The contract is allegedly for six years, but the financial details are shaky at this time. While the initial report suggested the deal was worth $40 million, Clark Spencer of the Miami Herald is hearing the Marlins offered less money. Unless the Marlins have offered significantly less than $40 million, Cespedes’ contract will likely break the record for Cuban-born players. That slot is currently held by Aroldis Chapman, who received a six year, $30.25 million contract from the Cincinnati Reds.

Signing Cespedes would be a huge gain for the Marlins, who currently lack a true center fielder on their roster. The Chris Coghlan experiment was a disaster last season, causing the Marlins to turn to Emilio Bonifacio. While Bonifacio experienced a breakout season, much of his success was a result for a .372 BABIP, which was the second highest BABIP among qualified hitters last season. His defense has been acceptable in the outfield over his career, but he posted a -2.6 UZR in center this past season.

We don’t know what kind of defense Cespedes will play in center, but we have already taken our best guess at what his bat will produce. Jack Moore noted that Cespedes was probably less of a risk than other Cuban-born players, and Clay Davenport projected Cespedes’ stats based on his performance in the Cuban league. Based on Davenport’s research, Cespedes should hit .260/.325/.457 in the majors. Those numbers would put him in line with the average center fielder, who hit .261/.325/.406 this past season. What sets Cespedes apart from the typical center fielder is his power potential. Few center fielders are capable of hitting 20+ home runs each season. Even if Cespedes is a slightly below-average defender, his bat should make him the best option to play center on the Marlins.

While Cespedes is likely the Marlins’ best option in center, it’s unclear how soon he’ll be able to make an impact in the majors. At 26, he’s much older than the typical prospect, but he’ll likely need time to adjust in the minors before he’s ready to take on major league pitchers. Cespedes will already have to adjust to numerous lifestyle changes once he begins his professional career in the US, which, I would imagine, can be very stressful. If the Marlins promote Cespedes before he’s ready and he struggles, that’s one more thing Cespedes will have to worry about.

Still, Cespedes’ potential makes him an intriguing candidate for most major league teams. The Marlins, in particular, are in need of a center fielder, and Cespedes looks like an ideal fit for them. Even if he’s not with the team initially, he’ll definitely make an impact at some point this season. The race for the NL crown should be tight this season, and signing Cespedes strengthens the Marlins’ chances to contend for the division.

However, Dave Cameron made an interesting point: the Rockies play in the National League West, where hitters seemingly face s larger proportion of stud pitchers — Dave mentioned Tim Lincecum, Matt Cain, Madison Bumgarner, Clayton Kershaw, and Mat Latos in this connection. He also pointed out that Longoria did not have to face the Rays’ own excellent pitching staff. So I decided to look at it more closely. The point is not to settle the Longoria versus Tulowitzki dispute. Rather, I am interested in whether individual hitters face (or do not face) particular pitchers enough that they require a “divisional” adjustment of some sort.

Let’s get a couple of things out of the way. First of all, I am not going to get into the overall American League versus National League dispute here. I realize that even seeing a birth certificate is not going to convince some people, so I will simply reference (again) MGL’s recent study and his more extensive 2006 study. If you want to complain about the assertion that the AL has better talent overall, please direct your complaints there or elsewhere. While the Senior Circuit has caught up and perhaps taken a slight lead in hitting talent (at least through 2011, who knows how this off-season might have changed things), the AL still had more talent overall because of a much greater lead in pitching.

Second, the best way to do this would be to take all the pitchers each hitter faced and get projections (or retro-jections) of the true talent in 2011, including all of the relevant adjustments for environment, and then compare. Well, I’m not doing a whole set of pitcher retro-jections and then matching them up per plate appearance with two hitters for one post. I am claiming that this is some super-duper rigorous study. I am simply going to look at the small group of “really good” pitchers as given by my Twitter interlocutors. There were other qualifications I could put in here, e.g., the problem of park factors and interleague comparison, but I’ve already gone on too long with prefatory remarks. Caveat lector.

Did Troy Tulowitzki face such a great proportion of NL West studs (as listed by Dave and others) such that he should get a special “adjustment” for difficulty level? For the sake of keeping things relatively simple, we will just look at 2011 matchups. (I just used MLB.com’s pages, which do not have PA listed separately, in a convenient way, so “plate appearance” should be understood as AB+BB for the purposes of this post. Yes, this probably led to an insignificant arithmetical error or two.) Tulowitzki had 596 plate appearances (AB+BB) in 2011: six versus Linceum, six versus Bumgarner, nine versus Cain, nine versus Kershaw, and 10 versus Latos. That is a total of 40, just under seven percent of his total plate appearances.

While that might be a slightly greater proportion of good pitching than hitters for other NL teams and divisions may have faced, given that 93 percent of his plate appearances came against the “rest” of the league (I know it gets complicated because of interleague, but let’s just stick with the basic premise for the sake of simplicity), I do not think that requires us to make NL West hitters like Tulo a special case. We do not take 40 plate appearances to be a significant sample for almost anything of which I am aware of off the top of my head.

How about if we expand this off-the-cuff selection of great pitchers to include the Diamondbacks’ Daniel Hudson and Ian Kennedy, as Paul Swydan suggested? (With all due respect to Paul and the great years and Hudson and Kennedy had, I am not sure who would put them on the same “true talent” level as Kershaw, Lincecum, or Cain, but let’s humor Paul. Dude’s gotta be exhausted from running all those “After Dark” chats.) That adds another 16 plate appearances to Tulo’s list of “stud” opponents. Again, without doing the math, I am pretty sure that those 16 plate appearances do not push things over into “cancel that league adjustment” territory, as the total is still under ten percent of Tulowitzki’s plate appearances.

What about Longoria not having to face the Rays’ staff? That’s a bit trickier, since we do not have the numbers for how many times Longoria would have faced individual Rays pitchers in an alternate universe. With a bit of digging, I found an AL East hitter who faced the Rays quite a bit: Dustin Pedroia. Now, I was not given a list of “official studs” on the Rays’ staff, but for 2011, I will count David Price and James Shields. Pedroia had 721 plate appearances (AB+BB) in 2011; 16 versus Price, 17 versus Shields. That comes to a total off 33, or less than 5 percent of Pedroia’s plate appearances.

Oh, I’ve forgotten one Tampa Stud: Pedroia also faced Matt Moore twice, pushing things all the way up to… 4.8 percent. Obviously, if I am no inclined to accept that Tulowitzki’s proportion of stud pitchers faced should change the way we thing of his “difficulty adjustment,” I am not going to be doing the same for Longoria based on an even smaller proportion of hypothetical plate appearances.

[Side note: Longoria faced CC Sabathia 16 times, more than Tulowitzki faced any one of the NL West pitchers listed above.]

The 2011 National League West (and the San Francisco Giants in particular) did feature a number of tremendous pitchers, and it is understandable that one would be tempted to judge the hitters in their division on a different grading curve. However, even taking both those pitchers that Tulowitzki faced (including Hudson and Kennedy) and that Longoria did not face together, we are talking about less than 80 plate appearances between two players versus more than 1000 PA versus of all the other pitchers they collectively faced during the season. If someone wants to do a more detailed and mathematically rigorous account of that proves otherwise, that would be both great. Until then, I do not think Tulowitzki and other NL West hitters get bonus points, or at least not a significant number of them.

Our current measures of opponent strength are imperfect and somewhat crude, and can probably be improved upon. I can understand the why Dave and others want to note that hitters in the 2011 NL West faced a great number of excellent starters. But as we have seen, a hitter like Tulowitzki faces a group of seven starters less than 60 or 70 times a season, and given all the other evidence about the league-wide skill level of the far greater proportion of hitters he faces, those league-wide evaluations likely come closer to the truth about the difficulty level faced by a individual hitters. In any case, Tulo is a great player, he doesn’t need the extra credit.

Also we’ve found a few missing profiles including Billy Butler, Johan Santana, Kendrys Morales, and Franklin Gutierrez.

I’d also like to gauge whether or not we should explore putting the FanGraphs+ content into an eBook / PDF format. Poll after the jump:

1. Julio Teheran, RHP
BORN: Jan. 27, 1991
EXPERIENCE: 4 seasons
ACQUIRED: 2007 international free agent
2010-11 TOP 10 RANKING: 1st

Teheran leads the charge for Atlanta’s young arms. He attacks hitters with an explosive repertoire that screams future No. 1 starter… if he can polish one of his two breaking balls. His fastball, which can touch 96-97 mph, and changeup are both plus pitches at times and just need more consistency. Teheran has both above-average control and understanding of his craft for his age. He is a fly-ball pitcher but he does a nice job of keeping the ball in the park after allowing just five home runs in 144.2 innings at triple-A. Despite a strong changeup, Teheran struggled against left-handed batters (at least in comparison to right-handed hitters who hit .199) by allowing a .276 batting-average-against. He just recently turned 21 years old and already has 20 innings of big league experience under his belt. Atlanta has excellent pitching depth at the big league level so Teheran should receive some more seasoning at the triple-A level to begin 2012.

2. Arodys Vizcaino, RHP
BORN: Nov. 13, 1990
EXPERIENCE: 4 seasons
ACQUIRED: 2007 international free agent (by Yankees)
2010-11 TOP 10 RANKING: 6th

An astute pick-up from the Yankees organization, Vizcaino is a pitcher who’s currently in between roles. He made 17 starts between high-A and double-A but then pitched exclusively out of the bullpen at both triple-A (six appearances) and in the Majors (17 games). The right-hander could very well open 2012 in a very impressive big league bullpen that already featues young talent such as Craig Kimbrel and Jonny Venters. As hard as it may be to believe, Vizcaino features the raw stuff to fit right in with those two arms. His fastball can touch the upper 90s and he flashes a plus curveball. The changeup also has the potential to be above-average, which could help him achieve the ceiling of a No. 2 starter if he eventually returns to starting. One concern with Vizcaino is the torn elbow ligament that he suffered in 2010 that was healed through rest and rehab, rather than surgery.

3. Randall Delgado, RHP
BORN: Feb. 9, 1990
EXPERIENCE: 5 seasons
ACQUIRED: 2006 international free agent
2010-11 TOP 10 RANKING: 4th

Like the other two pitchers at the top of this list, Delgado has risen quickly through the ranks and currently sits one step away from the Majors at the age of just 22. He worked 174 innings in 2011 split between three levels (AA, AAA, MLB) and 35 of those came at the big league level. Delgado wasn’t quite ready for the Majors, as witnessed by his 5.14 FIP and 4.63 strikeout rate. The majority of his innings came at the double-A level. Delgado has a big, strong pitcher’s frame and has provided at least 120 innings in each of his three full seasons. He has a little work to do with his control and overall consistency before he becomes a workhorse No. 2 or 3 starter for the Braves, perhaps beginning in 2013 after a full year of seasoning in triple-A. His repertoire includes a low-90s fastball that can hit the mid 90s. Both his curveball and changeup have the potential to be above-average weapons.

4. Tyler Pastornicky, SS
BORN: Dec. 13, 1989
EXPERIENCE: 4 seasons
ACQUIRED: 2008 5th round, Florida HS (by Blue Jays)
2010-11 TOP 10 RANKING: Off

A personal favorite of mine while he was with Toronto, Atlanta made a smart move in acquiring him during the Yunel Escobar/Alex Gonzalez swap. One baseball official referred to the former Florida prep star as a “very good baseball player… He’s got a really good approach at the plate, works counts and can hit the ball to all fields.” Pastornicky is the type of player that you have to watch a few times to really appreciate. He doesn’t hit for average and doesn’t have any one standout tool but he does the little things and also has the potential to steal 20+ bases in a full season. He should fit in nicely at the top of a lineup in the two-hole where he can focus on advancing runners and wreaking havoc on the base paths in front of the big guns. The big question with Pastornicky is his ability to play shortstop at the big league level. He is OK at the position and has good range but his arm is average and he can be slow to unload his throws. With lots of depth in the system a move to second base would not be the worst thing for Pastornicky or the Braves. A baseball official said of the infielder, “Pastornicky has faced every challenge and improved almost every year as a professional”

5. Sean Gilmartin, LHP
BORN: May 8, 1990
EXPERIENCE: 1 season
ACQUIRED: 2011 1st round (28th overall), Florida State U
2010-11 TOP 10 RANKING: NA

Gilmartin was a bit of a curious pick when the Braves selected him with the 28th overall selection of the 2011 draft but if there is one thing the organization knows it’s pitching. Similar eyebrows were raised when the club selected Mike Minor and that worked out pretty well. The southpaw pitched 23.1 innings, including five starts in low-A, during the regular season after signing and performed rather well. Assigned to the Arizona Fall League at the conclusion of the season Gilmartin looked a little tired. He struggled with his command and elevated his pitches more, which led to five home runs in 29.0 innings. Because he doesn’t have an electric repertoire he needs to work down in the zone to succeed and his control is important. His repertoire includes an 87-91 mph fastball, slider and potentially-plus changeup. A two-way player in college, a full-time focus on pitching could help him take another big step forward. Gilmartin should open 2012 in either high-A or double-A.

6. Andrelton Simmons, SS
BORN: Sept. 4, 1989
EXPERIENCE: 2 seasons
ACQUIRED: 2010 2nd round, Oklahoma JC
2010-11 TOP 10 RANKING: Off

Simmons is behind Tyler Pastornicky on the depth chart but his presence could eventually push the infielder over to second base. Although more raw in overall baseball skills, Simmons has an explosive package of defensive skills led by a cannon arm. He’s racked up more errors than you might expect but he tries to do too much at times. At the plate, Simmons has shown the ability to hold his own and hit for average. He flashes good gap power but probably won’t top 10-12 homers in the Majors. He makes a lot of contact, which leads to low walk totals but also very low strikeout rates (just 7.5 K% in 2011 at high-A). Like with his defensive work, Simmons tries to push the envelop too hard at the plate and needs to learn to wait for better pitches to drive. He stole 26 bases in 2011 but was also caught 18 times and needs more work on base running fundamentals; his speed is just average.

7. Christian Bethancourt, C
BORN: Sept. 2, 1991
EXPERIENCE: 4 seasons
ACQUIRED: 2008 international free agent
2010-11 TOP 10 RANKING: 10th

Bethancourt has always been an intriguing catching prospect because of his above-average athleticism. He has all the tools necessary to be a gold glove defender behind the dish and one baseball official questioned about Bethancourt referred to him as “arguably the best defensive catcher in the minor leagues right now…” Questions have been raised more than once about his maturity and effort on the field. Although he has four years of experience in pro ball, he’s still just 20 years old. As the baseball official put it, though, there has never been “major makeup issues with Bethancourt… Most 17- and 18-year old kids would seem immature if they were playing with teammates 4-5 years older.” The organization was encouraged by his performance during the 2011 regular season, as well as with his play in the Arizona Fall League, which saw him hit above .300 in 19 games. Although Bethancourt has always hit for a good average, he might struggle to do so against big league pitching unless he learns to be more selective (1.7% walk rate in 45 high-A games).

8. Edward Salcedo, SS
BORN: July 30, 1991
EXPERIENCE: 2 seasons
ACQUIRED: 2010 international free agent
2010-11 TOP 10 RANKING: 9th

Signed as a high-profile amateur shortstop out of the Dominican Republic, Salcedo appeared in just 19 games at the position in 2011 and was shifted to the hot corner. The prospect has begun to show the in-game power necessary to succeed there; his body and swing suggest at more untapped strength. Salcedo hit just .248 last season but experience should help him pull that average up – he showed flashes of hitting for average but then went into prolonged slumps. He did a nice job of trimming his strikeout rate from about 25% in ’10 to below 19% in ’11. With Brandon Drury coming up quickly behind him there is some talk that Salcedo could move to a corner outfield position. He should spend 2012 in high-A ball.

9. Zeke Spruill, RHP
BORN: Sept. 11, 1989
EXPERIENCE: 4 seasons
ACQUIRED: 2008 2nd round, Georgia HS
2010-11 TOP 10 RANKING: Off

A top prep arm in the 2008 draft, Spruill fell off the prospect radar for a variety of issues and injuries. A strong 2011 season, though, made him relevant again. The right-hander has a solid fastball that ranges from 89-94 mph and induces a lot of ground-ball outs. Both his curveball and changeup continue to need development but he’s made strides with commanding both on a more consistent basis. Because he’s more of a pitch-to-contact guy now, Spruill’s ceiling is in the range of a No. 3 or 4 starter. Spruill has a solid pitcher’s frame and, after providing 174.2 innings last season between high-A and double-A, he has the makings of an innings eater. The Georgia native should return to double-A to begin 2012.

10. Brandon Drury, 3B:
BORN: Aug. 21, 1992
EXPERIENCE: 2 seasons
ACQUIRED: 2010 13th round – Oregon HS
2010-11 TOP 10 RANKING: Off

Drury, a former 13th round pick, got off to a slow start to his pro career by hitting below .200 in his debut in 2010. Rejuvenated for the ’11 season, he produced the second highest batting average in the Appalachian League (Rookie ball). It was no fluke. Drury’s approach improved and he isn’t afraid to use the whole field. He makes excellent contact but that leads to low walk rates so he may have to become more selective as he climbs the ladder. One scout contacted regarding Drury wasn’t concerned with his approach:

“He will learn how to be more patient with time. With maturing… he will improve on those numbers. Being [consistent] is what every player needs to make it to the majors. We’ll see if he can continue to hit as he moves up through the minors.”

Defense was a question mark for Drury as he entered the 2010 draft. A prep shortstop he immediately moved to third base as a pro and has taken to the position well. He lacked speed and range for shortstop but should develop into at least an average defender with a solid arm at the hot corner. The scout had no doubt that Drury would squeeze every ounce of ability out of his body.

“Brandon was a baseball rat [in high school]. Every time I saw him he had a bat, ball or glove in his hand. I saw him at a tournament in Arizona walking around the hotel with his glove and ball. This kid loves baseball…”

11. J.R. Graham, RHP: Graham is raw but he has an intriguing power fastball and bowling-ball effect. Despite his rough edges, the right-hander had no issues in Rookie ball as he posted a 2.12 FIP (1.72 ERA) and did not allow a home run in 57.2 innings. Because he’s not a big pitcher (6’0”) Graham is going to have to keep on top of the ball as he moves up the ladder. He could make an interesting high-leverage reliever if his success continues.

12. Matt Lipka, OF: After struggling in the field for the past two seasons the former infielder has been converted to the outfield. With any luck the conversion will help jump start his bat as he posted an OPS of just .608 at low-A in 2011. Lipka is still young and has plenty of time to turn things around but he has the athleticism necessary to succeed as a super-utility player.

13. J.J. Hoover, RHP: Hoover doesn’t have the same power arsenal that other pitchers at the top of this list possess but he knows how to pitch and has had success at the both double-A and triple-A (albeit in a small sample size). Hoover split the year between the starting rotation and the bullpen but has the potential to be a solid No. 4 starter at the big league level. With some higher profile arms in the system, though, he could end up as a big league league swing man if he sticks with Atlanta.

14. Carlos Perez, LHP: For a more detailed report on Perez you’ll want to catch up with Mike Newman’s scouting report on the southpaw that ran recently on FanGraphs. Perez has the potential for above-average stuff from the left side but he’s painfully inconsistent. This is not unusual for such a young pitcher with limited experience. With so much high-ceiling pitching depth ahead of him, though, Atlanta can afford to be patient.

15. Joe Terdoslavich, 1B: A 2010 6th round pick out of Long Beach State, Terdoslavich has an up-and-down college career. Atlanta scouts did an excellent job identifying him as a potential steal and he’s rewarded the organization so far. A switch-hitter, he has impressive raw power and has hit for average. His verstility could make him a valuable bench player if he falls short on his regular playing time aspirations. A strong showing in the Arizona Fall League could vault him onto the fast track for 2012.

SLEEPER ALERT: Navery Moore, RHP: Moore slid in the 2011 draft landing in the 14th round but he has a plus fastball that reaches 95-96 mph. A closer in college with Vanderbilt, the right-hander also has the mentality that teams covet in a closer. If he can tighten up his breaking ball, or develop his changeup or perhaps develop a cutter, he could become a key high-leverage relief prospect. Otherwise he may top out as a set-up man.

Another reason lists could be so pitcher heavy is that apparently pitcher, for some analysts, are easier to project. Sickles just did a few articles on this. Top pitchers, almost without exception, he rated as A or B+ prospects. The position players were all over the place, with several good position players being B- or C level prospects.

Just food for thought.

Pretty interesting food, actually. I’m not sure why I hadn’t thought of this earlier, but on the surface, this comment seems to pass the smell test. Kids in high school can throw in the mid-90s, and that’s a pretty easy thing to scout. They can throw nasty breaking balls that no one can hit. Likewise, there are always a few college arms who command their pitches so well that they’re considered to be nearly Major League ready before they ever sign a pro contract. With these types of premium pitching prospects, there’s not really a lot of projecting to be done – the forecasting involved is more along the lines of whether they’ll be able to stay healthy or not.

This isn’t really true of hitters. Very few high school kids possess the physical skills of a Major League player. A large part of hitting is how well you can drive the baseball, and game-usable power often doesn’t develop until a player is in his early-20s. Likewise, hardly any teenagers have the understanding of which pitches to swing at and which ones to lay off, as that is learned through experience and repetition – things that only come with time. Underdeveloped power and overly aggressive hitting strategies mean that very few young kids are capable of stepping right into the Major Leagues and performing well offensively. The position players who do make the big leagues before they can legally drink are usually those whose athletic abilities allow them to contribute in the field or on the bases – a disproportionate number of teenage position players in the big leagues have been shortstops and center fielders.

Amateur pitchers flash the kind of skills needed to become top-notch Major League arms, and in many cases, those skills can translate directly to the Major Leagues in a short period of time. Amateur position players can show athletic ability and good hitting mechanics, but rarely do you see a HS or even college hitter who is already displaying the kinds of skills necessary to hit well against big league pitching. Position players require a bit more projection – how will the player fill out as he gets older, can he adjust to facing good breaking balls on a regular basis, etc…

It makes sense, and would help explain why teams have been willing to invest so much money in high draft picks on pitching prospects despite knowing that their flame out rate is significantly higher. As we talked about yesterday, our confidence in our evaluations goes up as we gain information, and if scouts feel that they have more information about a pitcher’s Major League tools than they do a hitter of the same age, it’s natural that they could prefer the pitcher, even with the greater chance of injury. Of course, a lot of things make sense when you think about them, but are debunked once you actually start looking at the data. So, let’s try and look at some data.

We’ll start off by just borrowing some research from Jeff Zimmerman, who looked at the relative percentage of players from Baseball America’s All-Time Top 100 list that showed up on the 2010 leaderboards. There were 13 pitchers that posted a WAR of +5.0 or higher in 2010, and all 13 appeared on BA’s list at one point or another. There were 18 pitchers who posted a WAR of between +4.0 and +5.0, and BA had identified 72% of those. They got 70% of the 20 arms who posted a WAR between +3.0 and +4.0. This is a pretty good showing for BA, as prospect evaluation isn’t easy, and they consistently nailed a large majority of the best arms in baseball.

On the hitting side of things, they didn’t fare quite as well. Again, 13 players posted a WAR of +6.0 or higher, and BA identified 77% of those. They stayed in the mid-70% range for every tier down to +3.0 to +4.0 WAR, and as Zimmerman’s final table shows, the only real difference in the results seems to be at the very top. In most tiers, they got close to the same percentage of hitters and pitchers, but when it comes to +5 WAR or higher players, they did significantly better with pitchers.

We’re dealing with pretty tiny samples, though, and only one year of results from one source. We can’t draw any conclusions from this information. So, let’s look back at Sickels’ rankings, where the source of the original comment came from. A couple of weeks ago, John posted a review of his prospect grades for pitchers who rated in the Top 25 in baseball in WAR last year. Of the 25 guys who posted +3.9 WAR or higher, Sickels had placed a B- or better prospect grade on 23 of them – only C.J. Wilson and Doug Fister fell through the cracks, and they’ve both taken some pretty anomalous career paths to success. Twelve of the 25 pitchers received an A- grade or better. By and large, Sickels was able to identify most of the best pitchers in baseball last year while they were minor leaguers.

He then looked at the top 30 position players from a year ago, and the results were somewhat less impressive. Most of the guys on the list got B- or better grades at some point, but Sickels acknowledges that he missed on Matt Kemp and Robinson Cano, notes that Matt Holliday was a late-bloomer, and underestimated the abilities of Brett Gardner and Shane Victorino, who were pegged as fourth outfielders. We’ll give him a pass on Jose Bautista because what he’s doing is basically unprecedented and no one could have seen this coming.

He still got most of the best hitting prospects, just as Baseball America did, but the proportion of misses is higher and more severe.

Again, not enough information to draw any firm conclusions, so I decided to look at how very young kids perform in the big leagues. I grabbed all player seasons since 1982, and then filtered out only the ones where the player was 21 or younger and had at least 50 IP/150 PA. There were nearly identical samples of each population – 132 pitcher seasons, 123 hitter seasons. That was not planned, but it’s a pretty nice coincidence, as it gives us very similar samples to deal with.

The 132 21-or-younger pitchers were pretty pretty good (thanks to guys like Dwight Gooden, Bret Saberhagen, Fernando Valenzuela, and Madison Bumgarner), throwing just over 15,000 innings and posting an ERA- of 99, supported by an equal FIP- of 99. Overall, this combination of above-average pitching over a decent number of innings added up to +212 WAR, or an average +2.53 WAR per 180 innings pitched.

The 123 21-or-younger hitters also weren’t bad. Alex Rodriguez, Albert Pujols, and Ken Griffey Jr were all monsters at an early age, and helped lead the group to +192 WAR in just under 49,000 plate appearances. That averages out to +2.36 WAR per 600 PA, just a bit lower than what the young pitchers put up.

Again, the gap isn’t large enough for us to draw any real conclusions. There have been some really good young pitchers, and some really good young hitters. The young pitchers have been slightly better, and may be slightly easier to identify, but the information isn’t overwhelmingly in support of the idea that premium young pitchers are just easier to identify than young hitters.

The idea still makes sense, though, and I wouldn’t be surprised if a more thorough study ended up supporting the claim. It’s officially on my to-do list for this year, and is a topic I’d love to see discussed in more depth.

Table of Contents
Here’s the table of contents for today’s edition of Offseason Notes.

1. Prospecting: Keith Law’s Top-100 Prospect List
2. Video: Hak-Ju Lee and Julio Teheran
3. Crowdsourcing Broadcasters: Tampa Bay Television

Prospecting: Keith Law’s Top-100 Prospect List
Keith Law has published his top-100 prospect list for 2012. (Insider only.)

Here are some notes on same:

• Regarding the top-est of the top prospects, they’re all generally where you’d expect. Law ranks Mike Trout first of the Trout-Bryce Harper-Matt Moore triumvirate. Manny Machado at fourth overall is probably slightly higher than on other lists you’ll see, but not particularly so. Atlanta right-handed prospect Julio Teheran at 18th overall is decidedly lower than on other lists. (Teheran was, for example, ranked fourth, fourth, fourth, and sixth, respectively, by Baseball America’s Jim Callis, J.J. Cooper, Will Lingo, and John Manuel on their top-50 lists from the BA Prospect Handbook.)

• On that note, Tampa Bay shortstop prospect Hak-Ju Lee fairs well in Law’s estimation. Law ranks him 12th overall, whereas no one from that aforementioned BA foursome ranks him higher than 33rd (J.J. Cooper). Lee slashed .318/.389/.443 (.380 BABIP) as a 20-year-old in 454 plate appearances at High-A last season. Law notes that the power upside is quite limited, but that, between defense and plate discipline, Lee will “be an All-Star candidate a few years after reaching the majors sometime in 2013.”

• Angel right-hander Garrett Richards is ranked 70th overall. He was 67th on Jonathan Mayo’s MLB.com top-100 list. Per some work I did recently on the relationship between velocity, control, and pitching success, he (i.e. Richards) appears situated for major-league success in the near future.

Video: Hak-Ju Lee and Julio Teheran
Here’s video of Lee and Teheran, from Baseball Instinct and MLB.com, respectively. I wasn’t able to find particularly good footage of Lee at short, unfortunately.

Crowdsourcing Broadcasters: Tampa Bay Television
This offseason, FanGraphs is asking readers to rate the broadcast teams for all 30 major-league clubs. (Click here for more on this project.)

Rate other teams: Arizona / Atlanta / Baltimore / Boston / Chicago (AL) / Chicago (NL) / Cincinnati / Cleveland / Colorado / Detroit / Miami / Houston / Los Angeles (AL) / Los Angeles (NL, Home Games) / Los Angeles (NL, Away Games) / Milwaukee / Minnesota / New York (AL) / New York (NL) / Oakland / Philadelphia / Pittsburgh / St. Louis / San Diego / San Francisco / Seattle.

Trading Burnett is a no-brainer for the Yankees; they would be freeing up payroll space while simultaneously opening up a spot in their rotation for Phil Hughes or Freddy Garcia. But why would the Pirates be interested in adding Burnett?

As it turns out, the Pirates are in a unique predicament that makes them one of the few teams in the majors in a position to add Burnett. They have a weak rotation, headlined by the enigmatic Charlie Morton (who had off-season surgery and is doubtful for the beginning of the season) and the injury-prone Erik Bedard, and they have been rebuffed by numerous free agent pitchers this offseason. They offered Edwin Jackson a three-year deal, but he turned it down in favor of taking a one-year deal with the Nationals; they also attempted to woo Roy Oswalt, but he has limited his search to a handful of contending teams.

Burnett is no Oswalt or Jackson. He has upside in Pittsburgh’s park — which is considerably less home-run-prone than Yankee Stadium — but he’s still only a +2 to +3 win pitcher who is under contract for two more seasons. He’s not the final piece that will allow them to put together a competitive team, and he’s not going to be able to compensate for the other holes in the Pirates’ rotation. He’s an improvement and will likely come at a good value — although the Yankees had better be ready to pony up more dough — but why are the Pirates spending their resources on a mediocre upgrade?

Teams that have struggled for a long period of time have a vicious cycle holding them down, making it difficult for them to become contenders. Losing teams generally have weaker revenue streams than successful teams, and they face the added challenge of the top free agents typically don’t want to go to a perpetually losing team, even if they are offering boatloads of money.

Based on this offseason’s progression, it seems like the Pirates are stuck in that position. They have some exciting young position players, but they desperately need to add pitching depth if they want to take their club to the next level. And even if A.J. Burnett doesn’t solve all their problems, he’s got three things going for him: he’s a step in the right direction, he’ll come at a fair value, and he isn’t going to say no. Even an incremental upgrade might make it more likely that the next player the Pirates pursue will say yes.

First, Irish players had to display superior performance to earn regular positions. Second, they generally were relegated to less important field positions. Regular Irish players were also more likely to be assigned to fill in at field positions other than their regular ones. Last, the Irish were underrepresented as managers. The evidence also suggests fan discrimination, with the presence of Irish players positively correlated with their cities’ Irish populations. These patterns, again with the exception of pitcher, mirror those observed for African Americans in the first decade or two after Jackie Robinson broke the MLB “color line” in 1947.

Eckard notes that this discrimination did not prevent Irish players from getting jobs in baseball: “Roughly one-third of players were Irish, similar to the proportion of Irish in the general populations of cities with major-league ball teams.” There was no anti-Irish color line. Rather, the discrimination against Irish players was more subtle. But that very subtlety helps to make the history of the 1880s all the more applicable to the tensions of the present day.

Indeed, as a commenter pointed out on the Milton Bradley story, the portrayal of Irish at the end of the 19th century was very similar to that of African Americans in the middle of the 20th century. As Eckard writes: “The basic elements of the stereotype were innate low intelligence, unreliability, laziness, and (for males) a penchant for drunkenness and fighting. Newspaper and magazine cartoonists of the era often portrayed the Irish with simian features.”

Eckard then develops a number of hypotheses to measure possible anti-Irish discrimination in baseball. Most of these hypotheses have been substantiated with regard to African American players in the decades following baseball’s integration in 1947.

1. 1. Irish players might have a higher mean performance: due to discrimination, given a choice between an Irish player and a non-Irish player of comparable value, a racist owner would choose the non-Irish player, which would mean that only standout Irish players would be employed.
2. 2. Teams with Irish players might have a higher winning percentage: a team unwilling to employ Irish players would be disadvantaging itself with regard to the talent pool compared to a team that was willing to use Irish players.
3. 3. Irish players might have less desirable positions on the diamond, as racist teams reserved the more desirable positions for non-Irish players, who would also be paid a higher wage.
4. 4. For similar reasons, Irish players might be forced to change positions more often so that the positional preferences of non-Irish players could be accommodated.
5. 5. There would be fewer Irish managers in baseball, to placate racist players who wouldn’t want to play for an Irish manager.
6. 6. Because racist fans might not want to watch Irish players, Irish players might only be employed by teams in cities with a high Irish population.

Eckard compares the triple slash lines of Irish players compared to non-Irish players, as well as the proportion of Irish players at each position and the number of Irish players on each team, and demonstrates these hypotheses to be largely correct. Irish players did have demonstrably better performance but were less prevalent at premium positions and as managers. Cities with larger Irish populations had more Irish players on their teams. Despite the fact that the number of Irish players in baseball was higher than the Irish proportion of the U.S. population, Irish-American ballplayers appear to have faced demonstrable discrimination.

(The second hypothesis, about team winning percentage, is not statistically significant at the 5% level, but is significant at the 10% level.)

Eckard determined Irish ethnicity by examining player records in ancestry.com to determine whether they or their father were born in Ireland; the author then established a probability of Irishness for all other white players by comparing the number of people with their surname to the number of people with their surname who also had a father born in Ireland. He repeated this process with players of German ancestry and English ancestry to determine whether any similar discrimination could be discerned, and found that there appeared to be a statistically significant anti-German bias in managers, but could not find support for the other discrimination hypotheses listed above.

The author is careful to note that his analysis reveals subtle results, and that discriminatory outcomes are different from overt racism:

It is not clear that contemporary baseball owners and players were even aware of the relatively subtle manifestations of discrimination revealed in the above statistical analysis. The popular modern image of the game in the late 1800s as a (European) ethnicity-blind meritocracy might require only a minor revision.

I enjoy looking at baseball history because our game has the richest history of any American professional sport. It’s frankly awesome that a tenured professor can conduct meaningful research using the OBP and slugging percentage of Hall of Famers like Ned Hanlon and King Kelly. But history can also help us better understand baseball today. (I remain fascinated by the history of performance-enhancing drugs in the 19th century.) The stereotypes that followed Irish players later dogged African Americans, as did the discriminatory practices. Moreover, those practices were not merely as simple as barring them from the profession. Much as integration did not end racism in American society, it did not prevent discrimination in baseball.

Nor, I daresay, has racism ended in society, though it is also almost certainly true that the most important color in baseball is green. In modern American usage, the word “racism” tends to apply to relations between African Americans and whites, but the history of racism is much broader. It also, perhaps just maybe, offers hope for the future. After all, the amount of anti-Irish discrimination in modern society is vanishingly low. Of course, there are a few major differences between Irish-Americans and African Americans. There are few subjects more fraught than skin tone, which seems to be one of the more universal marks of discrimination around the world. But the Irish experience demonstrates that discrimination is neither necessary nor permanent. In a hundred years, it may all simply seem like ancient history.

I’ll admit it: when Andrew Friedman said at the beginning of the off-season that the Rays didn’t need to trade a starter, I called bull. It’s no secret that the Rays have a glut of major-league-ready starting pitching, with seven starters who could theoretically be in the opening day rotation*, so I wrote off Friedman’s comments as positioning. You don’t want to announce to the world that you desperately need to trade a starter, thereby jettisoning your leverage. Friedman was playing his hand, but there’s no chance the Rays would actually enter the 2012 season without dealing a starter…right?

*In case you’re having a brain fart: David Price, James Shields, Jeremy Hellickson, Matt Moore, Jeff Niemann, Wade Davis, and Alex Cobb.

As it turns out, wrong. The market ended up being flooded with starters, and there was never a surplus of demand that would have pushed up offers for either Jeff Niemann or Wade Davis. Who saw Gio Gonzalez and Jeremy Guthrie being traded? Or Roy Oswalt staying on the market this late? It was a poor off-season to be stuck trying to deal a mediocre starter, so now the Rays are faced with the task of making all their pitchers fit their roster without decreasing anyone’s trade value.

But the solution to this glut of pitching is simpler than it seems: keep Alex Cobb in Triple-A, and move Wade Davis to the bullpen. That may not seem ideal, but based on his pitch repertoire and success, Davis may be destined to move to the bullpen anyway.

Considering he was once one of the top pitching prospects in the Rays system, Wade Davis has been somewhat of a disappointment. After striking out over 20 percent of hitters at every step in the minors (outside one poor year in Double-A), he initially burst into the majors at the tail end of 2009 with such promise; he struck out 24 percent of the batters he faced, helping Rays fans forget that he was replacing Scott Kazmir in the rotation.

This success should have come with a minor warning bell, though. Despite the strikeouts, Davis only generated a league-average amount of swinging strikes (8.8 percent), suggesting that his strikeout rate was potentially too good to be true. Some regression was expected in 2010, and Davis did struggle that season; his strikeout rate dropped to below league average (16 percent), and batters rarely swung and missed at his pitches (6 percent). But instead of rebounding in 2011 and adjusting in a positive way, Davis continued to backtrack in 2011 (13 percent strikeout rate) and raised some serious concerns about his ability to be a viable major-league starter.

If you break down Davis’ results by pitch, the data doesn’t look any more encouraging. Davis has been able to fool hitters with his pitches less and less often each season:

Pitch classifications and data from Brooks Baseball.

To place these numbers in some context, Jeff Niemann posted a league-average strikeout rate last season (18 percent) with the following breakdown: 12-14 percent swinging strikes on his fastballs; 27 percent whiffs on his curveball and slider. Meanwhile, Jeremy Hellickson posted a meger 15 percent strikeout rate, but managed to get hitters to whiff at his curveball and changeup 30+ percent of the time.

In general, if you want to post a decent strikeout rate in the majors, you need to have at least one or two out-pitches that can consistently make hitters miss. Davis’ best out-pitch was only getting a swinging strike once every five times a hitter swung at it last season, while Hellickson and Niemann had pitches they could drop in for a whiff once every three or four times.

Is this to say that Davis is doomed and can never improve? No, certainly not. He obviously had swing-and-miss stuff at one point, and it’s not unheard of for young pitchers to improve their whiff and strikeout rates from one year to another. Doug Fister had a horrendous whiff rate in 2010 — four percent — but he boosted that up to nearly 7 percent in 2011 and increased his strikeout rate as a result. Also, Joe Blanton increased both his strikeout and swinging strike rates dramatically after moving to Philadelphia.

In general, though, these pitchers appear to be the exception to the rule. If you look at the leaderboard of pitchers who have posted swinging strike rates below 6 percent over the course of a season (since 2005, at least), you won’t find many pitchers who dramatically changed their career. In fact, it’s difficult to find a single pitcher who ever got their strikeout rate to league average. Joe Saunders. Chris Volstad. Trevor Cahill. Brian Bannister. Zach Duke. Kyle Lohse. Jeremy Guthrie. Mike Pelfrey. It’s a mediocre list, at best, and it goes on and on.

Maybe Wade Davis can turn things around, but from this perspective, his upside in the rotation appears limited. If he may only ever develop into a +1 to +2 win pitcher, why not try him in the bullpen and see what he can do? The Rays certainly have the pitching depth to give it a shot, and they only owe him a guaranteed $12 million over the next three seasons. He would be an expensive reliever for the Rays, but if he turned into a bullpen ace, he’d be a relatively good value.

The Rays pitching coach, Jim Hickey, has already hinted that Davis could move to the ‘pen to start the season. If he does well out there, I wouldn’t be surprised if this move became more than just a temporary fix.

That also may be why the Rangers weren’t willing to buy out any of Cruz’s free agent seasons, going beyond his age 34 season. The Rangers did sign Cruz to an extension Thursday, buying out his final two seasons of arbitration for $16 million, Fox Sports’s Ken Rosenthal reports.

The Rangers’ trepidation at undertaking an extension beyond Cruz’s arbitration years were summed up quite succinctly by the joke Twitter account MLB Fake Rumors:

#Rangers OF Cruz pulls hamstring while taking physical.

— MLB Fake Rumors (@MLBFakeRumors) February 9, 2012

As excellent as Cruz has been for the Rangers, putting up 10 WAR over the past three seasons, his injury history is far to extensive to ignore. Observe, from his SB Nation player page:

The Rangers clearly recognize Cruz as a good player and one who can be a cornerstone for their team in the short term. Even at 32, he’s primed to continue his solid play: ZiPS projects him for a .269/.327/.511 line. Justifiably, though, the Rangers are balking at any longer commitment. Cruz has simply been too brittle to commit to the player as a 34-year-old or beyond.