Andy Sonnanstine: trade bait, rotation candidate, bullpen filler, or AAA veteran?

I had sort of forgotten about Andy Sonnanstine, but the tweet reminded me what an interesting pitcher he is. Sonnanstine was worth over 3.5 wins for the Rays in 2008, but then things fell apart in 2009. Part of that was bad luck on his BABIP and HR/FB, but part of it was also based on his performance. Sonnanstine doesn’t strike out many batters or get that many ground balls, so he needs to have a great walk rate to succeed. That is what he did in 2008 — walking just 1.7 — but in 2009 it increased to 3.0, erasing much of his value.

The lack of walks was not from missing the strike zone — his pitches were in the zone just as much — but, rather, from batters swinging less often at his out-of-zone pitches and making more contact on out-of-zone swings. Here are those numbers by pitch type:

             o-swing        o-contact
           2008   2009     2008   2009
Fastball   0.23   0.23     0.83   0.80
Cutter     0.22   0.19     0.73   0.72
Slider     0.40   0.35     0.55   0.69
Curve      0.29   0.26     0.57   0.86

The rates on his fastball were essentially the same, but for his cutter, slider and curve the O-Swing rates were way down. This turned many more plate appearances into walks. Another big problem was that the O-Contact rate on his slider and curve were way up.

Interestingly Sonnanstine also threw his cutter much more often in 2009. According to my pitch classifications, it went from 28% of the time in 2008 to 44% in 2009. Mostly this change came at the expense of his fastball which went from 35% to 24%. It could be that hitters do better on the cutter after seeing it more often or because they are expecting it. But I do not see evidence for this on an at-bat level. That is there was no trend for batters to do any better on the second or third cutter they see in an at-bat than the first cutter they see in at-bats against Sonnanstine.

Getting back to Sky’s question, I think I would take a little from column a, a little from column b and a little from column c. That is start him off in the pen as a long reliever — since the Rays have five better starting options — but with the eye to trading him if anything of value comes along or moving him to the rotation if needed. He has a relatively small platoon split, doing fairly well against LHBs, so deploying him as a long reliever would be a nice way to leverage that talent. Also his very deep repertoire of pitches plays well as a long reliever where he might have to face batters multiple times. These skills also mean he might be better suited as a starter if he can get things back together, which might mean throwing his fastball a little more often.

I thought that it would be interesting to look at differentials in linear weight values between pitches for different hitters. I found some interesting stuff, but I want to avoid the illusion than pretend that I’ve “discovered” anything at this point, so I’ll begin with a post (or two) about an individual . In the spirit of Dave C.’s earlier “questions” posts, this is the beginning of a conversation (and I hope to get more in-depth later) rather than the conclusion of a study. For today, I want to talk about Jimmy Rollins‘ recent problems against the fastball against the backdrop of his continued success against changeups.

* If you haven’t already read Dave Allen’s clear and excellent explanation of how pitch type linear weights work, I strongly recommend that you do so.

While Rollins is still a good player overall, there’s not denying that 2009 was a down year offensively, as he put up a mere .316 wOBA after a very good .357 in 2008 and an excellent .378 in his 2007 MVP campaign. This is well known. There could be different reasons for it (which may all have roots in age-based decline), for example, bad luck on balls in play. But what also stands out are his pitch-type linear weight values against fastballs and changeups.*

* Those of you who dutifully read Dave’s article already know that the linear weights are by count, there is the chance, of course, that recently Rollins is only falling behind on fastballs then crushing them later, but that seems pretty unlikely, and for simplicity we’ll be ignoring that possibility for now.

Over the last three seasons (2007-2009), Rollins has been +6.3 against fastballs, and +22.8 against changeups during the same period. As one might expect, during that time his best season against fastballs was 2007, when he was +10.7. He was even better in 2006, at +20.4. However, he’s been in (apparent) decline against fastballs since 2006 and 2007, sporting a -1.8 in 2008 and a -2.7 in 2009. His rates per 100 fastballs bear out the decline as well: from 0.58 in 2007 to -0.12 to -0.17.

In contrast, Rollins continues to be consistently good against change-ups. While prior to 2007, his numbers against changeups where generally unimpressive, in 2007 he smashed them for +13.3, and while he hasn’t been as good (against much of anything) since then, while he numbers against fastballs dropped off, in 2008 he was still +4.5 (+1.29/100) against changeups, and in 2009 +5.0 (+1.36/100). More interestingly, of the good hitters I looked at (bad hitters are terrible against most everything), Rollins had one of the biggest “gaps” in his numbers between fastballs and changeups. I’m curious as to what this means.

Obviously, players typically lose ability as they age, but I’m curious if the linear weights tell us something specific about how that works for hitters. I apologize for ending with questions, but that’s better than presumptuous answers. I want to know if readers a) have any insight (even educated guesses) into what’s going on with Rollins in particular and/or b) want to see more stuff on this. Is Rollins “sitting changeup” more often as he gets older? Maybe, I don’t know for sure from the data I have. It would be easy to say he’s doing this because he’s aware that he’s “lost bat speed,” but to me, that is also a leap — “bat speed” is a useful scouting term, but it is too quick to infer anything about that that from the data I’m looking at. Perhaps an aging study can be done down the road using this or other data. I don’t know what this means right now, but I’m interested to see if we can find out.

Unfortunately, it goes south pretty quickly after that. The second most talented guy in the organization is probably Pedro Alvarez, and while I think he’s going to hit, there are enough questions about his defense, his conditioning, and his contact rates to have concerns. And, really, it’s hardly ever a good thing when your second franchise building block is ticketed for the minors. But that’s the state of the Pirates roster; it’s McCutchen and a bunch of role players.

There just aren’t that many good everyday players on this team. Maybe Jeff Clement figures out how to play first base and hits well enough to be a platoon first baseman, but he doesn’t have much star potential there. Maybe Andy LaRoche adds a bit more power and becomes more than just a solid third baseman, but he’s 26 and is running out of time for growth. Maybe Lastings Milledge or Jose Tabata translate their tools into production, but I wouldn’t count on it.

The Pirates decision to go for quantity over quality in most of their trades has left them with a lot of options, but few clear good ones. They’re going to need several of these guys to develop beyond expectations, or they’re going to have to keep making moves and hope to hit a home run on a couple of them. McCutchen and friends aren’t going to win in 2010, and unfortunately, there’s not enough quality around him to expect them to become contenders in the near future either.

That said, the Pirates are doing some things well. Neal Huntington is pushing the organization forward into thinking about things in new ways, they’re honest about their chances, and they aren’t wasting cash on superfluous veterans anymore. They’ve acquired enough useful pieces to avoid being terrible, and they’ve got some young talent in the farm system.

But, the common theme here at the bottom of this list is a small payroll team, a lack of a championship core, and not young talent to expect development into contenders in the next few years. McCutchen is great, but he’s not enough – Pittsburgh needs a few more guys like him before they can be taken too seriously.

Slowly and deliberately, the Pirates are building something. If you squint and project generously, there is quite the offensive core coming together. It starts with a pair of potential stars: Andrew McCutchen and Pedro Alvarez. You’ll see a lot of teams ahead of the Pirates on this list whose ranking is largely owed to the presence of a superstar. These two have that potential. McCutchen could push 4-5 wins above replacement this season, and really looks to be successful at every phase of the game.

Pedro won’t be that successful from a fielding perspective, and will have to be +25-35 with the bat to match McCutchen’s potential. I think we can certainly project the low end of that scale, making Pedro the Robin to McCutchen’s Batman. And as Dave mentioned in the Padres review yesterday, a good team needs a few superheroes.

Around them you’ll see a series of unexciting, but low-floored prospects that could contribute to a winner. Tony Sanchez, the team’s budget-conscious first-round pick last year, is a great example. The team believes he is a plus defensively to go along with a league-average hitter – that’s a 2-3 win player. Or how about Chase D’Arnaud? Here’s a guy that scouts are saying could be average defensively (+0), stick at shortstop (+7.5), live in the two hole (+20) and ride his patient approach to a ~.360 wOBA (+15). And you have Tabata, who is no longer a projectable middle of the order star, but a great contact hitter that could hit .300.

If you didn’t notice, that’s getting close to a full lineup of players: C Sanchez, 1B Jeff Clement, MI D’Arnaud, 3B Alvarez, LF Lastings Milledge, CF McCutchen, RF Tabata. I think it works, and it’s going to be under team control until 2015 or so.

But then you get to the pitching staff. and things aren’t so optimistic. The group that pitched in the Major Leagues last season is about replacement level. You might like Paul Maholm, or believe in the Ross Ohlendorf sinker, but generally, these aren’t the guys you win with. The first-round picks the team put together in the decade don’t really help. Dan Moskos has fallen off the radar, and while Brad Lincoln had an encouraging return from Tommy John surgery, his stuff no longer inspires faith below a 4.00 FIP.

You can feel the Pirates beginning to sense the discrepancy between the offense and pitching staff, as they spent seven figure bonuses on two players in last June’s draft: LHP Colton Cain and RHP Zack Van Rosenberg. Both are years away from the Major Leagues – their peaks should be after some of the hitters above have moved on – but it does show a recognition from the front office.

The Pirates drew some criticism last year for drafting Tony Sanchez, a low upside player, so high in the draft. But I think this front office knows its talent and understands what it needs. If ownership is patient with Huntington’s strategy, and McCutchen and Alvarez blossom as expected, the Pirates are ahead of the curve in competing once the aging St. Louis and Chicago rosters drop off. But they need pitching, and they need lots of it.

As a group, the Pirates’ position players project as around average, partly due to their smart strategy of buying low on former top prospects whose value has dropped for whatever reason. Homegrown center fielder Andrew McCutchen is the only player here that has real star potential; at only 23, he’s a very exciting young player who is good at the plate and in the field. The rest are much less impressive, but outside of the failed-former-prospect competition between Bobby Crosby and Ronny Cedeno at shortstop, there aren’t any gaping holes. Ryan Doumit is a poor defensive catcher, and his bat isn’t all that great, but that’s still good enough to be at least an average catcher. Second baseman Akinori Iwamura is virtually the definition of league average. Andy LaRoche isn’t the stud he looked like he might become as a prospect for the Dodgers, but he has an adequate bat and a decent glove at third base. In left field, former top Nationals/Mets prospect Lastings Milledge projects as about average, and at 25, he still has some upside (whatever that means). 2009 surprise Garrett Jones projects as around average in right, and reserve outfielders Ryan Church, Brandon Jones and Brandon Moss are quality role players. Former Seattle catching prospect Jeff Clement will start at first, and while his bat isn’t anything special there, if he really bombs, the Pirates can always move Jones back to first and put Church, B. Jones or Moss* in the outfield full-time without losing too much.

* I realize that one of B. Jones or Moss may not survive the roster crunch.

If the nonpitchers are average-ish, the pitching as a whole is… not. Paul Maholm is the only pitcher on staff who projects as clearly above average, and could help a lot of teams, but he’s certainly no ace. At 28, he’s probably as good as he’s going to get. Charlie Morton is a bit younger (26) and looks like a capable #3 starter, and 27-year-old lefty Zack Duke is about league average as well. Ross Ohlendorf, Jeff Karstens, Daniel McCutchen and the rest are back-of-the-rotation fodder who will feature all-too-prominently in 2010, and none of them are particularly young. As Bill Simmons might write, if Octavio Dotel is your best reliever, that means Octavio Dotel is your best reliever. The rest of the group isn’t sub-replacement level, but they’re pretty bad, and things could get ugly once Dotel (better suited to middle relief at this point) is traded.

In a strange way, the terrible bullpen is a sign of the front office’s smarts. Yes, it will be hard to watch, but the 2010 (and 2011) Pirates aren’t anywhere close to contention, and no amount of overspending on, say, Brandon Lyon or Jose Valverde would have changed that. A decent bullpen can be constructed much more quickly than a rotation or a group of position players. As for the former, each pitcher is going to be at least one rotation slot higher than they can handle; as for the latter, they should be a respectable group, with a one star-in-the-making, some former top prospects who could still surprise, and solid role players. A mid-70s win total isn’t out of the question, given the divisional opponents, and while that’s hardly something to get excited about, at least the Pirates haven’t compromised their future (by trading away prospects or signing onerous contracts) to attain sub-mediocrity.

There’s no chance that Toronto gets lucky enough to win the AL East this year. Everything could break exactly right, they could get a plethora of career years, and 3rd place is still their ceiling. That’s just life in the toughest division in baseball. And, unfortunately for them, that really hurts their chances of winning in the next few years, so they have to look towards the future.

There are reasons for optimism going forward. Snider and Lind can hit, and Aaron Hill is a good up the middle player in his prime. They’ve become a bullpen factory, spitting out good reliever after good reliever. And now, the rotation is full of upside, with interesting arms everywhere you look. As we talked about a few months ago, they also are going to have a ton of money to spend next winter, as nearly all of the role players are on expiring contracts, so Toronto will theoretically be able to go shopping for a new star hitter.

But, in the AL East, it just won’t be enough. They’re a long ways from catching Boston, New York, and Tampa Bay in terms of talent. They’ll never have the resources of the Red Sox or Yankees, and they’d have to seriously upgrade their process to catch Tampa in terms of running a team. They’re trying to catch a trio of sports cars while riding a bicycle. Even the Orioles have moved ahead of the Jays in the east, with a strong collection of young talent themselves. It’s just a monster of a division.

So, Toronto faces a rebuilding process with the knowledge that they have to do everything right. They have to draft well, hit on some good international free agents, make a few great trades, and have everyone stay healthy and mature at the same time. If that all happens, they’ll have a one or two year window to contend before their guys get too expensive and they have to start trading them away. It’s not fair, but it’s reality, and it’s why the Jays find themselves near the bottom of the pack – their odds of winning any time soon are just not good.

Dukes came over to Washington before the 2008 season and went gangbusters. He was worth nearly three wins in just over 300 PAs by hitting a 135 RC+ with good defense in right. But in 2009 everything fell apart: his walk numbers dipped (but were still good), his power fell off and his defense took a hit. As a result he played below replacement level.

At just 25, and with his minor league numbers and good 2008, it entirely possible that 2009 was just a hiccup and that Dukes could be on his way to a solid career as a Major League outfielder. So it is surprising that the Nationals, who are definitely not in win-it-now mode, do not take more of a chance on Dukes. Plus in spite of his poor 2009 and history of off-the-field problems Dukes would seem have at least some trade value, but Ben Goessling tweeted that Rizzo could not find any takers on for a potential Dukes trade.

The release is another twist in the career of a guy who has worlds of ability, and lately, at least, had seemed to be keeping himself out of trouble. Still he will most likely not be out of a job for long as his youth, cheapness and potential are just too much to be passed up all 29 other teams.

Over the years, though, all of those strengths slowly faded away as the club’s fan base, revenue and budget eroded. Gaston was re-signed as the club’s manager during the 2008 season and this year will mark his last as manager (He’s shifting to consultant beginning in 2011). The 2010 season marks a new direction for the club with a new sheriff in town: Alex Anthopoulos, a young inexperienced GM who has sharpened his skills through years of front office experience. He was able to receive good value for Halladay despite the fact that everyone knew the pitcher had to be traded. Anthopoulos has made changes on the farm and, most importantly, in the scouting departments. The organization went from having one of the smallest scouting departments to one of the biggest in the game.

Ownership has openly committed to spending money if the front office can justify the move, as seen by the recent (rumored, but officially unconfirmed) signing of unproven Cuban prospect Adeinis Hechavarria for about $10 million. The club also made a hard push for another Cuban, left-handed starter Aroldis Chapman, who ultimately signed with Cincinnati for mega-bucks.

Toronto will enter the 2010 amateur draft with the 11th overall pick and something to prove after blowing three of its four top picks in 2009, which may have been one of the last straws that broke the former GM’s back. The organization also has nine picks in the first three rounds of the 2010 draft, so it has a real chance to improve the talent and depth in the system. With that said, the club had a similar draft bonanza in ‘07 and those prospects haven’t developed quite as well as the organization had hoped. The club also has its back up against the wall with a couple of the picks (those received for failing to sign ‘09 draft picks James Paxton, Jake Eliopoulos, and Jake Barrett). The representatives for the players chosen in those slots will know that the club has to sign the picks this season or they will lose those compensation picks for 2011.

Although the ‘10 club clearly cannot compete with the likes of Boston, New York, and Tampa Bay, there are building blocks in place that give Canadian fans a hope for the (near-ish) future. Outfielders Adam Lind (26) and Travis Snider (22) could form the middle of the order for years to come. Aaron Hill, soon-to-be-28, could have more valuable as a trading chip than as the club’s second baseman over the next five to seven years, especially if he proves his power outburst in ‘09 was no fluke. In the high minors, the club also has some interesting names in first baseman Brett Wallace (acquired in the Roy Halladay fallout), catcher J.P. Arencibia, second baseman Brad Emaus, and outfielder Moises Sierra. A few disappointing drafts have left the low minors barren, save for a few names like catcher Carlos Perez and shortstop Tyler Pastornicky.

On the mound, the club has a lot of potential but few proven, young pitchers. Ricky Romero enters 2010 as the No. 1 guy in the rotation, but he’s only in his second season in the Majors. Other names to keep in mind are Brandon Morrow (obtained from Seattle this past off-season), Marc Rzepczynski, and Brett Cecil. The club could also see contributions from rookies Kyle Drabek (another part of the Halladay loot), Zach Stewart, and Brad Mills. Henderson Alvarez may have the highest ceiling, but he’ll spend a good portion of 2010 in high-A ball. The club also likes what its seen from ‘09 No. 1 draft pick Chad Jenkins, who should join Alvarez in Dunedin. Right-hander Danny Farquhar could help out in the bullpen by mid-season.

The good news is that the club has a lot of flexibility when it comes time to work these young (inexpensive) players into the lineup. The only bad long-term contract on the team is for Vernon Wells. Hill has a very affordable contract that could make him extremely attractive on the trade market. It’s going to be a bumpy ride for the next new years, and a lot of patience will be needed, but the final destination looks promising.

One key departure, of course, offsets this pitching gain. When the Blue Jays traded Roy Halladay they essentially signaled their 2010 surrender. This could not have been an easy decision. Halladay had been with the Jays his entire career and was, by no slim margin, the team’s most popular player. Even with him the Jays stood little chance against the Rays-Yanks-Sox triumvirate. Without him those chances diminish to near nonexistence.

Surprisingly, though, the Jays staff might not be much worse than in 2009. Again, injuries forced a number of young players and even a reliever into the rotation. Chances are they won’t need Brian Tallet, a career reliever, in the rotation again this season. They could also see progress from Ricky Romero, Brett Cecil, and Marc Rzepczynski, three rookies who made 57 starts last season and who could make many more in 2010. Add in the returns of Marcum and McGowan to start the season and Litsch around the All-Star break, plus the addition of Brandon Morrow, and the staff could perhaps reproduce its 4.47 ERA from 2009.

Still, a 4.47 staff ERA without a powerhouse offense won’t cut it in the AL East. This mark also assumes a steady performance from the bullpen, which has lost one of its top contributors, Brandon League. The team does appear to have many options for the pen, though, and could piece together a successful unit. Pitchers who don’t break camp in the rotation — McGowan, Brad Mills, and Robert Ray among them — could pitch out of the pen, giving the Jay options.

While the Jays pitching staff took a turn for the worse in 2009, its offense moved in the opposite direction. In 2007 and 2008 their offense ranked below league average. Yet in 2009 the unit ranked sixth in the AL, a tenth of a run per game behind the Rays. Unfortunately, many of their top contributors will play elsewhere in 2010, most notably Scott Rolen and Marco Scutaro. Furthermore, they likely won’t see such an impressive season from Aaron Hill this year, who hit 36 home runs in 2009. None of the popular projection systems has him at even 25.

Three players will prove the keys to the Jays’ 2010 offense: Adam Lind, Vernon Wells, and Travis Snider. Lind, once a highly touted prospect who spent 2007 and 2008 splitting time between AAA and the majors, broke out in 2009, posting a .394 wOBA. His defense cost him in WAR, just 3.7, and he’ll probably spend most of his time at DH in 2010. Snider broke camp with the big league club last year, but after producing a paltry .288 wOBA through May 20 he headed back to AAA. His return in mid-August went a bit better, but the Blue Jays expect much more from their 2006 first round pick.

Wells plays the part of wild card. After signing a seven-year, $126 million contract after the 2006 season, Wells has produced just 2.1 WAR in the following three seasons. This includes his -0.1 WAR from 2009 which is due not only to his .314 wOBA, but also to his -18.2 UZR. After posting positive UZR figures from 2004 through 2006, Wells has been in the negatives the past three seasons, and in the double-digit negatives in the past two. He hit well in 2008 and has a generally positive track record, leaving the Jays with hope for 2010 and beyond. As we’ve seen over the past three seasons, though, it would be a mistake to rely on his production.

The Blue Jays do have a number of talented players on their roster, and in any other division they might have dark-horse potential. Given their spot in the AL East, though, it appears Jays fans will have to wait until next year — and maybe even the year after. But with four top-100 prospects and four of the top 41 picks in the 2010 draft, they could make their run yet. Just not this year.

With 72 HR and 199 RBI in the last two seasons for Reynolds, a comparison to Dan Uggla seems apt. Uggla will earn $7.8 million this season on top of a $5.35 million reward in his first arbitration season, with his $13.15 total falling just short of Reynolds’ new deal. In the context of actual arbitration rewards, this contract appears to be fair for both sides.

When it comes to judging players on HR and RBI, as the arbitrators tend to do, the club is often going to lose on players like Reynolds. The Diamondbacks appear to be acknowledging that with this contract, as Reynolds is receiving $14 million for the equivalent of exactly one free agent season in the final two seasons of the deal. Reynolds is a fine player, as he showed last year with a 4 win performance, but with the downturn in the market, it’s unlikely that he is worth that much money.

CHONE, Marcel, and the fans all project a dip in home runs for Reynolds, backed by likely regression from a ridiculous 26% HR/FB rate in 2009. Without these home runs, Reynolds is a good-but-not-great hitter – his projected .363 wOBA is in line with last year’s performance by Paul Konerko. His fielding has now been below average for three straight seasons. This is not to say that he’s not valuable – almost every team could use a 27 year old 3B with a 3.0 WAR skillset. That doesn’t mean, however, that the market will be kind to the club holding his rights. Indeed, it seems like the Diamondbacks were forced to pay $14M for what is projected to be around $10.5M of arbitration market value.

Despite the negativity above, this contract certainly beats having to pay market value for Reynolds’ production for Arizona, and it was inevitable that Reynolds would receive a high contract relative to his production. Josh Byrnes may be trying to take advantage of the lull in the market for player contracts and attempting to squeeze all the production out of the current low value of wins while he can. If the market picks up in future seasons, as I expect it will, this contract could pay dividends to Arizona in a couple of years.