovation based on international cooperation (see below).

Secondly, not all national bureaucratic/economic systems work the same, and with the same efficiency. Insuring an efficient system, for fund management that works in similar ways (national laws make it impossible to make it work in the same way) is key. The contrary would lead to the same polarization effect described above.

Participation is key

Any fund, project, policy, or programme is useless if the targeted actors do not actively participate. This is why the governance model would also have to provide the necessary tools for the independent formation of supporting participatory structures, which could ensure the reaching of targeted of actors. This type of structures should be independent of national governments, or EU institutions, and their formation should be based on voluntary association and organized in order to insure responsibility building.

Another important task of these structures would be to encourage and support international participation (based on the Territorial Cooperation objective). As any start-up or innovation can be the brainchild of multiple participants (similar to how the idea for this fund came to existence), it is important that their contributions are not to be hindered by national borders, national laws, or other structural limitations.

These support structures can be local or regional. They would be funded from the fund directly and their decision-making and expenditures should be transparent.

Digitalizing it all

The Digital Agenda (DA) becomes more real every day, insuring an integration of this fund with it is crucial. A simultaneous and coordinated action of the DA and this investment fund, would in my own opinion encourage more start-ups to take action. How well innovation, the DA and this type of fund go together goes without saying, I think.

In the end I would also like to point to an element very dear to me: job creation and work in the digital era. Digital nomadism and workshifting are not just trend words anymore (1, 2). I should know, I practice digital nomadism on a daily basis. The opportunity given by this type of fund is, I believe, a currently non existent way of sponsoring a type of work-economy that is specific to this day of age. Sponsoring location independent businesses and creating the infrastructure for them to function from anywhere, is one of the ways in which the EU can step ahead of its competitors. But about this, I will write in detail another time.

Please contact any of us involved in this brainstorm if you want to contribute or need any clarifications!

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Regionalization 101 – an introduction

Alexandru F. Ghita — Wed, 21 Nov 2012 10:29:48 +0000

I live in Romania, a country which until 22 years ago was under a communist regime, and which had to drastically modify its social, institutional and administrative constructs in order to adapt the market economy and the ‘western’ style of life. I observed the reform (partial – my opinion might be biased in this respect) of an overly-centralized state and the EU driven adaptational changes.

Lately there has been a lot of talk about ‘real’ regionalization. We already have development regions, but the objective here would be to create fully functional regions, with some administrative and financial independence, instead of formal regions which hold no real power. While doing some analysis of proposals and discourses I discovered that regionalization and the regions are not that well understood. This is not a Romanian trait, I found that this is a general issue around most EU member states.

Basic misconceptions about regionalization

#1 – A region is a region, no matter where you are

The blurred understanding of the meanings of regional and the regions is caused by the fact that if we perceive the region from both policy-making and administrative perspectives it has many different roles, which in turn can create some level of confusion. In a comparative analysis we would probably observe some type of resemblance from state to state, in how regions are perceived. But if there is a general rule in these resemblances we can’t put our finger on it just yet. This is mainly because the regionalization process varies from state to state, based on its own sub-national criteria and priorities.

#2 – It’s only natural to have regions

Regions are not ‘a given’, but are man-made constructs aimed at a specific objective (i.e. administrative, jurisdictional, statistical, etc. ), or they are contoured based on historical, ethnic, religious, language or other social delimitations.

#3 – Regionalization is made in the EU

In the EU there is a misconception, that the EU institutions are shaping the regionalization process. That my hold some water if we talk about encouragement to develop a regional level of decision-making, in order to adapt to EU regional policy (I have written about the EU’s regional policy here). However, in terms of prescriptions EU policy is rather scarce in this field, leaving it up to member states to decide how the process will take place.

Roles of the region

In practice at the national and supra-national levels the region could hold a myriad of roles, which might at times overlap, however the most common are:

administrative and managing roles (one does not assume the other) – its authorities can be responsible for regional services, intra-regional cooperation of the authorities, management of regional resources, responsible for authorizing projects of regional importance, and for coordinating national and international partnerships and projects;
fiscal role – the regional authorities can be responsible for setting taxation levels and the management and collection of taxes;
policy-making role – its authorities can be responsible for the elaboration of policy and programming at the regional level, and ensuring the participation of both national and sub-regional actors in this process;
policy implementation role – regional authorities can be responsible for implementing supra-national, national, and regional policy and projects;
end-users – at times regions can be only beneficiaries of projects and funding;
representative role – regional authorities can be responsible for representing the region, its sub-regional administrative components, and interest groups at national and supra-national levels in policy-making, implementation or other types of negotiations that would affect in any way the regional actors or the territory;
statistical role – here the Eurostat NUTS levels are more than self-explanatory. The Commission required a standardised unit of measurement for statistical purposes.

The extent of the roles above varies from state to state, and there is no standardised recipe for regional design (note the overuse of the expression “can be”), which is based on national law and the level of decentralization that also varies from state to state.

I hope the presentation above shed some light on what regions are and what their roles can be. I did not try to compose a comprehensive guide to regions and regionalization as that would be impossible in so few words, but I do hope I managed to offer a useful introduction.

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The new love triangle: quality of government, institutional trust and development

Alexandru F. Ghita — Mon, 19 Nov 2012 07:29:09 +0000

Recent weeks brought forward debates concerning governments and the quality and efficiency of their interventions and decision-making processes. While this discussion can be nuanced in many ways, my personal interest lays mainly with the basic understanding of the relation between the quality of the governmental act, the level of trust in international, national and sub-national institutions, and the GDP variation (perceived in this case as a unit of measure for development levels). I believe that the understanding of this relation is one of the keys in developing effective governance and policy-making processes.

Data sources and motivation

Developing a high-quality and accurate measurement of the relation between the quality of government, trust and GDP is a complicated matter as it involves correlating sets of qualitative and quantitative data, which are not always in sync in terms of meaning, therefore making the interpretation of the results debatable. My study represents a preliminary analysis meant to spark some (more) interest in further researching the relation between these three elements, as it might lead to interesting conclusions.

I based this short analysis on three data sets (secondary data). First, I needed an appropriate level of measurement for the governmental act and its effectiveness. A recent study regarding regional governance and quality of government (working paper available here) required the same. By combining the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), provided by the World Bank (full description and data sets are available here), the authors were able to create a national level ranking system (see table below) based on the combined averages of four of the pillars provided by the WGI: Control of Corruption, Rule of law, Government Effectiveness, Voice & Accountability (Charron, Lapuente & Dijkstra, 2012, p.3-4).

[caption id="attachment_208" align="aligncenter" width="309"] Table source: Regional Governance Matters, WP[/caption]

Considering the regional level would have been too extreme for a blog post analysis due to the size of the data sets. As a result I decided to only use the national Quality of Government Index (QoG), as it compared well with the other data described below. I have to note that this QoG index is based upon indices for the year 2008.

The second data set was the "Public opinion in the European Union" survey published by Eurobarometer covering the spring of 2012. Among other issues the survey asks the interviewee what is the level of trust for his/her: national government, national parliament, regional and local authorities, and the EU (QA13.2, QA13.3, QA13.4, QA13.6). For the purpose of this analysis I have used the "Tend to trust" scores for each individual member state.

Even if the inquiry in itself is fairly clear (I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: […] ), I have to point out that in the case of the EU the results are questionable at some extent. This is because, "the European Union" in itself is not a single institution, but it is composed of several bodies, with different functions and roles.

Alas, the same survey actually points out that from the total interviewees, 9% have not heard of the European Parliament, 17% have not heard of the European Commission, 30% have not heard of the Council of the European Union, 16% have not heard of the European Central Bank, and 24% have not heard of the Court of Justice of the European Union (QA16.1 – QA.16.5).

The third data set represents the most recent GDP per capita in PPS for the year 2011, provided by Eurostat (full data set available here). I decided to use the 2011 GDP levels because the variation between 2008 (the year for which the QoG indices were used) and 2011 is relatively low (generally bellow 5%), the only exception being Greece with a 10% decrease. Because the analysis is constructed on the interpretation of the relation between data pairs (see below), I decided that the use of the 2011 is appropriate as the value can, at some extent, reflect the results of policy implementation in contrast with the QoG index measured for 2008, and at the same time motivate the trust levels reflected in the 2012 Eurobarometer survey. Even if causality might seem to run the train of though here, I have to emphasize that based on my research, causality cannot be implied in these circumstances, because of the lack of clear-cut proof. However, we can suspect it, and further analysis can confirm or refute it.

Putting it all together

The basic methodology of the analysis is fairly simple. I gathered the three data sets and combined them together in one table. Then I combined the columns in pairs of two and composed scatter-plots for each pair in an attempt to identify trends in the data. Additionally, because the 'trust' related data set is composed of three percentages a chart seemed the appropriate way to simultaneously visualize all three combined with the GDP values. Based on the scatter-plots' distribution and the chart I was able to extract some interesting insights. (Country codes are listed here)

QoG vs Trust

Comparing the QoG index with the tendency to trust international, national and sub-national institutions resulted in four scatter-plots (see below) which if interpreted give a relatively consistent perspective. One major anomaly can be observed in the case of Romania and Bulgaria. Both have very low QoG indexes which positions them close to the Y Axis (i.e. vertical axis) in all four graphs.

It is clear that for Romania and Bulgaria the low level of trust in national and sub-national institutions is a reflection of the low quality of national governance, which cannot be countered by the higher level of trust that is associated with the EU institutions. Leaving this exception aside, it is clearly visible that a correlation between institutional trust and good governance is true in the case of the EU member states. The most evident, I believe, is the link between the tendency to trust the national parliaments and QoG. This can be assigned to the fact that usually parliament members are elected through democratic vote. In the case of national governments as well as regional and local authorities, these are also correlated in an ascending trend with QoG, while the trust in EU institutions seems not to have a very important relation with the QoG.

In conclusion, we can state that it is possible that a higher level of trust in national and sub-national authorities can lead to a higher quality of governance at national levels.

Trust vs GDP

Building upon the trust levels emphasized by the Eurobarometer survey, using the chart below we can clearly observe the following. First, by comparison there is an overall difference between the trust in national institutions and sub-national authorities, the latter being in some cases two or even three times higher than the first (e.g. Czech Republic, United Kingdom, Latvia, Hungary). Second, by ordering the member states according to the trust in regional and local authorities and then by GDP, they can be divided in 3 categories. From left to right, according to the tendency to trust regional and local authorities: (1) 0% - 29%: IT, ES, EL; (2) 30% - 49%: IE, LT, RO, PT, BG, SI, PL, HU, MT, LV, UK, CZ, CY, SK; (3) 50% - 75%: EE, NL, FR, DE, FI, BE, SE, AT, DK, LU. (Click on the chart for full size)

Strangely enough the GDP variation between the 3 categories is not as obvious as I first suspected it would be. The first category is compose of three countries which all have a GDP of over 75% of the EU average, moreover Spain is close to 100%, while Italy has a GDP of 101%. The second category is the most varied in terms of GDP, the lowest GDP being of 45% (i.e. BG) while the highest reaches 127% (i.e. IE). Lastly, the third category has the highest GDP average, as only one member state in this category has a GDP below 100% (i.e. EE, 67%), while the rest span from 100% to 125%, with a peak of 274% in the case of LU. It has to be noted that the case of LU is an outlier in this analysis and because of the disproportionate difference in GDP and population, its case cannot be considered as a standard.

Another interesting observation is that in the case of the third category we can see a close relation between all the trust levels; in the case of all the member states the trust levels for national institutions span from 35% to 74%. Compared to the second category in which large differences in trust can be identified between national institutions and regional and local authorities, it can be stated that a direct link between institutional trust and GDP can be suspected. However, this chart would imply that in order to ensure a high GDP level a higher trust level in regional and local authorities (2) is not enough; as the member states in the third category show, concurrent trust in all institutional levels is more probable to create the premise for higher GDP levels.

As you may have notice I neglected the first category in the analysis above. The reason behind this (as in the case of LU) that there is a notable difference between the levels of the GDP and the levels of trust. Basically this means that with low levels of trust from the population, these countries' national and sub-national institutions managed to implement policies that achieved economic growth. If we also consider the QoG index for these countries, and the recent macro-economic developments we can clearly observe that these three countries (i.e. IT, ES, EL), are the ones that, at the moment, suffer the most from the economic crisis. In conclusion, we can suspect an artificial inflation of the GDP.

In conclusion, a relation between the composite level of trust in national and sub-national institutions and the GDP does exist. Moreover, it is also clear that high levels of trust of only national or sub-national institutions are not enough in order to correlate these to a certain level of GDP.

QoG vs GDP

By verifying the relation between the QoG index and the GDP levels, a clear emphasis of the direct relation between good governance and GDP is evident. If we consider the four pillars of the QoG (see above), and their implicit effect on the perception of the individual and his/her trust level, it can then be confirmed that trust can be one of the elements that creates the premise for high GDP levels.

Conclusions

The most clear-cut conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that trust in the sub-national and national authorities is of utmost importance, and can be suspected as an important player in the GDP evolution. The link is also confirmed by the QoG index, which coincides with high (I use the term loosely here) trust levels, as well as with high GDP levels. This creates the opportunity to develop the inter-dependency between the three in a tool, aimed at explaining public policy impacts and effectiveness at national and sub-national levels.

While I believe the above analysis depicts a useful and accurate image of the inter-dependent relation I described, it is, however, limited in scope and depth. National GDP levels can sometime show distorted images, which ignore sub-national disparities in development levels, and why not, even trust disparities. Even though I do not believe that the end image might change in entirety, further research should extend this framework to sub-national levels, as it might bring forward some new scale related issues and differences not considered here.

The European Creative Class – theory and reality

Alexandru F. Ghita — Wed, 12 Sep 2012 09:51:50 +0000

The creative class. Could be said that the term is Richard Florida‘s brain child. He put forward the theory that there is a new class in the wide pool of the workforce: the creatives. In this case, the creative class points to the multitude of professionals that are involved in: the creative industries (obviously), science, research and development, high-tech industries. In short, the majority of knowledge based industries, which rely on the highly educated and skilled individuals, and their ability to create (I use the term loosely, as it can range from writing books and articles to high-tech solutions).

The creative class, in theory

Florida’s theory (mainly constructed on evidence of American cities, and which has received some vehement criticism I might add) revolves around the fact that creatives are attracted by and thrive in certain environments. An URBACT project in Europe (i.e. Creative Clusters in Low Density Urban Areas) called these environments creative ecosystems. What this means? It means that in order for the creative class to move to a region or a city, certain conditions have to be pre-exist. Some of the conditions identified by Florida in US cities, which also apply in Europe are: cultural and ethnic diversity, tolerance, night life, quality public spaces, accessibility and amenities. The reason behind these have-to’s are actually seen as originating from one single change in democracies. The social move from family life to individual life. It has been proven time and time again that highly educated and skilled professionals postpone having children, thus having different priorities. It is then not uncommon for them to search for places which can satisfy their social needs, specifically social needs of their individualistic life style.

Is it important?

The European creative class is not much different than that of the US. Highly educated and skilled individuals seek the perfect environment in which to thrive. It has to be noted that in the EU the creative class (workforce) has a slightly lower percentage then in the US, however in 2008 it still accounted for 7% (19 million) of the EU labour force. Recent ESPON studies have showed that compared to other categories of the workforce, the creative workforce increased in size three times faster between 2001 and 2008. These numbers and the recent shift to a service oriented economy show that the creative class is growing in size (and probably still grow in the next period) and its role and contributions are more and more important for the current economic markets.

Where is the European creative class going?

The EU creative class has however some very interesting features. While the basic place-dependent conditions regarding lifestyle, amenities and accessibility observed in US cities are still valid conditions in terms of attractiveness of cities and regions, the EU regions experienced a slightly different trend. Urban amenities and accessibility still make metropolitan areas attractive hubs for creatives (9.2% increase in the 2001-2008 period), however rural and peripheral areas have experienced a larger increase in creative workforce (12.6% increase in the 2001-2008 period). This has been largely attributed to the large wave of migration from post-industrial regions to rural ones (Germany, Netherlands, France, Spain, Bulgaria).

Recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe (fall of the Iron Curtain, EU integration, development of the market economy) made the region very attractive for the creative workforce, and a clear relation between a rise in GDP and the concentration of creative workforce can be identified. However, Western and Northern Europe still concentrates the highest concentration of creative workforce.

To attract or not to attract?

European studies show that inclusiveness and sustainability are two key conditions for the European creative workforce. The ATTREG project emphasizes this find by pointing out that cities promoting these concepts have managed to raise their attractiveness level. Although, considering individual strategies of the cities, not all of them have specific targets when considering attractiveness. It is my honest opinion, that general overarching policies will not be able to attract the creative workforce on long term. In the end this might not be a bad thing. After all, not all regions are meant to be or can be creativity hubs. But it is pity that those that have the potential would miss out on this opportunity.

Developing cities through the EU policy for knowledge and innovation is an important piece of the Europe 2020 puzzle, however a closer look at this creative class might show different patterns of development (e.g. 1, 2), than those known at the moment. I think that besides the obvious question of: how we attract them to our city/region, the next question should be: how long can we hold on to them?

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Ultimate Guide to Online Spatial Data Sources

Alexandru F. Ghita — Tue, 11 Sep 2012 13:01:51 +0000

Spatial planning research is somewhat a murky field of research, and data available online is sometimes hard to obtain, as you have to navigate around search engines and complicated sites. For some time now I meant to put together a list of spatial data sources and tools I use when doing research, which I gathered along the years. The list below is not exhaustive by any means, however these are the main sources where you can obtain reliable EU and world data free of charge. I am not going to go into detail for every source as their descriptions are usually self-explanatory. Please be advised that for more detailed national and subnational data you should research country specific data sources.

(Disclaimer: All text in Italics is excerpted from and is the property of the respective websites)

Eurostat

Probably the best known source for statistical data for the EU. It holds standardised data from all EU and partner countries. Eurostat provides both statistical handbooks and raw statistical data which you can customize to your own need. Raw data extraction has quite a learning curve if you are not experienced with quantitative data, but basic manipulations are fairly easy to do. The website has numerous sections, the main ones are listed below.

Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union situated in Luxembourg. Its task is to provide the European Union with statistics at European level that enable comparisons between countries and regions.

Eurostat > GISCO: Geographical Information and Maps

GISCO, a Eurostat service which promotes and stimulates the use of GIS within the European Statistical System and the Commission.

It is responsible for the management and dissemination of the Geographical reference database of the Commission. It produces maps, spatial analysis, promotes geo-referencing of statistics and provides user support for Commission users of GIS.

GISCO is one of the leaders of the INSPIRE initiative, supporting the implementation of the directive for the establishment of a European Spatial Data Infrastructure.

Eurostat > LUCAS: Land Cover / Use Statistics

LUCAS project is also a part of Eurostat. The 2012 survey is not finished yet, however they offer useful insights into the data they gathered and some preliminary results.

EUROSTAT is carrying out the LUCAS 2012 survey on the state and the dynamics of changes in land use and cover in the European Union. The LUCAS 2012 survey covers all 27 EU countries. The field work will be carried out in March-September 2012.

Eurostat > NUTS – Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics

This specific section of the Eurostat website gives insights into the NUTS system, and points to the data regarding classification and basic statistics.

Eurostat > Regions and cities

This section provides a single access point to Eurostat’s sub-national statistics. These consist of a wide variety of data for the regions and cities of EU countries.

Eurobarometer

The Euromarometer is the go-to website for data resulted from public opinion analysis regarding EU issues. They publish several studies concerning all domains.

This is the website for the Public Opinion Analysis sector of the European Commission.
Our surveys and studies address major topics concerning European citizenship: enlargement, social situation, health, culture, information technology, environment, the Euro, defence, etc.

ESPON

ESPON is maybe one of the most versatile data and information sources for the European Union. It consists of different sections and has been at the origin of several projects and analysis tools.

ESPON > Projects

This section of ESPON lists all the projects contracted under ESPON 2006 and ESPON 2013 programmes, providing detailed information and documentation for each of the projects. The list is extensive and according to your needs is rather easy to get around this section, as it is well organised.

ESPON > Tools and Maps

Next to the Projects section, the Tools and Maps section is by far the most useful as it lists the main tools provided by ESPON to be used for policy-making and analysis. At the moment through the ESPON 2013 programme four tools are available for use, and a fifth is under development.

ESPON 2013 DataBase (DB)

The DB provides access to regional, local, urban, neighbourhood (candidate countries), world, grid and historical data. The data is mainly provided by ESPON projects and EUROSTAT. More information

ESPON HyperAtlas (HA)

The HA is an analytical tool based on the multi-scalar territorial analysis concept. With the HA a local decision maker can compare and analyse its region’s relative position at European, national and local scale for a whole set of criteria. More information

Mapping Guide (MG)

The MG provides guidance on mapping statistical data correctly and delivering the right message. The MG looks into the mapping method, aggregation level, level of statistical areas, type of data and the graphic variables to be used.

ESPON Typologies (TYP)

The TYP provides 9 regional typologies for additional analysis of project results to be considered in the European context. Guidance is given on how the project can filter their results in relation to the specific types of territories.

Online MapFinder (OMF) – Under Development

The OMF provides access to the most relevant ESPON maps resulting from ESPON projects and reports. The maps are accompanied by an explanation and observations for policy makers.

European Environment Agency (EEA) > Data and Maps

The European Environment Agency (EEA) is an agency of the European Union. Our task is to provide sound, independent information on the environment. We are a major information source for those involved in developing, adopting, implementing and evaluating environmental policy, and also the general public. Currently, the EEA has 32 member countries.

Urban Audit

Following a pilot project for the collection of comparable statistics and indicators for European cities the first full-scale European Urban Audit took place in 2003, for the then 15 countries of the European Union. In 2004 the project was extended to the 10 new Member States plus Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. Under Eurostat coordination, the work of the Urban Audit involves all national statistical offices as well as some of the cities themselves.

The second full-scale Urban Audit took place between 2006 and 2007, and involved 321 European cities in the 27 countries of the European Union, along with 36 additional cities in Norway, Switzerland and Turkey.

Data collection currently takes place every three years, but an annual data collection is being planned for a smaller number of targeted variables.

UNdata

The United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) launched a new internet based data service for the global user community. It brings UN statistical databases within easy reach of users through a single entry point (http://data.un.org/). Users can now search and download a variety of statistical resources of the UN system.

World Bank Data

This site is meant to provide all users with improved access to World Bank data and to make that data easy to find and use.

The World Bank recognizes that transparency and accountability are essential to the development process and central to achieving the Bank’s mission to alleviate poverty. The Bank’s commitment to openness is also driven by a desire to foster public ownership, partnership and participation in development from a wide range of stakeholders. As a knowledge institution, the World Bank’s first step is to share its knowledge freely and openly.

Statistics and data are a key part of that knowledge and are easily accessible on the web for all users. The World Bank provides free and open access to a comprehensive set of data about development in countries around the globe, together with other datasets cited in the data catalog.

Broader access to these data allow policymakers and advocacy groups to make better-informed decisions and measure improvements more accurately. They are also valuable tools to support research by journalists, academia and others, broadening understanding of global issues.

OECD – iLibrary

OECD iLibrary contains all the publications and datasets released by OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), International Energy Agency (IEA), Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), OECD Development Centre, PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment), and International Transport Forum (ITF) since 1998 – over 1 200 journal issues, 3 300 working papers, 2 900 multi-lingual summaries, 7 700 e-book titles, 16 000 tables and graphs, 25 000 chapters and articles, and 480 complete databases with more than 4.5 billion data points.

While OECD iLibrary is a subscription-based service and requires proper access to some full-text titles, many content areas are freely available to any site visitor, such as the OECD Factbook, Working Papers, OECD Key Tables, and more.

Human Development Reports – Indices and Data – provided by UNDP

The human development data utilized in the preparation of the Human Development Index (HDI) and other composite indices featured in the Human Development Report are provided by a variety of public international sources and represent the best and most current statistics available for those indicators at the time of the preparation of this annual report.

World Government Data – provided by The Guardian

Governments around the globe are opening up their data vaults – allowing you to check out the numbers for yourself. This is the Guardian’s gateway to that information. Search for government data here from countries, cities and states around the world – and we’re adding more all the time.

Gapminder

Gapminder Foundation was founded in Stockholm by Ola Rosling, Anna Rosling Rönnlund and Hans Rosling on February 25, 2005.

The initial activity was to pursue the development of the Trendalyzer software. This software unveils the beauty of statistical time series by converting boring numbers into enjoyable, animated and interactive graphics. The current version of Trendalyzer is available since March 2006 as Gapminder World, a web-service displaying time series of development statistics for all countries.

CIA – the World Factbook

The World Factbook provides information on the history, people, government, economy, geography, communications, transportation, military, and transnational issues for 267 world entities. Our Reference tab includes: maps of the major world regions, as well as Flags of the World, a Physical Map of the World, a Political Map of the World, and a Standard Time Zones of the World map.

The Data Hub

The Data Hub is a community-run catalogue of useful sets of data on the Internet. You can collect links here to data from around the web for yourself and others to use, or search for data that others have collected. Depending on the type of data (and its conditions of use), the Data Hub may also be able to store a copy of the data or host it in a database, and provide some basic visualisation tools.

Data Catalogs

DataCatalogs.org aims to be the most comprehensive list of open data catalogs in the world. It is curated by a group of leading open data experts from around the world – including representatives from local, regional and national governments, international organisations such as the World Bank, and numerous NGOs.

Google Maps

Probably the most known tool out of the whole list, it is a useful tool in spatial analysis as it can help visualize information, aggregate basic GIS information and more. Some good examples by Alasdair Rae can be found here.

If you believe I missed a major source, please leave a comment below and I will try to update the list!

The post Ultimate Guide to Online Spatial Data Sources appeared first on European Spatial Planning Perspective.

Nations, regions, identity – a federal perspective

Alexandru F. Ghita — Thu, 30 Aug 2012 08:37:45 +0000

This is a guest post from Horațiu Ferchiu. He is a planning professional and independent researcher with interests spanning from strategic planning, governance, and policy to politics, and federal Europe. He is currently brainstorming his future PhD subject around federalism and development. This article sums up some of his preliminary findings and thoughts, and is the first in a series of three articles meant to tie federalism and spatial planning together. While this might seem like an intensely political debate, the current European economic situation forces us to look into new ways of approaching spatial planning and development, making this a necessary debate. — AFG

From nation states to the EU

Throughout history and even more so in recent history the continuous problem of nationality, and implicitly that of the nation state, has led to an ever increasing number of violent conflicts. The conflicts, be them violent in dialogue or aftermath – be them warmongers, have managed to keep alive a flame of distrust and general seclusion amongst the countries of Europe.

We all hoped that the European project would change that. That it will finally bring an end to this continuous bickering, and set forth the promise of unified growth across the continent.

Recent years have seen the inflammation of religious conflict, albeit at a scale one could imagine might rhyme better with the times of the crusaders. And although plagued by this world-wide-web of religious conflict, Europe has never stopped maintaining its nationalistic issues – be it immigration related, be it work rights for EU citizens from other member states. Violence occasionally erupts, generally aimed at non EU immigrants, as only to remind us of this consistent fault in our upbringing – our fear of the man across the imaginary line called a border.

This continent is changing. New states emerging over years and years of ethnic struggles, regions aiming for more and more autonomy – all of them play their most solid card – ethnicity and/or nationality, in order to claim their god given right to an anthem and a flag. And this claim, this line of thought, does not stop at EU borders. As it has always been the case with this continent – ideas born out of conflict spread quickly.

In light of the above mentioned one cannot help but wonder: Under the mainframe of the EU is the nation state still viable? Can it still produce the best result for its population?

The problem with nations

At the turn of the XX^th century the problem of nations erupted across the continent. It’s primary consequence – World War I. The primavera dei popoli that had begun in 1848 achieved its completion at the end of this gruesome conflict, and the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson marked a victory of its philosophy. The all mighty European empires, that once ruled not only this continent, but almost half of the globe, crumbled. Some died. Some did not. And everybody thought that we can only go forward from that point on, only to find ourselves thrown in a whole new nationalistic conflict – World War II.

Achieving unity across this continent, so burdened with history and fairy tales of heroes and grand achievements, seems more and more to be an issue of union under an anthem and a flag, but that anthem and flag has to be the essence of the nation. Extreme right movements across Europe seem to be experiencing a revival of unprecedented magnitude. As the generations that suffered under the Cold War begin to fade out, we seem to forget what was a cruel reality only 20 years ago.

The EU came to be under a general optimism after the war. It was a time of less conflict and more willingness to work together. More willingness to create a continental fabric so tight, that excess and conflict would not have room to rise. But all this is now behind us, and this new age of conflict, of nationalism and xenophobic discourse is eating away at that fabric, like a dark mold on a piece of cheese.

In an interview for Der Spiegel, French philosopher André Glucksmann states the following: “The crisis of the European Union is a symptom of its civilization. It doesn’t define itself based on its identity but, rather, on its otherness. A civilization isn’t necessarily based on a common desire to achieve the best but, rather, on excluding and making the evil taboo. In historical terms, “the European Union is a defensive reaction to horror.” (link).

Nation & Identity

European Identity – this concept pops up more and more. And it started making news as economic crisis hit the continent. Because identity implies a sense of unity, and no one wants to be alone in face of this new danger. But this European Identity, if we look at it from a social and political point of view, comes second to most Europeans – first and foremost we are German, or French, or Polish, Romanian, Hungarian and only after that has been clearly stated will we admit to be being European. Those who favor the EU will insist, without missing a beat that this is a secondary issue, that we can be united and yet different – Unity in Diversity, In varietate Concordia as it stands as the EU motto. But no matter the optimism behind this, it’s failing us. Centuries of continuous conflict between neighboring nations have bred archaic mentalities, great exaggerations and inflammations with a more glorious past.

So how can we define and expand our unity if we cannot come to terms with this very basic and utterly very important question of European Identity? Why can’t we decide which affiliation is more important?

The obvious question that all this leads to is simple – How can we change the identity of a certain group of people, that have been raised, taught and led to accept nothing but the identity supplied to them by their nationality?

Although this might not be the best of examples, I have to call upon it to make a point: if one is to ask a regular US citizen where he is from, he will undeniably say he is American, and you would need a second question to find out that he is from NY or Texas. Now, an EU citizen, faced with the same question will almost always refer to his nationality first.

The Europe of Regions project is a very subtle way of attacking this problem – by moving financing from a national to a regional level, and promoting a certain regional identity, it is to be expected that the nation state identity will begin to lose its grip. This thinning of the nation state identity will then allow for editing, for penetrations and modifications, so as to impose these two new levels of belonging – a superior, European Identity, and an inferior, Regional Identity.

The Region has thusly become the long sought engine for development – financing, more administrative power, a certain feeling of independence. In time this will lead to improvements in the life of those within the region, and certain affection will become implied between the individual and the more ubiquitous Region. And following this logic, how many generations do we have to allow before that question of where you are from no longer answers with a member state but with EU?

Sizing up a Region

Using regions as development vehicles is a positive and accepted move. Development professionals across the EU have understood this move and supported it. However, one issue has been a continuous source of disagreement – how big should a region be?

Those that deal with statistics already have standards – the N.U.T.S. system. According to NUTS the EU is regionalized on three different levels of size – big – NUTS 1 – 3 to 7 million inhabitants, medium – NUTS 2 – 800 000 to 3 million, and small – NUTS 3 - 150-800 thousand.

These regions are based on pre-existing national subdivisions, either administrative or historical. This is practical indeed, as everything is already set in place. The people already identify with this type of region, there are administrative rules and certain governance implied.

This is also where the problem resides actually. By using preexistent regions, the much sought for thinner of national identity is gone. Because the collective minds of the people associate this with the national identity they already have. Moving the identity particle of these regions from a national frame to an European frame can quite easily become ammunition for extreme right and nationalistic movements, as a move to disrupt the nations unity.

It’s this writer’s belief that for regions to fulfill their purpose we have to start anew. By admitting first and foremost that a limit is only a line traced on a map. The Schengen space for example is one way to wipe out lines like this. And we must move forward. There are many cases within the EU, where trans-national regions would be highly beneficial. Because that is how the economy works.

Here is an example: say we have two administrative entities, called A and B. A and B are neighbors, and share a common limit. A extracts raw material and B has the processing facilities. However, A and B are not in the same region. So A has funding from C and B has funding from D, where C and D are the corresponding superior administrative level. Now, D considers that the best strategy for its development is to have raw material transported all the way from the other end of the region to B for processing. C on the other hand considers that export is best, so everything A extracts is sent to export to a different. In the end you have this bizarre situation where A and B, although very close to one another, do not work together, because regional development and funding has other priorities. Of course, this example is absurd, and under the modern economy this would probably never happen. But as a philosophical example it is still valid.

So, the region is now the culprit. And here comes the trick – the trick is to devise an algorithm that will allow for the creation of new regions, with common purpose and unified administration, that can to a certain degree govern themselves, that can be transnational and multiethnic and that are created by free association. This is the type of region that would be a solid building block for a federal state.

One million follow up questions come next. How do you deal with language, how do you deal with cultural and ethnical differences? How do you convince the people that this is something viable? Geographical economy holds some of the answers, sociology and psychology, planning and politics some other. But it can be done. The French system of communauté is the proof to this concept. Education is going to be the deal breaker.

And yet, all through this one very important question has been left unanswered: are we to believe that the nation state will just wither and die? Or will it put up a fight?

– Horațiu Ferchiu (follow me on Twitter)

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6 reasons for mixing politics with spatial planning and development

Alexandru F. Ghita — Wed, 15 Aug 2012 14:59:53 +0000

Politics – one of the reasons the world goes round, or is it just a result of the world going round? Not really an easy question. One thing that anyone agrees upon though, is that politics (good or bad, doesn’t really matter) can make or brake economies (whatever the level: global, European, national, local, personal), and with these any chance of future spatial development.

Politics, in our context, are not a result of social relations, but the compound formed by social relations which involve power and authority, and the use of the latter in designing and implementing policies. Why is this important in the context of spatial development? Simply put, because economic growth is usually the desired result of spatial development (if this is always ethical is another matter, which I will discuss some other time) and it depends on the efficiency of economic policies to deliver positive results. Economic policies are nothing more than the results of strategies formulated based on political ideologies.

Last December I had the opportunity to participate in a lecture held by Andreas Faludi at the Urban Planning Faculty of the “Ion Mincu” University of Architecture and Urban Planning in Bucharest. In his short presentation Faludi made reference to politics, and their role in spatial planning and policy, specifically European spatial planning. The reactions were mixed, some grunts floated around and a combination of denial and frustration could maybe characterise the general atmosphere. This is not something that planners (urban, regional, spatial; you can pick your scale or type freely) generally feel comfortable talking about.

Do politics and (spatial) planning really mix?

Considering the issue in our present context is rather important, as the planning “mythology” generally (until recently at least) discards politics as a major issue in the process of planning and subsequently excludes it from the process of development. The general consensus is that planning usually takes place on an imaginary plane which floats independently above the dirty world of politics, and this is how it should stay. Planning should not be tainted by political interests. To this, I would have to say: (Dangerously) Wrong! This view is more than unrealistic, and at some degree not even recommended as a conceptual thinking perspective. I’m not saying that this utopian view is not desirable, but rather that it is flawed in it’s core. I say this because of 6 main reasons, which I believe make politics important in the context of spatial development:

Political ideology. As I’ve already written above, in the given context in which economic growth is the main purpose of spatial development, ignoring that economic strategies are built upon political ideologies can prove to be destructively foolish. Considering the current economic state of the EU for example, ignoring that national governments, which have different political majorities (in terms of ideology) and agendas can be fatal. Disjointed national development oriented interventions with no clear common strategic objectives will not be able to insure economic growth, or reduce national and regional disparities.
Lobbying. Political and non-political actors will lobby in favour of their direct interests and priorities to the closest influential power figure or institution. Not all stakeholders in the development processes are lobbyists, but considering common areas of interest can allow for future developments to benefit from lobbyist support or provide support for opposition, whatever the case.
Relative values (viewpoint alterations). Politics hold a strange power, that allows the alteration of economic and social values of past, present and future developments. Imagine a change in government from party A to party B. When aspiring to power party B will usually try to prove that all that which is being done by the current government (party A) is either flawed or dead wrong. After the change in power, party B will assess current policies and developments and only support those changes which favour themselves, and will promote better (I use the term loosely) strategies and policies than those of the former government (party A). Party A will take the place of party B as the opposition, beginning the opposition of the latter’s policies and so on. So, the economic and social values of development change their relative value based on how well they emulate the political interests and priorities of those in power.
Development typologies. Political economy, resulted from the development of political ideologies has a direct influence on the type of development (e.g. socialist or liberal development policies) that is being promoted, and will usually serve the interests and priorities of those in power.
Power inequality. By definition, politics imply that power and authority are not divided equally between political actors and stakeholders. This is held to be true, as empirical observation can easily assess that not all actors or stakeholders have leverage when entering negotiations concerning their development priorities. Thus those in power or those who hold a powerful leverage can influence the outcome of the negotiations in their favour.
Cultural differences (political or otherwise). This is more of a delicate subject, as nobody likes to acknowledge the problem. Planners (or any other professionals for that matter) can’t always be neutral, even if the wish to be so. Lay-knowledge resulted from professional and life experiences will influence the decision-making process in one way or another. This is not always voluntary. The personal values of each individual are built throughout his or her life, and these cannot always be deemed right or wrong. But these values will, without a doubt, have an influence in their work, if these values are not consciously evaluated and related to the context.

Conclusions

I want to be clear regarding these reasons, which I listed above. I do not believe that these are flaws induced by politics in the decision-making processes of planning and development, which should be fixed. I consider these natural, and at some extent normal social phenomenons which affect decisions, and thus should always be considered.

The purpose should not be to take politics out of the development processes, but rather build an inclusive methodology for policy-making and implementation, which can adapt to the continuous and inevitable changes of political ideology of power and authority, and perpetuate a set of common objectives which can evolve despite political change.

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European identity and common values

Alexandru F. Ghita — Thu, 12 Apr 2012 10:35:25 +0000

Cultural values and language define two of the most important characteristics of territorially defined nations or ethnically defined groups. The recent buzz around the EU blogosphere revealed certain cultural and language issues that limit the way in which people react and interact (1, 2, 3). By similarity, this is not different in the spatial planning field, especially considering that policy measures are usually filtered through the past, present and future visions resulted from cultural and political frameworks.

Protesilaos Stavrou actually pointed towards an important issue of the European project. That of the European identity. It’s fairly easy to declare that from today on, the EU member states will promote a European identity, giving them a common benchmark of values. Some would say it sounds ideal, and this should be the cultural target of Europe, others will deem it as utopian, and see it as a threat to national culture. Deciding on who is right or wrong is difficult, but regardless of what your side of the barricade says, one should always be aware of the ‘other way’.

Bringing the European identity concept and spatial planning together shows that in fact there is no formal European spatial planning. It might not seem like it, but the two are in fact dependant on each other. As a result, it is difficult to define a European level of spatial planning, in the context in which the European level has no cultural representation, or a common benchmark of values.

Comparing spatial planning principles across EU member states identifies important differences not only in institutional architecture and decision-making processes, but also in priorities. While developed countries as those in Western Europe will prioritise green policies, developing countries as those in Central and Eastern Europe will, without a doubt prioritise policies targeted at economic gain, while keeping the ecological issues on the back burner. One clear example here would be the veto of Poland on the EU limits on greenhouse emissions.

We cannot talk about a European identity or a common set of values in the cultural sense, at this point in time. This is not by design, but simply because individuals will prefer to identify themselves with nation states and their values, rather than a European community. This is what makes policy-making difficult in the European context, considering its national and sub-national levels of implementation.

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